EL SALVADOR'S INSURGENTS: RESURRECTING AN URBAN POLITICAL STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000100260001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
El Salvador's Insurgents:
Resurrecting an Urban
Political Strategy
ALA 86-10042
September 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Political Strategy
El Salvador's Insurgents:
Resurrecting an Urban
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with
a contribution fro ALA, and a
This paper was prepared by
biographic contribution from
Leadership Analvsisl
Division, ALA
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 86-10042
September 1986
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STAT
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El Salvador's Insurgents:
Resurrecting an Urban
Political Strategy
Key Judgments As their military situation has worsened over the last two years, the
Information available Salvadoran insurgents have relied increasingly on a multifaceted political
as of 2 September 1986 strategy to undermine the democratic government of El Salvador. The
was used in this report.
dynamics of the war and the domestic political situation make it highly
likely, in our judgment, that the rebels will focus even greater efforts on po-
litical agitation over the next 18 months.
the guerrillas hope to take advantage of economic hard times and war
weariness to foment antigovernment actions. The basic elements of their
strategy include re-creating the popular front groups of the late 1970s,
gaining control of the labor movement, and strengthening leftist-oriented
student groups.
Even though their initial gains have fallen short of their objectives, the
rebels have built a substantial foundation in the labor sector and have
made strides in converting the university into a base for logistic operations.
We expect that the intensified guerrilla effort in these and other civilian
sectors will make the Salvadoran Government press Washington harder for
economic aid to dilute the appeal of the rebels.
We judge that the insurgents' best prospects for stirring agitation are on
the labor front. Guerrilla supporters control some 50,000 workers consti-
tuting one-fourth of organized labor. Their activities have contributed to a
dramatic increase in strike activity since 1984 with over 100 strikes and
work stoppages in 1985 and more than 50 in the first four months of this
year. Steps taken last year to tighten rebel control over Marxist unions and
to co-opt democratic unions into a broad labor front may enhance the left's
capacity to stimulate further labor troubles. Inadequate funding, differ-
ences among leftist labor factions, and the defection of some democratic
unions, however, are hampering the guerrillas' efforts to strengthen their
following in the labor movement.
The insurgents' ability to make further inroads into organized labor will
depend perhaps most significantly on the state of the economy. In our
judgment, they are likely to shift more funds and manpower into strength-
ening their labor ties as their battlefield prospects worsen and the economy
stagnates. Continued leadership disputes within democratic labor unions
would make these unions vulnerable to subversion by aggressive and better
organized leftist elements.
Secret
ALA 86-10042
September 1986
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If the left is able to provoke widespread labor disturbances, this almost
certainly would provoke increased student opposition to the government at
the National University, located in San Salvador. The rebels have made a
concerted effort to turn the university-closed for five years-into the
armed camp and base of operations it was in 1980, but so far have
attracted only a few hundred students who actively support their cause. As
on the labor front, factionalism among students has undermined the
insurgents' ability to strengthen their support on campus. Nonetheless,
students continue to make university facilities available to the guerrillas,
who are persevering in their campus recruitment efforts.
Confrontations between militant student and labor groups and the govern-
ment's security forces clearly would provide grist for insurgent propaganda
alleging government repression and human rights abuses. Insurgent-
backed human rights groups-even though their credibility has been
eroded by association with the guerrillas and by the improvement since
1983 in the government's human rights record-would try to exploit
renewed urban violence to regain financial and political support from
sympathetic Western nationals and organizations.
financial assistance to the insurgents from Western
political, labor, and religious groups has virtually evaporated since 1984.
President Duarte's government so far has been able to avert a serious labor
crisis by granting pay raises and developing closer ties to democratic
unions. However, its ability to satisfy workers' grievances will be increas-
ingly limited by tight budgets. As a result, labor problems seem likely to
become less manageable, and the security forces-which consistently have
avoided confrontations-may be called on more often to restore order.
El Salvador's weak economy-with persistently high unemployment and
inflation-will remain the government's chief vulnerability. Duarte fears
alienating his main constituents-workers and peasants-and thus is
unlikely to take the austerity measures needed to stabilize the economy. In
addition, Duarte does not want to give the insurgents a rallying point on
economic issues that they might be able to translate into broader political
support for peace talks and power sharing. Instead, the Salvadoran
Government will continue to rely on ad hoc measures and on US economic
and military assistance to support the economy sufficiently.
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 Contents
Key Judgments
Reviving a Political Strategy
Agitation: The Insurgents' Best Hope 2
Propaganda
Human Rights Front Groups 6
International Image Making and Fundraising 7
Focus on Dialogue: Enhancing Credibility 7
The Government Response
Dealing With Labor 10
Countering Insurgent Propaganda 11
Caution on Dialogue 11
Outlook and Implications for the United States 11
A. Changing Front Groups, 1979-86 13
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Figure 1
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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El Salvador's Insurgents:
Resurrecting an Urban
Political Strategy
human rights front groups.
environment and a stagnant economy, plan to oppose
the Duarte administration by reviving the defunct
"popular" organizations of the late 1970s, which used
often violent strikes and mass demonstrations to cre-
ate widespread turmoil. The guerrillas, having made
considerable progress in the labor movement, are now
trying to duplicate that success with student and
insurgent leaders, aided by a more tolerant political
Jose Napoleon Duarte.
Military setbacks in the last two years have put the
Salvadoran guerrillas on the defensive and forced
them to place their emphasis on political strategies
aimed at undermining the government of President
for US policy.
This paper examines the insurgents' political strategy
and its prospects for gains in the next 18 months. It
focuses on the efforts of the insurgent alliance-which
includes Marxist guerrilla hardliners and socialist
politicians-to weaken Duarte's support by provoking
political and labor agitation in El Salvador, exploiting
any dialogue with the government, and regaining
foreign backing. The paper also evaluates the govern-
ment's tactics in meeting the insurgents' political
challenge and the implications of these developments
Reviving a Political Strategy
radicalized politicians.
The Salvadoran insurgents have long recognized the
importance of the political dimension of their struggle
to seize power. The historical record shows that in the
late 1970s the rebels were able to make rapid political
gains in a society increasingly polarized by gross
inequity in the distribution of national wealth, rising
unemployment and cost of living, and military repres-
sion. By 1979 they had created or co-opted mass
umbrella organizations composed of nearly 100,000
teachers, students, workers, peasants, clergy, and
These groups came to pose a serious threat to the
government as they launched demonstrations and
strikes calling for social and political reforms. The left
showed its strength in January 1980 by turning out
some 100,000 supporters in a mass demonstration that
ended in chaos as unidentified snipers opened fire on
the crowd. Moderate politicians of the democratic
left-considering the government to be near collapse
and wanting to be well positioned for the succession-
joined the mass front groups in April 1980 to form the
Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR). This broader
representation gave the guerrillas greater prestige and
attracted increased foreign backing.
By January 1981, however, the leaders of the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 25X1
(FMLN)-created in November 1980 as a loose alli-
ance of the five armed rebel factions-for the most
part abandoned the political struggle. Believing the
Salvadoran Government was in its death throes, the
insurgents put their energies into an all-out military
effort to take power. The insurgents' January 1981
"final offensive" failed, however, and by 1984 the
Salvadoran Army-better led, more mobile, and in-
creasingly aggressive-gained the military advan-
tage.'
Although they have not been decisively beaten, the
guerrillas, in our view, no longer have the capability
to launch and sustain major offensives. To compen-
sate for their diminished military capabilities and to
prolong their survival, the rebels have turned to
terrorism, economic sabotage, and mine warfare to
Secret
ALA 86-10042
September 1986
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Figure 2
Organization of Insurgent Alliance
Marxist-Leninist
Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN)
Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL)
Armed Forces of National
Resistance (FARN)
People's Revolutionary
Army (ERP)
Communist Party /Armed
Forces of Liberation
(PCES/FAL)
Revolutionary Democratic
Front (FDR)
Popular Social Christian
Movement (MPSC)
National Revolutionary
Movement (MNR)
Independent Movement of
Salvadoran Professionals
and Technicians (MIPTES)
own forces.
economic infrastructure with minimum risk to their continued aid to San Salvador.
Rebel plans to "reactivate the masses" as a means to
undermine the Duarte government are key to the new
strategy. rebel leaders
believe that the evolving political system has created a
favorable environment for recruiting supporters and
organizing front groups, strikes, and demonstrations.
the rebels plan
eventually to provide arms and clandestine training to
agitators in order to provoke clashes with government
forces. increasing violence
will fuel the insurgency either by alienating Duarte's
primary constituencies in the lower middle class and
the urban poor, or by provoking a coup and military
crackdown.
Another important objective of the guerrillas' revised
strategy is to undermine foreign-especially US-
support for Duarte by depicting his government as
belligerent, nonreformist, and corrupt. FMLN guer-
rilla commanders view US military and economic aid
to El Salvador as the major obstacle to their winning
believe prolonged antigovernment demonstrations and
violent confrontations with Salvadoran security forces
inflict maximum damage on the armed forces and will weaken US public and Congressional support for
especially by provoking labor and student unrest.
The rebels' poor prospects in the field have forced
them to renew their emphasis on political strategy,
Agitation: The Insurgents' Best Hope
Labor. The guerrillas hope to take quick advantage of
El Salvador's economic problems by mobilizing the
labor movement against Duarte. The labor front
historically has been a vital source of support for the
Secret 2
the guerrillas
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left; in 1980, for example, the Marxists controlled
some 40 percent of the organized work force, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting. During the 1980s,
however, rightwing and government repression fol-
lowed by defections to democratic unions sharply
reduced insurgent influence. By 1985, El Salvador's
struggling economy-with a rising cost of living and
over half the working population unemployed or un-
deremployed-provided fertile ground for leftist labor
organizers, according to US Embassy sources.
The guerrillas began rebuilding their labor strength
by consolidating existing Marxist unions. In early
1985, US Embassy reporting suggested that
younger labor militants were seizing control from
longtime Marxist union leaders whom they blamed
for the left's loss of influence in the labor sector.
Three FMLN factions subsequently united most of
their affiliated urban trade unions in the Worker's
Solidarity Committee (CST)
This organizational effort produced a reasonably
sound foundation-about 25 percent of an organized
labor force of some 200,000, according to US Embas-
sy reporting-for potential expansion. The left dem-
onstrated growing strength when more than 10,000
people showed up for a CST march on May Day
1985. This contrasted with the previous year's turnout
of a few hundred supporters. The FMLN then set out
to absorb independent non-Marxist unions into a
broad labor front group. Disarray and conflicting
agendas within the democratic labor sector made it
vulnerable to such penetration and manipulation, and
US Embassy reporting showed that the Marxists were
successful in co-opting some democratic labor leaders
and unions. Leftist militants in a few key labor unions
helped provoke additional factional splits within dem-
ocratic labor federations, which ultimately led to the
collapse of a large democratic labor umbrella organi-
zation in 1985 . In
February 1986, the left organized a new labor front-
the National Unity of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS)-
that included 30,000 members of dissident factions of
democratic unions and peasant associations.
Marxist sponsors of the UNTS believe such labor
fronts provide their own labor movement with in-
creased legitimacy and support.
UNTS officials recently told a
Mexican audience that they represented a democratic
labor front of some 100,000 members opposed to
Duarte's economic policies
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The dramatic upsurge in strike activity since 1984- 25X1
when wage freezes and other labor restrictions were
lifted by the government-underscores the insurgents'
success in revitalizing their labor front. In 1985, the
US Embassy counted over 100 strikes and work
stoppages, and more than 50 were recorded in the first
four months of this year. Most of these labor actions
were fomented or abetted by Marxist unions, accord-
ing to the US Embassy
By mid-1986, however, the guerrillas were having
difficulties in manipulating their democratic allies.
US Embassy 0 sources indicated that, al-
though some democratic unions originally were duped
by the democratic appearance of the UNTS, media
and government reporting on its ties to the insurgents
was gradually weakening its domestic credibility. E::
many democratic unions in
the UNTS did not participate in leftist labor actions
last spring (several later withdrew from the organiza-
tion) in order to protect their independence and
improve their chances of acquiring funding from
international labor organizations.
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Selected Marxist Labor Organizations
National Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers
(FENASTRAS) split from a progovernment union
following the fraudulent presidential election of 1972
and was quickly radicalized. After violent strikes and
demonstrations in 1979-80, many members were
killed, jailed, or recruited by the sponsor guerrilla
faction, FARN, thus weakening the group's strength
among textile, coffee, and public utility workers.
Nevertheless, the union remains one of the most
influential forces in the Marxist labor movement.
The US Embassy estimates it has about 14,000
members.
Revolutionary Trade Union Front (FSR) was created
in 1979 as the labor arm of the FPL. Its militant rank
and file work mostly in textile and coffee unions, but
its cadre includes rural combatants and urban terror-
ists. US Embassy sources reported last year that FPL
sponsors were trying to rejuvenate the front's activi-
ties after splits and after the theft of the treasury by a
front official. The US Embassy believes FSR mem-
bership may approach 5,000.
United Federation of Salvadoran Trade Unions
(FUSS) is one of the oldest unions and is the tradi-
tional labor arm of the Communist Party; it is also
sponsored by the Soviet-supported World Federation
of Trade Unions. FARN and other guerrilla groups
have penetrated FUSS and contributed to factional-
ism. Over the years, FUSS has lost members through
defections and arrests. According to the US Embassy,
its membership (less than 4,000) is composed of
metalworkers, electricians, and fishermen.
Salvadoran National Union Federation of Workers in
Food, Clothing, Textile, and Related Industries
(FESTIAVTSCES) is a traditional Communist Party
labor front that generally allies with independent
unions and FUSS. Although vocal, its orthodox pro-
Moscow orientation generally has made it less influ-
ential than more radical worker groups. US Embassy
reports indicate that it represents perhaps 2,000
members.
National Association of Salvadoran Educators
(ANDES) is a militant public school teachers union
founded in the mid-1960s. Several ANDES leaders
became top cadre of the rebel alliance, and many
rank and file were arrested or murdered, or fled to
become combatants with the union's sponsor guerrilla
faction, FPL. US Embassy estimates place present
membership at 3,000, down from a strength of possi-
bly 15,000 in 1979.
The rebels' ability to sustain antigovernment labor
agitation also has been limited by their own internal
problems, including factional and personal disputes
and inadequate funding.
arena of antigovernment opposition until the universi-
ty was closed in 1980. Since the university reopened in
March 1985, the insurgents have attracted some 500
active student supporters and several hundred sympa-
thizers out of a student body of about 28,000. The
campus has been useful to the leftist opposition,
allowing leftist unions and other rebel front groups to
use its facilities for meetings and press conferences.
several student organiza-
Students. The guerrillas are also working hard to
revive support for their cause at the National Univer-
sity of El Salvador (UNES), which had been a major
tions are once again controlled by the rebels and are
trying to recruit supporters with the aid of some
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University and Human Rights Front Groups
University Organizations
University Professors 'Association (ADUES) Formed
in 1985; more militant than older AEU; involved in
organizing solidarity committees and raisingfunds in
the United States; led by FPL member Hector
Jangura Linares.
Association of University Educators (AEU) at the
National University of El Salvador (UNES). Also
known as the Salvadoran University Educators
(EDUS); main body of leftist professors influenced by
several rebel factions; participates in and facilitates
student protest activities; leaders include Miguel
Angel Parada, Manuel Canas, Ana Gloria de Mon-
toya, and Jesus Marquez Ochoa.
General Association of Salvadoran University Stu-
dents (AGEUS) at LINES. Long dominated by guerril-
las; composed of several student groups run by
different insurgent factions, although FPL appears
dominant; leaders not known but probably only a few
dozen committed members; works closely with leftist
labor unions.
Central Council of University Workers (CCTU) at
UNES. New, aggressive group; few members; led by
Jorge Salvador Ubau, a member of the FPL.
Revolutionary University Movement (MUR). Con-
trolled by breakaway FPL group; competes for con-
trol of UNES with AGEUS; probably fewer than 50
armed activists on campus; leaders include Sabino
Linares.
Association of Professionals and Technicians
(Protejel UES) Formed in April 1986; also attracting
university faculty members who have spurned more
vocal ADUES.
Union of University Workers (SETUS). Small mem-
bership; less radical rival to CCTU; led by Mauricio
Figueredo.
Human Rights Groups
Nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of El
Salvador (CDHES). Established about 1978; operat-
ed primarily by FARNfaction; claims to document
and investigate civilian massacres and bombings;
prepares written testimony, photo books; nominated
for Nobel Peace Prize in 1981, 1982, and 1984;
several leaders and members dejected or were
arrested in mid-1986.
Committee of Relatives in Favor of Liberty for the
Political Prisoners and the Disappeared in El Salva-
dor (CODEFAM). Has held hunger strikes and com-
memorative masses for victims of death squads and
government attacks.
Committee of Christian Mothers (Comite de Ma-
dres) FARNfront founded in 1977; claims member-
ship of 500 family members of individuals who are
missing, imprisoned, or have been victims of political
assassinations; belongs to Latin American Associa-
tion of Relatives of Prisoners and the Missing
(FEDEFAM); produces handouts, paid ads and other
publications; holds periodic demonstrations calling
for end to US military aid, freedom for all 'political"
prisoners, and dialogue with FMLN,? shares offices
with CDHES and may share personnel and funding
with CDHES and CODEFAM; received JFK Human
Rights Award in 1984; hurt by defection in May 1986
of its Director, Dora Angelica Campos. Second
"mothers" group-COMAFAC formed in 1985.
Committee of Political Prisoners (COPPES) In-
cludes most insurgents held in two national prisons;
attempts to organize protests, hunger strikes; gives
press interviews on prison conditions; led by Roberto
Aviles.
Christian Committee for the Displaced in El Salva-
dor (CRIPDES) Focuses on refugee issues, may be
controlled by the FPL; channels supplies to guerrillas
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school administrators and teachers-who have boldly
told US Embassy officials that the university's legiti-
mate role is to prepare students to be revolutionaries.
Student front groups have participated in Marxist
labor demonstrations and have sponsored antigovern-
ment conferences that have attracted hundreds of
Salvadoran and foreign participants. Some groups
have ties to US organizations that have served FMLN
propaganda purposes by repeating guerrilla claims of
government repression and rightwing terrorism on
campus, according to the US Embassy.
Unless the government again shuts down the universi-
ty-an action it is reluctant to take because of bad
publicity-the rebels plan to use the campus as a base
of operations for activities in San Salvador. One
insurgent group responsible for several assassinations
in the capital last year regularly used the university as
a meetin lace
been smuggled into the university since last fall for
distribution among student terrorist cells.
FMLN attempts to control the university, however,
have been hurt by a student body made more cautious
by the five-year closure and by factionalism among
the activists. most
students are not as politicized as they were five years
ago and are fearful that leftist involvement will again
jeopardize their education. In addition, Marxist stu-
dent front groups competing for recruits and leader-
ship of university organizations have often fought and
even issued death threats against one another, accord-
ing to US EmbassyF--Ireporting.
Propaganda
The propaganda component of the rebels' political
strategy focuses on efforts to denigrate the Duarte
government's record-mainly on human rights-and
to enhance the insurgents' own image. This propagan-
da employs a wide variety of human-rights-related
themes aimed at both foreign and domestic audiences.
Human Rights Front Groups. The FMLN has used
several Salvadoran human rights organizations to
echo claims by leftist student and labor groups of
government mistreatment and to otherwise criticize
the human rights performance of the Duarte adminis-
tration. Although the rebel effort in this area does not
appear to have grown substantially in the last few
years, its focus has shifted from condemnation of
death squad activity to criticism of air attacks, popu-
lation relocation, and other effective government
tactics.
According to US Embassy sources
approximately six human rights organizations aid
the insurgents by coordinating demonstrations and
marches-increasingly in conjunction with FMLN
student and labor fronts-and producing publications
condemning the government for human rights abuses
in order to discourage domestic and foreign support
abuses reported by these organizations are fabricated.
Some human rights front groups also have provided
personnel and materiel assistance to the guerrillas.
Several human rights activists arrested in May admit-
ted that their organizations used fraudulent methods
to secure international funding, of which 95 percent
goes to the rebels for the purchase of munitions and
other supplies. According to
sources of the US Embassy, some human rights
activists have fought with the insurgents and have
participated in marches intended to provoke violence.
The credibility of insurgent-backed human rights
groups has been undermined at home and abroad by
the government's steadily improving human rights
record since 1983. US embassies abroad indicate that
many Western and Latin American governments
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COM{TE l S Y FWXl
EBBS tJ a{q
M `F1Rt
Members of the Committee of Christian Moth-
ers-a rebel front group-conducting a human
rights march demanding the release of politcal
prisoners and the prosecution of death squad
members=
applaud the progress Duarte has made in this area.
Within El Salvador, the Catholic Church has taken
the lead in praising the government's performance,
according to US Embassy and press reports. On the
other hand, leftist-sponsored human rights marches
and meetings in San Salvador have drawn hundreds
of sympathizers from Europe, the United States, and
Latin America in the last two years. Several leftist
Salvadoran human rights activists touring Europe in
1985 persuaded a group of Dutch, German, and
Greek parliamentarians to return with them to El
Salvador, where they met with and harshly criticized
Duarte, according to the US Embassy.
International Image Making and Fundraising. Guer-
rilla representatives abroad publicize the charges
made by their various front groups in an effort to
isolate the Salvadoran Government and to obtain
political and financial support for the insurgency.
Moderate FDR members such as Guillermo Ungo
and Ruben Zamora-former leaders of democratic
opposition parties in El Salvador-occasionally meet
with foreign leaders and continue to be the most
credible spokesmen for the insurgency. Guerrilla
spokesmen also maintain ties to sympathetic unions,
churchmen, students, and politicians in Western
Europe, Canada, Latin America, and the United
States, who, in turn, conduct numerous activities-
including fundraising-in support of the insurgency,
The insurgents' image abroad, nevertheless, has been
seriously undermined by their turn to terrorism and
by Duarte's success in strengthening El Salvador's
democracy
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the kidnaping of President Duarte 's 25X1
daughter in October 1985 alienated formerly support-
ive officials in many Western and Latin American
governments, political parties, labor organizations,
and church groups, and vitiated support within the
Socialist International and the United Nations. Ungo
has noted that his 1985 visits to several countries
received less publicity than in the past, and other
FDR leaders had cooler receptions at international
gatherings The decline 25X1
in political support has been reflected in the cessation 25X1
of nearly all financial assistance from Western
sources.
Any attempt to reverse the downward trend in foreign
support is likely to be hindered by tactical differences
between the FDR and the FMLN. 25X1
some FDR leaders are opposed to 25X1
the FMLN's terrorist tactics used since the June 1985
attack on the US Marines and are threatening to
withdraw from the alliance-a loss that would almost
certainly undercut FMLN efforts to regain support.
The dispute already has limited public displays of
unity; for example, last November FDR leaders re-
fused to sign an FMLN dialogue proposal because
they believed it condoned terrorist operations
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Some low-ranking 25X1
FDR members have since returned to El Salvador,
according to the US Embassy, and others probably
have quietly dropped out of the alliance.
Focus on Dialogue: Enhancing Credibility
Negotiation with the government is another important
element of the insurgents' political strategy to regain
domestic and international credibility.
the guerrillas believe that dia-
logue enhances their legitimacy by elevating them to a
position of equality with the government. Since the
first round of peace talks in October 1984, rebel
propaganda has persistently claimed the existence in
El Salvador of a duality of power that cannot be
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MEN
IN
HEctor Oqueli;
LA ALIANZA PDR,rMLN FS h EME Y SCIL[oA,
BOLETIN SEMANAL 213216
CENTROAMERICANO
El Salvador
Segundo Semestn de 1985
El Salvador: Balance de 1984
Politico a Mitar a Econ6mko a Derechos humans
n r~xor~a~urwia
Propaganda materials produced and distributed worldwide by the FDR and FMLN.
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Secret
Figure 3
FMLN/FDR?Representatives Abroad
Canada \ ` - \
United States x~ \ 41
Dominican
Republic
Jamaica
:L SABI Nicaragua
rr.r, air .-.J___-..
aFMLN - Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front
FDR - Revolutionary Democratic Front
0 2000 Kilometers
I_
ignored by the government.
the guerrillas also support to to
relieve military pressure and to sow dissension be-
tween Duarte and the military leadership. For these
reasons, the insurgent alliance has pushed for negotia-
tions and was quick to respond to Duarte's offer in
June to renew formal talks.
While agreeing to new talks, however, FMLN hard-
liners and moderate FDR political leaders are divided
on negotiating strategy.
=the FMLN opposes concessions to the govern-
ment and holds to the demands that led to the collapse
of the 1984 talks-including power sharing and the
reorganization of the armed forces as preconditions
for new elections. FDR leaders, on the other hand,
support more reasonable proposals in order to reestab-
lish their credibility with the government, with church
officials, and with foreign backers as a moderating
force in the alliance,
i/Finldpd
an
Libya
G.D.R.-German Democratic Republic
F.R.G. - Federal Republic of Germany
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
. They also probably view a renewed dialogue
as a means to enhance their value to rebel military
leaders by appearing as essential mediators in negoti-
ations with the government. Recent rebel pronounce-
ments rejecting the legitimacy of the constitution and
the Duarte administration and calling for a restruc-
turing of society indicate to us that the FMLN's more
radical demands will dominate the insurgents' negoti-
ating position.
The rebels regard leftist-controlled labor, student, and
human rights front groups as essential to building
support for their negotiating position
=plans by the FMLN to mobilize these groups in
peace marches and demonstrations in favor of insur-
gent demands and to boost public expectations for a
negotiated settlement.
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The government response to the insurgents' political
strategy has been principally ad hoc and pragmatic.
decisions on how
to deal with such issues as leftist labor agitation and
dialogue with the guerrillas often are made quickly
and without consultation and debate within the gov-
ernment. The US Embassy reported, for example,
that Duarte's decision to publicly propose new peace
talks was made the night before his speech to the
National Assembly and caught his ministers-and the
military leadership-by surprise. Even without a
formalized political strategy for dealing with insur-
gent political challenges, however, the government's
measured responses have been generally effective.
Dealing With Labor
The government has yet to develop a coherent labor
relations strategy. The US Embassy reports that
Duarte's handling of union unrest has been reactive
and not preemptive, and that substantive coordination
between the various ministries and agencies responsi-
ble for labor issues has been seriously deficient.F-
Despite its inability to preempt strikes by systemati-
cally dealing with basic labor grievances, the govern-
ment has managed to use financial or punitive lever-
age to limit the duration of the work stoppages. In
past years, the government often used wage hikes to
end strikes, but tight budgets are increasingly limiting
this option. Reporting by the US Embassy shows that
in the past year the government has been able to end
several strikes without concessions by firing or threat-
ening to fire striking workers. Ironically, Duarte
probably has been aided in this by poor economic
conditions because many workers realize that, as long
as over half the working population is without jobs or
underemployed, the government and private industry
have an ample pool of workers.
Duarte's judicious use of his security forces has kept
strikes and demonstrations under control so far and
frustrated insurgent goals of trying to provoke violent
confrontations and military reprisals.
the military and security forces
have kept a low-key and limited presence at strikes
Gloomy Economic Outlook
El Salvador has been experiencing modest economic
growth, due in large measure to massive US assis-
tance, after a severe, four-year recession, but substan-
tial problems remain. Real GDP grew approximately
1.5 percent in 1984 and 1985, but, because of a high
rate of population growth (nearly 3 percent), the slide
in per capita income is continuing. Inflation, fueled by
wage increases and expansionary fiscal and monetary
policies, accelerated from 15 percent in 1984 to
22 percent last year, and is likely to rise to 30 percent
this year. Unemployment or underemployment affects
slightly more than half the work force. Despite some
improvement, the fiscal and balance-of-payments def-
icits remain large, and the country continues to face a
heavy debt burden.
Private-sector confidence in President Duarte and in
the business climate remains depressed, with levels of
private investment less than half of their highs in the
late 1970s. Although both the government and the
private sector recognize the need to improve relations,
mistrust will make reconciliation difficult. The gov-
ernment announced a short-term austerity program in
January that included some beneficial measures-
including a currency devaluation and passage of an
export promotion law-but the US Embassy reports
that the package has been poorly implemented. In
addition, President Duarte remains reluctant to
alienate his traditional constituents by undertaking
additional necessary economic reforms. As a result,
we believe that San Salvador will continue to be
heavily dependent on US aid to generate even limited
growth probably no more than 1 percent-this year.
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and demonstrations and rarely have arrested even
known leftist labor and student leaders or armed
demonstrators. Duarte has used military personnel to
run vital public utilities only once in the last two
years-in May 1986-and forbids military interven-
tion at the universities, according to the US Embassy.
San Salvador also has been successful recently in
countering insurgent efforts to dominate labor by
consulting more closely with democratic unions and
laying the groundwork for an alliance with moderate
labor groups. In March, Duarte's Christian Demo-
cratic Party and the American Institute for Free
Labor Development sponsored the creation of the
National Worker and Peasant Union (UNOC) to
unite many of the largest democratic trade unions and
peasant organizations with smaller independent work-
ers groups as a counterweight to the guerrilla-backed
UNTS. US Embassy sources report that the
UNOC-with at least twice the membership of
UNTS-has helped boost Duarte's sagging popularity
by extolling his government's record on political and
economic reforms. Leaders of UNOC-affiliated
unions also have made progress in splitting some
moderate leftist unions from UNTS~
The US Embassy reports,
nevertheless, that democratic union leaders still in-
tend to confront the government when their members'
interests are jeopardized, as several of them did in
July by publicly opposing additional austerity
measures.
Countering Insurgent Propaganda
The government's response to FMLN propaganda
abroad has been weak because of a lack of funds and
high-level neglect. The US Embassy reports that the
Salvadoran diplomatic service is small and poorly
staffed, and, consequently, the Duarte government
often is not represented at international gatherings
attended by rebel leaders. According to the US
Embassy, the government's diplomatic efforts are
focused on Duarte's periodic trips to Europe and
Latin America, which have dispelled some mispercep-
tions of El Salvador and won over new allies. Al-
though Duarte reportedly is proud of his achieve-
ments, we doubt that he will expand and improve the
diplomatic service or take other steps to strengthen
public diplomacy.
Duarte has placed greater emphasis on countering
FMLN propaganda in El Salvador and probably has
had some success, particularly in refuting rebel
charges of human rights abuses by the military. The
Ministry of Culture and Communications was created
in 1985 specifically to improve the government's
public relations effort and has been well funded. It 25X1
has used press conferences, television and newspaper
ads, and mass-produced publications to promote the
government's performance and publicize guerrilla
atrocities, according to the US Embassy.
Caution on Dialogue
Duarte's call in June for renewed talks with the
guerrillas was intended primarily as a dramatic public
relations gesture, according to US Embassy sources.
Government officials see little to be gained in a
dialogue with the rebels while the Salvadoran military
has the initiative in the war,
Duarte, however, could score gains if the talks suc- 25X1
ceeded in further dividing moderate insurgent politi-
cal leaders from the hardline guerrilla commanders-
which the President has told US Embassy officials is
one objective of the negotiations. 25X1
Despite concern about giving the guerrillas a new
propaganda forum, Salvadoran officials believe the
government will come out ahead in the dialogue.
The government's negotiatin
position again centers on calling for the insurgents to
lay down their arms and participate in the democratic
process-a proposal the FMLN has consistently
rejected.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
Even though the insurgents so far have been unable to
exploit economic grievances to galvanize massive op-
position to Duarte, the poor state of the economy
remains a serious vulnerability for the government.
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Deteriorating economic conditions have hurt Duarte's
standing with workers and peasants-his traditional
constituents-who are the key targets of the guerril-
las' political strategy. Their strong opposition to aus-
terity measures that would adversely affect their
livelihood makes the government reluctant to imple-
ment additional necessary reforms to stabilize the
economy. This hesitance is likely to result in greater
inflation and unemployment that could prove a boon
to leftist labor agitators. Key democratic unions-
responding to a growing economic crisis-would be-
come more willing to cooperate with the left in
demanding wage and price concessions.
We believe, moreover, that labor agitation will be-
come increasingly important to the insurgents'
strategy over the next 18 months. As their battlefield
prospects continue to wane, we expect to see rebel
commanders who earlier rejected the political struggle
putting more money and manpower into strengthen-
ing their support among labor. The likely return of
some guerrillas with their sympathizers to urban
areas would facilitate such an effort. Leftist labor
leaders also may increasingly use intimidation and
violence to cow or eliminate their democratic rivals to
gain control of unions.
More frequent strikes and work stoppages by a more
militant labor movement could increasingly damage
Duarte's standing. Political violence would lend
credibility to insurgent propaganda, badly weaken
Duarte's domestic and international stature, and per-
haps convince some former donors to renew funding to
the FMLN.
The government almost certainly views US support
for El Salvador-particularly economic aid-as cru-
cial if it is to withstand the rebels' political strategy
over the next year or so. Duarte, who resisted imple-
menting austerity measures for 18 months and then
watered down the eventual economic plan, is extreme-
ly worried about his slipping popularity, according to
the US Embassy. He appears unwilling to take any
additional economic steps that would erode his popu-
lar base of support.
We believe, therefore, that the government will rely
on any additional US aid rather than on devising a
comprehensive strategy to utilize its present resources.
Duarte is unlikely to find recent increases in US
assistance sufficient to arrest El Salvador's economic
decline and to counter insurgent labor agitation and,
thus, probably will request even greater levels of aid.
Further US training of security forces in countersub-
version and crowd control will also be requested to
facilitate the penetration of urban insurgent cells and
to minimize the possibility of overreaction. In addition
to continuing economic and military support, the
Duarte government is likely to depend on US diplo-
matic efforts to help counteract propaganda generat-.
ed by the rebels and their allies overseas.
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Secret
Appendix A
Changing Front Groups, 1979-86
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR)-(60,000 members)-Popular
Liberation Forces (FPL)
? Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants (FECCAS)
? Union of Rural Workers. (UTC)
? National Association of Salvadoran Educators (ANDES)
? Several university and high school student, worker, and slumdweller groups
Leaders: Francisco Rebollo, Marco Portillo, Juan Angel Chacon Vasques, Julio
Portillo, Julio Flores'
Popular Leagues of February 28 (LP-28)-(3,000 to 5,000 members)-People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP)
? Worker Popular Leagues (LPO)
? Campesino Popular Leagues (LPC)
? Popular Leagues of Secondary Students (LPS)
? University Popular Leagues (LPU)
Leader: Jose Leonicio Pichinte '.
National Democratic Union (UDN)-(3,000 to 5,000 members)-Armed
Forces of Liberation (FAL)
? Centralized Federation of Salvadoran Workers (CUTS)
? Union Federation of Salvadoran Trade Unions (FUSS)
? Salvadoran National Union Federation of Workers in Food, Clothing, Textile,
and Related Industries (FESTIAVTSCES)
? Campesino and student groups
Leaders: Manuel Quintanilla, Mario Aguinada Carranza,' Adan Chicas Mendez,'
Manuel de Jesus Franco Ramirez
United Popular Action Front (FAPU)-(at least 20,000 members)-Armed Forces of
National Resistance (FARN)
? Revolutionary Campesino Movement (MRC)
? Revolutionary Teachers Organization (OMR)
? Secondary Students of Revolutionary Action (ARDES)
? National Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS)
Leaders: Saul Villalta,2 Jose Alberto Ramos, Hector Bernabe Recinos Aguirre
Popular Liberation Movement (MLP)-(1,000 members)-Revolutionary Party of
Central American Workers (PRTC)
? Field Brigade Workers (BTC)
? Salvadoran Womens' Association (ASMUSA)
? Pioneers of Popular Liberation (PLP)
? Workers' Base Committee (CBO)
Leaders: Fabio Castillo, Humberto Mendoza
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Unitary Movement of Unions and Guilds of El Salvador (MUSYGES)-24,000
members belong to Marxist unions
? FENASTRAS
? FUSS
? FESTIAVTSCES
? ANDES
? Revolutionary Trade Union Front (FSR)
Leaders: Maria Lopez Castro, Jorge Mendoza Santos, Cristina Marin, Jose
Jeremias Pereira Amaya, Gerardo Anaya, Faustino Murcia Arifa, Fidel Alberto
Palacios, Mario Cabrera, Bernabe Recinos, Ernesto Flores, Carlos Ernesto
Vasquez Someta
BPR, FAPU, MLP, UDN, and LP-28 exist in name only.
National Unity of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS)
1st of May Committee (30,000 leftist members)
? Workers' Solidarity Committee (CST)
? Coordinating Committee of State and Municipal Workers (CCTEM)
? Union of Agrarian Workers (SITA)
? National Association of Campesinos (ANC)
? Syndicated Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FESTRAS)
? General Confederation of Unions (CGS)
? General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS)
Unions and federations under these coordinating bodies include FUSS, ANDES,
FESTIAVTSCES, FENASTRAS, FSR
Leaders: Victor Rivera, Saul Sanchez, Mario Palencia, Julio Portillo, Guillermo
Rojas, German Dario Garcia, Edito Genovese
Human Rights Related (several hundred members)
? Committee of Political Prisoners (COPPES)
? Christian Committee for the Displaced in El Salvador (CRIPDES)
? Committee of Relatives in Favor of Liberty for the Political Prisoners and the
Disappeared in El Salvador (CODEFAM)
? Nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDHES)
? Committee of Christian Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners, the
Disappeared and those Assassinated for Political Reasons (Co-Madres)
? Committee of Christian Mothers and Relatives of Prisoners, the Assassinated,
and the Disappeared, Father Octavio Ortiz-Sister Silva (COMAFAC)
Following mid-1986 arrests and defections, present leadership unknown.
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Appendix B
Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) Leadership
Guillermo Manuel UNGO Revelo
President, Revolutionary Democratic Front;
Secretary General, National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)
A vice president of the Socialist International with excellent contacts among
international leftist organizations ... lends credibility to the guerrillas' cause on
the international scene ... meets frequently with Cuban and Nicaraguan officials.
In an unusual show of disunity between the FDR and FMLN, condemned the
FMLN for the June 1985 Zona Rosa killings of US Marines ... clearly indicated
he wanted to distance himself from the insurgents who kidnaped President
Duarte's daughter in September 1985 by stating: "Even if the guerrillas carried
out the kidnaping, I would not necessarily have t know" his ties to the
guerrillas, however, appear to remain strong
maintains residence in Panama ... 55
Upper-middle-class background ... earned LL.B. degree in 1963 ... official of
University of El Salvador law faculty ... Duarte's running mate in 1972
presidential election, but victory thwarted by Army in favor of the military
opponent ... served briefly in junta that took power after the 1979 coup ...
resigned in January 1980 over what he called failure of junta to institute necessary
socioeconomic reforms ... went into exile and became head of FDR in 1980.. .
legitimate democratic political process in El Salvador
Ruben Ignacio ZAMORA Rivas
Vice President, Revolutionary Democratic Front;
Leader, Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC)
Has been primarily involved in gaining international support for the insurgency ...
has traveled widely throughout Latin America and Europe as spokesman for the
group ... reportedly often at odds with Ungo ... met with PDC leader Julio Rey
Prendes in Lima in April 1986 to discuss reopening of dialogue between the
FMLN/FDR and the Government of El Salvador ... deeply concerned over the
Zona Rosa massacre ... his spokesman condemned killings as "a terrorist act that
offers nothing toward the achievement of peace" ... also concerned about the
insurgents' kidnaping of President Duarte's daughter and denied prior knowledge
of FMLN plans ... may want to abandon FMLN/FDR alliance and return to the
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Completed studies for priesthood but never ordained ... holds law degree from
National University of El Salvador and M.A. degree in economics from University
of Essex in England ... involved in Christian Democratic youth activities ...
originally a member of the PDC and briefly served as Minister of the Presidency
(1979-80) ... broke from party and government in March 1980 to protest
government failure to implement promised socioeconomic reforms and to control
human rights abuses of the armed forces ... went into exile, formed the MPSC,
and joined the Salvadoran opposition ... 43
STAT
Hector Francisco OQUELI Colindres
Chief Representative for Western Europe, Revolutionary Democratic Front;
Vice President for International Relations, National Revolutionary Movement
Second only to Guillermo Ungo in the social democratic MNR ... has worked
hard to gain international support for the insurgent cause and has been a
representative to the Socialist International ... met with PDC leader Julio Rey
Prendes in Lima, Peru, in April 1986 to discuss reopening dialogue between the
FMLN/FDR and Salvadoran Government ... publicly distanced the FDR from
involvement in FMLN 1985 kidnaping of President Duarte's daughter and called
for her release "as soon as possible to prevent more bloodshed and incidents."
military role in government ... wife is an FDR official ... 42
junta, but resigned because of dissatisfaction over government policy and the
Holds LL.B. degree from University of El Salvador and studied at London School
of Economics and Political Science ... politically active since his university days
. . served for four months (1979-80) as subsecretary for foreign affairs under the
Eduardo CALLES Salguerro
Vice President, Revolutionary Democratic Front;
President, Independent Movement of Salvadoran Professionals and Technicians
(MIPTES)
Agricultural engineer and former university professor .. became leader of
MIPTES in 1980 after the murder of top FDR officials ... lived in hiding on Cen-
tral American University campus until sometime in 1982 when he moved to
Managua ... subsequently has lived in exile in various Central American
countries and Mexico ... under his leadership, MIPTES has tried to resume open
political activity and to reestablish an office for the FDR in El Salvador ... 46.
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Secret
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