(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
I I
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
01 July 1986
China: More Receptive to a USN Ship Visit
SUMMARY
l :Z" y f 3 C
In our judgment, a number of developments since last year have
improved the atmosphere for finessing the nuclear issue that scuttled last
year's negotiations on a USN port call to Shanghai: US-China military
cooperation continues to develop; Beijing has grown impatient with
Gorbachev's "smile" diplomacy; Deng and the reform leadership are no
longer on the defensive the way they were a year ago; and the Chinese
have hosted an increasing number of visits by other Western navies since
last spring. We believe, however, that negotiations are unlikely to be easy.
Chinese sensitivity to real or apparent infringements on their national
sovereignty could still prove to be a major stumbling block. Moreover,
Beijing may balk at adjusting the UK formula, especially at a time of
increased tension over US defense ties to Taiwan.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 01 July 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Foreign Affairs, China Division,
OEA,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
We believe China seeks three objectives in its military relations with the United
States:
? To expand its access to advanced US military technology
? To exert leverage with Moscow by fostering the appearance of limited military
cooperation with the United States
? To learn more about the concepts of modern war through working level contacts
with US military personnel.
Some within the Chinese leadership such as Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Aiping
may see hosting a US ship visit as helping to promote these objectives. The Chinese
military, in particular, recognizes that access to Western military technology in general
depends on fostering good bilateral ties with the United States, including between our
military forces. In addition, we believe Beijing sees a USN port call as creating doubts
in Moscow about the extent of US support if the Soviets threatened to apply military
The Chinese are achieving much of what they want without a US ship visit,
however, and will continue to unless the United States makes a port call a litmus test.
Beijing has had considerable success in acquiring Western military technology over the
past year In recent months, moreover, the United States has
agreed to sell China artillery plant upgrades and 55 avionics packages for F-8 fighter
aircraft. Complementing these anticipated transfers have been Chief of Naval Operations
Watkins' April trip to China and PLA Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi's visit to the United States
in May.
Foreign Ship Visits: Room for One More. To avoid overdependence on US
military ties and technology and to deflect conservative criticism at home that the PLA
is moving too far, too fast with the United States, Beijing also has increased its military
contacts with other Western powers This year, the Chinese have already
hosted naval visits by Dutch, Swedish, and Italian ships. And British and Australian ships
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
In our view, these visits facilitate a USN ship visit by making it appear to be
merely one in a series of "friendly" visits by foreign navies. Characterizing it in this
way, Beijing could mollify domestic conservatives and deflect Soviet criticism somewhat
while still demonstrating goodwill toward the United States.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
Sino-Soviet Relations Static. We believe the state of Sino-Soviet relations
enhances the prospects for a US ship visit. Unlike last year, Beijing sees no opportunity
for improvement in its political relations with Moscow, and indeed has tired of what it
has termed Gorbachev's "smile diplomacy." Over the past few months the Chinese have
resumed their sharp criticism of Soviet policies while continuing to improve bilateral
economic ties. Although China last year was concerned about the impact of a port call
on chances for gains with the Soviet Union, now Beijing is more concerned about
keeping Moscow from using growing Sino-Soviet economic contacts as a lever with
Washington. It is highly conceivable to us, as well, that China would want to balance a
high level Soviet visit--a Soviet first deputy premier reportedly is scheduled this
fall--with a USN ship visit or other such visible sign of growing military ties with the
Calmer Waters at Home. The domestic atmosphere in China also appears to be
more propitious for a USN ship visit now than it was last year. The conservatives,
1985: Running Aground on the Nuclear Shoal
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang asserted at a
press conference on 10 April 1985 that the United States had assured China that
no nuclear-capable vessels would be involved in a proposed USN ship visit to
China. By putting Beijing on record as claiming that the United States had
compromised its longstanding policy of neither confirming nor denying ("NCND")
the nuclear capability of USN vessels, Hu put the United States in the position
of having to suspend negotiations with China to maintain credibility with US
Hu's motivations for making this assertion are not fully clear. It is
possible he misspoke on the record, but we cannot rule out he knew exactly
what he was doing. In any case, the fact that ship visit talks lingered on until
the following month suggests that the Chinese leadership had not made a final
decision on the matter at the time of Hu's press conference. Circumstantial
evidence and press reporting suggests that the ship visit became entangled
with other issues, including fighting over personnel changes at the September
party meeting, how to respond to Gorbachev's call for better relations, and
Chinese concern about increased military cooperation between Moscow and
Pyongyang. We believe that in the end Deng came down on Hu's side both to
demonstrate confidence in his anointed party heir and as a concession to
conservative critics of reform who also were arguing for greater flexibility
who we believe were pressing hardest for greater balance in Chinese foreign policy,
suffered a political defeat at the September party meetings and have been relatively
quiet in 1986. We are less certain about the state of play within the Chinese
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
bureaucracy, which split over the handling of the USN ship visit. Both the Ministry of
National Defense and the Navy--which want greater access to Western technology and 25X1
Western military doctrine--strongly favored the visit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
When taken together with Beijing's more sober view of Gorbachev and the fact
that Beijing has already reached an agreement with the British navy, we judge Deng's
renewed political strength should make China more receptive to a USN ship visit
Two considerations temper our optimism, however. We do not dismiss the
Chinese leadership's deep sensitivity to perceived slights to China's sovereign rights and
dignity, especially on an issue such as determining what weapons a foreign ship can
bring into China. We believe Beijing will press for, and may insist on, face-saving
conditions on the nuclear capability issue that Washington would find unacceptable.
Historical memories of Western gunboats plying China's rivers and patrolling the Chinese
The UK formula-- an expression of "awareness" of China's policy on foreign
nuclear-capable ships--could also complicate possible efforts by Deng to finesse the
issue with the United States. Having already agreed to what they probably consider to
be a compromise with London, Chinese leaders could balk at making further concessions
to accommodate Washington, calculating that differences over this issue are highly
unlikely to jeopardize other elements of US-China military relations. In fact, some within
the Chinese leadership could point to US willingness to go ahead with recent arms sales
to make a case for not going beyond the British formula.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
Central Intelligence Agency
2 - C/OEA/CH, Room 4G32
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOR, Room 4G32
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV, Room 4G32
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEF, Room 4G32
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM, ROOM 4G32
1 - OEA/Production Officer, Room 4G48
1 - D/OEA, Room 41718
1 - DDI, Room 7E44
Others
1 - LCDR Robert W. Maggi, OPS-612, Room 4E475, Pentagon
1 - DIA DB-2B2, Room C2-814, DIAC
1 - Karen Stelberg, Chief, NOIC/04, Room 1650, Suitland
1 - Chief, B72, Room 25040, NSA
Department of State
1 - James Lilley, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 6208,
1 - Richard Williams, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs,
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 4318
1 - Robert Drexler, Director, Office of Regional Affairs,
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 4310
1 - Louis G. Sarris, Director, Office of Analysis for East
Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence, and
Research, Room 8840
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4
1 - Mark S. Pratt, Director, EA/RA/Taiwan Coordination,
Room 5206
1 - Douglas Paal, S/P, Room 7330
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/17: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301290001-4