THE MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9 25X1
en ra me igence gency
.: ~ a=~r;~.::
washiogton, a c zosos
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 March 1985
The Mozambique National Resistance
Summary
The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) is a rural-
based insurgent group with 12,000 or more armed guerrillas.
Formed in 1976 from several small groups opposed to the ruling
FRELIMO Party, RENAMO received direction and support from
Rhodesia?and, by 1980, South Africa. The insurgent group has
expanded rapidly and now operates in'all ten provinces of
Mozambique. RENAMO's military success, distributions of
captured food, and opposition to FRELIMO's attempts to
collectivize agriculture have gained the guerrillas some
measure of popular support. Despite increased insurgent
activity since implementation of the Nkomati Accord in March
1984, we doubt the rou is bein ac "
Africa.
25X1
.25X1
Iwas written by
Africa Division of the Office of African an a tin
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
American Analysis. It has been coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the Office of Central Reference. Questions and comments
COPY OF ~~
25X1
25X1
TOP
- -~ r-I~ iTI- - -" Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
~ yr ~wnc ~ i ~
While scoring some impressive gains on the military front,
RENAMO's political infrastructure and ideology are undeveloped,
and it has no leader with the stature of President Machel.
Moreover, RENAMO's military wing, largely black Africans,
distrusts the group's exile-based and mostly Portuguese
political spokesmen and back who themselves appear divided
by personal ambitions.
The civil war in Mozambique is currently stalemated, with
neither side able to defeat the other, but Maputo's military
strength is eroding. Negotiations for ending the insurgency
remain deadlocked; RENA~iO seeks a power-sharing arrangement,
while FRELIMO offers only amnesty and discussions toward a
Background
forces in 1979 (see attached map).
After Mozambique became independent under FRELIh10 in 1975, several
anti-FRELIt~10 elements came together to form what later became the
Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO). Included were conservative
whites who had fled black-ruled hozambique, blacks from small political
parties that refused absorption into FRELIPIO, disenchanted FRELIMO
officials, colonial Army veterans, secret police agents, and tribal
leaders. With direction and support from Rhodesian intelligence and
military officials, the guerrillas in early 1977 began sabotage and
reconnaissance operations in central Mozambique against units of Robert
Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union. Soon, however, RENAMO began its
own hit-and-run attacks against Mozambican economic targets. During this
period of Rhodesian assistance, the insurgents operated with marginal
success in Manica and Sofala Provinces, as their forward bases in the
Gorongosa mountains of central t~iozambique were overrun by government
25X1
25X1''
25X1
----;,~,-~-;,- ----- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9 --------- -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
As Zimbabwe neared independence in 1980, however, South Africa
assumed sponsorship of RENAMO. The South African armed forces created a
logistics infrastructure to support insurgent operations in Mozambique,
and they established a headquarters and training base in the northern
Transvaal. "The Voice of Free Africa"--RENAMO's radio station previously
located in Rhodesia--began broadcasting from South Africa at that time, n 25X1
With South African assistance, RENAMO expanded north and south from
central Mozambique, spreading to nine provinces by early 1983 and to Cabo
Delgado Province in the extreme northeast last year. Insurgents also
operated out of sanctuaries in South Africa and Malawi. We believe that
antigovernment sentiment has been partly responsible for insurgent
recruitment: FRELIMO has neglected rural areas hard hit by three years of
alternating drought and floods, and its efforts to impose collectivization
have been unpopular with the peasants,
Leadership
RENAMO's President and Commander-in-Chief is Afonso Jacama, a black 25X1
Mozambican and ex-FRELIh10 guerrilla leader. Jacama has headed the group
since 1979 when Andre Matsangaisse was killed in a clash with government
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
1 VI JL\il\L 1
Evo Fernandes, RENAh1O's Secretary General and second ranking
official, heads the political wing.
Fernandes has held his position since shortly after his
predecessor, Orlando Christina, was killed by unknown assailants at his
residence in South Africa in April 1983.*
He resides in Portugal, unlike his predecessor
who lived in South Africa, and has handled most negotiations with Pretoria
and FRELIMO on RENAMO's behalf.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 ~~
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9 -
 1 11 ?Iy_L. 1 I... l _ _ _ ~ _ ~ __ -_ __ - _ _ ~_
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9 25X1
IVI JLVI\LI
Popular Support and Ideology
we have no
evidence tat the insurgents--unlike UNITA in Angola--have established
"liberated areas" in the sense that they provide civil administration or
engage in systematic political indoctrination in areas under their
control. Moreover, they have alienated the Catholic Church, which exerts
considerable influence over the country's Christian minority. Tl~e Church
had considered RENAMO a viable political fgrce until the recent murders of
several priests and nuns. Church spokesmen now say it is an ill- .
disciplined group with no real political ideology and little popular
support, according to Embassy reporting.
In our judgment, RENAMO has little appeal beyond the rural peasantry,
in large measure because its political ideology is undeveloped and
simplistic. The insurgents' pronouncements are little more than
vehemently anti-Communist .sloganeering, describing Machel as an agent of
Soviet expansionism and condemning his acceptance of Soviet, Cuban, and
East German advisers. RENAMO professes vague support for a democratic
form of government and a free-market economy, and it swears allegiance to
the Mozambican nationalism of the late Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's first
president, but it has not articulated these views in a well organized
fashion. In our view, RENAMO remains essentially an anti-FRELIMO
Military Situation
As a political movement RENAh10 is unsophisticated, but on the
military front it has grown and expanded impressively since 1979 when a
few hundred guerrillas were on the run from government forces in
Mozambique's two central provinces. In fact, RENANiO may have more than
25X1
r
25X1
__ ,~,___ ,_ _ ___._ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
i ur ~~t,rc~ i i ~
the 12,000 guerrillas that we estimate.
to expand popular support and demoralize the Arrny.
the insurgents seek to isolate Maputo by attacking
government forces, transportation routes, power lines, and foreign
workers, and to demonstrate RENAMO's reach throughout h1ozarnbique in order
RENAMO has murdered approximately 42
oreigners over the past two years, and kidnapped others, which has caused
many foreign workers to flee and set back develo ment ro'ects throughout
the country, according to Embassy reporting.
Reports of guerrilla incidents--including sabotage, ambushes, raids,
and terrorist attacks on civilians--increased b more than 50
1984,
from six in 1983 to 100 last year.
os inci ens ave taken place in Zambes~a, P~tozambique s
ric est an most populous province, and also near the capital (see
attached graphics). Attacks recorded in Maputo Province alone increased
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
*The South Africans also calculate that the incident rate rose
sharply in 1984, according to Embassy reporting. ~~ 25X1
25X1
25X1
___,,~,_~_,_ _ __ _ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9 _ ~__
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
25X1
25X1
In addition to insurgent attacks against FRELIMO, RENAMO's activity
also includes some banditry. The insurgents have looted stores and
civilian homes, and they bayonetted dozens of civilian passengers during
ambushes near Maputo in January, according to the international press.
The brutality seems to increase in the south, however, and it may reflect
looser control by RENAMO headquarters over remote units, as well as some
ethnic hatred for southerners and e' rs by guerrillas recruited
mainly i n the central province s. ~~r 1-Qn~ 25X1
Maputo's response to RtNAMO's attacks has been ineffective, and we
expect additional government reverses in the months ahead. The Army
continues to mount sporadic offensives in the countryside, but it has
generally withdrawn to protect the cities and a few key transportation
routes. The US defense attache calls Mozambique's Army of about 20,000
troops the poorest he has seen, partly because the USSR has not provided
equipment appropriate for a guerrilla war during its nearly ten years of
military assistance programs. The force is mostly conscripted, and morale
suffers from poor food, quarters, training, and medical care. Embas~
sources report that it remains in garrison and is avoiding combat.
Outlook
RENAMO's unabated guerrilla activity over the past year has shattered
President Machel's early hope that implementation of the Nkomati Accord in
March 1984 would cause the insurgency to wither and die. In our judgment,
the civil war in Mozambique is at a military stalemate in which neither
eroding.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Y
25X1
- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
We judge that, confident of its military prowess, RENAMO is unlikely
to abandon its hard-line position in the deadlocked neyotiations.
REWAMO wants an internationally
supervised cease-fire, direct talks with the government to choose a
president, and free parliamentary elections. It also demands that Maputo
suspend arms agreements with the Soviets and send all foreign troops home
within a 15-day period. Maputo so far has offer
and discussions toward arranging a cease-fire.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9 - - --- -- - --
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
i yr a~~.n~ ~ I ~~
Distribution:
Copy
1 of 40
-- P
hilli
p Ringdahl
, Di
rector Afr
ican
Affairs, NSC
Copy
2 of 40
-- D
onald
Gregg, Of
fice
of the Vi
ce P
resident
Copy
3 of 4U
-- C
heste
o
r Crocker,
f African
Ass
Affa
istant Sec
irs
reta
ry of State, Bureau
Copy
4 of 40
-- F
rank W
Bu
isner, De
reau of A
puty
fric
Assistant
an Affairs
Sec
retary of State,
Copy
5 of 40
?
-- R
obert
Se
Cabelly,
cretary o
Spec
f St
ial Assist
ate, Burea
ant
u of
to the Assistant
African Affairs
Copy
6 of 40
-- M
orton
Abramowit
z, D
irector, S
tate
/INR
Copy
7 of 40
-- A
nthony
Dalsimer
, Di
rector INR
/AA,
Department of State
Copy
8 of 40
-- N
oel Ko
Se
ch, Deput
curity Af
y As
fair
sistant Se
s, Departm
cret
ent
ary, International
of Defense
Copy
9 of 40
-- R
obert
Gelbard,
AF/S
, Departme
nt o
f State
Copy 10 of 40
Copy 11 of 40
Copy 12 of 40
Copy 13 of 40
Copy 14 of 40
copy 15 of 40
-- U
-- D
-- SA
-- E
-- NI
-- N
CI
DCI
/DCI/
xecuti
O/Afr
IC
IA
ve Direct
ica
or
,
Copy 16 of 40
-- DD
0
0
Copy 17 of 40
Copy 18 of 40
Copy 19 of 40
Copy 20 of. 40
Copy 21 of 40
Copy 22 of 40
Copy 23 of 40
-- DD
-- AD
-- PD
-- I L
-- C/
-- D/
-- AL
I
DI
B Sta
S
DDI/P
ALA
A Res
ff
ES
earch Dir
ecto
r
Copies 24-25 of .40 -- ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean copy)
Copies 26-29 of 40 -- OCPAS/IMD/CB
Copies 30-33 of 40 -- ALA/AF
Copies 34-35 of 40 -- ALA/AF/S
Copies 36-40 of 40 -- ALA/AF/S
ALA/AF/S (4 March 1985)
25X1
25X1
25X1'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
~ ;2 ~ r - ~~ .J.
Katumbi ~ ( Bongea ~ Tanzania - --
% ' t ~~
/ i
:Mpika ~ ~Mz~mba% 1
i
i
t2 ~ 1 /
`
~ - ------.--~-~ - --
~
i 1
t
~ Augusto
Cardoao
v ~ ~' ~'~
i
b'
'
'
i t'.
r
.,~ca J i `
,~,:,? c a e o ~,
:
a m
~
a ;
;
,
y
1
~,
D
l
1
~
N I a
~
Kasungu
}
'
e
gado
~
s S a ~
Pemba
I1
i
~
~
1
r ~ l+chinga
I
~
d
7
Serenle i Maiawi
1
~'
~
~~~~~ Chipat ~ Salima ~ Catu
~ `
v'
~ ~ ~lilong ~
~atete - ~,,'~\
o i
~ ~? Poo ~? I ~
^
J
t~iacala
Cuam
Furancung `~
Nampula ~ ~
~_
Fingoe e 1
V
i Nampula ~ Lumbo
U~
Zomba
~ R'~,
i Songo` ahAr Blantyre
~
9' v
16
~
T M
ilange i -t6
enga
0
Zam ezia
Zawi
~~~--~` Vila
~
I) de Sena
alisbury
~
uelimane
j ~
S uthern
Marromeu
'
l
R od 'a
1
Vila do Chinde
cu.ica
- 1 S ala
~
Umtahl
Chiomoio
mvuma
i
Manica ~ a
Vilad ondo
~ ~,
~
~~ ~ 6
i
Mozambique
e
ra
?
.,-~
?r'
ictori
~ ~ , ~
20_
Channel
a
j
l
JNovaMam
\ ~
7
e
Rutenga
~ ~
Rio S`'" ~ y
i
8assas da
~
~ .i ~) i
D I
India
(Fr) i
S
\ l
~
/
~
V`lanculo
'
Ch
kualacuala J~
i i
i Ile Europa
Messina
I
' (Fr>
\
'~ ~~ ,~~e ~, ~
Mozambique
,
a Gaza
,
~
? ~ I
~
International boundary
'
zaneen
~
InhamlS
ane Province boundary
2a
pJtants
I i /~ } ~
~-.~ ~ u,,.. ?? ?~
/ / ~
2a
~* National or colonial capital
?
I arrime
- i
o Province administrative center
South
?
~
_ ;
- I
~ Railroad
Africa
~ xa' '' ~
Road
Maputo
Mbabane
~ oba
o w >o0 150 Miles
Map to
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
Swa
~i?
40
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9 -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 :CIA-RDP04T00447R000100310001-9