PAPUA NEW GUINEA - INDONESIA: UNEASY NEIGHBORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000301820001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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,V
Central Intelligence Agency
WashinyKon.D.C.ZOSOS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 June 1984
Papua New Guinea - Indonesia: Uneasy Neighbors
Summary
Recent activities along the Papua New Guinea-
Indonesia border have heightened the mutual suspicions
that dominate bilateral relations. Tensions rose as a
result of incursions by Indonesian military aircraft
into Papua New Guinean airspace in March. More
recently, Indonesian military actions against rebels in
the province of Irian Jaya have produced an
unprecedented 8,000 refugees fleeing into Papua New
Guinea.
Both parties want repatriation. This will be a
massive and politically complex undertaking that will
further arouse public sympathy in Papua New Guinea for
the indigenous Melanesian Irianese, who are of the same
ethnic stock as the Papua New Guineans. The problem
could broaden to involve Australia--where there is
intense public distrust of Indonesia--and the United
Nations--which Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, at
Indonesian insistence, thus far have shut out of the
repatriation process.
Althu h both Papua New Guinea and Indonesia say
they wan tia congenial relations, Indonesia's
patronizi of Papua New Guinea makes cooperation
difficult. The bitterness from the latest series of
This memorandum was prepared byl (Islands Branch,
Southeast Asia Division, Office of East Asian Analysis of the
Directorate of Intelligence. It was coordinated within the Directorate
of Intelligence. Information available as of 15 June 1984 was used in
its preparation. Catments are welcome and ma be directed to the Chief,
Southeast Asia Division,
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incidents will probably endure and
sharper reactions in the future.
stage for
An Ethnic Problem
Ethnic tensions along the Papua New Guinea - Indonesia
border are a key to the irritants that are never far below the
surface in bilateral relations. The indigenous Melanesian
inhabitants of the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya, which
constitutes the western half of the island of New Guinea, have
been concerned over their future since Indonesia absorbed the
area in 1963 (see map). At the same time, Papua New Guineans see
their ethnic kin across the border as suppressed by
"outsiders."
Fears have been heightened in the last several years by
Jakarta's transmigration program, the government-subsidized
resettlement of Indonesians from Java and other overpopulated
Indonesian islands into relatively empty Irian Jaya, which--
although slightly larger than California, has only 1.2 million
people. Jakarta plans to move 680,000 Javanese into Irian Jaya
in the five-year period beginning this year, although there are
doubts about its ability to entice this many to relocate.
Nevertheless, the program could in time result in the indigenous
Irianese being overwhelmed by Javanese settlers, a development
the Irianese fear will destroy their way of life. Although
Indonesian officials insist that local customs will be respected,
A separatist Irianese organization, the Free Papua Movement
(OPM) has pressed for international support for independence from
Jakarta since Indonesia absorbed Irian Jaya. Although its armed
core is only about 150 members, the OPM has harassed the
Indonesian military in Irian Jaya and has considerable sympathy
among ethnic Melanesians on both sides of the border. Despite
the OPM's limited capabilities, the Indonesian Government tends
typifies a prevailing Javanese contempt for the Irianese.
Foreign Minister Mochtar's recent remark that local "nomads who
run around naked" can benefit by learning from Javanese settlers
To maintain good relations with Jakarta, Port Moresby is at
pains to deny any support for the OPM or permit it to operate
from Papua New Guinean territory. It also prohibits political
activity by Irianese who have been granted legal residence in
Papua New Guinea and has returned illegal border crossers to
Indonesian control. Papua New Guinea is unable, however, to
adequately patrol the jungled and incompletely demarcated border
or to prevent OPM use of its territory. The Indonesian military
to blame it. for any security disturbances.
is convinced, probably with reason, that the OPM receives
material support and protection as a result of the collusion
local Papua New Guinean officials in the border area.
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Current Developments
The latest round of difficulties began in late March with
the alleged buzzing of a settlement ten miles inside Papua New
Guinea by two Indonesian jet fighters searching for a missing
civilian aircraft. Jakarta was aroused when the OPM killed two
and abducted two other Indonesian occupants of the missing aircraft
after it landed at a remote Irian Jaya airstrip -- further evidence
to Jakarta of Port Moresby's inability to control the OPM. The
OPM's subsequent release of the two prisoners probably headed off
an Indonesian rescue operation into Papua New Guinea, as had
occurred in earlier years. 25X1
When the Indonesian military refused to admit the incursion
of its search planes, Papua New Guinea expelled the Indonesian
military attache, who had been suspected of conducting
intelligence activities against the OPM. The Indonesian
military's denial, typical of its cavalier attitude toward Papua
New Guinea, undercut a growing disposition by the Foreign
Ministry to deal with Papua New Guinean officials as equals.
Foreign Minister Mochtar recently showed his frustration over
being upstaged by telling a reporter to "ask the military" about
the incident and has privately deplored to a US diplomat the
military's "provocative and unnecessary maneuvers."
Ministerial talks in Jakarta in April resulted in little 25X1
more than agreement for further discussions. The Indonesians
took offense at Papua New Guinean Foreign Minister Namaliu's
airport arrival statement offering to educate the Indonesians on
Melanesian culture. The Indonesians rejected his request for
prior notification of military operations near the border and
canceled appointments with the Indonesian Defense Ministry and
Armed Forces Commander Murdani. For its part, Papua New Guinea
rejected an Indonesian request for joint border patrols, for
which it does not have sufficient personnel and equipment.
The Refugee Problem 25X1
The key issue is the disposition of some 8,000 Irianese who
have crossed into Papua New Guinea since February, claiming they
were fleeing OPM-Indonesian military confrontations. There has
long been a trickle of Irianese refugees, but the recent influx
is particularly dramatic in view of the low number of border
crossers over the past two years.
Although Port Moresby is anxious to be relieved of the
refugee burden, it is bracing itself against mounting criticism
from the political opposition, students, and church workers
against its "pitiless and ruthless" disregard for fellow
Melanesians. Domestic opposition is unlikely to reach a level
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that would threaten the Somare government, however, and Port
Moresby is determined to push ahead with the repatriation.
Both Jakarta and Port Moresby want to carry out the
repatriation program as quietly as possible -- Jakarta-from a
desire to avoid international attention to its policies toward
its Melanesian minority. Believing that any successor to the
Somare government would almost certainly be less accommodating on
border issues, Jakarta also recognizes that it is in Indonesia's
interest to help Port Moresby minimize the domestic outcry.
Jakarta has provided Port Moresby with a modest amount of money,
to care for the refugees, pending their return.
Despite its preference for monitoring by the UN of the
refugee return, Port Moresby is acceding to Jakarta's insistence
that there be no UN involvement. Jakarta's attitude is based
partly on its experience with what it believes was intrusive UN
monitoring of its handling of Vietnamese boat refugees. This
sidestepping of the UN has annoyed the UN refugee representative
stationed in Port Moresby, who is upset over the lack of
screening for refugees who fear Indonesian retribution. In
addition, he considers Port Moresby's assertion that Jakarta
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promised humane treatment for returnees inadequate.
Australia: An Uncomfortable Observer
Tensions between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia present a
special problem to Australia, which wants amicable ties with its
populous neighbor, Indonesia, yet feels an obligation toward its
former UN trusteeship, Papua New Guinea. Canberra finds it
difficult to offer its good offices because both Papua New Guinea
and Indonesia are quick to view third-party suggestions as
interference. For example, Port Moresby recently delivered an
official protest over a recommendation in a leaked Australian
security document that Papua New Guinea be encouraged to suppress
OPM activities in order to reduce a potential threat to Papua New
Guinea from Indonesia.
Port Moresby also complained of violations of its
sovereignty when a recent Australian press interview with an OPM
leader in the border area was shown on Australian television
despite Papua New Guinea's disapproval. Port Moresby was further
angered by a suggestion by the head of the quasigovernment
Australian Broadcasting Corporation that the interview was
permissible because Papua New Guinea's form of democracy does not
meet Australia's standards.
Although it has tried to avoid the refugee issue as a
bilateral problem between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, the
Australian Government is finding it increasingly difficult to do
so in the face of intense public interest and sympathy for Papua
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New Guinea. Besides the immediate refugee issue, the Australians
are concerned over the ultimate impact of the transmigration
program on the Melanesians of Irian Jaya. Mindful of the strong
anti-Indonesian constituency in the Labor Party, and under
pressure from the press to persuade Jakarta to abandon the
transmigration program in Irian Jaya, the Hawke government is
searching for an opening to broach the subject informally with
Jakarta.
Outlook: Border Problems Intractable
However disposed either side professes to be to resolve
border problems, conflicting perceptions ensure sporadic
tensions. Jakarta's policy of assimilating the Irianese will
intensify concerns in Papua New Guinea over Melanesian brethren
in Irian Jaya. This, plus the Indonesian military's penchant for
armed repression of any dissidence, seems destined to rule out
any early settlement of differences. Both national governments
will try to project an image of cooperation, but this will have
limited effect in the absence of cooperation among local
officials along the border.
At the same time, a recurrence of mass movements of refugees
across the border appears inevitable, given Jakarta's
heavyhandedness in Irian Jaya. In view of concern already shown
in Australia and within the UN over the current refugee
situation, succeeding episodes will probably focus greater
international attention to Jakarta's policies in Irian Jaya.
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Typescript: Papua New Guinea - Indonesia: Uneasy Neighbors
Original-Branch
1--OEA/ITM
1--OEA/SEAR
1--D/OEA (4F18)
1--Research Director (4G48)
1--C/Production/OEA (4G48)
1--C/NIC (7E62)
1--NIO/EA (7E62)
2--DDI (7E44)
I--CPAS/ILS (7G50)
5.--CPAS/IMD/CB (7G07) 1 sourced
1--C/PES/DDI (7F24)
1--
1--
1-
1--OCR ISG
OEA/SE/IB (June 21, 1984) 25X1
Defense:
1--James Riordan
1--Bill Mayo
1--John Greenwood
1--Don Berlin
1--Stewart Ring
1--Capt. Craig Perkins
1--Rob Huddleston
1--Col William Wise
Treasury:
1--Douglas Mulholland
Commerce:
1--Bil'l DeRocher
1--Stephen Hall
1--Gene Lawson
State:
1--Paul Wolfowitz
1--Bob Carroll
1--John Dorrance
1--William Brown
1--Bob Brand
1--RADM Jonathan Howe
1--Joseph Winder
1--Paula Causey
NSC:
1--Richard Childress
1--Gaston Sigur
1--David Laux
Embassies:
1--Suva
1--Port Moresby
25X1
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