JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS: WHAT COULD MOSCOW DO TO MAKE THEM BETTER?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000301910001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 17, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
WashiVon, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 July 1985
Japanese-Soviet Relations: What Could Moscow
Do To Make Them Better?
Summary
Mikhail Gorbachev's consolidation of power--
particularly his replacement of Foreign Minister
Gromyko--and his reputation for innovative
leadership suggest that the USSR may adopt a more
vigorous foreign policy and look for new
opportunities to increase and exercise its influence
on the world stage. Japan may offer such
opportunities. Since the 1950s Moscow has given
Tokyo a low policy priority, both because it views
Japan as a relatively unimportant player in world
power politics and because it judges Japan firmly in
the US camp. In pursuing a policy toward Japan
based on those perceptions, the Soviets have ignored
Japanese vulnerabilities they could have easily
exploited,
oscow s insensitive
approach to Japan has made their life easier by
generally antagonizing those Japanese who might
otherwise be influenced by Soviet initiatives to
press for new policies from Tokyo.
This memorandum was prepared by Northeast Asia Division, Office
of East Asian Analysis, and Third World Activities Division,
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and questions are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Japan Branch, Northeast Asia
Division, OEA
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The very rigidity of the Soviets' approach to
the Japanese over the past 30 years suggests to us
that even small steps now could command attention in
Japan, albeit without basically changing Tokyo's
willingness to cooperate with the United States on
policy toard the Soviet Union. Gorbachev has
already suggested he will take greater interest in
issues outside the US-Soviet relationship,
mentioning Asia as a possible area of increased
attention. The meeting between Prime Minister
Nakasone and Gorbachev at the Chernenko funeral and
hints over the past several months of a visit by the
Soviet Foreign Minister have already captured
Japanese attention. This paper depicts a range of
options available to the Soviet Union and identifies
those that would be hardest for Tokyo to handle if
Moscow took a new tack.
Soviet Intransigence
The Soviet Union's postwar policy has gained it little
ground in Japan. Since then Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to
Moscow in 1973, the Soviets have thumbed their noses at official
and popular Japanese sensibilities by refusing to discuss the
Northern Territories--the disputed Kurile Island group under
Soviet control that remains the obstacle to a bilateral peace
treaty. The Japanese have consistently said the unyielding
Soviet position impedes progress in relations.
The Soviets, moreover, have attacked Japan vigorously on
other fronts. They have used threats and intimidation to try to
slow Japan's gradual military buildup and to caution the Japanese
about closer security relations with the United States. The
substance and tone of Soviet economic overtures have also been
wanting from the Japanese perspective. Moscow's calls for
expanded economic ties characteristically have been accompanied
by tough negotiations and, as in other areas, by a clear Soviet
condescension toward Japan and its leaders.
worth the investment needed.
The rigid Soviet approach to relations with Japan has been
consistent enough to suggest Moscow has basically assigned Tokyo
a low policy priority. We believe this decision is due in part
to the Soviets' view of Japan as a militarily weak nation
dependent on the US strategic umbrella, and thus not a
significant actor on the international scene. Furthermore, the
Soviets have traditionally focused on Europe, where they have had
some success in influencing developments. The Soviets may well
calculate that the close political, economic and military ties
between Tokyo and Washington give them less room to maneuver and
make driving a wedge between the two more difficult. Both
perceptions appear to have led Moscow to conclude that real
improvement in relations with Tokyo is either unlikely or not
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We believe the Soviets have at times even passed up seeming
opportunities for closer ties because in many areas they judge
that an effort to improve relations would cost them too much.
Expanded economic dealings with Japan, for example, could bring
diminished trade with the Soviets' politically more important
partners in Western Europe. In such circumstances, the
consequences for Moscow could outweigh the value of any
anticipated improvement in Soviet-Japanese ties. We believe this
kind of "trade-off" has been at the heart of Soviet policy on the
territorial issue. In Moscow's view, Soviet flexibility on the
Northern Territories could complicate similar claims, based on
the post-World War II status quo, at issue with China and in
Europe. Moreover, the Soviets have made major capital
investments in the Northern Territories to improve their military
capabilities, suggesting that Moscow sees them as an important
strategic asset. We doubt the four northern islands are even on
the table as a hypothetical issue when Soviet policy planners
discuss possible steps to improve Japanese relations.
Possibility of Change?
The fact that the Soviets believe the price for any far-
reaching gains in Japan to be too high does not rule out the
possibility of moves calculated to improve the atmospherics.
Furthermore, changes in the Soviet leadership, including
Gromyko's replacement and the resulting possibility of widespread
changes in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, raise intriguing
questions about future Soviet policy toward Japan. Indeed,
Gorbachev has already hinted that Asia--at least as far as China
is concerned--will receive greater attention. Moreover, his
resurfacing of the Asian collective security scheme suggests the
Soviets are at least lookin for new points of contact and areas
of discussion.
The Soviets may not see specific benefits to improving ties 25X1
to Japan now, but may want to position themselves to take
advantage of possibilities down the road. A revitalized Soviet
leadership more willing to pay attention to Asia, for example,
could view increased US pressure on Japan on trade and defense
issues as an opening for sowing discord in the US-Japanese
relationship. We believe the Soviets could identify a number of
low-cost approaches that would improve their public image in
Japan and appeal to politicians in Tokyo. The thinly veiled
competition between Nakasone and Foreign Minister Abe, one of the
Prime Minister's aspiring successors, over who should take credit
for the recent signs of a somewhat warmer tone in Japanese-Soviet
relations is the latest example of how the political ambitions of
Japanese politicians can create opportunities for the Soviets.
The Northern Territories: A Little Movement Could Go a Long Way
Almost all Japanese politicians would find a Soviet offer to
talk about the Northern Territories irresistible, no matter what
the context. A Japanese politician who could make even limited
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progress on the problem would put an historic feather in his cap,
and in the past political rivals have used the issue to jockey
for the spotlight in Tokyo. The lack of a treaty concluding
World War II remains significant, unfinished business for Japan--
as witnessed by the fanfare given the conclusion of the Sino-
Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978. The vast majority
of Japanese dislike the Soviets, which contrasts with deep-rooted
popular affection for China and the United States. If Moscow
agreed to talk about the islands--or, though unlikely, revived
the offer it made three decades ago to return the two smallest
islands as part of a comprehensive peace settlement--political
leaders, the Foreign Ministry, and some in the press would be
wary of the Soviet price. Nonetheless, if the Northern
Territories were on the agenda, no Japanese prime minister could
ignore a Soviet offer to discuss a peace treaty, and even hints
in that direction would be front page news.
Even if--as is almost certain--the Soviets refused to make
substantive concessions, Moscow could still be flexible enough on
minor or procedural aspects of the question to cause problems for
Japanese managers of the bilateral relationship. A Soviet offer
of expanded access for Japanese fishermen who traditionally
worked waters surrounding the southern Kuriles, for instance,
would capture considerable attention. Moscow could further
capitalize on a positive Japanese reaction by "considering"
additional practical or humanitarian steps, such as making it
easier to visit Japanese graves on Soviet soil. These
initiatives, at a minimum, would put Tokyo on the defensive. In
short, we believe that a little, essentially cosmetic movement by
a new Soviet leadership could give Moscow some leverage on Tokyo,
which heretofore has counted on Soviet intransigence in
fashioning its own approach to this longstanding problem.
A public relations gambit on the Northern Territories could
be coupled with a visit to Tokyo by the Soviet Foreign Minister,
which has been hung up for a decade over the territorial issue.
If a visit took place, the competition between Nakasone and Abe
almost certainly would focus even more sharply on their
respective roles in managing Soviet policy. Given the contest
for Liberal Democratic Party leadership next year--not to mention
Nakasone's desire to make his own mark in Japanese-Soviet
relations before he leaves office--we assume Moscow is well aware
of the potential for exploiting the tensions between current and
would-be Japanese leaders. A Shevardnadze visit to Tokyo, in our
view, would catalyze other trips--such as travels by Abe and
perhaps Nakasone to Moscow--as well as put pressure on the
bureaucracy to produce "results." Whatever the significance of
any accords that might be concluded--and a convincing case could
be made that any new bilateral accord would principally be an
exercise in atmospherics rather than substance--the Soviets would
be able to claim a real improvement in relations.
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Other Political Gestures: A Low Budget Approach
The Soviets' hardline policy toward Japan has largely
ignored low cost moves that could bring returns for them in
Japan. Most obviously, Moscow could benefit by simply abandoning
its uniformly negative public portrayal of Tokyo. Even if it
chooses not to play to Japan's desire to be perceived as a global
power, Moscow could end its critical commentary on the ruling
party and its supporters in the business community, instead
emphasizing--as it did during detente--the economic ties that
could grow to benefit the Japanese establishment and the Soviet
In Japan, the Soviets could expand their program of
invitation diplomacy and target Liberal Democratic politicians
and interest groups not already identified as Soviet
sympathizers. In practical terms, that could include more direct
help to individual conservatives via gestures, such as easing
harassment of Japanese fishermen, expanding the size of the
Japanese catch in Soviet waters, and reducing fishing fees, for
which the politicians could claim some personal credit. The
results of these steps would be hard to measure, and we would not
expect them to produce any basic policy shifts by the LDP or its
main backers. But these moves would create a new opening for
potential Soviet influence with Japanese political figures who
are considerably closer to Tokyo's power centers than the
ideological fringe elements Moscow has heretofore courted. In
our view, this sort of effort could be more effective over the
long run than the Soviet covert action programs that have
channeled funds and support to their sympathizers on the left.
Defense and Economics: Less Room for Change
A concerted Soviet effort to play down the security threat
to Japan--however unlikely--would directly challenge the official
Japanese rationale for the defense buildup program and closer
security ties with the United States. In our view, some steps--
particularly those that involved media treatment of the security
relationship--could be taken relatively easily and, from the
Soviet perspective, with a reasonable hope they would have an
impact on public opinion in Japan.
The Soviets would appear less bellicose to the man-in-the-
street if they changed their tune on popularly supported aspects
of Japanese foreign policy. For example, they could take the
line that, just as Moscow's intentions in improving relations
with Beijing are good, Japan's efforts to strengthen relations
with China and cooperate in its modernization are a legitimate
effort to enhance stability in the region. The message would be
no less well received in Japan if Moscow continued to warn Tokyo
against involvement in China's military modernization.
Attenuated Soviet propaganda against Japan's rearmament and
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economic penetration in Asia would also be seen as a "sign" of a
new Soviet perspective, especially in the Japanese media.
Moscow could introduce some new variations in its position
on regional security. Gorbachev's recent revival of Soviet
interest in an Asia-wide collective security conference--if
pursued with more imagination than Moscow applied to its earlier,
largely ignored proposal on the same subject--could at a minimum
prompt the Japanese media to question whether the Soviets were
moving in a "new" direction in Asia. Such a proposal could be
coupled with a strong Soviet pitch that supported Japan's
antinuclear movement, perhaps implying that broader changes in
Tokyo's approach to its US alliance relationship--much as New
Zealand has taken--could pave the way for real tension reduction
in Northeast Asia. One of the most appealing possibilities to
Japanese officials as well as the press would be a Soviet
suggestion that bilateral discussions of regional security
include the subject of Soviet garrisons and air force elements in
the Kuriles and Sakhalin. We do not believe there is much chance
that the Soviets would make such an offer. But if they did, and
said--as we expect they would--that Tokyo should come to the
table ready to discuss the status of similar assets in Hokkaido,
it could provoke both popular interest and, in our view,
political pressure on the government in Japan.
Other tension-reducing steps, such as the adoption of agreed
procedures for handling military incidents at sea and in the air,
less aggressive air and sea patrolling around Japan, or the
installation of a Tokyo-Moscow hotline, would generate a
positive, popular Japanese response. Recent visits by Japanese
defense officials to China would make it difficult for Tokyo to
avoid considering a Soviet offer to send observers to each
other's military maneuvers. Such initiatives would not affect
the foundation of Japanese security policy or, necessarily, even
current defense plans. But if they surfaced when contentious or
politically symbolic subjects, such as the 1-percent cap on
defense spending or Japanese participation in SDI, were under
active public debate, they could complicate the government's
effort to firm up a popular consensus behind new departures in
defense policy.
Although there is more possibility of movement on the
economic side, Moscow would find it difficult to alter Japanese
skepticism about the commercial opportunities available, under
current market conditions, from larger trade and credit
commitments to the Soviet Union. But if the Soviets chose to
complement an effort to create a better political climate with
steps to show more promise as an economic partner, the Japanese
private sector would have to reevaluate its expectations.
We would not expect the Japanese Government and business
community to abandon the case-by-case approach used to assess
whatever the Soviets have to offer. And, for Moscow, some of the
actions that would appear most appealing to the Japanese would
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also cost the Soviets--in effect, by robbing Peter to pay Paul--
in their relations with Western Europe or elsewhere. But the
possible changes in Soviet economic behavior cover a broad front
and we would expect the Japanese to look for such things as:
-- Greater flexibility on price and credit terms for
Japanese exports.
- Permission for the Japanese to capture some of the
contracts traditionally granted to the West Europeans.
- Price concessions designed to expand the Soviet market
share for Japanese timber, energy, and raw material
imports--particularly liquified natural gas.
- Allocation to Japanese firms of most capital equipment
purchases for the Sakhalin oil and gas project.
The Potential Is There
Japan's history of cooperating closely with the United
States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Nakasone's
strong backing for this aspect of US-Japanese relations, the
deepseated Japanese antipathy toward the Soviet Union, and the
growing popular concern with Soviet military strength all enhance
prospects for continued US-Japanese cooperation in dealings with 25X1
Nonetheless, the simple fact that Soviet policy toward Japan
has been so counterproductive for so long gives Moscow an array
of low-cost choices for new departures that, for the Soviets,
could prove to have a positive impact on Japan. Admittedly, the
returns to the Soviets from most of these measures would be low
as well. In a period when international attention, including
that of the Japanese, is focused on the new leadership in Moscow,
even limited innovations in Soviet policy nonetheless could make
the job of managing the relationship considerably more difficult
for political leaders as well as foreign policy professionals in
Tokyo. We do not believe the consequences would necessarily
produce changes in the US-Japanese security relationship, but
they could complicate the task of obtaining Japanese support for
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any new US measures aimed at the Soviets.[ I
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Distribution: Japanese-Soviet Relations: What Could Moscow Do To
Make Them Better?
Original - OEA/NA/Japan
1 - OEA/NAD/Korea
1 - C/OEA/NAD
1 - C/OEA/China Division
1 - C/OEA/Southeast Asia Division
1 - OEA Production Office
1 - D/OEA
1 - DDI
1 - Executive Director
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NIO/EA
1 - C/PES
1 - C/DDO/PPS
1 - C/EA/RR
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - NIC Analytic Group
1 - SOVA/TWAD
1 - CPAS/ILS
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB 25X1
1 -
1 - Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1 - The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Department of State
1 - William Sherman, Department of State
1 - Thomas Hubbard, Department of State
1 - William Brooks, Department of State
1 - Gaston Sigur, National Security Council
1 - William Martin, National Security Council
1 - The Honorable Richard Armitage, Department of Defense
1 - James Kelly, Department of Defense
1 - Commander James Auer, Department of Defense
1 - Defense Intelligence Agency 25X1
1 - E National Security Agency
1 - Michael B. Smith, Office of the United States Trade
Representative
1 - James Murphy, Office of the United States Trade
Representative
1 - Byron L. Jackson, Department of Commerce
1 - Doug Mulholland, Department of Treasury
DDI/OEA/NAD/JAPAN (17 July 1985)
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