JAPAN HIGHLIGHTS: APRIL 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 30, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
Central Intelligence Agency
Washingon, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
30 April 1985
Japan Highlights: April 1985
Summary
Japanese reaction to US Congressional threats of
retaliation over trade issues and to Prime Minister
Nakasone's 9 April message on opening Japan's markets
dominated news coverage and press commentary in April.
Most media observers believe the public, ruling party,
and even many bureaucrats are now convinced they must
heed Nakasone's call to lessen trade friction.
This memorandum was prepared byl Office of East
Asian Analysis. Information available as of 30 April 1985 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Japan Branch, Northeast Asia
Division, OEA
Duplicate of C05422674:
RIP
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
Some Japanese press commentators' have called Japan's $37
billion trade surplus "appalling," and most press articles have
reflected recognition that Japan must take steps to cut back its
trade surplus. Although a variety of editorials have cited the
strong dollar and the US fiscal deficit as factors contributing
to the growing surplus and have alluded to misunderstandings of
and racial prejudice against Japan, they also have concluded
that Japan must give US products a "fair chance."
Newspaper reporting generally reflected an easing in
tensions during late April, as Tokyo made concessions in the
sensitive telecommunications sector and continued plans for
talks on electronics, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, and
forestry products. Many reporters on the major dailies,
however, appeared to believe that Washington would revive
demands in other areas, including beef and other agriculture
issues and depressed industries such as the aluminum industry.
Some press commentators speculation cited Washington's
frustration as a factor that could bring the United States to
take up again the issue of Japan's "free ride" on defense.
On specific issues, most editorials in major Japanese
dailies recognized the plight of the lumber industry. But
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
commentators also criticized it for inefficient operation.
Business-related press reports cited comments by business
leaders who said the telecommunications and electronics
industries could absorb any damage to their markets from trade
concessions. The articles noted that domestic producers
reportedly are confident they can compete with US manufacturers
in an open market. On a less upbeat note, the president of the
Japanese Pharmaceutical Association told reporters his industry
can survive in an open market only if it seeks markets outside
the country or exports plants.
The Prime Minister's Address
Most journalists found Nakasone's television speech on 9
April to be a "daring move" that clearly demonstrated a unique
leadership style. A subsequent spot survey on the purchases of
foreign goods by the Yomiuri, a major newspaper, however,
disclosed that Japanese buyers would continue to base their
selections on quality. Press coverage of political reaction to
the Prime Minister's public initiative on trade focused heavily
on reactions in the ruling party. Some senior Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). leaders used "backgrounders" to criticize
Nakasone for failing to coordinate his plans for new "market
opening" steps, although press speculation also spotlighted
criticism from party Vice President Nikaido in particular as an
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
effort to prevent Nakasone from monopolizing media attention.
Most political observers believe Nakasone has succeeded in
at least winning general support in the party for resolving the
trade crisis. Throughout April, press stories covered
Nakasone's frequent meetings with LDP committee members to
discuss trade issues. The press has reported that the party's
top leaders--its secretary general and the chairman of the
Policy Affairs Research Council--have been conspicuously
involved with Nakasone's market-opening efforts.
Despite press stories that suggest the bureaucracy has also
been a source of criticism of the highhandedness of Congress and
US trade negotiators, Japanese officials have emphasized that
Tokyo must take visible action to reduce trade friction. Press
stories sourced to senior levels in the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry as well as the Foreign Ministry
have warned against the protectionist mood in Congress and the
danger it will drive the Reagan Administration to drastic
action. Even the Agriculture Ministry has admitted,/to reporters
that it must lower tariffs sooner or later.
Press coverage of the bilateral talks also has aimed a
share of criticism at the bureaucracy. Editorial writers and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
other media observers in several stories in April pointed to
"overbearing, arrogant bureaucrats" as the main cause of trade
friction, while others have argued that differences over
economic issues could be reduced by breaking up the entrenched
interests that administer trade regulations. One observer in a
major daily predicted that Nakasone's efforts to open Japanese
markets to foreign goods will further chisel away at the
bureaucratic power structure.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2
Japan Highlights - April 1985
Original - OEA/NAD/Japan
1 - OEA/NAD/Korea
1 - OEA/NAD
1 - OEA/Production office
1 - D/OEA
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/EA
1 - C/PES
1 - C/EA~
1 - OCR/ISG
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1 - Desaix Anderson, Department of State
1 - William Brooks, Department of State
1 - Defense Intelligence Agency 25X1
1 - Byron Jackson, Department of Commerce
1 - Douglas Mulholland, Department of the Treasury
1 - Lew Cramer, Office of the United States Trade Rep.
1 - National Security Agency
DDI/OEA/NAD/JAPAN
(30 April 1985)
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP04T00447R000201630001-2