COLOMBIA: DEATH OF A MINISTER--IMPLICATIONS FOR US NARCOTICS CONTROL POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100330001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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11 MAY 11984
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Addressee List)
SUBJECT: Colombia: Death of a Minister--Implications
for US Narcotics Control Policy
1. The attached memorandum presents the prospects for the
crackdown on narcotics trafficking in Colombia in the aftermath
of the assassination of Justice Minister Lara. It concludes that
President Betancur probably will lift the recently imposed state
of seige by the end of the year and that in any case the
Colombian antinarcotics effort will only temporarily disrupt the
illicit industry's operations.
2. This memorandum was prepared byl (Inter-
national Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues and
South America Division, Office of African and
Latin America Analysis.
3. Queries and comments are welcome and may be addressed to
(the Chief, Strategic Narcotics Branch, OGI, on
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Attachment:
Colombia: Death of a Minister--Implications for
US Narcotics Control Polic GI M84-10088,
ALA M84-10047, May 1984.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 May 1984
Colombia: Death of a Minister--Implications for US
Narcotics Control Policy 25X1
Summary
The assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara
Bonilla--widely attributed to drug traffickers--has prompted
President Betancur to launch an unprecedented crackdown against
Colombia's powerful narcotics traffickers and to declare a
nationwide state of siege. Public outrage over the murder as
well as embarrassment over the harm done to the country's
international image have influenced the actions of the President,
who is highly sensitive to domestic opinion trends. Never-
theless, we judge the effort will only temporarily disrupt the
illicit industry's operations. Popular'support for the new
programs probably will wane over the next few months, and
meanwhile the major traffickers will reduce their activities to
cut their risks; in the unlikely event the traffickers opt to
fight the authorities, we judge the threat to US mission per-
sonnel will greatly increase. Finally Betancur's interest in
pursuing a truce with insurgent groups probably will lead him to
lift the state of siege later in the year. The enforcement
effort would then be returned to weak civil and judicial
authorities, enabling the traffickers to resume fairly normal
operations. Nevertheless, we believe the President will find it
difficult to back away from his recent public promise to extra-
dite those Colombian traffickers wanted by US authorities.
This memorandum was prepared byl (International
Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues and
South America Division, Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. This analysis is based on information available as
of 11 May 1984. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Strategic Narcotics Branch, OGI on
GI-M-84-10088
ALA-M-84-10047
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Colombia: Death of a Minister--Implications for US
Narcotics Control Policy
Traffickers Strike
On 30 April, Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla--the
government's most prominent antinarcotics spokesman--was murdered
in Bogota. One assailant was killed by Lara's bodyguards;
another was captured and is currently being interrogated by the
authorities. Although no one has claimed responsibility, we and
most observers assume the act was carried out by drug
traffickers. We believe the murder was intended to deter the
administration's current drug control activities and to
intimidate any successor to Minister Lara.
We suspect this action was carried out by low level
traffickers bent on enhancing their reputations rather than by
one of the major drug organizations whose activities had been
largely unaffected by Lara's antinarcotics efforts. There are
several reasons for this view:
? Through media smear campaigns and private threats against
Lara and his family, the drug mafia had already rendered
the minister politically impotent. According to the US
Embassy, Lara was planning to resign this month and accept
a diplomatic assignment overseas to escape the threat to
his life.
? President Betancur's hesitancy to introduce new drug
control programs and his nationalistic opposition to the
extradition of Colombian citizens to the United States
meant that the government represented little threat to the
major traffickers' interests.
? The major traffickers typically prefer to use bribery,
media manipulation, and intimidation to achieve their ends
rather than drawing attention to themselves through such
public spectacles as assassinations of prominent
Government Reaction
The assassination of Lara has spurred Betancur to take
strong and unprecedented action against the Colombian drug
mafia. A highly moral man, the President probably was personally
outraged by the killing. His response, however, also was
prompted by the high-pitched public reaction,. embarrassment over
GI-M-84-10088
ALA-M-84-10047
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the harm done to Colombia's international image, and a desire to
demonstrate strong leadership and rebut opponents' criticism that
weak executive support for Lara's drug programs contributed to
his death. Betancur's actions include:
? Publicly declaring war on drug traffickers.
? Reversing his opposition to the extradition of Colombian
nationals.
? Declaring a countrywide state of siege--the eleventh since
1948--that sanctions armed forces involvement in drug
control activities, places narcotics cases under military
court jurisdiction, and severely limits freedom of travel
and assembly.
? Ordering widespread arrests of narcotics traffickers and
raids on their property.
? Strengthening existing antinarcotics statutes in order to
give authorities sweeping powers to seize both traffickers
and their assets.
Traffickers' Response/Impact on the Trade
According to the US Embassy most traffickers apparently have
decided to scale back operations, go completely underground, or
temporarily flee the country. This may help explain why no major
figure has yet been arrested by the authorities. We anticipate
that the major traffickers will continue to maintain a low pro-
file until public anger and pressure on Betancur dissipate.
Any disruption in drug trafficking as a result of the
crackdown is likely to be limited and transitory. There will be
some immediate disruption of drug operations--especially among
low level operators--as the traffickers scramble to protect their
interests. Because the major trafficking organizations are
strong enough to preserve their networks and maintain their
operations at a profitable level, at least for the remainder of
the year, the government crackdown probably will inflict the
greatest damage on smaller trafficking organizations that do not
have the resources to "ride out the storm." The crackdown also
will hurt the many independent coca and marijuana growers, who
will find fewer buyers for their product.
We believe this disruption of traffickers' activity could
include a temporary relocation of operations to neighboring
countries--Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil--until the pressure dies
down in Colombia. Traffickers also may reduce their Colombian
stockpiles either by storage in adjacent countries or increased
shipments to the United States and Europe. Alternately, but less
likely, traffickers could attempt to fight back against the.
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authorities to maintain operations and protect their extensive
infrastructure and investment. This would entail more heavily
armed protection for processing laboratories and shipments, and a
decision to shoot it out with security forces.
Prospects
We expect popular support for Betancur's crackdown to wane
over the next few months, both because of the country's
historical apathy toward antinarcotics efforts as well as an
increasing preoccupation with the nation's worsening economic
problems. The antinarcotics effort also is likely to conflict
with Betancur's fervent drive to end-the longstanding insurgency
problem b tiating truces with'the guerrilla roups. For
example, neo the armed
forces hope to use the present state of siege to i.t hard at
guerrilla groups as well as drug dealers. This could jeopardize
a peace initiative that we believe Betancur cherishes much more
than the antinarcotics campaign. Moreover, Betancur would, in
our view, regard the prolonged use of extraordinary security
measures as an embarrassing admission that he could not govern
through normal procedures. Thus, we expect him to lift the state
of siege later this year. The enforcement effort would then be
returned to the weak civil and judicial authorities, enabling the
traffickers to resume fairly normal operations.
Implications for the United States
We believe the President will find it difficult to back away
from his recent public promise to extradite those Colombian
traffickers wanted by US authorities; consequently if major
traffickers, such as Carlos Lehder or Pablo Escobar are
apprehended soon, Betancur probably would approve their
extradition to the United States. Nevertheless, we judge that
over the long haul Betancur is more likely to promote programs
aimed at appeasing popular sentiment and projecting a favorable
image than enacting and seriously enforcing a rigorous drug
control program. Although the power of enforcement agencies in
Colombia has been strengthened under the state of siege, we doubt
that this situation will last long enough to have a permanent
effect on the overall supply of drugs to the United States.
Although the prospects for a Colombian spray campaign are 25X1
better than ever, we still believe that Betancur is likely to
resist US requests for a widespread herbicidal spray campaign.
Any expansion of the current test program of herbicidal spraying
of coca and marijuana plants will remain a difficult issue and we
suspect he will continue to delay making such a controversial
decision for as long as possible. Popular support for a
crackdown on drug dealers does not translate directly into
backing for herbicidal eradication, because the latter stirs
political, ecological and other public concerns.
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In the unlikely event that traffickers choose to stand and
fight rather than wait out the current maelstrom, the threat to
US mission personnel would greatly increase. Because of the
publicly acknowledged role of the United States in promoting a
strong antinarcotics campaign in Colombia, we would expect the US
to become the traffickers' next major target.
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SUBJECT: Colombia: Death of a Minister--Implications for
N
arcotics Contorl Policy
UGI/ISID/NA (May 1984)
Distribution:
1 - Mr. Clyde Taylor, State
1 - Dr. Carlton Turner, SA to the President
1 - Mr. J. Philip Hughes, DA to Vice President
1 - Mr. Donald Gregg, Assist. to the Vice President
1 - Mr. Gary Liming, DEA
1 - Mr. Jon Wiant, State
1 - Captain James Haas, US Coast Guard
1 - Mr. Dou hlas Mulholland Treasur
1 -
1 - Mr. Albert S. Bonner, Jr. US Customs
1 - Colonel Richard Childress, NSC
1 - The Honorable Langhorne A. Motley,
1 - The Honorable Dominick L. DiCarlo,
1 - Mr. Lowell C. Kilday, ARA, State
1 - Mr. Fernando E. Rondon, ARA/AND,
1 - Mr. Jon R. Thomas, INM, State
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
1 - NIO/NAR
1 - NIO/LA
1 - C/NIC/AG
1 - C/ASG
1 - D/OGI,
1 - D /ALA
1 -
DD/OGI
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
1 - 4 CPAS/IMC/CB
2 - SAD
5 - SAD/SW
1 - SAD files
1 - CPAS/ILS
2 - ISID
2 - ISID/NAR
1 - Ch/PG
8 - PG
ARA,
INM
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