(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100270001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 14, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
V1t3shingon, D. C ZO505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 January 1984
CUBA: THE MOOD AFTER GRENADA
Summary
Cuba's ?Zoss? of Grenada last October accentuated the to11
the revolution has taken on Zife in Cuba today. In our view, it
has profoundly affected the Zeadership, the military establish-
ment, and the citizenry. A particularly humiliating experience
for the Cubans, the Grenada affair has had unique repercussions
likely to have Zastinq influence in several key areas of both
domestic and external affairs.
Although there is convincing evidence of significant
dissatisfaction with the regime--Castro himself admitted privately
in 1981 that 5 percent of the population would emigrate if given
the chance--we see no corresponding sign that this discontent has
crystallized into a political force or represents any threat to
Castro's grip on power. Nevertheless, Havana's unstinting effort
over more than two years to discourage US mediumwave broadcasts to
Cuba is a clear indication that the Cuban Zeadership, with its
complex apparatus for monitoring popular opinion, worries that the
Ieve1 of disenchantment is dangerously high.
This memorandum was requested by Ambassador Gerald Helman at the State
Department. It was prepared by Office of African and Latin
American. This memo was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer
for Latin America, Office of Soviet Analysis, and Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Cuba-
Caribbean Branch, Middle America-Caribbean Division
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The regime almost certainly does not believe--nor do we--that
its position is under immediate threat. It is probably mainly
concerned that the US broadcasts could spark protest demons-
trations that would embarrass Savana internationally. With the
recent Grenada experience in mind, the Zeadership is probably
particularly fearful that Cubans will not passively accept
accurate accounts of about the cost in blood of Cuba's military
operations overseas.
Fidel Castro's revolution, now in its 26th year, is tired.
Years of austerity, regimentation, dashed hopes, and--perhaps
most important--dim prospects for the future are sapping the
Cuban population's revolutionary ardor. Castro, recognizing that
the level of disenchantment is growing, has tried to insulate the
Cuban people from the truth about his Grenadian misadventure,
appease the frustrated military, and smoulder quietly about
Moscow'"s feeble response. Much could be done to ease the
conditions undermining the revolution's vitality but the
leadership--primarily Castro himself--adheres to rigid
ideological rules of behavior and refuses to make the policy
changes that could provide relief.
Disillusionment, while widespread, poses no direct threat to
the regime, whose efficient security services and biased judicial
system insure against the development of organized opposition.
The few desperate enough to commit some act of defiance in-
variably are working alone or in small, isolated groups. While
many Cubans probably would emigrate if given the chance, the
majority remain strongly nationalistic, especially in their
attitudes toward the United States. Castro is no longer exempt--
as he was in the early years--from blame for Cuba's ills, but he
is far~from discredited. Ample evidence shows he is still, highly
respected and accepted as the country's "maximum leader".
The fallout from Grenada has put Castro on the defensive in
his contest with Washington. We believe he will continue his
diplomatic and propaganda activities against the United States,
but his fears of Washington's low tolerance for Cuban misbehavior
will temper his actions at least until the outcome of the US
elections is clear.
The USSR
The Grenada crisis almost surely heightened Cuba's sense of
vulnerability by adding friction to its relations with the
USSR. Grenada was a jolting validation of the spheres of
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influence thesis--a concept Cubans understandably reject. Moscow
clearly did not think Maurice Bishop's revolution--no matter what
its worth to Cuba--was of sufficient value to risk a confront-
ation with the United States. While none in the Cuban leadership
expected the Soviets to act militarily, many probably judged
Moscow's response inadequate and saw it as a preview of the
Soviet attitude in the event of a US assault on Nicaragua or even
Cuba itself.
Moreover, the Soviet role in Bishop's demise showed that
Moscow and Havana at best had failed to synchronize their
activities in promoting the Grenadian revolution, and at worst
were working at cross-purposes. During a visit to Moscow in
January, a top Cuban official pointedly called for greater
ideological cooperation with the Soviets, while President
Castro's recent speeches indicate clearly his misgivings about
the Soviet relationship with Bernard Coard, Bishop's deputy and
chief antagonist. In a speech on 15 November, Raul Castro
likened the Coard-Bishop struggle to an incident in Cuba in 1962
when a Moscow-backed clique of orthodox Cuban communists tried to
undercut Fidel's grip on power.
The irritation of the Cuban leadership notwithstanding, the
prevailing trend toward ever closer Cuban-Soviet cooperation is
likely to continue. No matter what his personal attitude toward
the USSR, Castro realizes he has no alternative source for the
massive aid that Moscow provides to keep the Cuban economy from
collapsing. Moreover, the Cuban military establishment depends
almost entirely on Soviet supplies of weapons and equipment--all
provided free of charge--and any interruption in that supply
would damage a major element of the Cuban power structure.
Castro in his pique may slight the Soviets from time to time but,
as he has done before, will eventually come to heel. On the
other hand, popular attitudes toward the Soviets, never very
warm, have almost certainly worsened.
The Cuban Military
The Grenada affair seems to have badly stained the reput-
ation of the Cuban military establishment. During interrogation,
some of the Cuban civilian construction workers captured by US
forces complained bitterly about the failure of their supervisors
and the military advisers to organize the workers to defend them-
selves. Some of the laborers believed they were abandoned by the
Cuban military when the fighting became intense. Although
welcomed home as heroes, these construction workers were kept
together as a unit presumably to prevent them from spreading
their disenchantment among the population.
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Havana, apparently recognizing this blot on the armed
forces, has tried to bolster military morale and improve the
image of the officer corps. In an unusual gesture, two top
military officers were belatedly awarded medals on New Year's Day
for their service years ago in Angola and Ethiopia.* The medals
were probably also intended to heal some bruised a os and
distract attention from the Grenada loss.
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Cuban mi nary ea ers
saw Castro s first reaction o e Grenada invasion--his
insistence on fighting to the last man--as unrealistic, emotional
and an affront to the Cuban military. In addition, these
officers are seriously disturbed over 25X1
Soviet in uence on u an mi i ary operations abroad, attributing
the Grenada fiasco to Moscow's insistence that Cuba not keep a
large military presence there. they believe 25X1
that--judging from the Grenada experience-- r ular troo s
would fight well against trained US forces. 25X1
It seems clear that the Grenada disaster stung the pride of
Cuba's military professionals, who probably are anxious for an
opportunity to redeem themselves. As a start,
they would like to inflict a sigr~,ficant
e eat on ou rican troops in Angola. Their ire almost
certainly is directed not toward Castro but toward the United
States and other adversaries.
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*This contrasts with the failure to award a decoration to Colonel Pedro
Tortolo, head of Cuba's military mission in Grenada who sought refuge with
most of his men in the Soviet .Embassy. hou h welcomed home warml b Fidel
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butt of popular jokes about his uninspiring performance during the fighting,
and has become a symbol of cowardice. 25X1
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The Cuban People
Several signs suggest
Grenada debacle, especially
Cubans or at least left them
that Castro's management of the
in its early hours, displeased many
confused and uneasy.
some faulted him for ordering a
fight to the finish against what clearly were overwhelming odds,
and few seemed to understand his contention that any blood shed
in Grenada would hel discoura a US intervention in Central
America. inaccurate
news early in the fighting led many Cubans to the conclusion that
all of the more than 700 Cubans in Grenada had been killed
obeying Castro's fatalistic order; this caused considerable grief
for their relatives, friends, and sympathizers until the casualty
situation was clarified. This draining emotional experience
appears to have left many Cubans more critical of their own
leadership than of the United States.
one small group in Havana tried to hold a emonstration to get
the government to bring Cubans home from Grenada and Nicaragua
but was quickly dispersed by police.
Much of the Cuban public is probably aware of the dismissal
of the Interior Ministry's foreign intelligence chief as a result
of Cuba's "intelligence failure" in Grenada; the official's to
aides almost certainly were sacked with him.
a a so ering a on intelligence officers, diplomats, and
the bureaucracy in general, and probably helped to increase
popular uncertaint confusion, and lack of confidence in the
leadership.
eastern Cuba, which apparently has generously supplied the
Probably to improve morale in the area,
Castro on 1 January declared Santiago de Cuba--eastern Cuba's
largest city--a "hero of the Republic of Cuba" and awarded the
ese puns ive ac ions are i e y o ave
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city a medal.* Subsequently, 350 "internationalist fighters" in
the city were decorated individually.
Presumably to explain the government's actions to the
general population, boost morale, and direct popular hostility
toward the US, the regime in December released a documentary film
entitled "Grenada, the Take-off of a Dream" and in late January
placed on sale in all provincial capitals a book, Grenada, the
World Against the Crime, purporting to "make known the truth of
what happened in Grenada. .." Moreover, the government made an
effort in December to ease temporarily some of the standard re-
strictions on consumer goods. Our Interests Section in Havana
noted, for example, that apples were offered for sale for the
first time in 10 years, unrationed pork and chicken were made
available, and toys were ,much more prevalent than in the same
period in previous years.
Conclusions
Despite the doubts raised in the military, as well as in the
population in general, about the wisdom of Casto's decisions, any
direct US effort to challenge Castro's leadership would almost
certainly generate enough nationalist Fervor to make Cubans rally
to his defense. His efficient propaganda apparatus along with
his own lingering charisma have spared him the blame for his many
disastrous decisions. He has had great success in finding scape-
goats and in limiting the public's access to information that
would reveal the true import of his mistakes.
Since Grenada, however, is perceived by many Cubans to be a
serious blunder, Castro appears vulnerable to a long-term, low-
key campaign of criticism. We believe a well-informed Cuban
public would be less willing to accept some of Castro's more
adventurous policies. While some Cubans would completely
discount US broadcasts as baseless propaganda, we believe many
are anxious--in the wake of Grenada--to have an external source
of objective, dispassionate news about events affecting Cuba.
As for. the military, the leadership appears anxious to
redeem itself and to rekindle the euphoria that accompanied its
resounding victory over Somalia in the Ogaden campaign in 1978.
*Such awards were gi ven in the Soviet Union during World War II to cities
whose populations took part, and suffered particularly heavy Zosses, in
combat.
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A dramatic rout of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua,
for example, or of South African forces in southern Angola could
fully restore the military's own morale as well as that of the
public. Another costly defeat, in contrast, would further under-
mine Castro's credibility and the people's confidence in his
regime.
Castro probably feels outrage toward the United States over
Cuba's helplessness to prevent the reversal of Grenada's revolu-
tion and appears apprehensive about signals that Cuban tactics of
the past are proving less effective. We believe he will continue
his diplomatic and propaganda efforts to mobilize world opinion
against the United States, but his recent speeches indicate a
fear that Washington is willing to ignore public opinion and,
even worse, has US public opinion behind it on its tough policy
toward Cuba.
We believe that Castro, uncomfortably on the defensive,
realizes he has lost the initiative in his continuing battle with
Washington and seems uncertain what to do next. Understanding
that Washington's tolerance for Cuba's misbehavior has been
lowered dramatically, he likely does not want to engage in
activity that could justify US retaliation. Yet, he is wary of
negotiations as a way out of his dilemma, viewing concessions to
the US as surrender to his main ideological enemy.
If the United States made the first move, we believe that
Castro would probably enter into talks but, with this an election
year in the US, he would not be very forthcoming.' The signs so
far suggest that without an immediate military threat to Cuba
itself, he is prepared to buy time in hopes of seeing a change in
administration in Washington. Only after the outcome of the
United States elections is clear and there was no change in
administration in Washington would he be likely to negotiate in
earnest.
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I I
SUBJECT: Cuba: The Mood After Grenada
{
Original & 12 - Gerald Helman
13 - Executive Director
14 - LA/NIO
15 - NIC/AG
16 -
17 - C/DDI/PES
18 & 19 - D/ALA
20 & 21 - ALA/PS
22 - ALA Research Director
23 to 26 - OCPAS/IMC/CB
27 to 35 - ALA/MCD/CC
DDI/ALA/MCD (14 February 1984)
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