(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000201170001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
January 30, 1984
CHINA: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE SPIRITUAL POLLUTION CAMPAIGN
Summary
China's two-month old campaign against "spiritual
pollution"--a codephrase deriding liberalizing trends in
ideology--has begun to wind down, although the concern for
ideological conformity and. social control that triggered the
campaign has not abated. We believe the campaign is being reined
in primarily because it had become ?a vehicle for attacking
elements of the reform program--such as the agricultural
responsibility system--and had.aroused foreign speculation that
it might adversely affect China's open-door policy. '`Because the
campaign exacerbated a longstanding dispute within the party over
the role of ideology in society, we believe the issue will emerge
The confusion generated by the spiritual pollution issue and
by the contradictory guidance emanating from Beijing suggests
that some political jockeying occurred within the Politburo over
the scope and targets 'of the campaign. We do not believe the
situation verged on a major power strugFle, but available
evidence does suggest that strains and disagreements developed
during the course of the campaign, contributing to confusion at
lower levels'. General Secretary Hu Yaobang at times appeared to
be a target of damaging criticism for.tolerating spiritual
pollution, but was nonetheless instrumental in curtailing the
excesses of the campaign. Insofar as any light has been shed on
Chinese leadership dynamics, we believe the campaign has
underscored the potential constraining forces that party and army
conservatives can have on the reform program and On the political
conduct of Deng's successors.
This memorandum was prepared by members of the Domestic
Policy Branch, Office of East Asian Analysis, Directorate of
directed to the Chief Domestic Policy Branch
_Trta -
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Origins of the campaignl
Although the spiritual pollution issue--in various forms--
has been debated in China for years, we are not certain why Deng
chose to highlight the issue in his speech to the 2nd Plenum of
the 12th Central Committee in mid-October. That Deng himself has
been concerned with the question of "liberalism" and unorthodox
ideas among writers and artists is clear from his key speeches
over the last five years. Furthermore, the issue involves very
fundamental philosophical problems that have plagued party
ideologues ever since the fall of the Gang of Four, namely how to
manage the contradiction between promoting material progress
through economic reform and maintaining ideological orthodoxy and
tight social.controls. Chinese-leaders also want to avoid a
Polish-style situation and to combat the cynicism that has
afflicted the Darty and the society at large regarding'"Communist
For Deng and his old guard Politburo colleagues, the
solution seems to be to reiterate orthodox Marxist concepts, to
maintain party domination of intellectual life, and to shut off
debate when it affects the party's prestige or legitimacy.
Although Deng has been associated in the past with,advbcacyof a 25X1
writers and artists to observe the party's boundaries.
We believe the fact that his warnings were ignored not only
affronted Deng personally but exposed him to criticism from party
conservatives. Deng is also concerned that well-Known party
theoreticians, such as former propaganda chief Zhou Yang and two
senior-editors of the People's Daily, have promoted heterodox
ideas in major speeches and articles. Borrowing freely from
"bourgeois" philosophers, they discussed~Marx's "humanism" and
personal "alienation" caused by the party in a socialist
society. These ideas evidently were perceived as threatening by
the party elders, because they contributed to a loss of faith in
Deng's'speech-to the October 1983 plenum can therefore be
seen as a continuation of his battle against "liberalism" and
tolerance for heretical thinking in the party's propaganda
apparatus. He defined the problem in broad terms: spiritual
pollution consists not only of spreading "decadent and declining
ideas of the bourgeoisie," but also of losing faith in socialism
1See appendix for a detailed chronology of the spiritual
pollution campaign.
2
CFrprT
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Lack of Guidance Leads to Problems
We do not know whether Deng intended that hi.s remarks should
become the basis for a nationwide ideological campaign, or
whether that decision was made by other leaders. That the
campaign got under way within,a week of the plenum suggests it
was planned in advance. That different leaders seemed to take
the movement in different directions suggests it was not well-
organized enough 'to prevent distortion for other objectives. The
campaign against spiritual pollution moved ahead rapidly in late
October, with State Chairman Li'Xiannian, NPC Chairman Peng Zhen,
and military leader Wang Zhen raising the issue in major?
speeches. Wang in particular seemed to alter the tone of the
debate by linking spiritual pollution to an "antirightist"
theme. He told an audience of ideological workers in Nanjing
that they needed to undergo a purge.
The campaign hit its peak in early November, when a few
writers publicly admitted the existence of the problem within
their. ranks, Zhou Yang made a guarded self-criticism for speeches
and articles he authored on "alienation in socialism," and Hu
Jiwei and Wang Ruoshui--the two "liberal" editors of Pe_o lp e's
Daily--were sacked. On 8 November, the spiritual pollution issue
was added to an otherwise nondescript editorial on.rural
concerns, implying that it was a serious problem in the
countryside, requiring party action. On 12 November, the
People's Daily printed a vitriolic commentary, entitled
"Eliminating Spiritual Pollution Is Also a Kind of. Emancipation
of the Mind," which implicitly attacked many reform policies and
contained oblique criticisms of Hu Yaobang and perhaps even Deng
himself. The commentary also seemed to nuestinn a's
association with the United States.
Some members of the party and other influential non-party
leaders apparently viewed these developments with alarm, and began
to make their misgivings known to the party leadership. They
raised fears that the campaign would degenerate into a reckless
"anti-rightist" one in 1957, and would disrupt
practical work.
Reports from around the country also related serious
excesses carried out in the name of eliminating spiritual
pollution. The China Youth League, for example, complained that
some cadre had criticized youth for wearing colorful clothes and
stylish.hairdos, or for reading Western classical literature.
Local cadre, many of them Cultural Revolution holdovers, took
advantage of uncertain guidelines to attack any and all things
that smacked of liberalism, including established party
policies. In the military, things went even further. Soldiers
were charged with spiritual pollution for complaining about army
food, putting up pictures of their ai ds, and smoking
filter-tipped cigarettes.
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Efforts to rein in the spiritual pollution campaign began as
early as 16 November, with the publication in People's Daily of a
commentator's article that took a moderate approach to the issue,
urging caution and avoidance of the extreme methods typical of
the Cultural Revolution era. In its tone and page placement, the
article resembled an authoritative editorial. That it was only a
commentary, and therefore less authoritative, suggests that the
prlvdng may not have been full a on he question of
providing guidance.for.the campaign-. 25X1
The campaign sputtered on, and efforts to bring it under
control were-piecemeal. On 8 December, Propaganda Department
head Deng Liqun told an audience of propaganda workers,that the
spiritual pollution campaign was not to be ca~ried'but in the
countryside, reversing the earlier editorial. Subsequently,
scientists, foreign trade workers, and nonparty leaders were told
that the campaign would not be permitted to interfere with their
During this period, Hu Yaobang's views on spiritual
pollution found their way into the media. Hu, whose silence on
the campaign may have been a sign of reservations about it, told
Chinese students in Japan that the campaign should be confined
strictly.to ideology and to literature and art. His remarks were
picked up by the Workers' Daily on 12 December-but were ignored
The party finally issued a form of authoritative guidance on
23 December. A speech by PLA General Political Department
director Yu Qiuli, delivered at the end of November, was
republished in the People's Daily with an editorial note that the
party leadership found the speech "excellent, comprehensive, and
completely in,line.with the realities." Yu attacked local
excesses and set out strict guidelines for implementing. the
campaign: only those things specified by the Central Committee
are to be criticized as spiritual pollution, and only in a
restrained and prescribed manner.
2Deng Liqun had made another important speech on 28
November, laying out "ten clear lines of demarcation" for the
campaign. The speech was not published. in full, however.
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The People's Daily New Year's Day editorial, usually a
programmatic description of the work to be done in the ensuing
year, made scant mention of spiritual pollution and insisted
repeatedly that "economic construction" was the party's prime
task; "under no circumstances should this task be interfered with
or undermined." Later in the month, US Embassy sources were told
that the spiritual pollution campaign was essentially' over.
A Damage Assessment 25X1
We believe that the issue of spiritual pollution is very
important within the party-and that it will arise again in the
course of rectification, as well as in routine guidance of
literary work. The issue also involves the party's commitment to
reform. It is remarkable how quickly local officials, presumably
opposed to reformist methods, if not goals, made use of the
campaign to attack even successful reform policies. The hyper-
sensitivity of cadre to shifts in the political line from Beijing
is a reminder that support for r f rm am on leftist local
officials is tenuous at best. 25X1
It is less clear that the minimal guidance given,the
campaign and its confused course reflect divisions within the
central leadership. The evidence thus far is merely
suggestive:
-- Postponement of a work conference to discuss ideological
issues from December to the spring of 1984.
-- Reversal of the 8 November editorial;
--.The month-long delay in publi~hinP Yu Qiuli's speech
providing guidance to the PLA and the relative lack of
publicity for Deng Liqun's speech limiting the campaign.
-- A National Peoples Congress Standing Committee meeting in
early-December discussed the spiritual pollution issue for
several days but was unable to issue, an official statement
because the issue was "complex and its solution will be
The coincidence of the campaign with renewed criticism of Hu
Yaobang is another factor:suggesting it has been internally
divisive. Hu's close association with some of the writers under
attack, his month-long silence on the conduct of the campaign and
the selective editing of his comments in early December all
suggest. to us that he was a target ofthe controversy. Moreover,
3The current campaign has not set,the army against the
party, as did the Bai Hua affair, although the issue is
strikingly similar. Yu's?guidance suggests Deng's speech was
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' I I
he was implicitly attacked in some of the early November
commentaries. At the same time, Hu's leadership style was
reportedly being criticized by several senior Politburo
members. We believe that Hu's reputation and leadership
credibility were damaged by these events, though not
irreparably. Hu seems to have been instrumental in efforts to
We do not believe that the campaign issue should be read as
a major factional breakdown or power struggle at the top.
Nonetheless, the campaign seems to have created strains and
exposed differences in approach between leaders apparently
willing to tolerate some intellectual ferment--such as Hu--and
more conservative leaders who will brook no challenge to accepted,
dogma, particularly on the issue of the party's ideological
mandate. There may also be a generational element to the
disagreements, with elders seeking ideological unity and
"successors" stressing the need to get on with .practical economic
work. Despite their differences, the leadership reached a
consensus that the campaign had been ineffective and needed to be
restricted. The curtailment of the campaign suggests that, in the
press. their efforts for a,party purge and economic reform.
In our view, the spir.itual pollution campaign exacerbated 25X1
ideological divisions within the party. For that reason, we do
not believe the spiritual pollution campaign is over. The'debate
in fact, has continued within the press, albeit in a more
controlled and limited fashion. It is clear that major
differences of view still exist in the party over. ideological
questions. The planned Central Committee meeting on ideology
this spring will provide an opportunity to raise spiritual
pollution again, and we expect the co.ntrotversy to continue.
We believe that the inept way in which the party has handled 25X1
the spiritual pollution issue probably has damaged its already
tattered reputation among China's intellectuals and disaffected
youth. the campaign caused at least some 25X1
intellectua s to pull away from involvement in party affairs.
Literature and art production dropped off sharply, with writers
.fearful of publishing anythin that mi ht later be attacked as
culturally contaminated. 25X1
arrow
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APPENDIX: A CHRONOLOGY OF THE "SPIRITUAL POLLUTION" DEBATE
1983
22 Sep Zhongguo Jiaoyu Bao (China Educational Journal.) publishes an
editorial entitled, "Educational Workers Must Combat
Intellectual Pollution," an early reference to problems
criticized in subsequent propaganda.
24 Sep Deng Liqun tells an academic degree committee that' educators,
theoretical. workers, and literary and art workers should
spheres."
30 Sep In National Day toast, Zhao Ziyang notes continuing efforts to
"prevent and counter moral pollution by decadent bourgeois
ideology."
12 Oct Communique of 2nd Plenum and publication of rectification
"Decision." Communique mentions onlyDeng/Chen speeches on
ideological work, notes a meeting will beheld to make-
decisions on topic. "Decision" discusses "corrosive influence
of bourgeois ideology" but doesn't adopt "spiritual pollution"
rhetoric.
15 Oct Liberation Army Daily (LAD) editorial asks party members to
"dare to struggle against.acts that cause spiritual
pollution."
18 Oct Li Xianriian and Ni Zhifu both use the term in their speeches
at the 10th National Trade Union Conference.
21 Oct Peng Zhen makes speech to forum of important non-party
personages and provides first open media discussion on
contents of Deng's speech to 2nd plenum: says Deng's themes
were rectification and spiritual pollution.
23 Oct Wang Zhen, in Nanjing,. discusses Deng's speech and calls for
"purification" of the ranks of theory teachers. Wang calls
for action "to correct the rightist tendency of.weakness and
laxity."
27 Oct Xinhua reports Hu Yaobang's address to the forum of non-party.
personages, which is basically a'historical review with only a
very perfunctory mention of opposing spiritual pollution.
Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily) editorializes that "spiritual
pollution is neither a common problem of ideology nor a purely
academic problem, but a political problem of reality."
31 Oct People's Daily.frontpages a commentary, "Hold Aloft the Banner
of Socialist Literature and Art and Resolutely Guard Against
and Eliminate Spiritual Pollution." Enjoins party members to
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stand in the front rank of the.struggle. Warns against .
repeating leftist error of. "oversimplified, one-sided, crude,
and'excessive" criticism.
1 Nov. Speaking to foreign correspondents, Deng Liqun denies any
danger of the new campaign leading to another Cultural
Revolution.
4 Nov Writers hold press conference, say they have nothing to fear,
and warmly embrace criticism while denouncing spiritual
pollution.
5 Nov Zhou Yang offers his self-criticism, and thanks "Comrade Hu
Yaobang and others" who attended a meeting of the Central
Advisory Commission: "They sternly criticized. me, but also
helped me with warmth."
In a lengthy. PD article, prominent. party philospher Xing Bensi
refutes the theory of alienation.
7 Nov .Wenyi Bao (Literary Gazatte), the party's primary arts
journal, prints a lengthy editorial which asserts that?one
reason for the appearance of spiritual pollution is that "the
leadership in literature and art is generally incompetent."
8 Nov The first PD editorial to address spiritual pollution is
entitled, "It is Imperative to Eliminate Spiritual Pollution
in Building Civility Villages and Towns." Notes presence of
ideological confusion among some peasants. Passages on
spiritual pollution look almost like editorial inserts. (See
entry'of 8 Dec., following)
9 Nov PD front page commentator, "Pay Utmost Attention to Party
Rectification Study,.Raise the Consciousness of Communist
Party Members," seeks to make a clear connection between the
drive against' spiritual pollution and party rectification.
Solving the problem of 'spiritual pollution is a necessary
first step in attaining the first goal of rectification,
ideological unity.
Xinhua reports speech by Deng Liqun to more than 100
theoretical workers on 5 Nov., citing "lack of organization"
among theorists as a main cause of spiritual pollution.
Indirectly promises greater central control and attributes
term "spiritual pollution" to Deng Xiaoping.
12 Nov Incendiary PD front page commentator, "Eliminating Spiritual
Pollution is Also a Kind of Emancipation of the Mind," uses
inflammatory language to criticize some of the rhetoricof
reform, cites explicitly anti-US articles by Mao to criticize
fawning attitude toward foreign things.
14 Nov ? AFP publishes officially confirmed story that Hu Jiwei and
Wang Ruoshui are sacked from PD posts.*
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15 Nov Speaking again to Western journalists, Deng Liqun denies that
current drive will lead to another "anti-rightist" campaign, or
Cultural Revolution.
Guan min Ribao (GMRB), party newspaper aimed at
Intel ectua s, Commentator, "Elimination of Spiritual
Pollution Must Also Take Practice as the Criterion." A fairly
hard-line piece, makes an imprecise connection between crimes
of the young and spiritual pollutants.
16 Nov PD front page commentator, entitled "Build Spiritual
Civilization, Oppose Spiritual Pollution," looks just like the
long awaited.editorial--but isn't. Takes a relatively
moderate, instructive line. Quotes Deng's 2nd plenum speech,
defining spiritual pollution as "spreading all kinds of
corrupt and declining ideas of the bourgeoisie," and "a lack
of, faith in the cause of socialism and communism or in the
leadership of the Communist Party."
17 Nov Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), organ'of the China
Youth League, runs a commentator article stating that 'young
people who want their lives to be more colorful and
interesting should not be accused pursuing a bourgeois way of
life.
GMRB Commentator addresses "Eliminating Spiritual Pollution
and the Opening Up to the Outside World," saying that the
"stupid way" of opposing the open door must be resisted, but
so too must the liberal trend of uncritically borrowing
foreign things.
LAD Commentator, "Carry Out Reeducation in Opposing
Liberalism," states that "the current struggle to combat
spiritual pollution is a part,of the party rectification
campaign."
20`Nov
28 Nov
In a meeting with Korean Workers Party delegation, Hu Yaobang
says that a major purpose of party consolidation and
opposition to spiritual pollution is to effect.a rise in
economic work.
Deng Liqun addresses a joint meeting of cultural department
and radio. and television propaganda workers, discussing the
scope, policies, and limits of campaign to eliminate spiritual
pollution. Talk includes the authoritative "10 clear lines of
demarcation" but is only excerpted in press coverage:
30 Nov Yu Qiuli addressed GPD audience on how to draw clear lines of
demarcation in eliminating spiritual pollution. Speech is
mentioned in press, but full text is not published.
Excerpts--cited as Central Committee guidance--are published
on 23 Dec. (See entry of that date, following)
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 2 Dec 3rd Session of the 6th NPC Standing Committee publishes
comments from 5 plenary meetings (from 29 Nov to 2 Dec) at
which spiritual pollution is discussed. Secretariat member
.Chen Pixian notes some are shocked by drive to eliminate
spiritual pollution, and asks "what's wrong with a little
shock?"
A front page "short commentary" in PD, "Eliminate Spiritual
Pollution, Draw Clear Distinctions," hits the now familiar
themes--make careful demarcation, don't disrupt the economy.
8 Dec Xinhua radio alerts listeners to pay attention for important
commentary: "'Eliminate Spiritual Pollution' Should Not Be
Mentioned in the Countryside." Hence the only PD editorial of
the drive is reversed. Report goes on to cite excesses of
cadre who felt licensed by the editorial of one month earlier.
NPC Standing Committee meeting ends, declines to issue a
decision on eliminating spiritual pollution despite spending 7
days on it. Peng Zhen says, "It is all right not to make a
decision for the time being."
9 Dec Deng Liqun again, at a forum on 'ideological and political work
in enterprises: "We should firmly focus on economic
construction and must not waver on this question." Explains
that the Central Committee decided the drive against spiritual
pollution was inappropriate in rural areas.
9 Dec A front page PD Commentator--"Encourage the Peasants to Go All
Out to Become Well-Off Through Hard Work"--backs up Central
Committee decision to stop the spiritual pollution campaign in
the countryside, once again discusses the erroneous criticisms
leveled at wealthy peasants.
12 Dec Gongren Ribao (Workers' Daily) quotes Hu Yaobang in a front.
page commentator: "Spiritual Pollution chiefly refers.to the
remarks and works of a very small number of people in
theoretical circles and in the fields of literature and art
that are harmful to the building of the four modernizations
and to the stability and unity of the country."
13 Dec GMRB summarizes the Gongren Ribao commentator and edits out
Hu's remarks.
23 Dec Xinhua broadcasts excerpts from Yu Qiuli's 30 November speech,
which bears the imprimatur of the Central Committee:
"excellent, comprehensive, and completely in line with the
realities in various localities and departments."
GMRB publishes Deng Liqun speech of 4 June 83, "Propaganda
Workers Must Maintain a Clear Head." Obviously revised,
speech has Deng, some four months before the 2nd Plenum,
calling for the elimination of "spiritual pollution."
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26. Dec Mao's birthday commemorated with a full turnout of the
leadership at the Mao Mausoleum, a PD editorial, and on the
25th, a long remembrance by Hu Yaobang.
Cultural figure Lin Mohan, writing in Honggi (pp. 33-35),
notes that "to eliminate spiritual pollution requires
destruction." Notes that some writers have stopped writing to
protest the drive against spiritual pollution.
28 Dec In GMRB front pager, commentator Shi Youxin calls combating
spiritual pollution "a vital content of party
rectification." Shi denies that the struggle is winding down,
says it is long-term, necessary project.
31 Dec The PD'New Year's editorial subordinates spiritual pollution--
and everything else on the agenda, rectification included--to
economic construction.' Spiritual pollution is given hardly
any space..
9 Jan Zhang Xiaotian, author of "Boundless Grass Over the Plain,"
offers a cowering self-criticism in PD (p. 7).
10 Jan Banyuetan Commentator, "Prospects for 1984," almost skips
mention of spiritual pollution. Drive is indeed winding down,
despite Shi Youxin's protestations.
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Distribution: China: A Perspective on Spiritual Pollution
EA M 84-10018
National Security Council
1 - Senior Staff Assistant for China and Hong Kong (David Laux)
Department of State
1 - Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
(William Brown)
1 - Director, INR (Hugh Montgomery)
1 - Director of Research, INR (Carol Bauman)
1 - Chief, Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, INR
(Jay Taylor)
1 - INR/EC/RE (Emil. Erickson)
1 - Director, Office of'Chinese Affairs,. Bureau of East Asia and
Pacific Affairs (Don Anderson) .
1 - Chief, Economic Section, Office of Chinese Affairs
Department of Defense
1 - Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs (James Kelly)
Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - DIO for East Asia and Pacific
1 - Chief, DE3
Central Intelligence Agency
2 - D/DDI
1 - D/OEA
2 - C/OEA/CH
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOR
1 - C/OEA/CH'/DEF
1 - C/OEA/NA
1 - C/OEA/SE
1 - NIO/EA
1 - OCR/EA
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - D/NIC
5 - OCO IMB.CB
1 -
1 - FBIS China
1 - FBIS/NEAD/CE
1 - C/PES/DDI