NICARAGUA-EL SALVADOR: SANDINISTA AND SALVADORAN GUERRILLA PROPAGANDA NETWORKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100240001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 5, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
5 1984
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Attached is the paper you requested on
Sandinista and Salvadoran guerrilla propaganda
efforts world-wide.
Robert M. es
Deputy Director for telligence
Attachment:
As stated
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Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
5 January 1984
NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
The typescript on the Sandinista and
Salvadoran guerrilla propaganda networks is
attached for you. were
very helpful in helping us pull this together
worked until 25X1
after 0300 in order to have a draft for me
early this morning. I think it is a very good
job and hope it is what you wanted.
Attachment:
As stated
Director
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Central Intelligence Agency
%bshingon. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 January 1984
NICARAGUA-EL SALVADOR: SANDINISTA AND SALVADORAN
GUERRILLA PROPAGANDA NETWORKS
Summary
Since seizing power in 1979, the Sandinistas have-vigorously
pursued a policy of controlling information at home while
developing a sophisticated apparatus for disseminating'-propaganda
abroad. We judge that Sandinista propaganda efforts--including
media control, establishment of solidarity organizations,.and
extensive travel by government leaders--have been instrumental in
eliciting international sympathy for Nicaragua.. we believe that
the regime, now facing mounting criticism of the Nicaraguan
revolution and concerned. over US initiatives in Central America,
increasingly will rely on propaganda both to counter its critics
and to generate pressure on Washington.
Information regarding the propaganda network of the
Salvadoran guerrillas is sparse and reflects their extra-legal
'status. Nevertheless, available reporting and public information
suggests that they view their propaganda effort as a major element
in maintaining international political and material support. As
This memorandum was requested by-the Director of Central Intelligence.
It was prepared of the Central America
Branch, ALA. It was coordinated by the Directorate of operations and contains
information available as of 5 January 1984. Questions and comments are
welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America/Caribbean Division,
OALA,
Copy I of 27
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in Nicaragua, we believe the Salvadoran guerrillas will soon
intensify their propaganda efforts, particularly as they move to
discredit the election set for late March and attempt to intensify
opposition against US support for the government.
THE SANDINISTA PROPAGANDA APPARATUS
Propaganda plays a central role in Nicaraguan domestic and
foreign policy. The Sandinistas have established a propaganda
and media network whose purpose is to mold domestic opinion and
present a favorable image of the Nicaraguan revolution abroad.
In addition, much of Sandinista propaganda efforts have been
devoted to mobilizing international pressure against alleged US
destabilization efforts. Nicaraguan propaganda structures play a
critical role in recent Sandinista efforts to convey the image of
flexibility in domestic and foreign policy.
Structurally and substantively, the Sandinista propaganda
apparatus imitates those in Cuba and the Soviet bloc. Both the
Cuban and Soviet press have picked up Sandinista statements and
themes, thus extending Nicaragua's propaganda reach.
Media Management
Since 1979, the Sandinistas increasingly, have extended their
direct control over the Nicaraguan media. Dominance of the media
assists the regime in fostering new revolutionary values at home
and obscuring internal dissent from outside view. While media
policies have encouraged uniformity, responsibility is shared by
several government and party organs.
One of the first acts of the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) after assuming power in 1979 was to organize a
Department of Propaganda and Political Education (DEPEP),
responsible for overall information and propaganda strategy. It
coordinates major propaganda events, such as the annual
anniversary celebration and mass demonstrations. Since 1980,
FSLN National Directorate member Carlos Nunez has assumed general
responsibility.for direction and control of media and propaganda
activities.
The Sandinista press includes two of the country's three
newspapers, both television stations, two powerful radio
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stations, and a network of smaller ones. Since the regime
declared a state of emergency in March 1982, the opposition
newspaper and a dwindling number of independent radio stations
have had to submit to prior censorship. In 1983, the Sandinistas
prohibited live broadcasts of Archbishop Obando y Bravo's weekly
television Mass, an unprecedented action in Nicaragua.
The Minister of Interior, Tomas Borge, controls censorship
through his Office of Communications Media. The Ministry of
Culture provides auxiliary aid in promoting knowledge of and
support for the government. Its chief, revolutionary priest
Ernesto Cardenal, has been dispatched on numerous propaganda
trips abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs disseminates
propaganda information to diplomatic missions, and in late 1982
organized a press center in Managua to aid foreign journalists.
Both the Ministry and the FSLN's Department of International
Relations have offices dedicated to promoting solidarity
activities in foreign countries.
Sandinista leaders have repeatedly stressed the need for
"revolutionary journalism" to reflect Nicaragua's continuing
revolution. The pro-Sandinista Nicaraguan Journalists Union
(UPN) was formed in 1979, and it has associated itself with
leftist Latin American and Soviet journalists' associations. The
UPN has also developed ties with East European countries and
signed a cooperation accord with Czechoslovakia in June 1982.
Dissemination of News Abroad
The Sandinistas have gradually expanded the structures for
dissemination of information abroad.
The New Nicaraguan News Agency (ANN) was created in
September 1979 to provide copy favorable to the Sandinistas that
would compete with international news agencies. Its director has
publicly acknowledged that ANN is an instrument in support of the
government's foreign policy and an organ of ideological
struggle. ANN had opened 5 offices by mid-1982, with plans to
expand its services by 1984. Technical accords were concluded
with East European countries and Havana in 1980, and ANN expanded
its news reach by joining the pool of non-aligned agencies.
The official Sandinista newspaper, Barricada, began
publication of monthly international editions in Spanish and
English in 1982. A Managua-based organization publishes a
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bilingual monthly magazine Soberania, which is devoted to
sensationalist stories, rabid anti-Americanism, and personal
attacks on US officials. Philip Agee is listed as a member of
the editorial board, and in the past the magazine has published
lists of alleged CIA agents.
Nicaragua's neighbors--particularly Costa Rica--have
expressed concerns because Sandinista radio and television are
received in some areas of their territory. On occasion, there
have been complaints of Nicaraguan interference with their
domestic broadcasts.
The government's principal radio station, Voz de Nicaragua,
tedly plans to increase its power significantly in the next
six months in order to broadcast as far away as Europe.
On a regular basis, the Sandinista press has originated or
repeated disinformation about US policies and activities. In
December 1983, for example, the Sandinista press reprinted a
story alleging US use of chemical weapons in Grenada. The regime
also circulated a report that an American bishop had been
kidnapped and killed by Indian insurgents. The Sandinistas may
have calculated that news of Bishop Schlaefer's death would have
an unsettling effect in the US, even if the story eventually
proved untrue.
International Solidarity
The FSLN has constructed a number of national pro-Sandinista
propaganda organizations with the dual purpose of socializing its
own population and maintaining ties with external revolutionary
and solidarity organizations. These Nicaraguan organizations
reflect the Sandinistas' commitment to the struggle against
"imperialism" and their need for foreign support.
The Nicaraguan People's Solidarity Committee (CNSP) was
formed in October 1979, and has primary responsibility for
promotion of internationalism and forging overt ties with
national liberation groups. It coordinates activities of
pro-Sandinista foreign residents in Nicaragua, and
internationalists who have formed voluntary work brigades. The
CNSP made preparations in 1982 for meetings in Managua of the
World Front for Solidarity with the Salvadoran People--an
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organization headed by a US citizen claiming representatives from
27 countries.
The Nicaraguan Association for Friendship with Socialist
Countries (ANAPS) was founded in June 1981, closely patterned on
a similar Cuban organizaiton. It has promoted political and
cultural events, including friendship agreements with the Soviet
Union, East Germany, and Cuba, and coordination of programs for
Communist visitors.
The Nicaraguan Peace Committee (CONIPAZ) was established in
April 1981, and quickly affiliated with the Moscow-led World
Peace Council (WPC). CONIPAZ President Olga Aviles serves as WPC
Executive Vice President. In April 1983, the organization
convoked a peace conference in Managua attended by 100
delegations from over 20 countries which condemned alleged US
aggression.
The Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our Americas (TANA) is a
Managua-based international organization formed in September
1981. The members of the Tribunal are avowed anti-US
journalists, intellectuals, and politicians, and the organization
is headed by former Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo
Toriello. TANA claims that 21 chapters have been established
throughout Latin America. At an October 1983 conference in
Managua, the organization called for formation of an
international brigade to fight in Nicaragua. TANA publishes the
magazine Soberania whose articles frequently are the subject of
news stories by international wire services.
Following the Cuban example, the Sandinistas have also used
cultural organizations to promote ties with leftist intellectuals
in other countries and to capitalize on the prestige of well
known writers and artists. In July 1983, for example, the
Sandinista Association of Cultural Workers (ASTC) organized a
conference on Central America attended by 200 intellectuals,
including 100 from the US.
The Sandinistas place particular emphasis on promoting
solidarity committees in foreign countries in order to spread
favorable information about Nicaragua, develop political and
financial support, and mobilize pressure on their governments to
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criticize US policies. Solidarity committees have mounted vigils
and demonstrations, organized letter writing campaigns, collected
clothing and money for Nicaragua, placed newspaper
advertisements, and mobilized contingents of international
volunteers to come to Nicaragua to aid the revolution. Last
July, Managua hosted the Second International Meeting for
Solidarity with Nicaragua, attended by committees from 22
countries.
Diplomacy and Propaganda
The Sandinistas also frequently dispatch high level
delegations abroad to defend Sandinista policies. Foreign
Minister D'Escoto probably spent as much time on the road as he
did at home last year, and Culture Minister Cardenal was another
frequent traveler. Interior Minister Borge visited 7 countries
in Western Europe as a one-man truth squad last fall. The
Sandinistas probably aided their peace offensive in.late 1983
through frequent consultations with the Contadora countries.
Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega's three day tour of Contadora
capitals in October helped to dramatize Nicaraguan claims that
the US was preparing an invasion.
Nicaragua has scored some propaganda successes through its
active diplomacy in international organizations. The Sandinistas
have brought their complaints about the US to the UN Security
Council on several occasions in order to attract world attention
and support, and they mounted a similar effort in the General
Assembly last fall. Nicaragua scored a major diplomatic victory
when it was elected to the UN Security Council for the 1983-1984
term. A few weeks later, it hosted a massive meeting of the
Nonaligned Movement which gave the Sandinistas firm backing.
The Sandinistas' attention to the possibilities for
propaganda opportunities frequently gives them the edge in
comparison with their Central American neighbors. The
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Nicaraguans lodge frequent diplomatic protests with their
neighbors over border incidents, and as a result the Sandinista
version usually receives international press attention.
Similarly, the Sandinistas often circulate protests and
information bulletins at the United Nations, while their
neighbors remain silent.
Sandinista Propaganda and the US
We judge that the Sandinistas consider the US as the most
important market for their propaganda. While they are apparently
convinced of Washington's hostility, they probably believe that
they can have some effect on its policies by influencing US
public opinion. Although the Sandinista propaganda line is
unremittingly hostile to the US and pro-Soviet, the regime is
receptive to US journalists and Congressional visitors.
Moreover, Sandinista openness becomes a propaganda theme in
itself, and it is contrasted with recent US denials of visas to
Interior Minister Borge and Council of State President Nunez.
Solidarity efforts by American citizens undoubtedly have
special significance for the Sandinistas. They recently
publicized representations by US citizens living and working in
Nicaragua that they felt safe and did not wish to be used as a
pretext for US intervention. Similarly, the Sandinistas probably
welcome the now weekly demonstrations outside the US Embassy by
American activists and press reports of their plans to mount
peace vigils in areas where anti-Sandinista insurgents have been
active. More importantly, the Sandinistas have strongly
supported the so-called "popular church" in Nicaragua, and
through it they have received sympathetic treatment from Church
sources in the United States.
The Sandinistas repeatedly raise the spectre of Vietnam in
their propaganda, and they probably regard that theme as the most
effective in influencing the American public. Nevertheless, the
Sandinistas must spend a considerable amount of their propaganda
resources to defend themselves against charges of repression.
Recurrent excesses--such as the mistreatment of the Pope during
his March 1983 visit--waste propaganda capital and offset the
potential value to the regime of its propaganda apparatus.
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SALVADORAN GUERRILLA PROPAGANDA
The insurgents' propaganda apparatus appears sophisticated
and extensive. Calculated largely to maintain political and
material support from non-Communist nations and organizations, it
involves use of clandestine radio and press services, as well as
diplomatic contacts, information offices, and "solidarity"
committees in Latin America, Western Europe, and the US.
The breadth and relative success of the guerrilla propaganda
apparatus in part reflect the close cooperation provided by Cuba
and Nicaragua. It also stems from the eclectic membership of the
Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), the political wing of the
insurgency. Institutionalized by the Marxist guerrillas in 1980
to broaden their political base, most FDR spokesmen are social
democrats, Christian Democrats, or independent leftist
professionals.
The guerrillas also founded a political-diplomatic
commission designed to present the insurgent program
internationally and imply an evolving government in exile. The
FDR has since used its "progressive" credentials--including its
membership in the Socialist International--to maintain support by
claiming a democratic orientation and playing down the extent
Marxist-Leninist influence within the guerrilla coalition.
The insurgents' use of the FDR as a moderate political voice
probably has helped the organization to establish its many
offices and support groups throughout the region, and also has
facilitated the finance and weapons-seeking efforts of guerrilla
representatives abroad. B 1981,
there were as many as 60.suc representatives worldwide. We
believe that number has grown significantly in the past three
years.
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Use of the Media
The insurgents have operated as many as five clandestine
radio stations--one for each faction--including the widely
monitored Radio Venceremos, which has operated with little
interruption since January 1981. These commercial band networks
report guerrilla military successes against government forces and
other information, which is frequently picked up by international
wire services and broadcast media. The insurgents also
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occasionally use these stations, which reportedly transmit from
varied locations in El Salvador, in efforts to recruit local
peasants and to urge government troops to defect.
As part of its propaganda support for the insurgents, Havana
regularly provides a forum for the radio stations by replaying
their political commentaries, military communiques, and news
bulletins. Monitoring in early 1983 indicated that these
stations broadcast in excess of 40 hours per week, with the
lion's share coming from Venceremos.
Cuba also has placed high priority on promoting Salpress,
the news agency of the Salvadoran insurgents. According to
Havana Radio, Salpress was formed in Mexico city in December
1980, just before the start of the January 1981 insurgent "final
offensive." It now has branch offices in six other countries,
correspondents serving with guerrilla groups in El Salvador, and
membership in the Nonaligned movement's news agency
organization. Salpress presumably has received considerable
Cuban assistance and guidance.
Despite such assistance,
guerrillas are concerned that their media effort is losin
around.
Human Rights Tactics
The credibility of guerrilla propaganda both within and
outside the region has, in our judgment, been assisted by their 25X1
effective attacks on the human rights situation in El Salvador.
As outlined in captured documents dating from 1980, they have
focused much of this effort on churchmen, academics, and other
professionals sympathetic to change in Central America. 25X1
The left's penetration of, or affiliation with most of the
human rights organizations in El Salvador apparently has been
instrumental in their success. As of mid-1982, monthly political
violence statistics reported by four of these organizations were
running approximately 50 to 100 percent higher than local press
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reports which form the basis for US Embassy statistics.
Moreover, these groups consistently charge that the government is
responsible for virtually all violent deaths in the country over
the past four years.
A body of reporting tends to undercut claims of impartiality
by most of these organizations. For example, as early as 1979
Socorro Juridico (Legal Aid Society) was composed largely of
volunteer members and sympathizers of groups which had joined the
guerrilla coalition. In addition, a member of the independent
Human Rights Commission of El Salvador admitted to US officials
that the group overlooked killings by leftists because it
considers the government and military responsible for the climate
of violence in the country.
Monthly figures disseminated by UCA (the University of
Central America) are equally suspect. Often referred to as the
Catholic University, the school has been a key political base of
the militant left for nearly a decade.
Hemispheric Links
Since its inception, the FDR has sent representatives
throughout the region to attract support for the insurgency.
Their activities have included the establishment of interest
sections and information offices in a variety of Latin American
countries, as well as the US and Canada. Partly as a result, the
insurgency apparently has received a relatively steady stream of
financial and logistical support from local groups, in addition
to cooperation from some governments.
Mexico has been of particular importance to the
insurgents. In 1981, for instance, the Lopez Portillo government
reportedly helped fund a local FDR information office and also
cooperated in arranging a massive demonstration in Mexico City in
support of the Salvadoran left. Shortly thereafter, Mexico
joined with France in publicly recognizing the insurgent alliance
as "a legitimate political force" and advocated negotiations with
the Salvadoran junta. The close relationship between the
guerrillas and Mexico City appears to continue, as evidenced by
recent indications that Salvadoran insurgent leaders--reportedly
under orders from the Sandinistas to vacate Managua--will
establish a greater presence in Mexico City.
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European and Other Ties
The breadth and effectiveness of the
guer
rilla propaganda
network outside of the hemisphere have be
en ap
parent
various European labor an religious
groups were major financial contributors. Swedish organizations
alone were said to a have contributed more than $300,000 to the
FDR during the first 10 months of 1981.
The apparent financial and logistical resources of the
insurgency were also underscored by US Embassy reporting
indicating that an FDR delegation's itinerary included West
Germany, Sweden, Algeria, and New Delhi during one period in ?
1981. The relative success of such globetrotting was highlighted
at roughly the same time by the willingness of West European
socialists to sponsor solidarity rallies for the insurgents in
Paris, Bern, Frankfurt, and Rome.
Other propaganda objectives seem to focus as much on
marshalling international opinion against Washington as they do
on supporting the insurgency. In early 1981, for instance, two
of Ungo's colleagues met with Canadian officials in an effort to
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garner diplomatic backing. Although the attempt was
unsuccessful, Canadian officials intimated that the propaganda
moves were generating increasing public pressure on Ottawa to
oppose US military assistance to San Salvador.
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insurgent political spokesmen 25X1
were present in the US, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, the United Kinqdom, Algeria, Libya,
Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru. In our judgment, this list is
particularly striking insofar as it is dominated by non-leftist
governments. Nevertheless, public opinion in these countries has
been led to believe--incorrectly--that the Salvadoran insurgency
is a popular uprising, a fact that attests to the power of
guerrilla propaganda. 25X1
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SUBJECT: NICARAGUA-EL SALVADOR: Sandinista and Salvadoran
Guerrilla Propaganda Networks
DISTRIBUTION
Copy # 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
DCI
Executive Director
SA/DCI/IA - 7D60
NIO/LA - 7E62
NIC/AG - 2E49
- DDI - 7E44
- D/ALA - 3F45
& 9 - ALA/PS - 3F38
- C/DDI/PES - 7F24
- ALA/RD - 3F44
12, 13, 14, &
16 - C/MCD
17 - DC/MCD
18 - C/CA
19 - DC CA
20 -
21
22
23
24
25
26
15 -
CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07
Division Files
Branch Files
27 -
DDI/ALA/MCD/CA/
(5 January 1984)
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