CASTRO THE US AND NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100380001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 3, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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I I
Central intelligence igence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 August 198
CASTRO, THE US, AND NEGOTIATIONS
Summary
Cuban,President Fidel Castro has recently sent a number of
clear signals that he is interested in reaching a less
confrontational relationship with the US. He appears ready to
make policy changes--as he has done in difficult times in the
past--to accommodate the US on issues he does not consider vital
so long as he can do so without losing face. On fundamental
issues, however, such as his relationship with Moscow and his
"right" to aid revolutionaries throughout the world, he will not
retreat. Moreover, Castro's unshakable hatred and fear of the
US--conditioned by 30 years of hostility--indicate that US
relations with Cuba are likely to be hostile as long as he
remains in power. Nevertheless, within these general strictures,
the US should be able to profit through talking with him. His
interest in opening channels to Washington would falter quickly,
of course, if the burgeoning pressures that drove him to be more
forthcoming abated or if he found that increased liaison with the
US would bring no relief at all. Similarly, any attempt to move
the bilateral exchanges into the public eye would probably
convince him that the US was more interested in a propaganda
victory than in good faith bargaining; he wants no part of talks
that portray him to the world as submitting to "imperialist"
pressure.
This memorandum was requested by Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, Michael H. Armacost. It was prepared by office of
African and Latin American Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
should be addressed to Chief, Cuba-Caribbean Branch, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, OALA,
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Castro's Dilemma
Castro's cautious probing on talks with the US in our
opinion, stems directly from his conviction that he and his
regime will be seriously threatened if current trends continue.
On the defensive because of both internal and external pressures,
he probably sees negotiations as the only reasonable option that
can change the course of events at an acceptable cost.
On ocda"sions in the past, he has sought talks only as a
means of buying time--for the Salvadoran insurgents, for example,
in late 1981 and early 1982--and he thus had no intention of
offering concessions of any kind. Now, however, he seems to
realize that some compromise on his part is necessary if he is to
avert disaster. Other evidence suggests that Castro is not
merely seeking to buy a few months of time. Havana's probing of
US views on Angola, Central America, and emigration has been
accompanied by a'variety of other actions to relieve pressure on
Cuba. For example, Cuba seems to be striking a more conciliatory
posture with China, has moved to resolve longstanding irritants
with several South American nations, and seems to be actively
engaged in consolidating its friendships with a number of other
African nations.
The pressures on him are indeed formidable. Serious
problems have been coming to a head for Cuba in Africa. Mounting
pressure from the UNITA guerrillas and dogged US diplomacy have
helped to turn Cuba's relationships with Angola and Mozambique
from assets into liabilities. South African agreements with
these countries undercut the guerrilla struggles being waged by
Cuba's allies in the SWAPO and ANC, respectively, and the Cuban
troop presence in Angola became the major stumbling block to a
peaceful solution to the problem of Namibian independence.
Castro, stung by Luanda's and Maputo's failure to consult with
him prior to their meetings with South Africa, had his confidence
in the Dos Santos and Machel governments badly shaken.
In addition, as the UNITA insurgency has widened and become
more threatening to the Cuban-backed regime in Luanda, the Cubans
have become more dangerously involved in the fighting. They are
taking more casualties, and may have even had to increase their
commitment of troops over the past year to keep the insurgents
from overrunning key government towns and garrisons.
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At the same time, the Grenada experience last October proved
to Castro that Washington was prepared to ignore world criticism
and resort to military force to stem Communist expansion in the
region. He was subsequently dismayed when opinion polls in the
US showed wide support for the intervention. He had long counted
on US public opinion as a brake on Washington's foreign policy
and had an exaggerated estimate of his ability to influence the
US citizenry through propaganda and his manipulation of the US
press. Post, Grenada polls made him fear that Washington, assured
of solid popular backing, would take action against Cuba; his
anxiety grew as the US massed military and naval might in Central
America and the Caribbean. Moscow, meanwhile, devoting attention
to the problem of US missiles in Europe, seemingly paid scant
heed to Cuba's worsening military plight. Castro clearly
understands--and has admitted publicly--that in any miliary
confrontation with the US, Cuba will have to rely on its own
defenses.
At. home, Castro has admitted that austerity will be the
watchword at least through the end of the century. He has
finally come to understand that Moscow's economic largesse has
limits and that Cuba cannot continue to expect major increases in
Soviet subsidies. His plans for acceleraed industrialization
were dashed by the recent CEMA summit in Moscow and Cuba had to
suffer the indignity of being lumped with Mongolia and Vietnam as
CEMA basket cases.
In addition, Cuban popular attitudes clearly have--Castro
worried, as his extensive--and expensive--measures to counter
Radio Marti attest. The Mariel refugee exodus in 1980 did little
to reduce the number of would-be emigrants--a year later
five percent-of the
population (some 500,000 persons) would leave if given the
chance--and, given Cuba's current economic outlook, the total has
probably increased. Cubans are weary
of shortages, increasingly apathetic regarding labor
productivity, and concerned over the cost in Cuban blood of
Castro's internationalist policies. Cubans at home were badly
rattled last October by the Cuban casualties in--and Castro's
handling of--the Grenada intervention, and again in March when
some 80 Cubans were injured or killed in a terrorist incident in
Huambo, Angola.
Thus, Castro, beset by major problems at home, in Central
America, in Africa, and in the economic sphere, feels forced to
consider discussions with the US seriously.
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Reagan administration will spell even greater US hostility toward
his regime. This almost certainly caused him to want to get
talks under way well before the elections. The trip of the
Reverend Jesse Jackson to Havana fortuitously provided Castro
with the opportunity to press the negotiations issue in a manner
that would guarantee broad media attention yet would not give the
appearance of having succumbed to US military muscle.
Castro's Aims
In talks with Washington, Castro will not discuss distancing
himself from Moscow or abandoning his "right" and "duty" to aid
revolutionaries worldwide. We believe that these two issues are
"sacred" to the Cuban leader.
On other matters, however, Castro is likely to demonstrate
uncharacteristic flexibility. His apparent readiness to accept
the Mariel "excludables", for example, shows a desire to
reinstitute a continuing flow of emigrants from Cuba similar to
the Varadero-Miami airlift of 1965-1972. He knows that
continuing economic problems are going to produce further
disenchantment within Cuba--he is expecting Radio Marti to feed
popular disillusionment--and he believes the disgruntled are less
likely to start trouble if they have a chance to emigrate. He
knows a regular exodus will serve as a valuable source of
information for Radio Marti but it will also help to reduce
unemployment, ease the critical housing shortage, and tend to rid
Cuba of those who consume but do not produce.
He may also be looking for a graceful way to reduce Cuba's
military presence in Angola, although we believe serious movement
on this issue is likely to have to await the outcome of the large
Angolan government offensive against UNITA which is now under
preparation. The offensive preparations have involved
substantial Soviet and Cuban input and it appears the Cuban
troops in Angola will play a substantially more active and
aggressive role in the fighting. In our judgment, should the
offensive inflict major damage on UNITA, the Angolans would be
more likely to be able to move on the negotiation front, thereby
opening the possibility of a Cuban troop withdrawal.
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In any event, Dos Santos' failure to consult with.Castro on
the South African negotiations early this year insulted the Cuban
leader and most likely caused him to reconsider Cuba's role in,
and sacrifices for, Angola. In light of events since then, he
probably believes he has been deftly outflanked there and thus
may be reluctant to continue his major investment in a client
that has proved to be both ungrateful and untrustworthy.
Moreover, Cuban casualties in Angola have become a serious
domestic problem and if Angola can no longer pay for his troops
and adviser's', he has little motivation for keeping such a large
contingent there. A rapid reduction might cause a slight
increase in unemployment at home but, at least in the short term,
returnees would be widely welcomed by the Cuban people. Castro
would insist on avoiding the impression of a surrender and thus
will likely link a troop reduction with some kind of acceptable
arrangement on Namibia. Above anything else, he does not want to
appear to be knuckling under to US pressure.
Castro may probe to see if he can gain a relaxation of some
US economic restrictions, but this is not likely to be among the
first items on his agenda for bilateral discussions. He might
also be willing to negotiate an arrangement on Radio Marti,
perhaps agreeing to eschew counterbroadcasts in return for a
change in the radio's name. An agreement not to jam the US
broadcasts, however, is almost certainly unattainable; the
station is too great an ideological threat for Cuba's hardliners
to accept without challenge.
To salvage the Salvadoran revolution, Castro may be prepared
to curtail t 1nniAtical support Havana is providing the
insurgents.
While
we recognize that Castro may be making tie otter oniy ait to
draw the US into talks, we believe it more likely that he feels
compelled to offer a significant concession to prevent a total
reversal of the revolutionary process as occurred in Grenada.
Moreover, we believe Castro would continue to provide training
for Salvadoran insurgents as well as continue to give them
political guidance and propaganda support.
Any agreement to reduce the arms flow, however, would be
temporary and would pertain only to the specific case of El
Salvador. A blanket pledge to suspend aid to revolutionaries
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This, in our opinion, is out of the question. His determination
to go down in history as the Simon Bolivar of the 20th century
precludes any relaxation in his personal hostility toward the
US. Moreover, he has a visceral distrust of the US that has been
firmly substantiated--in his eyes--by the many actions the US has
taken against him since 1959. His suspicions are strongly
reinforced by all of his top advisers and the ex-guerrilla
cohorts in his inner circle and none would urge him to consider a
major political, realignment.
At this point, Cuba needs far more than a propaganda victory
or a few months time. Convinced that the administration will
tighten the screws on Cuba even further during a second term,
Castro is under time-pressure to see not only that discussions
get under way but that they produce some quick results. Hence,
he is likely to be influenced most effectively by concrete
incentives. Assurances and clarifications regarding US goals in
Angola, for example, might make Castro much more receptive to a
troop withdrawal. He wants to be convinced that the US is not
bent on destroying the MPLA government and replacing it with
Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces. He also wants assurances that a
Cuban troop withdrawal can be portrayed in a positive light, with
Cuba making a genuine contribution to Namibian independence
rather than suffering an embarrassing foreign policy defeat.
Heretofore, Castro had had little faith in talks as a
problem-solving tool. His ideological approach to international
relations tends to define issues in stark, black-and-white terms,
stifle compromise, and focus on all-or-nothing solutions. He
cannot help but be impressed, however, over progress toward a
resolution to the seemingly insoluable problems in southern
Africa. He may have decided that opening channels to Washington
might better enable him to protect Cuban interests in southern
Africa, Central America, and elsewhere.
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SUBJECT: CASTRO, THE US, AND NEGOTIATIONS
Original - Requestor
1 - Executive Director
ALA/MC/CC
- NIO/LA
- NIC/AG
C/DDI/PES
D/ALA
ALA/PS
ALA Research Director
CPAS/IMC/CB - Do not send
ALA/MCD
ALA/MCD/CC
(3 August 84)
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