(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000302320001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 10, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Ag~rxy
washir~on. v. c.105os
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
out--he still will have accrued substantial gains by
driving deep wedges into the fictionalized opposition
10 December 1985
The Philippines: President Marcos's Snap Election Strategy
Summary
President Marcos's announcement last month of a
snap preside,n,tial election--two years before he is
constitutionally required to face the voters--is a
classic example of both his unpredictability and his
political genius. By unilaterally changing the
rules of the game, he has almost overnight succeeded
in refocussing domestic politics and directing
domestic and international attention away from the
country's depressed economy and rapidly growing
Communist insurgency. His manipulation of the issue
in recent weeks, moreover, has displayed more than a
hint of the old, politically astute Marcos. Even if
he cancels the vote--a move we cannot completely rule
and mollifying some of his foreign critics.
intensify opposition to his rule.
If Marcos goes ahead with the election--as we
believe he will--and has to choose between holding a
fair election and winning, there is no doubt in our
view that he will choose the latter. What Marcos will
have to reconcile in the weeks ahead is pressure for
clean elections from his domestic and foreign critics
and pleas that he protect the interests of his close
associates. How he goes about this will determine
whether the snap election is a brilliant stroke--
designed to put a lid on US pressure for political,
economic, and military reform--or a gross
miscalculation that, by requiring heavy-handed
manipulation of election rules and results, could
This memorandum was prepared byl (Islands
Branch, Southeast Asia Division, Office of ast Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 9 December 1985 was used in its
preparation. Comments are welcome and ma be directed to Chief,
Southeast Asia Division 25X1
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What Tipped the Balance This Time?
The key element in Marcos's decision to call a snap
election, an idea he had floated and dropped earlier, almost
certainly was his changed calculation of the benefits of a poll
and increasing confidence regarding the outcome (see box).
Marcos probably calculated that an election victory would divide
and confuse US policymakers, help regain some support in the US
Congress, and give him at least a temporary reprieve from US
pressures to make broad reforms. Furthermore, he probably
believes that he has no chance of gaining Washington's
"endorsement" for his continued tenure; he may have concluded
that the prospect of a snap election would hopelessly divide his
domestic political opponents, illustrating to Washington that
there is no credible alternative to his leadership.
At the same time, Marcos's confidence that he can win
without blatant election irregularities has been bolstered
recently by a variety of public and private polls indicating that
he could defeat the opposition. Marcos also appears to be
enjoying a period of relatively good health, and he probably
believes he is physically able to campaign now, while there is no
guarantee that he will be healthy enough to campaign for
reelection in 1987 Furthermore, although his party
currently controls we over 0 percent of the local elected
offices nationwide, internal party assessments indicate that it
will lose a substantial part of that majority to the opposition
after elections for mayors and governors next May. Marcos may
have calculated that electoral gains by the opposition in local
elections, combined with advances in rural areas by the
Communists over the next two years, would make him far more
vulnerable to defeat in 1987.
Marcos, meanwhile, has moved farther down the road toward
tightening his control over the country's election machinery
since his last flirtation with a snap election. For example,
last August he packed the election commission with loyalists, a
contingency that will facilitate manipulation of the vote
tally. In addition, Marcos removed operational control of the
local police from the military and returned it to mayors--a move
that he says is designed to aid the country's counterinsurgency
effort and provide voting booth security during the election, but
which is_interpreted_by many political observers as an attempt to
Finally, the current election code--railroaded through the
Assembly by the ruling party this fall--contains provisions to
undermine the monitoring abilities of poll watching groups and
allow intimidation of voters by local government officials, who
will be permitted to act as official poll monitors in their
hometowns. In addition, the National Citizen's Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL)--the private poll monitoring group generally
credited with safeguarding many of the opposition's victories in
last year's National Assembly election--is currently poorly
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The Snap Election: Not a Snap Decision
The idea of a snap election was not a new one. Marcos first
began considering an early election when rumors that he was
critically ill set off an intense round of succession jockeying
within his ruling party following kidney transplant surgery in
November 1984 Marcos's principal political adviser, Jose Rono,
tried to persuade him to synchronize and advance local and
presidential elections--scheduled in mid-1986 and mid-1987
respectively--in the hopes of tightening party discipline and
quieting maneuvering over the critical succession issue. Upon
regaining his health in January, however, Marcos announced that
the election schedule would remain unchanged.
Marcos appeared to reverse course in mid-1985 when he
threatened to schedule a snap presidential election for November
in response to opposition impeachment efforts. According to US
Embassy reporting, Marcos was persuaded to reconsider his
decision during a tense five-hour party caucus, in which key
advisers pointed out that the absence of a constitutional
mechanism allowing an early vote would require Marcos to resign
from office at least 70 days before running for reelection,
because the constitution only allows for a special election if
the President dies. is incaoacitated_ is impeached, or resigns.
Marcos subsequently
as a ega exper s on is sta to devise a way to allow him to
campaign for an early election while sti 11 holding office.
Although confusion surrounding election details continues to cast
doubt on whether he intends to go through with the proposed
balloting, National Assembly passage of the special election bill
on 2 December, Marcos's hard-hitting campaign appearances in
recent weeks, and ongoing opposition maneuvering to select a
presidential candidate now ensures that some form of early
review--at a minimum a national referendum on his leadership--is
inevitable.
positioned to monitor the election in rural areas. NAMFREL's
chairman is organizing to monitor all 90,000 of the country's
polling booths, but esti he will only be able to cover
60 percent by February. 25X1
Gains Achieved, Risks To Be Weighed
Marcos's proposal of an early election has already gained
him a great deal of political capital. The intense bickering in
opposition camps over who will be its single candidate turned
into decisions by Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel in late
November to run separate campaigns against Marcos. Before the
split, most opposition leaders--and many ruling party leaders--
believed that a point Aquino-Laurel ticket would be the
opposition's best hope to defeat Marcos. Whether or not Aquino
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and Laurel still end up on the same ticket, Marcos probably
believes he has permanently weakened the opposition by smoking
out Cory Aquino's candidacy and preference to run without
Laurel. In any case, the opposition's political and financial
resources--meager when compared to Marcos's political and
financial 3uggernaut--will be further tretched if internal
rivalries are not resolved.
Marcos probably also believes that his political maneuvering
over the past month has restored some of Washington's respect for
his leadership--at least enough to win him a tactical advantage
over what he charges is a clique of enemies in Washington's
bureaucracy working to undermine his standing with more senior US
officials. Probably the most important factor in Marcos's
decision to raise the prospect of an early election was the fear
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that the recent series of high-level US visitors signalled an
emerging consensus among US policymakers that Marcos is no longer
capable of managing the country's critical problems, including
the Communist insurgency and the deteriorating economy. If he
believes he has shaken this perception among VS policymakers, he
almost certainly will feel no need for further cnnr_Peeinnc nn ..~...
Marcos, however, almost certainly is still weighing some
reservations about subjecting himself to an early review. In our
judgment, these concerns are well-founded, given the ruling
party's large losses in Manila in the National Assembly election
last year and Marcos's unpopularity in the cities.* Conflicting 25X1
reporting makes it-impossible to au a Marcos's electoral
strength nationwide at resent.
There is also the possibility that Marcos may misjudge his
ability to manage election events--as he apparently did in the
period leading up to the National Assembly election.** Marcos,
in short, cannot be certain that Aquino's "fresh wind" campaign--
promising an alternative to old-style politics as represented by
Marcos and most of the traditional opposition--will not gain
momentum in the weeks ahead, forcing rival opposition leaders to
abandon their bids and fall in behind her. Marcos also cannot
rule out a strong "moral" vote for Cory Aquino along with votes
based on "anti-Marcos" sentiments that could force him to use
extraordinary measures--ev n b Philippine standards--to ensure a
favorable outcome.
Another issue that could cost Marcos ruling party discipline
is the pivotal question of the vice presidency. The US Embassy
says that Marcos is torn between selecting a credible vice
president--to satisfy domestic and foreign critics who see a vice
president as a way to resolve the critical succession issue--and
*The ruling party took only 5 seats of 21 in Manila, where
Imelda Marcos is the regional party chairman.
**Marcos predicted last year that the opposition would take
fewer than 20 of the 183 contested National Assembly seats--
instead they won 61. Marcos underestimated NAMFREL's ability to
prevent vote tampering immediately after the election and
overestimated the ruling party's ability to turn out the vote in
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his own political instinct to choose a political nonentity to
avoid designating a clear successor, who could become a political
rival or spearhead a plot to assassinate him.* If Marcos moves
to satisfy his critics by choosing a credible running mate, he
almost certainly knows that he runs the risk of alienating key
stalwarts--including his wife--who have been hoping, for years
that he would give one of them the nod to succeed.
Marcos's Options as Balloting Approaches
Marcos retains control of the country's political, military,
and financial institutions--a circumstance that will allow him to
manipulate key variables and continue pulling political levers in
the weeks ahead. During the snap election threat in mid-1985, 25X1
the Embassy reported that the ruling party was poised to vote in
favor of an ly ballot even though
a majority of ruling party members personally were
against the idea. Although Marcos decided to scrap the idea, the 25X1
party's willingness to quickly push through the measure--which
would have required using questionable parliamentary and
constitutional rocedures--underscores Marcos's tight grip on the
ruling party. 25X1
Marcos's control over the $1 .7 billion national budget is
another key election asset. According to US Embassy reporting,
Marcos discussed tapping the budget to provide each KBL
assemblyman--there are currently 110--with about $450,000 for
public works projects in his district. NAMFREL's chairman, Jose
Concepcion believes that Marcos might easily spend as much as
$300 million to buy votes and finance projects to win political
support. Marcos will also be able to supplement government
expenditures for his reelection bid with large contributions from
his wealthy political allies, including agricultural magnates
Eduardo Cojuangco and Roberto Benedicto. In addition, through
close presidential associates and government agencies, Marcos
controls nearly all television and radio media and a majority of
the country's newspapers and periodicals. 25X1
Marcos has other levers he can pull to ensure the election
outcome. In the past, he has used the Supreme Court--which he
has packed with loyalists--to legally .justify controversial moves
such as retaining his authoritarian powers after the election of
a National Assembly last year. He has also used the election
commission--six of its seven members are close associates--to
*Marcos's concern about an attempt on his life has not been
confined to the issue of the Vice President. According to the
Embassy, Marcos wore a bulletproof vest at a recent campaign
appearance in the opposition stronghold of Cebu and has been very
concerned that one of his political opponents might make an
attempt on his life during the campaign.
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Election Timetable
DATE EVENT
3 December 1985 Marcos signs election bi11...Corazon
Aquino announces her candidacy.
11 December 1985 Ruling Party Nominating Convention...
deadline for filing presidential and vice
presidential bids...campaign begins.
21 December 1985 Marcos's announced date for naming his
running mate...political parties must
declare which candidates they
support...first voter registration day.
28 December 1985 Final voter registration day.
5 February 1986 Official campaign period ends.
7 February 1986 Presidential and Vice-Presidential
elections.
9 March 1986 Date by which constitution requires
proclaimation of a winner.
manipulate vote tallies* In addition, Marcos controls the
military--through a tight loyalty network amassed over his 20
years in power--and has in past elections used the armed forces
*There are currently two vacancies on the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and Marcos has promised to fill at least one
with an opposition re r sentative, but so far has made no
appointments.
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to intimidate voters and cast fraudulent votes.* His recent
decision to reinstate General Ver as Armed Forces Chief of Staff--
ostensibly to oversee a ravamp of the military--will ensure that
loyalists remain in command to deliver the military's
contribution to Marcos's victory. 25X1
Marcos may also move--as he has in the past--to weaken the
opposition's chances by setting up straw parties to run against
the ruling party. For example, the Embassy reports that Marcos
funded and supported the Roy wing of the Nacionalista Party
during the presidential election in 1981 and the National
Assembly election last year to divide votes amon several
opposition candidates.
Althou h Marcos 25X1
g probably believes a mixture of such tactics
will ensure an election victory, several loopholes would allow
him to call off the election if he fears he might lose. For
example, he could orchestrate an appeal to the Supreme Court to
produce a ruling that the early election is unconstitutional.
Alternatively, he could dissolve the National Assembly--which has
the final authority to tally votes and declare the presidential
winner--decree a postponement of the election, or revoke his
postdated resignation--which would void the vacancy and the need
for the election. His last resort probably would be invoking his
emergency powers to stop an electi n, a move he knows would cost
him political capital. 25X1
Other Factors in Marcos's Decisionmaking
Predicting what Marcos will do and when he will do it is
always a hazardous venture. What we can say for certain is that
US pressure on Marcos to hold a fair election, combined with
domestic pressure that he make concessions on election
safeguards, soon will collide with his own instinct for political
survival and urgings from his ruling party, inner circle, and
family. Marcos's maneuvering room is likely to be constrained as
he struggles to resolve key issues such as how dirty the election
can be, how far to go in accrediting NAMFREL, whether to fill the
two remaining vacancies on the election commission, what role to
assign to the Supreme Court, whether and when to retire Ver, and
finally, what role the military should play. Acknowledging the
certainty that Marcos will act to protect his grip on power, the
actions of the following groups will influence Marcos's
decisionmaking as the election approaches.
*The military is frequently used to cast "flying votes"--a
practice where the same group of voters visits different polling
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Critics in the US. Marcos's response to US calls for a free
and fair election. will almost certainly depend on how cohesive he
believes his US critics are. If he detects confusion or
disagreement in the US Government, we believe his concessions on
election safeguards will be minimal. A relatively unyielding--
and united--US stand on election issues is more likely to elicit
broader concessions from Marcos. At the same time, Marcos is
likely to attempt further maneuvers--such as retiring General Ver
or his recent suggestion that the Military Bases Agreement be
extended past its scheduled expiration date in 1991--to divide
his US critics and fend off pressure for fair elections.
His Domestic Political Opponents. Marcos is almost
certainly more coR#ident of his ability to cope with the moderate
opposition. If the opposition runs more than one candidate,
Marcos probably will make just enough concessions to ensure that
a majority of his opponents participate. We believe, however,
that he would not give in on key opposition demands, such as
accrediting NAMFREL as the sole citizen's watchdog group. A
unified Aquino-Laurel ticket, on the other hand, would pose
considerable problems for Marcos and might prompt him to resort
to large-scale fraud to avoid defeat. Marcos, in that case,
could_even_decide to use one of the existing election loopholes
The Inner Circle. Marcos's election decisions are also
likely to be substantially influenced by his wife, family, and
close personal advisers such as Eduardo Cojuangco, Jose Rono, and
General Ver. According to US Embassy reporting, Marcos's close
associates counseled him against calling an early election
because they believed the risk of defeat was too great. This
group is likely to pressure Marcos to use all the levers in his
possession--including the military--to pull off the election
successfully. Marcos also recognizes that this group does not
want him to name a legitimate successor as vice president, unless
it is one of them. Marcos then will have to decide whether to
choose a credible alternative--as is hoped for by the US and the
opposition--or satisfy his loyalists, who fear that their post-
Marcos prospects will be jeopardized if he names a successor.
The Parliament of the Streets. Marcos almost certainly
believes that he needs high voter turnout to convince his critics
in the US that he has renewed his popular mandate. He also
probably believes that a relatively calm balloting day is
necessary to give the appearance to foreign and domestic critics
that police and security forces were not used to coerce or
intimidate voters. To that extent, Marcos is likely to be
susceptible to some public pressure that he guarantee a minimal
police presence at voting booths and that voters are not
pprevented in any way from voting according to their beliefs.
Marcos's political concessions to this group, however, are likely
to be minimal and mainly for public relations purposes. For
example, he will probably make a strong public admonition that
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Z~X11
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security forces exercise maximum tolerance toward political
activists who decide to demonstrate near voting places on
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election day.
The Cosn~unists and the New People's Army. Marcos almost
certainly does not view the CPP as a direct threat to his early
election plan. Similarly, Marcos probably would not directly
alter his election plans on the basis of pressure from the New
People's Army. Increased military activity by the NPA during the
election, however, would force the military to respond--a
development that almost certainly would cost Marcos th
appearance of a clean and peaceful election. 25X1
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Typescript: President Marcos's Snap Election Strategy
EA M 85-10217
Original--OEA/SEA/IB
1--OEA/SEA/ITM
1--D/OEA (4F18)
1--Ch/OEA/BEAD
1--DC/OEA/BEAD
1--PDB Staff (7F30)
1--Senior Review Panel
(5G00)
1--C/NIC (7E44)
1--NIO/EA (7E62)
5--CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1--C/PES/ODI (7F24)
1--DDI (7E47)
1--C/DDO/IAD (3D00)
1--C/DDO/EA (5D00)
1--CPAS/ILS (7G50)
1--OEA/NEA (4G43)
1--OEA/CH (4G20)
1-
NIC/Anal
tical Group (7E47)
,/1-- E Research Director (4G48) ~~
1-- ANIO/Economic (7E48)
1--OCR/ISG (1H19)
1--OCR/EA/A (1H18)
1--C/DDO/EAR (5D10)
Outside:
1--The Honorable
1--John Monjo
1--John Maisto
1--John Finney
1--Robert Dean
Paul Wolfowitz
State/INR:
1--John Taylor
1--Allen Kitchens
1--Dick Hermann
1--Marjorie Niehaus
1--Corazon Foley
1--Morton Abramowitz
1--William J. Newcomb
1--William D. Howells
1--Robert Dubose
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Treasury:
1--Douglas P. Mulholland
1--Bill McFadden
1--Bill Quinn
Office of the Vice President:
1--Donald Gregg
Commerce:
1--Robert Severance
1--Byron Jackson
1--William Brown
Federal Reserve Board:
1--Robert Emery
Army:
Navy:
1--Gaston Sigur
1--Richard Childress
1--David Laux
1--Alan Thomas
1--James Kelly
1--The Honorable Richard Armitage
1--Colonel James Martin, USA
1--Lt. Colonel James Smith,' USAF
1--Don Eirich
1--Brigadier General Philip Drew, USAF
1--Brigadier General Larry Dillingham, USAF
1--Lt. Colonel Robert Cooey, USAF
1--James Cossey
1--Lt. General Sidney T. Weinstein
Marine Corp:
1--Brigadier General Frank J. Breth
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1--Tim Wright
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