CHILE: THE EMERGING PARTY SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Directorate of Secret
A Intelligence
Chile:
The Emerging Party System
Secret
ALA 84-10110
November 1984
Copy 2 2 8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Chile:
The Emerging Party System
An Intelligence Assessment
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with
This paper was prepared by
the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA,
25X1
25X1
25X1
Secret
ALA 84-10110
November 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
Chile:
The Emerging Party SystemF_~ 25X1
Key Judgments Despite their legal proscription, Chile's political parties are playing an
Information available important role in the opposition to President Pinochet's 11-year-old
as of I November 1984 military-dominated regime. In practice, the government has tolerated open
was used in this report.
political activity by all but Marxist parties, especially since widespread
opposition exploded in mid-1983. In our view, Pinochet realized at that
time that to stifle organized debate among the highly politicized Chilean
electorate would leave only violence as an outlet for political expression and
fuel radical opposition to his government. While the political parties
provide a partial safety valve, their evolution-which hinges on the smooth
transition to democratic government, currently scheduled to be completed
by 1990-will influence whether Chile moves in an orderly fashion to
civilian rule or succumbs to violence and confrontation.
Chile's renewed political vigor has spawned, at last count, some 64 parties
and factions. Through attrition and consolidation, a manageable system of
five to seven major parties is beginning to take shape, covering the political
spectrum from the right to the left:
? The Right. The traditionally powerful Chilean right is slowly reorganiz-
ing, but remains severely fractured. Democratic conservatives-who
constitute the vast majority of rightist party members-have a history of
pragmatism, and we believe they have a good chance of overcoming their
tactical differences regarding a transition formula to become an influen-
tial political force.
? The Christian Democrats. Spearheading the democratic opposition to
Pinochet, the centrist Christian Democrats advocate a mixed economy,
reject violence, and are wary of working with the Communists. Although
the party has majority moderate and minority leftist currents, it is
basically united, popular, and well placed to act as a stabilizing force
during the transition to democracy.
-'The Left. Long hampered by internal feuding and an ambiguous
commitment to democracy, the Socialists have spawned a dominant
faction that eschews violence and, in our view, are evolving into a modern
democratic socialist party. Failure to achieve a peaceful transition to
democracy, however, would benefit Chile's Moscow-supported Commu-
nist Party, the biggest and best organized force on the left. The
Communists are committed to terrorism and violent mass protests, but so
far have failed to pressure Pinochet seriously.
Secret
ALA 84-10110
November 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
How Pinochet and the armed forces handle the transition to democracy
will be crucial. In our view, the military is primarily concerned that it be
succeeded by moderate civilians who do not initiate Argentine-like trials of
the military for human rights violations. But Pinochet-buoyed by the
opposition's inability to sustain the momentum of last year's protests-will
accept opposition demands that the transition to democracy be accelerated
only if he comes under heavy political pressure. We judge that it probably
will require considerable political tumult-including renewed violent pro-
tests-to induce the President to compromise with his opponents. If he
holds fast in the face of growing violence and unrest, however, the military
might replace him with a general more amenable to a faster democratic
transition.
On balance, we believe that the chances are slightly better than even that
an orderly shift to democratic rule can be achieved. This would involve
concessions both by Pinochet-such as advancing the date of congressional
elections planned for 1990-and by the opposition-accepting Pinochet's
full term as President until 1989, for example. Such a transition would
stand the greatest chance of producing a party system conducive to stable
democratic government. Democratic conservatives would dominate the
right, the Christian Democrats would tighten their hold on the center, a
democratic socialist alternative would emerge on the left, and the Commu-
nists might become politically isolated.
A refusal to compromise by Pinochet and the opposition probably would,
however, cause the transition to democracy to collapse, fostering confronta-
tion and, violence. Although Pinochet would probably retain control for
some time, the party system most likely to emerge would hinder the
development of peaceful democratic government. Political polarization
would strengthen the authoritarian right-currently a minor factor-and
the Communists at the expense of the Christian Democrats and the
democratic left. The stage would be set for chronic instability and the
reinsertion of the military into politics.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
The reemergence of stable representative government would benefit the
United States and limit opportunities for Soviet and Cuban meddling in
Chile. Most important, the return of democratic government to Chile
would be widely viewed as underscoring Washington's commitment to
pluralistic politics in Latin America. Conversely, failure to establish stable
democratic rule would strain bilateral relations and increase the influence
of the Moscow- and Havana-backed radical left. A greater role for the
Communists might in turn either provoke a military coup or perpetuate the
present regime. In either case, the United States-because of its past
involvement in Chilean internal affairs-probably would be blamed by
critics in Chile and elsewhere for torpedoing the transition process, with a
consequent loss of influence and prestige throughout Latin America.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
Contents
Key.Judgments
Scope Note
Introduction
The Right
Authoritarians
4
The Christian Democratic Center
5
Past Problems
5
Internal Stresses ...
6
... And Strengths
7
Outlook and Implications for the United States
10
The Most Likely Case
10
An Alternate Scenario
11
B. Key Chilean Party Leaders
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
Scope Note This paper outlines the current and most likely future growth of the political party
system in Chile, and assesses how it both affects and is affected by the ongoing
transition from military to civilian rule. We are mindful of the many pitfalls that
could interfere with such a process. Thus, we make no attempt to provide a
detailed assessment of the political scene in the 1989-90 time frame, when
President Pinochet's term in office is slated to end and congressional elections are
scheduled.
Because of their recent emergence from the underground and the new form of
many of Chile's political groupings, reliable information on their structure,
organization, and leadership is scarce. The absence of free elections since 1973 and
the dubious scientific validity of many Chilean polls make even general assess-
ments of party strength and popular support difficult. Partially reliable member-
ship statistics are available only for the Christian Democratic Party and the
Communist Party. As a result, the conclusions of this paper are necessarily
speculative, since they are based largely on a close reading of the Chilean press
and US Embassy reporting, inference and projection from past events, and the
judgments of US official and academic specialists in Chilean politics.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
Chile:
The Emerging Party System
Introduction
In our view, Chile's traditionally high level of politici-
zation has not been diminished significantly by the
more than 11 years of military rule. When General
Augusto Pinochet toppled the Marxist government of
Salvador Allende in September 1973, he had a
straightforward message for Chile's civilian poli-
ticans: "Your time is up." As President, Pinochet
sought to remold Chilean political culture and perma-
nently sideline the country's old political elite. The
anti-Pinochet protest movement that emerged during
1983, however, clearly revealed that the President had
failed to fashion a new political order. Many of the
same parties and politicians that had dominated
Chile's public life prior to 1973 returned to the fore
after a decade of hibernation.
Since mid-1983 the parties have played an important
role in organizing the opposition movement, and they
will influence whether Chile has an orderly transition
to civilian rule or succumbs to violence and confronta-
tion. After the prolonged hiatus in partisan political
activity, old parties have reemerged and new ones
have formed; many are riven by internal dissension,
according to the US Embassy. We believe that this
chaotic situation-the Chilean press' latest estimate
lists over 64 parties and factions-will not last. An
assessment of US Embassy reporting and open
sources leads us to believe that a manageable system
of five to seven major parties is already taking shape,
while the minor political groups are either merging
with stronger forces or sinking back into political
obscurity.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the emerging
party system and assess its probable development over
the next three to five years. We focus on how the
nature of the return to democratic government will
affect internal party development and relations be-
tween parties. The structure of'the party system that
is fashioned during the twilight of the Pinochet era
will, in turn, provide the key indicator of Chile's
prospects for political stability under civilian rule.
Figure 1. President Pinochet With Interior Minister Jarpa. Fash- 25X1
The Right
Before Pinochet came to power, the right was well
organized, dynamic, and, according to electoral re-
sults, was supported by up to a third of the voters.
Although conservative by Latin American standards
on socioeconomic matters and devoutly anti-Marxist,
the Chilean right was democratic and constitutional-
ist. Authoritarian ideologies were championed by only
small extremist parties; such views were barely repre-
sented within the National Party (PN), Chile's leading
rightwing force. 25X1
The right, however, was sufficiently alienated by the
Allende government to support the 1973 military
coup. We suspect that most National Party leaders
believed that the military, after an initial crackdown,
would return power to the traditional center-right
politicians. Pinochet, however, refused to share power
even with the civilian right. The press reports that the
President also rejected attempts to form a projunta
"Pinochetista" party, preferring a military-dominated
regime that suppressed all forms of public political
activity. 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
The 1980 Constitution and the Transition to
Civilian Rule
In 1980, with a booming economy and the military
government at the height of its popularity, over 60
percent of Chilean voters approved a Constitution
providing for a gradual transition to civilian rule. It
calls for President Pinochet's current term in office to
last until 1989, when the subsequent president-who
may also be Pinochet-will be named by the four-
man military junta and approved by popular plebi-
scite. Congressional elections are scheduled for 1990.
Other provisions of the Constitution allow the execu-
tive branch to arrest and exile dissidents by adminis-
trative fiat and ban Marxist parties.
Both the democratic opposition and the radical left
deny the Constitution's legitimacy. But, while Com-
munists and hardline Socialists insist that Pinochet
resign and the Constitution be immediately derogat-
ed, the moderate opposition has publicly hinted that
it may accept the Constitution as a fait accompli,
provided that some of the basic law's most controver-
sial aspects are modified. The moderates held open
discussions with Interior Minister Jarpa concerning
political liberalization in September 1983, but they
foundered over Pinochet's refusal to consider a spe-
cific timetable to accelerate the transition to civilian
rule. No formal opposition-government dialogue is
under way this year, but behind-the-scenes contacts
have taken place, and neither side has firmly rejected
In our view, Pinochet's refusal to sanction even that
modicum of politics implicit in an official party
prevented the Chilean right from totally abandoning
its support for democracy. Excluded from a signifi-
cant role in the government, most rightist leaders had
little alternative but to urge an eventual return to
pluralist politics. This was precisely what Pinochet
offered in his 1980 Constitution, and, despite some
public grumbling that a 10-year transition period was
too long, most of the right supported the initiative.
the possibility of eventual compromise. The reforms
suggested by the moderates for an orderly transition
include advancing congressional or local elections to
the 1986-88 period, repealing the government's spe-
cial administrative powers, easing the ban on Marxist
parties, and prohibiting Pinochet from succeeding
himself. The moderates have not formulated their
minimum demands, but we believe that if Pinochet's
political and economic position remains strong they
might agree to participate in the government-spon-
sored congressional elections slated for 1990 in ex-
change for as little as a pledge from the President not
to run in 1989 and to hold local elections before
1990.
If, however, Pinochet comes under considerable pres-
sure from his various adversaries and the govern-
ment's overall standing weakens, the moderate
opposition would probably hold out for major re-
forms, such as congressional elections in 1986 or
1987 and an end to Pinochet's emergency authorities.
If Pinochet responded to such demands by refusing
any changes in the Constitution, the stage would be
set for nonparticipation by all but extreme conserva-
tives in the electoral process, increased violence, and
political polarization.
is not in its best interests. Polls show that Chileans-
perhaps unfairly-associate the right with Pinochet;
consequently, if the President relies on repression to
maintain himself in power until 1990, it will almost
certainly alienate vast sectors of the population from
rightist parties and ideas. This realization has, in our
view, spurred much of the right to reorganize itself
and loosen ties with the regime so as not to be caught
unprepared should Pinochet falter
25X1
25X1
We believe, however, that in view of the current
domestic turmoil the right probably judges that rigid
adherence to Pinochet's timetable for democratization
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
The right has yet to refashion itself into a force
comparable to the pre-1973 National Party. Conser-
vative leaders publicly admit that their failure to
maintain even skeletal party organizations under Pi-
nochet, combined with longstanding personal rival-
ries, produced organizational chaos on the right. In
our view, the right is also divided by differing atti-
tudes toward collaboration with the military regime
and the best strategy to follow for a smooth transition
to civilian rule. Ideological disputes, while evident,
play a secondary role in fracturing the right, especial-
ly among those groups that trace their ancestry to the
old National Party. Reporting from the US Embassy
and the press indicates that the most influential
sectors of the right continue to espouse essentially
democratic views.
In our view, there are three major currents on the
right: traditional, authoritarian, and free market.
Traditionalists. The traditional right-by far the
largest and most influential-consists of three major
groups, all of which are-descendants of the National
Party.' These parties favor political pluralism, advo-
cate moderate state intervention in the economy, and
are profoundly anti-Communist. They differ primari-
ly over tactical questions of how best to engineer the
transition from military to civilian rule and how
closely to support the government on this issue. The
three groups are:
? The National Party (PN), according-to the US
Embassy, is the best organized and largest of the
conservative parties and has had considerable suc-
cess in capturing the loyalty of the members of its
pre-1973 namesake. The PN accepts the legitimacy
of the 1980 Constitution, but is relatively independ-
ent of the government and has pushed vocally for
constitutional reforms that would speed the pace of
democratization. Specifically, it has called for an
elected congress in 1985 and an end to emergency
powers that permit the government to arrest and
expel dissidents by administrative fiat.
rightist mold. Their backgrounds, however, differ substantially
from the PN-derived parties: We expect that they will be either
absorbed into the larger groupings or become irrelevant political
? National Unity (UN),
is supported by Interior Minister Sergio Jarpa, a
former president of the old National Party. Party
leaders have publicly stated that they want to form
a broad center-right force that will have a wider
appeal than the old National Party. To this end they
have organized the National Democratic Accord
(ADENA), a coalition of five progovernment par-
ties. National Unity hews more closely to the Pino-
chet regime than the other traditional rightist par-
ties, but it, too, has publicly advocated changes in
the 1980 Constitution, including congressional elec-
tions in 1986 and the prompt legalization of all non-
Marxist political parties.
? The Republican Right (DR), is the only important 25X1
rightist group to have totally repudiated the 1980
Constitution. As a member of the Christian Demo-
cratic-dominated Democratic Alliance opposition
coalition, it has openly called for Pinochet's resigna- 25X1
tion and the election of a constituent assembly to
draft a new constitution. Although important sym-
bolically as evidence that Pinochet's once solid
conservative support is eroding, there is no indica-
tion that the party has much of a grassroots follow-
ing.
While the extent of their support for Pinochet differs,
the parties of the traditional right share a common
ideology, and we believe that if an orderly transition
to democracy were achieved-thus making the ques-
tion of constitutional reform a less divisive issue-
differences regarding political tactics and relations
with the government could be overcome. The right has
surmounted similar obstacles in the past: in 1966
three declining conservative groups stopped feuding
and united to form the National Party, which quickly
became Chile's second-largest party.
We judge that, if the traditional right shows similar
pragmatism in the late 1980s, the right will become a
potent force. The pre-1973 PN regularly mustered 20
percent of the congressional vote, and a third of the
electorate usually backed the rightist presidential
candidate. Eleven years of military rule, in our view,
have done little to erode this level of underlying
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Under a 1977 legislative decree all Chilean parties
are technically illegal. In addition, the 1980 Consti-
tution specifically outlaws "totalitarian" (that is,
Marxist) parties. The government is preparing to lift
the 1977 decree but will maintain the constitutional
ban on Marxist parties. Since the emergence of the
mass opposition movement in 1983, the regime has
enforced the ban on political parties unevenly, gener-
ally tolerating open activity by parties of the far right
to the moderate left while arresting and banishing
Communist and hardline Socialist leaders.
Most of the parties have established informal alli-
ances or coalitions. The most important include:
? National Democratic Accord (ADENA). A group of
five basically progovernment conservative parties.
? Democratic Alliance (AD). A broad democratic
opposition coalition dominated by the Christian
Democrats and stretching from the moderate right
to the center-left.
? Social Democratic Federation (FSD). An effort to
unite three social democratic parties within the AD.
? Socialist Bloc (BS). An alliance spearheaded by
Socialists belonging to the AD and several small
Christian Socialist groups.
? Popular Democratic Movement (MDP). A Commu-
nist Party-controlled. front that includes the hard-
line Almeyda Socialist faction and a Cuban-backed
terrorist group.
We expect the party alliance structure to remain fluid
until the political party law is promulgated and
congressional elections are held, at the earliest in
1986. Cooperation among parties to oppose Pinochet
will not necessarily carry over into formal electoral
coalitions. The AD in particular will, in our view,
tend to unravel as its Socialist component seeks to
fortify the Socialist Bloc and its right wing searches
for a less overwhelming ally than the Christian
Democrats. The alliances that span narrower ranges
of the political spectrum-ADENA, BS, and FSD-
stand a better chance of enduring, in our view. The
MDP is ,a special case, since government repression
has nearly driven it underground and the ban on
Marxist parties will prohibit it from contesting the
first congressional elections.
support. A variety of polls reveal that public support
for Pinochet-which we believe will mostly translate
into votes for the traditional right in a free election-
has never dropped below 30 percent. Furthermore, the
conservatives' anti-Marxism and staunch support for
Pinochet's coup will help them retain middle- and
upper-class backing. Academic studies show that
these sectors still fear a return to the chaotic Allende
years and widely respect the military's political
achievement of reestablishing order.
Authoritarians. The authoritarian right differs in
political ideology from the traditional right in that it
lacks a commitment to democracy.. Leaders of the
National Action Movement (MAN)-the main au-
thoritarian rightist party-openly denigrate democra-
cy and the rule of law, and have publicly hinted at the
desirability of one-party authoritarian rule in Chile.
Press reports indicate that the MAN has gained a
small measure of influence among the traditional
right through participating in the ADENA coalition.
Nevertheless, we suspect that, if an orderly transition
is negotiated, traditional rightists will distance them-
selves from the MAN's "fascist" image in order to
attract centrist support. The authoritarian right,
splintered and ideologically isolated, would, in our
view, then be reduced to a coterie of leaders without
followers. Only the collapse of the transition to de-
mocracy and a sharp rise in political polarization
would give groups such as the MAN a significant role
in the party system. In such circumstances, the au-
thoritarian right's strident anti-Communism and
hardline stances would probably attract middle- and
upper-class elements who feared that the temporizing
conservatism of the traditional right could not counter
a leftist revolutionary threat.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
Free Marketeers. The free market right diverges from
the traditional right in its economic ideology. Locally
known as the "Chicago Boys," this sector, organized
in the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), de-
signed the untrammelled free market experiment that
brought Chile fleeting prosperity before the severe
1982 depression. The UDI's reliance on market incen-
tives represented a radical break with the statist
and nationalist approach of traditional Chilean
The UDI, in our view, has the worst prospects for
survival of any group on the right. The US Embassy
reports that the favoritism Pinochet showed to the
"Chicago Boys" irritated both the authoritarian and
traditional right, who are loathe to'work with the
UDI. We believe that the party's current influence is
largely illusory, since it is based.on patronage derived
from the official posts held by UDI members.
the government
is already removing UDI members from some of these
positions: Finally, a reading of the press indicates that
the Chilean public associates the UDI with the 1982
depression and the country's current economic woes
and has largely forgotten its earlier economic achieve-
ments. This legacy will probably handicap the free
market right regardless of the nature of the transition
process
The Christian Democratic Center
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is Chile's
largest, possessing, according to press estimates,
roughly 25,000 members. Only the Communists can
rival the PDC in size, organization, and influence.
The party faces no serious challenge to its dominance
of the crucial center of Chilean politics and overshad-
ows both its Socialist and conservative partners in the
Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition. The PDC cur-
rently spearheads the democratic opposition to Pino-
chet, and we believe it probably will play a key role in
any future civilian government.
Past Problems. In the past, the Christian Democrats
were crippled by weaknesses that reduced their effec-
tiveness both in power (1964-70) and in opposition
(1970-84). The Christian Democrats had been espe-
cially obstinate in their refusal to cooperate with the
democratic right, except for the goal of countering
Allende. The PDC originated as a schism from the
Conservative Party, and its founders have always
emphasized the distance traveled from their rightist
origins. Rooted in an anticapitalist bias, this disdain
for the right produced increasingly doctrinaire posi-
tions on economic issues in the pre-Allende period.
Thus, by 1970,the party advocated an idiosyncratic
brand 'f Christian Socialism, stressing land reform,
nationalization. of key industries, and close coopera-
tion with the left. Even this formulation failed to
satisfy leftist members who abandoned the party to 25X1
found several hybrid Marxist/Christian groupings.
When it achieved power in 1964, party leaders spoke
of 30 years of Christian Democratic hegemony and
shunned coalition politics. This arrogance alienated
potential collaborators and reduced the party's effec-
tiveness in government and, subsequently, in the
opposition.
We believe that the PDC's experiences under Allende 25X1
and Pinochet have yielded indelible lessons and that 25X1
the party has been toughened in the process. Christian
Democrats now openly recognize that they cannot act
effectively alone. The creation of the Democratic
Alliance-where the PDC collaborates with four oth-
er parties-is a concrete example of this new pragma-
tism. Christian Socialism is now espoused only by the
party's leftmost fringe; the official PDC position
stresses the importance of free markets in a mixed 25X1
economy. This is accompanied by a renewed faith in
democracy and an emphasis on social welfare pro-
grams that distinguishes the PDC from the right,
along with a clearcut rejection of violence and terror-
ism as inherently polarizing and destabilizing. 25X1
Chilean Christian democracy today retains its hu-
manistic outlook but is concerned mainly with practi-
cal solutions to specific social and political challenges.
This is exemplified by the recent publication of a
24-volume PDC-sponsored study that spells out spe-
cific proposals to tackle a variety of the country's
problems, ranging from housing and education to debt 25X1
relief and industrial development. In sum, as a result
of the pressures of the last decade or so, the party, in
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100230001-7
Figure 2
Distribution of Major Parties on the Chilean Political
Spectrum, 1984
Communist Party (PCCh)
Luis Corvalan
Socialist Party-Almeyda (PSCh-A)
Clodomiro Almeyda
Socialist Party-Briones (PSCh-B)
Carlos Briones
Radical Party (PR)
Enrique Silva Cimma
Social Democratic Party (PsD)
Mario Sharpe
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
Gabriel Valdes
Independent Democratic Union (UDI)
Sergio Fernandez
National Action Movement (MAN)
Federico Willoughby
our view, has reaffirmed its identity and ideological
moorings while shifting its energies from sterile doc-
trinal debates to more productive and pragmatic
concerns.
Internal Stresses .. Although more united today
than in the past, the PDC is not monolithic. The party
is divided between leftists associated with current
party President Gabriel Valdes and moderates led by
former PDC President Andres Zaldivar. Christian
Democratic leftists define their party as center-left
and their recent rhetoric has been more populist than
that of the Zaldivar grouping. The private statements
of Valdes and his leftist advisers sometimes show
traces of traditional PDC antipathy for the democrat-
ic right, and, according to.the US Embassy, that
faction has hesitated to make common cause with
even "civilized" conservatives. Valdes publicly has
excluded the Communists as possible partners in any
future PDC-led government, but his faction generally
favors tactical cooperation with them to try to pres- 25X1
sure the government. The Zaldivar group, in contrast,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
defines the party as purely centrist and is much less
diffident regarding collaboration with the right. Party
moderates have also adopted a more forthrightly anti-
Party-was never formally dissolved and is thus fairly
well organized.' The PDC is being renovated through
a series of elections that we believe will leave it in
better shape than any other Chilean party, with the
possible exception of the Communists. The PDC's
formal structures are reinforced by an extraordinary
sense of party loyalty. Christian democracy has be-
come, according to the press, a subculture for its
activists, who frequent the same schools, clubs,
churches, and even vacation spots. This has helped -
overcome centrifugal forces based on ideological, per-
sonal, or generational conflicts. Chilean Christian
democracy also possesses considerable intellectual fi-
Communist stance than Valdes's followers.
These differences do not, in our view, imperil party
unity. Opposition to Pinochet strengthens the party's
already considerable esprit de corps, and here Zaldi-
var-expelled from Chile by the regime from 1981 to
1983-is as hardline in his public statements and
actions as Valdes. Moderate Christian Democrats
have also softened some of their anti-Communism and
agreed to work with the Communists in organizing
antigovernment protests. Likewise, Valdes's leftism is
tempered by pragmatism: he explicitly rejects the
notion of Christian Socialism and
has 'been trying to
forge an alliance with conservatives to undermine
Pinochet's support on the right.
The Zaldivar faction has accepted Valdes's steward-
ship because the moderate-leftist dispute is over nu-
ances rather than basic principles. Moreover, there is
considerable evidence that the moderates are stronger
than the leftists and will dominate the party in the
long run:
? The moderates have many popular young leaders;
six of the seven top votegetters in a recent political
committee election were young moderates.
? The Zaldivar faction controls the PDC youth sec-
tion, which accounts for 40 percent of party
membership.
? Moderates control the PDC labor front where they
recently defeated a leftist proposal to fuse Christian
Democratic and Communist unions into one
federation.
In our view, the moderates are now satisfied with
Valdes's leadership style and, provided they are given
adequate representation in party councils, will wait
several years before effectively challenging Valdes for
the PDC presidency.
... And Strengths. The internal differences among
the Christian Democrats are characteristic of any
party with its breadth of membership, and the PDC
possesses counterbalancing strengths that could make
it the fulcrum of the future party system. The US
Embassy reports that the party-unlike the National
her: unlike most other Chilean parties, the PDC 25X1
maintains a network of foundations and institutes that
support policy-related research in economics, politics,
law, and other fields. 25X1
We believe, however, that the party's greatest asset is
its status as the only major cross-class party in Chile.
Academic studies reveal that the party polls best
among middle-class voters, many of whom appreciate 25X1
the subtle support it receives at the grassroots level
from the Catholic Church. The PDC's ties with the
Church-which in Chile is identified with the defense
of workers and the poor-also stand it in good stead
among the country's large and politically active lowe]25X1
classes. The US Embassy reports that the party is
actively organizing in slum areas, thereby continuing
a trend begun in the 1960s~
Christian democracy, however, has an Achilles' heel:
its position in the center of the political spectrum. If
Chile achieves a negotiated transition to democracy,
the party will be able to portray itself as a stabilizing
force, attractive to moderates on both the right and
the left. If Chilean politics become radicalized, how-
ever, this centrism probably would become an elector-
al liability and might strain party unity. A polarized
struggle between the authoritarian right and the
Marxist left would, in our view, limit the appeal of 25X1
' The PN dissolved itself in 1973 as a gesture of solidarity with the
new military regime. The Christian Democrats adopted a more
neutral stance toward the Pinochet government and preferred
to maintain an independent, albeit largely clandestine, party
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100230001-7
PDC calls for consensus and moderation. We would
expect more ideologically combative political alterna-
tives to come to the fore, reducing the Christian
Democrats' ability to stem the slide into conflict and
confrontation.
The Left
The authoritarian left in Chile long has overshadowed
more moderate domestic leftist groups. This circum-
stance, particularly evident during the Allende period,
has been in our view a persistent source of political
instability in modern Chile. The presence of a large,
rigidly Marxist-Leninist Moscow-oriented Commu-
nist Party (PCCh) was an important factor in hinder-
ing the development of democratic leftist parties. The
Communists remain a potent force, but the prospects
for the emergence of a viable counterweight on the
left have been bolstered by the increasing strength of
moderates in the Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh).
Socialists. The PSCh-Allende's party-is the major
socialist force in Chile and was the biggest leftist
party before 1973, polling roughly 20 percent of the
vote. The Socialist party historically has been divided
between advocates of violent revolution and moder-
ates pledged to a legal transition to socialism. This
tension, exacerbated by personal disputes and genera-
tional struggles, caused the party to splinter into over
a dozen factions by the late 1970s. During the past
year the Socialists, anxious to reestablish their politi-
cal influence, have coalesced into two major group-
ings: a group of incipient democratic socialists led by
Carlos Briones and Hernan Vodanovic, and a hardline
Marxist-Leninist faction led by Clodomiro Almeyda.'
The Briones Socialists are determined to avoid the
path that spelled disaster under Allende. They public-
ly reject the use of violence in opposing Pinochet and
emphasize the importance of democratic procedures
' A third, smaller group-the so-called historic Socialist party-
separated from the Briones faction in May 1983. Although it has
some influence at the moment, we believe that the historic party
probably will collapse because of internal divisions and opportunist
leadership. The group contains both democratic and Marxist-
Leninist socialists, and individual militants will most likely find a
home eventually either in the Briones or the Almeyda factions.
and the rule of law. According to US Embassy
reporting, the faction has grown wary of alliances
with the Communists, especially since the Communist
Party abandoned its traditional opposition to armed
struggle in 1980. Bucking the old Socialist "unity of
the left" approach, these Socialists have made com-
mon cause with the Christian Democrats in the
Democratic Alliance. Vodanovic has told US officials
that his goal is to fashion a modern democratic
socialist party along the lines of Venezuela's Demo-
cratic Action or the Spanish Socialist Workers Party.
the Briones faction has
already made impressive strides in that direction;,
whether it continues to gain ground depends largely
on the vitality of the opposing Almeyda faction and
the assistance the Briones group receives from moder-
ate leftist forces outside the Socialist Party proper.
The Almeyda group is the descendant of the Socialist
Party's radical wing, which under Allende often took
stances to the left of the Communists. The faction
seeks the violent overthrow of Pinochet and, according
to US Embassy and press reports, works virtually
hand in glove with the Communists as a member of
the PCCh-controlled opposition coalition, the Popular
Democratic Movement (MDP). Almeyda himself re-
sides in East Berlin, espouses Marxism-Leninism, and
has publicly adopted a pro-Soviet foreign policy.
Almeyda's adherents have worked with the PCCh and
a small pro-Cuban group-also a member of the
MDP-in organizing terrorism against the Pinochet
regime.
We judge that the Briones faction has a better-than-
even chance of besting the Almeyda group and emerg-
ing as the legatee of the pre-1973 Socialist Party.
Based on press reporting, the Almeyda wing is in
internal disarray, having expelled many leaders and.
some rank and file because of differences over policy
and personality conflicts. Through subservience to
Moscow it has forfeited claim to the venerable Chil-
ean socialist tradition of freedom from foreign influ-
ence. Finally, the faction's mimicry of Communist
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
policies has blurred distinctions between hardline
Socialists and Communists. The Almeyda group may
subsist as a Communist appendage, but we judge its
future as an independent political entity to be bleak.
Prospects for democratic socialism are further en-
hanced by the existence of social democratic forces
outside the PSCh proper. Chief among these are the
Radicals, Chile's oldest party, and their offshoot, the
Social Democrats. Both parties, currently reuniting
under a European-style social democratic program,
have publicly shown interest in working with the
Briones Socialists. While longstanding personal rival-
ries probably preclude a formal fusion, we judge that
social democrats and democratic socialists will even-
tually arrive at some form of cooperation. Ideological
differences between the two groups are minimal, and
leaders of both have openly said that they want to
prevent the Chilean left from being dominated by the
Communists. Past voting patterns suggest that, work-
ing together, PSCh moderates and social democrats
from the Radical tradition might attract support from
up to one-third of the electorate, thereby constituting
a workable non-Communist, center-left option.
The chances for such a change in the party system
would be greatest within the context of an orderly
transition to democracy, which in our view would
reduce the appeal of the extremist Almeyda faction to
potential Socialist supporters.
Communists. Polarization and violence, however,
while peripherally aiding the Almeydistas, would
mostly benefit the Communist Party, the most radical
and powerful force on the left. It is well organized,
disciplined and-with membership estimated by the
US Embassy at 15,000 to 20,000-probably the
largest party in Chile after the Christian Democrats.
The PCCh has traditionally attracted upwards of 15
percent of the electorate and, according to the US
Embassy, retains the loyalty of its hardcore working-
class following.
The Communists also have been helped by financial
assistance and training provided by Moscow. The
Chilean security services report that the PCCh re-
ceives funding from abroad, and the Soviet press
acknowledges that Moscow finances the university
studies of young Chilean party members in the
USSR. Although more precise evidence is lacking, we
agree with the conclusion of much of the Chilean
press that the party could not underwrite its varied
activities solely through membership dues and other 25X1
internal sources of funding. Furthermore, the PCCh
has been generally responsive to Soviet views regard-
ing political strategy, partially, in our view, in order to
avoid ieonardizinQ this imnortant source of sunnnrt
in mid-1983 the Chilean party abruptly
jettisoned its policy of ignoring the democratic opposi-
tion and accepted Soviet instructions-reversed sever-
al months later-to work closely with the Christian
Democrats and other parties.
Soviet Bloc influence can also be detected in the
party's recent emphasis on terrorist tactics.
25X1
25X1
170 mem- 25X1
eb s of the Communist Youth received paramilitary
training in Cuba, East Germany, and Libya and
returned to Chile last year to initiate terrorist activi-
ties. We agree with the US Embassy's assessment
that the PCCh's terrorist arm may be directed and
funded from outside Chile, probably by exiled Chil-
ean Communists in close consultation with Moscow.
In 1980,1 the PCCh- 25X1
under pressure from Moscow and influenced by the
Sandinista victory in Nicaragua-abandoned its long- 25X1
standing opposition to violence and advocated armed
rebellion to topple Pinochet. Since then the party has
fomented terrorism, worked for a general strike, and
attempted to organize street violence during anti-
Pinochet protests:
? The armed wing of the party, according to the US
Embassy, is responsible for a series of bombings
throughout the country this year.
? Communist-dominated labor unions called for the
abortive one-day strike against the government in
October.
? The press states that PCCh front organizations have 25X1
sponsored illegal land seizures by squatters in
Santiago.
The Communists have complemented their covert
strategy with overt political mobilization via their
front, the Popular Democratic Movement.F__ 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Thus far, Communist efforts to foment armed resist-
ance have been largely frustrated. Sporadic violence
among slumdwellers has flared during protests. Al-
though this serves Communist interests, we agree with
the US Embassy's assessment that. these outbursts are
largely spontaneous and beyond party control. The
PCCh continues to organize among the urban poor,
its influence in the slums is held in check by the
government's frequent arrest and deportation of Com-
munist organizers.
the party's plans to use its leverage wit
organized labor to launch an "insurrectionary general
strike" to bring down the government. So far, how-
ever, the Communists have been unable to rally
support from a sufficiently broad spectrum of workers
to carry out a crippling nationwide strike. Moderates
still control the labor movement, and the regime's
judicious mix of economic reforms and repression has
kept the unions disunited and dispirited.
The Communists also are making little headway in
their efforts to use terrorism to goad Pinochet into a
blanket repression that could deprive him of key
middle-class support. Selective government security
measures have hampered the party's bombing cam-
paign. Moreover, according to press accounts and the
US Embassy, the violence has confirmed middle-class
fears that a quick return to civilian rule would renew
the chaos of the Allende years
We believe that Communist influence can be con-
tained during the transition to civilian rule, especially
if the democratic opposition arrives at a modus viven-
di with the government. The party will probably
remain ostracized by the Democratic Alliance as long
as it perpetrates terrorism. Even if the Communists
abjured violence, they would be hard pressed to
convince either the regime or the rest of the opposition
of their sincerity. Furthermore, while all partisan
activity is theoretically forbidden under a special
decree that the government has failed to enforce since
1983, the 1980 Constitution singles out the Commu-
nists for special proscription. This constitutional
ban-which, unlike the decree, is rigorously; imple-
mented by the regime-may be lifted after Pinochet
steps down, but until then it will almost certainly
retard Communist progress in electoral politics.
Nonetheless, if Chilean politics degenerates into vio-
lent confrontation between the opposition and the
regime, we believe the Communists would gain adher-
ents and influence because they are the sole major
party that has consistently refused to negotiate with
the dictatorship.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
Pinochet and the armed forces
as an institution are not directly involved in shaping
the emerging party system. Since assuming power in
1973, only President Pinochet and a handful of
generals have exercised important governmental func-
tions; the military as a whole has remained aloof from
politics. Pinochet has publicly rejected proposals from
the authoritarian right to create a civil-military
"movement" that would inject the armed forces into
partisan politics. Likewise, he has publicly warned the
opposition not to try to bypass the President and
.negotiate directly with the military concerning the
transition to democracy.
We believe that the armed forces are primarily
concerned that Pinochet be succeeded by a moderate
civilian government that will not initiate Argentine-
like trials of military leaders for human rights abuses
and that the constitutional ban on Marxist-Leninist
parties not be lifted before the transition is completed.
The military as an institution does not appear to
support individual parties or to strive for the forma-
tion of specific coalitions or alliances
The Most Likely Case. The major variable determin-
ing Chile's future party structure is the nature of the
transition to democracy. Developments in Chile over
the past six months-such as opposition disarray, full
military solidarity with the President, and effective
government repression-have strengthened Pinochet's
hand and moderated the opposition's demands. As a
result we believe that there is now a slightly better-
than-even chance that the shift from authoritarian to
democratic rule can be achieved through negotiations
25X1,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
between the government and the democratic opposi-
tion.4 Although dialogue is currently stalled, Pinochet
has pledged to return Chile to pluralism and shares
the moderate opposition's desire to contain Commu-
nist influence. The elements of compromise, which
have been publicly suggested by government leaders
close to the President, lie in modifications of the 1980
Constitution-such as advancing by two or three
years the dates of congressional or local elections
scheduled for 1990-that would leave Pinochet's ba-
sic powers intact while giving the center and the right
a stake in the peaceful evolution of the political
system. Pinochet will not grant even minor conces-
sions easily, however. In fact, we judge that there
probably will be considerable political tumult-in-
cluding renewed violent protests-before the Presi-
dent either modifies his hardline stance or the mili-
tary replaces him with a general more amenable to an
accelerated democratic transition.
We believe that a consensual transition would help
create a party system conducive to political stability
during the late and post-Pinochet era. On the right,
one or two pragmatic democratic conservative
groups-derived largely from elements of the
ADENA coalition, the National Party, and the Re-
publican Right-would probably dominate. These
parties would seek to extend their appeal to center-
right voters by moving closer to the Christian Demo-
crats and shunning authoritarian rightists such as the
Nationalist Action Movement. Most important, under
these conditions the Christian Democrats, in our view,
would be well placed to consolidate their control of
the crucial political center, and would probably
emerge as the largest party
Developments on the left, however, also would be
crucial. We judge that there is a better-than-even
chance that a democratic socialist alternative-cen-
tered on the Briones Socialists, along with either the
Radicals and Social Democrats or several small
Christian Socialist groups-can take root while the
radical left remains legally proscribed. Although it is
likely that the Communists and the Marxist-Leninist
Socialists will be legalized after Pinochet steps down,
by then the.democratic left may well have proved its
mettle. In that case, Communist Party influence could
probably be contained, and the way would be open for
peaceful competition among democratic forces of the
right, left, and center. 25X1
The reemergence of stable representative government
in Chile would benefit the United States. The Soviets
and Cubans-whose meddling was so pervasive dur-
ing the Allende years-would be stymied, and the
overall prestige and influence of the United States
would be enhanced because of its support for the
transition to democracy. Indeed, Chile would serve, as
it did prior to 1970, as evidence that democratic rule
in Latin America is a workable alternative to the 25X1
extremes of both the right and the left. Furthermore,
a reduction in human rights violations would permit
the United States to renew arms sales and training to
Chile, thereby easing currently strained military ties.
25X1
An Alternate Scenario. Because of the'volatility of
Chilean politics and the present intransigence of the
political actors, however, chances are just shy of even
that Santiago may not achieve an orderly transition to
democracy. This alternate scenario hinges on an
outright refusal by the democratic opposition to par-
ticipate in government-sponsored elections, accompa-
nied by increased repression, political polarization,
and violence. It could, in our view, come into play if
Pinochet rejects even minor constitutional revisions, 25X1
reverses liberalization measures taken to date, or
attempts to stay in office after 1989. 25X1
The democratic, opposition would be likely to respond
to such a turn of events by organizing more mass
protests, while the radical left would step up its
terrorist campaign. We believe that, unless a severe
economic depression coincides with antiregime politi-
cal agitation, Pinochet can probably keep control
through repression. But the political costs of thus
clinging to power would be great: Pinochet would
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
thoroughly alienate the democratic opposition and
probably lose support among moderate conservatives.
Handing over power to civilians under such circum-
stances would probably produce a narrowly based
rightist administration, dependent on military backing
whose legitimacy would be challenged by most other
components of the political spectrum.
We believe that the party system most likely to
mature under these conditions would reduce the
chances for peaceful democratic government. The rift
between the authoritarian right-strengthened by
middle-class fears of Communist-inspired violence
and terrorism-and democratic conservatives would
probably widen. The Christian Democrats would be
placed in a bind, since the polarization of politics
would cause them to lose middle-class support to the
hardline right and lower-class followers to the radical
left. The party would almost certainly be weakened,
its internal tensions exacerbated, and its effectiveness
as a political conciliator reduced. On the left, demo-
cratic socialism would probably remain a minority
current, while the Communist alternative of violent
rebellion would appeal to an increasingly radicalized
working class. Taken together, the result would be an
unstable party system dominated by antithetical ex-
tremes and lacking a strong, stabilizing center. The
stage would be set for chronic instability and the
possible reinsertion of the military into politics.
This scenario would almost certainly result in a more
strained and complicated relationship with the United
States. Moscow and Havana regarded Allende's over-
throw as a significant setback and have since been
searching for a way to redress the balance; enhanced
influence of the Communists and the Almeyda Social-
ists would directly benefit Soviet and Cuban interests.
While Chile would probably remain outside the Soviet
orbit, a greater role for the radical left would inflame
latent anti-Americanism and probably limit the abili-
ty of even a moderate government to work closely
with the United States. A military coup, on the other
hand, would intensify Chile's international isolation
and probably involve human rights abuses reminiscent
of the early Pinochet era. Under such conditions
bilateral military relations would continue to stagnate
and government-to-government contacts would re-
main strained. Because of past involvement in Chilean
politics, the United States would almost certainly be
accused by its critics in Chile and elsewhere of
torpedoing the transition process, with a consequent
loss of prestige and influence throughout Latin
America.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
. Secret
Appendix A
Chilean Anti-Communist Action
(AChA)
New terrorist group; alleged ties to
state security services
Nationalist Union of Chile (UNACh) FNCh
Jorge Vargas Diaz
National Sindicalist Movement (MNS) FNCh
Werner Von Bischoffhausen
FNCh parties, all miniscule, unreserv-
dl
Pi
h
National Action Front (FRAN) FNCh
Juan Gonzalez
e
y support
noc
et government
National Vanguard (AN)
Cesar Hidalgo
Possibly largest far-right group
National Action Movement (MAN) ADENA
Federico Willoughby, Pablo
Rodriguez, Gaston Acuna
Most moderate of authoritarian
nationalists
Andres Allamand, Fernando
Maturana, Sergio Jarpa
Largest ADENA member; many pre-
1973 National Party leaders
Julio Duran, Jaime Tormo
Rightist schism from pre-1973 Radical
Party
Democratic Socialist Workshops (TSD) ADENA
Social Christian Movement (MSC) ADENA
Juan de Dios Carmona, William
Thayer
Rightwing former Christian
Democrats
Sergio Fernandez, Jaime Guzman,
Javier Leturia
"Chicago Boys"; free market/mone-
tarist right
Carmen Saenz, Patricio Phillips,
Fernando Ochagavia
Possibly largest rightwing party;
majority of pre-1973 PN leaders
National Democratic Party
(PADENA)
Luis Minchel, Juan Francisco Espinoza Tiny, moderate, center-right party
Liberal Movement (ML)
AD
Hernan Errazuriz, Claudio Cerda
Close contacts with PADENA and PN
Republican Right (DR)
AD
Hugo Zepeda, Julio Subercaseaux,
Armando Jaramillo
Some pre-1973 PN leaders; only im-
portant rightist party in open opposi-
tion to Pinochet
Gabriel Valdes, Andres Zaldivar,
Juan Hamilton, Patricio Aylwin
Probably largest party in Chile; leads
democratic opposition to Pinochet
Enrique Silva Cimma, Anselmo Sule
Chile's oldest party; secular, more left-
ist alternative to PDC
Mario Sharpe, Luis Bossay
Moderate faction of pre-1973 Radical
Party
Popular Socialist Union (USOPO)
AD/FSD
Ramon Silva Ulloa
Rightwing split from pre-1973 PSCh
Socialist Party of Chile-Briones
(PSCh/B)
AD/BS
Carlos Briones, Hernan Vodanovic,
Ricardo Lagos, Julio Stuardo
Largest and most moderate PSCh fac-
tion; heads Socialist Bloc coalition
Socialist Party of Chile-Mandujano
(PSCh/M)
Manuel Mandujano, Victor Sergio
Mena
Disparate collection of democratic and
Marxist Socialists
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Selected Chilean Political Parties a (continued)
United Popular Action Movement
(MAPU)
BS c
Blas Tomic, Jorge Molina
United Popular Action Movement
Worker, Peasant (MAPU-OC)
BS C
Marcello Contreras
Authoritarian left
Communist Party of Chile (PCCh)
MDP
Luis Corvalan, Jaime Insunza, Jose
Sanfuentes, Ociel Nunez
Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR)
MDP
Andres Pascal Allende,
Hernan Aguilo
a This table lists only parties of some political relevance; scores of
minute parties and factions clutter the Chilean political scene, but
most are of no practical significance.
b Key: AD = Democratic Alliance
ADENA = National Democratic Accord
BS = Socialist Bloc
FNCh = Chilean Nationalist Front
FSD = Social Democratic Federation
MDP = Popular Democratic Movement
c Factions of both these parties also belong to the MDP.
Small group of Christian Socialist dis-
sidents from PDC
Originally Christian-Marxist split
from PDC; now somewhat moderated
Schism from MAPU
ments terrorism in cooperation with
Communists
Hardline Moscow-oriented party; dom-
inates MDP and controls Manuel Ro-
driguez Patriotic Front terrorist group
Small collection of PSCh dissidents;
terrorist group
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
Appendix B
Key Chilean Party Leaders S
This appendix lists 10 Chilean politicians who are
likely to play a significant role during and immediate-
ly after the transition to civilian rule. Some, such as
Sergio Jarpa and Gabriel Valdes, are already key
political players while others, such as Hernan Vodan-
Sergio Onofre Jarpa Reyes
A prominent rightwing politician, Sergio Jarpa, 63, is
the senior member of President Pinochet's Cabinet,
where he serves as Minister of Interior. He is the chief
proponent within the government of an accelerated
transition to democracy. He is the most impressive
and probably the most popular figure in the Pinochet
government with a. wide personal political following
and considerable influence in conservative circles.
Jarpa has the equivalent of a high school education.
During the 1960s he helped revive Chile's conserva-
tive political movement. From 1968 until the 1973
coup he was president of the National Party (PN),
where he was more identified with the authoritarian
wing of the PN than with its democratic elements. He
was a staunch advocate of the military coup in 1973
that brought Pinochet to power.
ovic and Andres Allamand, are promising younger
leaders. Rightist leaders are presented first, followed
by Christian Democrats, Socialists, and a Commu-
Andres Allamand Zavala
Andres Allamand, a lawyer about 27 years old, is
secretary general of the National Union (UN), a
conservative faction of the pre-1973 National Party.
He is trying to organize the UN into a political party
on a nationwide basis. In a January 1984 press
interview, Allamand said he wants to broaden the
UN's constituency and create a party that goes
beyond the traditional limits of the Chilean right.
Allamand is a close political ally of Interior Minister 25X1
Sergio Jarpa, and several National Party leaders
consider the UN to be Jarpa's own political group.
Allamand and his fellow UN leaders have publicly
stated that the Communist Party and other Marxist-
Leninist groups must be excluded from any future
Allamand was actively involved in student politics
during the Allende government as President of the
National Party's youth organization
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sergio Fernandez, 45, heads the Independent Demo-
cratic Union (UDI), a conservative grouping of politi-
cians and businessmen known in Chile as the "Chica-
go Boys." He is one of many UDI members who have
served in the Pinochet government.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Fernandez was removed as Minister of
Interior in 1982 because he urged the President to
initiate a political transition process that would have
legalized the political activity of the major parties by
1983.
Fernandez received a law degree from the University
of Chile in 1963 and studied at New York University
during the early 1970s. As a student, he was active in
the Christian Democratic Youth. During 1976-77 he
served as the Pinochet regime's first civilian Labor
Minister. He was Interior Minister from 1978 until
early 1982. In 1980 the Chilean press chose him as
"Man of the Year" for his help in drafting the new
constitution.
Carmen Saenz de Phillips
Carmen Saenz de Phillips, president of the center-
right National Party (PN), is coordinating the com-
mittee that is reorganizing the party. The Chilean
press reports that she is also currently attempting to
organize a center-right federation of political parties.
She has been active in the National Party since at
least the early 1970s, when she served as a PN
national deputy and on its Board of Directors as one
of four vice presidents. In that position she was
responsible for directing PN women's programs.
25X1
25X1
25X1
2 A11
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
Gabriel Valdes Subercaseaux
Gabriel Valdes, 65, a longtime left-of-center politi-
cian, is president of the Christian Democratic Party.
His association with the PDC's left wing somewhat
limits his support among more moderate party ele-
ments. A PDC youth leader has remarked that,
although Valdes is extremely ambitious and may
believe that his moment for national power has come,
he has not demonstrated ability as a practical and
realistic politician.
Valdes intends to rejuvenate the PDC by
appointing younger people to some party leadership
posts.
Valdes received a law degree from the Catholic
University in Santiago in 1945. A founder of the
PDC, he rose rapidly through its ranks after his 1964
appointment as Foreign Minister under President
Eduardo Frei (1964-70).
Andres Zaldivar Larrain
Andres Zaldivar, 47, is a former president of the
Christian Democratic Party and the current head of
the Christian Democratic International. He returned
to Chile in October 1983 after a three-year govern-
ment-imposed exile. Although Zaldivar holds no for-
mal position in the PDC or in any of the multiparty
coalitions, we believe that his moderate political
stance and his civilian support make him a key
opposition leader and a strong contender to become 25X1
party president. Zaldivar considers himself to be a 25X1
centrist alternative to Gabriel Valdes; 0 25X1
he is unwilling 25X1
to contest the party leadership at this time. In Sep- 25X1
tember 1984 he was arrested briefly for participating
in a Santiago protest rally.
in 1980.
In 1959 Zaldivar received a law degree from the
University of Chile. He was president of the Universi- 25X1
ty of Chile PDC law group and secretary of the
party's tax commission. During 1968 to 1970 Zaldivar
was Finance Minister in the Frei government and
from 1970 to 1973 was an opponent of Frei's Socialist
successor, Salvador Allende. Since the 1973 military
coup that ousted Allende, however, Zaldivar has
become one of the regime's most outspoken critics.
During the 1970s he served as a senator, as party
treasurer, and finally as PDC president until his exile
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100230001-7
Juan Hamilton Depassier
A moderate Christian Democratic leader, Juan Ham-
ilton, 57, is associated with the conservative party
faction that opposes PDC president Gabriel Valdes.
Hamilton plans to challenge Valdes for the party
presidency at the PDC Congress slated for December
1984. He has expressed interest in transition plans
calling for a plebiscite in 1985 to modify the constitu-
tion, set congressional elections for 1986, and have
Pinochet step down in 1989.
Hamilton graduated from the University of Chile in
1950. He was undersecretary of the Ministry of
Interior from 1964 until 1966 and then served for
three years as Minister of Housing and Urban Affairs
in the Frei administration. He was elected a senator in
1973. During the early and middle 1970s, he was
PDC media director and headed the party's interna-
tional relations committee. In 1979 he became a
member of the PDC governing board.
Ricardo Lagos Escobar
An ideological moderate, Ricardo Lagos, 46, repre-
sents the Socialists in the Democratic Alliance (AD).
He is a vocal critic of the Pinochet regime; in August
1984, Lagos stated that the President's comments on
the transition "have notified Chile's politicians that
they should not expect anything from him." Although
he is slated to head the AD in November 1984,
he is willing to
give up presidency of the Alliance in order to replace
the rotating presidency with a permanent four-man
executive committee. Lagos has
criticized members of the AD for lacking vigor and
for not cooperating with one another.
sumed the post.
Lagos received a law degree from the University of
Chile in the early 1960s. During that time he be-
longed to the center-left Radical Party and served as
president of the Radical Youth organization. He
broke from that party in 1964 to support Salvador
Allende's unsuccessful bid for the presidency. He then
studied at Duke University where he received a
doctorate in economics in 1966. From 1967 until 1970
he was director of the School of Political Science and
Public Administration of the University of Chile. At
the university he held the prestigious post of secretary
general during 1970-71. Under the Allende presiden-
cy (1970-73), Lagos was a member of Chile's delega-
tion to the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly
in 1971. One year later, Allende named him as
Ambassador to the Soviet Union but he never as-
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
Hernan Vodanovic
Deputy secretary general of the Briones faction of the
Socialist Party of Chile since April 1984, Hernan
Vodanovic is aligned with the moderate wing of the
PSCh. US Embassy officials consider him to be a
rising Socialist leader and a possible party head once
present PSCh secretary general Carlos Briones re-
tires. Vodanovic
is willing to accept Pinochet's remaining as President
until 1989. Vodanovic has recently made efforts to
expand his power base within the Chilean socialist
community
Vodanovic has been active
in the PSCh since at least 1980 when he represented
the moderate Altamirano faction of the party at a
Chilean exile Socialist Congress in Paris.
Jaime Insunza Becker
A leader of the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh)
since the mid-1970s, Jaime Insunza, who is about 39,
is a founder and the secretary general of the Popular
Democratic Movement (MDP), the Communist-domi-
nated opposition coalition established in 1983. In
early April of this year the government forced him
into exile after accusing him of "promoting totalitar-
ian doctrine." He has reportedly returned to Chile
and is in hiding.
In 1973 Insunza was a member of the Communist
youth organization's National Committee. By 1976 he
had become a member of the Politburo of the PCCh
Central Committee.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/14: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100230001-7