THE CHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS ALLIES: INTENTIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000100150001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
and Its Allies: Intentions,
Capabilities, and Prospects
The Chilean Communist Party
A Research Paper
ALA 86-10024
May 1986
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Directorate of Operations.
Office of African and Latin American Anal sis, with
a biographic contribution by Office
of Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
and Its Allies: Intentions,
Capabilities, and Prospects
The Chilean Communist Party
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South American Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 86-10024
May 1986
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The Chilean Communist Party
and Its Allies: Intentions,
Capabilities, and Prospects
Key Judgments Terrorism and violent demonstrations by the revolutionary left threaten to
Information available undermine the US goal of encouraging an orderly transition to democracy
as of 1 April 1986 in Chile. We believe that President Pinochet will continue to use the far
was used in this report.
left's campaign of violence to try to maintain military support for delays in
political liberalization and harsh policies ostensibly aimed at rooting out
subversion. Many informed observers suspect that he wants to remain in
power after his term expires in 1989, and the 25X1
Communists and their domestic allies believe that this intransigence is
fueling political polarization, which they see as benefiting their long-term
strategy of armed struggle. The most serious threat to US interests would
occur if, after several years, the revolutionary left achieves its ultimate goal
of fomenting an all-out insurgency in Chile, as this could lead to civil war
or insurrection in which the Communist-dominated left might gain power.
The Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) is the largest, most cohesive, and
influential far-left group in Chile. Despite regime repression, the PCCh has
grown steadily in recent years and
currently has about 50,000 active members, including its youth wing.
While many of its top leaders are in exile-its aging Secretary General
lives in Moscow-the party closely follows their directives and has not
experienced serious internal dissension. Closely allied with the PCCh is the
terrorist Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), which, since its
creation in late 1983, has carried out a steadily ascending wave of
bombings and other violent actions. We estimate it currently has about
1,000 activists. Another group, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR), a pro-Castro organization, suffered sharp losses in clashes with the
security services in late 1983 but is reportedly rebuilding with the aid of
Cuba, Libya, and Nicaragua, and probably now has about 400 to 500
militants in Chile
We believe that the PCCh and the FPMR have the capability and the will
to increase significantly the pace and sco a of their campaign of violence
over the next few years. Already, Chile 25X1
leads the world in number of terrorist incidents-although to date there
have been relatively few casualties. We expect more frequent and lethal
terrorist incidents during 1986 and 1987, involving attacks on military
personnel, installations, and government buildings, as well as stepped-up
Secret
ALA 86-10024
May 1986
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bombings against civilian targets. Attacks on US companies and US-
related facilities robably will rise only moderately, since
the Communists do not view these installations as
primary targets. The MIR probably will attempt several sensational
terrorist actions against senior officials and possibly against US Embassy
officers or facilities during the coming months.
We believe that the Communists are convinced that their expanded armed
actions will promote political instability and undermine public confidence
in the government to the point that the PCCh will become widely perceived
as the Pinochet regime's most effective opponent.
the Communists also want to foment numerous protests and
widespread civil disobedience throughout 1986 to prepare the way for a
national strike. They probably calculate that these activities will enhance
their standing with the moderate opposition, frustrated by Pinochet's
intransigence over a transition to democracy, and with a general public
that appears increasingly disenchanted over the debilitating effects on
living standards caused by slow economic growth. We agree with the US
Embassy's prediction that 1986 will almost certainly be a year of
confrontation between the political opposition and the regime and that the
Communists will play a leading role in these activities and spark consider-
able violence.
In the past few years, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and radical states such as
Libya have provided greater levels of material support, guidance, arms,
and training to the Chilean revolutionary left.
this increased support derives from Moscow's and Havana's calcula-
tions that conditions are ripe in Chile for a sustained effort by the left to
forcibly oust Pinochet from power, although both capitals evidently expect
this to happen only after several years of "armed struggle."
several West European countries and South American
democracies such as Argentina are favorably disposed toward anti-
Pinochet groups in general and are tolerating activities within their borders
by the Chilean far left.
In our opinion, the security services' ability to curb terrorism and control
antiregime protests will be a key factor affecting near-term prospects for
the revolutionary left. While US Embassy reporting
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demonstrates that the services effectively have prevented large-scale
violent protests and patrolled upper-class neighborhoods, they recently
have had great difficulty curbing slum violence and have failed to deter the
rising wave of terrorist bombings. We also believe that the security services
have poor intelligence on the main revolutionary leftist groups, especially
the PCCh and the FPMR.
As a result, we doubt that the security services will be able to prevent far-
left groups from continuing their sustained campaign of violence over the
next two years. Moreover, we believe that their resources will be strained to
the limit if, in the meantime, the moderate opposition parties also stage fre-
quent civil disobedience actions and mass protests. On balance, however,
we do not believe the Communists and their allies will undermine the
Pinochet regime during 1986, and are convinced that the security services
would quickly defeat the far left in any direct military engagements.
Nevertheless, a substantial threat to political stability in Chile could
develop over the medium to long term if the transition to civilian rule
remains stalled and the far left continues to lay the foundations for an all-
out insurgency. Under these circumstances, we think that Pinochet's
chances for remaining in power would become shaky and that a period of
full-scale armed confrontation between the far left and the security forces
would become increasingly likely.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Party Leadership
Background
Wooing the Moderates
Communist Strategy
Preparing for Insurgency 8
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front 9
Movement of the Revolutionary Left 11
Cuban and Nicaraguan Guidance 14
Western Europe and South America
The Most Likely Case
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Isla
San Felix
Isla San
(Chile) Arnbrosm
(Chile)
Archipielago
Juan FernAndez
(Chile)
South
Pacific
Ocean
Mendoza
,SANTIA *
Conce1ci6n
J -
Beagle
Channel
Falkland Islands
g (Islas Malvinas)
(administered by U.K.,
chimed by Argentina)
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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The Chilean Communist Party
and Its Allies: Intentions,
Capabilities, and Prospects
age and exploit.
Introduction
Chile today appears to be in the throes of what for US
policymakers has by now become an all too familiar
drama: an authoritarian but basically pro-Western
regime seeking to hold at bay pressures for a return to
democracy while facing a challenge from the radi-
cal-and increasingly violent-left. Moderate Chil-
ean opposition parties are struggling to maintain a
fragile unity, rightist groups are distancing themselves
from President Augusto Pinochet, and economic stag-
nation threatens to undermine support from key mid-
dle-class and business sectors-all against a backdrop
of escalating violence fomented by the country's
radical left. Informed observers predict that Chile will
soon experience accelerating political polarization,
growing social ferment, and widening international
isolation-trends that the left stands ready to encour-
The paper focuses on the Chilean far left-mainly the
Communist Party and its terrorist allies-the group
that may hold the key to the way events play out in
the country and how US interests are affected. It
examines the leadership and organization of the Com-
munist Party, its recent activities and goals, its rela-
tions with other radical leftist groups, and its sources
of foreign support. It also assesses the ability of the
Chilean security services to combat the activities of
the revolutionary left and the circumstances under
which these activities might threaten Pinochet's
power in the near or medium term. Finally, the paper
analyzes the implications for the United States of
escalating leftist-sponsored violence, even if it does
not immediately threaten the stability of Pinochet's
regime.
"Pinochet: Fit for a Long Bout? " South, the Third World Magazine
increasingly violent monthly mass protests which,
according to the US Embassy
sources, caused senior military officers to press Pino-
chet to moderate his hardline policies. The President
made a few cosmetic concessions that temporarily
defused the crisis, but, when it became clear in 1984
that he would not accelerate the transition to civilian
rule, the opposition once again organized protests that
Background
President Pinochet confronted the first major chal-
lenge of his decadelong rule in 1983. Declining living
standards generated widespread popular discontent,
which political parties and organized labor exploited
to press for economic revitalization and a speedy
return to democracy. These groups staged a series of
have continued to this day.
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The Role of Far Leftist Parties Prior to 1980
Numerous studies portray the Communists as the
prime movers behind the creation of the Popular
Unity coalition, which elected Socialist Salvador
Allende to the presidency in 1970 with a narrow
plurality of the vote. The Communist Party of Chile
(PCCh) was the best-organized entity in the coalition
and during the Allende period increased its member-
ship from 90,000 to 120,000, according to assess-
ments by the US Department of State. It placed party
leaders in key ministries, dominated the largest labor
organization, and expanded its congressional repre-
sentation. Nevertheless, the Communists lagged the
Socialists in voter appeal, essentially because of
President Allende's popularity
The Socialists, however, were plagued by
factionalism that offset their showing at the polls and
undermined their efforts to build support among
labor and other key sectors. The Castroite, violence-
prone Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
supported the government but was not in the coali-
tion. It did not develop mass support and
probably had no more than a
few thousand members in 1973.
Regime Crackdown. One of the principal objectives of
the military leaders who ousted Allende in Septem-
ber 1973 was to eradicate Marxism from the Chilean
political scene. The new junta "recessed" all political
parties and banned and vigorously repressed all
Marxist groups. Because the Socialists lacked a
Radical leftist parties capitalized on the turbulent
political climate to emerge from clandestinity and
regain some of their former influence. The Commu-
nist Party of Chile (PCCh) was especially active,
moving rapidly to help organize the monthly protests
and to seek a formal accord with moderate parties for
a broad opposition front, according to the US Embas-
sy. The PCCh's refusal to renounce violence, however,
spurred the moderates to form the Democratic Alli-
ance (AD) coalition, a broad opposition grouping
dominated by the Christian Democrats and stretching
from the moderate right to the center left. The
disciplined structure and had almost no underground
apparatus, they suffered more than the PCCh and
MIR and effectively ceased to function as a party.
Communist leaders concentrated on keeping the
PCCh's clandestine structure intact, although the
party's headquarters was burned, its records de-
stroyed, its media outlets closed, and its labor arm
dissolved. Some PCCh leaders were killed right after
the coup and many more were detained or exiled. The
PCCh acknowledged publicly that as the result of the
regime's crackdown party membership shrank to
about 10,000 to 25,000 active members and sympa-
thizers in the mid-1970s. Meanwhile, several thou-
sand party members living abroad, along with most of
the top leadership, carried out a variety of support
functions, including propaganda activities and fund-
raising, according to reporting from several US em-
bassies.
The military high command was especially eager to
destroy the MIR
believing that its clandestine terrorist apparatus
posed a direct threat to the new regime. Many of the
Movement's top leaders were killed in armed clashes
with the security forces, which also broke up the
training centers and potential guerrilla bases the
MIR established during the Allende years. Within
several months of the coup, the MIR was reduced to
only a few hundred militants in scattered terrorist
units. Some of its leaders and members escaped into
Communists then created the rival Popular Demo-
cratic Movement (MDP), which encompassed most
radical leftist parties-including the hardline Al-
meyda Socialist faction, the MIR, and several small
violence-prone groups-and reconfirmed the PCCh's
commitment to armed struggle, according to press
reports
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exile, most settling in Cuba.
these elements, with the aid of the Castro
government, operated a support network involving
training, some arms shipments, and modest financial
aid for MIR groups stillfunctionin in Chile
throughout the 1970s.~
basically inactive within Chile, according to academ-
ic studies. Meanwhile, the moderate Christian Demo-
crats turned down all PCCh overtures and sought to
avoid any taint of association with the Communists,
The MIR continued
to conduct sporadic violence, staging several spectac-
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The Left's Staying Power. Despite the regime's crack-
down, the far left demonstrated considerable resilien-
cy throughout the 1970s. This was especially true of
the PCCh, which by the end of the decade appeared to
be revitalizing its internal organization.
of PCCh figures returned from abroad while recruit-
ment drives bolstered the party's ranks, according to
press and academic studies.
From 1973 to 1980, the Communists repeatedly
condemned those who favored violence as the only
way to overthrow the regime, often clashing publicly
with the MIR on this issue. The PCCh's insistence on
peaceful methods and ostensible support for a demo-
cratic system produced few concrete gains, however,
The Socialists remained hopelessly divided and were
In late 1983, the PCCh reportedly supported the
creation of a new terrorist group, the Manuel Rodri-
guez Patriotic Front (FPMR), which was primarily
responsible for the sharp escalation in violence during
1984. Pinochet imposed a state of siege in November
of that year, pleasing Communist leaders in exile who
hoped that
he would continue to "overreact" by cracking down
indiscriminately against his opponents, thereby
strengthening the PCCh's prospects for being accept-
ed in a broad opposition front.
ular terrorist actions during 1980.
The government responded to these attacks by tou h-
ening its its "state of emergency" and,
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resorted more frequently 25X1
to arbitrary actions against its opponents. In August 25X1
1980, the regime held a national plebiscite on a new 25X1
constitution that would give Pinochet a new eight-
year presidential term, with the possibility of reelec-
tion in 1989. It also codified the regime's restrictions
on political activities and made permanent the ban on
all Marxist and other "subversive" groups. The
plebiscite outcome-67 percent in favor-dealt a
major psychological blow to the regime's opponents, 25X1
especially Communist leaders who espoused peaceful
exiled party chief Corvalan announced that the PCCh
would now follow an anti-Pinochet strategy employ-
ing "all forms of combat, including acute violence. "
Communist Party Organization
US Embassy reporting makes clear that the PCCh is
the largest, most cohesive, and most influential far-
left group in. Chile. It is organized in the classic
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pattern of Communist parties worldwide 25X1
At the top is a Central Committee, 25X1
from which is drawn a nine-member Political Com- 25X1
mission that oversees a network of functional and
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A. SOMOZA
Nicaragua
J. VIDELA
Arge,liuo
G. ALVAREZ
Uruguay
the PCCh has kept much
J. FIGUEIREDO
Brad!
A, PINOCHET
Chile
A. STROESSNER
Paraguay
regional directorates, local committees, and cells com-
prising three to five persons each.
The party and all of its components are proscribed
under the 1980 Constitution.' Consequently, while it
has functioned more openly in recent years,
of its apparatus covert and highly compartmented.
cultivating youth, labor, professional, and other key
sectors. CCh
membership reached 30,000 in 1985-up from an
estimated 15,000 to 20,000 a year earlier-and its
youth wing numbered 20,000. The majority of the
membership is located in Santiago and other large
(The PCCh when last fully legal before Allende s
overthrow in 1973 numbered up to 120,000 members
and at least twice as many sympathizers
The PCCh's major recruitment gains in recent years
the party retains substan-
tial financial resources and is one of the few Chilean
parties with a sizable salaried staff.
have been among jobless and underemployed youth,
as well as among university and secondary level
students The
US Embassy notes that the left accounts tor a out 30
percent of politically active Chileans under age 30,
and that the well-organized and well-financed PCCh
youth wing is gaining popularity on university cam-
puses and in slum neighborhoods. Student factions
affiliated with the political opposition have defeated
progovernment slates in every university student elec-
tion since 1983, and in most cases Communists were
either on the winning ticket or ran a close second.
The US Embassy sources the Communists recently
emphasize that the party is well organized nationally, have stepped up their activities among secondary-level
has grown steadily in recent years, and is actively students, organizing, for example, several rallies at
' Nonradical political parties are technically illegal, but since the
emergence of the mass opposition movement in 1983 the regime
forces.
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Despite the high priority the PCCh assigns to rebuild-
ing its strength in organized labor, the US Embassy
estimates that no more than one-fifth of union leaders
are Communists while 20 percent are progovernment
and 40 percent are Christian Democrats. The Com-
munists, however, exercise strong influence on the
main opposition umbrella labor grouping, the Nation-
al Workers Command (CNT), which during the past
three years has frequently collaborated with the mod-
erate and far-left opposition in staging protests.
the party so
far has failed in its efforts to recruit members and
form cells within the armed forces. The PCCh has
also tried for several years to undermine military
loyalty to Pinochet through a sustained propa anda
campaign Nev-
ertheless, we share the views of the US Embassy and
the US defense attache that to date this effort has had
virtually no impact on the military's attitude toward
the Pinochet regime or appreciably lessened the antip-
athy toward the Communists that pervades the armed
Party Leadership.
the overall policy of the
PCCh is directed from abroad by Secretary General
Corvalan and other exiled leaders-who number
nearly half of the Central Committee. The party's
internal leaders frequently travel overseas to meet
with Corvalan and other exiled Central Committee
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Secretary General, Communist
Party of Chile
Since its founding in 1922, the PCCh has not suffered
from significant internal divisiveness or splintering,
There has been some
dissension recently over how vigorously to pursue
armed struggle, but
for the past two years a major-
ity of the internal leaders and virtually all of the
exiled officials have advocated a steady increase in
debate on this subject persists, especially because the
Communists continue to be shunned by moderate
opposition groups because of their espousal of vio-
violence.
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Corvalan, who has led the PCCh for more than 25
years, was jailed and exiled after the 1973 coup. He
has lived in Moscow since the mid-1970s but travels
frequently to Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America.
Consistently loyal to Moscow, Corvalan is the main
channel through which the Soviets guide the PCCh,
He has publicly
defended his party's support for armed struggle and
made the original announcement on adoption of this
strategy in a speech from Moscow in September 1980.
he periodically
meets with representatives from nonradical Chilean
parties and invariably affirms that violence is the
only way to oust Pinochet. Corvalan's age-he is in
his midseventies casts doubt
on his future role as a political leader.)
US Embassy source reports, how-
ever, that a generation gap has developed and that
most of the key internal Central Committee members
are in their midthirties, while Corvalan and his exiled
companions, as well as the "old guard" leaders still in
Chile, generally are in their sixties or older.
In press interviews
however, top internal and external leaders have again
reaffirmed the commitment to armed struggle, which
suggests to us that the proviolence group remains in
the ascendancy. Moreover,
e view these debates not as
heralding an impending split but as safety valves that
enable the party hierarchy to control PCCh strategy
while placating dissident views by allowing fairly open
internal discussion over tactical matters.
the party.
Communist Strategy
The PCCh pursues a two-pronged approach designed
to increase pressure on Pinochet while rebuilding its
own political influence, according to the US Embassy.
The Communists have shown considerable tactical
flexibility in the recent past-reflecting, in our view,
their recognition that they are unlikely to topple
Pinochet in the near term-while adroitly exploiting
the ambivalent attitude of many moderates toward
Wooing the Moderates. The overt element in Com-
munist strategy involves working through the
Communist-led far-left coalition, the MDP, to lure
the nonradical parties, including several in the AD
coalition, into a joint campaign to accelerate the
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"While Chile Burns, Pinochet
and the Cardinal Take Tea"
transition to civilian rule. US Embassy reporting
emphasizes, however, that many Chileans distrust the
MDP's public claims to support pluralism and democ-
racy and are concerned that the PCCh's fundamental
objective is to install a Communist dictatorship in
Chile. Nevertheless, some leaders of moderate parties
hesitate to sever contacts with the PCCh or accept the
regime's insistence that the party remain formally
proscribed (under any future government), maintain-
ing, according to the US Embassy, that this would
only reinforce the Communists' commitment to vio-
lence. These politicians argue that, because the Com-
munists traditionally attracted about 15 percent of the
vote in elections before 1973 and have basically
withstood the regime's repression, they should play a
role in the transition. These moderates apparently
believe-unrealistically, in our view-that once Pino-
chet is ousted the Communists will abandon violence
and revert to their pre-1973 adherence to democratic
and parliamentary procedures. Moreover, we judge
that, on balance, the Communists' democratic rheto-
ric appeals to some middle-class and labor groups,
intellectuals, and others who still think of the PCCh
as having a legitimate place in an open political
system of the pre-1973 mold.
Spokesmen for the opposition moderate parties have
repeatedly urged the PCCh to renounce armed action
and join them in a broad anti-Pinochet coalition.
ates' overtures but refused to abandon armed action.
The dedication of the PCCh and other far-left groups
to violence contributed to their exclusion from the
"national accord," a document calling for a speedy
and orderly transition to civilian rule that 11 main-
stream parties-ranging from the right to the demo-
cratic left-and the Catholic Church promulgated in
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Jaime Insunza, about 40, represents the younger struggle" in late 1980, the PCCh has revitalized its
generation of leaders who are directing the Commu- ties to other far left groups and has backed both their
nist party's armed struggle strategy. Insunza helped terrorist actions and those of the new FPMR. The
direct the PCCh youth movement in the early 1970s, Communists intensified this approach when Pinochet
since the shift to "armed
by 1980 was a member of the Central Committee,
and later became the first president of the Commu-
nist-dominated Popular Democratic Movement coali-
tion. In 1984 the government briefly expelled him
from Chile.
He occasionally surfaces as a PCCh
spokesman, promoting cooperation among all opposi-
tion parties against the regime. We believe, however,
that Insunza is an important leader of the hardline
PCCh faction that favors all-out violence to topple
leaders believe that such peaceful protests will not
bring the regime to the negotiating table, and that
popular support is building for the PCCh's thesis that
Pinochet can only be ousted through violence.
Preparing for Insurgency. The party's covert strategy
is dedicated to Pinochet's violent overthrow.
declared the state of siege in November 1984.
The Embassy I (report that through
Pinochet.
ly to the accord.
Member, Communist Party
Central Committee
massive peaceful demonstration in Santiago to sup-
port the accord, which was judged by most of the
press as the largest antiregime protest since 1973.
Nevertheless,
1PCCh
accord's proponents refused to collaborate with the
Communists in sponsoring antiregime protests in ear-
ly September, correctly fearing that they would spawn
violence. The PCCh, for its part, has reacted cautious-
August 1985.
it does not want to antagonize its signatories
its campaign of violence the PCCh hopes to promote
greater polarization, with the Communists gaining
stature as the proponents of the only "viable" strategy
to topple Pinochet. The party also wants to foment
increased political instability that will ultimately un-
dermine support for the President among the armed
forces. The Communists evidently realize that to try
to carry out a full-scale insurgency would be counter-
productive at present, but are persuaded that steadily
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late November the AD and MDP jointly staged a
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increasing terrorist actions will provoke Pinochet into
hardline measures that will eventually create the
conditions needed to drive him from office.
the party-despite its
weakness in organized labor-is also working toward
a general strike, which PCCh leaders calculate would
facilitate more frequent armed actions, promote mass
agitation, and, in the long run, lead to a prolonged
"popular struggle" with insurrectional characteristics.
addition to several minor organizations,
The Communists' Terrorist Allies
There are two main Chilean leftist terrorist groups,
the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and
the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), in
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expansion of the party's military wing reportedly
created pressure from rank-and-file militants to take
security service personnel increased during late 1985.
In addition, the PCCh accompanied violent demon-
strations in Santiago in early November by a series of
coordinated bombings that caused major damage to
the heavily guarded main power grid in central Chile,
reportedly demonstrating greater preparation and im-
proved technique on the part of the terrorists.
' For a full discussion of external support to the Chilean left, see the
section, "The Role of External Actors."
FPMR and MIR are responsible for placing Chile at
the top of the Latin American terrorist chart in total
number of incidents over the past two years. More-
over, they appear to represent an increasingly intrac-
table problem for the Chilean security services. Nev-
ertheless, we are not certain whether Communist and
other leftist party leaders exercise full control yet over
the terrorists-despite government claims to the con-
trary.
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. Since its creation
in December 1983, the FPMR has become the largest
and most active far-left terrorist group in Chile,
The US Embassy
notes that there was a fourfold increase in terrorist
bombings in 1984 over 1983-735 compared to 139-
and a further surge in 1985-to 865-the bulk of
which were carried out by the FPMR. The front's
favorite targets have been electrical power grids-it
frequently blacks out Santiago and much of central
Chile-railway lines, commuter buses, and public
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The US Embassy adds
that PCCh leaders backed the FPMR primarily out of
fear of losing control over the party's activist and
radical youth, who were already cooperating with
elements of the MIR in terrorist activities.
establishments in major cities, but most of these
bombings have been staged in a way seemingly calcu-
lated not to cause widespread civilian injuries
The FPMR also has
bombed government buildings and police or military
installations, and about 50 of its bombings in 1984-85
were directed at US-related facilities, such as bina-
tional cultural centers, American firms, and-once-
a car outside the US Consulate in Santiago. More-
over, the front has attacked police stations and pa-
trols, a military airfield, and even the presidential
palace on one occasion. According to the US Embas-
sy, 10 members of the security services were killed
and another 30 wounded by terrorists in 1985, most
probably at the hands of the FPMR.
Whatever the degree of control the PCCh is able to
exert over the FPMR, we are convinced that party
leaders assign the front an important role in their
armed campaign against the Pinochet regime.
Only a few spokesmen for the front have
military training.
surfaced in press interviews. One of them claims that
the FPMR is run by a nine-person national director-
ate independent of any political party or coalition, and
that the front consists of commando units located in
major urban areas, the bulk of whose members are
youths without any previous political background or
by late 1985 it had
grown substantially, and we estimate that it currently
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Secretary General, Movement
of the Revolutionary Left
The nephew of former President Salvador Allende,
Andres Pascal Allende, 41, has led the MIR since
1974. Fleeing Chile in 1976, he settled in Cuba and
has traveled to the Soviet Union and throughout the
world seeking financial support and traini
terrorist grotin.
have been several recent instances when FPMR units
reportedly have temporarily established control over
parts of Santiago's slums and given political indoctri-
nation and weapons training to local residents. These
units have engaged in gun battles with the security
forces, sometimes forcing the latter to retreat. These
clashes have occasionally been reported even in the
Chilean press, thereby-in our view-adding to a
growing popular perception that the FPMR is willing
and able to confront the security forces, at least in
poor neighborhoods.
Movement of the Revolutionary Left. The MIR-
founded by Castroite students in 1965-is the oldest
and historically the most violence-prone terrorist
group in Chile. The US Embassy notes that even
though the security services ruthlessly repressed the
MIR after the 1973 coup-only an estimated 100 to
150 activists remained in the country by the early
1980s-it nevertheless committed the great majority
of antiregime terrorist incidents until late 1983. These
ranged from "armed propaganda" actions, such as
distributing milk from hijacked delivery trucks to
slumdwellers, to the murder of police and government
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Pascal Allende's strident calls
for all-out war against Pinochet have isolated his
movement from the moderate political opposition and
provoked sharp disagreements with Chilean Commu-
nist leaders over the pace of antiregime violence. The
MIR leader,
and constant militant posturing.
has been widely
criticize or his flamboyant revolutionary rhetoric
comprises at least 1,000 militants-about half in
Santiago and the rest in other urban areas.
in recent months the front has
staged more sophisticated and lethal terrorist actions
the pace of the group's--
terrorist activities remained low during 1984 and most
of 1985. It has concentrated on restructuring, infil-
trating cadres back into Chile, and developing closer
ties to other far-left groups, especially the PCCh.
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Capabilities of the Security Services
The Chilean security services have demonstrated
uneven effectiveness in meeting the increased armed
threat from the left, in our view. Judging by reporting
from the US Embassy
they have been most successful in preventing
repetitions of the large-scale violent demonstrations
in downtown Santiago that had threatened public
order during 1983, and in protecting senior officers
and government officials. In addition, heavy police
patrolling of upper-class neighborhoods and of San-
tiago's subway system has apparently helped tofore-
stall more frequent terrorist actions in these areas.a
the
security services are frequently hard pressed to con-
tain antiregime violence by far-left groups in Santia-
go's slums. Moreover, as the US Embassy has noted,
the security services have not been able to curb the
escalating wave of bombings or other armed actions
by far-left groups over the past two years. We also
believe that the services' intelligence on the major
leftist groups is very poor. They have been often
caught unaware by potentially major terrorist ac-
have failed to detect most of the weapons shipments
from Communist countries that have entered Chile
over the past 2 to 3 years. For instance, none of 12
weapons shipments from the La Paz safehouse raided
by Bolivian authorities was intercepted by Chilean
security personnel, even though the arms entered
Chile via six distinct infiltration routes over a 24-
month period
tions,
a The US Embassy reports that Chile's internal security apparatus
is composed of the National Intelligence Center (CNI); the Investi-
gations Police, a plainclothes force; the Carabineros-a 28,000-
member militia-type national police force-and several military
intelligence units. All are under the jurisdiction of the Defense
Ministry, except the CNI, which is technically under the Ministry
of Interior but is staffed by military officers. In anticipation of
large demonstrations, the security services often are backed up by
By late 1985 the MIR had partially revitalized its
apparatus within Chile
4nd was preparing to compete with
the FPMR as the leading terrorist group. According
to the US Embassy, the rebuilding process altered the
MIR's membership, which had previously been heavi-
ly middle class and middle aged. The reorganized
in our view, had become a more mili-
tant-though perhaps less well trained-terrorist or-
ganization.
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according to the US Embassy. A special judge ap-
pointed to clarify the case indicted 14 Carabineros
for the killings. These developments led to the firing
of the commanding Carabinero general, the dismissal
of numerous senior officers, and the reorganization of
Carabinero antisubversive units, according to the US
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When leftist terrorists staged several lethal attacks
on Carabineros in October 1984, Pinochet imposed
the state of siege, which lasted until May 1985.
During that period, the security services conducted
mass sweeps of slum neighborhoods, temporarily
detained over 8,000 persons, sent hundreds of individ-
uals to internal exile, and frequently resorted to
torture, according to the US Embassy.
state of siege caused no appreciable slackening in the
intensity of leftist terrorist bombings.
Carabinero mo-
rale suffered under the state of siege as theforce bore
the brunt of the expanded enforcement measures
without higher manpower levels or extra equipment.
The situation in theforce deteriorated further in mid-
1985 because of a scandal over the slaying of three
Communists by a suspected police death squad,
The US Embassy then
forecast that infighting among the security services
would become more bitter and hamper counterterror-
ist operations. The new Carabinero commander con-
firmed to US officials at the end of 1985 that morale
had plummeted and that his force was stretched to
the limit.
Chilean authorities are especial-
ly confident that in any direct confrontation the
security forces would decimate the far left-a judg-
ment that we share. Moreover, while many officials
regard the bombings perpetrated to date as little
more than harassment, they continue to support
Pinochet's harsh policies and see no alternative to
continuous repression of the revolutionary left.
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ripe for revolution, that Pinochet's power is weaken-
ing, and that it supports efforts by leftist revolutionar-
ies to mount an insurgency over the next few years. In
February 1985, Cuban President Castro even ac-
knowledged to US officials-through a senior aide-
that Havana is supporting "insurgents" in Chile with
"Carabineros-Protecting God,
Country ... and Santa"
The Role of External Actors
In the past few years, and especially since the out-
break of vigorous anti-Pinochet protests in 1983, the
Soviet Union, Cuba, and such radical states as Libya
have increased their support-arms, training, funds,
and guidance-to Chilean far-left groups advocating
armed strug
Meanwhile,
number of governments in Western Europe,
Latin America, and elsewhere are permitting anti-
Pinochet activities by Chilean far leftists within their
territories. only
a few thousand of the estimated 1 million Chileans
living abroad are politically active, but that the best
organized and most energetic belong to the PCCh and
allied groups that seek foreign aid to oust Pinochet
through violence.
Cuban and Nicaraguan Guidance. The general thrust
of Cuban policy toward Chile is clear, in our view.
Havana has frequently indicated publicly
that "objective conditions" in Chile are becoming
arms, supplies, and training.
Castro has advocated that the Chilean far left contin-
ue trying to forge links to moderate opposition groups
to be in a position to exploit the Pinochet regime's
eventual downfall.
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MIR's tactics.
latter's top leaders live in Havana and many MIR
members have been trained in Cuba prior to serving
in Nicaragua, Angola, and elsewhere-Cuban offi-
cials probably help formulate a good deal of the
the Sandi-
nistas have offered training, arms, and other aid to the
MIR and several minor terrorist groups. F_
Chilean far left's campaign of violence.
the Pinochet government publicly and endorsed the
The ties between the Sandinistas and Chilean radicals
date from the mid-1970s, when exiled MIR militants
and other leftists took part in the anti-Somoza strug-
g] In recent years,
substantial numbers of MIR militants relocated from
Cuba to Nicaragua, working in several government
agencies and serving as military advisers in the armed
forces. Sandinista officials occasionally have criticized
than does Havana.
Nevertheless, we
believe that, while contacts between the Sandinistas
and Chilean subversives are increasing, Managua still
provides considerably less assistance to the radical left
PCCh is rigidly committed to Soviet policy guidelines,
and we believe that the PCCh receives advice on a
systematic basis from Moscow.
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We believe, however, that be-
cause of Havana's longtime ties to the MIR-the
the
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Western Europe and South America.
several Western European na-
tions-especially Sweden, France, Italy, Spain, the
Netherlands, and West Germany-support the efforts
of both Chilean leftists and moderates to oust Pino-
chet and have given exiled Chilean political activists
safehaven and various types of financial assistance.
several European
political parties and foundations fund and maintain
close ties to a wide variety of Chilean parties. The US
Embassy adds that financial aid from abroad is
increasing and has also gone to Chilean research
centers, human rights groups, and trade union organi-
zations, many of which are influenced by Communist
and other far-left groups. While the Embassy notes
that several million dollars are contributed to these
entities annually, we have no breakdown on the
amounts that may be funneled to the far left.
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Chilean opposition groups have also benefited from
the return to civilian rule in several South American
countries during the past 2 to 3 years. The new
democracies' publicly expressed distaste for Pinochet
and the generally more open political climate in the
region have created more favorable conditions for
exiled leftists operating from countries neighboring
Chile. For instance, there is
easier movement through Argentina, Bolivia, Peru,
and other countries into Chile by radical leftist and
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terrorist operatives.
forces within Chile, and generates assistance from
organization known as Democratic Chile has emerged
as the largest and most active anti-Pinochet exile
grouping in South America. Based just across the
Chilean border in Mendoza, it is reportedly supported
by various leftist Argentine political parties and the
local Argentine provincial authorities. Democratic
Chile coordinates both moderate and leftist exile
groups in Argentina, channels funds to anti-Pinochet
Prospects
The Most Likely Case. Our central conclusion is that
the revolutionary left in Chile will systematically
escalate armed attacks against the security forces and
organize a continuing series of violent protests over
tionary left will defeat the military in battle.
the next two years to prepare for an eventual insur-
gency against Pinochet. We believe that the PCCh
and the FPMR are able and willing to press this effort
vigorously, even though what we know of Communist
thinking suggests that the party does not expect to
topple the dictator any time soon. Nevertheless, in our
view, the party believes that in the long run-perhaps
by 1989-it can spark civil war in Chile, or, at a
minimum, a prolonged period of armed confrontation
that would force the military to oust Pinochet. The
Communists probably calculate that playing a key
role in driving him from power would enable them to
dominate the post-Pinochet era, especially if the
military agrees to a quick return to civilian rule.
Nevertheless, even if Pinochet's military support re-
mains firm in the face of sustained armed action by
the Communists and their allies, we judge that the
PCCh leaders will persist in their insurrectionary
strategy, believing that in time a strengthened revolu-
Consequently, we expect the incidence of terrorism,
especially that of the FPMR-which probably will
come under full PCCh control-to increase during
1986 and 1987. We also expect terrorism to become
considerably more lethal, involving more attacks on
military personnel, installations, and government
buildings. In addition, we believe there will be more
frequent terrorist actions in middle- and upper-class
neighborhoods in Santiago, as well as against busi-
nesses, banks, and probably the public transportation
system, resulting in more civilian casualties. US com-
panies and other foreign-owned establishments may
come under somewhat more frequent attack, although
we doubt that they will become a primary target for
terrorist bombings, since-despite ample opportuni-
ty-the far left has shown little inclination so far to
attack them on a major scale.
In our view, the Communists also see armed actions
as promoting political instability and sowing doubts
among the population concerning the capabilities of
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the security forces. They probably want to give party
and FPMR militants returning from training abroad
ample opportunity to use their new skills, to continue
pressing the overtaxed Carabineros and other ele-
ments of the security services, and to provoke Pino-
chet into further hardline policies, thereby accelerat-
ing political polarization. They clearly look upon a
polarized political atmosphere as beneficial to their
long-term strategy, in our opinon.
The Communists are also likely to promote other
forms of violence, such as protest actions by students
and slumdwellers and general civil disobedience de-
signed to lead to a national strike. In our judgment,
however, the PCCh's success in this area will more
directly depend on popular support and the attitude of
moderate opposition parties than in the case of terror-
ism. The US Embassy reports that the Communists
and their allies are pleased over Pinochet's intransi-
gence regarding a dialogue on a transition to civilian
rule and are lobbying with the national accord spon-
sors for closer collaboration in a series of antiregime
protests this year. Consequently, we agree with the
Embassy that 1986 will almost certainly be a year of
confrontation between the political opposition and the
regime on various fronts and that the Communists
will play a leading role in assuring that anti-Pinochet
demonstrations are accompanied by considerable vio-
lence.
We believe that, although the Communists have
largely overcome the isolation they faced when they
were excluded from the national accord last August, it
is highly unlikely that they will be admitted to the
accord in the near future.
the moderate opposition is currently reluc-
tant to ally formally with the PCCh. The moderates
realize that this would preclude an accommodation
with Pinochet or with the strongly anti-Communist
armed forces, and they also basically mistrust the
Communists. In our view, however, the Communists
are now confident that their advocacy of violence as
the only viable tactic against the regime will slowly
gain currency among moderate parties and much of
the general public. We also believe that their expecta-
tions are realistic in several respects. For instance, if,
as we expect, Pinochet continues to refuse an acceler-
ated timetable for a transition to civilian rule, many
nonradical political groups will become frustrated
over their limited options and be tempted to work with
the PCCh. In addition, we judge that sluggish eco-
nomic performance this year and in 1987 will further
weaken popular support for the regime and could
catalyze spontaneous mass protests-as occurred in
early 1983-which the Communists and their allies
would almost certainly exploit to promote violence.
The PCCh leadership has so far not heeded proposals
by extremist elements in the party to assassinate
Pinochet or other top officials. Nevertheless, US
Embassy indicates that Pinochet's
and other senior officials' security precautions proba-
bly would not deter a serious terrorist assault against
them. In fact, a rocket attack on the presidential
palace in mid-1985 reportedly failed only for mechan-
ical reasons, and twice last year terrorists exploded
small bombs at sites where the President was to
We doubt, however, that any such plans would be
implemented unless there is a dramatic downturn in
the PCCh's political fortunes later this year, such as a
sudden decision by Pinochet or the armed forces to
negotiate a transition timetable with the moderate
opposition. The Communists almost certainly would
be excluded from these negotiations and, faced with
renewed political isolation, might assassinate Pinochet
or other senior officers to derail the transition talks
and promote political instability.
We believe, however, that the MIR may be more
inclined than the PCCh to murder senior officials,
calculating that this would refurbish the group's
reputation as a major terrorist organization. More-
over, history demonstrates that this group has the
determination to conduct political murders. The num-
ber of MIR activists in Chile is increasing, and
many have received
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sophisticated military training abroad. The MIR
bombed a Carabinero bus in early February resultin
in numerous casualties
tions, in our view.
A decisive factor affecting prospects for the revolu-
tionary left will be the security services' ability to
counter violence and control antiregime demonstra-
the services will probably contain street
protests over the next year, they have yet to curb
terrorism, including acts against the security services
themselves. Moreover, we question their ability to
counter a more sustained campaign of violence by the
PCCh and FPMR, especially if other opposition
groups join the Communists in staging frequent civil
disobedience acts and antiregime protests.
On balance, however, we believe that-barring assas-
sination-the far left will not seriously threaten the
stability of the Pinochet regime over the next year.
Moreover, we are convinced that the security forces
would easily defeat the far left in any direct confron-
tation. Nevertheless, if there is no progress on a
transition dialogue by the end of 1986, we believe that
the far left's plans to mount an insurgency will
become more feasible. Consequently, in our view, the
longer the Communists are able to carry on an
intensifying armed struggle, the poorer Pinochet's
prospects become for avoiding challenges from the
military and, ultimately, of staying in office beyond
Alternative Scenarios. We see two alternative scenari-
os regarding prospects for the revolutionary left in
Chile over the next two years, but believe that either
has only an outside chance of occurring. The first is
an all-out Communist military offensive-perhaps by
early 1987-involving a sharp escalation of armed
attacks on military and police establishments, system-
atic efforts to disrupt the electricity supply to Santia-
go and to cripple railway and port links, and sustained
bombings in upper-class sections of the capital. In
addition, the PCCh and the FPMR might take control
ment officials, and even Pinochet himself.
of slum neighborhoods and fight to hold them against
the security forces, hoping to establish permanent
guerrilla enclaves. Finally, the far left might attempt
to kill large numbers of senior military and govern-
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We believe that the PCCh is currently too cautious to
embark on such a risky venture, and would do so only
out of desperation if excluded from a peaceful transi-
tion to civilian rule negotiated by the moderate oppo-
sition or because of miscalculation by overconfident
hardline party elements. The Communists almost 25X1
certainly realize that failure would subject them to
massive repression. They also probably know that
defeat would severely damage their public standing
and that most other political forces would repudiate
their actions, leaving them more isolated than ever. In
addition, we believe that Communist leaders think
that their party still is too small and its armed
contingents too weak to challenge the military in a
The second scenario involves a Communist conclusion
that armed struggle cannot topple Pinochet and that,
therefore, the party should revert to its pre-1973
peaceful approach. Thus, the party might respond to
moderate appeals to play a "constructive" role by
ceasing violence and working to engage the regime in
a dialogue on a transition to civilian rule. We believe,
however, that the Communists remain convinced that
Pinochet will not step down voluntarily, and that they
must use force either to oust him or show the military
that the country is ungovernable under Pinochet.
Consequently, we believe that the Communists would
be reluctant to abandon violence because, in their
view, this would strengthen Pinochet's power. Never-
theless, if Pinochet were to decide to resign-a highly
unlikely prospect, in our view-the Communists prob-
ably would be thrown into some disarray and might
decide to halt, at least temporarily, their violent
activities. Thus, they might decide that any other
policy would be counterproductive during a period of
general euphoria brought on by Pinochet's stepping
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Implications for the United States
We believe that escalating leftist violence in Chile
adversely affects US policy goals because it reduces
the prospects for an orderly transition to democracy.
Even if the left's armed struggle does not seriously
threaten political stability for the next two years, US
interests will most likely suffer. Continued leftist
terrorism would probably frustrate Washington's ef-
forts to encourage negotiation on a transition formula
and buttress moderate opposition unity since Pinochet
almost certainly would capitalize on the violence to
rally military support for his harsh policies and justify
his contention that political liberalization is impossi-
ble until the subversives are eliminated.
An all-out Communist-led insurgency against Pino-
chet would, in our view, harm US interests much
more seriously, because it could lead to civil war on
the Central American pattern. Not only would the
Chilean Communists stand a good chance of reaching
power by violent means, but Soviet and Cuban stand-
ing would be greatly enhanced by the prospects of
establishing a new Marxist-Leninist state in Latin
America and the consequent blow to Washington's
influence throughout the region. Moreover, the Sovi-
ets and Cubans would almost certainly attempt to
duplicate their success in Chile by expanding aid to
selected revolutionary groups elsewhere on the
continent.
US interests would benefit in the short run if Pinochet
were to unexpectedly defeat the far left and dramati-
cally reduce terrorism because this would, at least
temporarily, reduce political instability. But while
such a victory would deprive Pinochet of his chief
justification for continued repression, he might try to
portray a success against the far left as giving him a
mandate to run for the presidency again in 1989.
Thus, he might claim that he needed another term to
complete the economic and political rebuilding of the
country before it could return to civilian rule. In such
circumstances, US interests in Chile would suffer in
the long run because, in our view, the root causes of
polarization and eventual political instability would
persist.
We believe that the most favorable development from
the US perspective would be a decision by the Pino-
chet regime to work with the moderate opposition on
accelerating the transition to democracy. Such a move
would be greeted enthusiastically by the opposition
parties and the general public and, in our opinion,
would constitute a major setback for the far left. The
latter might try to derail the transition through
sensational terrorist actions, but the vast majority of
Chileans would condemn such tactics. Moreover, the
government could further isolate and discredit the far
left by ignoring violent provocations and pressing
ahead with transition negotiations. We believe that, as
the return to civilian rule neared, the Communists
and their allies would have little chance of either
mounting an insurgency or playing a significant role
during the initial phases of democratic government.
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