THE TOKYO SUMMIT: HOW IT WILL AFFECT JAPANESE POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000301940001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 22, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washingon. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
role at the Summit.
Tokyo's early start in making preparations to
host next year's Economic Summit suggests Prime
Minister'Nakasone will push the government hard to
adopt policies that will ensure a smooth meeting. The
Prime Minister's visit to Paris this month was in part
to convince President Mitterrand to withdraw his
threat to boycott the Tokyo meeting. Nakasone's term
expires soon after the Summit. His desire to leave
his mark on. Japan's foreign policy, to choose his
successor, and to remain a force behind the scene all
give him incentives to press for Japanese initiatives
-that enhance his own political legacy as well as his
22 July 1985
The Tokyo Summit: How It Will Affect Japanese Policy
Summary
This memorandum was prepared byl I Office of East 25X1
Asian Analysis. Information available as o 22 July 1985 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Japan Branch, Northeast Asia
Division, OEA 25X1
Duplicate of
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Distribution List
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There are ample reasons for the Japanese to worry about the
outcome of the 1986 Tokyo Summit. The failure to reach
agreement on a date for a new trade round, contention about SDI,
and other difficult issues at the Bonn Economic Summit have put
Tokyo under considerable pressure to ensure the next meeting's
success. Furthermore, two new concerns surfaced in the wake of
Bonn: French President Mitterrand's threat not to attend and a
sense in the Foreign Ministry that Japan barely escaped major
criticism for its trade practices this year. The chance that a
less favorable world economic situation in 1985-86 could
exacerbate Japan's problem as the target of trade-related
complaints makes Tokyo all the more worried about its pivotal
role and vulnerability as host next year.
Nakasone's Equities
For the time being, Nakasone can approach Summit
preparations from a position of domestic political strength. He
has the highest popularity rating in-recent history and has
managed to keep his critics in the ruling party at bay. The
-Prime Minister's term expires in late 1986, and he clearly hopes.
to mark the end of his formal role in foreign affairs with a
smooth Summit. Throughout his tenure he has depended heavily on
the good reviews earned by his political performance as an equal
with other Western leaders to enhance his image at home.
Moreover, we do riot-believe Nakasone sees himself as a lame
duck. He wants a major role in choosing his successor during
the Liberal Democratic-Party (LDP) presidential election next
fall. If he can play a kingmaker's role, it would extend his
political power behind the scenes and perhaps offer him the
opportunity to run again for office of Prime Minister in the
future. _
There also is speculation, and some nervousness on the part
of his aspiring successors, about a move next year to change the
LDP internal rules to enable Nakasone to serve a third
consecutive term. Given the array of contenders in the party
already vying for the prime ministership, that would require
Nakasone to have considerable leverage--in terms of support from
the other faction leaders--that is-not now evident. But other
things-being equal, he could envision a highly regarded Summit
as a way to create the right atmosphere for a run at a third
Even if Nakasone does not harbor hopes of a third term, he
would still, in our view, be concerned about the risks of a
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failed meeting next year. Although a successful Summit would
probably not ensure fulfillment of his personal ambitions, a
meeting on Japan's turf that was regarded as a "failure" or one
that singled out Tokyo for highly publicized criticism over
trade practices could hurt him badly. As a consequence, he may
believe that he must strike policy bargains on issues that he
judges as possible pitfalls for Japan, and himself, at the
meeting. In sum, we think Nakasone has a larger than normal
stake in making an early effort, including possible concessions
on contentious policy issues, to prepare the way for the 1986
Summit.
What Will Matter Most?
We believe that several factors impinge on Japanese
perceptions of what they must do to ensure a successful Summit.
Most important, how Tokyo prepares for the Summit will depend
directly on the state of US-Japan relations in the months before
the meeting. If trade frictions abate in 1985, the Japanese
almost-certainly will believe they have greater maneuvering
room. That judgment could well bring Tokyo to turn more
--attention to the views of the West Europeans, to seek some
balance in its approach to issues dividing the United States and
the EC, and to put some political distance between Tokyo and
Washington on other topics where Japan historically has been
viewed.-as a mouthpiece for the United States.
As a case in point, Nakasone has already sympathized with
Mitterrand's-concern aver the inclusion of agriculture in a new
round of multilateral trade negotiations. Tokyo could continue
to side with Washington in calling for a new trade round, but
deemphasize agricultural products in its support for
-negotiations to score some points with the Europeans. In an
effort-to defuse protectionist sentiment in Western Europe,
Japan has already decided to purchase three French helicopters
for use by heads of state at the Summit and begun exploring
joint projects with the Europeans in areas such as communication
satellites.. The Japanese also could choose to stop short of
fully supporting SDI until the Europeans reach a consensus on
the issue.- Tokyo has acted similarly before because of its
perennial concern over being out in front of the NATO Allies on
troublesome issues. This approach could also perhaps help Tokyo
win some European backing for global limits on intermediate
nuclear forces, one of Japan's key policy objectives to inpede
the shift of Soviet SS-20s from west to east.
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In the event trade frictions with the United States remain
prominent or intensify, Japanese fear of retaliatory measures
could produce more forthcoming trade policy initiatives. The
threat of protectionism in the United States--as well as in
Europe--has proven to be a lever on Japan. Still, we believe it
is too soon for Nakasone to effectively use the possibility of
high-level complaints at the Summit to prompt the bureaucracy to
set out an ambitious program to liberalize trade practices over
the medium term. Rather, in our view, the Japanese will try in
the next several months to give enough on an ad hoc basis to be
"responsive" to selected demands by Summit participants. Tokyo
may offer further "gifts" next spring, when it calculates such
steps would have an immediate positive impact on the atmosphere, 25X1
and correspondingly diminish its risks at the Summit.
Japan's experience with the political byplay at previous
Summits also will probably reinforce the expectation that other
participants will work at making the meeting a success. In
particular, Tokyo will count on Washington--whatever the 25X1
bilateral problems at the time--to play a leadershi role in
dampening overt criticism of its Japanese ally.
25X1
Forecasts for the world economy will be another major
factor-shaping Tokyo's behavior. Some Japanese officials have
worried that an economic slowdown in the United States could
prompt Washington to press Tokyo to take up the slack--a tactic
used at the Summit in 1978, when Tokyo and West Germany were
singled out to serve that role. We doubt Tokyo currently
expects such an initiative, but Nakasone may be hypersensitive
on that score. He has never been noted for his skill in
economic management, and although he has strongly opposed
stimulating domestic demand, some of his political rivals have
been advocating such growth-oriented programs.
Outlook
Tokyo will look hard in the coming months for issues on
which it can offer support in return for US help. Past Japanese
performance suggests that Tokyo will try to deflect attention
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from contentious economic issues as the Summit approaches by
playing up its broader cooperation in other areas. As they have
done before, the Japanese may well announce plans to step up
economic assistance to areas deemed strategic by Washington,
such as Thailand, Pakistan, and the Caribbean Basin, or to
provide more visible support for Western efforts to combat
terrorism. Tokyo could point to its call on Iran and Syria to
use their influence to help secure release of the TWA hostages.
The Japanese could even give more prominent official support to
SDI, although we believe this unlikely unless at least one of
the West Europeans breaks ranks and provides its endorsement.
Since the first Summit meeting in Rambouillet in 1975,
which symbolized for the Japanese their debut as a major ally
and co-equal with Western Europe, Tokyo has considered its
participation in the Economic Summits critical to its
international prestige.. The Tokyo Summit is even more important
for Nakasone, given his political agenda for the coming year,
and for both reasons, we believe Washington will have added
leverage on Tokyo in the months ahead. As a result, Nakasone
and some bureaucrats may call for initiatives that would
-decrease Tokyo's vulnerabilities next spring, but we expect
elements of the bureaucracy with close ties to strong domestic
interest groups will not easily abandon resistance to trade
concessions that could damage their constituents.
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Distribution: The Tokyo Summit: How It Will Affect Japanese
Policy
Original - OEA/NAD/Japan
1 - C/OEA/NAD/Korea
1 - C/OEA/NAD/STI
1 - C/OEA/NAD
1 - C/OEA/China
1 - C/OEA/SEA
1 - OEA Production Office
1 - D/OEA
1 - DDI
1 - Executive Director
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/PES
1 - C/EA/RR
1 - NIO/EA
1 - C/DO/PPS
1 - NIC Analytic Group
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - C/EURA/EID
1 - CPAS/ILS
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1 - William Sherman, Department of State
1 - Thomas Hubbard, Department of State
1 - William Brooks, Department of State
1 - Byron Jackson, Department of Commerce
1 - James Murphy, Office of the USTR
1 - Glen Fukushima, Office of the USTR
1 - Doug Mulholland, Department of the Treasury
1 - National Security Agency
DDI/OEA/NAD Japan JG:me (22 July 1985)
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