(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000100560001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 23, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ccnlral Inidligcncc Agency
Wa',hi nglon, D C. 20505.
Bolivia: The Aftermath of Operation Blast Furnace
23 December 1986
Summary
We believe Operation Blast Furnace--the four-month joint US-Bolivian
antinarcotics campaign--has had a net positive effect both for President Paz Estenssoro's
domestic position and for bilateral relations. Paz's stature as a nationalist left him
virtually immune to criticism that Bolivia's sovereignty was violated. The exercise
sensitized the Bolivian public to the gravity of the narcotics trafficking problem to the
extent that any future joint operation would be, in our view, a politically neutral event. As
expected, however, traffickers have been able to resume their activity since the departure
of US troops. Moreover, narcotics-related
violence appears to be on an upswing.
Initial hostile reactions to Operation Blast Furnace within Bolivia quickly subsided
and rarely focused directly on President Paz. Early outcries from small opposition parties
that national sovereignty had been violated by the intervention of US troops failed to gain
public acceptance.
During the
four month exercise, the single event that attracted the most popular criticism was the
murder of a prominent Bolivian scientist by drug traffickers--the Huanchaca affair.
However, public outrage against this act was channeled away from Paz Estenssoro,
--------------------
This memorandum was prepared byl (South
America Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with
the Office of Global Issues and the Directorate of Operations. Information as of
December 1986 was used in the preparation of this paper. Questions and comments may
be directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA
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focusing largely on local US DEA agents, who were blamed for failing to warn of danger
in the area.
The political costs of Blast Furnace for Paz that we had expected failed to
materialize for several reasons. Paz--a grand old man of the Bolivian Revolution--was
uniquely prepared to ride out charges of "sell-out" to the US. Further, he had the strong
support of major opposition leader Hugo Banzer and Armed Forces Commander General
Lopez Leyton. Although influential coca growers' unions initially protested the operation,
Bolivia's labor confederation was distracted by continuing troubles in the mining sector
and eventually lost interest in Blast Furnace. Paz was also helped by the fact that
political attention during and after the operation has been diverted by a succession of
episodes, such as the march on La Paz by militant miners, the customary year-end
Cabinet shuffle, and, the rumored retirement of General Lopez. In many ways, the
shallowness of the political impact of Blast Furnace is typical: La Paz is so isolated from
the rest of Bolivia and so crisis prone that reactions to most major events are diffuse and
shortlived.
Although some neighboring governments saw the US intervention as a dangerous
precedent and publicly emphasized that Bolivia was a special case, Bolivian spokesmen
apparently did not feel compelled to defend their actions nor did they seek to deflect
criticism to Washington. On balance, relations between Bolivia and the US during this
period appear to have been strengthened rather than weakened, while relations with
neighboring countries did not deteriorate in any measurable way.
Outlook and Implications
In retrospect, we believe Operation Blast Furnace was a political success but a
mixture of successes and failures at the operational leve~ Reports of an upsurge in
trafficking began even before US troops left the country. Nevertheless, from the US
perspective, most of the longer term consequences of Operation Blast Furnace now
appear positive. The joint effort has highlighted narcotics trafficking in Bolivia in such a
way that continuing Bolivian media and political attention to this issue seems assured.
We consider it likely that the present Bolivian government would be willing to
participate in another such joint operation, particularly as it becomes apparent that
Bolivian security forces cannot sustain effective antinarcotics efforts on their own; the
recent increase in violence attributable to narcotics traffickers--which may mark a new
trend--is likely to facilitate cooperation. For example, the murder of a Bolivian
congressman who was an outspoken member of the Huanchaca investigating committee
and the recent downing of a Bolivian Air Force helicopter--apparently by traffickers--have
demonstrated the continuing seriousness of the narcotics issue.
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As a result of the groundswell of antinarcotics sentiment, the Bolivian government
may be under increasing pressure to respond to charges by the media that some senior
officials are engaged in illegal narcotics activities.
The Bolivian government claims that more US financial support will be necessary
to sustain effective narcotics interdiction and eradication efforts. Diplomatic lobbying
efforts are already underway to solicit a major commitment of US funds--$360 million
has been quoted as the amount needed to enact draft legislation to eliminate coca
cultivation in several growing areas of Bolivia. Although the Bolivian government can be
expected to continue to cite the Operation Blast Furnace as a precedent and rationale for
more US assistance, the emphasis on antinarcotics efforts also reflect a greater
commitment on the part of the Paz administration to eradication than existed before.
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SUBJECT: Bolivia: The Aftermath of Operation Blast Furnace
Dissemination:
1-
1-
The Honorable Ann Wrobleski, INM, State Department
Mr. Jerrold M. Dion, INM, State Department
Dr. Carlton Turner, SA to the President
Mr. Gene Williams, Office of the Vice President
The Honorable Elliott Abrams, Inter-American Affairs,
State Department
Mr. Paul Taylor, State Department
Mr. Robert Gelbard, Inter-American Affairs, State
Department
Ms. Vicki Huddleston, ARA, State Department
Mr. Dwight Ink, AID, State Department
Mr. Larry Dash, AID, State Department
Ms. Penelope Farley, AID, State Department
1 - Mr. Dave Westrate, DEA
1 - Mr. Douglas P. Mulholland, Treasury Department
1 - Mr. Ciro DeFalco, Treasury Department
1 - Mr. Greg Christopoulos, Treasury Department
1 - Mr. William von Raab, US Customs Service
1 - Col. Richard Childress, NSC
1 - Mr. Lucian Heichler, INR/C, State Department
1 - Mr. Bryon Jackson, Commerce Department
INTERNAL:
Original - Requestor
1 - D/DCI-DDCI
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - O/DDI
1 - NIO/NAR
1 - NIO/LA
1 - C/NIC/AG
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/PES
1 - DDI/CPAS/ILS
1 - D/ALA
1 - DD/ALA
1 Executive Director
2 - ALA/PS
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SUBJECT: Bolivia: The Aftermath of Operation Blast Furnace
1 - ALA Research Director
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - CPAS/ISS
2 - C/ALA/SAD
2 - C/ALA/SAD/AN
1 - D/OGI
1 - DD/OGI
2 - OGI/IND
2 - OGI/IND/A
4 - OGI/PG/CH
1 - OGI/EXS/PG
1 - DO/LA
1 - DO/LA
1 - DO/PINS
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