(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000100580001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of
Intelligence
ecret
Views of Chinese Military
and Civilian Analysts on the
Strategic Defense Initiative
An Intelligence Assessment
EA 86-10002
January 1986
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111t-ce Directorate of
Views of Chinese Military
and Civilian Analysts on the
Strategic Defense Initiative
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared for China Division, Office
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, China
Secret
EA 86-10002
January 1986
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Secret
Views of Chinese Military
and Civilian Analysts on the
Strategic Defense Initiative
Senior Chinese leaders have not yet decided how best to deal with the
challenges of the US SDI program. To date, official Chinese pronounce-
ments have been generally confined to deliberately vague statements
opposing the extension of the arms race to outer space. Chinese leaders
apparently believe they have time to work out a policy because both the
United States and the Soviet Union are in the initial stages of research.
The SDI issue, including its implications for Sino-Soviet relations and the
Western Alliance, is under active study in Chinese military and civilian
think tanks.
This paper is a summary of a much longer study prepared for the China
Division of the Office of East Asian Analysis. It is based on conversations
in fall 1985 with Chinese military and civilian strategic thinkers and
analysts. The views of these officials may not coincide with those of
China's top decisionmakers in every instance. We believe, however, that
they accurately reflect both the range of thinking on SDI in China and the
advice reaching top leaders on this issue.
This paper presents only the views and analysis of Chinese nationals. 25X1
25X1
The majority view of Chinese analysts is 25X1
presented throughout. As in any country-and China is no exception-
there are differences on this and any other issue. We have attempted to in-
clude these alternative viewpoints where we believe them to be most
important.
Secret
EA 86-10002
January 1986
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Secret
Views of Chinese Military
and Civilian Analysts on the
Strategic Defense Initiative
Key Judgments Chinese strategic thinkers are concerned that SDI will significantly alter
Information available the global strategic situation in the 1990s and thereby damage China's
as of 10 December 1985 security interests. They believe the rough parity that now exists between
was used in this report.
the United States and the Soviet Union is the best guarantee of the stable
international environment China needs to complete its economic and
military modernization programs. The Chinese believe this parity also
affords Beijing maximum leverage in the Sino-Soviet-US triangle.
Government ministries and research institutes are interested in SDI, but
the statements of Chinese officials on SDI indicate that they have limited
knowledge of the strategic thinking behind it. Chinese analysts tend to view
SDI primarily in political terms-that is, in terms of its impact on US-
Soviet political relations. They question US sincerity about seeking a way
to eliminate nuclear weapons and believe that Washington really wants to
increase its military leverage over Moscow to achieve political goals.
Chinese military and civilian analysts are well aware that the Soviet Union
is working on its own SDI program, and they stress that Moscow's goal in
opposing SDI is not to prevent the deployment of space-based weapons, but
to delay the US effort until the Soviet Union is in a better position to com-
pete. Some Chinese analysts worry that Moscow may calculate that it has
more to lose by allowing the United States to deploy a system, and may
elect to use force against the United States or a US system before it is de-
ployed. China's military and Soviet experts are more inclined to hold this
view; its US experts tend to play down the possibility.
A number of Chinese analysts believe SDI will exacerbate tensions within
NATO. They believe the decision to participate in SDI research will be a
politically difficult one, with European governments facing a Hobbesian
choice of an angry electorate if they elect to participate or the risk of
falling further behind US technology if they elect not to. They are also con-
cerned that SDI will reduce the US defense commitment to Europe.
Chinese analysts believe SDI has had a positive effect on the arms control
talks by forcing the Soviets back to the table. They see little chance of an
accord in the near term but do not rule out a limited agreement in the fu-
ture. Analysts are concerned, however, that the US refusal to put SDI on
the table gives the Soviet Union a propaganda advantage. They believe
Washington has a twofold task at Geneva: to convince Moscow that the
V Secret
EA 86-10002
January 1986
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United States is determined to deploy SDI so that Moscow will be forced to
make some compromises, and to put forth a realistic counterproposal to
blunt Moscow's propaganda edge. Analysts generally believe an arms
accord would benefit China by reducing international tensions, but many
harbor suspicions that Washington and Moscow might agree on terms
harmful to China's security interests.
Of greater concern is the fear that the Soviets will deploy an SDI system
that will neutralize China's small nuclear deterrent. Chinese analysts do
not believe this will happen soon, however, and expect they have 20 to 30
years to develop countermeasures. A more immediate concern is the fear
that China will be left out of the technological bonanza they see flowing
from SDI research, and some analysts have hinted at possible participation
in the EUREKA (European Research Coordinating Agency) project.
Chinese analysts believe Soviet preoccupation with stopping SDI provides
the Soviets additional incentives to improve ties to Beijing. Unstated by the
analysts is what we presume to be a Chinese belief that heightened concern
in Washington about Sino-Soviet relations increases China's room for
maneuver in the triangle. Chinese analysts are concerned about appearing
to side too closely with Moscow on SDI, but they stress that Beijing will
not hesitate to criticize the United States if China concludes that the
Soviet Union is seriously seeking an agreement and that US "intransi-
gence"on SDI is the principal obstacle.
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Secret
Key Judgments
Chinese Views on the Strategic Situation and SDI 1
Chinese Views on US Motivations and Goals in Pursuing SDI I
Chinese Views on Soviet Objectives in Opposing SDI 2
Chinese Views on SDI and the Western Alliance 3
Chinese Views on Arms Control and SDI 3
Chinese Views on the Implications of SDI for China's Deterrent 5
Relations With the Soviet Union 6
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Chinese Organizations Working on SDI Issues
This paper is based on both writings and interviews of individuals associated with
the following government organizations and think tanks:
? Disarmament Division, International Organizations Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
? American and Oceanic Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
? Disarmament Division, Ministry of National Defense
? General Staff Department, People's Liberation Army (PLA)
? Academy of Military Sciences
? Institute of Strategic Studies, PLA Military Academy
? Central Party School
? Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies
? Institute of Contemporary Foreign Relations
? Institute of International Studies
? Institute of Soviet and East European Studies
? Institute of US Studies
? Institute of World Economy and Politics
? Center for International Studies
? Shanghai Institute of International Studies
? Beijing University
? Fudan University
Secret Viii
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Secret
Views of Chinese Military
and Civilian Analysts on the
Strategic Defense Initiative
Chinese Views on the Strategic Situation and SDI
China's key goals for the rest of the century-
economic and military modernization-require a
stable, however tense, international environment. Al-
though concerned about the conflicts in Cambodia
and Afghanistan, the massive Soviet military presence
in Mongolia and the Soviet Far East, and the arms
race, China sees the present international strategic
environment as generally conducive to its goals. In
viewing the international scene, Chinese civilian and
military leaders-according to their own state-
ments-take comfort in the belief that:
? A Soviet attack on China is very unlikely, although
the Soviet Union will continue to pose the primary
threat to Chinese security. China's independent
foreign policy as well as the US military buildup
will counterbalance Soviet power and prove a strong
incentive for Moscow to refrain from hostile behav-
ior toward Beijing and to seek improvement in Sino-
Soviet relations.
? The rough parity in the US-Soviet military balance
will be maintained over the next five years and
beyond, if there is no deployment of advanced
strategic defense systems. The United States, how-
ever, will retain an edge over the Soviet Union in the
global balance of power because the US lead in
technology will increase slightly.
? US-Soviet relations will remain tense but not con-
frontational, and China will continue to enjoy better
relations with both than either enjoys with the
other. The Soviet Union will continue to be tactical-
ly on the defensive-preoccupied with problems of
economic and technological development and with
the US military challenge.
? It is unlikely that there will be a war in Korea or
that any other major conflict will erupt in Asia. The
conflicts in Cambodia and Afghanistan will remain
stalemated and will not escalate.
? The world economic situation will favor China's
achievement of its national development goals de-
spite continuing protectionist sentiments in the
United States and elsewhere.
Chinese military and civilian analysts are concerned,
however, that SDI will drastically alter this favorable
strategic situation and adversely affect China's inter-
ests into the next century by disrupting the rough
parity between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The disruption of parity, the Chinese main-
tain, would lead to strategic instability and create an
incentive for one side to launch a nuclear attack
against the other. Deployment of strategic defense
systems or other ballistic missile defenses (BMD) '
could give one side what it is incapable of achieving
otherwise-a first-strike capability.
Chinese Views on US Motivations
and Goals in Pursuing SDI
Nearly all Chinese analysts doubt that the United
States is genuinely seeking a means of eliminating
nuclear weapons and question the sincerity of the
President's stated desire to share strategic defense
technology with the Soviet Union. Rather, they view
the SDI program as part of a political, economic, and
military strategy aimed at enhancing the US position
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the global balance of
power. The Chinese also believe the SDI program is
intended to revitalize the US and other Western
economies by stimulating rapid development of US
military industry and by accelerating the pace of
technological and industrial development. A faster
' In this paper, the term "space-based BMD systems" is used to
refer to strategic defense systems with the general characteristics
that have been envisioned in the SDI program. This system is
multitiered: it includes ground-based interceptors to destroy war-
heads during the midcourse and reentry phases, as well as space-
based lasers, particle beams, or kinetic energy weapons for attack-
ing missiles and warheads in their boost, postboost, and midcourse
phases.
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rate of economic growth, they claim, will widen the
US scientific, technological, and economic lead over
the Soviets; advance military programs at home; and
increase US prestige abroad.
Some Chinese analysts maintain that the US motives
are primarily "offensive"-a desire to achieve global
hegemony-but others see US actions as primarily
"defensive." Proponents of this latter view point to the
Soviet military buildup in the 1970s and the increas-
ing vulnerability of US ICBMs. They imply that the
United States has no recourse other than to develop a
strategic defense system, because, if the Soviet Union
deploys a space-based BMD first, it will provide
Moscow with a first-strike capability and an incentive
to start a war.
None of the Chinese who see Washington as seeking
superiority, however, suggest that the United States
would use a first-strike capability to attack the Soviet
Union. Rather, they maintain that the United States
wants increased military leverage over Moscow for
political goals, such as gaining concessions in the arms
control talks and obtaining restraints on Soviet mili-
tary actions. Some analysts also claim that the United
States is attempting to exploit Soviet economic diffi-
culties and ultimately to "exhaust" the Soviet Union.
They maintain that Washington wants to compel
Moscow to match US SDI efforts in the belief that
Moscow will be so pressed economically that modern-
ization of its offensive forces will be disrupted and its
land-based ICBMs will be rendered obsolete.
A few other knowledgeable Chinese analysts who
have spent considerable time in the United States
maintain that development of strategic defense sys-
tems by the Soviet Union and the United States is
simply the natural evolution of nuclear strategy and
military technology. In current US nuclear strategy,
they say, deterrence is based not only on mutual
assured destruction but also on planning to fight a
nuclear war, including a limited nuclear conflict, if
deterrence fails. Such a limited war strategy requires
defense as well as offense, they assert. Only by
making full preparations for fighting a nuclear war
can the United States have a reliable deterrent,
"stand firm" against the Soviet Union, and defend its
territory and that of its allies in case of nuclear war.
Chinese Views on Soviet Objectives in Opposing SDI
Chinese experts on the Soviet Union believe Moscow's
anti-SDI campaign has four broad objectives:
? Ban the US program while continuing to conduct its
own research in strategic defense technologies.
? Buy time to reinvigorate the Soviet economy and
catch up with the United States technologically.
? Prevent the United States from obtaining a first-
strike capability and, at a minimum, maintain pari-
ty with the United States in strategic offensive
forces.
? Gain a propaganda advantage over the United
States and drive a wedge between the United States
and its allies and friends in Western Europe and
Asia, including China.
The Chinese stress that the Soviets' long-term objec-
tive is not to prevent the deployment of weapons in
outer space. Rather, they maintain that Moscow seeks
only to postpone the competition with the United
States in space-based weapons until the Soviet Union
has achieved a stronger position economically. Ac-
cording to most Chinese analysts, the Soviets fear
that, if the competition in strategic defense is not
postponed, the United States will deploy a space-
based defense system first and seriously jeopardize
Moscow's nuclear deterrent.
Chinese analysts expect that the Soviets will attempt
to meet the SDI challenge by proliferating the num-
ber of warheads on their land-based missiles and by
developing and deploying new offensive weapons.
Chinese analysts also expect the Soviets to attempt to
defeat the system by the use of penetration aids,
adjustments in their boosters, and deploying space
mines and antisatellite weapons. While a minority of
analysts maintain that Moscow will confine its efforts
to defeat and destroy the US system, the dominant
view among Chinese civilian and military analysts is
that the Soviets will also build their own space-based
BMD system. Most say Moscow also will use the US
refusal to put SDI on the table to justify further
increases in Soviet offensive forces.
Both civilian and military analysts seem genuinely
concerned that the Soviets will use force either
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against the US space-based defense system to prevent
its deployment or against the United States before the
system is deployed. The Soviets are genuinely afraid
that the United States is seeking a first-strike capabil-
ity in SDI, according to Chinese experts, including
those who maintain that Washington has no offensive
intentions. Most Chinese analysts assert that the
Soviet Union will not allow its offensive forces to be
neutralized by US deployment of a space-based BMD
system.
Some analysts downplay such risks, contending that a
Soviet attack on the US defense system would risk a
US attack on Soviet space assets and even retaliation
against Soviet territory that could escalate to global
nuclear war. But others clearly worry that the Soviets
might calculate that they have more to lose by
allowing the United States to deploy an SDI system
than by taking the risk of launching a first strike.
China's military analysts and Soviet experts seem
most inclined to hold this view. An expert on the
United States from the Foreign Ministry, on the other
hand, disagrees, arguing that Moscow is more likely
to seek a political than a military solution to the SDI
threat.
Chinese Views on SDI and the Western Alliance
A number of Chinese analysts believe SDI will exac-
erbate political and economic tensions within the
NATO Alliance and could lead to increased West
European dependence on the United States-develop-
ments they see as equally negative. In addition, they
view SDI as potentially weakening the credibility of
the US deterrent for Europe and thus increasing the
possibility of instability and conventional war. Chi-
nese analysts argue that a US space-based BMD
system will not be able to protect Western Europe
from Soviet attack because of the short flight times
for Soviet missiles, while a similar Soviet BMD
system will neutralize US strategic forces. Western
Europe, according to this view, would be faced with
superior Soviet conventional forces and a dubious US
security guarantee. This new strategic situation would
lead to serious strains in the NATO Alliance, in-
creased instability in East-West relations, and greater
likelihood of conventional war in Europe.
Alliance. The Europeans must face the consequences
of what is likely to be an unpopular decision with their
electorates if they choose to participate, or run the
risk of falling even further behind the United States
and Japan if they elect not to.
Not all Chinese analysts agree with these pessimistic
views, however. One influential thinker who has writ-
ten knowledgeably about SDI argues that SDI might
actually strengthen the defense of West European
countries. Another analyst associated with a think
tank with ties to the State Council and Central
Committee predicted that, rather than leading to a
major rift between the United States and Western
Europe, SDI could encourage West European unity
and "create a strong coalition that will promote the
revitalization of West European economies and tech-
nological development." Although there is a possibili-
ty that SDI could lead to "fiercer competition be-
tween Western Europe and the United States," he
said, "this may be beneficial to both sides."
Chinese Views on Arms Control and SDI
Although Beijing opposes the deployment of weapons
in space as envisioned in the SDI program, analysts
see the announcement of stepped-up efforts by the
United States in strategic defense research as having
had some positive consequences. It has heightened the
Soviet Union's concern about its future position in the
military balance, they say, compelling Moscow to
return to the negotiating table. SDI has also played an
important role in shifting global perceptions of the
balance of power in favor of the United States. This
has put the Soviet Union on the defensive, according
to the Chinese, and forced Soviet leaders to at least
publicly demonstrate a willingness to compromise on
some arms control issues.
While some Chinese analysts doubt that the Reagan
administration really wants an arms control agree-
ment with the Soviet Union, all are far more suspi-
cious of Moscow's intentions. The Chinese contend
that the Soviet Union used arms control and detente
with the United States in the 1970s to mask a massive
buildup of military power. Many Chinese analysts
maintain that, even if Washington were to agree to
Chinese analysts point out that the decision to partici-
pate in SDI research is also likely to strain the
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Deng Xiaoping on SDI
Deng said here today that the "Stars Wars" plan
must not be carried out because it would cause
qualitative changes in the arms race between the two
superpowers. He pointed out that the "Star Wars"
plan was different in nature from adding a few
nuclear warheads or changing a few new types of
missiles.
- From a conversation with
Robert Maxwell of the
Pergamon Press and
Mirror newspapers
2 August 1985
We are concerned about the escalation of the nature
of the arms race and are opposed to any arms race in
outer space. We are against whoever goes in for
development of outer space weapons.
- Conversation with former
President Nixon
6 September 1985
China opposes any arms race in outer space. The
space arms race signals the qualitative escalation of
the US-Soviet arms race rather than escalation in a
common sense. The danger of such qualitative escala-
tion is that with a certain degree of development the
arms race will go completely out of control, thus
increasing the factors of war rather than reducing the
danger of war. Therefore, China openly opposes any
plan leading to a space arms race.
- Quoted in the Chinese press
16 September 1985
abandon the SDI program, Moscow may not be
willing to make drastic cuts in its land-based missiles
or to place limits on its research program in defensive
technologies and weapons. One disarmament expert
argued that the Soviet Union "won't let US `paper'
weapons be used to force reduction of actual weap-
ons." Citing Soviet negotiating tactics, Chinese ex-
perts on the Soviet Union allow a greater possibility
that the Soviets might eventually compromise on arms
control after a long period of negotiations with the
United States.
Although most Chinese analysts say that a US-Soviet
arms control accord is possible in the long run, they
doubt that an agreement would significantly reduce
offensive weapons or completely ban deployments of
weapons in space. They assert that Moscow and
Washington are likely to make only small concessions
on offensive and defensive systems while maintaining
roughly equal capabilities. China would gain, howev-
er, from the relaxed international environment that
would follow, and any agreement to halt or postpone
the extension of the arms race in space would slow the
growing gap between Chinese military capabilities
and those of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Chinese analysts are concerned about the implications
of Washington's refusal to bargain on SDI, and they
think the Soviets have scored a tactical victory by
appearing to be more "peace minded" than the Unit-
ed States. If Washington remains unwilling to com-
promise on SDI, they fear that Moscow will build on
the significant propaganda advantage it already has.
An arms control specialist on the General Staff
argued that the US task in Geneva is twofold: to
convince the Soviets that the United States is deter-
mined to deploy SDI, so that Moscow will be forced to
make some compromises; and to present a realistic
proposal to demonstrate to Moscow, Western Europe,
and the rest of the world that the United States is not
seeking superiority over the Soviet Union. "The Unit-
ed States needs to kick the ball back into the Soviet
court with a good offer, proof of Soviet [arms control
treaty] violations and [evidence] of the Soviet BMD
program."
According to proponents of this view, the United
States should use the leverage SDI provides to push
for an equitable agreement on substantial reductions
in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. Chinese analysts
state that, although the Soviet Union has not-and
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Secret
will not-give up its goal of achieving nuclear superi-
ority, it needs to slow the pace of its military spending
to redress its severe economic problems.
At the same time, although they claim they would
welcome a US-Soviet agreement, Chinese analysts
harbor suspicions that Washington and Moscow could
agree on terms harmful to Beijing's security interests.
This concern was voiced most explicitly by a senior
Soviet expert: "The possibility exists that the United
States and the Soviet Union will reduce their strategic
forces and that Soviet INF will not be reduced or
limited. We think that the United States and the
Soviet Union should reduce both strategic and theater
forces.... We hope that the United States and the
Soviet Union will consider the interests of third
countries such as China. Third countries will oppose
any arms control treaties that are not in their
interests."
Chinese Views on the Implications
of SDI for China's Deterrent
The potential threat to China's nuclear deterrent
posed by a Soviet BMD as well as possible Chinese
countermeasures are subjects of extensive discussion
and analysis by military and civilian thinkers. The
Chinese fear in the worst case that their small nuclear
deterrent will be neutralized and that, as a result,
Beijing's geopolitical and strategic position, as well as
its immediate security, will be affected. China's mili-
tary experts are examining some of the countermea-
sures that have been evaluated in the West, but
civilian and military analysts agree that countering a
Soviet BMD would be costly and China would be
better served if it could avoid increasing its military
spending-although it will if necessary to preserve its
deterrent.
Most military analysts say they are confident that
China's deterrent will be effective during the long
period before Soviet deployment of a space-based
BMD system. One analyst maintained that "no ratio-
nal defense system can be deployed by the Soviet
Union for at least 20 to 30 years, and Chinese forces
will remain effective during this time."
behind," and, to prevent the technology gap from
widening, they say, China will have to find some
means of benefiting from the technological advances
in the West. A few Chinese institute analysts
suggested that China
might participate in EUREKA, although it is too
early to make a decision because EUREKA is not yet
a concrete plan. EUREKA seems to appeal to China
more for political than technological reasons, howev-
er. Chinese analysts say that EUREKA will enhance
West European independence and unity and that this
is the basis of Beijing's support for the program. The
Chinese expect the West Europeans to lag far behind
in the technologies being developed for SDI.
Chinese analysts do not discuss the issue directly, but
they are concerned about the impact that mutual
space-based BMD systems would have on maintaining
Moscow's uncertainty about a US response to a Soviet
attack on China-a key element in Beijing's deter-
rent. This concern is reflected in their treatment of
"flexible response" and West European security.
Some military analysts are concerned that mutual
deployment of space-based BMD systems by the
United States and the Soviet Union will weaken the
US global deterrence posture while strengthening
Washington's ability to defend US territory. They see
SDI as potentially undermining the US strategy of
"flexible response." On the one hand, the United
States and the Soviet Union might be more likely to
fight a war in Europe since they would not risk
nuclear attack on their homelands; and, on the other
hand, the United States might be less likely to keep its
commitments to defend its West European allies if
they were attacked by the Soviet Union, especially
since Moscow has superiority in conventional arms in
Europe. Chinese analysts point to West. European
doubts that a US BMD system would provide them
with protection since Soviet missiles have very short
flight times to West European territory, and an expert
associated with the Military Academy noted that
China shared the same geography.
Chinese analysts are just as concerned about major
advances in technology resulting from SDI research.
Most analysts agree that China must not be "left
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Secret
Relations With the Soviet Union
Chinese analysts see Soviet preoccupation with SDI
as serving China's interests by keeping Moscow on the
defensive globally and providing the Soviets with
further incentives to improve ties to Beijing. They
expect Moscow to seek opportunities to expand its
dialogue with Beijing, stressing the common ground it
shares with China in opposing "the arms race in
space."
Unstated is what we presume to be the belief of
Chinese analysts that this heightened concern in
Washington about a possible Sino-Soviet rapproche-
ment will increase Beijing's room to maneuver in the
triangle. At the same time, Chinese thinkers are
aware that Moscow will seek to exploit China's
criticism of SDI for its own purposes. They are
concerned about appearing to side too closely with
Moscow, but stress that Beijing will not hesitate to
blame the United States for a lack of progress, if
China concludes that the Soviet Union is seriously
seeking an agreement and US "intransigence" on SDI
is the principal obstacle.
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Secret
Secret
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