FACTORS DRIVING NORTH KOREA'S BEHAVIOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100560001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Factors Driving
North Korea's Behavior
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Secret
EA 84-10045
March 1984
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Intelligence
Factors Driving
North Korea's Behavior
This pa er was prepared byl 25X1
f the Office of East Asian Analysis. 25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Northeast Asia Division, on
Secret
EA 84-10045
M irrh 19R4
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Secret
Factors Driving
North Korea's Behavior
Key Judgments North Korea's single, unswerving goal over the past three decades has been
Information available reunification of the Peninsula on its own terms. We see no evidence that
as of 2 March 1984. P'yongyang has softened its position on this issue or is considering doing so.
We believe North Korea's behavior springs from its reading of a number of
factors against which it measures progress toward reunification:
? South Korea's political stability and international standing.
? South Korea's economic outlook.
? Seoul's relations with Washington.
? Great-power attitudes toward the Korean question.
We believe that from P'yongyang's perspective the trend in all of these
factors has been decidedly negative in recent years.
A final element, is the political situation 25X1
in the North. We see no evidence that Kim 11-song's scheme to have his el-
dest son, Kim Chong-il, succeed him is taking policy in unforeseen
directions. There is little in the internal political scene to suggest the North
is engaged in a fundamental rethinking of its reunification goal.
The Rangoon bombing and the nearly simultaneous push for talks with the
United States and South Korea are not, in our opinion, evidence of a
radical shift in North Korean strategy. Behind both we see a certain logic
and consistent effort to reverse a negative drift of events and to advance
P'yongyang's unchanged objectives:
? The Rangoon bombing, had it succeeded, would have eliminated the man
who personified the South's political and economic successes and its
improved security ties with the United States.
? The talks initiative, in our view, is calculated primarily to drive a wedge
between Washington and Seoul and to register North Korean interests as
clearly as possible in any great-power discussions on Korea.
Secret
EA 84-10045
March 1984
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Throughout this year we expect P'yongyang to press its propaganda
offensive on the talks issue. We believe, however, that trends will continue
to work against P'yongyang, resulting in a more isolated and frustrated
leadership whose willingness to take risks will increase. The year or two
leading up to the summer Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988 could be a par-
ticularly dangerous time. We cannot rule out other North Korean terrorist
or subversive acts in the more immediate future to capitalize on a unique
opportunity such as that presented in Rangoon. In sum, the outlook is for a
more uncertain-and hence dangerous-period on the Korean Peninsula.
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Factors Driving
North Korea's Behavior
North Korea's single, unswerving goal over the past
three decades has been reunification of the Peninsula
on its own terms, and we see no evidence that
P'yongyang has softened its position on this issue or is
considering doing so. The key obstacle to this goal has
been the US commitment to South Korea's defense,
symbolized by the US troops stationed in the South.
Over the years, North Korea has used. a variety of
tactics to remove the US presence. Although the
tactics shift, North Korea continues to try for the
withdrawal of US forces to clear the way for an
attack on the South if necessary.
The record attests to P'yongyang's actions on this
score; they cover the spectrum from attempts on the
life of two South Korean presidents to fitful dialogues
with the South during the 1970s, to offers to talk with
the United States and South Korea. The Rangoon
bombing targeted at South Korean President Chun
Doo Hwan last October and P'yongyang's nearly
concurrent offer of more flexible terms for talks are
only the latest steps to this end.
This paper attempts to describe P'yongyang's complex
calculus on its options toward the South.
The Determining Factors
We believe North Korea's seemingly unpredictable
behavior is a function of four factors against which it
measures progress toward the goal of reunification on
its own terms:
? South Korea's stability and international standing.
? South Korea's economic outlook.
? Seoul's relations with Washington.
? Great-power interest in the Korean question.
Internal North Korean politics is a fifth-and possi-
South Korean Stability and International Standing
In our view, the North understands that the political
fluidity in the South following the assassination of
Park Chung Hee in late 1979 has long since passed.
Since Chun Doo Hwan and his military backers
seized power during that unsettled period, he has
made substantial progress toward political stability.
With the backing of the Army and the security
services, Chun appears firmly in place at least until
near the end of his term in 1988. Indeed, his ability to
weather domestic political difficulties-the financial
scandals of 1982-83-is only one of many measures of
durability that the North must find hard to ignore.
Although he lacks popularity, he is broadly accepted
by the South Korean public.
Dissidence continues, but demands for democratic
reform evoke little public interest. Organized opposi-
tion to Chun is fragmented and less active than it was
when he was consolidating control. Politicians in the
opposition parties are closely wedded to his system.
He has barred his strongest opponents from political
activity while allowing those individuals willing to
work within the system to resume carefully managed
political roles.
Nor is a fifth column likely to develop in South Korea,
despite P'yongyang's best efforts. Even if unenthusias-
tic about Chun, the populace remains staunchly anti-
Communist. Broadly felt sentiment for a unified
Korea exists but has not weakened popular aversion to
Kim 11-song and the system in the North. Opposition
to Communism was strikingly evident even during the
antigovernment uprising in Kwangju in 1980, when
rioters voluntarily turned over to the authorities sever-
al individuals whose actions seemed too militant and
too closely patterned on Communist tactics.
bly critical-element in the equation
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In the international arena-where each side expends
considerable energy competing for power, influence,
and legitimacy-the North must acknowledge that it
is falling behind. South Korea's growing assertiveness
on the international stage has eclipsed North Korea in
many respects. The latest diplomatic tally has 121
countries recognizing South Korea, against 101 recog-
nizing the North. Most of the credit must go to
Seoul's vigorous and persistent economic inducements
to developing countries and to President Chun's per-
sonal summit diplomacy and travels, which have
opened doors in the Middle East, Africa, and South-
east Asia.
South Korea's newly acquired prestige is most evident
in its gaining the opportunity to host a number of
planned international events, including the Asian
Games in 1986 and the Olympics in 1988-develop-
ments P'yongyang must find particularly galling.
These kinds of events have symbolic importance be-
cause they underscore the legitimacy of the Seoul
government. The depth of North Korean concern
seemed evident last fall, for example, when the North
made a determined but ultimately unsuccessful bid to
derail the conference of the Interparliamentary Union
in Seoul.
South Korea's Economic Outlook
South Korea's resurgent economy is a blow to P'yong-
yang as well. We imagine it is a source of discomfort
to Northern policymakers as they contemplate their
own bleak situation. Sound management and favor-
able external developments during 1983 have cata-
pulted Seoul back into the ranks of the world's growth
leaders. Broad economic indicators were striking; real
GNP grew by more than 9 percent, inflation was
below 3 percent, and the current account deficit was a
manageable $2 billion. Barring external shocks, the
South Korean economy is poised to perform well in
the years ahead.
Even in one of the South's few vulnerable economic
spots-foreign lending-there seems to be only cold
comfort for the North. Seoul's $40 billion debt is the
third largest among developing countries, but a broad-
based austerity program substantially reduces the
possibility of a debt-financing crisis. South Korea's
international credit rating is strong, and bankers
continue to extend the loans Seoul requires for eco-
nomic growth.
By contrast, the North's economy has been stagnant
over the past. two years, and growth has been sluggish
for nearly a decade. P'yongyang's inability to manage
its foreign debt-it has been in default to Western
creditors for years on about $1.6 billion-and its large
outlays for military programs are the primary reasons
for its dismal economic record. Industrial production
is hamstrung by shortages of electricity and coal.
Many plants operate below capacity and even are
forced into temporary shutdowns. The North's best
hope for growth depends orr obtaining sizable assist-
ance from its main Communist trade partners, the
Soviet Union and China. Neither, however, appears
likely to underwrite economic development in the
North. In our view, the South's economic lead appears
insurmountable, and the gap will continue to widen.
Seoul's Relations With Washington
The strains that existed in the last years of Park
Chung Hee's rule-and that the North hoped were
permanent-have largely dissipated. Under the Chun
government, US-South Korean security ties have
strengthened. The shelving in early 1981 of the plan
to withdraw US troops from the South halted a
decade of US disengagement from Asia. In our view,
the South-as well as the North-perceives the US
commitment to the defense of South Korea to be as
strong as it has ever been. Summit diplomacy-
Chun's visit to Washington in February 1981 and
President Reagan's visit to Seoul in November
1983-is a potent symbol of this strengthened tie.
Closer US-South Korean security ties provide the
Chun government with the necessary breathing space
to begin to redress the North-South military imbal-
ance. Seoul's 1982-86 Force Improvement Plan (FIP
II) will narrow the gap in some categories of military
power, but the South will still fall behind in others.
The North will probably maintain or expand its
current margin of military superiority. The cost of
sustaining that margin will be high; we estimate
North Korea allocated more than 20 percent of its
GNP to the military during the past decade. Over the
long haul, the South's greater economic vitality and
its larger population base should enable Seoul to begin
to erode the North's advantage.
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Great-Power Interest in the Korea Question
Great-power interest in the Korean question has
increased over the past year-most of it in ways that
we believe are disturbing to P'yongyang. Most signifi-
cant have been developments with its closest ally,
Beijing. Although P'yongyang's ties to Beijing have
improved over the past two years, we believe China's
decision last year to strengthen relations with the
United States has provoked uneasiness in the North.
Fears that its interests could be sold out in any Sino-
US discussions on the Korean Peninsula will continue
to haunt P'yongyang in our view.
P'yongyang is particularly disturbed over Seoul's
growing unofficial contacts with Moscow and Beijing.
Seoul is vigorously pursuing these contacts, which are
in part a recognition that South Korea has developed
into an important and stable element in East Asia
with which they must come to terms. Despite the
Soviet shootdown of KAL 007, unofficial Soviet-
South Korean contacts appear to be resuming now.
China's contacts with Seoul have also grown. Last
May, China sent an official delegation to South
Korea-a first-although we note that the mission
was tasked to secure the return of a hijacked airliner,
not to pursue contact with South Korea per se. In late
1983, Beijing permitted official South Korean delega-
tions to visit China to attend international meetings.
South Korea's own activist international role and its
hosting of upcoming regional and international events
seem certain to lead to even more contacts, with all
the attendant strains these imply in North Korea's
relations with the Soviet Union and China.
Indeed, we believe Kim worries that these contacts
might take on a more formal and bilateral nature.
North Korea has vigorously protested any moves
toward cross-recognition-the process that would in-
volve Chinese and Soviet recognition of South Korea
in exchange for US and Japanese recognition of
North Korea. P'yongyang wants, to resist any move-
ment toward a solution by outside powers that seeks to
legitimize the existence of two Koreas. We believe
both Communist powers will continue to pursue unof-
ficial contacts with the South, but will stop well short
of official recognition, at least in the midterm. In our
view even contacts using intermediaries will remain a
source of discomfort for P'yongyang.
Internal North Korean Politics
The internal political environment in P'yongyang is
undergoing subtle changes as well, but not in ways
that suggest a fundamental rethinking of the North's
reunification goal. North Korea is approaching its
first political succession, and the elder Kim, in a move
unprecedented in the Communist world, is arranging
for his eldest son, Kim Chong-il, to succeed him. All
signs kseem to indicate 25X1
that the succession scheme is on track, but we surmise
that a certain amount of political maneuvering must
be taking place, even if it is limited to competition to
get the ear of the heir apparent. We cannot say that
this competition is influencing policy at present, but
the history of such transitions in other Communist
regimes suggests major changes are likely after any
strong figure-particularly a founding father-passes
from the scene.
Kim Chong-il, at age 42, has gradually expanded the
scope of his leadership duties from domestic concerns
to foreign policy and national security affairs. His
visit to China in June 1983 was his first reported trip
abroad since he was formally identified as a high-
ranking party official in 1980. We believe that the
younger Kim, as part of his continuing apprenticeship,
is anxious to put his own imprint on North Korea's
most sensitive foreign endeavor-its policy toward the
South.
Kim Chong-il's handling of political and economic
affairs is universally and unstintingly praised in the
domestic media, but we do not believe this is an
accurate reflection of his influence or standing among
other senior North Korean officials, many of whom
are likely to see themselves as better qualified. We
would not expect serious opposition to the son to
surface until after the father passes on.
Rangoon and Talks
The savage attempt to assassinate the South Korean
leadership, followed soon after by the North's unprec-
edented call for tripartite talks with the United States
and South Korea, can be seen as evidence on the one
hand of a radical shift in North Korean strategy or on
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Burmese Martyr's Mausoleum,
site of the North Korean assas-
sination attempt on President
Chun, October 1983.F-
the other of a certain irrationality operating in
P'yongyang. Both interpretations, in our view, are
false. Beneath the apparent contradiction of the Ran-
goon bombing and the talks, we see a certain logic and
a consistent effort by P'yongyang to reverse the
negative drift of developments.
In the case of Rangoon, we believe the North Koreans
were acting on an opportunity to eliminate the one
leader most responsible for South Korea's recent
political and economic successes and its improved
security ties with the United States. Security condi-
tions were lax in Burma and the security services in
disarray after being purged last June. The North
probably hoped to create a leadership vacuum in the
South and to exploit any domestic unrest that ensued.
P'yongyang clearly also hoped that its hand in the
Rangoon bombing could remain hidden-at least to
the point of maintaining "plausible denial."
The North's simultaneous push for trilateral talks, in
our view, is a product of the same goals and thinking
that produced the Rangoon bombing. It is conceivable
to us that, well in advance of Rangoon, the North
Koreans had surfaced the talks strategy with the
Chinese.' In any case, P'yongyang's public call for
hat P
ficantly d
not
'yongyang sees its options as signi
efined
or limited by either China or the Soviet Union. The driving force
behind Kim's reunification goal has been self-reliance, or "chuche,"
a personal characteristic that he has developed into an elaborate
state ideology. We know that in North Korea's case, this is not a
matter of mere words-witness Kim's costly, yet continued, efforts
over the past decade and more to build an independent warmaking
capability. More than any other measure, this military buildup
illustrates his desire to preserve his independence.
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OcUtUt
North and South Korean negotiators meeting at Panmunjom in
19.72.F_~
trilateral discussions was designed, in part, to undo
some of the damage to the North's image as a result
of the Rangoon bombing. But beyond this, it strikes us
that the North Koreans also may have had several
additional tactical objectives in mind:
? P'yongyang's current stress on negotiations seems
directed at sowing discord between Washington and
Seoul over how to respond. The North undoubtedly
perceives that Seoul is reluctant to be a party to
talks in which the United States would remain the
North's primary interlocutor.
? The North has characterized its proposal as an
initiative for 1984-an indication that P'yongyang
may hope it can make Korean policy an issue in the
US Presidential elections.
? Beyond seeking to destabilize the US-South Korean
relationship, P'yongyang appears to be attempting
to frame the boundaries of any Sino-US discussions
on Korea by publicizing its own interests as clearly
as possible at the outset. Indeed, North Korea went
public with its proposal on 10 January, the day
Chinese Premier Zhao began an official visit to
Washington.
Implications
For the remainder of this year, we expect P'yongyang
to be on relatively good behavior. North Korea's
proposal for tripartite talks will not run its course
until the North has had more time to gauge the
results. From the North's perspective, the initiative
already has produced some positive interim benefit by
deflecting attention from Rangoon and by putting
Seoul somewhat on the defensive.
P'yongyang has not relaxed its harsh criticism of
President Chun, but the North continues to stress its
peaceful intentions and has moderated its invective
against the United States. Other indications of
P'yongyang's interest in continuing to pursue a nego-
tiations tack have cropped up in the North Korean
foreign policy apparatus. Kim Chung-nin,
perhaps as thescapegoat for Rangoon. Kim has been
replaced by Ho Tam, North Korea's well-known and
effective foreign minister, which suggests that P'yong-
yang plans to press its propaganda offensive on the
talks issue. More broadly, this particular emphasis
serves North Korea's interest in cultivating members
of the Nonaligned Movement. Given the Rangoon
incident, P'yongyang may feel it has some fences to
mend.
But as we have argued already, the North has little
difficulty in pursuing sudden tactical shifts between
diplomacy and brutality. A unique opportunity, such
as that provided by President Chun's visit to Ran-
goon, could produce another such shift-even over the
short term. The North, for example, might consider
the Pope's scheduled visit to South Korea in May as
an enticing opportunity to create doubts about the
security environment in Seoul.
In our view, the risk of such a dramatic return to
terrorism and subversion increases with time. We
believe the negative trends that threaten North Ko-
rea's goal of reunification are likely to persist and that
P'yongyang will continue to look for new opportuni-
ties to reverse them. Seoul's rising international stat-
ure may be the factor that most grates on the North
Korean psyche.
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We believe the year or two leading up to the summer
Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988 could be a particu-
larly dangerous period. For one thing, the political
climate as the South heads for a leadership transition
in 1988 is likely to be more fluid than it is today, and
this will make the South a more attractive target for
North Korean destabilization efforts. P'yongyang will
also want to discourage participation in the Olympics
and, in our opinion, will use whatever means neces-
sary-particularly sabotage and acts of terrorism-to
convince the world that Seoul is not a safe venue.
We have no reason to believe the North Korean
leadership has reached such a point of desperation
that it is ready to consider a return to open warfare
with a South that is backed by the United States.
There is, after all, a downside to the generally favor-
able situation in the South, which could even argue
for additional patience in P'yongyang:
? Time is running out on President Chun's promise to
step aside in 1988, and the longer it takes for him to
make concrete arrangements for the transition, the'
greater the risk of political turmoil.
? The South's economy remains highly dependent on
the influx of foreign capital and thus vulnerable to a
debt-financing crisis.
Given the North's bureaucratic inertia and the ideo-
logical prism through which it views the South,
P'yongyang, if anything, is likely to exaggerate the
potential for political and economic unraveling south
of the DMZ.
It is, of course, conceivable-however unlikely given
our reading of the situation-that at some point in the
next few years the North Koreans could accept the
fact that trends seem irreversibly against them, play
down or even renounce their reunification goal, and
choose instead to concentrate on economic develop-
ment in the North. Such a shift could even involve an
opening to the West, echoing the economic motiva-
tions in China's outreach to the West in the early
1970s. This realignment of priorities would most
likely occur in conjunction with the political succes-
sion in the North, although the succession process is
probably equally capable of producing a more reckless
leadership.
The bottom line here is that we are far more im-
pressed with the potential for aggressive action by the
North, such as we saw in Rangoon, through the
remainder of this decade than we are with the
prospects for significant changes in North Korean
objectives and strategy.
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