CAMBODIA: HOW VIABLE THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000200740001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
0 7 JUL R
Cambodia:
How Viable the
Heng Samrin Regime?
An Intelligence Assessment
g6-le-6
/i&/
~
EA 86-10022C
June 1986
Copy 1 L 9
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cambodia:
How Viable the
Heng Samrin Regime?
This paper was prepared byl Office of
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East Asian Analysis, with a contributiar}
_fr_om_E
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DOffice of Leadership Analysis.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 86-10022C
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Secret
Cambodia:
How Viable the
Heng Samrin Regime?
Key Judgments Vietnam has implemented an ambitious strategy over the past two years to
Information available lower its profile in Cambodia by turning over more responsibilities to its
as of l May 1986 client People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime. Hanoi is motivated
was used in this report.
both by the need to curb rising anti-Vietnamese sentiment in Cambodia
and a desire to escape the international isolation brought about by its
occupation of Cambodia.
However, development of PRK institutions has been slow and erratic. The
government is still dominated by Vietnamese advisers, the Army remains
politically unreliable and tactically inept, and the Communist Party has
been unable to assert the leading role ascribed to it. We believe Hanoi will
have to support the regime indefinitely through a large military and
advisory presence despite a public pledge in 1985 to withdraw its forces-
which we currently estimate at 130,000 to 140,000-by 1990. Hanoi still
maintains 40,000 to 50,000 troops in Laos more than 10 years after the
Communist takeover there, and, in our view, will be hard pressed to reduce
its personnel in Cambodia to a comparable level any time soon.
Hanoi appears to recognize that the PRK's weakness renders its withdraw-
al timetable unrealistic, and we believe it will have to use subterfuges, such
as incorporating Vietnamese troops into Cambodian units, to conceal its
presence beyond 1990. In the. meantime, we expect Vietnam to promote
aggressively an image that the PRK is making rapid progress toward
internal self-sufficiency in hopes of eroding international support for the
Cambodian resistance. Hanoi hopes that propaganda efforts, along with
containment of the resistance and at least modest PRK headway, will
hasten acceptance-either tacit or through negotiations-of its dominance
over Cambodia.
Although Hanoi, in our view, will be able to maintain and slowly
consolidate its hold on Cambodia over the next few years, several
developments, such as changes in Vietnam's aging leadership, a marked
improvement in the performance of the resistance, or major PRK advances
toward self-reliance, might induce Hanoi to make minor concessions. We
believe Hanoi is unlikely, however, to compromise on its fundamental goal
of a Vietnamese-controlled Indochinese security bloc.
Secret
EA 86-10022C
June
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Key Judgments
The Resistance Challenge
2
The Border Front: The PRK's Maginot Line
6
The Current PRK Leadership
7
Vietnamese-PRK Dynamics
7
Leading PRK Officials 11
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Cambodia:
How Viable the
Heng Samrin Regime?
Where Matters Stand
Seven and a half years after invading Cambodia,
Vietnam is trying to reduce its presence by turning
over more responsibilities to the People's Republic of
Kampuchea (PRK) regime it installed in Phnom Penh
in January 1979 (see inset). From Hanoi's standpoint,
"Cambodianization" is imperative not only to fore-
stall a deepening nationalist backlash in Cambodia,
but also for Vietnam to escape from the isolation
imposed by its neighbors and most Western countries
in retribution for its invasion and occupation. But
Hanoi's calculations are predicated heavily on the
dubious proposition that the client regime in Phnom
Penh can develop sufficiently to manage its affairs
largely on its own-particularly in security matters.
The Heng Samrin-led PRK has thus far displayed
little capacity for governing, and recent trends in
resistance activity and popular sentiment-though far
from conclusive-suggest even its limited capabilites
have eroded. Mutinies have been reported among
some frontline PRK Army units, and refugees, news
reporters, and visitors tell of growing anti-Vietnamese
sentiment. Although such accounts are often self-
serving and exaggerated, they are sufficiently credi-
ble, in our view, to underscore the probability that
Hanoi will not be able to meet its announced deadline
of 1990 for withdrawing its troops from Cambodia.
Pol Pot's Legacy. The principal barriers to PRK
progress lie in Cambodia's inherent weaknesses. Be-
tween 1975 and 1978, the brutal Pol Pot regime
destroyed or disrupted much of the fabric of Cambo-
dian life in its ultra revolutionary zeal. Public institu-
tions such as banks were abolished, religion was
brutally suppressed, and the cities were emptied as
part of the regime's agrarian reforms. Many of the
country's intelligentsia died at the hands of Khmer
Rouge or from the hardships they inflicted, while
others fled, leaving the country with little human
capacity for reconstruction once the Khmer Rouge
were evicted. An article in the Soviet newspaper
Senior Gen. Le Duc Anh has emerged in the past
three years as the top Vietnamese authority on
Cambodia, a position formerly held by Le Duc Tho.
Anh, who became a Politburo member in 1982,
presented the most authoritative outline of Vietnam's
revised strategy and perspective on Cambodia in
Vietnam's Army journal in late 1984. The article
enunciated a major shift in Vietnamese thinking from
the early years of the Cambodian occupation, when
the resistance was considered a declining "banditry"
element, to a position that postulated a much more
imposing threat requiring a coordinated multifaceted
strategy.
Anh set forth five precepts:
? Indochina is a single theater of operations, embrac-
ing a socialist alliance and a strategic and combat
alliance on a unified war theater embracing politi-
cal, military, economic, and cultural fields.
? The success of the Cambodian revolution will be
decided by the Cambodians themselves.
? The Cambodian people must be mobilized under
party leadership to contribute to national defense.
? There are twofronts-border and inland-both of
which are important, but the inland front is the
decisive one.
? Building a PRK Army is an urgent strategic
demand.
Pravda in March 1986 noted that Kampong Chhnang
Province, for example, had only one qualified doctor,
three medical assistants, and six secondary school
teachers out of a population of 250,000.
Although the economy is slowly recovering from the
devastation of the Pol Pot years, it has not regained
pre-1970 levels. The pace of commerce has picked up
somewhat, largely because of an influx of Vietnamese
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improved supplies of consum-
Top Vietnamese strategist on Cambodia and archi-
tect of comprehensive overhaul of strategy adopted in
1984... senior general since December 1984 (highest
rank in Vietnamese Army) and member of the Polit-
buro since 1982... as head of Vietnam's B-68 advi-
sory apparatus in Cambodia until at least late 1985,
controlled all major policy decisions by the PRK
Government ... from southern Vietnam ... served
with North Vietnamese forces in Mekong Delta and
Saigon region in early 1950s ... became deputy
commander of southern headquarters in 1968 ...
deputy commander of North Vietnamese command
that captured Saigon in 1975... since 1981 com-
mander of Ministry of National Defense Forward
Command in Ho Chi Minh City, responsible for
southern Vietnam and Cambodia ... about 67 years
old.
petty traders and merchants, but agricultural and
industrial production have been slow to develop
The population has
managed to meet minimum subsistence rice require-
ments, but cultivated areas amount to less than 1.9
million hectares, compared with 2.5 million hectares
before 1970 Shortages
of fertilizer, inadequate irrigation systems, and insuf-
ficient supplies of high-yield rice varieties are inhibit-
ing substantial agricultural improvements. Although
er goods in Phnom Penh markets compared with three
or four years ago, most observers agree that recon-
struction of Cambodia's economy will require many
years because of the lack of capital and skilled
manpower. Even with Soviet or Vietnamese assistance
in rehabilitating and constructing light industrial
facilities, the difficult internal security situation and
inadequate transportation and electric power systems
will inhibit recovery.
The Resistance Challenge. Hanoi and its client re-
gime in Phnom Penh are still faced with guerrilla
activity in many areas of the interior despite the
success of Vietnam's 1984/85 dry-season military
offensive (see inset). Khmer Rouge forces have adapt-
ed to the loss of their bases along the Thai border by
shifting most of their operations to Cambodia's interi-
or. They have singled out local PRK administrative
entities in particular to undermine popular confidence
Khmer Rouge derive support from the populace in
many rural areas, where the reach of any central
government has traditionally been limited. At the
same time, we believe most Cambodians still fear and
detest the Khmer Rouge; and their increased opera-
tions, though worrisome to Hanoi, pose no imminent
threat to Vietnam's control.
The non-Communist resistance forces-the Khmer
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and
Sihanoukist National Army (ANS)-were damaged
seriously by Vietnam's 1984/85 offensive and have
been slow in reorienting themselves toward an interior
guerrilla effort. Nevertheless,
troops remain close to the Thai border, we believe
they command some sympathy from the local people,
which complicates PRK consolidation efforts.
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Security: The Essential Precondition
Hanoi considers the establishment of a secure and
reliable PRK security apparatus essential for carrying
out its announced plans to withdraw its own forces by
1990. Despite its outward bravado, Vietnam recog-
nizes that much difficult work remains. A Kampu-
chean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) directive
issued in March 1986 emphasized that the defense of
the country remained a life-or-death question and
that efforts to eradicate its enemies remained arduous
and protracted. The directive ordered the highest
possible rate of military conscription, continuation of
the civilian mobilization begun in 1984 to build a
border defense line, and the consolidation of internal
security through the building of strong regional,
militia, and police forces.
The stepped-up conscription effort highlights the lat-
est of many Vietnamese-inspired efforts since 1979 to
build the PRK regular Army as the country's first line
of defense. Results, however, have come slowly for the
Vietnamese, and :]continuing troop
desertions and mutinies indicate that many hurdles
Main Forces. There is little in the PRK Army's past
record, in our view, to suggest it will come close to
achieving such an ambitious objective any time soon.
Despite intensive efforts to expand the number and
strength of PRK main force units since 1979, only five
understrength divisions totaling about 15,000 troops
now exist. Hanoi has attempted since 1982 to wean
such units from dependence on Vietnamese mentor
units by moving PRK units into frontline areas along
the Thai border. Although each attempt has been
accompanied by large-scale desertions, Hanoi has
' The PRK Army includes about 15,000 troops in main force
military units and another 15,000 to 25,000 in provincial military
commands. Militia and self-defense units at the village level are not
counted as regular forces, although Vietnamese and PRK military
strategy require close coordination between regular forces and
militia units at the local level. The goal of a 100,000-man regular
army corresponds closely to the 90,000 troops under arms in the Pol
persisted, and each of the five divisions now has
responsibility for important sectors of the border.
According to PRK and Vietnamese defectors, Hanoi
still has little confidence in the ability of the PRK
Army to hold its own, however, and has not been able
to reduce substantially its own presence along the
Thai border.
In addition to the absence of an educated, technically
proficient manpower base, efforts to build a compe-
tent and reliable PRK Army have been undercut by a
variety of psychological factors. Few Cambodians
willingly assume the risks and hardships of military
life, particularly under the tutelage of the long-hated
Vietnamese. By a similar token, many PRK troops are
reluctant to fight against fellow Cambodians in the
resistance-frequent instances of desertion, fraterni-
zation, and defection attest to this.
Although these psychological factors appear likely to
bedevil the Vietnamese indefinitely, at least limited
headway is being made in developing the military.
Defectors report that at least one PRK armor regi-
ment has been formed from 50 to 100 tanks delivered
by the Soviet Union over the past two years.
for tht25
deficient in the PRK Armed Forces.
first time the presence in Cambodia of Soviet-made
SA-3 surface-to-air missile equipment that will proba-
bly be used to defend the airfield. The Soviets have
provided several patrol boats for an embryonic PRK
Navy in the past two years. Defectors indicate that
several hundred PRK military officers and troops go
to Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe
yearly for training. The return of increasing numbers
of trained personnel should gradually enhance the
leadership and technical capabilities that are now so
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Evolution of Hanoi's Strategic
Outlook and Game Plan
Hanoi's ultimate goal in Cambodia, in our view, is to
have a regime as nearly self-sufficient in internal
affairs as possible, but functioning as a component of
a larger Indochinese security bloc under Hanoi's
control. Hanoi has long regarded a cohesive grouping
of the Indochinese states as essential to its long-term
national security goals and regional political ambi-
tions. Senior Gen. Le Duc Anh, the top Vietnamese
military strategist on Cambodia, wrote in late 1984
that "Indochina is a (single) theater of operations,
and the strategic and combat alliance" of the three
countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) is essential
to the survival and development of each country and
the group as a whole.
Although it would have preferred a more subtle and
less costly alternative than invasion in bringing Cam-
bodia to heel in such an arrangement, there is little
doubt, in our view, that Hanoi will remain steadfast
in pursuit of its strategic objectives, now that they
appear to Hanoi to be within reach. The invasion of
northern Vietnam launched by China in early 1979 in
retaliation for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, con-
tinuing Chinese military pressure since then, and
Beijing's aid to the Cambodian resistance have recce
firmed, in Hanoi's eyes, the imperative for a united
and enduring Indochinese front. Hanoi views Thai-
land's cooperation with China as further evidence of
the need to make Cambodia, and in turn Vietnam
itself, secure from external threat.
1979-83: The Waiting Game. With Hanoi's commit-
ment to these strategic assumptions never seriously in
doubt, the issue among the leadership in Hanoi has
generally centered on what tactics were best suited to
resolve the Cambodian problem on the terms most
favorable to Vietnam. From 1979 to late 1983, Hanoi
appeared confident that time was on its side. The
military resistance was derisively labeled merely a
"banditry" problem, and Hanoi was optimistic that
the diplomatic opposition spearheaded by ASEAN
and China would in time dissipate. Although Viet-
nam mounted sporadic "offensives" in most dry
seasons, their effects were localized and short lived,
and Hanoi devised no conclusive military strategy
toward the resistance. Meanwhile, with Chinese aid,
the Khmer Rouge was reinvigorated and ASEAN-
Chinese collaboration allowed the two non-Commu-
nist resistance groups under Son Sann and Prince
Sihanouk to achieve impressive numerical growth
through 1983. Diplomatic opposition, moreover,
gained momentum and Hanoi found itself increasing-
ly isolated, particularly in the United Nations.
In 1983 the Khmer Rouge mounted its most aggres-
sive interior campaign since the invasion, and by
early 1984 highly exaggerated accounts of its ex-
ploits were receiving widespread international public-
ity. Non-Communist resistance forces, buoyed by
their numerical growth, also mounted limited forays
deeper into the interior than before. Hanoi, mean-
while, appeared to be on a diplomatic offensive and
held its troops in abeyance despite apparent gains by
the resistance. When its diplomatic initiatives-high-
lighted by Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach's visits
early in 1984 to Australia and Indonesia failed to
produce progress, Hanoi immediately invoked the
military option.
1984 Onward: Acknowledgment of a Threat. At that
point, Vietnam and the PRK abandoned their pre-
tense that the resistance was composed mainly of
bandit elements and openly acknowledged that the
PRK's enemies posed a continuing serious threat.
Several hastily prepared attacks were mounted
against key resistance bases at the end of the dry
season in March and April 1984. Vietnamese forces
for the first time maintained strong border positions
in the ensuing rainy season in contrast to their
normal pullbacks to the interior. They proceeded in
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the November 1984-May 1985 dry season to destroy
the remaining major resistance bases along the Thai
border in an unprecedented military offensive.
Keeping the Heat On. Since the offensive, the PRK's
border defense program has moved into high gear,
complemented by mining and patrolling of resistance
infiltration routes by Vietnamese and PRK forces and
a psychological warfare program to entice defections
from the ranks of the resistance. Nevertheless, the
resistance, particularly the Khmer Rouge, has suc-
cessfully shifted its focus to the interior and mounted
attacks in widespread areas. Although this has re-
sulted in a deterioration of internal security, we
believe Hanoi is willing to accept such costs over the
short term in gambling that it can permanently
stabilize the so-called border front. Once it believes
the border is adequately secured, we expect Hanoi
will begin shifting the nine divisions currently near
the border to the interior, leaving border defense
largely in the hands of the PRK Army.
writings, however, acknowledge that securing the
interior is a much more complex problem, requiring
coordinated military, political, and economic mea-
sures by a client regime that is still poorly suited to
mount them.
In the wake of the 1984/85 dry-season offensive,
Hanoi also took the public relations initiative by
announcing, for the first time, a specific date-
1990-by which all its troops would be withdrawn
from Cambodia. This pledge, however, carried a
proviso that would allow Hanoi to maintain troops if
hostile forces threatened Cambodian security. Viet-
namese diplomats have since offered to move the
withdrawal deadline to 1987 if an acceptable solution
to the Cambodian problem could be negotiated by
then.
divisions to defend Cambodia's borders, Vietnam has
developed a local forces apparatus in each of the 19
provinces. 25X1
we calculate that these forces number 15,000 25X1
to 25,000, but they probably will be substantially 25X1
expanded under the present intensified conscription
campaign. Hanoi appears to have encountered better
fortune in building these forces than main force units:
Troops in provincial units generally are stationed near
their homes, and until recently they have not faced
nearly as serious a threat from resistance forces as
have frontline main force units.2 Their strength ranges
from several 200- to 300-man battalions in such high-
threat areas as Batdambang and Siemreab-Otdar
Meanchey Provinces to a single, probably under-
strength battalion in each of the more remote or
secure provinces.
PRK provincial forces have developed under the
mechanism of joint Vietnamese-PRK "groups," in
which provincial military units from "sister provin-
ces" in Vietnam have helped establish a security
apparatus in counterpart Cambodian provinces. The
duties of groups range from joint sweep operations
against the resistance to the formation, training, and
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political indoctrination of PRK provincial forces. The
Vietnamese military components in the groups appear 25X1
subordinate to a separate, province-level specialist
team. The specialist teams coordinate and direct the
overall development of a PRK governmental and
security apparatus and Communist party organization
in each province. In some of the more secure prov- 25X1
inces, such as Svay Rieng, the military components
apparently have been reduced or withdrawn, leaving
only a predominantly civilian specialist team in place.
the joint Vietnamese-PRK groups in
most provinces would be abolished this year following
the nominal dissolution of three such units in 1985.
Nonetheless, we believe most of these entities will
probably be retained in some other guise, although
selective withdrawals of some units are likely.
2 Increased Khmer Rouge attacks on local government facilities
since late 1985, however, have imposed added burdens on local
forces in some areas.)
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Militia. The third major component of the PRK
security apparatus-the local militia-has received
increasing emphasis over the past year. Under Gen.
Le Duc Anh's blueprint, the local militia forces
responsible for village and hamlet security form a
vital part of the "inland front." No reliable estimates
of the number of people in militia units are available,
but, in our judgment, they are probably at least in the
tens of thousands and growing. In many areas most
threatened by resistance activity, formation of militia
units has been accompanied by construction of so-
called combat villages similar to the strategic hamlets
built in South Vietnam in the late 1950s. F_
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some cases, the Vietnamese have relocated thousands
of civilians to such villages. A Vietnamese military
journal claimed in June 1984 that up to that point
more than 300 "combat villages" and 4,000 "combat
hamlets" had been established throughout Cambodia.
The Border Front: The PRK's Maginot Line. Parallel
with its 1984/85 dry-season destruction of major
resistance bases, Hanoi instituted a "border defense
campaign" to construct a network of barriers along
PRK issued "Circular K-5" in July 1984, mobilizing
Cambodian workers throughout the country to clear
forests, dig defensive ditches, and build dams and
strategic roads along the border to thwart guerrilla
infiltration and enhance the mobility and logistic
efficiency of Vietnamese and PRK forces. An impor-
tant initial objective of the K-5 campaign was to
prevent resistance forces from recapturing territory by
facilitating the year-round deployment of Vietnamese
and PRK forces along the Thai border. In previous
years, Vietnamese dry-season military gains had been
largely negated by Hanoi's inability or unwillingness
to maintain a strong border posture during the rainy
season. The long-term objective of the campaign,
however, is to make infiltration of resistance forces
and supplies into the interior increasingly dangerous
and difficult, ultimately forcing guerrillas to abandon
the fight. Vietnamese authorities have acknowledged
that completely sealing the border is impossible, but
they apparently believe the campaign is a vital compo-
nent of the border front against the PRK's enemies.
The K-5 program continued throughout the recent
dry season, with thousands of civilian laborers from
interior provinces serving three-month stints along the
border. The program, however, has produced a public
relations backlash for Hanoi and the PRK, with
widespread evasion and desertions reported. Many
workers have been killed or injured by mines or have
contracted malaria. More important, the military
effectiveness of the border defense line has been
spotty. Although guerril-
la logistics have been hampered in some areas, the
increased attacks by Khmer Rouge forces in the
interior since late last year indicate that the barriers
remain porous. Non-Communist forces have also been
able to move more guerrillas into the interior since the
beginning of 1986. A senior non-Communist resis-
tance official recently told a US Embassy officer that
guerrillas had little difficulty penetrating or circum-
venting the PRK barriers. A further indicator of the
ineffectiveness of the K-5 plan is that it has not
allowed any substantial reduction in Vietnamese
troops in the border regions.
Long-term prospects for the border defense program
are uncertain at best, in our view. The program is
clearly unpopular, and the defensive works will re-
quire continuous maintenance if they are to have
more than a temporary effect. Moreover, their utility
will be greatly undermined unless the PRK military
can effectively patrol the infiltration routes used by
resistance forces
Nurturing the Communist Party
Although Hanoi's principal emphasis has been on
establishing a security apparatus for the PRK regime,
it looks to the Cambodian Communist Party as the
principal institution for consolidating long-term con-
trol over the regime's internal affairs. The absence of
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a party structure at the time of the Vietnamese
takeover required that the party be organized from
the top down. Hanoi drew the top officials primarily
from those former Khmer Rouge officers and officials
who rebelled against Pol Pot in 1978 and 1979 (see
the appendix). Although efforts to develop the party at
grassroots levels also began in 1979, only in the past
year or two has the regime made any claims of
noteworthy success.'
Despite generally upbeat assessments by party offi-
cials, many of the same problems cited at the 1981
party congress-when party leaders openly acknowl-
edged the inadequacy of the party to perform its
leadership mission-were cited by party General Sec-
retary Heng Samrin as continuing issues at the Fifth
Party Congress in October 1985:
? Party organization remains too thin and weak,
particularly at district and local levels, and has
failed to take deep root even in state-run enterprises.
? Serious shortages of leadership, economic, profes-
sional, and technical cadre remain.
? The political commitment of many party cadre
remains suspect, particularly their resolve to move
against the PRK's enemies.
? The reach of central party authority is still limited,
and implementation of its policies is uneven in many
parts of the country.
The Current PRK Leadership. The Cambodian lead-
ership, both at party and government levels, is almost
entirely a creation of Vietnam. According to the US
Embassy in Bangkok, at least seven of the nine
Politburo members elected at the party congress in
October 1985 have longstanding ties to Hanoi. The
top three-party General Secretary Heng Samrin,
National Assembly Chairman Chea Sim, and Prime
' As with the Armed Forces, building the party has been slow and
difficultd fewer than 70 anti-Khmer
Rouge Cambodian Communists were on hand for the Party's Third
Congress, an event contrived to develop legitimacy at the time of
the Vietnamese invasion in early 1979. Not until May 1981 were
enough party members-about 700-available to hold the next
party congress, which adopted the official title of Kampuchean
People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP). Although precise figures are
not available, a Pravda article last year indicated KPRP member-
ship had grown to 7,500, but it is not clear whether all are full party
Minister Hun Sen-are former Khmer Rouge leaders
who fled the Pol Pot purges in 1977 and 1978 and
joined Vietnam in overthrowing that regime. Hanoi's
abrupt removal of independent-minded party leader
Pen Sovan in late 1981 has, in our view, had a
salutary effect on other PRK officials who may have
entertained thoughts of staking out a nationalist
stance beyond the limits imposed by Hanoi.
Indeed, Hanoi apparently continues to exercise con-
trol over much of the PRK decisionmaking process.
Group B-68,^
a Vietnamese Communist Party organization estab-
lished in Phnom Penh in 1979, continued to control all
major policy decisions as of late 1985. Cambodian
officials appear to have little independent power,
As a result of Hanoi's
overwhelming presence, no PRK party or government
official has attained any appreciable stature as a
Cambodian nationalist, which, in our view, hampers
the regime's effort to extend its writ in the country-
side and to reduce popular resentment toward the
Vietnamese.
Moving Toward 1990
Vietnamese-PRK Dynamics. A prime motivation in
Vietnam's plans to "Cambodianize" the PRK is its
concern that an open-ended and large presence there
will bring historic Vietnamese-Khmer ethnic tensions
increasingly to the fore, but the PRK's slow develop-
ment poses a dilemma for Hanoi, in our judgment. A
precipitate or premature withdrawal of troops and
advisers would risk allowing the resistance to make
new inroads against or even to topple a weak PRK. At
the same time, the continuing large-scale presence
apparently deemed necessary by Hanoi to protect and
strengthen the PRK adequately could fuel anti-
Vietnamese sentiments. Both the Vietnamese and
PRK leaderships have alluded to such tensions and
the need to avoid inflaming them. Le Duc Anh has
exhorted Vietnamese troops and advisers to respect
Cambodian sovereignty and avoid manifestations of
"big nation chauvinism" in their dealings with the
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Cambodian people. KPRP General Secretary Heng
Samrin made a similar appeal at the 1985 party
congress for Cambodians to close ranks with Vietnam
and oppose enemy-inspired schemes to exploit historic
tensions.
senior PRK officials also see a dilemma for
themselves. Many reportedly resent Vietnam's influ-
ence and fear Hanoi will reduce its presence to
acceptable levels only when forced by popular pres-
sure in the PRK. On the other hand, they grudgingly
concede that an early Vietnamese pullout would risk a
return of the feared Khmer Rouge. F__~
A major element in the apparent rise in anti-
Vietnamese sentiment has been the influx of Viet-
namese settlers into Cambodia since the invasion.
There is no credible evidence of an official Vietnam-
ese policy to move settlers into Cambodia, and much
of the migration appears to be individually motivated.
Hanoi has done little to halt it, however, and
Vietnamese settlers often receive
preferential treatment such as immunity from some
PRK laws. Large Vietnamese enclaves are reported to
exist along the Tonle Sap and in Phnom Penh.
Reliable statistics are not available, but we estimate
the total number of Vietnamese at roughly half a
million 5-approximately the number in Cambodia
before the Pol Pot era. Although there is little doubt
that the influx of settlers advances Hanoi's control
apparatus in Cambodia, unless Hanoi restrains the
influx, we believe it will further fuel anti-Vietnamese
passions.
Hanoi's External Calculations. Despite its outward
confidence, we believe Hanoi recognizes that it will be
required to maintain a sizable military and advisory
presence in Cambodia well beyond its 1990 withdraw-
al deadline. In neighboring Laos, for example, Viet-
nam still maintains some 40,000 to 50,000 troops
more than 10 years after the Communist takeover.
We believe Hanoi will be hard pressed to reduce its
presence in Cambodia even to this level over the
next several years. The client PRK regime, along with
its Army and party apparatus, in our judgment, is
many years away from being able to stand on its own.
Vietnamese officials have acknowledged to Western
newsmen and diplomats that their troop withdrawal
deadline and the PRK border defense program are
intended as much to be psychological measures to
prod the PRK into greater progress as they are
concrete goals.
Given the likelihood that "Cambodianization" will
achieve only partial success in the next few years,
Hanoi will, in our view, heavily promote the percep-
tion that it is accomplishing its goals to exploit
divisions in both the resistance and ASEAN. Vietnam
probably calculates that over time, propaganda ef-
forts, coupled with at least a containment of the
resistance and modest PRK progress, will advance
prospects for a favorable outcome for Hanoi along
such lines as:
? De facto acceptance by most ASEAN countries
(Thailand being a probable exception) of Vietnam-
ese control over Cambodia. Although an open break
in ASEAN ranks on this issue is, in our judgment,
unlikely, support to resistance forces would probably
decline and the impact of the Cambodian issue as a
constraint on Vietnamese behavior would gradually
weaken. Hanoi would find it easier to pursue dual-
track policies with opponents wherein the Cambodia
issue-though not formally resolved-would not
seriously impede other policy objectives such as
improved economic ties.
? A negotiated settlement that would require only
cosmetic concessions by Vietnam such as including
prominent non-Communist resistance figures in a
PRK-dominated government and containing guar-
antees that would emasculate the resistance. We
believe this is Hanoi's preferred option as it would
accord legitimacy to its control and more quickly
eliminate the Cambodian issue as an impediment to
other objectives
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military responsibilities to Vietnamese civilians.
To advance its public relations goals as well as
outwardly meet its public commitment to withdraw
by 1990, Hanoi will have to use subterfuges to conceal
the presence we believe it will be required to maintain.
These may include the integration of Vietnamese
soldiers into PRK units and the transferral of some
the
troops were being withdrawn.'
Vietnamese were preparing to integrate Vietnamese
troops into PRK divisions at an early date to strength-
en PRK forces and allow Hanoi to claim its own
las since late 1985.
Hanoi will also continue its highly publicized annual
troop withdrawals begun in 1982 as a necessary
propaganda measure, even though these have had
little impact on its military strength in Cambodia. We
do not believe any significant reduction in Vietnam's
130,000- to 140,000-man force will occur until Hanoi
is better able to gauge the effects of apparently
increased resistance activity by Khmer Rouge guerril-
Alternate Scenarios. Although we believe that Hanoi
will slowly consolidate its grip on Cambodia in the
coming years despite the weakness of its client PRK
regime, our forecast could be overtaken by several less
likely developments:
? Changes in the Vietnamese leadership are virtually
certain before or during the Sixth Party Congress
scheduled for November 1986. More pragmatic
successors to the aging old guard led by Le Duan
might conclude that efforts to develop a credible
PRK regime unacceptably hinder achievement of
other strategic objectives such as normalizing rela-
tions with the West and seeking rapprochement
with China. These considerations could lead to a
less rigid line on Cambodia that would allow a more
rapid or liberal "national reconciliation" between
the Cambodian resistance and the PRK than Hanoi
would otherwise be inclined to permit.
? A marked growth in the effectiveness of the Cambo-
dian resistance would delay Hanoi's withdrawal
timetable and possibly produce increases in both
' We have no conclusive evidence that Hanoi has actually begun
implementing such a plan.F__1
internal and external-for example, Soviet-pres-
sure on Vietnam to seek an early settlement. The
odds of this happening would be better if the
performance of the non-Communist resistance un-
der Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk were to improve
dramatically. Conversely, if resistance growth were
confined to the Khmer Rouge, Hanoi would proba-
bly take a harder line to forestall reemergence of
what in its eyes would be a Chinese-controlled
threat.
? The emergence of a competent PRK regime able to
stand largely on its own and resistant to Hanoi's
dominance. This is a far less likely prospect, in our
view. Despite the visceral anti-Vietnamese senti-
ment in Cambodia, we see no current evidence that
it can be channeled into the type of opposition that
would loosen Vietnam's basic control.
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Appendix
Leading PRK Officials
Heng Samrin
Chairman, Council of State (President), since June 1981 ... KPRP General
Secretary since December 1981 ... member of Politburo and party secretariat,
chairman of the People's Revolutionary Council since 1979 ... President of the
Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense (KUFNCD)
since December 1978 ... top KPRP leader in title, but not in reality ...
... joined Khmer Rouge in 1959 ... by 1975
commander and chief political commissar of Khmer Rouge Fourth Division and
deputy chief of staff of Eastern Region ... led Army uprising against Pol Pot in
1978 ... native of peasant stock from Prey Veng Province ... 51 years old ...
married with three children and at least two grandchildren.
Chea Sim
Politburo member since May 1981, Chairman of National Assembly since June
1981, and chairman of the KUFNCD since November 1981 ... probably responsi-
ble for united front and mass mobilization ... one of most influential KPRP
leaders ... cousin of Heng Samrin ... joined anti-French resistance in 1952.. .
elected to Pol Pot's People's Representative Assembly of Democratic Kampuchea
in 1976... escaped to Vietnam after participating in abortive uprising against Pol
Pot in May 1978 ... former PRK Minister of Interior ... native of Svay Rieng
Province ... about 54 years old.
Hun Sen
Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier) since January 1985 ... member of
Politburo and party secretariat, Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1979 ... proba-
bly most powerful official in PRK Government ... can be unpredictable and easily
angered ... private person wary of strangers ... native of peasant origins from
Kampong Chain Province ... broke off studies in Phnom Penh in 1970 to oppose
Lon Nol government ... rose to deputy commander and chief of staff of a
regiment in Khmer Rouge Eastern Region by 1977 ... broke with Khmer Rouge
that year and escaped to Vietnam ... about 35 years old ... lost an eye from a
shrapnel wound ... married with children.
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Kaoh Kong Province and an ethnic Thai ... about 61 years old.
Say Phuthang
Politburo member and vice chairman of Council of State since 1981 ... Chairman
of Central Committee Control Commission since October 1985 ... joined anti-
French resistance in 1948... sent to Hanoi as a student in 1954... probably
returned to Cambodia in 1970... broke with Pol Pot regime in 1974... headed
Central Committee's Central Organization Commission 1981-85 ... a native of
Bou Thang
Minister of Defense and a vice chairman of the Council of Ministers since
February 1982 ... Politburo member responsible for defense since May
1981 ... member of party secretariat known as "the bulldozer" because of
management techniques ... joined anti-French Issarak Movement in 1954 and left
to study in Hanoi same year ... became Khmer Rouge district commander in
northeast in 1970... turned against Pol Pot in 1974 and organized guerrilla
movement in northern Cambodia ... speaks Vietnamese and Laotian ... about 48
years old.
Chea Soth
Politburo member responsible for economy since May 1981 ... Minister of
Planning and Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers since June 1981 . over-
sees distribution of foreign aid ... since January 1985, chairman of a permanent
subcommission for scientific and technical cooperation between Cambodia and the
Soviet Union ... native of peasant stock from Prey Veng Province ... joined anti-
French resistance in 1949 and studied in Hanoi ... worked until 1970 for
Vietnamese News Agency ... worked for Khmer Rouge news agency in Hanoi
from 1970 until breaking with Pol Pot in 1974 and remaining in Viet-
nam ... PRK's first Ambassador to Vietnam, January 1979-September
1980... about 58 years old.
ried to Peng Patt, who possibly is Vice Minister of Economic Cooperation.
Men Sam-an
Politburo member since October 1985 and most influential woman in PRK
leadership ... alternate member of Central Committee since 1981, full member
since 1984... protege of Le Duc Anh, major factor in meteoric rise to Politburo-
... Defense Minister Bou Thang also may be patron ... has received unusually
large amount of foreign publicity as occasional party spokesperson ... head of
KPRP's Propaganda and Education Commission, 1984-85 ... chairman of
Central Organization Committee of party Central Committee since last October,
powerful position in charge of building party and making all party appointments-
... joined Khmer Rouge in 1970... studied Communist doctrine in
Vietnam ... in mid-1970s apparently worked as agent in Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge
for anti-Khmer Rouge Cambodians ... after 1979 ouster of Khmer Rouge, served
as chairman of a unit in PRK Ministry of Defense ... about 33 years old ... mar-
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Mat Ly
Politburo member since 1982, probably responsible for mass organizations ... gen-
eral secretary of National Council of the KUFNCD since at least 1983 ... vice
chairman of the National Assembly since at least 1982 ... chairman of the
Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions since at least 1983 ... Muslim, native of
Kampong Cham Province ... joined anti-French resistance in 1948, jailed and
tortured by French 1950-53 ... lost numerous family members during Khmer
Rouge purge of Muslims ... rebelled against Pol Pot in 1978 and fled to
Vietnam ... served as Vice Minister of Agriculture in 1983 ... about 61 years old.
Ney Pena
Member of Politburo and party secretariat with responsibility for security matters
and Minister of Interior since October 1985 ... member of Central Committee
since February 1985 ... as of 1981 party congress, held position of vice chairman
of Preah Vihear Province's security service ... as of 1985, secretary of Preah
Vihear party committee.
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