GROWING MUSLIM DISCONTENT IN INDONESIA: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000200670001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
for Stability
Growing Muslim Discontent
in Indonesia: The Implications
EA 86-10014
April 1986
197
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Growing Muslim Discontent
in Indonesia: The Implications
for Stability
Office of East Asian Analysis, with a
Division, OEA,
contribution from0 Office of Central
Reference. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia
Secret.
EA 86-10014
April 1986
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 7 March 1986
was used in this report.
for Stability
Growing Muslim Discontent
in Indonesia: The Implications
government previously tolerated free speech as a safety valve.
The resurgence of Islam in the past few years has manifested itself in
Indonesia in increasing mosque attendance, newfound religious fervor, and
the strengthening of the more doctrinaire Shia sect of Islam. The Soeharto
regime's response has been to intensify efforts to undercut the political
influence of Islamic groups-a process that began when Soeharto consoli-
dated control in the 1970s. Recent legislation requiring all public organiza-
tions-including religious groups and political parties-formally to adopt
the secular state ideology is, in our judgment, intended to stifle virtually all
legal avenues of Muslim political expression. In addition, authorities have
begun to crack down on militant preachers in the mosques-where the
Islamic political activity.
Despite this government pressure, the radical fringe-although still in the
minority-is rapidly growing. We believe that much of the violence in 1984
and 1985-ranging from rioting to arson and bombings-can be traced to
Islamic radicals. We also believe that increasing numbers of moderate and
nominal Muslims resent the government's heavyhanded restrictions on
achieve political gains will be better.
In our judgment, however, an Iranian-style surge of fundamentalist
opposition is not likely soon. Indonesian Muslims-most only nominally
religious and subscribing to the less doctrinaire Sunni form of Islam-lack
cohesion, leadership, and a tradition of effective involvement in politics.
They will have to overcome these major handicaps in order to exercise a
significant political role-a prospect we judge to be unlikely in the
foreseeable future. For now, moderate Muslim leaders-realizing they are
ill prepared to confront the regime-are resigned to forgoing political
action, concentrating instead on religious training and organization in
preparation for the post-Soeharto era, when they believe their chances to
arm's length.
In the event that Islam did become a stronger and permanent political
force in Indonesia, it would complicate relations with the United States.
Jakarta is already at odds with Washington on such issues as UN votes in-
volving the Middle East and Israel, and such differences might well
increase. Indonesian Muslims also might seek to promote representation in
Indonesia by Middle East elements, such as the PLO and Libya, thus
reversing Jakarta's current policy of keeping such militant influences at
Secret
EA 86-10014
April 1986
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Secret
In the meantime, we believe radical Islamic elements will continue trying
to whip up antigovernment sentiment by exploiting religious and political
grievances as well as other frustrations among Indonesians-such as
poverty, regime corruption, and the economic dominance of the Chinese.
Indonesia's bleak economic prospects increase the likelihood of spontane-
ous Islamic unrest-possibly appearing as sporadic mob violence triggered
by a minor incident or encouraged by antigovernment speeches-particu-
larly as low oil prices increasingly limit Jakarta's economic policy options
to implementing more financial austerity.
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The Rising Tide of Islam ...
Youth: Vanguard of the Revival
1
The Role of the Radicals Rising
3
Jakarta's Strategy-Legislating Harmony
3
... While Brandishing the Stick
4
... and Using the Carrot
5
The Dangers Ahead
6
A. Selected Indonesian Islamic Organizations
C. Chronology of Recent Unrest
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Province-level
boundary
Cocos (Keeling)
Islands
(Austl.)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
0 150 300 Kilometers
0 150 300 Miles
Pacific
Ocean
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Growing Muslim Discontent
in Indonesia: The Implications
for Stability
The Rising Tide of Islam ...
Since Indonesia declared independence in 1945, au-
thorities have been concerned that a resurgence of
Islamic militancy could threaten the stability of the
ethnically and religiously diverse archipelago. The
current military leadership in particular remembers
combating Muslim-led secessionist revolts in the
1950s and early 1960s. Government apprehensions
have been heightened by such incidents as the 1981
hijacking of an Indonesian airliner by a radical
Muslim group, and by the spate of antigovernment
activity in 1984-85, according to the US Embassy
(See appendix C for details.)
The current leadership-though not in principle anti-
Islamic `-regards the more strident versions of Islam
as a handicap to economic
development. The government has sought to confine
Islam to nonpolitical activity so that it will not
become a focus of opposition to authority. The leader-
ship is particularly apprehensive that radical Islam in
the Middle East could fuel domestic extremism both
by example and through direct support. Jakarta's
announcement in August 1985 banning Indonesian
students from traveling to "extremist" Muslim coun-
tries-Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Alge-
ria-we believe reflects concern about the threat of
"foreign" Islamic influence to Indonesia's security.
President Soeharto's policies, nonetheless, have not
prevented the Islamic revival that has swept much of
the Muslim world from reaching Indonesian believers
at the grassroots level.
mosque attendance, religious devotion, and the appeal
of radical doctrine are increasing, and this has been
confirmed by Indonesian Home Affairs Minister
Rustam to US Embassy officials. Several foreign
press and academic observers with long experience in
Indonesia note substantially increased adherence to
the five pillars of Islam in previously apathetic areas
of the Javanese countryside.' According to US Em-
bassysources, the number of prayer halls
has increased, as have religious publications, radio
lectures, and private instruction. Observers also note
that mystical Islamic sects appear to be expanding;
and that more Indonesians are making the hajj to
Mecca and are paying the zakat (tax) to benefit the
poor.
Although most of the evidence is anecdotal, we
believe the following broad characterizations of Is-
lamic activity are valid.
Youth: Vanguard of the Revival. A number of Islamic
leaders in Java-the most populated and politically
dominant island in the Indonesian archipelago-are
concerned about growing radicalism among Indone-
sian youth, particularly the urban and educated.
Improved educational and travel opportunities have
broadened their exposure to developments elsewhere
in the Islamic world and-according to US Embassy
officials-increased their receptivity to foreign ideas.
In addition, US Embassy sources report
that in recent years Indonesian youth have sharply
increased participation in mosque activities-includ-
ing affiliated study and social groups-near a number
of universities. We believe this trend in part results
from the ban on campus political activity, which has
driven such activity underground. An Embassy source
in Medan, Sumatra, for example, indicates that local
students are increasingly active politically, meeting in
small study groups to discuss political and economic
issues, particularly the failings of the current system.
2 The five pillars of Islam mandated by the Prophet Muhammad
are: (a) a verbal declaration of God's uniqueness and the primacy of
the Prophet Muhammad; (b) performance of daily ritual prayer; (c)
contribution of alms; (d) fasting during the month of Ramadan; (e)
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Despite their numerical superiority-nearly 90 per-
cent of a population of more than 170 to about 175
million-Indonesian Muslims have failed since inde-
pendence to achieve a dominant role in national
politics. Upon coming to power following the 1965
Communist coup attempt, Soeharto initially cur-
ried-and gained-the support of Islamic organiza-
tions to eradicate Communist and other leftist ele-
ments. For their part, Muslim politicians saw this as
an opportunity to secure a prominent political rolefor
Islam. By the early 1970s, however, Soeharto had
consolidated his position and began to curb Islam as
a political force. In 1973 he forced the four Muslim
parties to consolidate into the United Development
Party (PPP), a coalition that has remained faction
ridden, ineffectual, and effectively controlled by the
regime
Islam in Indonesia is diverse, embracing a majority
of nominal Muslim moderates and disparate funda-
mentalist minorities. Islam initially arrived in the
outer islands-such as West Sumatra, Kalimantan,
and Moluccas-via the Malaysian Peninsula in
about the 13th century, where smaller ethnic groups
tended to convert to stricter forms of orthodox Islam.
On the main island of Java, however, Islam melded
with traditional Javanese mysticism, Buddhism, and
Hinduism, forming a strain of Islam that generally
lacks the doctrinaire aspects of some Middle Eastern
varieties. Although most Javanese regard themselves
as Islamic, they generally do not rigorously apply the
prescriptions of Islamic law to daily life.
According to US Embassy observers, almost all
serious Muslims favor a greater political role for
Islam, but they differ on how to achieve that goal.
Most reject creation of an Islamic state, and many-
particularly the Javanese-oppose the application of
strict Islamic law, believing it would create civil
strife. Most would prefer a state in which Muslims
would exercise a greater role in policymaking and in
which Islamic principles would be reflected in govern-
ment law and regulations.
Orthodox Muslims are in the minority and do not
control any major Islamic institutions. It is impossi-
ble to assess what proportion of Indonesian Muslims
are devout, but knowledegable observers estimate
that only about 20 percent of the population of the
central island of Java is orthodox.
Despite their growing frustration with the regime's
authoritarianism and its disregard for their religious
sensitivities, the nominal Muslim mainstream and
most of the orthodox minority remain wary of radi-
calism and continue to at least passively support the
government. Local Muslim leaders in Java-speak-
ing to US Embassy officials-have indicated there is
only a handful of extremists among their devout, but
politically inert, constituencies. Leaders of estab-
lished Muslim organizations-such as the NU, the
HMI, and the Muhammadiyah-believe they must
continue to support the government for the present
because the current system is preferable to a less
tolerant fundamentalist Islamic state espoused by the
radical right.
In addition, many in the nominal Muslim majority
have benefited from the political stability and eco-
nomic progress of Soeharto's New Order regime and
do not want to see that stability threatened by civil
unrest. Most middle- and upper-class Indonesians-
whose livelihoods depend directly or indirectly on the
state-at least tacitly support present policies. The
masses generally accept the regime's authority and
feel positive toward Soeharto, according to Embassy
and other observers.
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At the same time, established student organizations,
such as the Indonesian Students' Association (HMI)
and the Indonesian Islamic Students' Movement -
(PMII), continue to attract and train young Muslims.
Because it is risky to carry out political protests,
senior HMI and PMII members instead prepare
students for the future by training them in the
ideology of Islam and increasing their awareness of
political and social problems, according to Embassy
sources. Traditional Islamic pesantren (boarding
schools) are another important setting for religious
activity. Most of these schools-estimated by foreign
observers to number 15,000 and concentrated in
Java-draw their students locally. US Embassy
sources indicate the schools appear to be increasingly
active in local social and political affairs.
External Influences Modest. Foreign influence ap-
pears to have had limited responsibility for fueling
recent Muslim unrest.
the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta does maintain exten-
sive ties to a number of mosque, student, and teach-
ers' groups. Iranian officials have distributed pro-
Khomeini literature and cassettes extolling the
Iranian revolution and the Shia sect, funded under-
ground religious publications, and sponsored unspeci-
fied training in Iran for youth leaders. This literature,
however, appears to have limited appeal to the Indo-
nesian public, according to US Embassy observers.
The Role of the Radicals Rising. Although Indone-
sia's Shia community remains insignificant numeri-
cally, US Embassy sources indicate that Shia ideas
are increasingly popular among urban, middle-class
youth who admire the Ayatollah Khomeini's indepen-
dence in dealing with the non-Muslim world. Accord-
ing to these sources, Indonesians with religious train-
ing in Iran are organizing "cells" of university-age
youths to rigorously study Shia doctrine. Trainees are
instructed to hide their affiliation and to await un-
specified action. Embassy sources also indicate that
Indonesian youths home from studies in Egypt and
Saudi Arabia have formed small Islamic Brotherhood
groups throughout the islands similar to those abroad.
These appeal primarily to lower-middle-class and poor
students.
Indonesian
authorities and Islamic leaders acknowledge that sev-
eral clandestine Shia groups, their leaders posing as
Sunnis, are active in East Java.
arrested and interrogated sev
Muslim clerics in religiously traditionalist East Java
who reportedly admit secret Shia cells are locally
active and that one-the "Aggressive Islamic Youth
Movement"-was involved in several terrorist bomb-
ings in 1984 and 1985. This group appears to have
been responsible for recent threats against the US
Consulate in Surabaya.
Jakarta's Strategy-Legislating Harmony
During his 20-year tenure, Soeharto has systematical-
ly pursued a strategy of legal maneuvering
to contain Muslim and other potential opposi-
tion groups. The regime appears to have capped this
strategy in 1983 by legislating that all social and
political organizations-including religious groups-
must formally endorse the secular state ideology
(Pancasila) as their primary ideological and organiza-
tional principle. By forcing public or formal compli-
ance with Pancasila, Jakarta hopes legally to elimi-
nate the basis for ideological conflict,
Subsequent legislation in mid-
1985 extended this stricture to include all mass
organizations-including religious, professional, and
cultural groups. In his public speeches, Soeharto
equates opposition to Pancasila to an attack on the
constitution and government itself, and the new law
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Indonesia's state ideology (Pancasila) was first enun-
ciated by Sukarno at the time of independence in
1945 and incorporated into the constitution as a
unifying, ideologically neutral symbol for the geo-
graphically, ethnically, and religiously diverse na-
tion. It is a vague credo of belief in one god,
humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and
social justice, intended by its architects to ensure
Indonesia's evolution as a secular state. During the
Sukarno era, overtly political organizations were
forced to accept Pancasila, but other groups were
required only to avoid violating its principles.
After coming to power, Soeharto initially retained the
doctrine to enforce social harmony and to head off
any Islamic resurgence to fill the political vacuum
left by the defunct Communist Party. In recent years,
however, he has become preoccupied with forcing
universal acceptance of the secular state ideology.
Soehart
offended
both Muslim and non-Javanese sensitivities in a
speech in 1982 that extolled the Javanese origins o
Pancasila and denigrated the role of Islam.
In promoting Pancasila, Jakarta stresses traditional
consensus politics and communal harmony rather
than 'foreign" concepts of majority rule, individual-
ism, opposition, and criticism. The Soeharto re-
gime-the self-appointed arbiter and enforcer of Pan-
casila-regards alternative ideologies and opposition
to the secular state doctrine as an attack on the
government itself and a threat to stability.
empowers authorities to police compliance with Pan-
casila and to disband offending groups. Muslim and
other organizations have had little alternative but to
bow to government pressure, and one after another
they have endorsed the state ideology.
Piqued by the United Development Party congress's
formal acceptance of Pancasila in August 1984,
Muslim resentment escalated sharply. There was a
surge of antigovernment propaganda, including
mosque speeches, cassette tapes, pamphlets, and post-
ers. In a slum neighborhood of Jakarta's Tanjung
Priok port district-an area of high unemployment,
crime, and with a concentration of immigrants from
the more fundamentalist outer islands-local activ-
ists whipped up popular discontent by denouncing the
regime's repression of Islam and criticizing the ties of
Soeharto, Murdani, and other key officials to finan-
cial kingpins in the widely hated Chinese business
community
The public mood deteriorated further following re-
ports that security forces desecrated a mosque while
removing anti-Soeharto posters. After police arrested
four activists, a mob of 1,500 to 2,000 people formed,
and several Chinese shops were looted and burned.
Demonstrators then marched on the police station to
demand the release of the arrested activists. Outnum-
bered security forces opened fire, killing numerous
demonstrators-including a well-known local com-
munity leader-and wounding many more. Officials
acknowledged that troops firing automatic weapons
killed 30,
The strong show of
military force, however, contained the disturbance
and prevented its subsequent spread to other cities, in
our judgment.
... While Brandishing the Stick
The Soeharto regime is intolerant of any challenge to
social order and has repeatedly demonstrated its
readiness to use force.' The Army, for instance, has
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long been deployed throughout the country primarily
to maintain order, and it responded decisively to the
September 1984 riot 4
Jakarta's extensive security apparatus-most of it
under the control of Armed Forces Commander
Murdani-further reinforces control of domestic
Muslim opposition, enabling authorities to penetrate
and monitor most potential opposition groups of sig-
nificant size-including student, labor, religious, and
political organizations.. The common knowledge of
this surveillance capability intimidates many would-
vaguely worded law requires only the possibility that
one's words or actions "might" be used by others to
cause unrest or to challenge Pancasila. In one case, a
Muslim primary school teacher was sentenced to 12
years in prison for holding an "illegal" course in
Islamic values in which he distributed a subversive
leaflet and played recordings of antigovernment
Before the recent unrest, Jakarta permitted substan-
tial freedom of expression in the mosques as an outlet
for public frustrations. Since then, authorities have
tightened the reins on religious expression.
security officials have
stepped up surveillance of individuals, organizations,
and mosques suspected of antigovernment extremism.
Jakarta, moreover, has followed up with publicized
arrests, prosecution, and stiff sentencing of dozens of
suspects-including some half dozen hardline Muslim
preachers-allegedly involved in antigovernment ac-
tivities. Among those prosecuted were three promi-
nent members of the dissident Group of 50-Muslim
preacher A. M. Fatwa, former Trade and Industry
Minister Sanusi, and retired Army General
Dharsono-in connection with the 1984 disturbances.'
Officials also have prosecuted numerous individuals
under the 22-year-old Law on Eradicating Subversive
Activities.
convictions are easily obtained because the
' The Group of 50 is a small opposition group composed primarily of
prominent retired government, military, and political party officials
who have become disenchanted with the Soeharto regime. They
have been largely ineffective and lack a popular following, but the
Group has sought to capitalize on recent disturbances to criticize
speeches.
... and Using the Carrot
Soeharto continues to counterbalance his hard line
with a co-optive and conciliatory approach toward
accommodating moderates. Soeharto and other key
officials often appear at major sessions of various
moderate Islamic organizations, for example. In addi-
tion, the Department of Religion has for years subsi-
dized religious pilgrimages and the construction and
operation of mosques and Islamic schools. Such gov-
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acquiescence of many local Muslim leaders whose
prestige has benefited. US Embassy sources indicate
that a number of such co-opted leaders are content to
pursue strictly religious and social programs and to
forgo political activity. In a recent meeting with
Soeharto, for instance, one such leader of the Muslim
organization Muhammadiyah-playing to his audi-
ence, in our judgment-said the group's primary
function was to be a bridge between the government
and the Muslim community.
Authorities have occasionally conceded to Muslim
sensitivities on nonvital issues. In the early 1970s, for
instance, in the face of vigorous Muslim protest,
Jakarta backed away from a controversial marriage
bill that would have created a nationally uniform
marriage and divorce law replacing Islamic regula-
tions. Several years ago authorities eased off when the
United Development Party (PPP) balked at pressure
to replace its religious symbol-the Ka'bah shrine in
Mecca-with a secular emblem. In 1983, Soeharto's
replacement of the Minister of Religion-a military
general widely resented by the Muslim community-
with a popular, Muslim-educated civilian, Munawir
Syadzali, appealed to Muslims, according to US
Embassy observers.
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In addition, Jakarta avoids offending domestic sensi-
tivities in conducting its foreign policy, tending to
support the Muslim consensus on Middle East issues.'
Authorities also limit missionary activities by other
religions among Muslims and periodically crack down
on gambling, prostitution, pornography, and other
manifestations of what Muslim critics denounce as
the erosion of traditional values by secularism. And
Jakarta continues to reassure moderate Muslim lead-
ers that Pancasila and other restrictions do not threat-
en-and presumably safeguard-Islam's religious
role. Immediately after the Tanjung Priok riot in
1984, for example, the regime dispatched leading
military figures-including General Murdani-to call
on key Islamic organizations as a gesture of deference
and to assure them the government's crackdown was
aimed only at radical elements.
The Dangers Ahead
Institutional Outlets Shut ... We believe Indonesian
Islam-for now-is unable to be politically effective.
Government manipulation, lack of cohesion, and
splintered leadership stand in the way of aspirations
by some in the Muslim community to translate Islam-
ic numerical superiority into political influence, and
there is no Muslim consensus on a future strategy.
Most dissatisfied Muslims agree-according to a
number of Islamic leaders and US Embassy observ-
ers-that they cannot yet effectively challenge the
regime. As a result, they have turned their frustration
inward and concentrate on religious training and
organization in anticipation of a change in the politi-
cal climate.'
Compounding their problem is the fact that the few
established Muslim political institutions continue to
erode. Since its inception in 1973, the PPP leadership
has remained preoccupied with infighting rather than
This debilitating lack of cohesion in part reflects the unstructured
character of Sunni Islam-in contrast, for instance, to the more
doctrinaire Shia sect. Sunnis have no central organization, leader-
ship, or common focus, no imam or national leader who can speak
authoritatively for the community. In addition, numerous regional
and theological cleavages further divide Indonesian Muslims
formulating and advancing party goals.' In national
parliamentary elections, it has routinely won only
about 30 percent of the vote-half that of the govern-
ment's political machine (Golkar and it has no
members serving in the Cabinet.
Government success at manipulating Islam was espe-
cially evident in August 1984 at the PPP's first
national congress since its formation in 1973, when it
bowed to government pressure and formally adopted
Pancasila as its sole ideological principle. As a result
of this and other government manipulation, the PPP
has begun to disintegrate. The Nahdatul Ulama
(NU), formerly the PPP's main component, has quit
the party-ostensibly to focus on religious, education-
al, and social functions. In mid-1985, the Syarikat
Islam faction similarly bowed out.
religiously devout rank-and-file mem-
bers of these groups-particularly idealistic youth-
resent their leaders' having caved in repeatedly and
readily to government pressure.
... While Frustrations Grow. In our view, Soeharto is
tightening control at a dangerous time-when both
Islamic consciousness and economic frustrations are
growing. US Embassy observers indicate that-with
few exceptions-almost all Muslims have complaints
about Soeharto's New Order regime. We believe that
Jakarta's imposition of a secular state ideology flouts
Muslim sensitivities and has angered even some mod-
erates who generally support the government and
oppose an Islamic state. Although open dissent has
tapered off since early 1985 in response to Jakarta's
crackdown, increasing numbers of Muslims appear to
be frustrated over the regime's disregard for their
religious sensitivities, according to US Embassy
observers.
Many orthodox Muslims and non-Javanese resent
Pancasila as another step by the Javanese elite toward
cultural dominance by supplanting Islamic values
' By the early 1970s President Soeharto had sufficiently consolidat-
ed his position that he could start to curb the Islamic parties. In
1973 he forced the four Muslim parties to consolidate into the
United Development Party, a coalition that has remained faction
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with their own beliefs,
This view is reinforced by Soeharto's appointment of
several loyal Christians to key military and other
sensitive positions, according to US Embassy observ-
ers. For instance, Armed Forces Commander
Murdani-a Catholic-is in charge of maintaining
order. Admiral Sudomo, a Protestant and former
head of internal security, is now Manpower Minister,
responsible for keeping labor under control.
Although outwardly quiescent, growing numbers of
students are frustrated and cynical about inequities of
the current political and economic system-particu-
larly the widening income gap, the regime's restric-
tions on political expression, and their own limited
employment prospects. According to US Embassy
observers, many students also resent what they regard
as Jakarta's overly close ties to the West and want an
alternative political and economic strategy for
Indonesia.
Popular resentment is also building over the regime's
connections with the finan-
business community
1984 and early 1985, radical Muslims played on this
resentment in mosque speeches and posters highlight-
ing Soeharto's and other key officials' ties to promi-
nent Chinese businessmen. Subsequently, several
businesses affiliated with the Soeharto family and its
Chinese partners were the targets of arson and bomb-
ings.
... But. We believe the regime's crackdown on the 25X1
radical Islamic opposition-and conciliatory rhetoric
toward moderate Muslims-have bought it some time
to deal with Muslim and broader social and political
frustrations. At the same time, the recent unrest, in
our judgment, appears to have strengthened Soehar-
to's resolve to force compliance with his program.
Moreover, we expect Jakarta to maintain its firm
approach toward political Islam and other potential 25X1
opposition elements in this period prior to parliamen-
tary elections in 1987 and the presidential election in
1988. There is a danger, of course, that regime
overconfidence and inflexibility could cause Jakarta
to misstep, provoking a localized outbreak like the one
in 1984. It is also possible, although less likely, in our
judgment, that the present strategy will lead Soeharto
to push too hard in reacting to an antigovernment
incident, thus polarizing the Islamic mass.
In any case, we believe Muslim dissidents may well 25X1
try to incite broader opposition by coupling their
complaints with widespread social and economic
grievances, which we expect to intensify through the
rest of the decade as a result of falling oil prices,
financial austerity, and the poor prospects for employ-
ment." Radical Muslims might also seek to make
common cause with regime critics among moderates,
intellectuals, youth, and leftist remnants. Because
Islam is one of the few social institutions in Indonesia
extending to the grassroots level, this would be a
feasible strategy. Consequently, we believe that the
discrediting of existing Islamic political institutions
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25X6
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and leadership in the eyes of many moderates, radi- "'
cals, and particularly youth will accelerate a turn to 25X6.-
religious and social organizations-such as mosque- 25X6
affiliated study and youth groups-as vehicles for
expressing political views.F__~ 2.`25X1
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After Soeharto, we believe the balance between Islam
and the government security apparatus could tilt
somewhat toward Islam. Under an orderly presiden-
tial succession, we anticipate that any likely successor
to Soeharto would come from the military and would
be inclined to continue Soeharto's basic political and
economic policies. Should Soeharto depart the scene
unexpectedly, however, or should the transition of
power be contentious, then existing widespread Islam-
ic, social, and economic frustrations could erupt." In
such an event, it is possible that a successor might
appeal to the Muslim mainstream for support, partic-
ularly if his authority was contested. An insecure
successor or leadership, for example, might seek to
downplay ties to the West-and the United States in
particular-or adopt a more activist posture on Mid-
dle East issues.
Implications for the United States
In Indonesia's conduct of foreign policy, efforts to
accommodate domestic and Middle East Muslim
sentiments and play up Third World credentials con-
tinue to put Jakarta at odds with Washington on such
issues as UN votes involving the Middle East and
Israel. Such differences might well increase should
Soeharto or a successor feel compelled to shore up the
the Philippines.
quick to reject any foreign scrutiny or criticism of its
political process as intrusion into its internal affairs,
in our judgment.
In the event that Islam becomes a stronger and
permanent political force in Indonesia, we believe it
would have far-reaching effects on Southeast Asia as
a whole and would complicate relations with Wash-
ington. Indonesian Muslims-at about 155 million,
the largest Muslim population in the world-probably
would develop more active contacts with Muslims in
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, thus ex-
panding their own influence in the region. In our view,
this probably would have important consequences for
policymaking in these countries. Indonesian Muslims
also might seek to promote representation in Indone-
sia by Middle East elements-such as the PLO and
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0
regime's image among Indonesian Muslims.
For its part, any radical Muslim opposition probably
will continue denouncing the Soeharto government's
ties to the United States. In addition, Indonesian
militants will criticize Washington's Middle East
policy and champion the cause of radical regimes such
as Libya and Iran. The US Embassy in Jakarta, for
instance, has received several apparently bogus tele-
phone and letter threats from fringe elements.
We believe the Soeharto government's efforts to
choke off legitimate Muslim opposition increase the
likelihood that the April 1987 parliamentary elec-
tion-and that body's pro forma election of the
president in 1988-will be criticized at home and
abroad, particularly in the wake of the recent focus on
Libya-which they currently lack.
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Appendix A
Selected Indonesian
Islamic Organizations
United Development Party (PPP)
Key Leader: John Naro, Chairman
Until recently, the PPP was a loose coalition of four
Muslim political parties forced to amalgamate by
Soeharto in 1973. The party has remained factiona-
lized and ineffectual. In the past year, the PPP has
begun to disintegrate as several constituent elements
have withdrawn. Naro-a career politician and advo-
cate of Pancasila-owes his position to Soeharto's
backing rather than constituent support
Nahdatul Ulama (NU)
Key Leader: Abdurrachman Wahid, General
Chairman
Founded in 1926, the NU is Indonesia's largest
Muslim organization, with approximately 12 million
members concentrated in East and Central Java. Its
style of Islam incorporates traditional Javanese values
and beliefs, including elements of mysticism and
magic. The NU has traditionally avoided confronta-
tion with the government, and, like most other groups,
has bowed to Jakarta's pressure to accept Pancasila.
The NU recently withdrew from the PPP, ostensibly
to forgo politics to concentrate on religious, educa-
tional, and social activities.
Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi)
A minor constituent of the PPP, Parmusi is the
successor to the Sumatra-based Masyumi Party,
which was banned in 1960. Soeharto allowed the
Masyumi to resume activity in 1968 under the new
name. Unlike other PPP elements, Parmusi has no
separate organizational structure outside the PPP
party framework.
Syarikat Islam (PSII)
After breaking off from the former Masyumi Party in
1947, the Syarikat Islam steadily lost political influ-
ence, and subsequently was incorporated into the
PPP. It retains scattered support in West Java, south-
ern Sumatra, and Sulawesi. Syarikat Islam left the
PPP in mid-1985.
Muhammadiyah
Key Leader: M. Imaduddin Abdubrachmin
Organized in 1911 to provide "modern" Islamic edu-
cation, Muhammadiyah now organizes schools, uni-
versities, hospitals, orphanages, and other social ser-
vices throughout Indonesia. Its leadership is currently
split between moderates and hardliners, the latter
headed by M. Imaduddin Abdubrachmin, a protege
of Mohammad Natsir. Previously opposed to Panca-
sila, the Muhammadiyah accepted it at its national
congress in December 1985, despite the objections of
some members.
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Islamic Brotherhood
A new group led by Indonesian youths who have
studied in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where they were
influenced by local Islamic Brotherhood movements.
There are reportedly numerous small brotherhood
groups scattered throughout Java, Sumatra, and Su-
lawesi, all allegedly with links to the "Ikhwani Ul-
Muslimin" (Islamic Brotherhood of Islamic Solidari- 25X1
ty). The group reportedly appeals to lower-middle-
class and poor students. According to US Embassy
officials, some members of the Muslim think tank/
publisher, LP3ES, including "Tempo" and "Kompas"
contributor Fachri Ali, have ties to the brotherhood.
Korps Muballigh Indonesia (Indonesian Preachers'
Corps)
Key Leader: Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Chairman
The Korps appears focused on opposing the regime,
and has affiliate groups in most major cities. The NU
general chairman indicates the Korps has the poten- 25X1
tial to become a serious antigovernment group if it
can upgrade its communications. Authorities are cur-
rently prosecuting several members on charges of
inciting the 1984 riot in Jakarta.
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Secret
Komando Jihad (Holy War Command)
According to US Embassy reporting, Komando Jihad
was a code name used by Indonesian authorities and
the press during 1980-81 for several radical Muslim
groups. In late 1981, Admiral Sudomo, then head of
the Security Command, told Muslim ulamas-who
regarded the government's use of the term Komando
Jihad as an attempt to discredit all Muslims-that no
such group existed and that Jakarta would cease using
the name. Since 1984, however, the government has
revived the term and prosecuted several alleged mem-
bers for subversion.
Solidaritas Islam
A collective name for a number of radical groups that
became active in 1984. Such groups may be tied to
the Islamic Brotherhood, since "Solidaritas Islam" is
one possible vernacular rendition of the Brotherhood's
Arabic name. Authorities suspect the group of various
acts of violence, including the Jakarta riot. The
group's leadership reportedly comes from more radi-
cal elements of the Indonesian Muslim Students'
Association and the Islamic Students' Association.
Security officials claim small cells of five or six
members form to conduct a specific attack and then
disband
a
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Secret
Appendix B
Selected Dissidents
Lt. Gen. (ret.) H. R. Dharsono: Previously an ambas-
sador and Secretary General of ASEAN, Dharsono is
the highest ranking former official convicted by the
Soeharto regime. His sentence-10 years in prison for
involvement in antigovernment meetings and the
"white paper" following the 1984 riot-is intended as
a warning to the moderate opposition and others that
open dissent will be at a high cost.F__1
H. M. Sanusi: 66, formerly parliamentarian and
Minister of Trade and Industry, and past leader of the
Muhammadiyah, recently sentenced to 19 years in
prison for allegedly financing the bombing of two
banks and a Chinese store in Jakarta in 1984. In 1980
Sanusi and 49 other prominent government, military,
and intellectual figures signed the "Petition of 50"
urging democracy.
Andi Mappetahang Fatwa: a 46-year-old Muslim
dissident recently sentenced to 18 years in prison for
antigovernment sermons and meetings. Previously ar-
rested and fired from the government in 1978 for
antiregime remarks and again detained the following
year.
Tony August Ardie: A well-known Muslim firebrand.
Ardie, 31, was sentenced in December 1985 to 17
years in prison for antigovernment statements before
the Tanjung Priok riot. A spellbinding orator, Ardie
was imprisoned in 1983 for 9 months following dissi-
dent sermons and challenging a government ban on
female student's wearing the traditional Muslim head
covering.
ists-particularly youths-reportedly regard him as a
martyr
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara: 74, leader of the Korps
Muballigh, and formerly head of the now-banned
Masyumi. He was arrested for involvement with the
Group of 50's "white paper" criticizing the govern-
ment's account of the 1984 riot. In recent years he has
preached sermons sharply denouncing the regime, and
in 1983 publicly accused the military of killing a
student during a confrontation. Despite the lack of
evidence of the death, the incident heightened public
tension
M. Imaduddin Abdubrachmin: A well-known Muslim
activist and leader of the hardline faction of the
Muhammadiyah. Formerly a lecturer at the Bandung
Institute of Technology and active at the affiliated
Salmon mosque, he was detained for 14 months for
involvement with student unrest in 1978. Abdubrach-
min has toured the Middle East. He is currently
studying in the United States.
Mohammad Natsir: 76, a member of the Group of 50,
is considered to be Indonesia's most prominent radical
Muslim preacher. He was detained by security offi-
cials in connection with the October 1984 Bank
Central Asia bombings in Jakarta. Since then, Indo-
nesian authorities have prohibited him from making
speeches, and have closely monitored his activities.
Natsir, who calls for the formation of an Islamic
state, is most influential among hardline Muslims,
and reportedly has strong ties to Islamic elements in
the Middle East. He does not have an official congre-
gation or following, however, because it is too risky
for individuals to be closely associated with him.
Abdurrachman Wahid: 45, chairman of the Nahdatul
Ulama (NU), is one of the most prominent of the
younger Muslim leaders. Wahid is outspoken on the
need for government to improve the economic position
of Muslims. He has called for government-funded
cooperation between Chinese and Muslim business-
men, but the appeal was regarded by the major
Jakarta newspapers as too dangerous to print. Wahid
has also openly condemned the corrupt business prac-
tices of the Soeharto family. But, at the same time, he
criticizes Indonesia's Muslim leaders for failing to
eliminate the occasional violence between religious
groups.
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2DA I
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Secret
1984
12 September
17 October
22 October
29 October
8 November
11 November
13 November
Appendix C
Chronology of Recent Unrest
Tanjung Priok riots in Jakarta.
Violent confrontation between Muslims
and security forces. Many casualties.
Bombings of Chinese-owned bank and
shop in Jakarta.
Bombing of bank, Pontianak, Kaliman-
tan Barat (West Kalimantan).
Bombing of Super Mei Factory,
Jakarta.
Fire at Sarinah department store,
Jakarta.
Fire at Chinatown restaurant and
nightclub complex.
Fire and explosions at Marine ammuni-
tion depot, Jakarta.
Department store and movie theater
fires, Jogyakarta.
Threat letters to US and Australian
Embassies.
Telephone threat to shopping/
apartment complex.
Undetonated bomb discovered at
Pertamina headquarters.
Fire destroys offices at Kartika Plaza
Hotel, Jakarta.
Fire destroys government offices,
Sarinah department store complex,
Jakarta.
Bomb hoax, American Express offices,
Arthaloka Building.
Christian Seminary bombed, Malang,
Jawa Timur (East Java)
Bank Central Asia owned by key
Soeharto business associate.
Another branch of Bank Central Asia.
A Chinese-owned business.
Owner has ties to Soeharto's son. Cause
probably accidental.
Owned by associate of Soeharto's son.
Cause undetermined.
Extensive damage. Origin unknown.
Previous fire occurred in July.
Possible bombing by competing Chi-
nese businessmen.
First threat on US Embassy since
spring.
Residence of several US Embassy
personnel.
Followed a telephone threat.
Origin unknown. Hotel controlled by
group of generals.
Origin unknown.
Followed telephone threat. A prominent
Jakarta office building.
Probably reflection of local religious
frictions.
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Secret
1985
21 January
16 March
18 March
10 July
Nine bombs damage Borobudur
Temple, Jawa Tengah (Central Java).
Fire destroys Sultan's Palace,
Surakarta Central Java.
Nighttime fire destroys warehouse
complex, army barracks, and 117
houses.
Bandung munitions depot explosion.
Threat letters to Jakarta nursery
schools for Western dependents.
Fire destroys police-owned 9-story
shopping complex, Central Java.
Fire destroys Indonesian state radio
station, Central Jakarta.
Fire damages national radio station,
Banjarmasin, Kalimantan Selatan
(South Kalimantan).
Fire damages Ministry of Religion
building, Jakarta.
Fire destroys textile factory complex
(Batik Keris), Surakarta, Central Java.
Explosions and fire at state television
station, Jogyakarta.
Fire severely damages state television
station, Jakarta.
Most prominent and revered cultural
landmark.
Cause of fire undetermined. Five
persons injured.
Several military personnel killed.
Seven killed, others injured. Radicals
transporting explosives.
Possible threat by competing
businessmen.
360 stores destroyed in early morning
blaze. Arson threats received. Explo-
sions heard.
Two persons killed. Cause undeter-
mined, possibly old wiring.
Extensive damage. No evidence of
arson. Cause undetermined.
Second major fire in two years. Possible
retaliation. Nearby shantytown, includ-
ing red-light district, recently razed by
security officials.
Possible insurance arson. Soeharto
family member major shareholder.
Cause undetermined.
Cause undetermined.
Cause undetermined. Possibly set to
disrupt Soeharto's annual New Year's
address.
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Secret
Secret
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