CUBA: MODERNIZATION OF THE AIR FORCE 1978-83

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of `"
Secret
Cuba: Modernization
of the Air Force,
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1978-83
An Intelligence Assessment
NGA Review
Completed
Secret
ALA 84-10003C
IA 84-10009C
January
1954
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Directorate of Secret
Cuba: Modernization
of the Air Force,
1978-83
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This paper was prepared by
~
of the
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Office of African and Latin American Analysis and
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA
Secret
ALA 84-10003C
IA 84-10009C
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Secret
Cuba: Modernization
of the Air Force,
1978-83 F__~
Key Judgments The delivery of 12 MIG-23 fighter-bombers in 1978 marked the beginning
Information available of a modernization program that has transformed the Cuban Air Force
as oil November 1983 into a major hemispheric power, one commensurate with Cuba's status as
was used in this report.
the premier Soviet military surrogate in the Third World. The greatest
improvements have come in air defense capabilities, although Cuba's
regional-intervention and power-projection abilities have been enhanced as
well. As a result, the Cuban Air Force is now better equipped, better
trained, and better able to survive an air attack than it was five years ago.
More than 150 of Cuba's 200 active jet fighters and trainers have been de-
livered since 1978,
Most of the new aircraft replaced older models, freeing at least 20 early
MIG-21s and a few MIG-17s that could be passed on to Nicaragua or An-
gola. Cuba also has expanded its regional and long-range airlift capabilities
and is preparing to acquire its first heavy-cargo-carrying aircraft when
Soviet-built IL-76s are delivered
Cuba apparently undertook this modernization to raise the costs to the
United States of any attempted airstrike either as a part of an invasion at-
tempt or in retaliation for Cuban support of revolutionary movements
abroad. Although Cuba's military interventions in Africa in the mid-to-late
1970s probably prompted the program, the pace of the modernization
increased after the Reagan administration focused on Cuba's support of
revolutionaries in Central America.
We believe Moscow has underwritten and overseen this modernization, and
an equally dramatic modernization of the Cuban Navy, as a signal of its
willingness to give Cuba the means to deter an attack by the United States,
and as a reward for Cuba's combat role in Africa in support of their
mutual policy objectives. The Soviets also appear willing to make addition-
al improvements to Cuba's regional intervention capabilities, but we
believe they will move more slowly and cautiously in this area in order to
gauge US reactions.
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ALA 84-10003C
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 Concurrent with the acquisition of more aircraft, Cuba has expanded and
improved its airfields and facilities to provide greater protection against a
large-scale air attack. Nearly 120 new hardened aircraft shelters are under
construction or have been completed since 1979 at three Cuban fighter
bases. Runways have been lengthened and revetments added at a number
of secondary and reserve airfields where aircraft could be dispersed during
a war.
Because the modernization effort has largely been completed, we expect
Cuba's fighter inventory to remain relatively stable for the next five years.
Cuban fighters pose only a marginal threat to US territory and naval
forces but could still require the diversion of several Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) aircraft, fighter squadrons, and a carrier battle
group to protect convoys destined to reinforce Europe during a war or a cri-
sis. They will also have a significant capability to project power through
much of the Caribbean Basin, and, from airbases in Nicaragua, Cuban
MIGs could threaten the Panama Canal.
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Key Judgments
Fighters
Pilot Training and Ground Support
11
Pilot Training
12
Ground Support and Maintenance
14
Implications of the Modernization
14
Improved Ground Support Capability
15
Expanded Airlift Capability
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Cuba: Modernization
of the Air Force,
1978-83 FI
Introduction
In the last five years, the Cuban Air Force has
replaced more than three-fourths of its aircraft with
newer models, has made extensive improvements to its
airfields and facilities, and has greatly expanded its
pilot-training program. These efforts have resulted in
large improvements in its air defense, ground support,
and short-range airlift capabilities, and have given
Cuba a greater ability to survive even a large-scale air
attack. The Cuban Air Force now has a larger
number of modern jet fighters than such Western
Hemisphere powers as Brazil, Argentina, or Canada
and has enhanced its capability to intervene through
most of the Caribbean region. This paper examines
the scope of these improvements, assesses the impact
of this modernization on the Air Force's ability to
carry out its missions, and addresses the implications
for the United States.'
New Aircraft
Fighters. Before mid-1978, Cuba's Air Force com-
prised primarily subsonic, gun-armed MIG- 15 and
MIG-17 fighters-first delivered in 1962-and early-
model, 1960s vintage MIG-21s. These aircraft had
relatively short ranges, small payloads, and low-
technology avionics that could be easily jammed.
Some 45 late-model MIG-21s based in the Havana
area provided the only modern air defense apart from
surface-to-air missiles.
The arrival of 12 MIG-23 fighter-bombers in 1978
marked the beginning of the modernization program.
Although these aircraft lacked the most sophisticated
Soviet avionics and were of a type that had previously
been exported to the Middle East and Ethiopia, they
were basic models of the top-of-the-line aircraft then
in the Soviet Air Force. Their increased range and
payload gave them considerable offensive potential,
and their arrival was, in our view, a strong signal of
Moscow's willingness to expand the capabilities of the
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Cuban Air Force despite warnings from the United program for the Cuban Navy was also begun at
States over Cuba's expanding role as a Soviet military approximately the same time.
surrogate.
In 1978 Cuba had a number of its MIG-21 pilots
flying combat missions in Angola and Ethiopia and
was undoubtedly concerned about the inadequacies of
its own air defenses should the United States adopt a
more bellicose posture. By agreeing to modernize
Cuba's Air Force,
the Soviets were able to soothe these fears, as well as
to reward the Cubans by giving them an Air Force
more commensurate with their status as a major
Third World power. A modernization and expansion
The pace of the Cuban modernization increased after
the Reagan administration began focusing public
attention on Cuba's support of revolutionaries in
Central America. Since then, at least 20 combat
aircraft have been delivered to Cuba every year.
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B-model interceptors-60 MIG-21s, and 30 L-39
trainers. More than 150 of the approximately 200
fighters and trainers now in service with the Cuban
The 20 to 40 remaining early-model MIG-21 s are
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Air Force have been delivered since 1978.
Most of the new aircraft have replaced older fighters,
but their deployment across the island has changed.
The MIG-23s are all based at San Antonio de los
Banos Airfield just southwest of Havana. Their arriv-
al there led to the transfer of one squadron of 12 late-
model MIG-21s to Santa Clara in 1982, where it
replaced the last squadron of MIG-17s. Many obso-
lete MIG-15s and MIG-17s were abandoned in a field
at Santa Clara in early 1982, but three appear to have
been refurbished and others are being used as decoys.
based at Holguin in eastern Cuba,
Some 24 MIG-21s and 30 L-39s are stationed at a
fourth operational base that was opened in September
1982 at San Julian on the western tip of the island.
These aircraft serve a new training school there for
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Table 1
Cuban Air Force Order of Battle
Aircraft
April
1978
September
1983
Fighters
177
144
MIG-15
45
0
MIG-17
26
0
MIG-21 (C/E/F)
58
20 e
MIG-21 (J/L/N)
48
94
MIG-23 (B)
0
20
MIG-23 (F)
0
10
Jet trainers
15
51
UMIG-15
9
0
UMIG-21
6
16
UMIG-23
0
5
L-39
0
30
Helicopters
49
44
MI-4
45
0
MI-8
4
22
MI-17
0
10
MI-24
0
12
Transports
28
74 b
AN-24/26
3
30c
IL-62
2
10
TU-154'
0
5
BB-318
3
2
IL-18
4
2
IL-14
13
11
YAK-40
3
14
a An additional 20 early MIG-21s may be available for service but
are no longer flown regularly.
b Cuba also has three DC-3s and several dozen small propeller-
driven planes, mostly AN-2s.
c These fly with either Air Force or Cubana markings.
Helicopters. The modernization of Cuba's small heli-
copter force has been equally dramatic. The obsolete
MI-4 Hounds have been replaced by MI-8 Hips, and
Moscow also has provided Cuba a squadron of 12
MI-24 Hind helicopter gunships-the weapon the
Soviets have used most effectively in Afghanistan.
This delivery I allowed the Cubans to
convert the MI-8 Hip F attack squadron based at
Cienfuegos to troop transports. Photography of these
Hip F's
pylons.
ey rarely carry
A second helicopter unit is now being formed at
Ignacio Agramonte Airfield near Camaguey in east-
central Cuba. Ten new MI-17 Hip H helicopters were
delivered they These helicopters are
armed,`and, with or without weapons pylons, they are
capable of transporting troops. The base has hard-
stands for 24 helicopters.
Transports. Cuba's fixed-wing military transport fleet
has also kept pace with the forcewide modernization.
At least 26 new AN-26 short-range transports have
entered the Air Force inventory since 1978, substan-
tially expanding Cuba's regional airlift capability.
These versatile aircraft can be used to transport
paratroopers, paradrop supplies, evacuate casualties
from frontline airfields, perform reconnaissance mis-
sions, tow targets, and carry light military-related
equipment to Nicaragua.
Cuba's civil airline has also upgraded its inventory
since 1976 by acquiring 10 long-range IL-62 and five
TU-154 passenger jets
Cubana also has a
fleet of 14 short-distance YAK-40s and numerous
older propeller-driven transports.
Improvements to Airfields and Facilities
Concurrent with the modernization of its aircraft, the
Cuban Air Force has substantially improved its air-
fields and ground facilities. Runways have been
lengthened at both main and secondary airbases, new
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Figure 4
Cuban Fighter Bases and Other Airfields
Havana and Vicinity
Road
-+- Railroad
Gulf of
Mexico
HAVANA
Campo Librtad
National Air and
Force Headq e
l' ~!ueva
de e la la Gerona
Juventud
La
Gloria
IN
0
Caribbean Sea
I San Jose
de las Lajas
Highway
)&Strip
A Major fighter base
0 Transport and helicopter
base
Secondary and reserve
airfield
Santiago
de Cuba
The
Bahamas
Antonio-:
Macao Guantanamo
(U. S. Naval Base)
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hardened aircraft shelters have been constructed, and
additional highway airstrips have been built to pro-
vide dispersal bases. These measures all enhance the
force's ability to survive a large-scale air attack
Main Bases. The Air Force has four main fighter
bases: San Antonio de los Banos in the Havana area,
Santa Clara in central Cuba, Holguin in the east, and
San Julian Airfield near the island's western tip. The
latter was activated in the fall of 1982 and serves as
the Air Force's fighter training school. Other primary
airfields used by the Air Force include Campo Liber-
tad Airfield in Havana-the National Air and Air
Defense Force headquarters and the primary MIG-21
maintenance base-and Playa Baracoa in the Havana
area, where most of the AN-26 transports are based.
Most of Cuba's helicopters are based at Cienfuegos,
but a new helicopter unit is being formed at Ignacio
Agramonte Airfield near Camaguey.
Construction of new hardened aircraft shelters began
at each of the three older fighter bases Sixty-
four new shelters have been completed and 54 more
are under construction. These Soviet-style shelters
provide better protection for aircraft than the older
earth-covered shelters previously built by the Cubans.
They also have adjoining personnel bunkers to protect
air and ground crews and their equipment.
San Antonio de los Banos-home base of Cuba's
MIG-23s-has benefited most from improvements
since 1980. Twenty hardened aircraft shelters were
completed, the main runway was extended and resur-
faced, and the main parking apron was resurfaced and
fitted with new fueling points. A separate secured
facility was added to serve Soviet Bear naval recon-
naissance and antisubmarine warfare aircraft that
periodically deploy to Cuba. Current construction at
this base includes an extension of the third runway
and at least 28 additional hardened aircraft--shelters.
At Santa Clara, four new fuel storage tanks have been
covered with earth, 16 new hardened aircraft shelters
have been built, and 14 revetted hardstands with
personnel bunkers have been added at the opposite
end of the airfield. Work on extension of the runway
and on an access taxiway for the new shelters is nearly
complete. Twelve additional hardened aircraft shel-
ters and another access taxiway are also under con-
struction.
At Holguin Airfield, the runway is being resurfaced
and 28 new hardened aircraft shelters have been
completed since 1980. Another 14 are under construc-
tion. The airfield's main parking apron has also been
enlarged and fitted with new fueling points.
Short-range navigation systems (RSBN-4 were in-
stalled at both Santa Clara and Holguin
Antonio de los Banos has had oneolguin This
system uses radio beacons that can be received by
equipment on board MIG-23s and the latest model
MIG-21s as an aid for all-weather navigation and
landings.
Secondary and Reserve Airfields. In addition to the
facilities at its main fighter bases, the Cubans have
improved a number of secondary and reserve airfields
to support combat operations. Aircraft revetments,
personnel shelters, and high-speed taxiways have been
added at several airfields and the runways at some
civilian airports have been lengthened. In a war, we
expect the Cuban Air Force to disperse several of its
fighter squadrons from the main bases to these sec-
ondary and reserve airfields, thus reducing their
vulnerability to air attack.
Five secondary airfields-Managua Airfield in Ha-
vana, Ignacio Agramonte in Camaguey, Kawama
Airfield near Varadero, Antonio Maceo Airfield at
Santiago de Cuba, and the San Pedro Highway strip
south of Havana-have.each supported the deploy-
ment of a fighter squadron
All of these airfields have aircraft
revetments an tree of them have personnel bunkers
nearby. Only Ignacio Agramonte and Managua, how-
ever, have permanent ground support equipment on
location. Operations at the others require the deploy-
ment of fuel and support equipment from the main
bases
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Some airfields used primarily for civilian air traffic
have revetments and runways long enough to support
at least some fighter operations. All of these can be
used by helicopters and AN-26 transports. Table 2
lists the primary, secondary, and reserve airfields in
Cuba and their respective runway lengths and mili-
tary support facilities. MIG-21s using runways of less
than 2,300 meters would have limited landing capa-
bilities and would probably need crash barriers.
Cuba has also begun construction of two highway
airstrips in the last year. These are stretches of good
highway with aircraft revetments and taxiways built
adjacent to them. An existing highway strip at San
Pedro, south of Havana, has been in use for several
years. The two new strips are also in the Havana area
at San Jose de las Lajas and just east of Managua
Airfield. Locating a highway airstrip near an existing
airfield allows the dispersed aircraft to share fuel,
support, and ground control facilities.
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Table 2
Cuban Airfields and Facilities, October 1983
Length
(meters)
HAS
U/C
ES
REV
San Antonio de los Banos
4,000
20
28
30
Yes
Santa Clara
2,600 a
16
12
26
Yes
Holguin
3,200
28
14
31
Yes
San Julian
2,500 a
Yes
Transport and helicopter bases
Campo Libertad
2,000
Yes
Playa Baracoa
1,800
No
Cienfuegos
1,800 a
Yes
Ignacio Agramonte (Camaguey)
3,000
Yes
Managua (Havana)
2,800
Yes
Kawama (Varadero)
2,400
Yes
San Pedro Highway
3,250
Yes
Antonio Maceo (Santiago de Cuba)
2,300 a
Yes
Jose Marti (Havana)
4,000 a
No
Los Canos (Guantanamo)
2,450
Yes
La Gloria
2,250
Yes
Manzanillo
1,860
Yes
Nueva Gerona
2,000
No
San Jose de las Lajas Highway
1,675
No
Pinar del Rio South b
2,000
No
Managua Highway b
2,500
Yes
a Runway being lengthened.
b New facility, still under construction.
HAS: hardened aircraft shelters; U/C: hardened shelters under
construction; ES: old earthen shelters; REV: revetments present.
Pilot Training and Ground Support
An air force that brings as many new aircraft into
service as rapidly as Cuba has done in the past five
years places a great burden on its pilots and ground
if Cuba's experience is
similar to the Soviets', we believe the Cubans will
need to have many more technicians and maintenance
personnel to service the more advanced avionics sys-
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An article in the Cuban military magazine
Verde Olivo in February 1983 confirmed that an Air
Academy has been established at San Julian in
western Cuba.
The school appears to be modeled after Soviet Air
Forces academies where cadets spend four years and
receive a college education along with their fighter
pilot rating. If it continues to follow the Soviet model,
stu-
dents will spend their first two years on the L-39
trainer, and then learn combat skills on the MIG-21
in their last two years. The initial enrollment and
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Cuban pilots appear to measure up well compared
with those of other Third World countries, but suffer
many of the failings of their Soviet mentors. A
number of Cuban pilots have combat experience in
Africa, but, with the exception of a few missions in
Ethiopia, this was almost exclusively limited to
ground attack missions against lightly armed insur-
gents. Although the Cubans proved mostly to be
brave under fire, their African experience would not
be directly applicable to conventional warfare against
well-trained and -equipped forces.
In particular, the Cubans lack experience in air-to-air
combat, and their training in this regard emphasizes
intercepts controlled from the ground. Free maneu-
vering against dissimilar aircraft is extremely rare.
In the very few brief encounters Cuban MIG-21 pilots
have had with South African Mirages over southern
Angola, the Cubans have performed poorly.
Soviet experience with "washouts," suggests that the
school will produce about 30 new pilots a year starting
in 1986 when the first class graduates.
force
On the basis of this evidence, we believe that the 25X1
average Cuban pilot would perform better in combat
than the average Libyan or Syrian pilot, and about on
par with an average Soviet pilot. Matched one on one
over neutral territory with a US pilot in a modern
fighter, he would probably stand little chance. Over
his own territory, however, with ground control put-.
ting him in the right position, we believe he would
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ing to the book. Unless ambushed, he would be
capable of inflicting casualties on even a superior US
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Ground Support and Maintenance. The moderniza-
tion of the Cuban Air Force has required a greater
Soviet technical advisory presence and a significantly
larger Cuban ground support and maintenance net-
work. Both the MIG-21 and MIG-23 aircraft are
designed for ease of maintenance. The radars, radio
navigation equipment, and other avionics, however,
are considerably more advanced than the systems in
older Soviet fighters.
an air unit making a transition from
MI -17s to late-model MIG-21s or MIG-23s must
more than double its number of technical and support
Implications of the Modernization
As a result of its modernization, the Cuban Air Force
of the mid-1980s is better equipped, better trained,
and much more capable of surviving an air attack
than it was five years ago. Although primarily defen-
sive and posing only a marginal threat to US territory,
it could threaten unprotected merchant shipping in
the Florida Straits and the Gulf of Mexico during a
war. The Air Force has also greatly enhanced its
ability to aid other revolutionary regimes in the
Caribbean region. Operating from airfields in Nicara-
gua, Cuba would have the potential to project power
into any area of Central America within a matter of
hours.
Enhanced Air Defense. The greatest impact of the
changes since 1978 have come in air defense. The new
fighters brought into service are designed and
equipped primarily for air defense missions,
more difficult and more costly.
Cuban military forces with conventional airstrikes
facilities contribute to this mission by making the
force more survivable on the ground. These factors
make any attempt by the United States to neutralize
The MIG-23s and late-model MIG-21s that now
make up the bulk of the force are much better
equipped for air-to-air combat than their predeces-
sors. The more powerful engines of these aircraft
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negate some of the tactics developed by US pilots
fighting against MIGs in the Vietnam war
The protection provided by new hardened aircraft
shelters and the increased availability of dispersal
airfields greatly reduce vulnerability to air attack
Each shelter would probably
require a direct hit to destroy the aircraft inside.
Moreover, the existence of secondary and reserve
airfields lessens the chance that a large portion of the
force could be put out of action by severe damage to a
few key runways. Cuban air defenses could still be
saturated by a massive air campaign, but we believe
that, if the Cubans are alert, the attackers will suffer
many more casualties than would have been the case a
few years ago.
Greater Airstrike Threat. While most of Cuba's new
fighters have a primary air defense mission, one
squadron of MIG-23s are fighter-bombers, and all of
the other MIG-21s and MIG-23s could carry out
strikes against US territory or naval and merchant
shipping. Southern Florida and the Keys are well
within range of airfields in the Havana area, and
Cuban MIG-21s and MIG-23s could attack the Pana-
ma Canal from airbases in Nicaragua. Given a pru-
dent level of air defense readiness by the United
States, however, such attacks would probably not be
very successful, and Cuba would lose most of the
attacking aircraft. We believe, therefore, that Cuban
airstrikes against US territory are unlikely except
perhaps as an act of desperate retaliation
tive range of their ground controllers.
Modern US fighters-the F- I 4,F- 15,F- 16, and
F-18-are. superior to Cuba's MIG-21s and MIG-23s, 25X1
and US pilots are better trained in air-to-air combat. 25X1
Moreover, in attacks against US territory or carrier
forces, the United States would have the advantage of
its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft while the Cubans would be beyond the effec-
In the case of a US naval blockade or invasion, Cuban
fighters might attempt to strike the US naval forces
involved. We believe they would follow Argentina's
example in the Falklands war by attacking isolated or
lightly defended ships on the fringes of the fleet rather
than attempting to tackle a carrier battle group. Their
highest priority would probably be landing craft,
troop transports, and oil tankers.
Even without taking off, however, Cuba's Air Force
would have a significant indirect impact on the de-
ployment of US forces by threatening to deny passage
of the Florida Straits and Yucatan Channel. They
could require the diversion of several US fighter
squadrons, AWACS, and a carrier battle group to
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protect convoys destined to reinforce Europe I LbA]
Improved Ground Support Capability. The addition
of MIG-23 fighter-bombers and MI-24 helicopter
gunships to the Cuban inventory has also expanded
the.force's capability to support ground operations.
The L-39s, when armed with cannons and rockets or
bombs, would also prove very useful in this role.
would probably be used to defend against an amphibi-
ous landing or in a Cuban attempt to seize the US
naval base at Guantanamo
Of even greater importance is the Air Force's growing
capability for counterinsurgency warfare. The MI-24
helicopter gunships and armed L-39 jet trainers are
particularly well equipped for operations against
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counterrevolutionary guerrilla forces. The Castro re-
gime would probably use these aircraft to aid Nicara-
gua should the Sandinistas be seriously threatened.'
We have no evidence so far, however, that the Cubans
are training pilots for such a role
Expanded Airlift Capability. Cuban ability to airlift
military personnel overseas has grown enormously
since the Angolan intervention in 1975, when the
Cubans had only three Bristol Brittanias and four
IL-18 turboprop aircraft for air transport. Cubana
Airlines' present fleet of 10 IL-62 and five TU-154
long- and medium-range jet transports would enable
them to move up to 2,000 lightly armed personnel
over several thousand miles in about 24 hours, provid-
ed Cuba had available a good commercial airfield at
the destination. Cuba's AN-26 fleet could carry small
arms, crew-served weapons and ammunition, and
several hundred personnel to short or unimproved
airfields throughout the Caribbean region in about
the same amount of time. They could also lift up to a
battalion of paratroopers to areas where no operation-
al airfields are available.
The primary limitation on Cuba's air transport force
is the lack of a large cargo aircraft capable of
carrying heavy or bulky items. This shortcoming will
soon be remedied when Cuba receives its first IL-76
transports from the Soviet Union
Possession of the IL-76 will enable the Cubans to
deliver such items as ground-based radars and other
support equipment to Nicaragua concurrent with the
deployment of combat aircraft. This would allow a
fighter unit to become fully operational within hours
of its arrival. Until they have such a plane, heavy
equipment would have to be transported by sea, either
through the Panama Canal or to east coast ports for
transshipment by truck to Managua area airfields.
IL-76s could also be used to carry high-priority cargo
~
to Angola or other African destinations
The Next Five Years
Unlike other Soviet clients, Cuba does not pay for any
of the military equipment it receives from the USSR.
The continued modernization of the Air Force and the
further growth in its capabilities are dependent on
how closely Cuban policy meshes with Soviet aims
and on Moscow's evaluation of the risk of provoking
the United States. Soviet deliveries to Cuba over the
past several years suggest that Moscow is firmly
committed to strengthening Cuba's defenses against a
possible air attack or blockade, but understands that
introducing offensive weapons like medium bombers
would cause a serious crisis and might provoke retali-
ation. The Soviets appear willing to make some
additional improvements in Cuba's regional interven-
tion capabilities, but will probably move slowly and
cautiously to gauge US reactions.
We expect Cuba's fighter inventory to remain rela-
tively stable over the next five years. Because the
Cubans just completed a massive reequipment and
retraining program, we doubt that they would under-
take another large turnover so soon. Events in Nicara-
gua are a major uncertainty in this calculation,
however. If the Cubans send fighter aircraft there and
become involved in combat, we would expect the
Soviets to replace their losses
A few more MIG-21s will probably be delivered in
any event. Some older MIG-21s may be returned to
Cuba after repairs and overhaul, and the remaining
early models at Holguin will eventually be replaced.
Cuba already has 20 or more early MIG-21s that it is
no longer flying, and some of these may be destined
for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
Other possible acquisitions by the Cuban Air Force
over the next five years include the more advanced
version of the MIG-23 interceptor and the MIG-25
Foxbat. The latest model MIG-23 in the Soviet Air
Forces-the Flogger G-was exported for the first
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The MIG-25 is a high-speed, high-altitude interceptor
and has been exported to several Middle Eastern
countries. Its radar is less advanced than the B-model
MIG-23, but its flight characteristics could enable the
Cubans to challenge SR-71 overflights. A reconnais-
sance version of this aircraft is also available, which
the Cubans could use for missions along or over US
borders in retaliation for US overflights. Moscow
might be more willing to provide the reconnaissance
Cuba will almost certainly receive some additional
helicopters, probably MI-17s like those first delivered
The first IL-76 transport probably will
arrive in our judgment, five or six
IL-76s would largely fill Cuba's needs for a heavy-
cargo carrier, but still would not enable it to conduct
large-scale airlifts of combat equipment. The Cubans
would thus remain dependent on the Soviets for any
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We expect airfield construction and expansion to
continue, although not at the same rapid pace as in
the past few years. The new airfield south of Pinar del
Rio is nearly complete, and some of the L-39 training
currently conducted at San Julian may be transferred
there. the run-
way at San Julian is -being extended by some 500
meters, making it comparable to the other three main
fighter bases
The expected arrival of IL-76 transports
will probably cause some additional expansion as well.
Playa Baracoa Airfield near Havana, the current base
for Cuba's AN-26 transport fleet, would have difficul-
ty handling the'much larger IL-76 because its runway
is very short and its parking areas would need to be
reinforced. The Cubans may base the IL-76s at Jose
Marti, their primary commercial airfield, until the
needed improvements can be made at Playa Baracoa
or until another base can be readied.
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