THE PHILIPPINES' NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT: REDEFINING ITS ROLE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000200860001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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~-- ~.
Directorate of , ~ ~~
Domestic Politics
Redefining Its Role in
The Philippines'
National Democratic Front:
EA 86-10036
LDA 86-10921
August 1986 9
COPY 2 g 1
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Directorate of S, ecret
The Philippines'
National Democratic Front:
Redefining Its Role in
Domestic Politics
the Office of Leadership Analysis.
e Office of East Asian Analysis and
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South East Asia Division,
OEA,
Secret
EA 86-10036
LDA 86-10921
August 1986
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The Philippines'
National Democratic Front:
Redefining Its Role in
Domestic Politics
Key Judgments The Communist Party of the Philippines' National Democratic Front
Igformation available (NDF) miscalculated badly when it decided to boycott the February 1986
as ?fls rule 19s6 presidential election-a move that left the NDF politically isolated from
was used in this report.
the Aquino coalition that ousted Marcos. To regain support among
Filipinos and further the Communist Party's revolutionary agenda among
non-Communist groups, we believe the NDF will pursue atwo-pronged
strategy of public reconciliation with the new government combined with
continued covert efforts to foment political unrest:
? Reconciliation, embodied in a new NDF policy program released last
February, avoids militant rhetoric and stresses economic reform in a bid
for the support of moderate Filipinos. In addition, the NDF will probably
launch a political party to field candidates for local elections expected
early in 1987.
? As in the past, efforts at destabilization will probably take the form of
strikes, rallies, demonstrations, and propaganda work through penetra-
tion of legal groups-including political, human rights, student, labor,
and religious organizations-and by influencing the Philippine media.
We believe the NDF is well placed to advance political instability if the
government of President Aquino should falter. It remains a cohesive and
highly disciplined organization that can marshal many assets to challenge
the authority of the government:
? On the domestic front, the NDF tries to establish its own front
organizations and to infiltrate and gain control over legal activist groups.
This complex web of leftist groups constitutes a large and vocal
grassroots support base.
? Internationally, the NDF maintains an extensive support network that
generates propaganda and serves as a conduit for funding from expatriate
Filipinos and sympathetic political groups. By sponsoring travel for NDF
cadre, the international commission also aids the flow of radical ideology
back to the Philippines.
iii Secret
EA 86-10036
LDA 86-10921
August 1986
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As the Aquino government grapples with the realities of governing, we
believe the NDF will try to exploit several key issues:
? The US role in the Philippines and, in particular, the presence of the US
bases by stepping up the theme of Philippine nationalism and sovereignty
in NDF propaganda material.
? The foreign debt problem, by urging the new government to take a
tougher stand in negotiations with international creditors.
? US and other foreign influence over the economy, by pushing for drastic
curtailment in the activities of multinational corporations in the
Philippines.
? The high level of unemployment and declining living standards by
fomenting strikes and becoming involved in labor disputes, such as NDF
participation in the strike by civilian workers at the Subic Bay Naval
Base last April.
From the perspective of the United States, the key question is whether the
NDF will develop the capacity to destabilize a key Asian ally. We believe
much depends on the practical political skills of the new government. If
Aquino can move ahead with political and economic reform, the NDF
probably will find its public appeal seriously eroded and permanently
weakened. Support for the NDF and its many groups seems to be a
fallback position for many Filipinos who are not attracted to Communist
ideology but nevertheless want political and economic reforms. Thus, the
NDF would face increasing difficulty staging the public demonstrations
that have been a major factor in establishing its political clout.
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Key Judgments
iii
The Challenge to the Revolution
1
A Profile of the NDF
1
The NDF at Home ...
1
...and Abroad
2
What the NDF Can Do
2
Efforts To Recapture Momentum
5
The Reconciliation Route
5
The Hidden Agenda
6
A. Cause-Oriented Groups and the NDF
C. Sample Teaching Material Prepared by Philippine Leftists 19
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The Philippines'
National Democratic Front:
Redefining Its Role in
Domestic Politics
The Challenge to the Revolution
The rise to power of President Corazon Aquino and
her centrist coalition has set back the radical left's
long effort to gain political supremacy in the Philip-
pines, in the view of most observers. One of the
potential losers is the shadowy National Democratic
Front (NDF), established by the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) in April 1973 with the primary
task of forming a broad coalition of forces to oppose
the Marcos government and the more tightly held
agenda of overthrowing the political system. Commu-
nist Party documents demonstrate that united front
activities-under the leadership of the NDF-are an
integral part of the CPP's long-term strategy, which
suggests that the revolution will ultimately be won in
the political arena rather than in an outright victory
by the party's military wing, the New People's Army
(NPA). The purpose of this paper is to assess how the
NDF functions and the degree to which it has devel-
oped the capacity to achieve the party's objectives.'
A Profile of the NDF
The NDF has an impressive ability to infiltrate legal
opposition groups and influence the antigovernment
press. The assassination in 1983 of Marcos rival
Benigno Aquino bolstered the NDF by politicizing
many Filipinos, including much of the urban middle
class, students, teachers, laborers, and members of the
Catholic clergy. Disillusioned with the traditional
political structure as a vehicle for reform, many of
these new activists joined the emerging "cause-orien-
ted" or issue-based political groups working in a loose
coalition referred to as the "parliament of the
streets." The rise of these legal activist organizations
provided the NDF with the perfect environment, in
our view, for coalition building. According to the US
Embassy, by 1985 the NDF had grown to approxi-
mately 6,000 hardcore urban activists, with a grass-
roots following of several million Filipinos.
The NDF at Home ... In theory, the NDF is the
highly organized and disciplined political arm of the
CPP. Divided into a number of commissions, it is
directed by the CPP Central Committee and charged
with organizing sectors of Philippine society such as
workers, women, and youth (see figure 1). The NDF's
primary function is to act as the party's agent in
attempts to establish and control often unwitting legal
front groups. In principle, these NDF-infiltrated
groups lose all but a few vestiges of their political
autonomy and are reduced to pawns of the CPP.
ings of the NDF are murkier than party propaganda
tute the NDF participate in a collegium with shifting
ties and allegiances (see figure 2). The degree of
ideological unity among members of this collegium, in
our judgment, varies between hardcore Marxist ideo-
logues and more moderate nationalists and reformers.
Some evidence suggests that relations between NDF-
affiliated groups, moreover, are characteristically Fil-
ipino-based almost exclusively on personal relation-
ships-and suffer as personal alliances change.
In our judgment, the nebulous character of the NDF's
de facto political network results in ambiguous lines
of authority between NDF cadre and front group
leaders. Moreover, distinguishing between individuals
and groups under the control of the NDF and those
fueled by genuine nationalism and support for reform
is extremely difficult because specific issues are often
supported by both the Communist and non-Commu-
nist left. Aquino's open political style makes such
indentifications even more problematic by downplay-
ing ideological differences between members of her
coalition.
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Figure 1
National Democratic Front
Functional Organization
Communist Party of
the Philippines
I
National Democratic Front
Christians for National
Liberation (CNL)
Nationalist Youth (KM)
Revolutionary Movement
of Workers a
Revolutionary Movement
of Peasants
New People's Army (NPA)
Organization of
Nationalist Women
Association of
Nationalist Teachers
Nationalist Association
of Health
Mindanao Provisional
Council b
Cultural minorities
Muslim representatives
a Formation began in 1980 - it is probably in place at this time.
b New as of April 1985.
c Probably only holds observer status.
The complex web of leftist groups within the NDF-
some of which have only a handful of members-
poses practical obstacles for unified control by the
CPP Central Committee. The NDF-controlled um-
brella group Bayan, for instance, is generally believed
to have over 500 member organizations. Even the
relatively minor NDF-influenced women's organiza-
tion Gabriela claims to have 47 constituent organiza-
tions (see appendix A). Some of these, in turn, belong
to other alliances or have satellite groups of their own.
As with any loose partnership, the formal affiliation
of these groups does not necessarily indicate doctrinal
agreement on all issues.
...and Abroad. To support its domestic programs, the
NDF has established organizational ties overseas.
Headquartered in Utrecht, the Netherlands, the NDF
international commission led by Luis Jalandoni is
believed to have established an extensive support
network with representatives throughout the world-
including Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, Mexico, the
United States, and several West European nations
(see figure 3, map). These regional "offices" are
primarily responsible for generating propaganda ma-
terial to influence foreign governments and draw
support from expatriate Filipinos. They are also in-
volved in providing a conduit for funding from sympa-
thetic political groups and arranging speaking tours
for visiting NDF officials-over the last several years
this has included trips to the United States, Sweden,
Greece, and Italy. We have no evidence that the
CPP/NDF receives any direct financial or material
support from the Soviet Union or any other foreign
government.
society (see inset and appendix C).
the NDF's
foreign ties also aid the flow of radical ideology back
to the Philippines, where politics is traditionally non-
ideological. The almost constant stream of NDF
cadre traveling overseas allows exiled radicals to
influence NDF policymaking. In addition, widely
available school textbooks compiled by an educational
group that includes members of leftist religious orders
use the example of the "US-Somoza dictatorship" as
a tool for analyzing forces for change in Philippine
What the NDF Can Do. The NDF has influenced
Philippine politics through strikes, demonstrations,
and propaganda. During the Marcos era, the NDF's
capabilities were felt most dramatically through vio-
lent protest activity nationwide and the continual
linking of grievances against the Marcos government
with attacks on the United States-particularly the
US military presence at the Subic Bay Naval Base
and Clark Air Field.
for example, NDF activity was largely
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Figure 2
The Communist Party of the Philippines
Domestic Political Network
- Direct relationship
- Direct relationship with probable
covert action channels in place
- Alliance relationship
Illegal organization
Legal organization
National Democratic Front (NDF)
r-0 Patriotic Youth (KM)
General Assembly Binding Q
Women for Reforms, Integrity,
Equality, Leadership, and
Action (Gabriela)
- Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT)
Nationalist Alliance for
Justice, Freedom, and
Democracy (NAJFD)
Moderate People United
in Vision and Spirit (Bandila)
Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG)
~-D Movement of Attorneys for
I^-- Brotherhood, Integrity, and
Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini)
~--D New Patriotic Alliance (Bayan)
~- Movement for Philippine
Sovereignty and Democracy
(Kaakbay)
responsible for the increase in protest activity from an
estimated 467 incidents in 1982 to 1,451 in 1984. For
its part, the CPP's publication Ang Bayan in January
1986 linked party involvement in the labor sector to a
30-percent increase in strike activity between 1984
and 1985. Protests widely believed by Filipinos to
have had CPP and NDF involvement include the
massive demonstrations in Manila and Cebu in Sep-
tember 1983, the shutdown of the Bataan Export
Processing Zone in 1983, the Bataan nuclear power
plant protest in 1985, the Manila transportation strike
of 1984, the escalating protest activity in Negros
Occidental throughout last year, and the series of
general strikes in Davao City.
The NDF has also made inroads in the public school
system and the press. Influence in the schools has
been through the NDF-affiliated Alliance of Con-
cerned Teachers (ACT), which has organized over
30,000 schoolteachers-particularly in the Metro
Manila area-for strike activity. NDF attempts to
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Figure 3
Communist Party of the Philippines/National
Democratic Front Foreign Propaganda Network
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
gain a higher public profile have met with consider-
able success through wide public exposure in the
foreign and domestic press-including the Philippine
newpapers Malaya, Mr & Ms, and Business Day, and
the Philippine Catholic Church-sponsored Veritas. In
the spring of 1985 the NDF held two widely publi-
cized press conferences in the Zamboanga Peninsula
and the Bicol region southeast of Manila with foreign
journalists. This was followed by an exclusive News-
week magazine interview with alleged NDF head
Antonio Zumel and the release of NDF policy state-
ments in the local press. Interviews with CPP, NDF,
and NPA figures-including rebel priest Conrado
Balweg-in the Philippine press have, we believe,
increased public sympathy and identification with the
radical left.
Growing public dissatisfaction with the Marcos gov-
ernment and its local officials also opened the way for
extensive NDF penetration of the. countryside. The
NDF's tactical objectives have been to raise the
political consciousness of the peasants through "vil-
lage teach-ins" and identifying potential recruits for
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Citing historical and cultural similarities between the
two countries, NDF propaganda often compares the
Communist struggle in the Philippines with .that
which characterized Nicaragua under Somoza, and it
uses the Sandinista regime~as the model.Jor a
Communist government in the Philippines. Although
we have no evidence that the Sandinistas otjrerlinan-
cial or material support to Philippine Communists,
many NDF members particularly church and peas-
ant activists-have i~tformal ties to Nicaragua that
lacilitate the exchange o.1'doctrine and political and
the NPA. the NDF
has successfully infiltrated local labor unions and
universities in many areas of the country and provided
the catalyst for antigovernment demonstrations.
the CPP
leadership is hotly debating whether to attempt to co-
opt the new government, to continue an aggressive
campaign of antigovernment propaganda and support
for armed struggle, or to develop a compromise policy
incorporating both strategies. It is still too early to
determine which faction in the leadership will prevail
in the dispute over party strategy. Nevertheless, we
believe recent developments suggest the CPP will
adopt atwo-pronged approach that allows the NDF to
seek rapprochement with Aquino while the party
mounts covert efforts to destabilize the government.
The Reconciliation Route. On the surface the NDF
appears to be positioning itself as an ally of the new
government. Antonio Zumel has been quoted repeat-
edly in the Philippine press suggesting the CPP and
the NPA might be willing to negotiate acease-fire. In
April 1986, moreover, Communist Party founder Jose
Maria Sison urged Aquino to allow "multiparty"
participation in the political process, suggesting also
that she appoint members of the radical left to the
Constitutional Commission.2
In our judgment, the NDF's strategy for cooperation
also includes plans to infiltrate the government and
influence key policymakers. The Philippine press re-
ported in March 1986, for example, that the radical
left has already named a number of high-level offi-
cials-including Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez,
Presidential Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, Cus-
toms Commissioner Wigberto Tanada, Minister of
Social Services and Development Mamita Pardo de
Tavera, and Deputy Justice Minister Silvestre Bello-
as "sympathetic" targets for NDF influence. In addi-
tion, Sison recently announced the formation of a new
legal party to operate under the NDF that is tenta-
tively called the New Democratic Party. According to
press reports, Sison hopes to recruit a leftwing sympa-
thizer-such as Jose Diokno or Lorenzo Tanada-as
party leader to provide the NDF with another outlet
for legal coalition building and developing grassroots
support.
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The NDF is also adopting asoft-sell strategy to
increase its credibility. One of the NDF's first re- 25X1
sponses to Marcos's ouster last February was the
release of a new "eight-point program" to replace the
"12-point program" of January 1985. In our judg- 25X1
ment, the new program represents a significant soft-
ening of the rhetoric of revolution used during the
Marcos years. Highly charged expressions such as
"overthrow" and "people's war" are conspicuously
absent. Objectives have been reordered, moreover, to
highlight moderation and tolerance; for example, the
Z Aquino named 48 delegates to the Commission, which convened in
early June. According to US Embassy and Philippine press reports,
the only presumed NDF member on the Commission is peasant
leader Jaime Tadeo.
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1. Unite the Filipino people to overthrow the tyranni-
cal rule of US imperialism and the local
reactionaries.
2. Wage a people's war to win total, nationwide
victory.
3. Establish a democratic coalition government and
a peoples' democratic republic.
4. Integrate the revolutionary armed forces into a
single revolutionary army.
S. Uphold and promote the.free exercise oJ'the
peoples' basic democratic rights.
6. Terminate all unequal relations with the United
States and all other foreign entities.
7. Complete the process of genuine land reform, raise
rural production through cooperatives, and mod-
ernize agriculture.
8. Carry out national industrialization as the leading
factor in economic development.
9. Guarantee the right to employment, raise the
people's living standards, and expand social ser-
vices as soon as possible g1'ter establishing demo-
cratic state power.
10. Promote a patriotic, scient~c, and popular cul-
ture, and ensure free public education.
11. Respect and foster the sell=determination of the
Moro and Cordillera people and all ethnic
minorities.
12. Adopt and practice a revolutionary, independent,
and peace-lovingforeign policy.
February 1986 Eight-Point Program:
1. Uphold and promote the free exercise of the
peoples' democratic rights.
2. Complete the process of genuine land reform, raise
rural production through cooperatives, and mod-
ernize agriculture.
3. Guarantee the right to employment, raise living
standards, and expand social services.
4. Terminate unequal treaties with the United
States, and renegotiate.Joreign investments and
loans on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
S. Implement a program of national
industrialization.
6. Promote a patriotic, scientific, and popular cul-
ture, and ensure,free public education.
7. Respect and foster self-determination for the
Moro people and the Cordillera people, and all
ethnic minorities.
8. Maintain a nonaligned, independent, and peace-
loving.foreign policy.
reassignment of "uphold and promote free exercise of
the people's democratic rights" to the number-one
position is followed by popularly supported proposals
for economic reform. In addition, the 1986 program
deemphasizes the military aspects of NDF policy and
ties to the NPA.
The Hidden Agenda. At the same time, the NDF will
probably continue more active-and possibly vio-
lent-efforts to destabilize the Aquino government. In
our view, the NDF will pursue basically the same
tactics that have contributed to past successes-
gaining strength and supporters through the infiltra-
tion of legal political, labor, and church organizations
and demonstrating its clout by organizing rallies and
strikes protesting specific grievances (see appendixes
A and B). Taking their cue from the 1986 program,
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we believe NDF agitators are likely to use the follow-
ing issues in the months ahead as the basis for action
against the Aquino government:
? The United States Military Role in the Philippines.
The presence of the US bases at Subic Bay and
Clark Air Field will continue to be a target for NDF
attack on the grounds that these facilities compro-
mise Philippine sovereignty. Growing public concern
over the safety of the nuclear power station on the
Bataan Peninsula may also result in an antinuclear
focus to protests over the US military activities. As
in the past, reports of abuses of civilians by the
Philippine military will afford the NDF an opportu-
nity to criticize US military aid programs.
? US Economic Ties. US economic aid will be criti-
cized as Washington's method for exerting undue
influence over Manila's policies. The NDF will also
continue to criticize the activities of American
multinationals in the Philippines-by claiming they
exploit native workers and hamper the growth of
indigenous industries-and will support continued
CPP/NPA efforts to exact "revolutionary taxes"
from these corporations, sabotage their activities,
and harass their employees.
? The Labor Sector. If rates of unemployment and
underemployment-which we currently estimate at
50 percent-are not brought down, and living stan-
dards do not show signs of improvement over the
next year, the NDF will step up already high levels
of labor unrest. The NDF-influenced KMU, for
example, was involved in the labor dispute at the
Subic Bay Naval Base last April.
? The Agricultural Sector. The NDF will continue its
work with rural unions such as the National Federa-
tion of Sugar Workers (NFSW) and the Alliance of
Central Luzon Farmers as it presses the Aquino
government for land reform. The NDF will exploit
any failure of the Aquino government to deliver on
its election promise to dismantle the coconut and
sugar monopolies.
? Foreign Debt. The NDF, which has made explicit in
its policy program that it supports renegotiation of
the Philippines' $26 billion foreign debt, will proba-
bly criticize the Aquino government if it does not
take a "tough stand" with international creditors.
? Military Reform. The NDF will try to capitalize on
any reports of military abuse of civilians to undercut
the government's credibility with the public and
create further divisions between Aquino and the
military. The NDF is also likely to demand investi-
gations of past abuses by military and defense
personnel-including Defense Minister Juan Ponce
Enrile and Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos.
? The Presence osthe Elite in the New Government.
In addition to singling out Enrile and Ramos, the
NDF will exploit any suggestions of impropriety by
members of the Aquino government-particularly
individuals such as Vice President Salvador Laurel
and Minister of Finance Jaime Ongpin, who have
been longtime members of the political and business
establishment.
Although US support-including close diplomatic ties
and economic assistance-is clearly seen by Aquino
as critical to the survival of her government, it could
also form the basis of a new NDF propaganda
campaign. Such a campaign would probably involve a
reworking of the Communists' theme of the "US-
Marcos Dictatorship"-a charge to which Aquino
might feel vulnerable in light of Washington's per-
ceived role in the fall of the Marcos government. For
her part, Aquino may take a more contentious stand
on some bilateral issues-such as the bases issue and
economic aid-to publicly demonstrate her indepen-
dence from Washington. Such a stance would not, in
our view, necessarily be a reaction to NDF propagan-
da and indicate anti-American sentiment, but instead
might reflect Aquino's recognition of rising Filipino
Assessing the Future Threat
The NDF's impressive political network is not suffi-
cient to pose anear-term threat to political stability.
The NDF, in our view, was weakened by a number of
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Sayan: A Case Study of NDF Infiltration
The Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (New Patriotic
Alliance), generally abbreviated as Sayan (Nation),
was organized in early 1985 by leftist activists within
the anti-Marcos opposition. It was originally con-
ceived-and publicly heralded-as a broad-based
umbrella organization that would bring disparate
antigovernment groups into a coalition that ultimate-
ly would be tran~Jormed into a political party of the
left. To this end, Sayan brought together most of the
important cause-oriented groups active since the
Aquino assassination and largely incorporated other
predecessor umbrella groups-JAJA, ATOM,
CORD, and NAJFD.
From the beginning, Sayan was an arena for power
struggles between Communist and non-Communist
elements-each assuming it would in time co-opt the
other. The Communists, however, moved quickly to
assert their dominance. Theirfirstline strategy was to
allow moderate elements to believe they were in
charge while moving to ensure radical domination
behind the scenes. This was done by allocating nomi-
nal leadership positions to the non-Communists and
exacting adherence to pro-Communist organizational
procedures in return. These procedural arrangements
consisted of stacking decisionmaking bodies-such
as Bayan's national and regional commissions-with
CPP/NDF cadre or sympathizers.
tactical mistakes in the waning days of the Marcos
regime. Strong-arm tactics by NDF members to
dominate the legal anti-Marcos opposition umbrella
group Bayan in May 1985, for example, resulted in a
walkout of many prominent members of the moderate
left, including Jose Diokno, Agapito Aquino (the
President's brother-in-law), and human rights activist
Sister Christine Tan. In our judgment, the Commu-
nists' tactics also alienated many political fence sit-
ters-including some journalists generally sympathet-
ic to the radical left-and contributed to the coolness
between Aquino and the radical left that has contin-
ued since she came to power.
NDF infiltration of Sayan proved particularly suc-
cessful in the provinces-where local cause-oriented
groups often have fewer options for creating tactical
alliances. Using funds collected from Sayan gf~liates
and mobilizing their memberships -usually students
and workers-the NDF has organized protest activi-
ties and strikes in provincial cities such as Bacolod,
Iloilo, Cebu, and Davao. These provincial demonstra-
tions, often involving crowds 0120,000 or more, have
received national media attention and led to confron-
tations with local government authorities. During
18-20 June 1985, for example, Sayan staged a mass
demonstration to protest the licensing of the nuclear
power plant in Bataan Province; awell-executed
series of marches, rallies, roadblocks, and human
barricades virtually shut down the province for three
days. In September 1985, on the anniversary of the
imposition of martial law, a Sayan-organized rally in
Escalante in Negros Occidental Province ended in
violence when police.f~red into the crowd, killing at
least 25 demonstrators and wounding more than SO
others. Bayan's success in the provinces, drawing as it
does upon the CPP/NDF s grassroots power base, in
our view, reflects the real strength of the radical left
and its ability to dominate antigovernment activities.
election undercut critical sources of NDF support and
continue to threaten internal stabilit
In our view, the NDF's
influence with radical leftist sympathizers was weak-
ened by the boycott decisions. The NDF was unable
to prevent a 79-percent voter turnout in 1986 and an
89-percent turnout in 1984. Moreover, the voter
participation in Metro Manila-an NDF strong-
hold~iuring the February presidential election
reached 70 percent despite government fraud and
disenfranchisement.
The NDF's decisions to boycott the February 1986
presidential election and the 1984 National Assembly
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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The State of Play on Key Reform Issues
Aquino's record on reform thus far is mixed. She is
vulnerable to claims that she has been excessively
authoritarian because she has unilaterally replaced
the Supreme Court, disbanded an elected parliament,
postponed scheduled elections for local government
officials, and replaced duly elected local o.~icials
with her own appointees. On other issues, she has
~'he armed forces has
created an independent board led by respected retired
officers to investigate charges of corruption and
human rights abuses during the Marcos administra-
tion. Although these reforms have been generally well
received by Filipinos, many civilians are skeptical
about the e.~cacy of in-house military investigations,
25X1
25X1
made some progress.
Agricultural Monopolies. The government is moving
ahead with the dismantling of the coconut and sugar
monopolies by freeing up marketing restrictions-
such as allowing the export of copra. There is little
political resistance tofurther liberalization, and most
economic observers expect slow but steady progress in
the months ahead.
Constitutional Reform. Aquino established a Consti-
tutional Commission in May 1986 that includes
representatives from her coalition, theformer Marcos
government, and the Catholic Church. We expect
infighting to slow the progress of the commission, but,
if the deliberations produce a drq~t constitution that
is approved in a national plebiscite later this year,
and local elections are held by the end of 1986 or
early in 1987, we believe at least minimum expecta-
tionsfor progress will have been met. The formation
of a Commission on Good Government, which is
charged with trying to retrieve the wealth of Marcos
and his associates, has also bolstered the perception
that Aquino is committed to "cleaning up"abuses of
government officials, according to Philippine political
observers.
Military Reform. Aquino has retired almost all of
the Marcos-appointed generals-often political allies
promoted on the basis olfavoritism-and has re-
placed them with professional o.~cers, according to
according to Philippine press reports.
Land Reform. There has been no progress on imple-
menting the sweeping land reform many Filipinos
believe was promised by Aquino during her election
campaign. In the months ahead, however, we expect
to see some movement toward resurrecting and ex-
panding the Marcos government's modest land re-
form program to include some coconut and sugar 25X1
lands. F~fforts to improve the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform's monitoring of corruption in the agricultural
sector could take the edge ojf calls for sweeping land
reform-a move Aquino probably believes is too
politically costly to undertake.
The Insurgency. In March 1986, Aquino released
virtually all political prisoners jailed during the
Marcos regime including several leading CPP/NPA
figures-a move with great popular appeal but one
that has caused friction between the President and
the military. The military has been ordered by
Aquino not to conduct any ojfensive operations
against the NPA while conditions for acease-fire and
amnesty program are negotiated over the next several
months. In the meantime, however, continued NPA
attacks have accounted for over 1,000 casualties 25X1
among the Communists, civilians, and members of
the military since Aquino took o,~ce.
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Secret
In view of the large voter turnouts in the last two
elections, we believe the NDF faces an uphill battle so
long as Aquino is in power. Support for the NDF, in
our judgment, is a fallback position for many Filipinos
who are not attracted to Communist ideology but who
want political and economic reform. For this reason,
we are fairly confident that the moderate-radical
balance will tip further against the NDF if Aquino's
government can begin the process of reform and is
able to show some improvement in the economy. In
addition, Aquino's continued popularity-88 percent
of the participants in a March 1986 public opinion
poll registered their support--could lay the ground-
work for erosion of the NDF's power base.
Although defections from the top NDF leadership are
unlikely, we believe Aquino has an opportunity to woo
less ideologically committed midlevel officials by giv-
ing them a stake in the success of her government,
possibly by including them in agrarian reform or local
social programs. Much more likely, however, in our
view, is the chance that some supporters of the NDF
will be satisfied by reforms-including the disman-
tling of agricultural monopolies, acease-fire and
amnesty program for insurgents, and improvements in
military civilian relations-provided that these are
not too long in the making and that the government
does not lapse into traditional patterns of favoritism,
corruption, and abuse (see inset).
If the Aquino government falters and there is little
progress on reform over the next year, however, the
NDF's political network could enable it to make
significant gains. The developments that would im-
prove the NDF's fortunes include:
? A serious breakdown in cooperation between mem-
bers of Aquino's coalition government.
? Continued economic stagnation.
? Aquino's resorting to Marcos's authoritarian tools
to maintain political control-particularly the wide-
spread arrest of political dissidents, harsh crack-
downs by the police and military on demonstrators
and strikers, and restrictions on the press.
? Increased public dissatisfaction over the pace of
reform.
Under these circumstances, we believe the NDF
would be able to exploit disillusionment and mobilize
large numbers of supporters in antigovernment dem-
onstrations. In addition, the belief that the Philip-
pines' experiment with anon-Communist alternative
to Marcos had failed would further polarize the
political spectrum by weakening the political center
and strengthening the radical left.
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Secret
Appendix A
Cause-Oriented Groups
and the NDF
sharing similar political objectives.
The NDF has focused much effort on infiltrating and
co-opting cause-oriented interest groups. Constituting
most of the Philippine left, these groups include
literally hundreds of human rights, legal aid, and
church groups; labor, student, and teachers unions;
and other professional organizations. The term cause-
oriented has a unique and exclusive meaning in the
Philippines; it is used to describe those groups on the
left that have openly, actively, and militantly identi-
fied themselves with political reform. "Umbrella
group" refers to a coalition or federation of groups
ATOM (August Twenty-One Movement)
Key Personalities: Agapito "Butz" Aquino (founder)
Named after date of Benigno Aquino's assassination
...organized by his brother ...target for NDF
infiltration while affiliated with CORD ...promoted
boycott of 1984 National Assembly elections ...split
in 1985 over participation in Bayan; Butz Aquino and
moderates pulled out to join Bandila. ~~
Bandila (Moderate People United
in Vision and Spirit)
Key Personalities: Butz Aquino, Teofisto "Tito"
Guingona
outside Manila.
Organized in August 1985 by moderates who pulled
out of Bayan in protest against CPP heavyhandedness
...intended as anon-Communist alternative .. .
hopes to resist CPP/NDF infiltration ...nationalistic
program emphasizes social and economic justice .. .
opposed to US bases ...has had little success dimin-
ishing the influence of Bayan ...not well organized
Bayan (New Patriotic Alliance)
Key Personalities: Lorenzo Tanada, Leandro
Alejandro, Loretta Rosales, Rolando Olalia
Currently the primary NDF front ...organized
during March-May 1985, conceived as broad-based
leftist coalition ...claims to have over 500 affiliated
groups and a membership of 1.5 million individuals
...actual membership probably no more than half
that ...CPP/NDF seized control at opening con-
gress; many moderates subsequently withdrew .. .
well organized nationwide ...split over participation
in February 1986 election.
CORD (Coalition of Organizations for
the Restoration of Democracy)
Key Personalities: Lorenzo Tanada, Jose Diokno,
Leandro Alejandro,. Butz Aquino
Formed in early 1984 as umbrella group for organiza-
tions supporting boycott of National Assembly elec-
tions ...later became long-term anti-Marcos coali-
tion ...during late 1984 and early 1985 strained by
internal disputes and CPP/NDF infiltration ... even-
tually collapsed; replaced by Bayan.
JAJA (Justice for Aquino, Justice for All)
Key Personalities: Jose Diokno, Butz Aquino, Sister
Christine Tan
First major cause-oriented umbrella group ...formed
shortly after 1983 Aquino assassination ...organized
demonstrations and protest rallies ...leftist tilt,
strong NDF presence ...moderates eventually began
to pull out ...largely replaced by CORD in early
1984.
NAJFD (Nationalist Alliance for Justice,
Freedom, and Democracy)
Key Personalities: Leandro Alejandro, Alexander Pa-
dilla, Lorenzo Tanada, Teofisto Guingona
Multisectoral, anti-Marcos umbrella group organized 25X1
in late 1983 ... presumably created by CPP/NDF,
but many members claim independence ...drew upon
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groups that had boycotted 1981 presidential election
...ultimate goal is formation of "democratic coali-
tion government" ...most moderates have with-
drawn.
KMU (May First Movement)
Key Personalities: Rolando Olalia
Leading militant trade union federation ...heavily
infiltrated by CPP/NDF ...has numerous union
affiliates nationwide ...claims one-half million mem-
bers but probably has fewer than 100,000.. .
launched in May 1980 ... has successfully organized
mass-action strikes ...close ties to leftist umbrella
groups; currently a Bayan affiliate ...has support of
Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez.
NSFW (National Federation of Sugar Workers)
Key Personalities: Luis Jalandoni, Roberto "Bobby"
Ortaliz
Organized in 1971 on sugar-growing island of Negros
...closely tied to leftist elements within Roman
Catholic Church ...claims 45,000 members .. .
strong CPP/NDF presence ...KMU affiliate .. .
organizes mass-action strikes and public demonstra-
tions.
Student/Teachers Organizations
ACT (Alliance of Concerned Teachers)
Key Personalities: Loretta Ann Rosales, Raul Segovia
Teachers organization closely affiliated with both the
NDF and Bayan ...founded by Loretta Ann Rosales
...believed to have organized 30,000 teachers out of
a total teaching force of approximately 470,000.. .
involved in demonstrations and labor disruptions with
the KMU and LFS.
Kaakbay (Movement for Philippine
Sovereignty and Democracy)
Key Personalities: Jose Diokno, Sister Christine Tan
Middle-class grouping of progressive intellectuals,
professors, and students ...largely consists of
Diokno's personal following ...formed in late 1983,
originally conceived as leftist but non-Communist .. .
has since been infiltrated by CPP/NDF ...has
factionalized over participation in various cause-
oriented umbrella groups.
LFS (League of Filipino Students)
Key Personalities: Leandro Alejandro, J. V. Bautista
Student arm of the NDF ...founded in 1977 to
succeed banned KM as primary "legal" student group
...well organized at University of the Philippines and
nationwide ...active in militant trade unions ...key
element in street demonstrations, strikes, and protest
rallies ...recently challenged by moderate student
groups.
KM; "Patriotic Youth" (Kabataang Makabayan)
Key Personalities: Jose Maria Sison
Original CPP student front group ...founded by
Sison in 1964 ... staged violent antigovernment ral-
lies during late 1960s and early 1970s ...banned
since the outset of martial law ...still active as
underground counterpart to LFS ...provides core
leadership to LFS, infiltrates other student groups.
CNL (Christians for National Liberation)
Key Personalities: Sister Mariani Dimaranan, Sister
Christine Tan, Luis Jalandoni
outlawed by the Marcos government.
Underground church arm of the CPP/NDF .. .
organized by Father Edicio de la Torre in 1972.. .
coordinates activities of radical priests and nuns .. .
promotes Communist strain of liberation theology .. .
aids and abets members of Communist NPA .. .
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TFD (Task Force Detainees)
Key Personalities: Sister Mariani Dimaranan
Monitors human rights abuses and promotes release
of political detainees ...organized by radical ele-
ments within the Catholic Church during martial law
...closely linked to CNL ...often cited as reliable
source by Amnesty International and other worldwide
organizations ...largely controlled and funded by
CPP/NDF ...generally ignores NPA atrocities.
Other Organizations
Mabini (Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity, and Nationalism, Inc.)
Key Personalities: Augusto Sanchez, Renito Sagui-
sag, Joker Arroyo, J. V. Bautista
Leftist human rights lawyers' group founded in 1979
...provides free legal aid to and defends dissidents,
terrorists, Communist sympathizers, and political
prisoners ...infiltrated by CPP/NDF ...close ties to
cause-oriented groups ...critical of US bases .. .
several members hold influential positions in Aquino
government.
Gabriela (General Assembly Binding Women for Re-
forms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action)
Key Personalities: Loretta Rosales, Maita Gomez,
Lidy Nakpil
Umbrella group of militant women's organizations .. .
claims approximately 50 affiliates ...heavily infil-
trated by the CPP/NDF ...somewhat factionalized
over participation in 1986 presidential election.
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Appendix B
Prominent Players
in the NDF Network
NDF cadre and their associates usually wear many
organizational hats. Individuals often hold under-
ground positions within the CPP/NDF structure in
addition to one or more "legal" positions in front
groups. The following are profiles of key activists with
NDF ties that typify these multiple posts and cross-
cutting affiliations.
Leandro "Lean" Alejandro
Affiliation: CPP/NDF, Bayan, LFS, NAJFD
Born: 10 July 1960
Radical student activist .:.former student council
chairman at University of the Philippines ... secre-
tary general and key hardliner in Bayan ...leader of
street demonstrations ...arrested and detained dur-
ing early 1985 ... married to Lidy Nakpil of Ga-
briela.
Jose Virgilio "J.V." Bautista
Affiliation: NDF, LFS, NAJFD, Bayan
Born: circa 1958
Former radical law student, now a junior partner in
law firm of Labor Minister .Augusto Sanchez .. .
chairman of Bayan's Electoral Struggles Commission;
public spokesman for the boycott campaign ... proba-
bly acandidate member of the CPP ...former secre-
tary general of LFS ...arrested with Alejandro in
1985 ... former editor of UP student paper.
Sister Mariam Dimaranan
Affiliation: TFD, CNL
Born: rrn
Militant Franciscan nun ...member of Presidential
Human Rights Committee ...often makes TFD
fundraising trips to Europe and United States ... 25X1
member of Bayan's International Relations Commis-
sion ...onetime detainee.0 25X1
Jose "Pepe" Diokno
Affiliation: Kaakbay
Born: 26 February 1922
Former senator, now leftist civil rights lawyer .. .
head of Presidential Human Rights Committee .. .
strident nationalist and critic of US bases ...active
leader in JAJA, CORD, and Bayan, but left each to 25X1
avoid being manipulated by Communists ...detained
for two years during martial law.~~ 25X1
Malta Gomez
Affiliation: NDF, Bayan, Gabriela
Born: circa 1947
Suspected NDF operative; involved in overseas propa-
ganda work ...daughter of a wealthy landowner .. .
"Miss Philippines" beauty queen in 1968 ... close
friend of Jemma Cruz ...went underground during
martial law ...escaped from detention in 1974,
turned herself in for health reasons in 1981. ~
Jemma Cruz
Affiliation: NDF
Born: xn
queen ...close friend of Malta Gomez.
Luis "Louie" Jalandoni
Affiliation: NDF, CNL
Born: rrn
1979 ... married to an ex-nun.
Former priest and founder of NDF ...currently
NDF representative in Utrecht, the Netherlands .. .
key overseas fundraiser for CPP/NDF ...helped or-
ganize NFSW in 1971 ... detained during 1973-74,
then went underground ...fled to Europe in
25X1
25X1
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Horacio "Boy" Morales
Affiliation: CPP/NDF
Born: 11 September 1943
Best known personality in-and alleged former head
of-the NDF ...former executive vice president of
Development Academy of the Philippines, prestigious
government think tank ...defected and joined the
CPP/NDF in 1977 ... apprehended and imprisoned
in 1982 ... released by Aquino in March 1986.. .
M.A. in economics from the University of Oklahoma.
Rolando Olalia
Affiliation: KMU, Bayan
Born: NA
Lawyer, militant labor leader ...succeeded his char-
ismatic, Marxist father as head of KMU and Nation-
al Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), KMU's
core affiliate ...vice president of Bayan; was acting
chairman during February 1986 election ... reported-
ly disillusioned with Bayan hardliners, disclaims
Communist elements in KMU ...has ties to Labor
Minister Augusto Sanchez.
Alexander "Alex" Padilla
Affiliation: Bayan, NAJFD
Born: Nn
Human rights lawyer ...secretary general of
NAJFD ...son of former senator and current Bayan
vice chairman Ambrosio Padilla ...member of
Bayan's International Relations Commission .. .
former UP student activist ...Marxist-Leninist ideo-
logue.
Meynardo Palarca
Affiliation: KMU
Born: NA
KMU international representative and suspected
NDF operative ...made speaking tour of United
States and Canada in fall 1985 ... secretary general
of Center for Nationalist Trade Unions in Mindanao
(CENTRLIM), largely a grouping of KMU affiliates.
Loretta Ann "Etta" Rosales
Affiliation: CPP/NDF, Bayan, Gabriela
Born: NA
Longtime NDF operative and alleged CPP Central
Committee member ...professor, leader of Alliance
of Concerned Teachers (ACT) ...member of Bayan's
Popular Struggles and People's Welfare Commis-
sion ...often serves as intermediary between
CPP/NDF hardliners and moderate leftists ... mar-
ried to Mabini lawyer Antonio Rosales.
Augusto "Bobbit" Sanchez
Affiliation: Mabini
Born: 6 August 1932
Aquino's Minister of Labor and Employment ...one
of the most radical members-and a former chair-
man-of Mabini ...close ties to CPP/NDF but re-
portedly has resisted the party's recruitment ef-
forts ...formerly active in Bayan ...member of the
National Assembly during 1984-86 ... brother was
Consul General in Chicago during 1975-86.
Raul Segovia
Affiliation: NDF, ACT
Born: Nn
Founding member and secretary general of Alliance
of Concerned Teachers (ACT).
Roland Simbulan
Affiliation: NDF, LFS
Born: NA
NDF international operative; associated with Philip-
pine Support Group based in Sydney, Australia .. .
professor of political science at University of the
Philippines ...author of The Bases of Our Insecurity,
a vehement attack on US bases in the Philippines .. .
reportedly the son of NDF operative Dante Simbulan,
head of Washington-based Church Coalition for Hu-
man Rights.
25X1,
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0
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Jose Maria "Joma" Sison
Affiliation: CPP
Born: 8 February 1938
Founder of the Maoist-oriented CPP in 1967 ... was
CPP chairman until his arrest and imprisonment in
1977 ... released by Aquino in March 1986... orga-
nized numerous Communist groups while a student
and professor at the University of the Philippines
during the 1960s ...now trying to reestablish his ties
to the CPP ...has announced the formation of a
political party, the "New Democratic Party."
Jaime "Jimmy" Tadeo
Affiliation: NDF, Bayan
Born: circa 1938
Activist head of Alliance of Central Luzon Farmers
since 1981 ... alleged CPP member ...currently a
member of the Constitutional Commission, where he
is pushing radical agenda ...former agricultural ex-
tension bureaucrat ...detained briefly after leading
anti-Marcos demonstration in early 1985 ... alleged
ties to Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
Sister Christine Tan
Affiliation: TFD, NAJFD, JAJA, Kaakbay
Born: circa 1930
Radical nun, liberation theologist ...militant human
rights activist ...founding member of JAJA and
Bayan; withdrew from Bayan in June 1985... pri-
vately admits Communist sympathies but denies CPP
membership ...has reportedly provided sanctuary for
NPA guerrillas ...went underground in 1980 after a
warrant was issued for her arrest ... from a wealthy
business family.
Lorenzo "Tanny" Tanada
Affiliation: Bayan
Born: 10 August 1898
"Grand old man" of the anti-Marcos movement .. .
also a leading anti-American, antibases, and antinu-
clear activist ...willing to be manipulated by Com-
munists ...leading member of NAJFD, JAJA, and
CORD ...currently chairman of Bayan ...took
leave of absence to support Aquino during her cam-
paign, returned to Bayan in March ...cited as possi-
ble leader of new "Organization of the National 25X1
Democratic Front" ...Harvard- and Oxford-educat-
ed lawyer ...senator for 24 years.
Antonio "Tony" Zumel
Affiliation: CPP, NDF
Born: 10 August 1932
Journalist and CPP Central Committee member .. .
widely believed to be head of the NDF ...heads the
CPP's Propaganda Commission and edits Ang Bayan,
the party newspaper ...president of the National
Press Club of the Philippines during the 25X1
1960s ...went underground when martial law was
declared in 1972 ... brother to Brig. Gen. Jose Maria
Zumel, former military aide to Marcos.
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Appendix C
Sample Teaching Material Prepared by Philippine Leftists
A Preliminary Political Snrvey of Nicaragua in the 1970s
Under the Joint US-Somoza Dictatorship
Political Grouping Classes and Social Strata
Represented
The Somoza clique Landlords, big comprador-
bourgeoisie
The plantation owners and Old type landlord-72 percent of
the old gentry all holdings under l0 acres are on
lease
Other bourgeois- Comprador-bourgeoisie
compradors
Pellas-Chamorro, Montea-
legre-Callejos families
Marginalized bourgeoisie National bourgeoisie and sections
of Comprador
Petty bourgeoisie small capitalists
intelligentsia; rank-and-file reli-
gious,white-collar workers)
Economic Role
and Interests
60-percent control of coun-
try's economy
Serve US imperialist inter-
est while enriching
themselves
Exploit peasantry through
leasehold and wage slavery
Promote agricultural ex-
ports of Nicaragua
Serve as partners of TNC in
industrial and trade
activities
Ties to Bank of America
and other business interests
Aspirations blocked by So-
moza, properties seized
Organizations and
Political Parties
Liberal Party
National Guard
UDEL-the "twelve" progressive
liberals (May 1974)
FAO-broad opposition that unit-
ed the UDEL, Democratic Conser-
vative Movement, Labor Unions
Repressive fascist dictatorship to Colonialism
preserve and expand rule Fascism
Feudalism
The State machinery, especially
the National Guard, responsible for
acts of repression in cities and
countryside
Legal opposition to Somoza clique Not anti-imperialist Parliamentary opposition and other
aiming at a share of wealth and Anti-Somoza but not essen- legal forms of action
power; goal: to remove Somoza and Bally antifascist
take his place
Essentially anti-Somoza and sup- Liberal, democratic, anti-
portive of the "twelve" in United fascist, not clearly anti-
States whose campaign against So- imperialist
moza aimed at removing US sup-
port for Somoza and winning such
support For themselves
Parliamentary and extraparliamen-
tary forms of protests, urban mass
actions, media, and other forms of
progaganda
Economically marginalized
and oppressed by Somoza's
actuations
Economically oppressed by
the Somoza clique
Aspirations blacked by So-
moza's monopolization of
economy
Social Christian Party and the pro-
Moscow Nicaraguan Socialist Par-
ty, both of which joined UDEL and
later the FPN
The MPU and later the FPN,
which are broad alliances that in-
cluded even the leftwing class par-
ties (conservatives et a])
FSLN-Sandinista National Lib-
eration Front
Farmers and farm workers Peasantry-125,000, of whom
52,000 had less than 7 acres
Farm workers-]09,000
Workers and urban poor Less than 85,000 industrial
proletariat
80,000 social and municipal
workers
20,000 workers in wholesale trade
Oppressed and exploited by
landlords through rent and
wages even during the ex-
port boom
Exploited and oppressed by
wages, prices, crisis
Did not profit From export
boom in chemicals, food-
stuffs, textiles, and electri-
cal equipment
Overthrow US-Somoza dictator- Anticolonial/anti-imperia4
ship through armed struggle and ist, antifeudal, and antifas-
mass struggles cist (National Democratic)
Marxist
FSLN-leading force of the liber-
ating movement, responsible for
mass organization of the rural and
urban poor, engaged in armed
struggle in the countryside and cit-
ies; won Nicaragua's liberation
MPU- and FPN-conducted urban
mass actions and propaganda sup-
porting armed struggle joined ur-
ban insurrections that led to victory
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012J01/26:CIA-RDP04T00794R000200860001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26 :CIA-RDP04T00794R000200860001-3
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26 :CIA-RDP04T00794R000200860001-3