VIETNAM: USING THE MIA ISSUE AS A BARGAINING CHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000301800002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 26, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 June 1984
Vietnam: Using the MIA Issue as'a Bargaining Chip
Summary
In dealing with Washington on the issue of US servicemen
missing in action in Vietnam, Hanoi has had one overriding goal--
to gain concessions from the United States. During the first few
years after the war, Hanoi concentrated on conditions included in
the Paris accords of 1973: provision of US economic aid for
post-war reconstruction, and US respect for Vietnamese
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Although the Vietnamese
approach has fluctuated from abrasive to conciliatory in response
to US moves, the demands have remained largely the same. With
the invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, however, Hanoi expanded its
demand for recognition of Vietnamese sovereignty to include
recognition of the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin regime in
Phnom Penh.
As long as Hanoi and Washington remain at odds over the
Kampuchea issue, we expect no major shift in Vietnamese policy
toward MIAs. Concessions by the United States on lesser issues--
aid to Laos or adjustments to the Orderly Departure Program, for
example--would, however, probably enc ura a Hanoi to release some
additional information or remains. 25X1
The Early Policy: Trading Remains for Aid and Recognition
When Saigon fell to the Communists on 30 April 1975,
approximately 2,500 US personnel throughout Indochina--including
42 civilians--were listed by the Department of Defense as
unacknowledged prisoners of war, missing in action (MIA), or
is memorandum was prepared byl (Office of East 25X1
Asian Analysis. Information available as of 21 June 1984 was
used in its presentation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to Chief, Southeast Asia Division 25X1
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killed in action with bodies not recovered. And although the
Paris Agreements called for exchange of information concerning
missing personnel, Hanoi has stalled on providing names of
missing Americans or repatriating American remains. By mid-1984,
the Vietnamese had returned less than 100 remains, and only four
remains had been repatriated by Laos.
stalemate between the two countries.
Following their victory, Vietnamese leaders appeared
confident in their ability to use the MIA issue to ensure that
concessions contained in the 1973 Paris accords were met: first
and foremost, US economic aid, and second, US support for (or at
least noninterference with) Hanoi's attempts to establish itself
as the legitimate government of Vietnam. When Vietnam first
applied for admission to the United Nations in 1975, for example,
a Vietnamese diplomat told the US Embassy in Paris that his
government had agreed to release the remains of three US
pilots. After the United States cast its veto, the diplomat
informed the Embassy that permission had been withdrawn. The
second veto in September 1.976 brought an official letter from the
Vietnamese UN observers, blaming American "hostility" for the
obstructed progress on the MIA issue.
Hanoi's leaders initially adopted a manipulative and
abrasive tone. They accused the United States of failure to
comply with the Paris Agreements while claiming Vietnam had
"scrupulously" done so. Vietnamese spokesmen responded to US
countercharges by claiming that Washington's lack of goodwill
talks with the United States in Paris.
Vietnam's application until November, Vietnam agreed to hold
Hanoi Tries a New Tack
These tactics were clearly unsuccessful, and in the fall of
1976 the US announcement that it would again veto Vietnam's UN
bid because of the MIA issue prompted Hanoi to try a softer
approach. After the Security Council postponed consideration of
Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen o ac
stated that his governmen was making a concerted effort to
obtain more information on missing personnel. Thach said he
expected US,aid eventually, but would set no preconditions for
Beginning in December 1976, several developments may have
encouraged Vietnam to believe this softer stand would pay off
with the new administration:
-- The House Select Committee on Americans Missing in
Southeast Asia concluded in December 1976 that no live US
prisoners were being held in Indochina.
-- UN Ambassador-Designate Andrew Young stated in January
that talks might soon be reopened with Vietnam, and that
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he hoped that the United States would normalize ties with
the Vietnamese shortly.
-- President Carter quickly carried through on his campaign
promise to send a presidential commission to Hanoi to
discuss MIAs with the Vietnamese and Lao.
aid.
..But Demands Remain the Same
But the Vietnamese treatment of 'the Woodcock Commission in
March 1977 indicated that Hanoi's basic stand remained firm.
Although Vice Foreign Minister Phan Hien noted that any
information Hanoi might obtain on missing personnel would be
given to the United States "as soon as possible," he continued to
stress the Paris accords and US aid "obligations." The Lao
authorities followed Hanoi's lead, linking MIA information with
and it began to lobby Washington for normal relations.
again appeared willing to back off from its demand for US aid,
After the United States announced in May 1977 that it would
not provide reconstruction aid but neither would it veto
Vietnam's application to the United Nations--if MIA
investigations were ex edited--Hanoi reinforced its aid
demands. the Vietnamese planned to 25X1
stress normal relations, MIAS, and aid in any subsequent talks.
If the United States objected to demands for aid under the Paris
agreement b claiming that the April 1975 offensive had violated
the treaty, this argument would negate the 25X1"
provision dealing with s as well. The Vietnamese team
subsequently announced the names of 20 more MIAs whose remains
were to be released, but waited until Vietnam was admitted to the
United Nations in September 1977 before allowing repatriation of
the remains. 25X1
Kampuchea Brings Stalling--and Stiffening Attitude
With the deterioration in Vietnam's relations with China and
with the Chinese-supported regime in Kampuchea, Hanoi in mid-1978
Hanoi wanted to expand its
By late fall, however, preoccupation with China and with the
Khmer Rouge regime in Phnom Penh--plus lack of concrete progress
in improving relations with the United States--caused Hanoi to
turn decisively toward the Soviet Union. With the signing of the
Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in
permitted to emigrate.
Southeast Asia--the hostility between Hanoi and Beijing--and
believed that Washington would be receptive to a new approach.
The former chairman of the House Select Committee on MIAs was
invited to Hanoi and Vientiane, where the Lao promised to return
four remains; "unofficial" talks with the State Department were
held; and a small group of Vietnamese with US passports were
diplomatic contacts ecause ot the "current political climate" in
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China.
November 1978, Vietnam committed itself--and its weaker neighbor
Laos--to a course directly opposed to that of the Carter
administration. which was about to normalize relations with
conduit for any information from Kampuchea.
The Indochina Foreign Ministers' communique in late January
1984 attempted to increase pressure on the United States. The
three countries agreed to cooperate with each other on the MIA
question, but they stated that cooperation with the United States
would be conditional upon the renunciation of its "hostile"
policy. This unprecedented statement appeared to be a bald
attempt by Vietnam to use MIAs to persuade the United States to
grant de facto recognition of the Phnom Penh regime backed by
Hanoi. Shortly after the communique's release, Phnom Penh indeed
offered information concerning the whereabouts of US personnel
missing in Kampuchea between 1975 and 1979 to US officials, but
dropped the offer when the US refused to deal directly with the
Kampucheans. The Vietnamese thus far have refused to act as a
cases to the Vietnam Veterans of America.
On the eve of a US mission visit to Hanoi in 1982, Foreign
Minister Nguyen Co Thach publicly announced that further use of
the MIA issue by the United States for political purposes would
end Vietnamese cooperation. The Vietnamese then refused to set a
schedule for technical meetings and reacted to a subsequent US
veto on aid for Vietnam by providing new information on four MIA
MIA issue, and violating the Paris accords.
to castigate the United States for backing Chinese aggression,
unfairly holding Vietnam totally responsible for resolving the
The US reaction to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea
brought a turning point for Hanoi's policies on missing
personnel. Although the Vietnamese virtually discarded their
demands for aid, they adopted new, hard-line tactics aimed at
undermining US resolve to oppose the'occupation of Kampuchea.
They used MIA meetings to denounce US policy and they bypassed
official channels in favor of "sympathetic" Americans. During
the second of two technical meetings in 1981, the Vietnamese
released the names of three missing personnel and promised that
their remains would be delivered later. But Vu Hoang--head of
the Office for Seeking Missing Personnel--used this opportunity
some years previously--emphasizing US "responsibility" for war
damage, and Vientiane's desire for aid and improved relations.
Testing the Waters With Laos?
The Lao similarly have adopted a "carrot and stick"
policy. After the United States made a donation to a Lao
hospital in late 1981, the Lao agreed to invite the National
League of Families to visit the following year. According to the
US Embassy, Lao rhetoric during the visit echoed that of Vietnam
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willingness to provide aid or make concessions to a close ally.
For this reason--and because Laos has faithfully followed
Vietnam's foreign policy initiatives--we believe Hanoi encouraged
Laos to begin MIA negotiations with the United States. Hanoi's
leaders may have been seeking to open a second forum (under
Vietnamese guidance) to increase Hanoi's leverage or to test US
for aid to Vietnam.
Hanoi's Policy for the Future
We expect Hanoi and Vientiane to continue to manipulate the
MIA issue in an attempt to gain concessions from the United
States. Basically, Hanoi seeks changes in US policy that would
lead to recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea and
provision of aid to Vietnam. We doubt, however, that the
Vietnamese leadership expects to achieve such goals, and we think
Hanoi may be willing to trade information or remains for lesser
concessions--less vocal US support for ASEAN's Kampuchea policy,
for example, or a US agreement to support an "empty-seat" formul a
for Kampuchea at the UN. Hanoi also has been seeking a separate
emigration quota for Amerasian children under the Orderly
Departure Program in order to speed up the departure of children
fathered by US servicemen during the war. Finally, Hanoi might
be more forthcoming in response to a long-term aid agreement
between the United States and Laos that would indirectly benefit
the Vietnamese by easing their aid commitments to Vientiane.
Such an agreement, however, might also lead to increased pressure
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Appendix
Chronology of MIA-Rel ated Events
1955
February Viet Minh sign agreement with French on searching
for, disintering, repatriating remains of missing
combatants from both sides. Viet Minh to provide
information on graves in the South, and if French
cannot find the sites, the Viet Minh will locate
the sites for them.
1969
May
1973
January
First official US public statement of
dissatisfaction with North Vietnamese treatment of
the POW/MIA issue.
United States and North Vietnam sign the Agreement
on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in
Vietnam (Paris Accords). Hanoi provides list of
all POWs in North Vietnam and repatriates them
within the stipulated 60 days.
February Talks begin on US economic aid to North Vietnam.
September Hanoi delegation to Four Part Joint Military Team
announces it will not search for MIAs while South
Vietnam continues to hold political prisoners.
1975
April Hanoi releases names of three MIAs killed in North
Vietnam to Senator Edward Kennedy.
June Pham Van Dong offers to normalize relations with
United States, demanding that US honor
"obligations" of reconstruction aid.
August North' V i etnamese diplomat tells US Embassy in Paris
Hanoi will turn over three sets of remains, but
offer is withdrawn after US vetoes Vietnam's UN
application.
September House Select Committee on MIAs formed.
December Vietnamese Ambassador meets with Select Committee
in Paris, links aid to MIAs, and offers to turn
over three sets of remains.
1976
March-August United States and Vietnam exchange notes on
normalization talks; United States stresses MIA
accounting as precondition, Vietnam stresses aid
"obligations."
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July Hanoi labels President Ford's speech to the
National League of Families "slanderous," and
accuses Ford of electioneering.
September Hanoi announces second try for UN seat, and turns
over list of 12 MIAs killed in North Vietnam; the
first such release since April 1975. Hanoi again
charges President Ford is using MIAs for
electioneering.
November US-Vietnam delegations negotiate in Paris.
December US Select Committee reports belief that no US
personnel are being held alive in Indochina,
recommends that United States begin direct
discussions in order to gain fullest possible
accounting.
1977
March Woodcock Commission travels to Hanoi and Vientiane;
Vietnam says it will cooperate with United States
on MIAs but continues to stall; MIA procedures set
up.
May
United States announces it will not veto next
Vietnamese application to UN if Hanoi will speed up
MIA investigations, but United States will not
grant aid. US-Vietnamese talks resume;
Congressional Resolution prohibits all nonemergency
aid to Indochina.
June Vietnam announces names of 20 MIAs.
September Vietnam gains UN seat; remains of 20 MIAs
repatriated.
1978
July VNOSMP and JCRC personnel meet in Hawaii.
August Congressional team visits Vietnam and Laos; four
remains promised from Laos, 14 from Vietnam.
December Vietnam invades Kampuchea
1979
August Congressional delegation finds Hanoi willing to
talk but not to compromise.
1980
October JCRC officials hold talks in Hanoi.
1981
February JCRC-VNOSMP meeting in Hanoi.
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June JCRC-VNOSMP meeting; three MIA names released.
December Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) visit Hanoi.
1982
February Joint US-League of Families delegation to Hanoi.
May Vietnam releases four MIA names to VVA.
September JCRC-League of F a m i l i e s group visits Hanoi and
Vientiane; Laos allows them to visit crash sites;
Thach subsequently announces acceptance of
quarterly technical meetings.
December Technical experts meet in Hanoi; inspect crash
site.
1983
February JCRC delegations visits both Hanoi and Vientiane;
Hanoi provides information on 12 names.
1984
January Indochina Foreign Ministers' communique takes hard
line on MIAs.
February US mission visits Hanoi.
April Hanoi postpones JCRC-VNOSMP technical meeting.
May
First team of Australian officials allowed into
Vietnam to look for Australian MIAs.
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Subject: V
ietnam: Using the MIA Issue as a Bargaining Chip
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Distributio
n:
Origina
l - Richard Childress, NSC
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI`
1 - NI0/EA
1 - 25X1
1 -
1 -
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1 - CPAS/ILS
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - D/OEA
1 - Research Director
1 - OEA/SEA/ITM
1 - OEA/SEA/IB
1 - OE A'/SEA
2 - OCR/ISG
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