(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000200830001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of COnfidential
Intelligence 25X1
China:
Agricultural Output
on the Upswing
Confidential
EA 86-10038
August 1986
Copy 2 2
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on the Upswing
China:
Agricultural Output
China Division, OEA,
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Confidential
EA 86-10038
August l 986
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China:
Agricultural Output
on the Upswing
tons. Japan and the Soviet Union both doubled their purchases of
Chinese corn and signed long-term trade agreements with Beijing.
Key Judgments In 1985 China experienced the seventh consecutive year of record agricul-
/n/ormation available tural production and became a net grain exporter for the first time. The
as oj7 July 1986 improvement in agricultural output in recent years came about through a
was used in this report.
program of reforms designed to encourage peasant initiative. Continuing
with policies to maximize rural initiative and expand free market farm
sales, Beijing saw important gains last year:
? The value of overall agricultural output rose 3 percent.
? Nonstaple agricultural production rose rapidly, with oilseeds, tobacco,
and sugar all up more than 30 percent over 1984. Meat, vegetable, and
egg output were reported significantly higher as well.
? Despite a 7-percent drop in grain production, grain exports tripled to over
9 million tons, while imports declined 45 percent to about 5.4 million
Despite the overall success, Chinese agricultural planners faced some
serious problems as a result of policies adopted last year:
? Decontrol of meat and vegetable prices, reduction of grain subsidies, and
promotion of rural free markets led to spot shortages, official confusion,
and an average 35-percent hike in food prices.
? Released from mandatory production quotas, Chinese farmers cut back
grain production sharply, concentrating on more lucrative crops or
industrial endeavors.
? Responding to these problems, Beijing instituted corrective policies that
further dampened peasant willingness to make long-term investments in
farmland.
Reacting to the grain shortfall in 1985, Beijing is implementing an
incentive package to rekindle peasant enthusiasm for grain production. The
reformers realize another decline in grain output in 1986 would be
politically dangerous, and are determined to implement polices that will
ensure a rise in production this year. We expect that revised policies to en-
courage grain production, increases in acreage allotted for grain, and good
weather will return overall grain output to an upward course in 1986,
although at a slower rate of growth than in the recent past.
The recently adopted five-year plan envisages about a 4-percent growth
rate in grain output between 1986 and 1990, but we expect the Chinese will
find it difficult to reach this goal unless they adopt measures that will
Confidential
EA 86-10038
August ! 986
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Confidential
increase the profit margin on grain production. Nonstaples, especially meat
and poultry, will continue growing steadily, but we expect increased
supplies to be offset by the growing demands of Chinese consumers for
more and better quality produce and for processed foods.
For the United States, China's agricultural reform policies offer both costs
and opportunities. United States agricultural producers will find the
Chinese to be tenacious competitors for corn exports to countries in the
North Pacific, and it will be difficult for US farmers to recover market
shares already lost. Faced with declining oil revenues, Beijing will continue
to press corn exports to Northeast Asia to earn foreign exchange, and we
expect the Chinese to go to considerable lengths-including suppression of
domestic demand-to maintain their market share. We also see little
likelihood that US wheat exports to China will return to levels of a few
years ago, at least in the short term.
The longer range outlook is more promising. China's food needs are
enormous, and the sophistication of the market is growing. We expect that,
as China's meat and dairy industries expand, the United States will have
opportunities to sell breeding stock, livestock-raising technology and
products, and food-processing equipment on a larger scale than at present.
Sales of US timber and wood products to China have grown considerably
in recent years, and we expect this trend to continue. The Chinese also will
be looking to the United States for seeds, pesticides, and assistance in
agricultural science and technology. Finally, judging by the construction of
new grain storage facilities in Chinese ports and by our estimate of China's
longer range food needs, we believe that Beijing will eventually begin
importing US grain again, in modest quantities, mainly to ease rail
transportation problems and to help satisfy the growing demand for wheat
products by Chinese consumers.
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Key Judgments
Agricultural Trends in 1985
Declining Grain and Cotton Output 2
Agricultural Trade in 1985
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China:
Agricultural Outer
on the Upswing
grain exporter.~~ 2a
r
n
rvestoc increase rama ica y m so, g a Livestock, forescry, Field crops
exports tripled, makin China, for the first time, a net and fisheries 76
1985, agricultural output, as reported by the State
Statistical Bureau (SSB), increased by 3 percent over
1984. China's output of oilseeds, vegetables, and
i
1' k ' d d t' 11 1985 Al
Agricultural Trends in 1985 Figure 1
China: Agricultural Output,
Seven consecutive years of record agricultural produc- 1979 and 1985
tion, capped by a strong performance in 1985, have
brought China a surplus of agricultural goods and Percent
marked it as a potential power in world commodity 1979
markets. Despite a 7-percent drop in grain output in 187 billion yuan
Chinese officials insist that pragmatic reforms that
encouraged peasants to make production and market-
ing decisions were largely responsible for the improve-
ments in the agricultural sector (see inset). Certainly lags
the causes of the agricultural boom are more complex 357 billion yuan
than that, but the results of these reforms have been
impressive.' Agricultural output in 1985 was nearly
twice that of 1979, the first year of reform (see figure
With reform, emphasis on grain production as the
"key link" in agriculture has been reduced and the
rural economy diversified, bringing unprecedented
prosperity to the countryside. According to the SSB,
between 1981 and 1985 the average per capita rural
income grew 11.7 percent per year, and in 1985 a
Chinese peasant, on average, earned 397 yuan ($123),
compared with 134 yuan in 1978. In contrast, average
urban income increased by only 8 percent annually
during the same period. Since 1979 over half of
Livestock, forestry, Field crops
and fisheries 64
a Compared at 1980 constant prices.
Source: Chinese State Statistical Bureau
309677 7-86
China's rural households have moved into new homes.
Rural consumption of animal-protein sources has
more than doubled, and purchases of household appli-
ances, bicycles, and other light manufactures also
have increased.
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Although reform policies have been good statistically
for Chinese agriculture, difficulties in their imple-
mentation have emerged. A 35-percent increase in
food prices last year and corruption by local leaders
were only the most publicized of these problems.
Judging from provincial statistics and scattered local
press reports, we believe last year's policies, which
combined the traditional program of consumer prod-
uct subsidies and production controls with a new
emphasis on free markets and the rule of supply and
demand, resulted in unexpected shifts in the type and
quantity of agricultural goods that were produced.
Beijing's planners have told Western reporters that
last year taught them a great deal about prices, supply
and demand, and how difficult it will be to bring in
policy measures that institute the positive aspects of
the free market (incentives), without relinquishing
control of the economy.
Growth Sectors
Freed from state-ordered demands to grow grain,
China's peasants turned to more profitable enterprises
in 1985. Many converted their grain land to various
types of cash crop production. Oilseed production rose
by one-third in 1985 to 15.78 million tons, a new
record. Consumer demand for vegetable oil, however,
still far outstrips supply, and producers responded this
year with a 9-percent increase in acreage. Sugar and
tobacco production each increased by over 30 percent
last year because of greater sown area and improved
yields. Jute and hemp output jumped 128 percent in
1985, reflecting an increased demand, both domesti-
cally and internationally, for gunnysacks.
China's retail food markets were in turmoil in 1985,
as the "second-stage reforms" required peasants to
sell their nonstaple crops-meat, vegetables, and
fruit-on the open market. Meat and vegetable prices
jumped over 30 percent after the reforms were insti-
tuted in April. Although there were scattered short-
ages reported after the free market policies were
implemented, the situation stabilized by yearend and
the Chinese media report that the quantity, variety,
and quality of these products have improved since the
state relaxed price controls. A survey sponsored by the
Chinese Xinhua news organization determined that in
most cities increasing numbers of independent vegeta-
ble peddlers brought about an improvement in the
variety, quantity, and quality of vegetables, as well as
in the convenience of daily shopping.
Price decontrol and higher pork prices stimulated an
increased interest in hog production. Red meat out-
put, mostly pork, increased by 14 percent to 17.5
million tons in 1985, and yearend hog inventories
were 8 percent higher than in 1984. Although China
has always been a producer of large, fatty hogs,
consumer tastes are quickly moving toward leaner
meats, and high lean-meat prices are challenging hog
producers to raise leaner pigs.
The poultry sector has expanded rapidly, growing at
an annual rate of 18.2 percent over the last five years.
Egg production in 1985 was over 100,000 tons, mak-
ing China the world's leading egg producer. The
strongest growth is taking place near large cities,
where households specializing in poultry, meat, and
egg production can find a ready market.
The success of earlier reforms is also changing
China's dietary habits. Larger incomes have brought
increased demand from Chinese consumers for conve-
nience foods, and 1985 saw substantial growth in the
output of some types of processed foods. The output of
beer, canned juices, and other processed drinks in-
creased by 60 percent in 1985, and still could not meet
demand. According to Xinhua, purchases of breads
and noodles by urban residents increased 18 percent
in 1985, accounting for 10 percent of each individual's
grain consumption. The output of animal feedstuff
jumped significantly last year and is expected to grow
even more dramatically in coming years as Chinese
meat consumption increases.
Declining Grain and Cotton Output
One of the most disturbing consequences of the new
policies-to Chinese leaders-was declining interest
in grain production. Attracted by higher profits,
peasants devoted more resources to cash crop produc-
tion, with the result that grain output fell by 7 percent
to a total 1985 output of 379 million tons (see figures
2 and 3). Crop damage from floods and other adverse
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Figure 2
China: Grain Production, 1980-85
a Includes tubers, corn, sorghum, millet, oats, buckwheat,
barley, peas, beans, and other legumes.
1980
81
82
83
84
85
Miscellaneous a
117.6
112.1
115.4
127.2
131.5
114.7
Soybeans
7.9
9.3
9.0
9.8
9.7
10.5
Wheat
55.2
59.6
68.5
81.4
87.8
85.3
Rice
139.9
144.0
161.6
168.9
178.3
168.5
Total grain
320.6
325.0
354.5
387.3
407.3
379.0
weather conditions were also factors in the grain
shortfall (see figure 4). Early in the year, Chinese
press reports indicated that Beijing planned to de-
crease grain area by 2.5 million hectares in 1985,
evidently believing that rising per unit output would
offset production area decreases and keep 1985 grain
output near the 1984 level of 407 million tons. Press
reports also indicate that farmers, anticipating lower
profit margins for grain, planted 4.5 million fewer
hectares of grain in 1985, nearly twice the decrease
Beijing originally planned. Also, profit-conscious
peasants used lower levels of costly production inputs
such as fertilizer and energy, causing per hectare
yields to fall for most grain crops (see appendix A).
Cotton output dropped by one-third in 1985 to 4.15
million tons. After two years of bumper cotton har-
vests, China has a huge cotton surplus, and Beijing
engineered the cut in 1985 cotton production
Reacting to last year's shortfall, Beijing is implement-
ing an incentive package to rekindle peasant enthusi-
asm for grain production. The motive for this pro-
gram-which includes input subsidies and
procurement policy changes-is largely political. The
grain drop became a strong issue in the fall of 1985,
when party conservatives pointed to falling grain
output as an example of how reforms were endanger-
ing central planning and social control. The reformers
fended off criticism by blaming bad weather and by
pointing out that, even though grain output was down,
gross agricultural output reached record levels.
Furthermore, some evidence suggests that grain pro-
duction may have fallen more than the 7-percent drop
reported. In any case, the reformers realize another
decline in output in 1986 would be politically danger-
ous and are determined to implement policies that will 25X1
ensure a rise in production this year.
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Figure 3
Grain Output in 1985
Bangladeah
Nei
Mongol
Mongolia
Sichuan
o"J
Guangdon
x. _ _.
South
Korea
Grain Output,
1985 Compared With 1984
(percent change)
Oto10
-10to0
-35 to -10
Soviet Unian l4Lake
/ ~i Baikal
.L(:J Hong Kong
Meceu (U.K.)
IPort.)
`ter' Hainan South China
Dao
Sea
Boundary representation is
nol necessarily authoritative.
Yellow
Sea
?rilt WBti
No' included
n study
East
China
Sea
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Figure 4
Precipitation as a Factor in the 1985 Grain Decline
Precipitation, 7 July to 31 August 1985
(percent of normal)
Flooding damage to crops likely
Drought damage to crops likely
Province-level boundary
Non-
cultivated
Mongolia
~1lei Mongol
Yunnan ~`~
~~
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
~ ~ ---
~heiia?r
}~ieilongjie g
_~\\
~ rr~
Norm
Korea
South
Korea
East
China
Sea
Philippine
Sea
708025 (A03163) 8-86
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Agricultural Trade in 1985
China has had a positive net agricultural trade bal-
ance the last three years (see figure 5). Two factors
contributed to the sharp drop in agricultural imports
in recent years: increased domestic grain produc-
tion-which reduced China's dependence on foreign
grain-and official restrictions on foreign purchases.
The jump in corn, cotton, and soybean exports was the
strongest factor in the recent upswing in Chinese
agricultural exports.
Imports. Chinese grain imports declined 45 percent in
1985, falling from 9.8 million tons in 1984 to 5.4
million tons. Wheat is China's principal import grain,
and good domestic wheat harvests allowed China to
further reduce its dependence on imported wheat.
Imports of US wheat fell by 80 percent in 1985 (see
figure 6).
China's imports of other US agricultural goods have
increased, however. The numbers of breeding live-
stock-hogs, dairy cattle, beef cattle, and poultry-
shipped from the United States to China have in-
creased. China also is importing more US cattle hides
to meet the growing demand-in domestic and export
markets-for leather goods.
Exports. According to Chinese Customs statistics,
grain exports tripled in 1985 to over 9 million tons,
making China a net grain exporter for the first time.
Cotton exports nearly doubled in 1985, totaling
347,000 tons.
Corn was the major export grain, and, despite an
estimated 12-million-ton decline in output, 6.2 million
tons were exported in 1985. After summer floods
damaged much of the corn-producing northeast, the
region's provincial leaders halted domestic shipments
of coarse grains and focused production and sales
efforts on international markets. Press reports suggest
that Beijing encouraged local leaders to limit domes-
tic sales and to push grain exports to earn foreign
exchange.
Corn exports went mainly to Japan and the Soviet
Union. China sold 2.5 million tons of corn to Japan in
1985, more than doubling the amount exported to
Figure 5
China: Farm Trade, 1978-84
I
-6 1978 80 84
Japan in 1984, and providing 20 percent of Japan's
corn imports. Japan has afive-year trade agreement
to buy Chinese corn, and Japanese importers have
reduced their purchases of US corn, saying Chinese
corn is of better quality. The fact that China repre-
sents anewly opening marketplace for Japanese ex-
ports and Japan needs to reduce a large trade surplus
with China in order to garner Beijing's good will
probably also encouraged the Japanese to increase
Chinese grain imports last year. The Soviet Union
bought 2 million tons of corn and soybeans from
China in 1985 and also signed along-term trade
agreement. Most of the imported grain goes to feed
livestock in the Soviet Far East. Indonesia is another
substantial importer of Chinese agricultural goods,
and in 1985 China supplanted the United States as
Indonesia's largest supplier of soybeans.
n
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Figure 6
China: Imports and Exports of Grain
by Source, 1980-85
Other
USSR
Japan
Imports
Other
Australia
Canada
~ United States
In developing agricultural policies for 1986, Beijing is
most concerned about ways to increase grain output
and encourage private investment in agriculture. Offi-
cial press commentaries have warned that the move-
ment of capital and resources out of grain production
and into other, more profitable sidelines in recent
years is endangering the long-term stability of China's
agricultural economy and must be reversed.
To increase grain production incentives, Beijing insti-
tuted aerogram of subsidized inputs and changed the
state's procurement plan for 1986. These policies,
which left the responsibility for implementation to
local-level officials, included:
? Subsidized prices and guaranteed supplies of fertil-
izer and fuel for grain producers.
? Loan discounts for grain growers.
? A procurement plan that allows peasants to sell
more of their grain to the state at higher prices.
Earlier this year, Beijing indicated in official and
press reports that the rapidly expanding rural indus-
trial sector might be tasked to provide financial
assistance to grain producers. Although no official
policy line was established, Beijing gave local officials
the go-ahead to tax rural industries in order to
support grain subsidy programs.
These directives-which have also encouraged rich
peasants to "volunteer" their wealth to assist in public
works projects and to help others become rich-have
spawned rumors among peasants that Beijing intends
to recollectivize agriculture. Local media reports indi-
cate that a great number of peasants who benefited
from the earlier policy changes are demoralized and
fear the state will both reduce investment in agricul-
ture and reverse its policies of promoting family
farming and rural free markets. In response, Beijing
has directed local officials to assure the peasantry that
there will not be a return to communes, and that state
investment in agriculture will increase in 1986. The
peasants were also encouraged to invest more of their
labor and resources in grain production. The spate of
rumors, directives, and public assurances makes clear 25X1
that policy instability and public uncertainty persist in
the countryside. Many rural entrepreneurs and peas-
ants are holding back from investing time and re-
sources into new types of business activity until they
can determine the direction of Beijing's long-term
policy plans.
According to He Kang, China's Minister of Agricul-
ture, agriculture is on an "upward trend" in 1986, and 25X1
good harvests of grain, cotton, and cash crops are
expected. After a dry, warm winter, generous spring
rains set the stage for what appears to have been a
good spring planting season.
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Officially reported crop acreages and conditions are
better than last year. Xinhua reported that, despite
delayed planting because of wet weather, 24.7 million
hectares of winter wheat have overwintered safely,
and this is a slight increase over 1985's wheat area.
Although exact planted grain area figures are un-
available, arecent official survey among rural house-
holds showed an increase in the planted areas of other
grain crops as well. Soybean area is reported up by
nearly 14 percent, and corn also increased significant-
ly. Overall, grain area is expected to increase by
nearly 2 million hectares in 1986, reversing a decline
of 4.5 million hectares last year. The production area
for rapeseed, China's main oil crop, is reportedly up
by 11 percent, and sugar acreage is also expected to
increase. Press sources indicate that the peasantry has
added to crop production area by increasing the
amount of land that is double-cropped, and by putting
back into production marginal land that was not
farmed last year.
The Chinese expect 1986 grain output to approach
1984's record output of 407 million tons. Although we
expect some increase in grain output this year, we are
skeptical that the policy incentives to grow more grain
will be that effective. Despite improved fertilizer and
loan subsidies, grain production is still less profitable
than other activities. To date, we have not seen any
indication of a substantial shift of private capital and
resources back into grain production. Rural residents
still appear to be focusing mainly on profitability.
Over the longer term, we expect Chinese grain pro-
duction to continue to increase, but at a slower pace
than in the last six years. The Seventh Five-Year Plan
(1986-90) set a grain production target of 425-450
million tons by 1990. Reaching 450 million tons will
require a growth rate equivalent to that registered in
the Sixth Five-Year Plan. We believe, however, it will
be difficult to reach this goal unless Beijing imple-
ments at least one of two options: make grain produc-
tion amore profitable activity-by increasing pro-
curement prices or by allowing the market more
freedom-or develop policies that will force peasants
back into grain production. Unless this year's meas-
ures achieve significant growth in grain production,
political pressure will grow to require farmers to
Chinese agricultural trade in 1986 will probably
follow the pattern established in recent years-in-
creasing exports and declining imports. We believe,
however, that the rapid decline in Chinese purchases
of US farm goods will ease this year. Given the fact
that the principal Chinese complaint about US grain
has been its price, the falling dollar and lower US
grain prices should make US exports more competi-
tive. Moreover, China needs feedgrains to support its
expanding livestock industry and has already
purchased over 200,000 tons of US soybeans this year,
the first soybeans sold to China in several years.
China also needs wood products-both logs and
lumber-to support its construction boom, and US
wood product exporters expect a jump in sales to
China in 1986.
Beijing appears determined to increase agricultural
exports in 1986 to offset the recent losses in foreign
exchange earnings caused by the drop in oil prices.
Press releases indicate that Beijing has given each of
the corn- and soybean-producing provinces a 1986
export quota, and during the first three months of this
year most of these provinces have doubled their
exports over last year. We believe that China will sell
as much grain as can be pushed through its over-
crowded ports while waiting to see how this year's
crop turns out. If the crop looks good, we expect the
export total to equal or increase slightly over 1985. If
bad weather or other problems bring poor harvests, we
believe China will have to pull back on its export plans
to maintain sufficient domestic grain stockpiles.
Beijing, in a recent press publication, discussed the
importance of developing along-term trade policy
program for China. Although He Kang and other
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Agriculture Ministry officials are optimistic about the
potential of agricultural exports as a foreign exchange
earner, they stated that they realize the demands of
China's growing economy will restrict the growth of
exports.
Because of its need for foreign exchange, and because
grain has proved in recent years to be a viable and
profitable export commodity, we believe the Chinese
will continue to push for moderate increases in grain
exports. Beijing recently announced plans to build a
series of bases for growing export crops. Most of these
bases are located in the northeastern provinces and
have contracted to grow corn and soybeans. China has
proved a competitive seller of these products to Korea,
Japan, and the Soviet Union. Beijing realizes it has
little chance of being a worldwide marketer of grain
but is determined to maintain and build on its position
as a stable, long-term supplier of grain to these nearby
countries.
Even as China strengthens its potential as a grain
exporter in North Asia, Beijing is taking steps to
prepare for an increase in grain imports. Several ports
are improving their facilities for unloading imported
wheat. Although wheat imports have fallen in recent
years, domestic demand is growing rapidly and Chi-
nese officials have admitted that an increase in Chi-
nese wheat imports is expected.
We believe US corn exporters will lose further ground
to China in the battle for grain markets along the
northern Pacific rim. Given China's determination to
develop export markets wherever possible, and its
willingness to sacrifice domestic consumption to
maintain them, we expect a further increase in grain
exports this year. Corn and soybean acreage is up
substantially and, unless the northeast has another
year of serious weather damage, it appears there will
be a surplus of grain to export. The Chinese are in the
corn- and soybean-exporting business on a long-term
basis, and US farmers will find them increasingly
competitive in these newly established markets.
Although US wheat sales to China in 1986 are not
likely to increase significantly over 1985 sales, some
US exporters will be encouraged by the Chinese
markets for other agricultural goods. The sales of
lumber, cattle skins, and soybeans should increase in
1986. The Chinese will also be looking for breeding
stock, seeds, and some specialized chemical pesticides.
Most of all, the Chinese need Western knowledge and
equipment to develop and systematize their food
production and processing industries. Various types of
food-processing equipment and flour- and corn-mill-
ing equipment-especially used machinery-are of
interest to the Chinese.
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Aside from coarse grain sales in North Asia, the
United States is not likely to face serious competition 25X1
from the Chinese in world agricultural trade any time
soon. In our estimation, China is not destined to
become a major world exporter of agricultural com-
modities. Indeed, we believe China will have difficulty
meeting its growing food demands with domestic
production, and eventually will again turn to the
United States and other agricultural powers to fill 25X1
more of its needs for grain, wood products, livestock,
and agrotechnology.
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Chinese agricultural reform began in 1979 with the
introduction of the peasant responsibility system.
Until that time, all agricultural production was con-
trolled by large rural communes and farm output was
sold to the government, which in turn marketed the
produce through state-runfood outlets. Under the
new program of reforms, communes were dismantled
and individuals and families were allowed to rent
,farmland and to make their own production deci-
sions. Furthermore, the state's agricultural procure-
ment prices were raised as an incentive for farmers to
increase production.
The second stage of reforms, implemented in 1985,
eliminated state monopoly purchases of agricultural
goods. The reforms permit peasants to sell part of
their grain, cotton, and oilseed production to the
state, the remainder being sold on the open market.
State purchases of meat, vegetables, and fruit were
eliminated, requiring peasants to sell all "nonstaple"
food production on the open market.
Most of China's provinces experienced a reduction in
grain output in 1985 (see figure 3J. The greatest drop
occurred in the northeastern provinces, where bad
weather was blamed. Output also was down in
China's southern region, probably because of a
nationwide move out 4f rice cultivation by Chinese
.farmers. Press reports indicate that in the last few
years rice production has become less profitable than
most other crops, and when new reforms instituted
this year gave peasants greater leeway in making
production decisions, they shlf'ted efforts into activi-
ties or crops that would make more money. Several
provinces in the North China Plain had increasing
outputs of grain in 1985, largely because this region
produces corn, wheat, and high-quality rice, com-
modities that are in strong demand in China.
Weather as a Factor in the
Grain Decline in 1985
Poor weather plagued sections of the country during
the year and is partially responsible for the decline in
grain output. The northeast was especially hard hit in
August and September by typhoons and.flooding,
which damaged over 10 million hectares of corn,
soybeans, and cotton (see figure 4J. Although early
Chinese press warnings of a SO percent decline in crop
output did not prove accurate, the US Embassy
estimated that grain production in the northeast
declined in 1985 by 10-12 million tons, most of which
was corn. Also, drought and pest problems settled
over the south-central region early in the summer and
caused some injury to the rice crop. Stepped-up
irrigation efforts helped avoid major damage, howev-
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Appendix A
China: Agricultural Inputs, 1985 a
Chemical fertilizer n
(million metric tons)
13.35
15.7
0
3.2
7.9
7.5
-8.6
Nitrogen (million metric tons)
tvn ~
13.3
-1.3
3.7
8.6
10.5
0
Phosphate (million metric tons)
Nw
26.9
8.7
1.2
5.1
-5.3
0
Potash (metric tons)
xn
25
25
0
16
37.9
0
Chemical insecticide (metric tons)
205,000
0
-9.9
-5.6
-27.6
-6.8
-31.3
Conventional tractors (units)
44,600 -
22.2 -
45.9 -
24.5
-7.5
7.3
12.3
Hand tractors (units)
rrn -
31.4
-8.7
49.7
67.1
34.7
0
In use
Conventional tractors (units)
864,000
11.7
6.3
2.5
3.5
1.6
1.2
Hand tractors (million units)
3.81
12.2
8.7
12.3
20.2
19.6
15.4
Rural electricity
(billion kilowatt-hours)
51.2
13.5
15.3
7.3
9.6
6.2
10.3
Irrigation pumps
(million horsepower)
78.5
4.8
0.5
2.3
2.3
-0.2
0
Chemical fertilizer
(million metric tons)
17.8
18.4
5.2
13.4
9.7
6.8
2.1
a Source: Chinese State Statistical Bureau.
b Nutrient content.
Not available.
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Appendix B
China: Selected Agricultural Production, 1982-85 a
Gross value (billion 1980 yuanJ ~
263.2
288.4
337.7
451.0
11.0
9.5
14.5
13.0
Grain (million metric tons) n
354.5
387.3
407.1
378.9
8.7
9.2
5.1
- 7.0
Cotton (million metric tons)
3.6
4.6
6.1
4.1
21.3
28.9
32.6
-33.7
Oil-bearing crops (million metric tons)
11.8'
10.6
11.9
15.7
15.8
-10.7
12.3
32.5
Sugarcane (million metric tons)
36.9
31.1
39.7
51.4
24.3
-15.7
27.4
30.2
Sugar beets (million metric tons)
6.7
9.2
8.3
8.9
5.5
36.8
- 9.8
7.6
Jute, ambari hemp (million metric tons)
1.1
1.0
1.5
3.4
-15.9
- 3.9
46.1
128. ]
Silk cocoons (thousand metric tons)
314.0
340.0
357.0
370.0
1.0
8.2
5.0
4.8
Tea (thousand metric tons)
397.0
401.0
411.0
440.0
16.0
0.8
2.6
6.0
Aquatic products (million metric tons)
5.2
5.5
6.1
6.9
1 ].9
5.9
11.0
12.5
Hogs (million head, yearend)
300.8
298.5
306.1
331.4
2.4
- 0.7
2.5
8.0
Sheep and goats (million head, yearend)
181.8
167.0
158.2
156.2
- 3.2
- 8.2
- 5.2
- 1.4
Large animals (million head, yearend)
101.1
103.5
108.3
113.8
3.6
2.3
4.7
5.0
a Source: Chinese State Statistical Bureau.
b Based on unrounded numbers.
Includes the output of rural industries.
d Includes potatoes, converted on a grain equivalent basis of 5 to 1.
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