PARTY AND GOVERNMENT REFORM IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000301960002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 21, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
21 August 1984
Party and Government Reform in Laos
Summar y
OJ4r the past two years, the Lao leadership
has made sweeping structural and personnel changes
in the government and the Lao Revolutionary
People's Party. The changes--begun at the 1982
Party Congress--were aimed at improving the
government's handling of the economy, reducing
bureaucratic waste and graft, strengthening
grassroots support for the Lao party, and
eventually creating an orthodox, Vietnamese-style
regime.
The results of the Lao effort at reform have
been dismal. Western diplomats report no
improvement in the bureaucracy, and the party's
membership drive does not appear to have
significantly broadened the regime's popular
base. As a result, we expect Vientiane to become
even more dependent on Vietnam's advisory and
administrative support.
1975-1981: The Thrill of Victory Fades
After the Communist victory in 1975, Lao Party General-
Secretary Kaysone Phomvihan and other Lao leaders turned to the
problems of stimulating the economy and building a strong network
This memorandum was prepared bvl (Southeast Asia
Division, Office of East Asian Analysis and was coordinated with
the Office of Central Reference. Information available as of
15 August 1984 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries
are welcome and ma be directed to Chief, Southeast Asia
Division, OEA
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of popular support. An economic recovery in the late 1970s--a 7-
percent annual growth rate during 1978-81, according to the World
Bank--gave them some reason to hope for success. But by March
1982, Kaysone and Finance Minister Nouhak Phoumsavan had to
announce to the Third Party Congress that the country was
suffering from "numerous shortcomings" and poor management by the
government. The current account deficit--the balance of trade
for goods, services, and financial transfers--had more than
doubled from $51 million in 1976 to $110 million in 1981.
Moreover, over 300,000 professionals, administrators,
technicians, and farmers fled the country during the same
period.
At the Third Party Congress Kaysone and other top party
members also expressed concern about the party's lack of popular
support--at about 35,000 members, cadres represent less than 1
percent of the population. Like the royal government it
overthrew, the Communist government found its attempts to build-
grassroots support hindered by the nation's lack of
cohesiveness. About half the population is composed of non-Lao
tribal groups, speaking almost 70 different languages. In
addition, the acute shortage of trained personnel has prevented
extension of the governmental structure over the entire
country.
This shortage of personnel, moreover, has forced the party
to rely on politically suspect, corrupt and inefficient
bureaucracts. Manv are civil servants from the previous
government. these holdovers
from 1975 still fear arrest or discrimination, and are alienated
from the party personnel with whom they work.
Reforming the Bureaucracy
Responding to the criticism leveled at the bureaucracy
during the Third Congress., the Council of Ministers over the next
two .years:
-- Cut the government work force.
-- Promoted technocrats and military officers.
-- Reorganized the ministries and the Lao Council of
Ministers.
-- Arrested several dozen officials for corruption.
The shake-up began with plans to cut administrative
personnel from 8,000 to 6,000. Western journalists reported that
some officials resigned or retired under pressure, while others
joined joint state-private enterprises. According to the US
Embassy, the Ministry of Finance cut its staff by up to three-
quarters, and offered employees early retirement or provincial
posts. The Embassy believed similar steps were in the offing for
other ministries.
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The cuts were followed by a reorganization aimed at defining
bureaucratic responsibilities and promoting capable
administrators in order to.spur economic development.
Nouhak Phoumsavan--number two in
both the party and the government--announced in August 1982 that
ministries dealing with the economy would be reorganized first,
followed by those dealing with other administrative matters.
Inside the ministries themselves, responsibilities of deputy
ministers and departments were ll d out more clearly,
according to press reports.
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'' Post-Congress Ministerial Changes
Former Ministry
Ministry of Industry and
Commerce
Ministry of Agriculture
Forestry and Cooperatives
Ministry of Communications,
Public Works and Transpor-
tation
Ministry of Education,
Sports and Religion
Ministry for Information,
Newspaper, Radio and
Television
New Ministry
Ministry of Commerce and
Ministry of Industry, Handi-
crafts, and Forestry
Ministry of Agriculture,
Irrigation and Cooperatives
Ministry of Public Works (or
Construction) and Ministry of
Transportation
Ministry of Education and
Ministry of Culture
Abolished; now a State
Committee of the-
same name
Ministry of Materials and
Technology; newly estahlished
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The beneficiaries of the reorganization in many cases appear 25X1
to have been nonparty technocrats and military officers.
at least 15 appointments o western-educate
technocrats, former royal officials, and military men as
ministers or deputy ministers.
-- A high-ranking official stated in July that "a significant
number" of arm officers and former royal officials would
r m t d
-- Nouhak had announced
that expertise, not party affiliation, would guide
appointments in the Ministry of Finance.
-- A French journalist reported in September 1982 that
officials with university degrees and technical training
had been promoted and a "goodly number" of these had
graduated from French schools.
-- Another western journalist noted in 1983 that nonparty
technocrats were rising in the civil service although
narty members continued to dominate the top posts.
At the same time, the Council of Ministers strengthened its
grip on the machinery of government. The reorganization divided
supervisory duties for ministries, state committees, and top
party organs among Kaysone, Nouhak and the top dozen members of
the Central Committee.
the Council of Ministers established joint inspection
committees with the Central Committee to scrutinize government
organizations for compliance with official directives.
Removing Corrupt Officials
In early 1983 and again in early 1984, reports surfaced of a
"purge" involving several dozen high-level officials. Among
those removed were several vice ministers, vice chairmen of state
committees, departmental heads, one minister, Kaysone's personal
secretary and two sons of President Souphannouvong. In addition,
the editor of the party PASASON. Chanthi Douan savan,
was also detained, By
far the largest number o removals occurred in the Ministry of
Agriculture, Irrigation and Cooperatives, and the Ministry of
Industry, Forestry and Handicrafts. We estimate that at least 47
officials may have been removed in those two ministries by mid-
1984.
The majority of those actually arrested had been accused of
corruption or of deviating from the party line,
the biggest ro
of arrests in March-May 1933 netted between 60 and 100 people.
Although the US Embassy was unsure of the merits of the
corruption charges,
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Some of them appear to have ha
access to official funds and materials, and the US Embassy
subsequently reported that one group of about 20 officials had
received heavy sentences for graft. The next arrests, in early
to mid-1984, netted perhaps two dozen officials includin tw
vice ministers and Souphannouvonq's sons.
Although most of the purges appear aimed at streamlining a
corrupt and inept bureacracy, there have been a few reports that
some of the removals were politically motivated.
the purge in 1983 sprang rom
either factional squabbles among the party leadership or
Vietnamese -pressure. At the same time, the US Embassy reported
that perhaps a dozen high-ranking officials had been sent to
Vietnam for political training, and two members of the Central
Committee had been sent to the provinces.
Mobilization Efforts--Too Few Communists?
While they were trying to streamline the bureaucracy, Lao
party officials also initiated efforts to broaden the party's
control and increase popular identification with the regime.
the party is seeking
75,000 new members between 1983 and 1988. During 1983 and 1984,
the party also convened the first national congresses of women's,
youth, and trade union organizations. After the Congress of the
Lao Women's Union in March 1984, the US Embassy commented that
the party had formally completed the establishment of its three
primary organizations and that it was theoretically more capable
of controlling the majority of the population and informing it of
its policies and goals.
We share the Embassy's skepticism, however, that much of the
population is actively involved in party-sponsored political
groups. Scattered reports in the press suggest difficulties in
recruiting for the party and its mass organizations, and press
statements by party leaders suggest impatience at the slow pace
of mobilization. For example, a female activist in Sayabouri
Province reportedly encountered problems because of the presence
of antiregime guerrilla forces and because of the political
ignorance of the local women. She managed to recruit about 130
women in six years, and the local Women's Union now has 155
members. Also indicative of attitudes affecting party
recruitment are occasional contributions to local newspapers that
complain about cadres' abuse of authority and express
disenchantment with party work.
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Membership of Selected Party Organizations*
GROUP MEMBERS
Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party 35,000 (1982 est.)
Women's Union 426,000
Youth Union 115,000
Trade Union 50,000
Total Population
3,938,000 (1982 est.)
*Our estimate of party membership figures--which the Lao
government does not publish--is based on diplomatic reporting.
For other organizations, membership figures are taken from
official broadcasts. The 1982 estimate of total population was
published by the Lao government.
Because of the problems in generating civilian interest in
the party, Lao officials may be turning to the military to boost
party membership. local party
officials include a high percentage of army and police
officers. One striking example is the party committee of
Savannakhet- 13 out of
21 full members are military or police o icers on active duty.
Moreover, there has been increased media coverage of military
figures in party affairs, and both military and security
officials gained seats on major party bodies at the Third Party
Congress in 1982.
Systemic Malaise?
Despite these efforts at reform, the Lao regime appears to
have made little progress in solving its problems. Still
dependent on a stagnating agricultural sector, the Lao gross
domestic product has increased by at most 1 percent annually
during the last two years. Inefficiency and corruption continue
unabated. In fact, the anticorruption drive may have worsened
the situation. According to the US Embassy, the drives against
officials on the take halted nearly all work in the Ministry of
Agriculture becai se no one was willing to take responsibility.
Finally, Vientiane's attempts to tighten its control over
the country's population may further alienate the rural
population. The US Embassy in Bangkok reported that refugee
arrivals from Laos during the first six months of 1984 nearly
equaled the total number of arrivals in 1982 and 1983 combined.
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Ethnic Lao refugees cited poor economic prospects, fear of the
draft, and anxiety about the future as their motives for
fleeing.
Greater Vietnamese Influence?
The unsuccessful attempts at reform may be leading to even
greater Vietnamese influence over the Lao party and government.
A politburo meeting last year adopted a resolution calling for
strengthened cooperation among the Indochinese nations and
detailing expected behavior of personnel working with Vietnamese
advisers. When the directive was disseminated in February,
government personnel were told to expect more Vietnamese
advisers.
In addition, the party's action in sending civil servants to
Vietnam for training suggests an effort to reshape both party and
nonparty personnel in the Vietnamese mold. The party leaderhip--
while willing to employ former royalists and western-educated
officials because of a manpower shortage--apparently continues to
feel it cannot trust them. Thus the ministers and "super-
ministers"--who oversee the ministries' work--continue to hP
loyal party members with strong ties to Vietnam.
Finally, the apparent increasing reliance on the military
forces for new party members and administering party affairs may
also strengthen Vietnam's influence over Laos. The Lao army has
extremely close ties with its Vietnamese counterpart--Lao and
Vietnam units conduct joint operations, Vietnamese advisers are
attached to most units, and most senior Lao commanders fought
side by side with the Vietnamese forces in Laos before 1975. F_
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Appendix
Officials Involved in Bureaucratic
Reforms, 1983 and 1984.
1983
Organization
Min. of Agriculture
Name and Post Date
Choung Phanlatsavong Mar-June
Dir. Irrigation Institute
Khamsingkeo June (?)
Dir. Veterinary Dept.
Oukeo
Dir. Nong Teng Animal
Husbandry School
Saneu Chounlamani
Dep. Chief Tha Ngon
Animal Feed Factory
Dep. Dir
of Veterinary Medicine
Sengdao (LNU)
Chief Tha Ngon Animal
Feed Factory
Sitaheng Rajaphon
Vice Minister
Company Number Three
Former Dir. Irrigation
Sivong Philamat.
forestry official.)
Sornmmai (LNU)
Dir. Nong Teng Vaccine
March
Comments
Corruption charges, may have
been sent to provinces, released
some months later.
Corruption charges; may have
been sent to provinces.
Unknown reasons; sent to
Vietnam.
Corruption; given heavy
sentence; released in July 1984
Corruption; given heavy
sentence released in July 1984
with Sitaheng.
Corruption; sentenced to 18
years; replaced by Somphong
Mongkhonvila, cleared and
released along with Saneu and
Sendao in July 1984.
Mar-Apr Corruption; sentenced to 18
years.
March Corruption; given heavy
sentence; cleared and
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P l ant
Min. of Construction Sengkham Phinit
Vice Minister
Min. of Culture
Sisana Sisan
Minister, member
Central Committee
Min. of Defense
Min. of Finance
Min. of Industry,
Forestry, and
Handicrafts
Chanaphon Songkham
Colonel
Post unknown
Khamphu Vongsa,
Colonel
Post unknown
Rattanarak Bounpheng
Post unknown
Chenpheng Duanqdara
Dung Thonsavat
Sovana Pheuphadi,
Posts unknown
Bounkeut Khamphaphongphan
Vice Minister
Khammouan Boupha
Vice Minister
Sichan Soksavat
Dir. State Forestry
Enterprise Number Three
released with Sitaheng and 25X1
Saneu.
May-June Corruption, according to
western press; released before
re-arrest and release in 1984.
Nov 83;
May
Circumstances unclear; rusticated;
Central Committee
member Thongsing Thammavong
replaced as minister; no
indication that lost Central
Committee seat.
Embassy reports arrest;
charges and fate unknown.
Embassy reports arrest;
charges and fate unknown.
Embassy reports arrest;
charges and fate unknown.
Embassy reports arrest;
charges and fate unknown.
Sent to Vietnam for training;
circumstances unclear.
Sent to Vietnam for training;
returned to psot 1984;
circumstances unclear.
Arrested for corruption;
released in July 1984 along
with Sitaheng.
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Min. of Material Soulivong Salavong
and Technical Supply Vice Minister
Thongsavat Paseut
Vice Minister
Min. of Public Health Vannaret Ratsapho, Dr.
Vice Minister
Min. of Trade
Bounpheng Soksavat
Chantha Vonqsa
Duangdara Bounmi
Sengboun (LNU)
Posts unknown
Min. of Transportation Khamlouat Sitlakon
and Posts Vice Minister
Tiou Sayavong
Finance Section, Land
Transportation Enterprise
Number One
PASASON
(party daily
newspaper)
Chanthi Douangsavan
Editor-in-Chief
Lao Federation of Sanan Soutthichak
Trade Unions
President; Member Central
Committee; Former Minister
of Public Works, Trans-
portation, Communications.
(pre-reorganization)
June Sent to Vietnam circumstances
and whereabouts unknown.
June Sent to Vietnam circumstances
and whereabouts unknown.
Mar-June Sent to Vietnam for training;
circumstance unclear;
returned early 1984; still
holds vice ministerial post;
former royal official; French
educated.
March US Embassy reports arrest;
no further information.
June Sent to Vietnam; circumstances
and whereabouts unclear;
retained post
May
June
Arrested for embezzlement; no
no further information.
Arrested for unknown reasons;
official Party broadcast on
24 May 1983 criticizes PASASON
for low quality and departing
from party line.
Sent to provinces for mass
work; rumors of corruption;
media still covered activities
in October 1983; died January
1984; central committee
organized funeral.
Arrested for corruption with
brother Choung; sentenced,
Social Welfare and Thongvan Phanlatsavong
Veteran's Committee Vice Chairman
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1984
Min. of Agriculture Saveng (LNU) April
Head fish pond and purchase
section
Tha Ngon Animal Feed Factory
Singkeo Sayasouk April
Advisor to Minister
Sisouvan Soutthiphong
Veterinary Dept
Sitha (LNU) April
Tha Ngon Feed Factory
Thon (LNU) April
Tha Ngon Feed Factory
Min. of Construction Boun Sien Feb-Mar
Chief Accounting Dept
Khampho Keomalavonq Feb-Mar
Chief Planning Dept
Sengdao Louangnoophakoun Feb-Mar
Chief National Construction
Company Warehouse at KM Five
Sengkham Phinit
Vice Minister
Feb-Mar
Sien Sihavong Feb-Mar
Deputy Dir. for Construction
Seuk Savan
Chief Construction
Enterprise Number Two
cleared and released in July
1984.
Arrested for corruption.
Arrested for corruption;
Singkeo and Sisouvan are
western-educated.
Corruption.
Corruption; possible suicide
or death under torture.
Arrested for corrupt
practices
Corruption; US Embassy
reports release in May.
Corruption; also allega-
tions of subversion.
See note in 1983; also
allegations of subversion.
Corruption; also allegations
of subversion.
Corruption; US Embassy reports
release in May 1984.
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State Planning
Committee
President
Souphannouvong
555 Tobacco Factory
Latsami Khamphoui
Vice Chairman, former
Vice Minister of Agriculture
April
Phansai Souphannouvong April
unknown Post at Ministry
of Industry, also teaches
at Party University
Vietvan Souphannouvong
(a.k.a. Khamman),
Office of Council
of Ministers
Sang Thong
Head of Factory
April
Arrested for corruption; had
denounced others for corruption
in 1983; alleged to have
deviated from or criticized
party policy.
Arrested for "adulterous
affair"; illegal foreign
contacts; under detention
in Houa Phan Province
Corruption; illegal trading;
deviation from party policy;
under detention in Houa Phan
Province.
Arrested for corruption; under
detention.
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SUBJECT: Party and Government Reform in Laos
Distribution:
Original - OEA/SEA/ITM
1 - Richard Childress. NSC
1 -
Lyall rec on, State/VKL Desk
Alan Kitchens, State/INR
Dorothy Avery, State/INR
Alice Straub, State/INR
John Mohenko. State/INR
Lt.
Lt.
DDI
Col. William Wise, Pentagon
Col. Denny Lane, Pentagon, J-5
Rep CINCPAC
CIA/FBIS/JPRS
CIA/FBIS/AG
OEA/SEAD
OEA/SEA/IB
OEA/NEA
OEA/CH
D/OEA
OEA/Research Director
DDI/OCR/EA/A
C/NIC
NIO/EA
OBI
Executive Director
CPAS/ILS
CPAS/I MD/CB
C/PES/DDI
OCR/ISG
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