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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000100280001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Cuba: Soviet Militar
Deliveries in 1985
An Intelligence Assessment
Top Sccrct
ALA 86-10046C
GI 86-10072C
IA 86-10066
er 1986
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Cuba: Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1985
An Intelligence Assessment
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This paper was
Office of African
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2bAl
prepared by
and Latin American Analysis,
and
the Office of
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Global Issues,
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It was coordinated with the Directorate
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of Operations.
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Comments and
directed to the
queries are welcome and may be
Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA,
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Top Secret
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ALA 86-10046C
GI 86-10072C
Reverse Blank
IA 86-10066C
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October 1986
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 1 October 1986
was used in this report.
Cuba: Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1985
Top Secret
In 1985, as it has every year since 1980, the Soviet Union delivered a large
quantity of military goods to Cuba. The tonnage of arms delivered,
however, declined sharply from the record high levels of the preceding four
years?an indication that the cycle of rapid expansion of the Cuban Armed
Forces that began in 1981 may be nearing an end. Nonetheless, military
deliveries in 1985 remained well above the levels of the late 1970s, and as a
result of the major expansion and modernization of the Armed Forces that
has taken place over the last five years, Cuba's military capabilities and op-
erational readiness are at an alltime high. Soviet deliveries continue
gradually to improve Cuba's defensive capabilities and raise the potential
cost to the United States of any attempt to neutralize Cuban forces by in-
vasion, airstrike, or blockade.
Key features of the 1985 deliveries were:
? Shipments of military equipment dropped some 40 percent?from an
average of 58,OQO metric tons per year in 1981-84 to 34,000 metric tons.
? Shipments from East European countries, including small arms, ammu-
nition, and light aircraft, amounted to 10,000 tons?double the tonnage
for each of the last two years.
? Among the most important items delivered were 75 medium tanks and
more than 80 other armored vehicles.
? The Cuban Navy received its first deliveries of Stenka patrol boats, and
the SSC-3 antiship missile system was deployed for the first time in
Cuba, while the air defense forces received SA-13 surface-to-air missile
launchers and state-of-the-art jamming equipment.
In addition, Cuba's Air Force benefited from the delivery of at least one
MIG-21 and two MIG-23 fighters, and two MI-17 helicopters?although
these deliveries represented a decrease from 1984. A second IL-76 heavy-
lift transport aircraft was delivered to Cubana Airlines, giving a boost to
Cuba's military airlift capability. The Cuban Navy continued to modernize
its mine warfare fleet with the acquisition of two Sonya-class coastal
minesweepers.
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Most of the military goods delivered to Cuba probably have remained in
that country.
Cuba continues to serve as a conduit for the transfer of Soviet military
equipment to other Third World countries, particularly Nicaragua and
Angola.
The drop in deliveries suggests that Soviet arms shipments to Cuba have
begun to stabilize at a new level?lower than the record deliveries of the
last four years, but substantially higher than those of the previous decade.
We do not expect this decline to affect Cuba's ability to operate the large
numbers of fighters, missiles, tanks, armored vehicles, and naval combat-
ants already in the Armed Forces inventory. Replacements and spare parts
are available for most equipment; pilots and technicians have become
proficient on new weapons; and a number of military projects, such as the
upgrading of air and naval facilities, the addition of new command and
control systems, and the hardening of air defense command centers, have
been completed recently.
Although the drop in 1985 deliveries may signal a curtailment of Havana's
rapid expansion program, the improvement in the Cuban Armed Forces
since 1980 has been dramatic. Even without taking hostile action, Cuba's
Navy and Air Force could have a significant impact on the allocation of
US naval and air forces in time of war or crisis because of the potential
threat to merchant shipping and troop convoys entering and exiting the
Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. Moreover, the appearance of
ground-launched antiship missiles in Cuba for the first time in over 15
years strengthens Havana's ability to threaten Caribbean shipping lanes in
time of war. Cuba's small but growing offensive capability and its potential
for intervention in the Caribbean and Central America also threaten US
interests, because many states in the region have little ability to defend
themselves and would look to the United States for protection.
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Contents
Page
Scope Note
111
Key Judgments
Introduction
1
Military Deliveries in 1985
1
General Patterns
1
Major Arms Deliveries
2
Shipments From Eastern Europe
3
Transshipment of Arms to Third World Nations
3
Impact of Arms Deliveries on Cuban Military Capabilities
7
Ground Forces
7
Naval and Coastal Defense Forces
8
Air and Air Defense Force
9
Benefits to the Soviet Union of Military Aid to Cuba
10
Outlook and Implications for the United States
11
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Figure 1
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\Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Argentina
Wrigr
708670 10-86
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Cuba: Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1985
Introduction
This paper details the available information on ship-
ments of major arms and military-associated equip-
ment to Cuba from the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe during 1985, identifies and discusses trends in
weapons deliveries, and assesses the impact of these
acquisitions on Cuban military capabilities.
1
Military Deliveries in 1985
General Patterns
The overall tonnage of Soviet seaborne military deliv-
eries to Cuba in 1985 was some 40 percent less than
the average volume of deliveries in the previous four
years
Cuba receives all of its military equipment from the
Soviet Union free of charge. We estimate the market
value of the equipment received in 1985 at US $350
million. Compared with the $4.5 billion per year in
economic aid and subsidies Cuba has received from
the USSR in recent years, we do not consider this an
inordinate amount for the Soviets to spend in ensuring
Cuba's effective participation in Communist military
activities in the Third World.
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Among the most important items of equipment deliv-
ered in 1985 were at least 75 medium tanks-25
T-62s and 50 T-54/55s?and more than 80 other
armored vehicles. The Cuban Air Force received a
Tot) Secret
handful of jet fighters, including one MIG-21 and two
MIG-23s, as well as two MI-17 helicopters.' Cuban
air defenses were strengthened by the delivery of 12
SA-13 surface-to-air missile launchers
The
Navy received its initial shipment of three Stenka
patrol boats and five additional Zhuk patrol boats?
which may be passed on to Nicaragua?and doubled
the number of coastal minesweepers in its inventory
with the delivery of two more Sonya minesweepers.
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the SSC-3
coastal defense missile system?with a maximum
range of 45 nautical miles?was noted for the first
time in Cuba last year.
Shipments From Eastern Europe
As in the past two years, a substantial volume of
military items, not included in the tonnage figures
presented here, was delivered by East European sup-
pliers in 1985.
it is clear
that the volume of deliveries from Eastern Europe
rose dramatically in 1985.
Deliveries of some 400 trucks and jeeps from
Romania, a large quantity of small arms from Yugo-
slavia, light aircraft from Czechoslovakia, and air-
craft spare parts and ammunition from Poland sharp-
ly increased the tonnage of East European shipments
3
last year.
even conservative estimates of the ton-
nage delivered by sea suggest that the volume of East
European military deliveries in 1985 was more than
double that for each of the previous two years.
Although no
major weapon systems were delivered to Cuba from
Eastern Europe during the year, Yugoslavia shipped
some 50,000 rifles, some 1,000 machineguns, and
millions of rounds of ammunition to Cuba in late
1985, In addition,
Zlin-142 light aircraft shipped from Czechoslovakia
enabled Cuba's Border Guards to establish an aerial
reconnaissance squadron last year.
Transshipment of Arms to
Third World Nations
Cuba serves as a conduit for arms and military
equipment to other Soviet client states in the Third
World, particularly Angola and Nicaragua. Most
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military deliveries to these countries, however, contin- greater security of this route, which avoids the Pana-
ue to be shipped directly from the Soviet Union. We ma Canal?to bring in arms and militar esui.ment
cannot quantify the proportion of Soviet military as well as general cargo. 25X1
deliveries to Cuba in 1985 that were shipped to other 25X1
countries, but we believe that most equipment has
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Cuban merchant ships that regularly (up to five times
per month) sail to Corinto, Nicaragua, apparently
deliver some military or military-related equipment to
the Sandinistas. Nicaraguan merchant ships also trav-
el periodically between Cuba and ports on
Nicaragua's east coast?taking advantage of the
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Figure 3. Deliveries of Soviet BMP infantry
combat vehicles (left) and T-62 tanks (right)
improved the mobility and firepower of Cuba's
Ground Forces.
Seaborne shipments of arms from Cuba to Angola
usually consist of heavier, and usually older, military
equipment?such as T-34 or T-54/55 tanks and
BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, for example?
and typically occur at least once per quarter. More
modern weapons, for Cuban or Angolan use, are
shipped directly to Angola from the Soviet Union.
7
Impact of Arms Deliveries on Cuban
Military Capabilities
Most of the modern weapons and major items of
equipment now in Cuban operational inventories were
delivered since 1980. The military equipment deliv-
ered in 1985 will enhance Cuba's Ground Forces
capabilities, strengthen its coastal defenses, and up-
grade its airlift capability.
Ground Forces
Cuba's Ground Forces, which are the least modern of
the three armed services, received the bulk of the
military equipment delivered in 1985. The addition of
some 75 T-62 and T-54/55 tanks and 80 other
armored vehicles to an already aubstantial armored
inventory has enabled Cuba to effect a major restruc-
turing of five of its nine active motorized infantry
divisions. A light tank brigade?a combined-arms
unit composed of tanks, BMP armored personnel
carriers, self-propelled antiaircraft and field artillery,
and combat engineers?has now replaced the motor-
ized infantry regiments in each of these divisions, and
provides greater firepower and protection. The Soviet
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Table 3
Inventory of Selected Cuban
Ground Forces Weapons and Equipment a
1975
1980
1985
Modern medium tanks
T-62
0
50
237
T-54/55
(400)
630
784
Other armored vehicles
BMP infantry combat vehicle
0
30
81
BTR-60 armored personnel
carrier
(80)
340
453
BRDM reconnaissance vehicle
(40)
90
130
Field artillery
M-1973 SP 152-mm howitzer
0
0
6
M-1974 SP 122-mm howitzer
0
6
18
B-21 122-mm multiple rocket
launcher
(0)
40
72
130-mm field gun
(100)
110
176
122-mm howitzer
(140)
160
225
Air defense artillery
ZSU-23/4 SP air defense artillery
0
28
45
Total estimated inventory.
Note: Parentheses denote substantially greater uncertainty.
armor deliveries also have allowed the Cubans to
replace most of the T-54/55 tanks and BTR-60
armored personnel carriers they had shipped to Ango-
la during the previous year.
Air defense of Cuban ground force units also has been
improved with the delivery last year of 12 SA-13
surface-to-air missile launchers. This short-range,
low-level air defense system was seen for the first time
with a Cuban unit last year.
An improvement over the SA-9 mobile launcher, the
SA-13 launcher is mounted on a tracked vehicle for
better mobility, and the SA-13 missile has slightly
better range and altitude characteristics than the
SA-9. The SA-9 and SA-13 systems are both effective
against helicopters and subsonic fixed-wing aircraft,
and in the Soviet military they both appear in the air
defense battery of motorized rifle or tank regiments.
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Naval and Coastal Defense Forces
The Soviets delivered only two coastal minesweepers
and eight patrol boats to Cuba in 1985. This made the
tonnage of naval vessels delivered last year substan-
tially less than the deliveries during 1984, when two
major combatants?a Koni frigate and an F-class
submarine?and nine Zhuk patrol boats were received
by Cuba.
The most notable of last year's naval shipments was
the delivery of three Stenka patrol boats. The Stenka
is used by the Soviet KGB as a border patrol craft and
had not been exported previously by the USSR. The
version shipped to Cuba, however, had the torpedo
tubes, depth charge racks, and dipping sonar removed,
and was equipped with a quadruple SA-N-5 surface-
to-air missile launcher, twin 30-mm gun mounts fore
and aft, and two 16-barrel chaff launchers astern.
The arma-
ment and outfitting of the Stenkas suggest that they
will be employed in a border guard role. Five addi-
tional Zhuk patrol boats also were delivered last
year?on top of the nine delivered in 1984?most of
which probably will be passed on to Nicaragua.
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Table 4
Inventory of Selected Cuban
Navy Assets a
1975
1980
1985
Foxtrot submarines
0
2
3
Koni frigates
0
0
2
Guided-missile patrol boats
Komar
(16)
6
3
Osa-I
5
5
5
Osa-II
1
13
Torpedo boats
P-4/P-6/Komar conversion
(24)
(19)
13
Turya hydrofoil
0
4
9
Patrol boats
Zhuk
(0)
12
26
Stenka
0
0
3
Minesweepers
Yevgenya
0
7
12
Sonya
1
4
Polnocny landing ship
2
a Operational inventory only.
Note: Parentheses denote substantially greater uncertainty.
Two Sonya minesweepers delivered in 1985 doubled
the Navy's inventory of coastal minesweepers and are
a major improvement over the smaller Yevgenya
inshore minesweepers that have been the mainstay of
Cuba's mine warfare capability. The new minesweep-
ers are bigger, faster, better equipped and can stay at
sea longer than the smaller Yevgenyas, and give the
Cuban Navy greater flexibility in performing a vari-
ety of roles other than minesweeping, such as mine-
laying and antisubmarine warfare.
Cuba's coastal defenses were significantly improved
in 1985 with the deployment of the SSC-3 ground-
launched antiship missile system. This truck-
mounted, highly mobile missile system has a range of
some 45 nautical miles, posing a significant threat to
shipping lanes in the Caribbean?especially the
Florida Straits, Yucatan Channel, and Windward
Passage. With a greater range than the cruise missiles
9
Figure 5. The most notable naval shipments in
1985 were three Stenka patrol boats
carried aboard Cuba's Osa patrol boats?and the
added advantage of greater concealment afforded to a
land-based system?the new missile system gives
Cuba an effective means of challenging US control
over Caribbean sea lines of communication in time of
war, and could threaten US freedom of navigation
operations in peacetime as well.
Air and Air Defense Force
Soviet deliveries of fighter aircraft to Cuba decreased
significantly in 1985, amounting to only one MIG-21
and two MIG-23s, compared to four MIG-21s and
three MIG-23s in 1984.
?aside
from the SA-13 system that went to Cuba's Ground
Forces. Other air-related shipments in 1985 included
the transfer of a new IL-76 heavy-lift transport, the
most modern Soviet air defense jamming equipment,
and two MI-17 helicopters.
The delivery of a second IL-76 transport to Cuba in
June 1985 increases Havana's heavy airlift capability
and improves its potential for providing long-range
logistic support to its allies and forces overseas.
Although the IL-76s are subordinate to Cuba's
national airline Cubana, and carry its markings, the
aircraft were designed to serve as military transports.
Like all Cubana aircraft, they are the property of the
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Figure 6. The SSC-3 ground-launched antiship
missile system was noted for the first time in
Cuba in 1985. This truck-mounted, highly mo-
bile missile system has a range of some 45
nautical miles and could pose a significant threat
to shipping lanes in the Caribbean.
Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.
The acquisition of the IL-76 transports has given
Cuba the ability to airlift heavier loads-40 tons
instead of the 20-ton capacity of the IL-62--any-
where in the Caribbean Basin. In addition, small
payloads of about 10 tons can be flown up to a
distance of 5,000 nautical miles. Each aircraft also
can carry up to 140 passengers or 125 fully equipped
paratroops. Before the arrival of the IL-76, Cuba had
no capacity to airlift bulky or heavy items, such as
armored personnel carriers, light aircraft, or large
loads of ammunition. Thus far, Cuba has used the
IL-76s principally for commercial flights to Panama.
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Table 5
Inventory of Selected Cuban Air
and Air Defense Force Weapons
and Equipment a
1975
Modern jet fighters/trainers b
MIG-23
MIG-21
L-39 trainers
Other aircraft b
0
(95)
0
MI-24 attack helicopters
MI-8/17 helicopters
AN-24/26 transports
Surface-to-air missile launchers
0
(3)
(2)
SA-2 d
102
SA-3 d
6
SA-6
0
SA-9
0
SA-13
0
1980
1985
12
44
138
161
0
30
0
11
30
58
24
30
120
132
24
42
20
20
0
20
0
12
Operational inventory only.
b Through 1980 there were also decreasing numbers of older
aircraft.
c Includes MIG-211-1 (reconnaissance) but excludes older MIG-21
variants whose operational status is uncertain.
d Includes only launchers associated with sites assessed to be
primary occupied/operational sites (excludes dispersal sites).
Note: Based on a recent reassessment. Parentheses denote substan-
tially greater uncertainty.
Benefits to the Soviet Union of
Military Aid to Cuba
The USSR does not charge Cuba for the military aid
it supplies, but these costs are more than offset by the
military and political benefits it derives from support-
ing the Castro regime. These have included the use of
Cuban troops as a surrogate force, most notably in
Angola, Cuban assistance in penetrating Western
governments and influencing nonaligned nations, and
the use of Cuban territory as a base for signals and
electronic intelligence collection against the United
States. Perhaps the greatest benefit to the Soviets,
however, is that the growing Cuban military threat
could force US military planners to allocate resources
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Figure 7. The acquisition of two IL-76 transport
aircraft gives Cuba the ability to airlift heavier
loads anywhere in the Caribbean Basin.
for maintaining the security of vital sea lanes of the
Caribbean Basin in times of war, thereby diluting US
forces available for deployment to Europe or other
potential areas of US-Soviet confrontation.
The Soviets also maintain a presence in Cuba of
nearly 13,000 personnel, more than half of whom are
military advisers. Some 7,000 to 8,000 Soviet military
personnel are associated with the Soviet combat bri-
gade, the signals intelligence facility at Lourdes, and
the Soviet Military Advisory Group. The effort ex-
pended by the Soviets to train and equip their ally in
the Caribbean reflects not only the importance of
Cuba's location and military forces to the Soviet
Union, but also Moscow's confidence in Cuba's ability
to disseminate Soviet military doctrine throughout the
Third World.
Outlook and Implications for
the United States
We judge?based on the downward trend in military
deliveries seen in the past two years?that Cuba will
continue to modernize its Armed Forces during the
rest of the decade, but probably at a more moderate
pace. The rate of growth in Cuba's military capabili-
ties will continue to depend on Moscow's assessment
of Cuban usefulness to Soviet aims, and its evaluation
of the risk of provoking the United States. In our
view, Soviet deliveries to Cuba over the past five years
indicate that Moscow is firmly committed to strength-
ening Cuba's defenses against a possible US attack or
11
blockade, but that it understands that the introduc-
tion of purely offensive weapons, such as medium
bombers, would cause a crisis. While the Soviets
appear willing to help Cuba improve its regional
intervention capabilities, they probably will move
cautiously to gauge US reactions.
Cuba probably will continue to develop its ground-
based air defenses; for example, the expansion of
surface-to-air missile forces already underway in cen-
tral and eastern Cuba will in turn require the delivery
of more radars, missiles, and communications equip-
ment. that Cuban forces in
Angola operate at least one missile system that has
not yet appeared in Cuba?the SA-8?and we believe
this system is a likely candidate for future deliveries.
Another, but less likely possibility, would be the
SA-5?a long-range, high-altitude system that the
Soviets have supplied to Syria, and more recently, to
Libya.
We believe that the Soviet Union will continue to
supply Cuba with replacement aircraft for the five
fighters lost in accidents in 1985, but that Cuba's
inventory of fighter aircraft will remain relatively
stable for the next few years. The Air Force has just
completed a major reequipping and retraining pro-
gram, and therefore is not likely to acquire any new
types of aircraft in the near future. One possible
acquisition, if Moscow were willing to risk US reac-
tion to provide it, would be the MIG-25 Foxbat high-
altitude fighter. Cuban President Castro?long net-
tled over what he considers to be unnecessary and
provocative US SR-71 overflights?has challenged
the right of the United States to fly such missions and
probably wants a weapon, like the Foxbat, that could
threaten the SR-71. The Cubans may also want to
acquire the reconnaissance version of the MIG-25,
which they might fly near US borders in retaliation
for the SR-71 reconnaissance flights over Cuba. The
Soviets may provide Cuba with several more IL-76
transports, which would expand Cuba's capability to
deploy troops and military equipment over long dis-
tances?although it would still be dependent on the
USSR for any large-scale redeployment of forces.
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Cuba can be expected to continue replacing its older
T-54/55 tanks with T-62s, and to acquire sufficient
armor for adding tank brigades to the three remaining
active motorized infantry divisions. Air defense of
Cuban Ground Forces units also probably will contin-
ue to improve with the acquisition of additional SA-9
and SA-13 missile launchers, and perhaps several
more SA-6 launchers.
Based on our assessment of trends in past deliveries,
we believe the Cuban Navy probably will receive at
least one major surface combatant or submarine from
the USSR during 1987. By the end of the decade, it
could acquire one more Koni frigate, one or two more
amphibious landing ships, and perhaps as many as
three additional submarines. Cuba's acquisition of the
Nanuchka-class missile patrol boat is also a possi-
bility, since it uses the same missile as the SSC-3
ground-launched missile system. Cuba also may ac-
quire more SSC-3 launchers, and is almost certain to
continue modernizing its minesweeper force by ac-
quiring more Sonya coastal minesweepers.
In time of war or crisis, Cuba's regular Armed Forces
could threaten merchant shipping passing through the
Caribbean or exiting the Gulf of Mexico, and, even
without taking hostile action, would likely cause US
military planners to divert air and naval assets to
protect troop convoys bound for Europe. The substan-
tial improvements in Cuba's Armed Forces over the
past five years also would raise the cost to the United
States of any attempt to neutralize Cuban forces.
Cuba's small, but growing, military airlift and sealift
capabilities also pose a potential threat to neighboring
countries in the Caribbean and Central America.
Many of these countries have no conventional armed
forces, and we believe that in a crisis they would look
to the United States for protection from any Cuban
threat.
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