THE CUBAN-SOVIET CONNECTION: COSTS, BENEFITS, AND DIRECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000100080001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Cuban-Soviet Connection:
Costs, Benefits, and Directions
ecret
ALA 86-10017
SOV 86-10020
April 1986
Copy 219
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Cuban-Soviet Connection:
Costs, Benefits, and Directions
This paper was prepared by I I Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, and
Office of Soviet Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Division, ALA
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 86-10017
SOV 86-10020
April 1986
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The Cuban-Soviet Connection:
Costs, Benefits, and Directions 25X1
Key Judgments The longevity and breadth of Soviet-Cuban ties-political, economic, and
Information available military-make their relationship, in our opinion, the strongest and most
as of 14 April 1986 important of the USSR's links to its Third World allies. Despite the
was used in this report.
expressions of harmony at their respective Communist Party congresses
earlier this year, however, relations between Havana and Moscow continue
to be marred by frictions arising from differing foreign policy priorities and
Cuba's poor economic performance. Strains in the relationship over the last
two years represent a low point in a longstanding cycle of alternating
discord and harmony dating back to the 1960s
The Soviets are pressing for policy changes in Cuba on both economic and
political issues. Castro, because of Cuba's overwhelming economic depen-
dence on the USSR, is less able to deflect Moscow's demands than at any
time since the late 1960s. This growing economic dependence and Castro's
consequential adherence to Soviet policy will undercut any pretension of
Cuba's nonaligned status and negate Havana's claim that the USSR is the
"natural ally" of developing countries
The complex patron-client relationship is based on a broad spectrum of
reinforcing linkages that provide mutual benefits. Soviet economic assis-
tance to Cuba, for example, has averaged $4.5 billion annually since 1980,
and is by far the most extensive Soviet aid program to any developing
country. It is the military component of this relationship, however, that is
most valued by Moscow:
? Soviet military aid, provided free of cost to Havana, amounts to more
than $500 million per year and has transformed the Cuban military into
one of the largest and best equipped forces in the Third World.
? The USSR maintains a military presence in Cuba of an estimated 8,000
troops, military advisers, and intelligence personnel, while utilizing
Cuban airfields and ports to project its military power into the Caribbe-
Secret
ALA 86-10017
SOV 86-10020
April 1986
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? Soviet military and economic aid to Cuba has enabled Castro to remain a
major political and military actor in developing areas and to deploy an es-
timated 45,000 Cuban military personnel in the Third World in pursuit
of Havana's-and Moscow's-revolutionary goals.
The current friction between the two states stems from a perception in both
Moscow and Havana that the relative cost of the overall relationship has
increased, although neither questions its worth. From the Soviet perspec-
tive, the cost of Moscow's economic subsidy to Cuba has jumped dramati-
cally at the same time that opportunities for joint military intervention
abroad have diminished and Castro has no new "victories over imperia-
lism" to tout to Soviet leaders. In Cuba's view, its influence in the Third
World suffers as Moscow's demands and Havana's subservience become
increasingly obvious.
Our analysis suggests that Moscow's pressure on Havana will continue to
increase. We expect the Soviets to seek greater influence over internal
Cuban decisionmaking, particularly in the economic realm, as well as even
greater Cuban subservience to Soviet foreign policy. There is likely to be a
period of sustained tension over the next several years as Castro makes
grudging adjustments to manage and deflect Soviet pressures that will
affect fundamental aspects of his handling of state affairs as well as his
economic policies.
The most contentious issue, in our view, will be bilateral economic
relations, including the level of Soviet aid and Cuba's management of its
domestic economy. We believe the new Gorbachev team in the USSR is
likely to:
? Slow the increase of Soviet economic aid to Cuba.
? Seek to assume greater control over and accountability for Havana's use
of Soviet economic assistance.
? Increase Moscow's direction of Cuban economic investment and
development.
? Increase pressure on Castro to reduce Cuban bureaucratic inefficiency
and mismanagement.
We believe these frictions will stop short, however, of causing any
fundamental shift in the relationship because Castro recognizes that there
are no alternatives to the massive Soviet aid that keeps his regime afloat.
Still, he is likely to resist Soviet moves that he perceives as a challenge to
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Cuban sovereignty and his personal authority. While in most cases his
resistance is unlikely to be confrontational, we believe Castro will at times
continue to use public diplomacy to signal his displeasure with Moscow as
he did at the Soviet Party Congress in February. More often, he will use
foot-dragging, delaying tactics, and the establishment of informal bureau-
cratic groups directly subordinate to himself to retain his policy preroga-
tives.
We believe that the Soviets-although increasingly intent on reducing the
burden of supporting the Cuban economy-are unlikely to make deep cuts
in aid to Cuba that could erode the regime's popular support. Moscow
almost certainly views Castro as one of its most stable and reliable allies,
and, in light of the continuing high levels of Soviet military aid to Cuba,
apparently continues to value highly Havana's ability to advance mutual
foreign policy objectives in the Third World.
Even if relations remain essentially unchanged, as we expect, Cuba's bleak
economic outlook and still-deepening dependence on the Soviet Union are
likely to have further implications on the conduct of Cuban foreign policy.
We have little doubt, for example, that Castro will continue to demonstrate
unswerving loyalty to Moscow's foreign policy line in international organi-
zations, even at the expense of his own image. Moreover, Castro will have
to coordinate even more closely his own international initiatives with
Moscow, and is likely to work even harder on the Kremlin's behalf to
justify his requests for increased aid and to deflect Soviet pressures on him
for domestic policy changes. In our opinion, the Cuban leader will be hard
pressed to refuse a Soviet request to send military personnel to an
endangered pro-Moscow regime in the Third World.
Judging from their public statements
we believe that Moscow and Havana have settled most of their disagree-
ments on Third World policy. Although the rising costs of joint Soviet-
Cuban involvement in the Third World, as well as foreign policy setbacks
such as Grenada, have been a source of friction between Moscow and
Havana over the last five years, both now seem to be trying to ensure that
their actions more closely complement one another. They seem to be
striving in particular to avoid working at cross-purposes in key client states
such as Angola and Nicaragua, where continued support and a coordina-
tion of efforts are essential to avoid disastrous foreign policy setbacks.
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We cannot rule out the possibility-although we consider it remote-that a
sharp deterioration in Cuban-Soviet relations could occur over serious
policy differences regarding Nicaragua or perhaps Angola. For Castro, the
Marxist Sandinista regime is his only ally in the hemisphere and represents
his only success in 26 years of fomenting armed revolution in Latin
America. As a result, we believe Castro would go further in acting
independently of Moscow to protect the Nicaraguan Government than he
would on any other foreign policy issue. In Angola, increasing Cuban
concern over rising casualties and the consequent unrest in Cuba could
make Castro more resistant to Soviet pressure to enlarge the Cuban
combat role.
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Key Judgments
Lingering Problems 15
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Figure 1
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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The Cuban-Soviet Connection:
Costs, Benefits, and Directions
The Cuban-Soviet relationship has developed over
time into the strongest and most important of Mos-
cow's ties to its Third World clients. Their joint
interventions in Africa during the mid-1970s trans-
formed Cuba from a relatively minor player to the
role of key Soviet surrogate and greatly expanded the
Soviet projection of power into that region. Currently,
the established network of political, economic, social,
and particularly military ties continues to enhance the
capabilities of both countries and increase opportuni-
ties for them to pursue their respective and mutual
foreign policy interests. Nonetheless, the Cubans and
Soviets have experienced periods of serious strain in
the past, and, over the last two years or so, visible
signs of discord have surfaced again.
This paper evaluates the costs and benefits of the
relationship as viewed from the Cuban and Soviet
perspectives. The paper also reassesses the relation-
ship in light of recent bilateral frictions, their foreign
policy setbacks over the past two years, and the new
Gorbachev leadership in the Kremlin. This study also
estimates the prospects for Cuban-Soviet relations
during the last half of this decade, explores the
potential vulnerabilities in their relationship, and con-
siders the implications for the United States.
The Special Relationship: Havana's Perspective
Over the years, the mutually reinforcing linkages
between Havana and Moscow-spanning the econom-
ic, military, and ideological spheres-have uniformly
broadened and deepened. Economic guarantees, a
continuing high level of free Soviet military aid, and
close Communist Party ties illustrate the Castro
regime's special status among the USSR's Third
World clients. As the tally sheet of benefits has risen
for Havana, however, so have the costs associated
with being a unique Soviet ally. As Cuba has become
an increasingly important Soviet military partner on a
global scale and as Washington has increasingly
focused on Havana's proxy actions in the Western
Hemisphere, Moscow has sought-and gained-
greater influence over Cuba's decisionmaking appara-
Benefits
The Castro regime has received considerable econom-
ic and military aid from the USSR, particularly since
1980. We estimate that over the last five years Soviet
economic assistance has risen to approximately $4.5
billion annually-by far the highest amount Moscow
spends on any Third World client. Overall, this
assistance-comprising trade subsidies and develop-
ment aid-has mounted to the equivalent of some $40
billion since the first bilateral economic agreement
was signed in 1960.' Cuban statistics show that
Havana now depends on the Soviet Union for about
70 percent of its total trade, with Moscow subsidizing
that commerce by paying artificially high prices for
Cuban products while pricing its exports to Cuba
below world market levels. We estimate, for example,
that Moscow pays at least five, and perhaps as much
as 10 times the world market price for Cuban sugar.
Moreover, during the early 1980s, Cuba paid only
about 50 percent of the OPEC price for Soviet crude
petroleum and petroleum products, which amount to
about 90 percent of Havana's needs and constitute the 25X1
most critical element of Cuba's dependency. The
Soviet Union also supplies most of Cuba's industrial,
agricultural, and transport equipment.
Moscow also provides Cuba-both directly and
through Cuba's participation in the Council for Mu-
tual Economic Assistance (CEMA)-materials,
equipment, and advisers for projects relating to export
development, import substitution, and infrastructure
improvements.
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General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party
Gorbachev, 54, has climbed the ladder of Soviet
politics by combining good luck, political skill, and
support from patrons in the top echelons of power. He
began his career in Stavropol' Kray, the political
bailiwick of two leaders-Mikhail Suslov and Fedor
Kulakov-who probably were instrumental in his
early advancement. He was later backed by Leonid
Brezhnev and Yuriy Andropov, largely because Gor-
bachev was able to anticipate their needs and inter-
ests. Gorbachev moved up in rank swiftly; he succeed-
ed Kulakov as agriculture secretary in 1978 at the
age of 47, thus becoming the youngest member of the
Secretariat. He became a candidate member of the
Politburo at age 48 in November 1979 and a full
member in 1980.
Gorbachev has proved to be an exceptionally astute
politician and consummate party bureaucrat. He
appears to have mastered the consensus style of
politics that seems necessary for survival in a collec-
tive leadership. Andrei Gromyko has described Gor-
bachev as a "man of principle" who speaks his mind
directly, suggesting that Gorbachev operates from a
high degree of self-confidence and willingness to take
measured political risks. Although preferring to
avoid confrontations that might create political ene-
mies, he probably could not have reached the top so
swiftly without a capability for tough political in-
fighting when the situation required it. Soviets and
Westerners have portrayed Moscow's leader as deci-
sive and formidable, well-mannered, and capable of
pragmatic, and authoritative discussions with foreign
leaders of different stripes. In business settings, he
appears professional, capable, and well briefed.
In sharp contrast to his Soviet counterpart, Gorba-
chev, a party infighter and master of compromise and
consensus politics, the 59-year-old Fidel Castro has
exercised absolute power in Cuba for over a quarter
century. In addition to serving as First Secretary of
the Cuban Communist Party, he is President of the
Council of State and the Council of Ministers, and
Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces. Intelligent and egotistical, Castro is widely
acknowledged to make all the significant-and many
of the minor-economic, foreign, and domestic policy
decisions. Despite many miscalculations and failures,
the Cuban population-disillusioned with many as-
pects of the revolution-still reveres the charismatic
Castro. Castro's inner circle, the vast majority of
whom are veterans of the guerrilla campaign against
Batista, apparently remains devoted to the Cuban
strongman, and no serious challenge to his leadership
has arisen since the early 1960s.
Castro and Gorbachev are only now beginning to
develop a personal relationship. The Cuban leader
committed a significant breach of protocol last year
when he did not attend Chernenko's funeral and
missed a chance to greet the new Soviet party boss.
Castro does not accept advice or criticism gracefully
and probably wanted to wait until he could show
Moscow some positive results from his efforts to
improve efficiency and productivity. Castro reported-
ly was impressed with a personal telephone call from
Gorbachev last winter to offer emergency aid after
severe hurricane damage in Cuba. The two leaders'
meetings at the Soviet Party Congress in late Febru-
ary also apparently went well, and they may be
developing a warm relationship early on.
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Table I
Estimated Soviet Economic Assistance to Cuba, 1976-84
Based on estimated balance-of-payments aid necessary to cover
Cuban soft currency trade deficits with the USSR, Cuban pur-
chases of capital goods from Moscow, and public statements by
Cuban and Soviet officials concerning the amount of development
aid extended. This aid is repayable, but terms are highly conces-
sional.
b Sugar and nickel subsidies are estimated as the difference be-
tween the price Moscow pays for these commodities and their world
market value. The difference is considered as a grant.
c The petroleum subsidy reflects the difference between the value of
the petroleum purchased from the USSR and the value of these
imports at world market prices. It is considered a grant.
Cuban facilities built or modernized with Soviet aid
since Castro took over in 1959 account for nearly 45
percent of electric power, 95 percent of steel produc-
tion, 100 percent of sheet metal output, 60 percent of
textile manufacturing, and 20 percent of raw sugar
processing.
Major joint projects initiated during the 1981-85
Five-Year Plan include, according to press reporting,
Cuba's first nuclear power generating station at Cien-
fuegos, which will save Havana 28 percent of its
Soviet petroleum imports, and a major nickel process-
ing plant at Punta Gorda near Moa. Together with
another nickel plant now in the early stages of
construction, Cuba's nickel export capability will
triple. Other joint projects currently under way in-
clude a supertanker port east of Havana and a new oil
refinery being constructed with Soviet assistance at
Cienfuegos. Several thousand Soviet economic advis-
ers on the island oversee these projects, and often
directly meddle in the day-to-day operation of the
Cuban economy
Cuba also has benefited over the years from Soviet
ndicate that the volume of this aid 25X1
Moscow does not charge
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Havana for the weapon systems and military-
associated equipment it provides the Cuban Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces. Moreover, 25X1
has increased recently. During 1980-84, the annual
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Figure 2
Cuba: Soviet Subsidized Versus World
Market Prices for Cuban Sugar Exports
and Petroleum Imports, 1981-84
- World
USSR
- Subsidy
Sugar
Cents per pound
benevolent, useful, and generous. Reflecting Havana's
success, Cuban civilian assistance programs grew
from some 1,800 economic advisers in the Third
World in 1975 to some 20,000 civilian personnel
abroad by 1980. This included large contingents in
Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, and Mozambique, as
well as smaller groups in some 28 other countries. In
addition, Cuba has become a major host for Third
World students-some 26,000 from 75 countries have
studied in Cuba over the past decade.
50 50 Costs
Despite these positive aspects, the Castro regime
recognizes that there is a price associated with its
close ties to the Soviets. As Cuba's dependence on
Moscow increases, Havana's image among Third
World nations tends to suffer. For example, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan spoiled Castro's concurrent
chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement and
Security Council. Similarly, the dutiful backing
Havana gave Moscow following the shooting down of
10 the KAL airliner and the Soviet boycott of the 1984
I I I I I I I Olympics undercut Castro's pretensions of indepen
Castro's decision in the 1960s to align Cuba with the
USSR has not accomplished the Cuban leader's ob-
jectives for economic independence or progress. In
1958, for example, 70 percent of Cuba's trade was
with the United States; today the USSR accounts for
flow of Soviet arms and military-associated equip- about the same portion. Investment, once supplied
ment to Cuba has been larger than during any year primarily by private US residents, now comes mostly
since the missile crisis of 1962.1 from the USSR. In addition, the several thousand
The successful Cuban-Soviet teamwork in their Third
World interventions has brought Castro considerable
international prestige, and has facilitated Cuba's ef-
Although some moderate Third World leaders
have expressed wariness over Soviet and Cuban
Soviet advisers now in Cuba have a far greater
influence on the island's economic management than
did US investors or the US Government in the 1950s.
Cuba's weakened economic position, however, is most
evident in its need for direct aid: whereas US econom-
ic assistance to Cuba in 1958 was equivalent to less
than 1 percent of Cuba's national output, Soviet
economic aid in 1985-estimated at some $4.5 bil-
lion-corresponded to somewhat more than 30 per-
"internationalism," many others view their role as cent of Cuba's real output. Without this aid, Havana
would be hard pressed to meet even basic consump-
tion and investment needs.
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Figure 3
Soviet-Sponsored Economic Development Projects in Cuba
$725 million subway system for Havana
scheduled to begin in 1993 . . . expan-
sion of Jose Marti steel plant to increase
its output to some 600,000 metric tons
per year . . . also in Havana, a 1,380 me-
gawatt thermal power plant is under
construction . . . will be largest conven-
tional power plant in Cuba ...55 Soviet
specialists advising on its construction.
Cuba's first nuclear power plant
near Cienfuegos . some 200
Soviet advisers direct construc-
tion . will save Cuba about
50,000 b/d of oil annually .
completion date early-to-mid-
1990s . two other nuclear
plants scheduled.
Supertanker port at Matanzas . .
one wharf toaccomodate ships up to
150,000 metric tons . . . three oth-
ers for ships up to 70,000 metric tons
20 storage tanks will have
50,000 cubic meters capacity each
. 22 Soviet advisers directing
construction.
500-kilometer oil pipeline
under construction con-
necting supertanker port at
Matanzas with oil refineries
near Havana and Cienfue-
gos.
New oil refinery at Cienfuegos. . . 125
Soviet advisers . . . 97 percent of the
plans, technology, and equipment
from Soviet Union . . . will be largest
of Cuba's four refineries. . . will proc-
ess 120,000 b/d of crude annually and
employ 2,000 workers . . . will acco-
modate tankers up to 30,000 metric
tons . . . scheduled completion date
1987 probably will not be met.
$900 million nickel refinery near Moa .
some 700 Soviet advisers at site . . . plant to
produce over 30,000 metric tons of nickel per
year . . . a sister plant nearby at Las Camari-
cas is in initial stage of construction, also with
Soviet and CEMA assistance . . . plagued by
construction delays . . . part of plant became
operational in late 1984 . . . will eventually
employ 6,000 workers.
Central railway line linking Cuba's
two largest cities being reconstruct-
ed with Soviet assistance.
0 100 Kilometers
1
0 100 Miles
80-d,Y,aP,ese-t-
hod--25X1
not ..ily -
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Figure 4. The new Soviet Embassy complex in
Havana, jokingly referred to by some Cubans as
the "control tower"or "the Kremlin," was inau-
gurated last year after long construction delays.
Initiated in 1978, the complex occupies four city
blocks and is comparable in size to the new
Soviet Embassy under construction in Washing-
ton, D.C. The complex is intended to house the
entire Soviet Embassy staff and dependents and
contains a multistory office building, a large
auditorium, apartment buildings, and a swim-
In economic matters generally, the Cuban leader is
finding himself under increasing pressure from the
USSR to adopt Soviet-style planning, to implement
the advice of Moscow's advisers stationed in Cuba,
and to integrate Cuba more fully into CEMA. C
a high-level
Soviet economic planning delegation visited Havana
in mid-1984 and chastised the Cubans for squander-
ing scarce foreign exchange by making hard currency
purchases from the West.
his usefulness to them in the Third World.
Castro continues to try to justify his requests to
Moscow for increased aid by reminding the Soviets of
"victories" in the Third World to herald in recent
years, however, and, in our judgment, the Cuban
leader's ability to deflect Moscow's pressures is at its
lowest point since 1967 when
the Soviets manipulated oil
supplies to Havana to force the Cuban leader to
institute major domestic and foreign policy changes.
Moreover, despite record levels of Soviet economic aid
in recent years, Cuban economic productivity and
performance have not been improving, and Castro,
because of low world sugar prices and falling oil
prices, has little near-term prospect of showing Mos-
cow any significant growth in the Cuban economy.
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Benefits
The USSR derives a wide range of political and
military advantages from its ties to Cuba. Since the
early 1960s, Cuba has provided the USSR with a
significant presence in the Caribbean Basin, an area
of strategic importance to the United States.
Cuban airfields are also extensively utilized by the
Soviets, such as for the deployment of TU-95 Bear
reconnaissance aircraft. These deployments tend to
last from two to four weeks and are staged to collect
intelligence on US naval operations or engage in
antisubmarine warfare operations off the US east
coast. The Soviet Navy also uses Cuba as a support
base for its periodic visits to the Caribbean Basin. In
addition, Soviet Bear flights to Angola stage through
Havana en route to Africa.
The Soviet-Cuban joint interventions in Angola and
Ethiopia transformed Cuba from an essentially pas-
sive recipient of military largess into an active and
valuable military ally of the Soviet Union. The use of
Cuban troops avoided the negative repercussions that
most likely would have been caused by the interven-
tion of Soviet military forces. Not only did the Castro
regime play a key role in consolidating the power of
two Marxist regimes, but the resulting increase in
Cuba's international influence also made the Castro
regime an increasingly effective defender of Soviet
interests in Third World forums. For example,
Havana was able by the late 1970s to eliminate the
concept of "two imperialisms" (the United States and
the Soviet Union) from the Nonaligned Movement
and to focus the hostility of the organization more
directly on Washington.
Figure 5. Cuban-manned, Soviet-made PT-76
light amphibious tank in downtown Luanda in
1976 during heyday of Cuba's involvement in
Angola. Since the late 1970s, however, Moscow's
and Havana's liabilities-material and human-
associated with keeping the dos Santos regime in
power have increased steadily. Although stingy
with economic assistance (see figure 7), Moscow's
military aid to Angola increased every year from
1979 to 1984. The 36,000 Cuban military person-
nel in Angola are still needed to man air defense
missile and radar sites, and service and fly the
Soviet MIG-21 fighters and Hind MI-24 attack
helicopters. Although they have avoided frontline
combat so far, Cuban troops could become more
involved in counterinsurgency operations over the
next few years despite Castro's sensitivity to
Cuba, in pursuing its anti-US foreign policy objec-
tives, has also assisted Soviet interests in the Western
Hemisphere. The most successful example is Nicara-
gua, where early on in
the revolution Cuba helped design the military strate-
gy of the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN), provided an estimated 500 metric tons of
weaponry to the guerrillas, trained and transported
combatants to join the battle, and later sent as many
as 50 advisers to accompany the Sandinista units.
These actions helped propel the Sandinistas to power
in 1979 at a low cost both to the Cubans and Soviets.
Moscow enjoyed the fruits of all these victories,
keeping its involvement restricted essentially to the
provision of military equipment and logistic support to
the Cubans.
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Figure 6. Cuban artillery unit in the Ogaden
campaign in Ethiopia in 1978, part of Cuba's
17,000-man troop deployment to roll back Soma-
lia's military invasion. Havana has drawn down
its military personnel to some 5,500 troops and
advisers. Castro has refused to assist Ethiopian
counterinsurgency operations against the north-
ern guerrilla movements, one of which-the
Eritreans-was supported by Cuba prior to Men-
gistu's rise to power. The remaining Cuban per-
sonnel have little to do except advise, man
garrisons, and repair equipment, E
Soviet interests in Nicaragua. Analysis
Ofor example, shows that Cuba has served as
a transfer point for Soviet military equipment des-
tined for the Sandinista regime, thereby enabling
Moscow to provide such material discreetly. Similar-
ly, the Cuban role in supporting the Salvadoran
guerrillas and other insurgent groups in Latin Ameri-
ca permits Moscow to maintain a low profile in the
region. By avoiding direct involvement in such cases,
Soviet flexibility is enhanced; Moscow can alter its
level of support to such groups or revise its policy
without risking a loss of face.
Costs
The euphoria of the victories in Angola, Ethiopia, and
Nicaragua began to wear off by the beginning of the
1980s, as the focus of Moscow's and Havana's efforts
necessarily shifted from helping insurgent groups
attain power to the more difficult process of consoli-
dating regimes in power. The Soviets and Cubans
were now confronted by their clients' problems such
as deepening economic malaise, growing insurgent
activity, rising popular discontent, and leadership
factionalism. Moreover, no new easy opportunities
have arisen over the last few years as the Soviets and
Cubans found themselves increasingly challenged by
Washington.
As troubles mount for Soviet-Cuban allies in the
Third World, so do Moscow's associated costs. For
example, Moscow had to increase its military aid to
the dos Santos government in Angola between 1979
and 1984. Soviet military deliveries to Ethiopia in
1983 and 1984 doubled the level of the previous two
years, and, in Mozambique, Soviet military aid since
1975 is now approaching $1 billion.
The Soviets, moreover, have broader Third World
concerns and are bearing other major burdens in the
developing areas. In addition to its major involve-
ments in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua,
---]Moscow is maintaining some
115,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, conducting a
war that has dragged on since 1979. In addition, the
Kremlin is supporting the Vietnamese regime with
more than $1 billion a year in economic aid and is
providing the military materiel necessary to sustain
Hanoi's counterinsurgency effort in Cambodia. Some
of these clients can do little more for the Soviets than
survive, and potentially could represent serious set-
backs for Moscow if they were toppled over the next
few years.
The Soviets apparently also are concerned over the
increasing cost of their Cuban aid programs, judging
from the sharp tenor of Soviet complaints about
Havana's economic mismanagement. Compared to
the mid-1970s when sugar prices were high and
Cuban economic performance was good, the island's
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Figure 7
Soviet Military and Economic Aid to Angola, Ethiopia, and
Nicaragua, 1975-85
Economic aid
Military aid
nn In
~~4
economy is now stagnating and the Soviet subsidy is
burgeoning. On the basis of our estimates, annual
Soviet assistance to Cuba amounts to more than half
of Moscow's total assistance to its Third World
clients.
Moscow seems to be particularly unhappy with what
it views as Cuban inefficiency and economic misman-
agement. Mos-
cow has frequently criticized the Cubans for failing to
meet trade and delivery commitments to the Soviet
Union and other CEMA partners.
The Soviets seem to be increasingly worried over the
poor international image of the Cuban economy.
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for the rest of Latin America, especially since food 25X1
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Figure 8
Soviet Economic Aid Per Capita for
the USSR's Major Recipients, 1984'
Angola
Ethiopia
Vietnam
Guinea
Iraq
Nicaragua
Syria
Afghanistan
Cuba
C
A History of Controlled Stress
Such unhappiness at both ends of the Havana-
Moscow axis is not new to the relationship. A variety
of academic studiesOshows that relations
between Cuba and the USSR have been characterized
over the years by periods of sharp disagreement. The
first such dispute was sparked by the missile crisis in
1962 when Moscow agreed to remove the missiles and
bombers without consulting Fidel Castro. Over the
next decade, public statements by the two nations
underscored bitter disagreement over revolutionary
strategy and economic theory.' Finally, the death of
Che Guevara in 1967 and the debacle of the drive to
produce 10 million tons of sugar in 1970 marked the
end of the Cuban leader's gamble that a combination
of spectacular economic achievements and guerrilla
victories in Latin America would enable him to fend
Figure 9
Soviet Economic Aid to Communist
and Non-Communist LDCs, 1984'
Nicaragua 1.2
Laos and Cambodia 1.8
Ethiopia 3.0
Mongolia 8.8
Non-Communist LDC's
(includes Afghanistan)
20.3
off domination by the Soviet Union. With the econo-
my in shambles and armed struggle discredited, Cas-
tro had no choice but to accept the conditions of
survival offered by Moscow-basic conformity with
Soviet principles in economics, ideology, political or-
ganization, and foreign policy.
The effects of Soviet pressure and Cuba's diminishing
independence were reflected in:
? The establishment of a joint commission in 1970
that became an instrument for strong Soviet influ-
ence over Cuban economic policy formulation.
? Cuba's accession in 1972 to full membership in
CEMA.
? The total reorganization in 1972 of the Cuban
Government apparatus on the Soviet model.
? A reduced emphasis on armed struggle in Cuban
foreign policy.
? A complete reorganization in 1973 of Cuba's mass
organizations along Soviet lines.
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? The convening in 1975 of the long-postponed first
congress of the Cuban Communist Party and a
reorientation of the party's role to correspond with
the Soviet and East European models.
? The adoption in 1976 of a new constitution, which
conformed to the letter and spirit of the Soviet
constitutions.
Nevertheless, Castro apparently did not accede to all
Soviet demands.
for example, in 1975 Moscow pressed Castro to
hand over the party leadership position to his brother
Raul at the first party congress. The Soviets
wanted Fidel to concentrate on
being a Third World spokesman and focus more on
ceremonial duties. Contrary to Moscow's wishes, how-
ever, the Cuban leader used the congress and the
corresponding governmental reorganization to reaf-
firm his personal hold on all the top party, govern-
ment, and military posts.
frictions have
been rising during the past two years over economic
issues. In our judgment, Havana and Moscow have
been at odds over the fundamental development strat-
egy assigned to Cuba within CEMA, as well as
Cuba's own economic inefficiency. Moscow also
seems to be attempting to reduce the burden of
supporting the Cuban economy, and its efforts on
these subjects are not being well received in Havana.
For example, an East European diplomat told the US
Interests Section in Havana that, during the planning
talks for the June 1984 CEMA summit in Moscow,
Cuba sought to adjust its economic role within the
organization to emphasize accelerated industrial de-
velopment. The Cubans evidently were rebuffed be-
cause published summit documents noted that Cuba
will continue instead to focus on agriculture-a role
analogous to that of a primary goods producer for a
colonial power. Castro stayed away from the heads of
state summit-the only leader to do so-probably to
avoid being associated with humiliating resolutions
that underscored Cuba's dependency and client
status.
Cuba apparently tried to raise the issue again at the
CEMA prime minister's meeting held in Havana
during October 1984. At a press conference one week
before the gathering, Cuban Vice President Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez said that Cuba did not want to
produce only agricultural products or consumer
goods, but also wanted to develop the "means of
production." He cited electronics and genetic engi-
neering as the kinds of industries Cuba hopes to
develop. In his speech to the assembled CEMA
premiers at the opening session, Castro pointedly
noted Cuba's disappointment over its "modest" par-
ticipation as an exporter in the electronics and ma-
chine industries within CEMA. He reiterated Cuba's
interest in expanding its participation in industrial
fields
Soviet economic officials apparently were unmoved by
Castro's pleas. The 15-year cooperation agreement
that Castro and then Soviet Premier Tikhonov signed
at the close of the CEMA meeting listed agriculture,
minerals, fuel,.and energy industries as the main
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areas of Soviet aid to Cuba. The agreement signifies 25X1
to us that the focus of Moscow's assistance for Cuban
development for the rest of the century will remain
restricted to energy development, petroleum refining, 25X1
nickel mining and processing, and modernization of
the sugar industry.
Moreover, the Soviets indicated at the Havana meet-
ing that future Soviet aid will be leveled off at 1984-
85 amounts.
Interests Section officials last year that the Soviet
problem with Cuba was that Castro simply did not
believe that Moscow would ever decrease its assis-
tance. In our view, the Soviet official was saying; in
effect, that Castro had been calling Moscow's bluff by
ignoring warnings about reducing his stipend, and, in
order to restore the USSR's credibility and control
over its investment in Cuba, Soviet officials need to
back up their tough talk with aid restrictions.
The Soviets may have relented somewhat on their
tough line because of last year's hurricane and
drought damage to Cuba's sugar crop, the fall of oil
prices that will substantially reduce Havana's earn-
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recent efforts to improve Cuban economic perfor-
mance. According to press reports, Soviet-Cuban
economic agreements for the next five years signed in
Havana in early April 1986, call for $3 billion in
Soviet development credits during the 1986-90 period,
an increase of about 50 percent over 1981-85 figures.
It remains unclear whether these new credits repre-
sent an overall increase of Soviet economic assistance
to Cuba because Soviet development credits generally
have accounted for only about 10 percent of the total
Soviet aid package.' Moscow may have made other
concessions to Cuba, but Castro's silence on the value
of Soviet trade subsidies or on the future of the oil
agreement that allows Cuba to sell the Soviet oil it
conserves more likely indicates that agreement on
these issues was not as advantageous to Cuba.O
Foreign Policy Frictions
Tensions between Havana and Moscow also have
arisen during the past few years over their differing
foreign policy priorities, the unequal burdens shared
in their Third World interventions, and differing
perceptions in the two countries of the commitment
the other side should be willing to bear. For example,
public speeches by Castro
indicate that Havana believes it is suffering increasing
combat casualties, that the Soviets should extend
more economic aid to Third World clients, and that
the USSR should react more strongly to such US
moves as the US intervention in Grenada.
Other disputes have surfaced over the pursuit of
parochial interests in particular countries, especially
where both Moscow and Havana have established
contacts and seek to promote their respective allies as
the dominant group at the expense of others. These
problems generally only complicate their efforts to
strengthen the left, although under certain situa-
tions-such as in Grenada-they can create condi-
tions resulting in a more fundamental foreign policy
setback for both the Soviets and the Cubans.
' Soviet development credits to Cuba amounted to approximately
$490 million in 1984, less than 11 percent of the total Soviet
economic assistance that includes large trade subsidies. Soviet trade
subsidies on sugar, petroleum, and nickel, for example, amounted to
over $3.6 billion in 1984. A significant cut in the level of subsidies
over the next five years, particularly in the price of sugar, could
Moscow and Havana have worked at cross-purposes
in a number of other cases, although none of their
recent differences approach the gravity of the Grena-
da episode.
Bending to Moscow's Will
Recognizing that continuation of present aid levels
requires him to accommodate Soviet demands, the
Cuban leader-while still bargaining and arguing
with Moscow-is moving to address a number of
Soviet complaints. One month after signing a long-
term Cuban-Soviet protocol on economic cooperation
in late 1984, Castro declared a "profound economic
revolution," that is, a nationwide effort against waste
and inefficiency., In a major speech, the Cuban leader
announced that Cuba would face economic hardships
until at least the next century. The thrust of Cuba's
new economic policy-increasing exports to the West,
meeting trade commitments to Communist countries,
and limiting imports of consumer goods-suggests
that Castro is responding seriously to Moscow's stric-
tures on the need to save foreign exchange and its
implicit warnings about future levels of assistance.
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The US intervention in Grenada and the lack of
Soviet response to this action led, in our view, to the
most significant policy dispute between Moscow and
Havana since the late 1960s. For the first time in a
decade, the Cuban and Soviet claim of a shift in the
correlation of forces in socialism's favor was called
into question. For Fidel Castro, the Grenadian epi-
sode almost certainly heightened his sense of vulnera-
bility, demonstrated Moscow's unwillingness to en-
gage Washington in a serious confrontation in the
Caribbean Basin, and proved to him that he must be
careful not to provoke a similar US action in Central
America. The Cuban leader's subsequent war hyster-
ia campaign, the rapid expansion of Cuba's Territori-
al Militia to some 1.3 million people, and his empha-
sis on preparing the population for a prolonged
people's war" in the event of a US invasion demon-
strated his recognition that Moscow would not come
to Cuba's defense even in the event of hostilities with
Washington.
What seemed to grate Castro even more was his
apparent belief that Moscow was partially to blame
for the bloody dissolution of the Grenadian revolu-
tion. In his speech at the funeral of the Cubans killed
in Grenada, Castro placed the blame squarely on pro-
Soviet Grenadian Deputy Prime Minister Bernard
Coard, arguing that his actions set in motion the
events that gave the United States a pretext to
intervene. Conversely, the official Soviet line, elabo-
rated in a TASS commentary, placed blame for the
Grenadian episode on the United States, whose "spe-
cial services" were alleged to have penetrated Grena-
dian circles and created the conditions for the US
intervention. The TASS replay of the Castro speech
pointedly omitted the paragraphs that described
Coard's culpability, while Cuba has never adopted
the Soviet line alleging US intelligence involvement.
Castro also is responding to economic problems and
bureaucratic inefficiency by making wholesale per-
sonnel shifts in the economic ministries to energize
performance and improve productivity.
The major change 25X1
thus far has been the replacement of the head of
Cuba's central planning agency, JUCEPLAN, with
the former Minister of Construction, a 43-year-old
technocrat who apparently impressed Cuban officials
with his management of that cumbersome ministry.
The Minister-President of the State Committee for
Finance-a cabinet-rank post-also was replaced by
a young technocrat. In addition to naming a new
Minister of Construction, Castro also has replaced the
Ministers of Transportation, Sugar, and Light Indus-
try.
Many other recent organizational and personnel
moves in Cuba are likely to address longtime Soviet
concerns by furthering the "institutionalization" of
the revolution along the Soviet model. The major
institutional change so far has been the clearer sepa-
ration of the roles of the Communist Party and the
government apparatus. A number of personnel
changes have relieved Politburo members from their
additional government duties as heads of ministries.
these moves are intended to emulate the more recent
Soviet practice of putting technically qualified person-
nel in ministerial posts held hitherto by political
appointees, cronies, or ideological hacks.
Dealing With Policy Differences
Judging from their public statements
we believe Moscow and Havana
are trying to ensure that their actions in the Third
World more closely complement one another. Not
only are the Soviets and Cubans continuing to probe
them.
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may even be settling on a tacit understanding of
which country should take the lead in exploiting
The two nations seem to be striving in particular to
avoid working at cross-purposes in key nations such as
Angola and Nicaragua, where continued support and
a coordination of effort are essential to avoid a
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Exploiting New Opportunities for
Diplomatic Inroads and Subversion
Despite the rising costs connected with their Third
World involvements, the Soviets and Cubans continue
to exploit opportunities for expanding their presence
and influence. Although a clearly defined Soviet-
Cuban division of labor-either functional or geo-
graphical-is not supported by available evidence, we
believe that in most cases they pursue coordinated-
and parallel policy approaches. The Soviets and
Cubans work to build state-to-state ties in the Third
World to gain economic and strategic access, under-
mine US relations with host governments, and create
divisiveness between Washington and its allies on key
policy issues. A case in point is Castro's assiduous
efforts over the last year or so to court new civilian
administrations in South America and socialist gov-
ernments in Western Europe. These efforts falling
within the mainstream of Soviet policy in the two
regions-are designed to end Cuba's isolation in the
hemisphere and gain backing for Havana's positions
on regional issues.
The disparity in capabilities and resources between
Cuba and the Soviet Union often dictates that they
use different tactics and tools to win over potential
allies in a target country. Moscow often uses military
assistance and commercial trade to solidify its rap-
port with governments in power, trying to create a
dependency relationship with the country and to
build a pro-Soviet clientele within its leadership. F_
disastrous foreign policy setback. The Soviets,
Cubans, and Angolans apparently have settled on a
harder-line strategy regarding the US-mediated nego-
tiations between Luanda and Pretoria and on future
levels of Soviet-Cuban aid to the dos Santos regime.
According to the US Embassy in Moscow, Soviet
Foreign Ministry officials said that the Soviets and
Cubans pressed the Angolans last year for improved
economic performance, although both patrons agreed
to provide increased aid to the government, including
intensified Soviet training of Angolan military offi-
cers. Castro, using last year's visit of UN Secretary
tro, on the other hand, relies on less costly policy
tools such as personal diplomacy, tenders of training
and technical assistance, sports and cultural ex-
changes, scholarship offers, and security training.
The expansion of Soviet and Cuban diplomatic rela-
tions and overall presence in the Third World create
opportunities for covert support to radical leftist
groups, both in the host country and its regional
neighbors. Despite both Gorbachev's and Castro's
current emphasis on diplomatic relations with a wide
range of governments, both countries continue to
support subversives and armed revolution-particu-
larly against pariah regimes such as Chile and South
General Perez de Cuellar as the backdrop for tough-
ening his position, asserted publicly that a total of
200,000 Cubans had served in Angola since 1975 and
that he was willing to send an equal number in the
coming decade if necessary.
The Cubans and Soviets appear to have synchronized
their policy toward Nicaragua as well, as both coun-
tries are increasing their aid to the Sandinistas.
Moreover, Havana and Moscow continue to reject any
talks or accommodation between the Sandinistas and
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the armed opposition. Instead, their moves to date
suggest that both the Soviets and Cubans agree that
they will meet the insurgent challenge by incremen-
tally strengthening the military aid program to the
Sandinista armed forces, including the provision of
equipment, training, and tactical advice.
Lingering Problems
Despite the evidence of coinciding views on most
issues, there are indications that Castro is continuing
to resist the Soviets on certain subjects. For example,
the Cuban leader apparently intends to press on with
his goal of strengthening the electronics industry in
Cuba and developing a genetic engineering capability
even though Soviet economic officials have refused to
assist such efforts.
the Cuban
leader has consolidated all enterprises associated with
electronics-which previously were spread across sev-
eral government agencies-under a single new Minis-
try of the Electronics Industry. In a move that runs
counter to the new ministerial personnel policy, Cas-
tro selected Ramiro Valdes, the former Minister of
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Interior, to head the new ministry. Although Valdes
has little experience in the electronics field and is best
known for his ruthless approach to security matters,
he has been a close associate of Fidel Castro since the
days of the guerrilla struggle against Batista. Because
of Valdes's unquestioned loyalty and his direct access
to the Cuban leader, his appointment underscores the
political as well as economic importance Castro places
on the development of this sector. As a result, we
believe there will be sharp disagreement between
Moscow and Havana over this program especially if
the Castro regime begins to divert scarce resources to
its development.
In a similar vein, Castro has become personally
involved in the construction of a major medical
research facility, which
Castro envisions the facility as the largest of its kind
in the world, attracting leading international scientific
and medical personnel to Cuba as well as hard-
currency-paying foreign patients. According to his
plans, the institute will also be used to host major
international medical and scientific conferences, sig-
nificantly raising the prestige of Cuba's medical
programs. Castro is pushing
ahead with the institute despite substantial criticism
Evidence of Castro's continuing concern that any
improvement in Moscow's relations with Washington
could negatively affect its commitment to its Third
World allies again became apparent during the Third
Party Congress in early February this year. On the
penultimate day of the congress, according to the US
Interests Section, the delegates unexpectedly adopted
a resolution approving-and explaining-Castro's re-
marks on foreign policy during his main report to the
congress two days earlier. Vice President Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez admitted to the delegates that the
resolution had been so hastily prepared that there had
not been time to distribute it in advance. The US
Interests Section noted that compared to Castro's
speech the document lavished considerably more
praise on Soviet efforts to promote detente and was
more outspoken in its approval of the general desir-
ability of solving conflicts through dialogue and nego-
tiations. The unprecedented resolution-in which
Castro played no public role-was probably adopted
to placate the Soviets, who may have been angered by
Castro's failure to address adequately Moscow's
broader effort to improve relations with the United
States. Indeed, a TASS statement issued shortly after
the resolution was approved emphasized the portions
dealing with the peace struggle and negotiated settle-
ments. Nevertheless, in his closing speech to the
congress, Castro adopted an even more aggressive
tone than his main report, speaking in emotional
terms about confrontation with the United States.
Persisent differences between Moscow's East-West
priorities and Castro's Third World focus carried over
to the 27th Soviet Congress. Gorbachev's main ad-
dress virtually ignored the Third World-focusing
instead on Soviet-US arms control issues-while Cas-
tro centered his remarks on the Third World. In
continuing his running debate with the Soviets over
the relevance of superpower dialogue to Third World
concerns (implicitly including Cuba), Castro called
the struggle for economic development "no less stimu-
lating" than that of avoiding war. Subtly chiding his
Soviet colleagues, he explicitly asserted that the na-
tions of the Third World "expect and are certain they
will receive maximum solidarity from the socialist
community in their struggle for just economic gains."
Given the benefits accruing to both countries from
this relationship, their large investment in it, and its
high level of institutionalization in the political, eco-
nomic, and military areas, we expect Soviet-Cuban
ties to remain strong. Nevertheless, bilateral tensions
are likely to continue marring the alliance, in our
judgment, and will offer occasional opportunities for
the United States to pursue its interests.
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We believe that these disagreements and strains-
particularly over economic issues-result from an
unequal, complex patron-client relationship. Moscow
seems increasingly intent on finding ways to ease the
financial burden posed by its foremost Third World
client, particularly as the USSR copes with its own
petroleum and agricultural problems. Although we
believe Castro's leverage with Moscow will be increas-
ingly limited, he is likely to continue to press the
Soviets for increased aid, and to cause bilateral
frictions in doing so.
The austerity and conservation measures already be-
ing implemented in Cuba indicate that Havana recog-
nizes that Cuba must respond to Soviet demands, but
Castro's open resistance on certain issues, such as the
electronics industry and genetics project, suggests
that movement on other areas may be slower and less
complete than Moscow desires. Moreover, if Cuban
frustration with Soviet aid levels spills over into public
view again, it is possible that Castro may miscalculate
the extent of Soviet patience and provoke Moscow
into making a significant aid cutback. Such a move
would have serious economic consequences for Cuba
and could weaken Havana's ability to sustain its
interventionist foreign policy at current levels.
Even if relations remain essentially unchanged, as we
expect, Cuba's bleak economic outlook and its mas-
sive-and still growing-dependence on the Soviet
Union are likely to have further implications for the
conduct of Cuban foreign policy. Castro will have to
coordinate even more closely his own international
initiatives with Moscow, and is likely to work even
harder on the Kremlin's behalf to justify his requests
for increased aid and to deflect Soviet pressures on
him for domestic policy changes. Castro will be hard
pressed to refuse a Soviet request to send military
personnel to an endangered pro-Moscow regime in the
Third World. Moreover, we have little doubt that
Castro will continue to demonstrate unswerving loyal-
ty-even if such actions damage his own image-to
Moscow's foreign policy line in international organi-
zations and to act on Moscow's behalf in Third World
forums where the Soviets do not directly participate.
Short of creating a serious disruption of Cuban-Soviet
relations, which we consider unlikely, Cuba's adher-
ence to Soviet policy and its economic dependence on
the USSR also create opportunities for the United
States to gain some political and propaganda advan-
tage. Cuba's support for Soviet actions-such as the
KAL airliner shootdown and Moscow's intervention
in Afghanistan-undercut any Cuban pretension to
genuine nonalignment and negate Havana's claim
that the Soviet Union is the "natural ally" of the
developing countries. Castro's alignment with Mos-
cow on such issues exposes his duplicity when he
suggests to sympathetic audiences in Western Europe
and South America that he could be weaned away
from the Soviet orbit by greater access to Western
markets and aid. Also undercutting the "natural ally"
thesis is Moscow's stinginess with economic aid to
Third World countries, and its inability and unwill-
ingness to compete with Western lenders and donors,
even in such pro-Soviet client states as Ethiopia and
Mozambique.
Cuba's own economic problems, despite the massive
flow of aid, will increasingly dampen Castro's ability
to hold up Cuba as a model of development for the
Third World. Indeed, we believe that economic aus-
terity and consumer sacrifice measures already being
implemented in Cuba will generate rising disillusion-
ment with the regime, and will cause Castro to
respond with repressive measures that would make the
Cuban model even less attractive. Moreover, Ha-
vana's indebtedness to Moscow and to Western lend-
ers, as well as Cuba's businesslike approach to its
recent debt renegotiations, make Castro susceptible to
charges of hypocrisy and meddling when he advocates
that other countries cancel payment on their debts to
international organizations. Meanwhile, Cuba's fail-
ure to meet performance targets set by its Western
creditors, as well as the leveling off of Soviet economic
aid, are likely to be damaging to Cuba's credit rating.
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At the same time, the continuing tension that under-
lies this relationship could also generate problems for
US policy objectives. Although unlikely, it is possible,
for example, that, given Cuba's long-term commit-
ment to Angola and Nicaragua, serious foreign policy
differences between the two countries could occur
over issues relating to these two client states. In
Nicaragua, Castro probably is far more attached to
the Sandinistas than the Soviets, given Nicaragua's
geographic proximity and cultural affinity to Cuba
and Havana's role in helping the Sandinistas attain
power. For Castro, the Marxist Sandinista regime is
his only ally in the hemisphere and represents his only
success in 26 years of promoting armed revolution in
Latin America. Because of his close relationship with
Nicaraguan leaders, we believe Castro would go
further in acting independently of Moscow with re-
gard to Nicaragua than on any other foreign policy
issue, particularly if he perceived a danger to the large
number of Cuban personnel stationed there and Mos-
cow's unwillingness to increase its own support.
Should the survival of the Nicaraguan Government be
seriously jeopardized by the insurgents, we believe
that Castro could possibly move out ahead of Soviet
policy, perhaps sending troops to back up Sandinista
forces or man major garrisons even at the risk of a
serious dispute with Moscow.
In Angola, it is the Cubans who might balk at upping
the ante still further in order to prop up the dos
Santos government against the South African-backed
UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola) insurgents. Although Castro's recent tough
talk on staying the course in southern Africa indicates
that he is not prepared to abandon Cuba's 10-year
commitment to Angola,
Cuban leaders are sensitive to
continuing casualties among both Cuban troops and
civilians, to rising morale problems among Cubans
serving in Angola, and to discontent at home over the
long-term involvement there. Castro might resist So-
viet pressure to increase further the Cuban military
presence or to step up their direct role in the counter-
insurgency fighting if he believes there is little pros-
pect of a quick military victory over the insurgents.
Substantial gains by Savimbi's guerrillas, then, could
result in serious Cuban-Soviet divisiveness as they
grapple with how to meet the insurgent challenge.
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Appendix A
Longstanding Military Ties
The Cuban-Soviet military relationship generally has
been characterized by far fewer frictions than bilater-
al economic or political ties. The massive stockpile of
arms given to the Cubans and the large Soviet
advisory presence from the early 1960s ensured a
close military relationship. Even during serious down-
turns in Cuban-Soviet political relations, Havana and
Moscow have maintained a closer military relation-
ship than exists between the Soviet Union and any
other non-Warsaw Pact country. For example, during
the period from late 1966 to January 1968 when
Cuban-Soviet relations were severely strained, Mos-
cow's arms deliveries to Cuba were the highest since
the massive 1962 buildup. Over the years, the organi-
zation of the Cuban Armed Forces has come to mirror
the Soviet model, with Cuba's top military leader,
Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro, making frequent
trips to the USSR and developing a close relationship
with Soviet military and political figures.
Upgrading Cuban Defenses
Since Cuba's 1975 intervention in Angola, and espe-
cially during the past five years, all branches of the
Cuban Armed Forces have been significantly upgrad-
ed with modern weapon systems supplied by the
USSR. We estimate that the worth of Soviet military
and military-associated deliveries to Cuba from 1981
Cuba, in our view, was able to defeat any invasion
force short of a serious effort by a major power.
While the current buildup probably is designed, in
large part, to deter any US military action against
Cuba, Castro also derives numerous foreign policy
benefits from his newly acquired military might.
Soviet military aid improves Castro's capacity to
support revolutionary regimes and movements abroad,
Significant Soviet Military Deliveries
to Cuba Since 1981
ince 1981 25X1
? Upgraded Cuba's air defenses by delivering Cuba's
first mobile surface-to-air missile systems, the
SA-6 and SA-9, in 1981 and 1982; improving the
existing SA-2 and SA-3 networks; and by continu-
ing to deliver MIG fighters, including Cuba's first
MIG-23 Flogger B interceptors in 1982.
? Provided more than 30 additional combat helicop-
ters, including Cuba's first MI-24 Hind gunships
and MI-14 Haze antisubmarine warfare
helicopters.
? Strengthened Cuba's air defense command and
control with the construction of new bunkers and
additional air surveillance sites, by providing new
radars and, in February 1984, its first electronic
data transmission system.
? Helped the Cubans expand and modernize their
Navy by delivering additional guided-missile and
torpedo patrol boats, amphibious landing ships,
minesweepers, three Foxtrot-class submarines, and
two Koni-class frigates.
? Provided Cuba's ground forces with more modern
equipment; during 1984 alone, some 180 tanks,
mostly T-62s, and more than 200 pieces of artillery
were delivered.
? Bolstered Cuba's airlift capability by delivering two
heavy transport IL-76 aircraft and expanded
Havana's merchant marine fleet for the support of
Cuban forces overseas.
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adds international stature to Cuba's revolutionary
government, and provides a means of gaining addi-
tional leverage with the USSR through demonstrated
competence in the military arena. These benefits
accrue not only through military hardware, but also
by way of technical assistance, training, joint exer-
cises, and improving the professionalism of the Cuban
officer corps.
The Kremlin's Caribbean Presence
From Moscow's perspective, costly investments in the
Cuban military benefit its strategic objectives, and
the Soviets have been strengthening their own assets
on the island. Cuba is the USSR's largest and most
valuable base outside the Soviet Union for intelligence
collection against the United States. 25X1
the SIGINT complex at Lourdes 25X1
houses separate facilities for the KGB, the GRU
(Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff),
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officer-level advisers and technicians, advises and
trains the Cuban Armed Forces. The major elements
of the MAG are located in the Kohly District of
northern Havana, although Soviet advisers are also
deployed with Cuba's Central and Eastern Armies.
Figure 11. Soviet TU-95 (Bear D) reconnaissance
aircraft at San Antonio de los Banos airfield,
Cuba. The Bear D's have deployed to Cuba, on
average, five or six times annually in recent years
to collect intelligence on US naval operations off
the east coast. Although they usually fly one or
The Soviets also use Cuba for periodic naval visits,
deployments of long-range naval reconnaissance and
antisubmarine warfare aircraft, and port calls by the
intelligence-gathering ships that patrol off the US
east coast and in the Caribbean.
The Soviet brigade, estimated at about 2,600 to 2,900
men, is made up of one tank and three motorized rifle
battalions, as well as fire-support battalions and com-
bat service support units. These units are garrisoned
in two facilities south of Havana-Santiago de las
Vegas and Lourdes. Recent construction
ndicates a modernization of
brigade facilities rat er than expansion. The Intelli-
gence Community believes the brigade is symbolic of
Soviet commitment and only serves to provide security
for Soviet facilities. The Soviet Military Advisory
Group (MAG), currently estimated at 2,500 to 2,800
onstruction activity in the
Kohly District since 1980 indicates that the MAG has
been expanded and has upgraded its communications
Benefits and Limits of Soviet Military Commitment
The Cuban-Soviet military relationship has.been ben-
eficial for both Havana and Moscow. Unlike their
economic ties, where Havana benefits from Moscow's
shouldering the burdens of Cuba's inefficient econo-
my, Soviet military investments have paid off hand-
somely for both countries. The Soviet-trained Cuban
military has performed effectively in two major mili-
tary campaigns, playing a key role in advancing
Soviet foreign policy goals. Cuba's location and its
military forces provide the Soviets with the capability
to project power near the United States, collect
intelligence on US military activities by monitoring
US communications, and help the Soviet Union com-
pete with the United States in the Third World. In
addition, the Soviets probably hope that a militarily
stronger Cuba, coupled with Havana's destabilizing
activities, will help cause US policymakers to focus
increased attention on the Caribbean Basin and divert
resources away from primary areas of interest, partic-
ularly the Eurasian continent.
Although Soviet-backed military aid to Cuba has
given Castro some offensive capability in recent years,
it is still primarily a defensive force. The expansion
and modernization programs, when added to Cuba's
efforts at civil defense, are geared to making an
attack on Cuba as costly as possible to the United
States. The Soviets clearly are concentrating on pro-
viding a deterrent capability to the Cubans, probably
hoping in this way to avoid a direct confrontation with
the United States. The defensive nature of Soviet
weapons and training also underscores public state-
ments from Moscow and Havana indicating that
Cuba will stand alone in any conflict with the United
States.
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Although economically integrated into the Soviet
Bloc, Cuba is not a member of the Warsaw Pact, and
the Soviet Union has refused to extend to Castro a
written defense treaty. Nor has Moscow been willing
to deliver to Cuba offensive weapons that would
clearly give Castro the ability to provoke Washington.
The Soviets, for example, have not sent advanced
equipment such as MIG-25 fighters and SA-5
ground-to-air missile systems that could challenge
SR-71 overflights-which other, less important, Sovi-
et Third World clients have received.
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Appendix B
Cycles of Strains
Castro's struggle against Fulgencio Batista is virtually ignored by Soviet media
and academics. Pro-Moscow Cuban Communist Party (Popular Socialist Party)
does not support guerrilla war until 1958, after Batista's military offensive against
Castro fails.
Soviet attention to Cuba grows as Havana's relations with Washington become
increasingly adversarial, encouraging Castro to seek outside economic and military
support.
Moscow and Havana open diplomatic relations, and Anastas I. Mikoyan, First
Vice Chairman of the USSR, pays historic visit to Cuba to sign trade protocol,
pledging Soviets to purchase 425,000 metric tons of sugar from Cuba's 1960
harvest and 1 million tons of sugar in each of subsequent four years.
1962 Castro discovers and purges a small pro-Soviet faction led by Anibal Escalante in
March 1962 for attempting to capture his revolutionary organization.
During October 1962 missile crisis, Soviets infuriate Castro by removing missiles
without consulting him-a major source of discord in the relationship.
Castro refuses to choose sides in Sino-Soviet rift, insists on armed struggle as
major path to change-while Soviets are stressing peaceful change-and publicly
criticizes Soviets for insufficient aid to Vietnam.
Soviets recognize Cuba as full-fledged member of "socialist camp" when Castro
makes first trip to the USSR during the period April-June 1963. Castro is
awarded the Order of Lenin and receives the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union."
1964 ? In January, Castro makes his second trip to the Soviet Union in eight months.
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Figure 12. Soviet Politburo member Anastas
Mikoyan with Castro on Cuban tobacco planta-
tion. Mikoyan headed a large trade delegation,
and his visit resulted in a $100 million credit to
Cuba and increased Soviet purchases of sugar,
beginning Cuba's long-term economic relation-
Figure 13. Soviet warships in Havana harbor in
1969 duringfirst visit of a Soviet naval task force
Cuba and USSR reach compromise on correctness of armed struggle versus
peaceful change at December 1964 Conference of Latin American Communist
Parties. Castro recognizes legitimacy of pro-Soviet Communist Party support for
peaceful road; Soviets, in turn, acknowledge Communist support for armed
struggle in several Latin American countries.
Havana and Moscow Split on Armed Struggle Thesis: 1966-68
At Tricontinental Conference of January 1966, Castro insists on priority of armed
struggle; chastises pro-Soviet Communist parties for lack of revolutionary commit-
ment, and asserts independence within the Soviet embrace.
Cuba presses Soviets on their duty to aid liberation movements and advocates
overthrow of governments with whom Moscow is conducting peaceful state-to-
state relations.
Castro castigates Soviets and their allies for their relations with the "oligarchies"
of South America.
Cuba broadcasts series of interviews with Latin American guerrilla leaders from
Central and South America, stressing the role of armed struggle in national
liberation.
Regis Debray, the French revolutionary Cuban sympathizer, publishes a major
book, Revolution Within the Revolution, laying out in detail the Cuban thesis on
armed struggle. Debray's book challenges Soviet theory of peaceful change,
downgrades the need for guerrillas to know Marxism-Leninism, and promotes a
global policy advocating the Cuban armed struggle policy.
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The Cuban-sponsored Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) convenes
in August 1967 in Havana, its participants being leftwing extremists from
throughout the hemisphere. Final declaration makes clear Havana's continued
pressure on and independence from Soviets on the question of armed struggle.
Castro snubs Soviet Union by failing to attend the 50th anniversary celebration of
the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
USSR reacting to Cuba's maverick behavior by failing to match Cuba's sharply
rising consumption of fuel with new oil deliveries, which causes gas rationing in
Cuba. Construction of Cuba's first SA-3 antiaircraft site is halted and converted
into an SA-2 site after Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin visits Havana in June.
Soviet-Cuban relations hit bottom.
1968 Castro conducts second purge of pro-Soviet faction from Communist Party, clearly
asserting Cuba's nonsatellite status with the USSR.
In August, Castro publicly supports Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, signaling
his readiness to improve relations with Moscow.
Havana and Moscow Pursue Converging Interests: 1969-75
Cuba lessens criticism of pro-Soviet Latin American Communist parties.
Soviets make first naval visit to Cuba.
1969-70 Soviets sign trade protocols with Cuba, providing long-term credits to cover Cuba's
rising trade deficits with USSR.
Although attaining the largest sugar crop in history, Cuba falls far short of its
10-million-ton goal, an effort that caused serious dislocation to all other areas of
the economy.
Sharp rise in scope and variety of Soviet aid to Cuba; Cuban-Soviet economic
collaboration now coordinated through the newly created Intergovernmental
Soviet-Cuban Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological
Cooperation.
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Figure 14. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev with
Castro in Havana in 1974. Brezhnev is presented
with Cuba's highest honor, the Order of Jose
Marti. It was the first visit of a Soviet leader to
kkkl-
Figure 15. President Castro surrounded by
newsmen after his address to the 27th Soviet
Communist Party Congress in February 1986 in
Moscow. Castro emphasized the strong bonds
between Cuba and the Soviet Union, but also
reminded Moscow not to neglect its Third World
Castro makes two lengthy trips to the USSR, signing important agreements for
cooperation.
Cuba admitted to CEMA in July as a full member.
Brezhnev visits Cuba; final declaration cites two countries' growing friendship.
First Congress of Cuban Communist Party meets in December 1975. By
December 1976, a National Assembly of People's Power, Council of State, and
Council of Ministers mirrors Soviet political system.
Cuban-Soviet Cooperative Intervention in the Third World: 1975-79
Havana and Moscow help consolidate rule of Angola's MPLA (Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola) during civil war period following collapse of
Portuguese empire in Africa.
Soviet and Cuban military personnel-including some 17,000 Cuban troops-
defend strongman Mengistu's Ethiopian military regime against Somalia's inva-
sion of the Ogaden.
Cuba and USSR become involved in Grenada after successful coup by the New
Jewel Movement ousts Prime Minister Eric Gairy.
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Cuba provides arms, finances, and advisers to help Sandinistas overthrow Nicara-
guan dictator, Anastasio Somoza. Soviets follow with military support once
Sandinistas assume control in July 1979.
Castro becomes chairman of Nonaligned Movement at summit meetings held in
Havana.
Strong Cuban-Soviet Relationship Faces Rising Costs and Strains: 1980-86
Raul Castro in Moscow meeting with Soviet cosmonaut Yuriy Romanenko and
Cuban cosmonaut Col. Arnaldo Tamayo at time of the joint Soviet-Cuban Soyuz
38 spaceflight.
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 causes embarrassment for Castro and
damages his tenure as chairman of the Nonaligned Movement when Havana
eventually publicly backs Soviet invasion.
Cuba loses bid for UN Security Council seat, owing in part to its close association
with the USSR on the issue of Afghanistan.
Third World's increasing complaints about Soviet inattention to North-South
development issues causes embarrassment for Castro.
1981 Soviet military aid to Cuba increases from $347 million in 1980 to $795 million in
1981.
US intervention in Grenada causes strains in Soviet-Cuban relations; differences
in perceptions of causes of US intervention; Castro closely associated with Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop and Soviets with Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard.
1984 Soviets do not send delegates to attend the 25th anniversary of the Cuban
Revolution, held 1 January.
Castro is only Soviet Bloc head of state who fails to attend CEMA summit
meeting held in June in Moscow; Cubans chafing for being relegated to supplier of
natural resources to CEMA members, rather than pursuing more rapid
industrialization.
Moscow sends only a low-level delegation to attend Cuba's 26th of July
celebrations.
Cubans admonished by visiting Soviet economic delegation to improve on their
efficiency and to cease purchasing Western agricultural equipment.
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CEMA prime-ministerial meetings in Havana end with Castro and Tikhonov
signing long-term cooperation agreement, but Soviets make clear that aid to Cuba
will not rise beyond current levels during next five-year period.
Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca completes "friendly" visit to USSR in
February; no final communique issued, and Malmierca admits in press interview
that differences exist.
Castro snubs Russians by not attending funeral of Chernenko and passes
opportunity to meet directly with new Soviet leader Gorbachev.
Soviet Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev travels to Cuba in May for
ceremonies commemorating the 25th anniversary of the renewal of diplomatic
relations between Cuba and the USSR and makes effort to smooth over
differences with Havana.
Fidel and Raul Castro, and nearly all of the Cuban Politburo members, attend in-
auguration of huge new Soviet embassy complex in Havana.
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze makes two-day trip to Havana in late
October, probably to assure Castro that Cuban interests would not be sacrificed at
upcoming US-USSR bilateral talks on Central America. Shevardnadze is effusive
in his praise of Cuba, although press reports on their substantive talks hint at con-
tinuing differences regarding Third World policy.
Moscow names Aleksandr Kapto as new Ambassador to Cuba. He replaces
Konstantin Katushev who, as head of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations, will continue to be influential regarding Soviet-Cuban
relations.
Yegor Ligachev, Soviet Politburo member and second-ranking Soviet leader,
attends Third Cuban Communist Party Congress in early February in Havana.
The first foreign delegate to address the meetings, Ligachev told the Cubans that
they could count on the USSR and that the Soviets would never let Cuba down.
Castro attends the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress in Moscow in
February, meets with Soviet leader Gorbachev, and is first foreign head of state to
address the congress. Despite the red-carpet treatment accorded Castro, he
implicitly called on Gorbachev not to abandon Moscow's Third World allies in his
pursuit of strategic weapons agreements with the United States.
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