INDONESIA'S PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: TWO GENERATIONS IN THE RUNNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000200930001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Sccrct---
Indonesia's Presidential Succession:
Two Generations in the Running
A Research Paper
-Secret-
EA 86-10045
November 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Indonesia's Presidential Succession:
. Two Generations in the Running
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis, with contributions
from Office of
Leadership Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Southeast Asia Division, 0EA,
Reverse Blank Secret
EA 86-10045
November 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of 1 November 1986
was used in this report.
Indonesia's Presidential Succession:
Two Generations in the Running
The timing of the Indonesian presidential succession will determine which
generation of military leadership inherits power. If 65-year-old President
Soeharto were to die or become incapacitated in the next few years,
someone from his own military generation?the "Generation of '45"?
would probably replace him. But if, as we expect, Soeharto renews his
office in 1988 and serves another five-year term, younger officers would
become the front-runners.
The younger officers?the initial graduates of Indonesia's premier military
academy?share many of the values of the Generation of '45, such as an
overriding emphasis on internal stability, a strong aversion to Communism,
a pro-Western outlook, and a wariness of Muslim extremism. Nonetheless,
some key differences between the generations exist. The younger genera-
tion is better trained and more professional than its predecessors. Younger
officers lack the close ties of their elders to the civilian population and show
less interest in political matters, and they have had less exposure to foreign
influences and are more insular and nationalistic. These differences are
likely to affect domestic policies and foreign relations.
This Research Paper profiles two leading presidential contenders, one from
the older and one from the younger generation of Indonesia's military
leadership, and discusses how each typifies his peers. Our purpose is not to
determine the probable winner in the presidential succession competition.
Rather, it is to examine to what extent the younger leaders differ from
their seniors in political outlook and how such differences might affect
Indonesia's future policies. Although it is difficult to predict how a
successor would deal with issues once in office, we believe his background,
his military career, and the characteristics of his generation can shed light
on his leadership prospects and his perspective on key issues. In Indonesia's
case, such projections are important because domestic and international
conditions in the next decade may be considerably different and, perhaps,
more difficult than they are today.
Two possible presidential contenders, Coordinating Minister for Political
and Security Affairs Surono and Major General Sugiarto are, in our view,
. typical of the older and younger generations, respectively. Surono probably
would continue most of the Soeharto regime's political and economic
policies, in our judgment. However, Sugiarto's concern about military
professionalism could accelerate the trend toward greater civilian partici-
pation in government. Even so, we believe younger officers such as
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EA 86-10045
November 1986
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Sugiarto would be more authoritarian than their predecessors and less
tolerant of civilian politicians?a mind-set likely to thwart the long-term
prospect for democratization of Indonesia. Under either leader, the
military would continue to dominate politics and to rely on force to
maintain political stability.
In the foreign policy arena, we believe it is unlikely that the younger
generation officers would depart radically from the policies of the Soeharto
regime, but they are likely to be more assertive in promoting Indonesia's
nonaligned image and more activist on Middle East issues because of their
pro-Arab bias. They are also likely to be more insular in dealing with the
West, and with the United States in particular, even though we believe
they would continue to value the US strategic presence in Southeast Asia
as a counterweight to China and the Soviet Union, and to look to
Washington as a preferred source of military equipment.
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Contents
Page
Summary
iii
A Question of Timing
1
Commitment to Core Values. . .
2
. . . But Differences Based on Experience 3
Two Typical Candidates
5
Surono: In the Soeharto Mold 5
Sugiarto: The Man To Watch? 6
The Shape of the Future 6
Probable Continuity 6
Possible Change 7
Implications for the United States 7
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Indonesia's Presidential Succession:
Two Generations in the Running
A Question of Timing
The generations of Indonesia's military leadership are
separated by only a few years in age, but each has
been shaped by distinctly different aspects of the
nation's history. Soeharto's "Generation of '45" is the
group of officers who commanded and fought in
Indonesia's war of independence against the Dutch
(1945-49). This corps of officers has deeply affected
all aspects of Indonesian society from the late 1950s
to the present and has led the government since 1965.
As the members of the elder Generation of '45 have
retired from active duty, many have been appointed to
senior positions in the bureaucracy. Most of the top
military positions are now occupied by the small
group of about 40 officers known as the Bridge
Generation. These officers?who fought in the revolu-
tion as very young men and were commissioned
during the early-to-middle 1950s?will retire from
active duty within the next several years. As the
group's name implies, the Bridge Generation spans
the gap in the officer ranks between the Generation of
'45 and the New Generation officers who are moving
into the upper- and middle-level officer ranks. These
younger officers?the initial graduates of Indonesia's
own military academies in the early 1960s?are the
country's first postrevolutionary eneration and clos-
est to being military technocrats.
Because of the dominant political role of the military,
the timing of the Indonesian succession will determine
which generation of military leadership inherits pow-
er?a matter of potentially great importance to the
United States. If President Soeharto were to leave
office soon, someone of the Generation of '45 or the
Bridge Generation would probably succeed him and
continue his policies. Soeharto, however, shows no
intention of retiring and has not designated or
groomed a successor, nor is there anyone, in our
judgment, who appears to have a clear advantage, a
plan, or the ultimate ability to carry it off.' Moreover,
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Soeharto has stated his intention to turn power over to
the younger generation and has initiated generational
change within the military leadership. If, as we
expect, Soeharto renews his office in 1988 for another
five-year term, the current top contenders probably
would be out of the running, and the younger genera-
tion of military leaders would become front-runners.
Commitment to Core Values . . .
The senior Indonesian leadership has labored to instill
the younger officers with their basic institutional and
political values, and the younger officers amear to
have accepted these values,
Like their elders, New Generation officers
place overriding emphasis on maintaining political
stability, because, as junior officers in the early 1960s,
they saw political parties tearing the country apart. In
addition, he New
Generation appears to have subscribed to Armed
Forces Commander Murdani's view that the liberal
democratic thought espoused in the West is incompat-
ible with Indonesian culture. They thus distrust civil-
ian political institutions and see no alternative to
continued military control, at least for now.
The younger officers share their seniors' strong aver-
sion to Communism and their generally pro-Western
orientation, and are strong nationalists, suspicious of
all foreigners. For example
that most officers go along with the
military's ban on contact with foreigners without prior
approval. Although most officers of both generations
are nominal Muslims, they believe extremist Muslim
states are a serious subversive threat. For this reason
security officials maintain close surveillance of diplo-
mats and visitors from the more radical Islamic states,
and last year Jakarta forbade Indonesian students
from traveling to extremist Muslim countries?Leba-
non, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Algeria. On the
other hand,
Muslim fundamentalism has not made any
appreciable inroads into either generation of the
officer corps.
Personal loyalties?particularly to superiors?persist
as a major factor in appointments to senior positions
in the military and the government,
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What Makes a Potential Successor?:
A Candidate's Checklist
In our judgment, Soeharto is concerned with his
place in history and aims to bequeath to the nation a
strong system of government to ensure the continuity
of his policies. We believe that there are some
qualifications for which he might look in choosing a
successor from either generation. The successor must
be:
.
A nominal Muslim. Indonesian Muslims have nu-
merical superiority?nearly 90 percent of a popula-
tion of more than 170 million?but most do not
rigorously apply the prescriptions of Islamic law to
daily life. Islam is melded with traditional Java-
nese mysticism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, forming
a strain of Islam that generally lacks the doctri-
naire aspects of some Middle Eastern varieties.
only about
20 percent of the central island of Java is orthodox.
? Javanese. A little more than hail' of the Indonesian
population is ethnically Javanese. The Javanese?
particularly those from Central Java?dominate
the government and administration.
? An Army general with major command experience.
Influence within the military-bureaucratic hierar-
chy, and the loyalty of both the retired and active
military are essential. For their part, Indonesia's
senior field commanders consider major command
experience the primary prerequisite for the
presidency.
? Able to protect and administer the spoils. Soeharto
would stress personal loyalty and expect his succes-
sor to protect the considerable financial interests of
his family and associates. Senior officers would
expect to protect the system of financial benefits
they have gained by virtue of their positions.
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In our judgment, this emphasis on
loyal connections is an outgrowth of the late 1950s
and early 1960s and the chaos following the 1965
coup attempt, when the military was factionalized and
infiltrated by Communist sympathizers. Likewise,
younger officers whom Murdani knows well or with
whom he has been impressed have had a significant
advantage in rising to the top. The key patron for the
most sensitive positions, however, is President
Soeharto, who considers the top military posts too
important for officers not meriting his total confi-
dence and trust
. . . But Differences Based on Experience
New Generation officers nevertheless have had differ-
ent career experiences than those of the Generation of
'45 and, in our judgment, do not share all attitudes or
attributes of their elders. For these younger officers,
training at certain service schools was crucial for
promotion and continued military development,
Most New Genera-
tion officers are graduates of Indonesia's own service
academies, which were established in the late 1950s;
the General Military Academy at Magelang, Central
Java, is the most important. Selection to Indonesia's
staff and command school has also been an important
re uirement for advancement
the emphasis at these schools is on political
indoctrination in the military's dual-function role (dwi
fungsi), the state ideology (Pancasila),2 the Constitu-
tion, the values of the Generation of '45, and econom-
ic development.
In addition to attending these schools, leading officers
have been rotated through key midlevel military
assignments.
these steppingstone posts have included battalion and
brigade commands, military province commands
(KOREM), and top staff positions, such as the opera-
tions chief and chief of staff of the Army area
commands (KODAMs). Promising officers also have
Pancasila is the government's essentially secular, nebulous ideolo-
gy encompassing five principles: belief in one God, humanitarian-
ism, national unity, democracy, and social justice. The first princi-
ple, belief in one God, is intended to accommodate Muslims,
Christians, Javanese mystics, and any other adherents of a Su-
preme Being, while maintaining the reality of a secular state.
been detailed to specialized or prestigious assign-
ments, such as military aide to the president or
commandant of cadets at Magelang. To gain valuable
foreign experience, some highly regarded officers
have also served as attaches, in the UN detachment to
the Middle East, and in the armistice force in Viet-
nam from 1973 to 1975. Finally, combat experience?
such as fighting the East Timor insurgency?is
another factor figuring heavily in the advancement of
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This preparation, in our judgment, has produced a
group of officers who are better trained and more
professional than their predecessors and have general-
ly shown less interest in civil matters. Despite their
indoctrination in Indonesia's revolutionary history,
many New Generation officers question the applica-
bility of the military's dual-function role to current
conditions, . For
example, many resent the military's having to provide
officers to manage bureaucratic and economic posi-
tions, and a number of field-grade officers have said
they would like to curtail these assignments.'
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Nor do the rising officers share the close ties to the
civilian population that the older officers developed
during their revolutionary experiences, when they
relied on the assistance of villagers. The younger 2g25X1
generation has had to fight in Sumatra, Timor, -25X1
Western Java, and Sulawesi, commanding conven-
tional forces against guerrilla bands that were to some
extent supported by a hostile populace. Thus, the
younger generation's attitude toward the general pop-
ulation is not as favorable as that of its predecessor,
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Also, the younger generation has had more limited
contact with foreigners than the Generation of '45,
pnlike their
On the other hand, the military owns a large number of enter-
prises, ranging from timbering to manufacturing plants. The profits
from these operations provide a substantial share of the operational
funding requirements of the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI),
are expected to
use these funds to provide for their troops.
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ABRI 'c Dual Function
Billboard proclaims "ABRI
from the people, for the people.
The country's firm defense and
security will guarantee national
development."
OAS KEAMAtIAN KURA
ANTAP AKAN NENJAMIN
ESNUJ481/11CAN PelBANGUNAN NANKAI,
Since 1966?following the aborted Communist
coup?the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI) has
emerged as the country's premier political institution,
forming the base of power for Soeharto 's rule. Under
dwi fungsi, or dual function, ABRI is recognized as
having a role both as defender of the nation and as a
sociopolitical force in national development. In 1982
the government for the first time gave dual function a
firm legal basis by passing legislation expressly stat-
ing that ABRI is both a military and a social force,
and conferring formal legitimacy on the wide-ranging
powers exercised by the armed forces. Soeharto
continues to stress dwi fungsi in his public addresses,
emphasizing that the armed forces should never lose
sight of their role as "guardians and pacifiers" of the
people, and that the dual function would be main-
tained indefinitely.
ABRI personnel are assigned as Cabinet ministers,
ambassadors, members of the legislature, corporation
executives, mayors, and even university rectors. Al-
though management of the economy is left largely to
civilian technocrats, military officers head such ma-
jor public entities as the state oil company (PER TA-
MINA), the State Logistics Bureau (BULOG), and the
state tin company. The military provides manpower
and managerial personnel to government enterprises
and institutions, including agricultural estates and
even labor unions. Military officers hold some two-
thirds of the governorships, and for more than a
decade ABRI officers on assignment have exercised a
major role within Golkar, the government-sponsored
political organization. In the Cabinet reshuffling fol-
lowing his reelection in 1983, Soeharto appointed
active or retired military officers to 15 of the 37
positions in his Cabinet.
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elders, who studied or traveled extensively abroad,
New Generation officers usually travel overseas for
relatively brief periods only. They seem to be less
influenced by Western values. As a result, they have
limited understanding of how the rest of the world
operates and are much more isolationist,
Furthermore,
has sought to reduce foreign
military contacts within the officer corps and has
restricted some types of overseas training in the belief
are inappro-
priate for Indonesian conditions and needs. The mili-
tary personnel sent abroad now tend to be those in
technical fields, who have limited policy- or decision-
making responsibilities.4
Two Typical Candidates
We consider Coordinating Minister for Political and
Security Affairs Surono Reksodimejo and Major
General Sugiarto to be typical of the older and
younger generations, respectively (see chart at the end
of the report). Both are representative of their genera-
tions in terms of career experience, and they possess
the qualifications that Soeharto might look for in a
successor.
Surono: In the Soeharto Mold. US officials have long
considered General Surono, 63, a darkhorse presiden-
tial candidate or interim president should Soeharto
leave office suddenly. A trusted and respected friend
of the President, Surono's background is similar to
Soeharto's. According to US Embassy observers, he
has broad support among the active and retired
military and in his home province of Central Java?
the politically dominant region of the country. Surono
shares this power base with other potential successors,
but he has the advantage of coming from the regular
Army tradition, unlike others such as State Secretary
Sudharmono or Murdani, who lack troop command
experience.
Surono is a nominal Muslim whose faith is apparently
sincere enough to be acceptable to mainstream Mus-
lim organizations, without troubling other govern-
ment and military officials who distrust Muslim
Of the top three younger generation officers, none have received
training abroad, Try Sutrisno
has traveled only briefly overseas (inciucfing to the united States),
while the foreign experience of Sugiarto and Maj. Gen. Edi
Sudradjat has been limited primarily to participation in Indonesian
force contingents to the Middle East and Vietnam.
5
aspirations. Like other leaders of his generation,
Surono probably perceives the most immediate near-
term threat to Indonesian unity and stability to be
that posed by Islamic fundamentalists. He has sup-
ported the Soeharto regime's efforts to undercut the
political influence of Islamic groups, and we believe
he would probably continue this policy as president.
Commenting on the domestic unrest in late 1984,
when local activists whipped up popular discontent by
denouncing government repression of Islam, Surono
identified the regime's greatest problem area as the
Muslim segment of society that strongly opposes the
legislation requiring all public organizations?includ-
ing religious groups?to adopt Pancasila as their sole
organizing principle.' Surono has stated that the
government would prefer disunity among the various
Islamic groups, but claimed that it is also sensitive to
their dissatisfaction, especially their distrust of
Murdani, a Catholic.
Surono's quiet, understated, leadership style is genu-
inely admired by the Javanese, according to Embassy
officials, and has helped him to avoid running afoul of
the Soeharto family and other powerful figures.
Surono's relations
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with other senior ministers are good and are helped by
his apparent lack of presidential ambition.6 US
Embassy officials report that Surono is also one of the
few Indonesian generals who has not used his positior,,x
for self-aggrandizement. For this reason, we believe L
he would not be subject to accusations of corruption
by the public or press, but he could still be counted on
by Soeharto to protect the First Family's extensive
The legislation, in our judgment, is intended to stifle virtually all
legal avenues of Muslim political expression.
6 Obvious ambition,
is more likely to hinder than help one's presiden-
tial chances, for Soeharto feels uncomfortable having ambitious
men in influential positions]
Furthermore, because of the strong tendency in Javanese culture
for subordinates to defer to their seniors, we believe it would be
unusual to see succession candidates reveal any policy stand that
differs significantly from that of the current leadership.
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business interests. Although Surono's unaggressive
style is part of his staying power, it could, in our view,
be a disadvantage to him in the maneuvering of the
military elite that will almost certainly accompany the
succession.
Sugiarto: The Man To Watch? Major General
Sugiarto, 50, is a member of the first Magelang class
(1960) and one of the rising stars of the New Genera-
tion, . Currently
Armed Forces Assistant for Personnel, US officials
consider him a leading candidate to be named Chief
of the General Staff later this year. He has a strong
power base among his contemporaries and subordi-
nates, who, see
him as a good leader with the capacity to become
nresident
A staunch Soeharto loyalist, Sugiarto is well liked and
respected by the President,
Both are natives of Central Java, and
when Soeharto visits his home province he often has
Sugiarto at his side. Although not known as a "Mur-
dani man," Sugiarto is loyal to Murdani as his
commander in chief.
personally chose Su-
giarto to be Assistant for Personnel, although
Sugiarto's selection reflects Soehar-
to's decision, and Sugiarto was named to provide
a counterbalance to Murdani.
owes his meteoric rise to
his association with Soeharto and is not beholden to
Murdani.
A nominal Muslim, Sugiarto, in our judgment, would
be inclined to continue the Soeharto regime's inflexi-
bility regarding Muslim issues. Like his elders and his
contemporaries, Sugiarto probably has been greatly
influenced by Indonesian history, and he believes that
the extremism of Iran and Libya is incompatible with
the Indonesian experience.
The Shape of the Future
Probable Continuity. Whichever generation succeeds
Soeharto, we expect the military to retain its com-
mand of Indonesian politics well into the next decade
because of the government's strong support for
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ABRI's political role, ABRI's desire to protect its
economic interests, and the lack of any effective
political opposition. In our judgment, a successor from
either generation is likely to continue to depend on the
military to control political opposition and maintain
internal stability as financial austerity reduces the
government's ability to alleviate social problems.' The
Soeharto regime is almost certainly confident that the
reliability of the military and security forces and the
regime's control of institutions would allow it to cope
with any outbreaks of popular unrest. We judge that
under a Generation of '45 successor, such as Surono,
the government would continue to ride out low oil
prices and slower economic growth with financial
austerity, because it probably would perceive the risk
of widespread disturbances as low.
On the other hand, we have no evidence that younger
generation officers will be better able to manage
Indonesia's economic needs, or have an economic
agenda of their own. Some senior Indonesian officials
and officers privately question whether the younger
officers have the dedication and sensitivity to handle
the nation's complex political and socioeconomic
problems, Indeed,
some observers believe that they may be even more
shortsighted and inflexible than their elders. Nor do
we have any indication that there will be less govern-
ment intervention in the economy?which we believe
would improve Indonesia's chances for economic re-
covery?under a New Generation successor
the younger o cers
consider the technocrats less disciplined than them-
selves and more inclined toward self-interest, views
that we believe would reinforce the need for close
military oversight of economic policy.
' We calculate that because of soft world oil prices, economic
growth will, at best, average no more than 3 to 4 percent for the
remainder of the decade. This will coincide with a period of rapid
labor force growth, resulting in sharp increases in an already severe
unemployment-underemployment problem. Unless there is a dra-
matic rebound in oil prices, which we believe is unlikely, the urban
unemployment rate could exceed 50 percent by the mid-1990s.
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We believe that the conflict of interest,
and favoritism that perva s e economic decision mak-
ing in Indonesia are also likely to continue under
either generation. One Embassy observer believes
that, over the long term, the younger generation
would probably become as corrupt as the older. So far
the younger officers have not had the same kinds of
pressures or opportunities as the older officers, but as
they move into more senior?and potentially more
lucrative?positions, we believe they are more likely
to be tempted, especially if official pay scales remain
low, many military
officers depend on some form of under-the-table
income to survive financially.
Possible Change. If, as we expect, the New Genera-
tion's emphasis on military professionalism continues,
the gradual trend toward greater civilian participation
in the government?perhaps with a growing nominal
role for the government political party (Golkar)?
could accelerate under a New Generation successor.'
The reservations of younger officers about dwi fun gsi
could also affect the extent of the military's political
role, but practical considerations will probably play
the largest part in any move toward greater civilian
participation.
ABRI recognizes that, as military reorganiza-
tion decreases the number of its officers and a
declining economy limits its resources, it must concen-
trate the armed forces' political resources on the more
traditional security-related ministries and a few key
posts in other ministries.
also speculate that greater
civilian participation in government notwithstanding,
a New Generation successor may be more authoritar-
ian than his predecessors, even draconian.
they argue for maintaining a tight
rein on dissident groups and other elements, such as
students. If this attitude is pervasive, in our judgment,
it would result in much stricter political controls than
exist at present.
The two other officially sanctioned parties, the United Develop-
ment Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), are
not likely to emerge as viable parties, in our view. The PPP and PDI
owe their current disorganization and leadership disarray in part to
ABRI manipulation, and ABRI undoubtedly will continue to
interfere in these organizations to render them powerless while
giving them the appearance of credibility.
7
The element most likely to be affected by a more 25X1
repressive regime is political Islam, which we expect
to become a more turbulent force. We believe Muslim
dissidents may well try to incite broader opposition by
coupling their complaints with widespread social and
economic grievances, which we expect to intensify
through the rest of the decade because of Indonesia's
poor economic prospects. Thus far, the Soeharto
government's crackdown on the radical Islamic oppo-
sition has bought it time to deal with these frustra-
tions. When Soeharto departs the scene, however, we
believe tensions could erupt into spontaneous Islamic 25X1
unrest, and the New Generation may be forced to deal
with hostilities the Soeharto regime has merely driven 25X1
underground. 25X1
Implications for the United States
Under a Generation of '45 successor, relations be-
tween Indonesia and the United States would remain
about the same as they have been under Soeharto.
There is little evidence that New Generation officers
would radically depart from the foreign policy of the
Soeharto regime, or of a Generation of '45 successor.
Their strong anti-Communist view suggests that they
are unlikely to develop significantly closer ties to
either China or the Soviet Union. Officers of both
generations have complained to US officials about
what they see as preferential treatment by the United
States toward China on a number of issues. They are
especially concerned about US assistance for China's
military modernization, particularly in the field of
high technology. Surono has commented that Wash-
ington is the "worst offender'
as the major long-term
external threat to regional security. The Indonesians
are concerned that as China's modernization program
progresses and it becomes stronger economically, Chi-
na will become a serious export competitor with
Southeast Asia and may attempt to exert greater
political influence in the region.
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Secret
US-Indonesian Relations
Under Soeharto's rule, Jakarta's approach to foreign
relations has been pragmatic, moderate, low profile,
and quietly pro-Western. Jakarta champions a practi-
cal approach to Third World causes, avoids contro-
versial issues and groups or governments that it
considers radical, opposes politicization of interna-
tional conferences, and often strives to tone down
anti-Western rhetoric at such conferences. Conse-
quently, Indonesia has a reputation as a moderating
influence in ASEAN, OPEC, Islamic, and Third
World forums. Jakarta is cautious about participat-
ing in international meetings that have a superpower
orientation, but US Embassy officials report that
some opposition elements criticize the regime for
working too closely with Washington.
Indonesia's regional interests have broadly paralleled
those of the United States, and Soeharto appears
intent on maintaining solidarity with ASEAN in
dealing with Vietnam about Cambodia,
In addition, Indonesia's economic ties are over-
whelmingly to the West and Japan. Washington's
interests are served by Indonesian petroleum exports
to Japan, and the United States absorbs one-fifth of
Indonesian exports and is Indonesia's largest market
for textiles. About one-fifth of Indonesia's total im-
ports come from the United States. However, Indone-
sia's uncertain economic prospects threaten both
American economic and political equities. At the end
of 1985, Indonesia's medium- and long-term debt to
the United States totaled about $5 billion?$3.3
billion owed to the private sector and $1.7 billion to
official US Government agencies. Although US banks
continue to give Jakarta high marks for its pragmatic
financial management, we believe a restricted flow of
new credit could precipitate a debt crisis as early as
mid-1987.
Despite Indonesia's political and economic leaning
toward the West, Jakarta often shows ambivalence
toward the United States. Jakarta's perceptions of
Washington's role in the Philippines crisis reflect this
attitude. According to US Embassy officials, many
Indonesians consider the US role as interference in
Philippine internal affairs, but at the same time
credit Washington with ending the crisis peacefully.
Because we expect that the current fundamental
policies would endure under a New Generation re-
gime, the major differences between it and one head-
ed by a Generation of '45 successor would most likely
be in style and tone. In our judgment, rising New
Generation leaders believe that Indonesia?by right
of its size and strategic location?is entitled to exert a
greater leadership role in regional and international
forums. Thus, we believe they would be more assertive
than their predecessors in promoting Indonesia's non-
aligned image and Indonesian interests in both bilat-
eral and international economic affairs, such as in
Secret
negotiations over commodity exports, access to devel-
oped-country markets, foreign investment, and eco-
nomic aid. At the same time, New Generation leaders
might be more insular and formal in dealing with the
West?the United States in particular?and apt to
react strongly to perceived slights over matters such
as Indonesia's not being accorded due deference in
bilateral dealings.
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The security interests of New Generation leaders
would continue to focus on Southeast Asian rather
than on broader concerns, however. In our judgment,
they would seek to promote closer, but quiet, coopera-
tion with their Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) counterparts in military and security
affairs, building on the base that has been established
in recent years. Like their predecessors, we believe the
New Generation leaders would base their relations
with the United States largely on their perception of
the US commitment to the region and Indonesia.
Jakarta probably will continue to value Washington's
strategic presence in Southeast Asia as a counterbal-
ance to the USSR and China.
Indonesia shares US con-
cern about Soviet activity in the South Pacific, but
can do little to stop it, so it will continue to rely on the
United States to ensure regional security. Nonethe-
less, New Generation officers are almost certain to
remain opposed to any formal security ties to the
United States that would compromise Indonesia's
nonaligned image.
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Secret
Indonesia: Two Possible Presidential Candidates
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11
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