(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000100500001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seemt.
Intelligence
on Taiwan
The Political Succession
Secret
EA 85-10001
January 19985Q
Copy 16 8
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Political Succession
on Taiwan ~
China Division, OEA, on
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Secret
EA 85-10001
January 1985
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Secret
The Political Succession
on Taiwan 25X1
Key Judgments Chiang Ching-kuol lis likely to be succeeded by a collegial,
Information available technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style.
as of 15 November 1984 The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older
was used in this report.
mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group
over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power
struggle.
By the same token, Chiang's immediate successors are unlikely to under-
take any major new policy initiatives. Thus, we expect they would initially
seek symbolic gestures of continued US support to demonstrate that they
can manage relations with Washington. We believe they would also
continue to hold China at arm's length to avoid Taiwanese charges of
negotiating with Beijing in order to perpetuate mainlander dominance on
the island.
We believe that no individual will dominate the immediate successor
regime. Rather, decisions will increasingly be made by consensus among
several powerful figures representing such key constituencies as the
military, the party's old guard, and the security services. This collegium, in
turn, will seek the formal ratification of the other members of the party's
powerful Standing Committee for all major policy decisions.
Over the longer term, a coalition of Taiwanese and younger mainlanders
will move up, a transition that Chiang has been preparing since the mid-
1970s. As these politicians develop more influence toward the end of this
decade, we believe they may press for more innovative approaches to old
domestic and foreign policy problems, including relations with the
mainland.
Any change they advocated in policy toward China, however, would be
tactical and designed mainly to reduce the appearance of Taiwan intransi-
gence. There is no indication that anyone within this group favors
reunification on Beijing's current terms, or on anything other than perhaps
the most nominal basis.
Still, such proposals could create serious dissension within the leadership
on this key political issue. Disagreements between the Taiwanese and the
senior mainlanders could also spill over into other areas, such as economic
planning and defense allocations.
Secret
EA 85-10001
January 1985
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Thus, despite Chiang's preparations, the present trend toward a peaceful
transfer of power to a more Taiwanese leadership over the next decade is
by no means assured:
? Those mainlanders who believe their interests are threatened by Taiwani-
zation could try to slow the process, thus provoking even sharper disputes
with Taiwanese in the Kuomintang. Conversely, Taiwanese in the party
or opposition could press too soon for a greater sharing of power, as
Taiwanese radicals did during 1979, provoking a strong conservative
mainlander backlash.
? Economic problems could also undermine stability. Chiang has used the
phenomenal improvement in the island's standard of living to mute
Taiwanese discontent over mainlander political dominance. But if the
government's present effort to retool the economy-a move intended to
ensure that the island's exports remain competitive-falters, the Taiwan-
ese could challenge mainlander management, especially if the prospect of
a greater sharing of political power proves illusory.
China's immediate response to Chiang's death will probably be a renewed
call for reunification negotiations. Beijing might even try to use intermedi-
aries to coax individual members of the collegium to support negotiations
with promises of support for their political position. Because the Chinese
believe that US arms sales to the island encourage Taiwan to resist Chinese
overtures, they might also increase pressure on the United States to halt
the sales.
Over the longer term, if the Taiwanese continue to move up within the
leadership, Beijing probably would fear that such a leadership might
declare Taiwan independent, a step China has said might cause it to drop
its pursuit of peaceful unification. We believe the Taiwanese would not
take that risk, but Beijing probably would apply political pressure on
Taipei to deter such a move unless the Taiwanese took steps to reassure
Beijing. Indeed, if the Taiwanese were able to persuade the senior
mainlanders to take a more flexible approach toward China, we believe
that Beijing would feel less compelled to press for further curbs on US
arms sales to the island. This, of course, would ease tension between the
United States and China.
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Mechanics of Succession
Policy Continuity
The Economy
Party Reform and the Second Succession
5
Managing the Pressure
5
Future Policy Disputes
7
Foreign Policy
7
Other Potential Conflicts
8
The View From Beijing and Implications for the United States
9
A. KMT Standing Committee (Elected in 1984)
B. Taiwan Cabinet (Inaugurated on 1 June 1984)
Influential Younger Mainlanders 6
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The Political Succession
on Taiwan
Chiang Ching-kuo, 74, has been the dominant figure
in Taiwan politics for the past decade. Those around
him who hold key positions of power and influence in
the government and the Kuomintang (KMT) are
nearly all mainlanders of the same generation-men
such as Premier Yu Kuo-hua, 70, and Chiang Yen-
shih, 69, the Secretary General of the KMT. Below
them, however, is a younger group of Taiwanese and
mainlanders whom Chiang has been grooming as a
successor generation.
To strengthen the legitimacy of the KMT and the
prospects for a smooth generational transition, Chiang
has broadened the popular base of the party and
incorporated key new constituencies-predominantly
Taiwanese-produced by Taiwan's rapid economic
development. This "Taiwanization" is gradually be-
ginning to change the makeup of both the party and
the government leadership. To underscore his com-
mitment to a gradual transfer of power, Chiang
selected Li Teng-hui, a 61-year-old Taiwanese, as his
running mate and vice president last spring. F_~
We believe Chiang's decision to seek another six-year
term as president-he was reelected last May-
despite his poor health stems from his desire to
increase the chances for an orderly transfer of power
after his death. In the short run, he wants to strength-
en the position of his most likely successors-the still
dominant mainlander clique surrounding him-while
putting more firmly in place his plans for a transition
to a younger, more Taiwanese leadership by the early
1990s.
Mechanics of Succession
If Chiang dies during his present term, Vice President
Li Teng-hui would accede to the presidency under
Taiwan's constitutional process. But because Li con-
trols no faction of his own, his power would not be
commensurate with his position. Premier Yu Kuo-hua
would probably be more powerful. But Yu, who was
named premier in June, also lacks a strong political
base and is primarily a technocrat
There is no established method to replace Chiang as
party Chairman, a position to which a successor must
be elected by the KMT Central Committee. Likely
candidates include current party Secretary General
Chiang Yen-shih, but his power base is also limited.
No single leader, in fact, is likely to possess the
extensive network of contacts and support necessary
to dominate the government the way Chiang has.
Thus, we believe that Li and Yu would have to share
power with the other senior members of the 31-man
KMT Central Standing Committee (see appendix A).
The Committee is the ruling party's highest decision-
making forum and will probably assume additional
power after Chiang's death.
Taiwan's political leaders are comfortable with such
ad hoc political arrangements and have worked well
together during similar periods in the past. For exam-
ple, Chiang Ching-kuo ran the government from the
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The Kuomintang in 1922 was consciously modeled
after the Soviet Communist Party and remains so
today. Chiang Ching-kuo is party chairman, in addi-
tion to being president of the state. There are no vice-
chairmen, nor is there any automatic process for
naming a successor as chairman.
Policymaking nominally resides in the Central
Standing Committee (see appendix A), which is equiv-
alent to a politburo, and in six subcommittees of the
party's Central Committee. The Secretary General,
Chiang Yen-shih, is responsible for day-to-day man-
agement of party affairs
Premier's office under a caretaker president following
the death of his father in 1975. More recently, when
Chiang was incapacitated after eye surgery in 1982,
an informal group of top leaders took over his respon-
sibilities for several months. A similar group was
formed and worked successfully when former Premier
Sun suffered a stroke earlier this year.
Chiang has carefully tailored the Standing Commit-
tee so that it now contains representatives not only of
the three traditional bases of power-the military,
security services, and the KMT old guard-but also
of important new groups from the bureaucracy, busi-
ness community, and the media, many of whom are
Taiwanese. We believe that Chiang envisions the
members of this body assuming a greater policymak-
ing role and making decisions representing a consen-
sus of the island's major political constituencies.
Chiang also probably hopes this arrangement will
forestall any serious challenge to the succession proc-
ess he has worked out.
If Chiang's plan succeeds, as seems likely, his death
will set in motion an evolution toward a more pluralis-
tic leadership less dominated by the military and
security services. Indeed, once Chiang dies, those at
the top will have to assess-for the first time-the
relative strength of their own power bases. Until now,
their power and influence have depended much more
on their relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo than on
the group they represent. As political jockeying be-
comes more pronounced, some of these men will
probably reach out beyond the traditional bases of
power in search of allies. This, in turn, should create
opportunities for businessmen, technocrats, and media
experts to play a larger role in policy formulation than
is now the case. We believe the probable formation of
such competing power blocs will lead to a more
pluralistic system that takes the interests of all the
major groupings more into account before decisions
are made.
Although we believe that no single individual will ever
be able to exercise the broad powers of either Chiang
or his father, senior Taiwan politicians may-like
many of their Asian counterparts-find collegial deci-
sionmaking difficult and eventually turn to one indi-
vidual to broker decisions. Alternatively, one man
could, over time, try to create a power base similar to
Chiang's. Because Chiang has prevented any of his
subordinates from building power bases that would
allow them to challenge his power, predictions about
which of the current politicians will emerge are
difficult.
The most likely candidate would seem to be Li Huan,
a mainlander who enjoys support from the Taiwanese
and also has good relations with the security services.
But Li is only the Minister of Education, does not
currently sit on the Standing Committee, and until
recently was absent from Taipei for four years. None-
theless, Li is, at 67, the youngest of the senior leaders,
and he built a strong following during his tenure as
director of the party's organization department during
the 1970s. In addition, despite his exile to Kaohsiung
following election rioting in 1977, Li was able to
maintain his substantial faction on the KMT's Cen-
tral Committee
Policy Continuity
We expect any new leadership-whatever its precise
composition-to hew closely, at least at first, to the
guidelines that Chiang has laid down, especially in
foreign policy, defense, and economic modernization.
The key exception could be on the question of the
"Taiwanization" of the ruling party and government.
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Foreign and Defense Policies. Taiwan's historical
need to maintain close economic, political, security,
and technological ties to the United States will contin-
ue to shape the foreign policy of Chiang's successors.
We expect no leader or group to question the need for
this linkage during the 1980s, although there will be
disagreements over how best to manage it. Because
nearly everyone within the leadership distrusts the
United States to some degree, Taiwan has sought
repeated US assurances about its intentions. We
believe Chiang's successors will follow suit, both to
bolster their own confidence and to demonstrate-for
domestic consumption-their ability to manage the
US relationship.
Any new leadership will maintain a strong military
deterrent and remain unpersuaded that close United
States-China relations reduce the island's military
needs. Hence, the new leadership will continue to seek
from the United States the weapons and weapons-
related technology it believes are necessary to deter
China from trying to seize the island. F___-]
Chiang's successors also will probably be loath to
change Chiang's policy of "no contact and no negotia-
tion" with the mainland lest they fuel domestic
tensions on the island. In particular, any new leader-
ship would have to fear that the Taiwanese majority
would interpret such moves as preliminary to a "sell-
out." Taiwanese politicians have stressed repeatedly
to US and other foreign officials that they will not
accept any form of settlement negotiated by the
mainlanders.
The Economy. Chiang's death probably will trigger
some capital flight and nervousness among foreign
and domestic investors, but we believe that will be
manageable. His decision to name Yu Kuo-hua Pre-
mier last May probably was intended in part to
reassure such investors that there will be continuity in
government economic policy. Yu is widely regarded as
one of the principal architects of Taiwan's remarkable
economic performance. He is also viewed-correct-
ly-as a very conservative economist, who can be
counted on to pursue sound, if cautious, economic
policies.
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Yu's selection probably also reflects Chiang's judg-
ment that his successors' ability to maintain internal
stability after his death will depend in no small
measure on how well they manage the economy. The
government has been highly successful thus far in
muting Taiwanese discontent over mainlander politi-
cal dominance by sustaining high rates of growth and
by ensuring an equitable distribution of the resulting
prosperity. As one consequence, most of the large and
growing Taiwanese middle class remains more inter-
ested in the pursuit of wealth than in political power.
This situation could change, however, if the island's
senior economic managers-who are mainlanders-
falter in their efforts to maintain Taiwan's strong
competitive position in the international marketplace.
Low population growth and increased prosperity have
sharply pushed up labor costs on the island. As a
result, Taiwan's traditional labor-intensive export in-
dustries face increasingly stiff competition from such
countries as China, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka.F---]
To overcome this problem, the government is promot-
ing the development of more technology-intensive
industries. Government economists are optimistic that
ultimately they will succeed, but even they expect that
the transition period may be difficult and are forecast-
ing slower economic growth over the next decade.F_
Party Reform and the Second Succession
Probably the single greatest potential problem for a
successor regime will be managing the pace of
Taiwanization. Over the past several years Chiang
Ching-kuo has appointed increasing numbers of Tai-
wanese to high positions in the party and government.
Although these moves have thus far been largely
cosmetic, half of the Cabinet (see appendix B) and
over a third of the Standing Committee are now
Taiwanese. Thus, an important precedent has been
established that Chiang's successors will find difficult
to reverse.
Perhaps more significant over the longer term is the
fact that Chiang has worked since 1977 to expand the
party's popular base to incorporate new social groups
that have emerged as a result of Taiwan's economic
development. As a result, the composition of party
membership has changed dramatically. The KMT is
now three-fourths Taiwanese, young-60 percent of
the members are under 35-and primarily middle
class, closely resembling the island's demographics.
These reforms markedly strengthen the party's popu-
lar appeal and sharply increase the prospects for the
maintenance of one-party rule on the island. At the
same time, they guarantee that the party's present
mainlander leadership will face increasing pressure
from below from competing new interest groups. For
example, many of the new Legislative Yuan members
elected in the relatively honest elections since 1977
represent grassroots interests and a powerful force for
change to which senior party mandarins will have to
pay increasing attention.
Another group that is moving up inside the party and
will be a strong voice for change is the younger
mainlanders (see table). These individuals recognize
that they are unlikely to inherit the power of their
fathers or other powerful relatives to whom they trace
their political lineage, and thus have made a strong
effort to cultivate close ties with influential Taiwanese
politicians. Their connections and knowledge of for-
eign affairs and foreign languages will, at the least,
guarantee them some influence in future govern-
ments.
Managing the Pressure
As long as the successor leadership does nothing to
slow or block Taiwanization, it should be able to
control the pace of this process. Thus far, the Taiwan-
ese inside the KMT have been patient, and we believe
they will remain so because they believe time is on
their side. In fact, two of the most powerful Taiwan-
ese KMT politicians told US representatives in Taipei
last year that they hoped Chiang would outlive his
appointed mainlander successors so that he could
hand over power directly to them.
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Name
Age
Position
Father's Position
Chen Lu-an
47
Chairman, National Deceased Vice
Science Council
President
CCNAA/W
dent, Academia
Sinica
Sung Chu-yu
42
Director, KMT
Deceased Deputy
Cultural Affairs
Department
Chief of Staff for
Intelligence
Chiang Hsiao-yen
42
Chief, US Affairs,
Current
Foreign Ministry
President
Chiang Hsiao-wu
39
President, Broadcast Current
Corporation of
China
President
Kuan Chung
44
Chief, Taipei
Father-in-law is
Municipal Party
Deputy Defense
Minister
The political opposition to the KMT-almost exclu-
sively Taiwanese-is too weak and divided to apply
significant pressure on the government to accelerate
Taiwanization and will probably remain so. If the
opposition pushed too hard, it would run the risk of
being repressed. In 1979, after the US recognition of
Beijing, the more radical opposition politicians con-
cluded that the government had been so weakened
that they could challenge it directly. That confronta-
tion resulted in a tough government crackdown and
the arrests of many radical Taiwanese leaders.)
The radicals could see a new opportunity to confront
the government after Chiang's death, but in our view
that would be a serious miscalculation. We believe the
security services would stifle such a challenge. An
initially weak or uncertain government might even
allow the security apparatus greater latitude than it
now has and, as a consequence, countenance a harder
crackdown]
residue of suspicion on both sides
the police have monitored and checked Taiwanese
political activity since the 1940s, and there is a strong
With one exception-Chen Shou-shan, commander of
the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters-main-
landers still man all key security posts. We believe
that there probably is an increasing number of Tai-
wanese at lower levels, but they are unlikely to reach
senior positions soon.
Most of the security services' efforts have been aimed
at anti-KMT dissidents, but we believe that the
security services look askance at all Taiwanese politi-
cal activity, even that within the KMT. We believe
the security services fear that a future Taiwanese
leadership might be less willing to crack down on
what they see as the activities of anti-KMT Taiwan-
ese, something they define more broadly than the
Taiwanese themselves.
The security services, therefore, could put pressure on
the government to slow the pace of Taiwanization,
posing problems for Chiang's successors. Still, Presi-
dent Chiang has been careful to stress military subor-
dination to civilians in his selection of top officers and
has already moved to limit the future power of this
group. Most notably, in 1983 Chiang demoted and
transferred Gen. Wang Sheng, then head of the
General Political Warfare Department and a symbol
of opposition to Taiwanese political aspirations.F_
Opposition to Taiwanization could also come from the
military, but during discussions with US representa-
tives on Taiwan most high-ranking officers seem
resigned to the eventual transfer of power to a
Taiwanese civilian leadership. The changes that took
place within the party and the government during the
late 1970s are beginning to occur in the military.
Although there are only about a dozen Taiwanese
general officers, a review of those just below flag rank
indicates that their numbers will increase significantly
by the end of the decade. Enlisted men are over-
whelmingly Taiwanese, as are most junior officers.F_
Indeed, we believe that the security services represent
the greatest obstacle to eventual Taiwanization of the
government and party. The garrison command and
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Military opposition would be constrained by fears that
Beijing could exploit any serious civilian-military
tensions. Like the senior mainlander political elite, the
military and security services believe that China
might undertake military action at any time and are
reluctant to participate in activities that might in-
crease Taiwan's vulnerability to such a move.
Future Policy Disputes
Foreign Policy. As the Taiwanese and younger main-
lander politicians become increasingly involved in
decisions affecting defense and foreign policy-dis-
cussions from which they are currently barred-they
might begin to question openly current policies, creat-
ing dissension within the leadership.
Although the rising young Taiwanese officials, along
with younger mainlanders, agree with the present
ruling elite that US arms and security guarantees are
important, they are also concerned about what they
see as excessive reliance on the United States. They
believe the government should put much more stress
on domestic political and economic developments,
claiming that Taiwan's security and stability are
enhanced more by its international economic position
and peaceful political evolution than by close ties with
the United States. Success in these areas, they argue,
attracts investors and trade and generates concern in
Europe and Japan-as well as in the United States-
over any Chinese attempt to bring about reunification
by other than peaceful means. We believe Taiwanese
businessmen, who dominate the private sector, would
support them. Such businessmen have repeatedly
criticized Taipei's ban on trade with the Chinese
mainland.
By the same token, some Taiwanese politicians have
also been critical of the current leadership's strict
limits on athletic, intellectual, and cultural exchanges
with China. In private conversations with US offi-
cials, Taiwanese politicians have argued in favor of
increased exchanges, not because they agree with
Beijing's view that this would eventually lead to
reunification, but because it might reduce Chinese
pressure on both Taiwan and the United States to
begin the process. These officials are critical of what
they term the current leadership's "paranoia" about
such activities and of the resulting policy of "no
contacts." These politicians believe that this approach
denies the island a valuable ploy to use against the
mainland and leaves the island's security overly de-
pendent on decisions made in Washington.
Many younger mainlanders are just as critical of
current policies and are already exploring ways of
dealing with the mainland that are quite different
from those of the current, leadership and sometimes
even offensive to it. For example, Sung Chu-yu, until
recently director of the Government Information Of-
fice and son of the late Lt. Gen. Sung Ta, a close
associate of President Chiang, has ended the ban on
factual reporting on life in China, in the apparent
belief that Taiwan can only profit by the comparison.
Another example is Wei Yung, currently the head of
a research organization under the premier. Wei has
put forward the highly controversial "multisystems
nation" theory-which would allow Taiwan to merge
nominally with China but remain independent in
fact-as a possible solution to the problem of reunifi-
cation. Several other, younger mainlanders have told
US officials privately that they subscribe to a similar
notion, the "German formula," for reunification,
whereby China is viewed as one nation divided into
two political states.
It is not clear whether these younger politicians have
considered all of the ramifications of such schemes. In
particular, they appear unaware of concerns voiced
frequently by current Foreign Ministry officials that
Taipei's requests for continued US arms sales might
be received less sympathetically in Washington if
Taiwan were more responsive to Chinese overtures.
As these politicians move from their predominantly
domestic interests to address foreign policy issues, we
expect that their awareness of the complexities of
such issues will sharpen.
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Other Potential Conflicts. Conflicts between the Tai-
wanese and the senior mainlanders could also arise
over the nature and pace of economic modernization.
Senior economic planners have traditionally yielded to
the military's desire to attain self-sufficiency in
defense-related industries such as steel and alumi-
num. Taiwanese officials closely tied to the island's
private economic sector could in the future oppose
such expenditures as wasteful and unnecessary. If so,
they would find allies among mainlanders such as
Chao Yao-tung, director of Taiwan's economic plan-
ning agency, who also oppose such projects.
In a similar vein, reform of Taiwan's financial institu-
tions, which is long overdue, has been blocked by
opposition from the security services. Taiwanese busi-
nessmen remain frustrated over the unwillingness of
the security services, for example, to allow expanded
international telex services or freer travel to and from
the island-two important prerequisites for reform.
Despite the potential for serious disputes, we believe
the Taiwanese will continue to exercise the caution
and patience that are their hallmarks. Even the most
impetuous of the Taiwanese, Vice Premier Lin Yang-
kang, recognizes the limits of tolerance for debate at
the top. Thus, none of the changes currently advocat-
ed by the Taiwanese will occur soon. Over the next
five years, we believe the senior mainlanders may, at
most, moderate their views slightly toward the posi-
tion of the Taiwanese. This moderation would acceler-
ate only if the Taiwanese and younger mainlanders
succeeded in gaining the support of one or more of the
senior mainlanders. Changes during 1981-83 in Tai-
pei's policy toward China, for example, including a
sharp reduction in rhetoric, were promoted by former
Premier Sun, who was strongly influenced by a coterie
of younger advisers. Conversely, Sun's incapacitation
following a stroke earlier this year put an end to these
policies because the young advisers lost their patron.
When Chiang Ching-kuo dies, it will mark the end
of his family's control of the Kuomintang, as well as
of the state and military organizations-control that
has existed since the 1920s. Chiang Wei-kuo, report-
edly the half brother of Chiang Ching-kuo, has a poor
reputation on the island and has held few substantive
positions during his career. His performance as an
officer in charge of Taiwan's military logistics has
been unremarkable, and he was moved last June to a
largely ceremonial post. Given his poor reputation, we
believe political groups would be unlikely to turn to
him, even as a figurehead.
Chiang Ching-kuo's children also are poorly posi-
tioned to succeed him. His oldest son is physically
unable to assume any responsibilities. Chiang has
failed to groom the others and has kept their hands
far from the levers of power. They are also not well
regarded, in part because they are half Russian-an
important consideration in racially conscious Chinese
society.
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Secret
The View From Beijing and Implications for the
United States
Beijing will probably treat the death of Chiang as the
beginning of the end of mainlander rule on Taiwan
and conclude that his successors-being politically
weaker-would be even less inclined to hold reunifica-
tion talks. Even so, Beijing probably would make new
overtures to Taipei to encourage discussion of reunifi-
cation. If Beijing does believe that the successors are
weak, it might send private messages to one or more
members of the collegium-via intermediaries-pro-
posing Chinese support for their political power in
exchange for the opening of reunification negotia-
tions. We believe such probes would be rejected. At
the same time, China might renew pressure on the
United States over arms sales to Taiwan, which
Beijing views as encouraging Taipei's refusal to begin
negotiations.
Over the longer term, Beijing probably would be
uneasy about the emergence of a predominantly Tai-
wanese leadership, fearing it would be more likely to
declare Taiwan independent. Time is not on Beijing's
side. China has long pinned its hopes on reaching an
accommodation with the present leadership in Taipei
and has tailored its reunification initiatives to appeal
more to the mainlander elite than to the Taiwanese
majority. In addition, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly has
warned that any declaration of independence could
lead Beijing to abandon its peaceful reunification
policy and possibly to invade the island.
If the rising Taiwanese and younger mainlanders are
successful in promoting increased contacts with Bei-
jing, China's fears might be mitigated. In this case,
Beijing would see little need to increase the pressure
and might be content, at least for a while, to explore
such initiatives with Taiwan.
If Beijing does believe that the chances for reunifica-
tion are slipping away, and especially if Taiwan
continues its policy of no contact with the mainland,
Beijing probably will increase the pressure, both
public and private, on the United States to end arms
sales to Taiwan.
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Secret
Appendix A
KMT Standing Committee (Elected in 1984)
1 Yen Chia-kan
2 Hsieh Tung-min
3 Sun Yun-hsuan
4 Ku Cheng-kang
5 Huang Shao-ku
7 Yuan Shou-chien
8 Kao Kuei-yuan
9 Li Teng-hui
10 Ma Chi-chuang
I I Shen Chang-huan
12 Li Kuo-ting
13 Yu Kuo-hua
14 Sung Chang-chih
17 Lin Yang-kang
18 Chiu Chuang-huan
19 Yu Chi-chung
20 Hung Shou-nan
21 Yen Chen-hsing
22 Tsao Sheng-fen
24 Ho 1-wu
25 Ku Chen-fu
26 Lin Ting-sheng
27 Huang Tsun-chiu a
28 Lien Chan a
29 Kao Yu-jen
30 Chang Chien-pang a
31 Hsu Shui-te a
1905 Mainland
1907 Taiwan
1913 Mainland
Mainland
1901 Mainland
1904 Mainland
1903 Mainland
1907
1923 Taiwan
1912 Mainland
1913 Mainland
Mainland
1916
1917
1926 Taiwan
1925 Taiwan
1909
1911
1917 Taiwan
1919 Taiwan
1934
1929
Former President
Former Vice President
Former Premier
Policy adviser
President, Judicial Yuan
President, Legislative Yuan
Policy adviser
Policy adviser
Vice President
Secretary General, Presidential Office
Minister Without Portfolio
Chairman, China Times
Vice President, Judicial Yuan
Chairman, Atomic Energy Council
Chairman, Central Daily News
Legislator; Secretary General, KMT Central
Policy Coordination Committee
Secretary General, National Assembly
Chairman, Taiwan Cement Corporation
Chairman, Tatung Engineering Corporation
Vice President, Control Yuan
Communications Minister
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Appendix B
Taiwan Cabinet (Inaugurated on 1 June 1984)
1916
1931
No portfolio
Ma Chi-chuang b
1911
Mainland
No portfolio
Chao Yao-tung a
1915
Mainland
No portfolio
Kao Yu-shu
1913
Taiwan
1923
1931
a New position in cabinet.
b New to cabinet.
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Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP04T00447R000100500001-8