(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000302070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 6, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 September 1985
Thinking the Unthinkable in the Phil oDine_s.
Is Sudden Collapse Possible?
Summary
Our projections of the Philippines' political
future assume some basic continuities, including a
gradual decline in President Marcos's power base and
continued improvement in the capabilities and appeal
of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
military arm,, the New-People's Army. Many observers
agree that unless reversed, present trends could lead
to the establishment of a radical government in
Manila--either directly or indirectly controlled by
the Communists--by 1990.
As disturbing as this projection may be, we
believe it would be a mistake to discount the
possibility of a more abrupt catastrophic turn of
events in Manila. In the Philippine context, the
Aquino assassination serves as eloquent testimony
that unanticipated events can radically alter the
political environment.
Marcos's ability to survive past political
crises--including fallout from the Aquino
assassination--may not accurately reflect his
regime's resiliency to future political shocks. The
brittle political system he has constructed is
This typescript memorandum was prepared by
the Islands Branch, Southeast Asia Division,
be directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division
Office of East Asian Analysis. Information available as of 30
August was used in its preparation. Comments are welcome and may
EA M-85-10160
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increasingly unable to adapt to changing conditions
and Marcos continues to lose support among his key
backers--including the military, business community,
bureaucracy. and even some members of his ruling
We cannot expect to know in advance which
specific shocks will be successfully managed by
Marcos or cause his rapid downfall. We believe,
however, that careful monitoring of political events
can provide indicators that Marcos's administration
is ripe for collapse. Accordingly, this paper is an
attempt to outline why and under what conditions a
sudden destabilization of the Marcos government might
occur and what signs to k for in order to avoid a
complete surprise. 10 ~
Departing From the Straightline Projection
Marcos's ability to survive a remarkable series of economic
and political crises over the past several years is not
necessarily an accurate yardstick for the continued durability of
his regime. We have to consider that Marcos has created a
brittle political system unsuited to adaptation, and thus
vulnerable to a sudden and unpredictable collapse, because of his
complete control over political institutions, reliance on
economic favors and corruption to reward loyal supporters, 25X1
resistance to reform, and the virtual exclusion of the moderate
opposition from the government's decision-making process.
Marcos has dismantled many of the checks and balances that
stabilized Philippine political and economic institutions,
setting in motion some of the events that in the past threatened
his administration. For example, Marcos--although possibly not
directly responsible--may have precipitated the Aquino
assassination by creating a political atmosphere of uncertainty
and intrigue fed by blind personal loyalty to the President, a
confused succession process, and Marcos's tacit approval of
political violence. Similarly, the economy has been severely
weakened by government loan guarantees and executive priveleges
granted Marcos's close associates, by widespread corruption
within his administration, and economic policies that favor urban
consumers over farmers ntributing to the growth of the
Communist insurgency. hUS c 25X1
We believe that the rapid erosion of Marcos's base of
support greatly increases the possibility that any new
flashpoint--however induced--could provoke a sudden and sharp
deterioration in his ability or willingness to govern. Marcos is
increasingly the object of attack in the domestic press, and his
popular support has fallen dramatically over the last several
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arcos has also lost considerable support among key constituent
groups--the military, business community, church, and his own
ruling party--and his government is the target of a revitalized
opposition and burgeoning Communist insurgency (see Appendix).
Possible Flashpoints.
As analysts, our dilemma is that we probably will not know
in advance whether a specific shock to this weakened system will
be successfully managed by Marcos or cause rapid
destabilization. Further, we cannot identify all the events that
could set off sudden destabilization. We would be surprised,
however, if the next year or two contained none of the
"surprises" common to the political scene since 1981--when
martial law was lifted and a major financial scandal erupted and
triggered the collapse of the corporate empires of several of
There are many possible flashpoints--some more likely than
others--that could mark the beginning of the end for the Marcos
government. We have divided them into two groups. The first
includes those important political actions that Marcos might
undertake without accurately assessing their full effects, a
prospect that is more likely as his physical and emotional health
declines. Under these conditions Marcos's pattern has been to
act self-seliant, rely on advisors less, and be so preoccupied
with retaining power that he loses sight of long range issues.
Flashpoints Marcos might trigger include:
Marcos's key political supporters.
? The reimposition of martial law or similar repressive moves
directed against the political opposition, press, or even
factions in the military.
? Mishandling of the Ver trial, including acquittal of all
military defendents or the permanent reinstatement of Ver as
Armed Forces Chief of Staff.
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? The assassination, incarceration, or exile of a leading
opposition figure--such as Cory Aquino, or another prominent
Marcos critic.
? Heavy-handed manipulation of the pre-election process--
indicating that reasonably fair elections are out of the
question--or flagrant fraud during elections.
? Indications that Imelda Marcos is his chosen successor.
? A devastating economic policy blunder that precipitates the
collapse of the financial rescue package provided by the IMF
and other international creditors or that inflicts intense
hardships on the beleaguered sugar or coconut industries.
In our judgment these flashpoints--either singly or in
combination--could begin the process of collapse. Subsequent
developments could include a series of progressively larger and
more violent street demonstrations or national strikes that
authorites are increasingly unable to control. Alternatively,
Marcos's actions could prompt a crisis in US relations that is
interpreted domestically as withdrawal of Washington's
support for his government.
The second grouping is made up of those events outside
Marcos's direct control and which he would be unable to manage.
They include:
Natural disasters, such as typhoons similar to those of last
year, that overwhelm the government's ability to respond and
result in severe hardship, such as widespread starvation or
economic dislocation.
? A serious industrial accident--such as a nuclear or chemical
spill--which is widely blamed on government incompetence or
the greed of Marcos's political allies.
? A series of dramatic NPA successes that give the insurgents
control over large portions of the country or lead to runaway
urban violence--particularly in Manila.
? A serious world-wide recession or new debt crisis
precipitated by Latin American countries that paralyzes
Philippine efforts at economic recovery by depressing export
prices and rising international interest rates.
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Indicators Pointing to A Sudden Fall
Despite the unpredictability of the specific events that
could set off a sudden collapse, we believe careful monitoring of
the political situation would reveal signals that the Philippines
is poised for a sudden fall. In particular, we will be looking
for:
Signs of more serious dissension within the military.
Dissension could surface over issues of leadership, or reform,
and possibly produce the justification in the minds of some
officers for a coup. In an extreme example, regional commanders
might defy specific operational commands from Manila. There
might also be evidence of active military officers pledging
support to individual political opposition leaders or parties.
Moreover, the military would probably be further divided if 25X1
Marcos authorized groups of loyalists to assume complement
ar or
overlapping military and police duties
Intensified Jockeying in the Presidential Palace and
dissension within the ruling party. Early stages might include
Marcos's failure to garner full party support on key legislative
issues or regular cooperation between some KBL politicians and
opposition members in the National Assembly. More decisive
developments could include one or more leading ruling party
players--such as Tolentino, Ople, and Enrile--challenging Marcos
for the KBL nomination, the party being plagued by numerous
resignations, or disaffected KBL politicians regrouping into new
political parties or alliances.
Sudden expansion of Communist control--however defined--in
the countryside. This could come about as the result of a broad
offensive of the sort the NPA has thus far eschewed. In such a
case, the NPA's military successes could force the Army to
abandon large areas--permitting the NPA to encircle Philippine
cities--and could even include the fall of several large
provincial cities. Marcos-associate Eduardo Cojuangco recently
told US Embassy officials that he could foresee the day when all
of Mindanao, parts of Negros, and some provinces in Northern and
Central Luzon might fall into the hands of the NPA. In addition
to these successes on the battlefield, there would likely be
evidence of large-scale infiltration of the military and local
government along with an upsurge in defections from the armed
forces.
CPP/NPA urban warfare in Manila. Terrorist attacks on
government facilities and assassinations of police, military
officers, government employees, and suspected government
informers, could have a dramatic effect. Terrorist acts against
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US military and diplomatic facilitigs would begin, along with
killi
kid
i
S
ng or
napp
ng U
personnel.
Major strides by the CPP's National Democratic Front (NDF)
in coopting leading moderate politicians. Especially important
would be large-scale NDF penetrations of student groups, trade
unions, church activists, and professional organizations. In
addition, NDF-controlled umbrella organizations, such as Bayan,
would have cemented ties with more moderate groups opposed to
Marcos. These tactics would permit the NDF to orchestrate large-
scale demonstrations and national strikes--highlighting the
government's diminished authority and the NDF's enhanced
political status. Under such chaotic circumstances, we believe
that the middle-class could come to view the NDF and its
"Democratic Coalition Government" as the only apparent viable
alternative to the Marcos administration.
Declining public confidence in the government's ability to
control the insurgents or radical left. One clear sign of this
would be greater numbers of Filipinos leaving for the United
States. If a CPP-dominated government appeared imminent,
moreover, we believe some military officers chiefly associated
with Marcos would join the exodus. Furthermore, as departing
Filipinos sold businesses and personal assets in exchange for
dollars, the black-market exchange rate would soar and the
foreign currency assets of banks and businesses would be quickly
In sum, we believe it would be a mistake to rule out the
possibility of a sudden collapse of effective leadership on the
part of Marcos himself or the loss of confidence by key
components of his power base. No matter how it is induced, such
a psychological failure could quickly result in Marcos's ouster
or--perhaps more likely--in his abrupt departure from the
country. This situation could be exploited by the Communists,
but it could also result in a power vacuum that none of the
prominent players--including the Communists--are presently well
positioned to fill. In such an event, the United States would be
confronted with a confused and rapidly changing political
environment and may need to make quick decisions about which
individuals or groups to support.
1For example, the 1985 program of the CPP/NDF calls for
"punishing" foreign military and civilian personnel directly
involved in training, logistical support, intelligence or field
operations that assists the Philippine government.
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Appendix
Marcos's Eroding Power Base
Our analysis of Marcos's deteriorating position includes the
following factors:
? The military reform movement, occasional rumors of coup
plotting, and recent reports of retired senior military
officers offering support to the moderate opposition
highlight Marcos's declining control over an institution that
has been the bulwark of his regime.
? As a result of both economic and political events, Marcos now
faces active criticism from powerful business leaders--
including Enrique Zobel, Emanual Soriano, and Jaime Ongpin--
and professionals who now openly support the moderate
opposition.
? Lack of confidence in the country's political future is
responsible for what we believe has been substantial capital
flight out of the country over the past several years and the
almost feverish visa arrangements some middle and upper class
Filipinos continue to make to expedite leaving the country on
short notice.
? The Catholic church is increasingly disenchanted with the
Marcos regime over government corruption and human rights
abuses. It is particularly aggravated by the harassment,
murder, and disappearance of clergy and lay workers.
Cardinal Jaime Sin has repeatedly embarassed Marcos by his
outspoken criticism of the ruling family. In addition, many
parish priests are openly admonishing the government from the
pulpit, and some radical priests are reportedly involved in
supporting the Communist insurgency.
? "Defections" from the KBL, diminished party discipline, and
increased jockeying in the "succession sweepstakes" are more
pronounced. Some key party members such as Prime Minister
Ceasar Virata have cautiously adopted more independent
positions while others, like valued technocrat Vincente
Paterno, have resigned from the ruling KBL. Most recently,
Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino and Labor Minister Blas Ople
have tested the limits of Marcos's tolerance, Tolentino
publicly calling for Marcos's resignation. 25X1
?
Eduardo Cojuang
co, Marcos'
s longtime crony
and coconut b
aron, may be hedging
his bets b
y cultivating
Marcos's poli
tical opponents.
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? The moderate
opposition captured
a surprisin
g one-third of
the National
Assembly during last
year's
ions, 0
Opposition
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assemblymen have maintained pressure on Marcos by lobbying
hard for reforms in the election code and instituting
embarassing impeachment proceedings.
? The relationship between Manila--the political center of the
country--and the hinterland exhibits advanced signs of decay
as Marcos faces a growing challenge for control of the
countryside from the Communist Party of the Philippines's/New
Peoples Army. The CPP/NPA has, over the past year, increased
its influence to the point of establishing "shadow
governments" in many rural areas--including parts of
Mindanao, Samar, Panay, and Central and Northern Luzon. It
is also openly challenging government authority in the
Philippines' second largest city, Davao. Furthermore, the
Communists' National Democratic Front (NDF) is working with
legal opposition groups to further foment anti-Marcos
sentiment--primarily through propag ndA ies,
demonstrations, and strike activity
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Typescript
Thinking the Unthinkable in the PhiliDoies:
Is Sudden Collapse Possible?
EAM-85 -10160
Original--OEA/SEA/IB
1--OEA/SEA/ITM
1--CH/OEA/SEAD
1--DC/OEA/SEAD
1--PDB (7F30)
1--C/NIC (7E62)
1--NIO/EA (7E62)
5--CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1--C/PES/DDI (7F24)
1--DDI (7E44)
1--DC I (7D60)
1--DDCI (7D6011)
1--C/DDO (3D00)
1--C/DDO (5D00)
1--D/OEAA (4F18)
1--Executive Director (7E12)
1--CPAS/ILS (7G215)
1--OEA/NEA (4G43)
1--OEA/rH 2)
1- NIC/Anal tical Group (7E47)
1- C/DO 3DO1)
OEA/Resparch R Director (4G48)
1- ANIO/Economic (7E48)
1-- enior Review Panel (5G00)
1--D/ALA (3F45)
1--D/EURA (6G42)
1--D/OGI (3G03)
1--D/NESA (6G02)
1--D/SOVA (4E58)
Outside:
State:
1--Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
NSC:
1--Gaston Sigur
1--Richard Armitage
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