CHINA'S NEW WESTERNIZED F-8 FIGHTER: US ROLE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL AIR BALANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of .
Intelligence
_
China's New Westernized
F-8 Fighter: US Role
and Implications for
Regional Air Balance
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
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EA 86-10046X
SW 86-10059X
December 1986
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Reverse Blank
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
China's New Westernized
F-8 Fighter: US Role
and Implications for
Regional Air Balance
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
of East Asian Analysis, and
Office
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Office of Scientific
and Weapons Research. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, China
Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 86-10046X
SW 86-10059X
December 1986
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 3 November 1986
was used in this report.
'
China's New Westernized
F-8 Fighter: US Role
and Implications for
Regional Air Balance
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China's military leaders have recognized for some time that their lack of a
modern all-weather, day/night fighter-interceptor has left China without
an effective deterrent to the increasingly sophisticated Soviet air forces in
the Far East. In an attempt to meet this Soviet air challenge?or at least
not fall too much further behind over the next decade?Beijing has decided
me F-8 Finback fighter,
The Chinese plan to convert this 1960s-
vintage daytime fighter into a modern, long-range, high- and low-altitude
interceptor, designated the F-8-2. Two versions of the F-8-2 are under
development, one with advanced Western technology and the other with
domestically built radars, missiles, and engines:
? For the Western version, China on 30 October 1986 signed a Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) purchase agreement for a US-integrated avionics
system and has signed a tentative contract?pending COCOM approv-
al?for an Italian radar-guided, air-to-air missile, the Aspide. The
Chinese have also expressed interest in US- or Israeli-produced engines.
? The domestic F-8-2 may eventually carry a new Chinese radar
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By the mid-1990s, Beijing should have at least 50 F-8-2 long-range
interceptors far superior to anything in its present inventory. The all-
weather "Westernized F-8-2," for example, will be able to distinguish low-
flying bombers from ground clutter and destroy these targets, and should
be able to destroy aircraft coming head-on up to 46 kilometers away.
Current Chinese aircraft, by contrast, have a maximum missile-firing
range of only 15 kilometers, can engage targets only from behind, and are
limited to clear weather. 25X1
The F-8-2 also will have the potential to operate as a multimission fighter
with credible ground attack/strike capability. By relatively simple modifi-
cations to the US fire-control system and the fitting of a laser designator,
the F-8-2 could be armed with antiradiation missiles to destroy defending
ground radars, incapacitating surface-to-air missile batteries.
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We judge that the F-8-2 is more likely to affect the air balance between
China and Vietnam than that between China and the Soviet Union or
Taiwan:
? US avionics and Aspide missiles would make the fighter superior to the
Soviet MIG-23 Flogger. But the F-8-2 will be no match for the advanced
MIG-29s and SU-27s that will become the mainstays of Soviet airpower
in the Far East by the time F-8-2s are deployed in numbers in the 1990s.
? We believe Beijing already has the ability to gain command of the air
over Taiwan because its Air Force greatly outnumbers Taiwan's. The
F-8-2s would erode the qualitative advantage of Taiwan's F-5E fighters,
but Taipei's planned Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) would offset
many of these gains.
? Vietnam in the mid-1990s might face a force of Chinese F-8-2s that are
more advanced than its own fighters and a Chinese Air Force more
prepared than today's for deep strikes into Vietnam. The shape of the
Sino-Vietnamese air balance, therefore, is likely to depend heavily on the
Soviet Union's willingness to provide Hanoi with a more modern fighter
than its current MIG-21s and with more sophisticated ground-based air
defense systems.
Although the Chinese have signed a letter of agreement for the US
avionics package, we believe tough negotiations lie ahead. The Chinese, in
our judgment, will again press for the transfer of technology in addition to
the purchase of 55 radar packages. They also will seek the production
technology for the avionics and missiles necessary for an air-to-ground-
attack capability.
The technology transfer issue notwithstanding, Beijing is pleased with the
avionics program, but is concerned that Washington might use the F-8
program to justify new arms sales to Taiwan. Taipei, for its part, will
almost certainly push more vigorously for the Patriot air defense system,
advanced air-to-air missiles, and F-16 or F-20 fighters.
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Reverse Blank
.a
We believe the sale of the avionics packages to Beijing will serve as a model
for future FMS sales, such as a Mark 46 torpedo coproduction agreement,
and will increase US influence with the Chinese military. Indeed, Military
Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping has already signaled Beijing's
interest in an even wider arms technology relationship by asking about the
possibility of US military credits or commercial assistance for weapon
purchases during Secretary Weinberger's visit to Beijing in October 1986.
Moreover, the United States will gain its first real access to China's
defense plants and operational air units through the Defense Department
officials and contractors on hand to install the avionics packages and
provide maintenance training.
V Secret
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Contents
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Page
Key Judgments
111
F-8-1: A Problem Aircraft
1
Revamping the F-8
3
Seeking Foreign Assistance
4
The Domestic Upgrades
6
Why Modernize the F-8?
6
The F-8 and Regional Air Balance
9
The Sino-Soviet Border
9
The Taiwan Strait Balance
11
Implications for Vietnam
13
A New Entry in China's Arms Export Catalogue
13
Implications for the United States
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China's New Westernized
F-8 Fighter: US Role
and Implications for
Regional Air Balance
F-8-1: A Problem Aircraft
Beijing's attempts over the past three decades to build
a twin-engined, high-altitude, high-speed intercep-
tor?without foreign assistance?have largely failed.
The Chinese began work on the F-8 Finback, which is
similar to the 1961 Flipper?a Mikoyan design that
Moscow never put into production?in the mid-1960s
soon after the Sino-Soviet split. The first F-8
in the early
1970s, but even at that time-
China's senior leaders were skeptical that the aircraft
industry was capable of building a modern fighter.
In fact, unsatisfactory performance prevented even
the prototype of this aircraft from entering service
with the Chinese Air Force until 1982, almost two
decades after the project began. The Chinese have
produced only 73 of the F-8-1 aircraft at the Shen-
yang aircraft plant
We believe these were only
intended to familiarize the Air Force and Naval Air
Force with the aircraft
1
Figure 2
China's Fighter Interceptors, 1986
Number of aircraft
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3,500
3,000
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2,500
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2,000
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1,500
1,000
500
F-5/MIG-17 F-6/MIG-19 F-7/MIG-21
Fresco Farmer Fishbed
1
F-8-1
Finback 25)(1
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Problems cited by the Chinese with the F-8- is include
faulty avionics, poor radars, underpowered and short-
lived engines, and outdated weapon systems:
? The aircraft has no inertial navigation system, no
head-up display, and range-only radar based on a
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Figure 3
F-8-1 Fighter With WP-7 Engines and Nose Air Intake
Soviet system of the late 1950s that searches only to
approximately 10 kilometers.
? The F-8-1's engine?the Wopen-7A (WP-7A),
which is based on the Soviet-designed R11F engine
of the early 1960s?must be overhauled after the
first 300 hours of operation and discarded after
another 300 hours,
? The F-8-1, with the low thrust-to-weight WP-7A, is
markedly underpowered compared with the latest
US and Soviet fighters and, therefore, is significant-
ly less maneuverable.
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? The F-8-1 is armed with the unsophisticated and
short-range PL-2 infrared-guided air-to-air missile,
which can only be fired from behind the enemy
aircraft at ranges less than 7 kilometers in clear
weather.
If the Chinese are to develop a credible air defense
against the Soviet bomber force, Beijing needs all-
weather, day/night fighter-interceptors with look-
down/shootdown capability. But China's air defense
inventory is largely composed of F-5 (MIG-17) Fres-
co, F-6 (MIG-19) Farmer, and F-7 (MIG-21) Fishbed
daylight, clear-weather fighters incapable of meeting
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Figure 4
The F-8-2 With Type 204 Radar, WP-13 Engines, and Side Air Intakes
the modern bomber threat.' With its flaws, the F-8-1
is simply another clear-weather fighter in which the
pilot must acquire targets visually. The deployment of
radars with terrain-clearance features 2 gives today's
Soviet bombers the ability to penetrate at low alti-
tudes and high speeds, allowing them to avoid detec-
tion and interception by high-flying F-8-1 s with ra-
dars unable to distinguish low-flying targets from
ground clutter.
A terrain-clearance radar mode provides information to the pilot
enabling him to maneuver around topographical obstructions in his
flight path
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Revamping the F-8
The Chinese, recognizing that the utility of the F-8 in
its present configuration is low, are on a two-tracked
course of domestic and foreign upgrades to make the
F-8 an all-weather, day/night interceptor. To allow
the fitting of the larger, more sophisticated air-
intercept radars?crucial to lookdown/shootdown ca-
pability?and all-weather electronics systems, Chi-
nese engineers have enclosed the aircraft's nose and
added side air intakes.
five proto-
types of the new F-8, designated the F-8-2 by the
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Chinese, have been built for flight-testing while Beij-
ing negotiates for Western add-ons and designs new
indigenous components.
Seeking Foreign Assistance
Cognizant that its defense industries were sorely
deficient, the Chinese Air Force in early 1984 sought
US assistance, primarily to improve the avionics on
the F-8. After extended negotiations, the Chinese on
30 October 1986 signed a contract for 55 US integrat-
ed avionics system kits-50 for installation in the
F-8-2s and five for spare parts?for approximately
$500 million under a Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
agreement. Under the proposed terms, the US avion-
ics package will provide the Chinese markedly en-
hanced capabilities:
? The US pulsed Doppler radar will enable the F-8-2
to detect a target up to 65 kilometers away and
track it up to 46 kilometers away?doubling the
capabilities of China's best current radar, the Type
204.
? The radar also will give the Chinese their first all-
aspect attack capability against low-flying targets.
The radar in its lookdown mode can differentiate
targets from ground clutter 37 kilometers away.
? And the head-up display, fire-control computer, and
inertial navigation system are all new capabilities
not found on the F-8-1.
If installation of the avionics packages goes as sched-
uled, the first F-8-2s with the US upgrade should be
ready to fly in the early 1990s.
The other critical improvement Beijing is seeking
from the West is a beyond-visual-range air-to-air
missile.
in three stages: initial purchase of
seven missiles for compatibility testing, outright pur-
chase of 1,500 more missiles, and eventual acquisition
of production technology.
China, however, is still
Secret
awaiting approval of the purchase by the Coordinat-
ing Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM). Japan has not cast its vote on the pur-
chase, citing fears that China could gain a power
projection capability with the acquisition of beyond-
visual-range missiles.
The Aspide is a potent all-aspect, all-weather missile
capable of destroying aircraft flying at high altitude
or at very low altitude. Essentially an Italian version
of the US-built AIM-7M Sparrow, Aspide provides a
maximum head-on range of 57 kilometers and if
mated to the US radar would be able to hit targets up
to 46 kilometers away. China's infrared- and radar-
guided missiles are estimated to have ranges up to 15
kilometers. They are, therefore, limited to close-in
combat engagements, where the F-8's lack of maneu-
verability?compared with current state-of-the-art
fighters?makes it extremely vulnerable to the most
modern Soviet fighters.'
To power the F-8-2, China has expressed interest in
the GE-404 engine. An F-8 using the GE-404 would
have a significantly higher thrust-to-weight (T/W)
ratio than an F-8 with WP-7A engines-1.2 for the
GE-404 versus 1.0 for the WP-7A. The increased
T/W would give the aircraft greater sustained turn
performance, an improved rate of climb, and better
acceleration?all valuable in air combat maneuver-
ing. China initiated discussions two years ago with
General Electric officials,
but may try to acquire the
US engine through the Pakistani back door.
and refit them with
GE-404 engines. Beijing may hope that US-sanc-
tioned Chinese involvement?by the building of the
The Chinese will probably arm the F-8-2 with short-range Israeli
Python 3 IR-guided missiles, in addition to Aspide missiles, because
fighters in a squadron often carry a mix of weapons.
The all-aspect Python 3?desig-
nated the PL-8 in China?has a 15-kilometer range and has
performance characteristics similar to those of the US AIM-9L
Sidewinder missile.
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F-7M airframes with GE-404 engine mounts?will
lead to a relaxation of US control on the technology.
Alternately, Beijing may believe, on the basis of its
close military ties, that Islamabad will illicitly pass
the GE-404 to China as it has done with French
antiship and air-to-air missiles.
China has also looked at the Pratt & Whitney 1117, a
lower thrust derivative of the F-100, and the Israeli-
produced J79-GE-17 to power the F-8-2. For reasons
of power and compatibility, however, we believe the
GE-404 is Beijing's first choice. The GE-404 is lighter
and, although its smaller size would necessitate some
modifications to the inlet and nozzle ducts on the
aircraft, it would fit better in the F-8-2 airframe than
either the PW-1117 or J79-GE-17 engine. Moreover,
the fuel consumption of the GE-404 is significantly
lower than that of the older J79. Although the J79
engine has performed well on the Kfir fighter and
Israel has become an important source of military
equipment for China in recent years, Beijing would
probably prefer the newer GE-404 engine.
The Domestic Upgrades
Although Beijing appears committed to US and Ital-
ian upgrades to the F-8 aircraft, the Chinese have by
no means given up on indigenous programs to improve
the fighter. The proposed US sale of avionics pack-
ages contains no provision for China's acquisition of
the production technology. Thus, Beijing is faced with
the prospect of continuing to buy the expensive radars
outright or develop a pulsed Doppler radar of its own.
According to a brochure acquired at the Farnborough
Air Show in early September and published by
China's aircraft industry, China has developed a new
radar, designated the JL-7, which is fairly sophisti-
cated. Although probably lacking a lookdown/shoot-
down capability, the radar reportedly can detect a
target 29 kilometers away and track it up to 16
kilometers away.
The Chinese could use this radar with the Aspide
missile, giving them a beyond-visual-range capability
on the "non-Americanized" F-8-2s, but only if the
missile was modified to operate on the radar's fre-
quency.
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China may also choose to power at least some of its
F-8-2s with WP-13 engines,
The WP-13, however, is essential-
ly Soviet technology of the 1960s.
Why Modernize the F-8?
Despite its flaws, the F-8 fighter interceptor is Bei-
jing's only option if it wishes to deploy an indigenous
fighter with an all-weather capability, beyond-visual-
range missiles, and a lookdown/shootdown capability
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Figure 5
F-8 Finback and F-7 Fishbed Size Comparison
Operational Maximum Guns
Radius a Speed
Missiles Radar
F-8-2
Finback B
800-900 km Mach 2.2 2 23-mm cannons 4 infrared guided Search and
or semiactive track
radar guided
F-8-1
Finback A
850 km Mach 2.3 2 30-mm cannons 4 infrared guided Range only
F-7
Fishbed C
690 km Mach 2.0 2 30-mm cannons 2 infrared guided Range only
The radius given is for a mission flown mostly at high altitudes at subsonic speeds.
before the mid-1990s. China's F-7 fighter?although
a good clear-weather, short-range fighter?in its pre-
sent configuration cannot carry the large nose radar
needed to guide medium-range radar-guided missiles
to target.
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Thus, Beijing views the F-8-2 as China's
primary long-range, high- and low-altitude fighter
interceptor for the next decade.
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Why Is China Not Buying a Foreign Fighter?
Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang publicly stated
in August 1982 that China was ready to buy and
coproduce French Mirage fighters, but no contract
was signed.
We believe that, because an imminent threat is not
perceived, and because of national pride and cost,
Chinese purchase of a foreign fighter such as the
Mirage 2000 is unlikely. A widely publicized Mili-
tary Commission meeting in May 1985 codified the
strategic judgment that China has a "window of
security" until the end of this century to revamp its
military forces before a major Soviet invasion is even
a possibility. Moreover, Beijing's stated goal is self-
sufficiency in weapons development and production,
and the Chinese are wary, once again, of depending on
a foreign country?as they did with the Soviets in the
1950s?for defense modernization. In addition, Bei-
jing holds insufficient foreign exchange to finance the
bulk purchase of aircraft and prefers either limited
imports or technological cooperation to enhance its
indigenous systems.
Moreover, the F-8-2 has the potential to operate not
only as a fighter-interceptor, but also as a multimis-
sion fighter with significant ground attack/strike
capability. The proposed US radar has a ground-
mapping mode, allowing for imprecise navigation and
target recognition?with a third of the resolution
available with state-of-the-art US radars?and an air-
to-ground ranging mode that will provide range infor-
mation for weapon launches. With relatively simple
modifications to the US fire-control system and the
addition of a laser designator for target illumination,
the Chinese F-8-2 could, for example, be armed with
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Table 3
The Soviet Air Threat Along
China's Border a
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1986
1995 Projections
Fighters and interceptors
Fiddler (TU-28P)
50
0
Fishbed (MIG-21)
90
0
Flagon (SU-15)
140
0
Flanker (SU-27)
20
260
Flogger (MIG-23)
390
240
Foxbat (MIG-25)
30
0
Foxhound (MIG-31)
40
150
Fulcrum (MIG-29)
0
240
Bombers and fighter-bombers
Backfire (TU-22M)
40
60
Badger (TU-16)
50
0
Bear (TU-95)
50
10
Blackjack (TU-160)
0
30
Fencer (SU-24)
240
260
Fishbed (MIG-21)
50
0
Fitter (SU-17)
230
50
Flogger (MIG-23/27)
170
230
Forger
0
20
Frogfoot (SU-25)
10
160
Fulcrum (MIG-29)
0
160
New light bomber
10
Attack helicopters
Havoc (MI-28)
0
60
Hind (MI-24)
350
500
Hokum
0
40
a These figures include Soviet Air Force and Air Defense aircraft
deployed along China's border, but not Soviet Naval Aviation
aircraft for which 1995 projections are not available. In the Pacific
Fleet Air Force there are currently 50 fighters, 50 heavy bombers,
190 medium bombers, and 40 fighter-bombers. The projections are
based on anticipated production and previous deployment patterns
of new systems. All figures are rounded to the nearest 10.
the French AS.30 TASM missile and ARMAT anti-
radiation missile:
? The laser designated AS.30 TASM is a relatively
short-range missile?approximately 15 kilome-
ters?used to attack point surface targets, such as
bunkers, bridges, and ships.
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Figure 6
The F-8-2 Will Give the Chinese Air Force Its First Credible Capability
To Interdict the TU-22M Backfire Bomber
TU-22M Backfire bomber.
? The ARMAT is a medium-range missile?approxi-
mately 30 to 50 kilometers?used to destroy defend-
ing ground radars to incapacitate surface-to-air
missile batteries.
Both systems are exported by France, but we have no
evidence of any serious attempt by Beijing to acquire
them. Nonetheless, according to US military officers
involved in negotiations with the Chinese, Beijing is
expressing a strong interest in turning the F-8-2 into a
multimission fighter with this kind of sophisticated
ground attack capability.
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The F-8 and Regional Air Balance
The Sino-Soviet Border
When Beijing begins fielding F-8-2s in the early
1990s, the Chinese Air Force will have its first
credible capability to interdict Soviet medium and
light bombers attacking China. Soviet TU-16 Badger
and TU-22M Backfire medium bombers, as well as
SU-24 Fencer light bombers, already are deployed in
East Asia. We expect that by the early 1990s the
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Figure 7
Soviet SU-27 Flankers, Armed With AA-10
Missiles, Initially Deployed in 1985
Soviets will also deploy in East Asia TU-160 Black-
jack bombers, capable of carrying nuclear-armed
long-range cruise missiles.
The F-8-2s, however, will not substantially alter the
overall air balance because the Soviet Union will
maintain its marked qualitative edge in fighter air-
craft by deploying more of its new fourth-generation
fighters?MIG-31 Foxhound, SU-27 Flanker, and
MIG-29 Fulcrum?in East Asia. An F-8-2 equipped
with US avionics and a beyond-visual-range missile
like the Aspide surpasses the performance capabilities
of the Soviet second-generation MIG-21 Fishbed and
approaches those of the third-generation MIG-23
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Flogger. However, the new F-8-2 will not be a match
for the Foxhound?in East Asia since 1983?and the
Flanker?initially deployed to East Asia in 1985?or
the Fulcrum?expected in East Asia in the 1990s.
The Chinese fighter's avionics will not give it the
multiple-target or track-while-scan capabilities that
the Soviets are developing for their advanced aircraft.
With a multiple-target capability, the Soviets would
be able to track more than one enemy aircraft at a
time. The Flanker and Fulcrum fighters will also be
far more maneuverable than the F-8-2. We believe,
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Figure 8
The Soviet MIG-29 Fulcrum Is Expected in Far East in the 1990s
therefore, that Beijing must field large numbers of F-
8-2s?as well as modern ground-based air defenses?
just to keep pace with the Soviet threat of the 1990s.4
The Taiwan Strait Balance
We believe Beijing already can gain command of the
air over Taiwan because its Air Force greatly out-
numbers Taiwan's. But China would take heavy,
probably exorbitant, losses primarily from Taiwan's
ground-based air defenses. China has about 5,100
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fighter aircraft compared with only some 320 fighter
aircraft for Taiwan. F-8-2s will still be highly vulner-
able to surface-to-air missiles. But, if equipped with
effective antiradiation missiles and TASMs as well as
air-to-air missiles, they could greatly reduce the num-
ber of Chinese aircraft lost to Taiwan's ground-based
air defense systems.'
'Another option for reducing Chinese losses over Taiwan would be
to equip A-5 ground-attack aircraft with ARMATs and TASMs to
erode Taiwan's surface-to-air missile-firing capability.
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In aerial combat, today's F-8-1 is not a match for
Taiwan's F-5E Tiger II fighter, but the proposed
improvements to the F-8-2 would erode the F-5E's
qualitative edge. The F-5E's air-to-air combat capa-
bility exceeds that of the F-8-1 because Taiwan's
fighter has a search-and-track radar and a better air-
to-air missile. The F-8-2, however, is likely to be more
maneuverable and have beyond-visual-range missiles
that allow the F-8-2 to fire before the F-5E acquires
the F-8 on its radar. Even if only armed with PL-8
(Israeli Python 3) missiles, the F-8-2 would have an
all-aspect attack capability not found on today's F-5E
fighter. Better engines?such as the GE-404
?on the F-8-2 would also improve
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China's capabilities in air operations against Taiwan,
giving the aircraft a combination of greater payload
and longer range. In addition, the longer engine life
for the F-8-2 engines will greatly reduce the aircraft
maintenance problems China experienced during its
1979 war with Vietnam.
Taiwan's planned development and deployment of its
Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) will offset many of
the advantages Beijing could gain from the F-8-2.
Taipei plans to equip the IDF with AIM-7F Sparrow
beyond-visual-range missiles and AIM-9L Sidewinder
all-aspect infrared-guided missiles, although Wash-
ington has not yet approved the plan. This equipment
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would make the IDF more than a match for the
F-8-2, with its shorter, radar-limited missile range.
Powered by two engines based on the Garrett
TFE731-2L, the IDF will be similar in capability to a
US F-20 Tigershark. The fighter's proposed APG-67
radar will give the IDF lookup/lookdown capability,
air-to-ground ranging, distinction of targets in ground
clutter, and the option to add track-while-scan and
surface moving-target track capabilities.
Implications for Vietnam
Fielding of F-8-2s may have its greatest impact along
the China-Vietnam border, although airpower has not
been a factor in Sino-Vietnamese hostilities. The
Soviet Union has not provided Vietnam with any
fighters more advanced than the MIG-21 Fishbed,
but China's deployment of F-8-2s will substantially
strengthen Vietnam's hand in requesting MIG-23
Floggers. the
Soviets have denied Hanoi's requests on the grounds
that the MIG-21 is at least as capable as any Chinese
fighter in service. Vietnam in the mid-1990s might
face a force of Chinese F-8-2s that are more advanced
than its own fighters and, if these fighters are
equipped for strike missions, a Chinese Air Force far
more prepared than today's for deep strikes into
Vietnam. The shape of the Sino-Vietnamese air bal-
ance, therefore, is likely to be determined by the
Soviet Union's willingness to provide Hanoi with more
modern fighter aircraft and ground-based air defense
systems.
A New Entry in China's Arms Export Catalogue
China is aggressively exporting arms to the Third
World?with sales of over $9 billion since 1980?and
has added the F-8-2 to its list of aircraft for export. At
the Farnborough Air Show, China's aircraft industry
displayed a model of the F-8-2 and distributed bro-
chures extolling the performance capabilities of the
fighter in air combat, battlefield interdiction, and
close air support missions. China hopes to find a
market for its indigenous F-8-2?not the aircraft with
US upgrades?which we estimate may be ready for
export as early as late 1987.
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Beijing is likely to initially sell the F-8-2 to customers
who have previously purchased Chinese aircraft, such
as Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe,
Tanzania, and Sudan.
rklthough the F-8-2 may not be a
modern fighter, its estimated price of less than $10
million will make it attractive to Third World coun-
tries that have come to view China as a reliable and
discreet supplier of inexpensive and easily operated
arms.
Implications for the United States
Beijing has high expectations for the F-8 moderniza-
tion program and the role the United States will play.
Because this is the first major FMS case, the Chinese
are bound to push the limits of the Foreign Military
Sales agreement to set precedents for future arms
sales. According to a US Defense Department offi-
cial, the Chinese have tried?in violation of the FMS
accord?to persuade the US negotiators to let them
select the contractor who will provide the F-8-2
avionics packages. The Chinese are unlikely to be
satisfied with the purchase of 55 radar packages and
will want Washington to eventually provide produc-
tion technology. In addition, we expect Beijing to seek
the avionics and missiles necessary for an air-to-
ground attack capability and active electronic coun-
termeasure equipment to better defend the aircraft. If
the Chinese cannot acquire this technology from the
United States, they will certainly turn to other West-
ern countries, such as France, Italy, or Israel.
Beijing appears pleased with US efforts to supply the
F-8 improvements and probably views them as a
signal that the United States is willing?at least to a
limited extent?to upgrade China's military capabili-
ty despite its possible detrimental impact on Taiwan's
defenses. In our judgment, though, Beijing is con-
cerned that the anticipated F-8 program will be used
in Washington to justify new arms programs for
Taiwan. Successful modernization of the F-8 with US
assistance probably will lead Taiwan to pressure the
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United States to at least match the technology provid-
ed to China. We believe that if Washington decides to
further aid F-8-2 development by providing engines or
upgrading the avionics packages, improving its air-to-
ground capability, Taipei probably will press more
vigorously for:
? Better ground-based air defense systems, such as
the Patriot.
? The AIM-7F Sparrow beyond-visual-range radar-
guided missile for the IDF.
? The AIM-9L Sidewinder all-aspect infrared-guided
missile for the IDF and F-5E.
? F-16 or F-20 fighters.
We believe the successful conclusion of the F-8
avionics sale signals the beginning of long-term ties to
Chinese defense industries that are likely to increase
Washington's influence with the Chinese military.
Today, US-Chinese military ties are limited to occa-
sional senior- and training-level exchanges, but instal-
lation of the avionics packages and maintenance
training will necessitate the presence of US Defense
Department officials and contractors at Chinese de-
fense plants for at least the next 10 years. If the
Chinese are pleased with the results of the F-8-2
avionics upgrade, we expect future FMS sales of
items such as the Mark 46 torpedo, currently under
negotiation with a contract expected next spring.
Deng Xiaoping, moreover, signaled Beijing's interest
in a wider arms technology relationship when he
raised the possibility of US military credits or com-
mercial assistance for weapon purchases with Secre-
tary of Defense Weinberger during his October 1986
trip to China.
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