NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER THE YEARS OF PROJECT HTAUTOMAT, 1956 - 1958 VOLUME II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00184R000400020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 130
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
THE YEARS OF PROJECT HTAUTOMAT, 1956 - 1958
VOLUME II
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by
Secret
NPIC 3
December 1974
Copy 1 of 2
PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
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Access Controlled by CIA History Staff and DD/S&T
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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
THE YEARS OF PROJECT HTAUTOMAT, 1956 - 1958
VOLUME II
by
Copies:
#1 - CIA-HS
#2 - DD/S&T
is
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Contents
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Volume I
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The First Looks Behind the Iron Curtain. . . . . 1
A. The Anatomy of HTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. Office of the Chief. . . . . . . . .. . . 4
2. Special Projects Branch. . . . . . . . . 4
3. Industrial and Geographic Branches . . . 6
4. Technical Intelligence Branch. . . . 8
5. Support Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Administrative Staff . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Statistical Branch, OCR. . . . . . . . . 12
8. Military Liaison Components. . . . . . . 14
9. Central Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B. The First Eight Missions Dominate Events of
July and August . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. The Eight Missions and Their Objectives. 20
2. Immediate Exploitation of the First
Eight Missions. . . .,. . . . . . . . . 21
3. Detailed Exploitation During July
and August.1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4. Technical Support. . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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5. Support Activities . . . . . . . . . . 29
6. OCR Statistical Branch Charges
Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7. Walker's Task Force: Headquarters
Outpost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8. Return from Europe . . . . . . . . . . 35
II. The Middle East Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A. U-2s Assume a Tactical Role. . . . . . . . 45.
B. HTA and the PARAMOUNT Committee. . . . . . 47
Functioning of the PARAMOUNT Committee .
E. HTA Continues Work on the First Eight
missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
F. A Stirring Giant . . . . . . . . . . . 60
G. PI Training . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
H. Looking Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
III. Back on Course 72
A. 74
B. Organizational Incongruity . . . . . . . . 75
C. Briefing-Aid Books . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
D. Soviet Long-Range Airfields. . . . . . . 80
E. Mozhaysk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
F. Testing. . . Testing . . . . . . . . . . . 100
G. Signs of Drought 105
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IV.
Reorganization and Renewal . . . . . . . . . .
109
A. Training and Orientation . . . . . . . . .
110
B. Training and Orientation Offered by HTA. .
121
C. New Tools for Eager Hands. . . . . . . . .
122
D. Familiar Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
132
E. Reorganization and Reassignment. . . . . .
148
V.
On to Greater Accomplishments. . . . . . . . .
159
A. First Aerial Coverage of Russian
Scientific and Technical Installations. .
159
B. Rejuvenation and Resumption of
Discoveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
162
1. Changing Faces and Responsibilities. .
163
2. New Discoveries Dominate Work at HTA .
166
C. Other Mouths to Feed
171
D. New Administrative Procedures. . . . . . .
178
E. Specter of a Job Freeze. . . . . . . . . .
182
Volume II
VI.
JAM SESSION Steals the Show. .. . . . . . . . .
184
A. Establishment of JAM SESSION . . . . . . .
184
C. GMIC Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
203
1. The Tyura Tam Missile Test Center and
Test Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
208
2. The Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center
and Test Range . . . . . . . . . . . .
217
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3. Good-Bye to GMIC Consultants . . . . . 240
D. Show and Tell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
E. Other PI Exploitation and Reporting. . . . 251
F. Making Equipment Function Better and
Getting Better Equipment. . . . . . . . . . 258
G. The HTAUTOMAT Organization Reacts to JAM
SESSION 271
VII. Winds of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
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D. Not by JAM SESSION Alone . . . . . . . . . 320
E. How to Proceed With the Publication
of Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
F. Carpenters, Plumbers, and New Equipment. . 334
G. People and Hierarchies . . . . . . . . . . 340
Volume III
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VIII. HTAUTOMAT Becomes the Photographic
Intelligence Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
A. The Last Months of JAM SESSION . . . . . . 355
1. COMINT Comes to MSB. . . . . . 356
2. A Bear by the Tail . . . . . . . . . . 357
3. The Show Goes On . . . . . . . . . . . 366
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4. A General on His Knees and PI Keys . . 376
5. Two Soviet Heavy Water Plants. . . . . 386
6. Uranium Mining and Milling Sites . . . 390
B. Keeping Busy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
C. Operating Procedures for HTA -- and PIC. . 427
D. Automated Mensuration -- With Bugs . . . . 438
E. "Playing Footsie" With the Norwegians. . . 446
F. A Center at Last . . , . . . . . . . . . . 449
Appendices
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A. Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
B. Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
C. Source References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
Volume IV
Figures, No. 1 through No. 39
Volume V
Figures, No. 40 through No. 86
Volume VI
Figures, No. 87 through No. 129
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VI. JAM SESSION Steals the Show
Detailed exploitation of the SOFT TOUCH materials
followed production of ODE reports, without a pause.
The photographic smorgasbord of scientific and technical
targets invited chaos, however, if left to unbridled in-
telligence interests and appetites. Something had to be
done to establish some priority of work and to provide
for orderly and imaginative exploitation of the photog-
raphy.
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A. Establishment of JAM SESSION
The solution adopted was called Project JAM SES-
SION. A more appropriate name could scarcely have been
chosen. Plans called for the convening of experts --
PIs, intelligence analysts, engineers, and scientists --
in working sessions where each could bring his particular
brand of expertise to bear on the solution of exploita-
tion problems. Though the experience gained the previous
March with Mozhaysk consultants proved useful in conceiv-
ing JAM SESSION and setting it up, at least as far as HTA
was concerned, the depth and breadth of the undertaking
were unprecedented.
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As of Monday, 23 September 1957, all projects in
HTA relating to guided missiles were combined as P-74
and all those dealing with nuclear energy as P-101. 297/
At the same time, exploitation teams consisting of
Army, Navy, and CIA photo interpreters were named to
work on each of the major high-priority targets. Each
team had an appointed leader who was designated chair-
man. Some of the latter were Army employees, some Navy,
and some CIA. 298/ All this high-priority photo inter-
pretation work was placed under the direction of
chief of the HTA Military-Scientific Branch. Within
HTA, all work on these projects, whether photo inter-
pretation or support services, was given top priority. 299/
Support personnel, though not under the direct
control of the chief, MSB, worked closely with photo
interpreters and their supervisors, but not all support
elements were equally involved in JAM SESSION. Those
most concerned were personnel engaged in collateral
support, mensuration, graphics, and the photo lab. The
US Army, whose commitment in the joint effort was second
only to that of CIA, contributed a few personnel to
augment the mensuration and graphics capability. Aside
from these, support personnel were all Agency employees.
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Work on Project JAM SESSION was located in the
Steuart Building. At this early date TALENT-cleared
areas were few and security controls were tight and re-
strictive. Moreover, HTA was the prime recipient of
the photography. In addition, the HTA drive for more
and better equipment, though limited in accomplishment
at this point in history, provided the best capability
for in-depth exploitation of the photography. That
this required others with greater professional pestige
than PIs to beat a path to the door of the photo inter-
preters was not inappropriate. After all, it was the
extraordinary nature of the photography that triggered
the whole exercise. Though there would be future con-
sultant meetings in the Steuart Building, this was a
situation that would not be repeated to the same degree
again, as TALENT and subsequent overhead photography
became more widely dispersed, as PIs became more knowl-
edgeable, and as analysts outside HTA and its successor
organizations sought to reassert their prerogatives as
producers of intelligence.
To inform participants of ground rules according
to which JAM SESSION would be conducted, on 24 Sep-
tember 1957 a memo was issued over the signature of
Lundahl. This memo listed representatives from OSI,
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Army, Navy, Air Force, and the AEC who had been ap-
pointed to work with joint Army-Navy-CIA photo inter-
pretation teams on nuclear targets, and representatives
from OSI, Army, and Navy who were to be their counter-
parts in exploiting guided-missile targets. Perhaps
the most important feature of the memo, from the HTA
point of view, was announcement of a schedule setting
hours for work and hours for consultations. From 0830
to 1430 each day, photo interpreters were to work un-
interruptedly, except for urgent consultations which
were to be requested and cleared through
chief ,
MSB. The hours between 1430 and 1700 were reserved for
consultations when any of the designated representatives
from Intelligence Community agencies could come to HTA
without special appointment and discuss with PIs the
findings on targets of interest to them and their or-
ganizations. Provision was also made for consultations
on the initiative of PIs needing assistance at any time
during working hours. 300/
In addition to representatives from the Intelli-
gence Community, plans were made to bring engineers and
scientists from Government and industry into the Steuart
Building, either in a special capacity or to participate
in seminar-type discussions of the evidence from all
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available sources bearing on major facilities at each
of the Soviet installations being examined. In most
cases, consultations would extend over a few days; in
the case of the two Russian missile test centers, however,
outside consultants worked in parallel and shoulder-to-
shoulder in the Steuart Building with HTA photo inter-
preters for several successive weeks. In this manner,
the full knowledge of those best versed in guided mis-
siles and nuclear energy and weaponry was brought to
bear, along with the talents of skilled intelligence
analysts and photo interpreters, on the problems of
exploitation.
Even given the overall plan for JAM SESSION, much
further planning and, in HTA, a great deal of prepara-
tion was required. Photo interpreters had to familiarize
themselves with details of the installations for which
they were responsible, countless measurements had to
be made to provide intelligence analysts and industry
consultants with information on the size, shape, and
height of key facilities, and graphics in the form of
annotated photos and mosaics, line drawings, and per-
spectives had to be prepared to portray the information
as vividly as possible for those not skilled in the
interpretation of overhead photography.
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C. GMIC Targets
Assignment of the JAM SESSION photo interpretation
teams accomplished one objective, at least in the Mili-
tary-Scientific Branch, that had eluded the grasp of
D/GP for several years. The scope of work on JAM
SESSION targets coupled with the unremitting pressure
to complete work on each of the targets rapidly resulted
in a degree of specialization not previously feasible.
Whether by choice or accident -- and both were a factor
in the initial assignments -- PIs found themselves
working exclusively on either nuclear- or missile-related
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targets. The effective specialization was even greater;
most were beginning to become acknowledged authorities
on the interpretation of a particular target, such as
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pr the Tyura Tam
Missile Test Center. Granted their degree of expertise
was decidedly limited as yet, they were, nevertheless,
cultivating it daily.
Even while consultations on the Tomsk installation
were in progress, PIs and support personnel were working
at a feverish pace to prepare for consultations on GMIC
targets. Thus, completion of consultations on the Tomsk
installation coincided with the virtual completion of
preparations for an even greater effort to interpret
the photography and evaluate the significance of the
Tyura Tam and Kapustin Yar Missile Test Centers. The
OCR Statistical Branch monthly report for October 1957
noted that because of the "extreme urgency" of intelli-
gence on guided missiles, GMIC requirements were being
given priority over those already scheduled for JAEIC.
It added that, during the last half of October, 25
copies of one book of graphics on the Tyura Tam Missile
Test Center was prepared for intelligence analysts and
consultants as well as an equal number of each of two
other books of graphics on the Kapustin Yar Missile Test
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Center for the same purpose. 304/ These were impressive
volumes in a 20 by 24 inch format, with perspective
sketches, and with annotated line drawings and photo-
graphs.
The overriding importance thus attached to work
on Russian missile test facilities was not surprising.
Earlier in the same month, on 4 October, the USSR had
stunned the world by launching the first earth satel-
lite. 305/ The political repercussions resulting from
the success of this venture greatly enhanced the already
urgent interest stimulated by acquisition of photography
of both the Kapustin Yar and the newly established
Tyura Tam Missile Test Centers. PIs and intelligence
analysts were cautious in preliminary interpretations
and assessments, but collateral evidence and the photog-
raphy left little doubt in their minds that the launch
point for Sputnik I was in the Tyura Tam installation.
Though there was little concern that a satellite such
as this could deliver nuclear or other weapons*to targets
outside the Soviet Union in the then foreseeable future,
there was animated concern about what parts of the United
States might be within range of ICBMS launched from pads
in these test centers.
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By early November all was in readiness for across-
the-board exploitation of photography and collateral
intelligence on GMIC targets. Essentially, this meant
the Kapustin Yar and Tyura Tam Test Centers. Three
more 20 by 24 inch books of graphics were printed in 25
copies each, completing the presentation for KY, as it
became familiarly known. All available collateral for
which need could be anticipated was assembled. The
Minicard room, which was still without the equipment for
which it was named, was made ready for use by members
of the Special Engineering Analysis Group. These ex-
perts from Government and industry were to be based in
the Steuart Building -- working and consulting with the
PIs, as appropriate, as well as doing their own analysis
and evaluation -- until they produced a detailed all-
source report on their findings. This work, in turn,
would be used by the GMIC Scientific Advisory Panel to
produce a brief report consisting of major conclusions
and recommendations.
Members of the GMIC Special Engineering Analysis
Group arrived in the Steuart Building on Monday, 4 No-
vember 1957. Though outranked by the GMIC Scientific
Advisory Panel, the members of this group were eminent
authorities in their own specialized fields. They
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included the following:
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These consultants worked continuously at HTA
through Friday, 29 November 1957. From the distribution
of personnel by category of specialization, it is clear
is
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where the muscle was concentrated -- in the investigation
of surface-to-surface missile (SSM) facilities.
Results of their work were published on 27 November,
just two days short of four work weeks after they began,
in a report consisting of 141 legal-size pages of text
and 14 figures which included photos, line drawings,
and charts. 306/ Extensive reference was made in this
report to graphics in the Tyura Tam (TT) and KY work-
books prepared by HTA for the consultants. In addition
to the photography, the other main source of information
used was COMINT. Availability of the photography
provided an opportunity to breathe structural reality
into the ghostlike facilities whose presence was indi-
cated by electronic intercepts.
1. The Tyura Tam Missile Test Center and
Test Range
The Tyura Tam* facilities, though neither as
extensive nor as long developed as those at Kapustin
Yar, provided the greatest excitement. After all, how
could an installation apparently devoted primarily to
the testing of intermediate and medium-range missiles,
* More commonly written as one word, Tyuratam, in sub-
sequent years, Tyura Tam it was to those who first
named the test center and exploited the early photography.
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surface-to-air missiles, and air-launched missiles
compete for top attention with a facility from which
Sputnik I had in all probability been launched and which
had a launch platform from which ICBMs could undeniably
be launched, either in anger or for testing purposes?
Moreover, on 3 November, the day before the Special
Engineering Analysis Group convened, the Soviets suc-
cessfully launched Sputnik II, a whopping 1,120-pound
package including a dog, in contrast to the mere
184-pound package of Sputnik I. 307/ The ability of the
Russians to put into earth orbit an object weighing
over half-a-ton in little more than a month after the
first one galvanized the exploitation team and the In-
telligence Community into action and threw Tyura Tam
facility into bolder relief.
Located in a barren and isolated part of Kazakhstan
served by the Aralsk-Tashkent rail line, this installa-
tion, with its heavily secured operational components,
was obviously the first step in the construction of a
permanent Soviet center for the launching of large
ballistic missiles with intercontinental, earth-satel-
lite, and space-flight capabilities (Figure 39). Prior
to the convening of JAM SESSION consultants, the in-
stallation had been covered twice. The first photographic
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mission, flown on 5 August 1957, was planned on the basis
of information obtained from other sources.
On this mission the range head appeared well out on the
oblique, making interpretation difficult. 308/ On 28 Au-
gust, a mission planned with the benefit of information
gathered on the earlier flight covered the whole instal-
lation with vertical and near-vertical photography.* It
was the latter photography, of much better interpretability,
that was the chief source of information on Tyura Tam
produced by PIs engaged in JAM SESSION.**
HTA photo interpreters liked to point out that the
installation had roughly the shape of a dumbbell. The
support base situated around the rail town of Tyura Tam
outlined one bell. The range head, 15 miles to the
north, outlined the other. Between the two were a rail
line and parallel power and water lines (Figure 40).
* The 5 August mission, planned before HTA had recom-
mended use of the A-2 camera in SOFT TOUCH missions, uti-
lized the B camera, which was not.yet functioning without
problems. For further information on the A-2 camera, see
NPIC-2, referred to in footnote, p. 1, above, p. 174; and
p. 262, below. For the B camera, see p. 124, above, and
p. 263, below.
** Unless otherwise noted, factual information on the
Tyura Tam Missile Test Center and all the graphics used
in this description are from JR-4-58, the PI report issued
by HTA following JAM SESSION. 309/ Illustrations in this
report are virtually the same, however, as those prepared
for the consultants months earlier.
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Chief interest in the range head, and indeed the
whole installation, was centered on a massive rail-served
concrete launching platform overhanging a huge pear-
shaped pit (Figure 41). This facility, including re-
lated structures, was designated "Launch Area A." The
launching platform
the top of 25X1
the platform rose
above the level of the flame 25X1
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deflector plate, at its foot. The pit in front of the
platform measured 880 by 550 feet, and at its deepest
level, was below the surrounding terrain (Fi-
gure 42). A servicing tower and two possible collima-
tion towers were identified on the platform. At least
nine instrumentation and observation positions were
situated around the rim of the pit.
Within a mile or two of the launching platform
there was a wide range of servicing facilities and
equipment, including unusual rail cars believed used
for transporting missiles and missile propellants,
rail-served assembly and checkout facilities, a concrete
controlbunker, an interferometer-type instrumentation
site and adjacent range control center, a power sub-
station, and a water supply system believed capable of
supplying quickly three to four million gallons of
water during missile firings (Figures 43 and 44).
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The support base, along the through rail line and
adjacent to the Syr Darya (River) provided services not
immediately involved in the preparation and launching
of missiles. Facilities at this location included
buildings to house personnel and administrative activities,
a plant for water treatment and storage, a power plant,
rail transloading and storage facilities, and a small
natural-surface airfield (Figure 45). A communications
receiving station (Communications Area B) was also situ-
ated in the support base area (Figures 46 and 47). It was
obvious that the test center was dependent on the rail-
road for transporting all materials and heavy equipment
brought in from outside the area as well as for de-
livering live missiles from the assembly and checkout
facilities to the launching structure.
There were just two important facilities along the
rail spur connecting the support base and the range head.
One was Communications Area A, the transmitting station
for the Tyura Tam installation. The other, which was
under construction, was believed to.be a propellant
production and storage facility (Figure 48). These
facilities, along with those at the range head and the
support base, constituted the key components of the Tyura
Tam Missile Test Center as distinguished from those farther
down range.
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In August 1957 there was major construction in.
virtually all parts of the test center. Since there
were two missions over the installation during that
month, it was possible to make judgments about the pace
of construction, particularly in the support base where
the coverage of 5 August had been better than that of
the range head. The observations were almost unbelievable.
For example, at Communications Area B on the support base,
on 5 August there were one double rhombic antenna array,
one two-bay fishbone antenna, and one row of three stick
masts. On 28 August, there were nine double rhombics,
two fishbones, one three-mast array, one four-mast array,
and three single masts. In those 23 calendar days, 92
masts had been erected, an astonishing accomplishment.
The feverish pace of construction indicated a crash
effort to achieve operational readiness for the Center at
the earliest possible date. Though the object of all
this haste, whether for military advantage or some spec-
tacular space event, was not apparent late in the summer
of 1957, the reason became crystal clear in the next
several weeks. By the uninhibited use of a military
booster, the Soviets were able to launch the first earth
satellite while Werner von Braun and his team at Hunts-
ville were removed from the competition by ideological
constraints imposed by the US Government in favor of the
floundering non-military Vanguard program.
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Though photography of the presumed test range was
limited, instrumentation facilities were covered for
approximately 70 miles north and northeast of Launch
Area A. The two largest, Sites 28 and 29, were located
between 60 and 70 miles to the north and east of the
launch point. Their positions were such that a line
bisecting the angle formed by imaginary lines passing
through each of the sites and the range control center
had an azimuth of 40 degrees (Figure 49). This was re-
garded as the probable primary direction of fire from
Launch Area A.
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Further photographic evidence supporting this
hypothesis, was provided by the discovery of probable
terminal range facilities 3,400 miles to the northeast,
on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Photography of 19 June 1957
and much better coverage three months later, on 16 Sep-
tember, revealed five apparent terminal-range instrumen-
tation sites near the settlements of Uka and Yelovka (Items
A through E, Figure 50). Three of these sites were situ-
ated along the Bering Sea coast, suggesting the possible
extension of the test range into the Pacific Ocean.
Many months after JAM SESSION was over, an instal-
lation under construction was discovered on the Sep-
tember 1957 photography of the Kamchatka Peninsula in the
vicinity of Klyuchi. It was belatedly identified as a
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high-frequency, long-range communications center (Figure
51). Two double rhombic antenna arrays were under con-
struction (Items A and B, Figure 51) and clearing was
under way for what were expected to be at least two more
(Items C and D, Figure 51). The size and configuration
of the two under construction were nearly identical to
several in Communications Area B, in the support base
at the Tyura Tam installation. Moreover, the azimuth
of the great circle defined by the orientation of the
two under construction at Klyuchi passed through Tyura
Tam. It was believed, therefore, that the Klyuchi com-
munications center was a key component in the Tyura Tam
Missile Test Range.
The impressive nature of the Tyura Tam installation,
coupled with Russian success in launching the first earth
satellite and following it a month later with a much
heavier one, caused much speculation and not a little
uneasiness about the status of the Soviet ICBM program
and possible deployment of operational ICBM launch sites
in the USSR. With so little of the Russian heartland
covered by up-to-date photography, there was serious
concern that operational launching sites might already
be under construction or even completed, with missiles
available for launching against US targets at the whim of
Russian leaders.
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The problem, therefore, was to develop guidelines
for use in searching existing photography and in plan-
ning further collection efforts. Out of the welter of
information and speculation stemming from JAM SESSION,
one criterion seemed to have unusual potential for
narrowing down the possibilities. It was the fact that
Russian long-range missile systems seemed dependent on
rail transportation and rail servicing.
This assumption led, during the next several years,
to the levying of requirements on HTA and successor
organizations to undertake rail searches of all photog-
raphy covering a broad spectrum of geographic areas in
the USSR for evidence of rail spurs servicing possible
launch sites completed or under construction. These
requirements also involved a search along thousands of
miles of the Russian rail net for evidence of sites
that might be prepared for use by a rail-mobile missile
system.
These searches were productive of little more than
the conscious satisfaction of learning that HTA photo
interpreters had done the job requested and found no
detectable evidence of the presence of deployed ICBM
launch sites in the areas examined. The task was a
dreary one from the point of view of the PIs and was
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spread out among photo interpreters in both the Geo-
graphic and Military-Scientific Branches. This divi-
sion of responsibility resulted not only in the dubious
consolation of spreading out the dog work but also
produced occasional embarrassment to the parent organi-
zation when differences in interpretation arose between
missile specialists in the Military-Scientific Branch
and other PIs pressed into service to share the work load.
2. The Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center and
Test Range
Concurrently with work on the Tyura Tam in-
stallation, the Special Engineering Analysis Group and
Military-Scientific Branch PIs were applying the same
all-source approach to the exploitation of photography
of the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center. Though Tyura
Tam had top billing because of the Sputniks and the im-
pressive nature of Launch Area A, it was but -a small up-
start compared with the staggering array of facilities
at Kapustin Yar, many of which were of much longer
standing.
The range head for the Kapustin Yar installation*
* At first, the place-name reference for this installa-
tion was only the settlement of Kapustin Yar, and, indeed,
this place name or the initials KY continued to be the
most familiar usage. As exploitation of photography
proceeded, however, (footnote continued on next page)
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sprawled across approximately 1,600 square miles of
Russian steppeland, an area greater than the total for
all range heads at US missile test centers in 1957. 310/
At Kapustin Yar, where there was no single facility to
compare with the launching platform and huge pit at
Tyura Tam, the chief impression was the vastness of the
installation, the far-flung arrangement of the facilities,
their diverse nature and the breadth of technical develop-
ment, the long period of growth, and the continuing ex-
pansion, presumably to accommodate the testing of new and
bigger missiles (Figure 52).
During HTA days, photographic coverage of the
Kapustin Yar installation was achieved for the first
time-on 10 September 1957, by a mission out of Adana. 311/
The flight proceeded from the east, uprange, toward the
northern end of the test center, photographing a strip
of the downrange area approximately 200 miles long. When
the pilot got one good look at the, herringbone SAM com-
plex, with its presumed 60 launch points, he banked the
U-2 and veered southwestward and crossed the Volga.
(footnote continued from preceding page) JAM SESSION
participants were impressed by evidence that some of the
facilities around and tributary to the city of Vladi-
mirovka were distinctly different. In recognition of this
distinction, the name Kapustin Yar-Vladimirovka Missile
Test Center later became the one used when circumstances
seemed to require the most precise terminology.
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This maneuver produced only oblique monoscopic coverage
of the SAM facilities and nearby SSM complexes. Coverage
of most other parts of the test center, which included
the most important SSM facilities, yielded coverage of
better interpretability, some of it stereoscopic.
There was a substantial amount of collateral in-
formation on missile testing in the area around Kapustin
Yar, beginning in 1946 or 1947. In addition, there was
a large body of information about testing derived from
COMINT and RADINT. 312/ All these sources pointed to
an impressive growth in the number of programs, in the
size and range of missiles being tested, and in the
sophistication of range facilities. It was these data,
correlated with visible evidence of the numerous testing
sites and support facilities captured on U-2 photography,
that enhanced the significance of what the PIs were
seeing and gave perspective to the development of the test
center.
The most extensive and most numerous facilities in
the range head were those for testing surface-to-surface
missiles, probably in ranges up to 950 nautical miles.*
* Unless otherwise indicated, the source of analytical
and descriptive information dealing with the KY Missile
Test Center is the report of the Special Engineering
Analysis Group and the book of graphics prepared by HTA
for the consultants. 313/
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U-2 photography revealed that complexes for testing
this type of missile were positioned along a broad arc
some 15 miles in length and lying northeast, east, and
southeast of Kapustin Yar. Generally speaking, the SSM
facilities to the northeast were for smaller, earlier
missile systems, whereas those to the east and southeast
were designed for successively newer systems involving
progressively longer-range missiles. Moveover, further
major construction was under way in the complexes east
and southeast of Kapustin Yar, indicating modifications
to existing systems and/or the development of still
newer systems. Even though the pace of construction
could not be estimated because of lack of comparative
photographic coverage, it was apparent that the Soviets
were pressing ahead vigorously in the field of missile
technology.
For purposes of identification and communication,
PIs arbitrarily divided the KY range head into areas
called zones. In defining the zones associated with
operations, an attempt was made to include in each zone
all facilities, and only those facilities, common to the
preparation and/or launching of one missile system. Each
zone was designated by an Arabic number. Zone 6, less
than 10 miles from Kapustin Yar, was obviously the oldest
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launch site in the range head and, by 1957, seemed in-
active. Moreover, the deployment of later complexes in
the line of fire from Zone 6 also suggested that the
latter was no longer operable (Figure 52). It was be-
lieved that Zone 6 was the site used for launching
Russian A-4 rockets reportedly tested on the range as
early as 1947.
Zones 4 and 5, somewhat north of the line of fire
from Zone 6 and probably added while Zone 6 was still
active, were regarded as a logical extension of systems
testing initiated at Zone 6 (Figure 53). At all three
facilities the launch-pads were similar. Moreover, Zones
4 and 5 were road-served from the same support base,
suggesting a close relationship between the two. It was
thought by JAM SESSION consultants that Zone 4 might be
a site for engineering-user tests of the A-4 missile
system. On the other hand, Zone 5, which featured three
launch pads in a linear pattern, was believed used for
training troops in use of the same missile system.
Zone 7, which appeared to have been the next SSM
facility constructed at the range head was believed to
have been the first site designed specifically for early
research and development. The launch area had two main
pads served by good paved roads plus up to five small
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pads with several associated revetments. The support
area was situated about one-half mile from the launch
area (Figure 54) .
Turn radii on access roads leading to the main
launch pads in Zone 7 as well as the size of the pads
indicated a capability to handle missiles up to 60 to
70 feet in length. Distance of the support area from
the launch area also suggested that the site was
designed to handle missiles larger than the A-4. Since
no permanent launch tower was present, it appeared that
the system tested would be fully mobile.
Candidates for systems employed were provided by
photographs of missiles displayed in the Moscow parade.
A trailer-mounted MRBM was the choice for firing from
the two main pads (Figure 55). Tank-mounted short-range
ballistic missiles exhibited in the same parade were
favored by JAM SESSION consultants for firings from the
smaller pads at Zone 7 (Figure 56).
Whatever the systems, whether these or some others,
the size and complexity of the support facility were
judged adequate to handle a major R&D project. Moreover,
comparison of Zone 7 with similar US missile testing
facilities led analysts to conclude that Zone 7 was
capable of accommodating a high rate of firing for either
a single system or a combination of systems.
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Zone 8, situated just over a mile south of Zone 7,
appeared from the photography to be an R&D launching
facility added after the construction of Zone 7. A
distinctive feature of Zone 8 was location of the support
area right next to the launch area (Figure 57). Indeed,
the distance from the main launch pad to the nearest large
building was only 600 feet (Figure 54). Though the lay-
out and turn radii on the roads serving the launch pads
would permit handling of trailers 60 to 70 feet long,
the approach roads to the launch area, which were un-
improved, and the closeness of buildings in the support
area to the launch pads suggested the testing of small,
rather than large, missiles.
Construction in Zone 9, almost due east of Kapustin
Yar, was believed to have been started shortly after
completion of Zone 8. Compared with earlier facilities
in Zones 4 through 8, those in Zone 9 were much more
elaborate and clearly intended for, launching larger
missiles. Indeed, at the time of the photography there
was a Thor/Jupiter-size missile erected on one of the
pads. The day following the U-2 overflight, a missile
was fired from the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center to
the 650-nautical-mile impact area. It was the opinion
of those working on JAM SESSION that the missile seen
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on the photography was the one fired the next day.
Facilities at Zone 9 were layed out in the shape
of a Y, with the road forming the stem oriented approxi-
mately east-west. A large pad was situated at the end
of each of the two roads forming the arms of the Y
(Figure 58). Separation of the two launch facilities,
arbitrarily designated "Launch Area North" and "Launch
Area South," was just over two miles (Figure 59).
Launch Area South was undergoing modifications at the
time of photography; two large hexagonal pads had been
added at the ends of service roads leading off the north-
east and southwest corners of the original pad. Each
of the new hexagonal pads was about 1,000 feet from the
original pad, center to center. It was on the original
pad at Launch Area South that the Thor/Jupiter-size
missile was discovered on the photography.(Figure 60).
A missile checkout facility was situated along
each arm of the Y, nearly one-half mile behind the
launch pads. Two missile assembly facilities, presum-
ably one for each launch area, were located along the
stem of the Y. What was though to be the control center
for Zone 9 was located adjacent to the point where the
road forming the stem of the Y bifurcated to head out to
the launch areas. Administrative offices for Zone 9
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were located where the road to Zone 9 turned off the
main road to Kapustin Yar (Figure 59).
The reason for duplication of facilities at Zone
9 was not immediately apparent. If then current US
practices were being followed, the two complete
launching and support complexes would be provided to
achieve a higher rate of test firing with a given system.
An alternative possibility was also considered, namely,
that the Russians were engaged in developing and testing
two different medium- or intermediate-range missile
systems simultaneously. It was generally supposed,
therefore, that Zone 9 could be engaged in the launching
of 950-mile as well as 650-mile missiles.
Evidence available to JAM SESSION participants led
them to conclude that surface-to-surface missile activity
was tied to Kapustin Yar, whereas wholly independent
facilities for testing cruise missiles, air-to-surface
missiles and, possibly, manned space flight were as-
sociated with Vladimirovka. Zone 10, which was situated
nearly 10 miles south of Zone 9, had all the external
appearances of a ballistic missile facility. This
created a distinct predisposition in the minds of those
analyzing the available evidence to associate Zone 10
with the other surface-to-surface missile facilities at
Zones 4 through 9.
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The case was not clear, however. Proximity to
Vladimirovka, less than 15 miles to the southwest, as
well as the rail connection to that city left room for
speculation that the activity at Zone 10 might be ad-
ministered from Vladimirovka and, in some manner, be
associated with space flight. There were, on the other
hand, contrary indications that Zone 10 was but another
SSM complex in the family of such facilities associated
with Kapustin Yar. Thus, Zone 10 was reached from
Kapustin Yar by the same road that served Zone 9, and
that road was being improved south of Zone 9 at the time
of photography. Moreover, assuming that Zones 7, 8, and
9 existed before construction on Zone 10 started, there
were just two places to locate the latter, if they were
to be placed as close as possible to Kapustin Yar and
utilize the existing test range. One place was north of
Zone 7 and the other was south of Zone 9 (Figure 52).
Placing it south of Zone 9 provided easy access by rail
to Vladimirovka. Consultants believed that the manner
in which the track terminated in the pad area indicated
a rail launch facility as opposed to one simply served
by rail.
It was apparent from the photography that Zone 10
would have two launch sites (Figure 61). At the time of
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the U-2 overflight, one of the launch sites was cleaned
up, though it was not believed to have been completed.
The other was in an early stage of construction. The
nearly completed site had a rail-mounted crane or service
tower. It also had a control bunker similar to the one
at Tyura Tam. Within the launch area were two towers
each with a 10-foot object at the top. It
was thought possible that these were collimation poles
(Figure 62).
If there was one facility at the test center that
could be said to have more than a broad generic resem-
blance to the launch area at Tyura Tam, it was the launch
area at Zone 10. Both were rail-launch facilities.
Moreover, Zone 10 had the only launch area at Kapustin
Yar with structures resembling the probable collimation
towers at Tyura Tam. It was not believed, however, that
the Zone 10 missile system -- if it was that -- was the
only one at Kapustin Yar that might employ inertial
guidance. Likewise, the Tyura Tam-type control bunker
was not the only one at the Kapustin Yar Missile Test
Center, yet it was another point of resemblance. Then,
too, Zone 10, like the launch site at Tyura Tam was judged
capable of launching an ICBM,; but so was Zone 9.* In
* It was not seriously considered by the consultants, how-
ever, that Zone 9 was primarily engaged in test firing ICBMs.
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spite of these points of resemblance between the launch
areas at Zone 10 and at Tyura Tam, the degree of similar-
ity was far short of striking. The launch facility at
Zone 10 was by no means as complex, and there was noth-
ing to compare with the huge pad at Tyura Tam.
It must be clear, from the foregoing considerations,
that the primary function of Zone 10 seemed, in the minds
of those working on JAM SESSION, much less certain than
that of any of the other presumed surface-to-surface
launch facilities. Perhaps the leading candidate at
this point in history, when JAM SESSION was just con-
cluding, was the 950-mile surface-to-surface missile,
but the testing of that system could easily have been
carried on at Zone 9. Indeed, if the 950-mile range were
to have been achieved by reducing the payload of the
650-mile missile from 6,600 pounds to 2,000 pounds, which
was regarded by consultants as a distinct possibility, it
was believed that the more probable launching area would
be Zone 9.
If conclusions about the specific function seemed
elusive, even confusing, this was precisely the situation
at the close of JAM SESSION. In matching data on missile
testing and firings obtained from collateral sources,
including electronics and communications intelligence,
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consultants were able to provide plausible candidate
missile systems for each of the SSM launch facilities
from Zone 4 through Zone 9. At that point, they had
exhausted the potential of the supporting information.
Moreover, the uncertain administrative subordination of
activity at Zone 10, whether to the base at Kapustin Yar
or the one at Vladimirovka, added another element of un-
certainty. The result was a degreee of ambivalence in
assigning a possible function to Zone 10 that was not
equalled in dealing with any of the acknowledged SSM
facilities at Kapustin Yar.
In addition to zone 10, with its rail connection
to Vladimirovka, there were five other zones of activity
closer to Vladimirovka that engaged the interest of JAM
SESSION participants. Two were along the road and rail
line serving Zone 10. A third, near Vladimirovka Air-
field, also had rail and road connections with the launch
facility at Zone 10.
Zone-11, about 10 miles out of Vladimirovka along
the road and rail line to Zone 10, was thought to be some
type of missile component manufacturing and test facility.
It was rail served (Figure 63). The other facility along
the road and railroad serving Zone 10 was closer to
Vladimirovka. At the time of overflight, it was under
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construction. Designated Zone 12, it featured a large
rail-through building covering an area of nearly 35,000
square feet (Figure 64). JAM SESSION workers thought
this might be intended as an assembly and support
facility. The third area, Zone 14, was made conspicuous
by the presence of a rail-through building, believed, at
least by the PIs, to be for assembling missiles. Covering
nearly 85,000 square feet, it was the largest building
in the Vladimirovka area (Figure 65). It was generally
assumed that these three Zones -- 11, 12, and 14 -- sup-
ported whatever type of system and vehicle were being
tested at Zone 10.
Of the other two areas near Vladimirovka, one,
Zone 15, was thought possibly to be a cruise-missile
test complex (Figure 66). The other, Zone 13, was much
more interesting and revealing. It was an airborne-
missile assembly and loading complex connected with
Vladimirovka Airfield by concrete taxiways (Figure 65).
The airborne-missile assembly and loading complex
was divided into two sections, within each section there
was a hangar-type building and a nearby smaller drive-
through building (Figure 67). Each section also had what
was believed to be a loading pit. The larger pit was in
the section with the larger hangar-type building and the
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larger drive-through building (Figure 68). It was ap-
parent from the dimensions of the larger pit that it
would accommodate the main landing gear separa-
tion on Badger aircraft and permit loading an airborne
missile or drone aircraft below the fuselage. The two
sections of the airborne-missile assembly and loading
complex were separated by a board fence, suggesting a
desire to inhibit casual observation of operations as-
sociated with two different airborne missile systems.
The U-2 coverage
of the Vladimirovka area, particularly of Vladimirovka
Airfield and Zone 13, provided considerable information
on the base of operations. Unfortunately, the limited
available coverage of areas to the east yielded no in-
formation on the supposed associated test range.
In a more speculative vein, the extent of construc-
tion and of facilities in the Vladimirovka area con-
sidered in the light of comparable projects then under
study in the United States suggested that various stages
of research leading to manned satellite and space flight
could be carried out from these facilities. There was
informed guessing among JAM SESSION consultants and
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others that manned vehicles like the US X-1, X-2, and
X-15, launched from bomber-type aircraft, could be sup-
ported from the airborne-missile assembly and loading
complex and Vladimirovka Airfield. It was further
speculated that in a later phase of development a mis-
sile booster with a manned final stage might be fired
from Zone 10, which had a logistical association with
Vladimirovka.
The activity at the other end of the range head,
roughly north of Kapustin Yar, was much more obvious.
Even though the oblique monoscopic photography severely
limited the potential for detailed exploitation, it was
clear that this was an area devoted to research and
development for the Moscow SA-1 sites. Moreover, JAM
SESSION participants were able to state with confidence
that the elaborate support and missile fabrication
facilities would undoubtedly be used in the future to
test new SAM systems.
Photo interpreters divided the SAM facilities
imaged on the photography into three zones. Zone 1
consisted of the launch area and close-in operational
support facilities (Figure 69). Included were a complete
herringbone site with Yo-Yo guidance facility,* a heavily
* See p. 28, above.
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secured area probably used for storage of warheads, and
an administration and housing area. Zone 1 also had
two smaller launch sites, two probable electronics-
type facilities, and unidentified installation thought
to be for storage, and a probable test stand for surface-
to-air missiles.
Instrumentation and guidance facilities associated
with the SAM launch areas were designated Zone 2, though
there was necessarily some overlap between Zones 1 and
2 in the vicinity of the launch areas (Figure 70). The
success of the PIs and analysts in pinning down these
electronics sites with a fair degree of certainty was
more a tribute to their familiarity with the Moscow SAM
sites and to the completeness of coverage of this small
test range than to the interpretability of the photog-
raphy. The SAM test range was instrumented to a distance
of 11 miles from the Yo-Yo radar behind the herringbone.
It was believed that good flight data could be obtained
for 25 miles downrange, assuming target and missile
altitudes above 20,000 feet. Furthermore, the high
density of close-in instrumentation sites indicated high
interest in obtaining accurate data during the early part
of the missile trajectory.
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Zone 3, situated just a few miles outside Kapustin
Yar, had a missile assembly and fabrication facility where
hand-tooled prototypes could be manufactured, reworked,
and checked (Figure 52). Nearby were several static
test stands. A small airport, suitable for use by liaison
planes, but not by large drone aircraft, was also close at
hand. It was believed by those working in JAM SESSION
that drones for use in test firings were probably based at
Vladimirovka Airfield, where at least 38 Beagle aircraft
were counted on the September 1957 photography.
As in the case of the SSM testing facilities, can-
didates for surface-to-air missiles tested at the SAM area
were provided by photographs from the Moscow parade (Fig-
ure 71). One was a single-stage missile, another a boosted
version. In either case, facilities at Kapustin Yar were
judged adequate to handle the testing.
Guidance facilities and range instrumentation for
the SSM facilities at Kapustin Yar were difficult -- in
some cases impossible -- to identify on U-2 photography.
No positive identification of pieces of instrumentation
equipment was possible because of the scale of the photog-
raphy. With the use of other intelligence information
sources, such as COMINT, ELINT and RADINT, it was pos-
sible,,however, to identify some instrumentation and
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guidance sites and to establish some patterns of in-
strumentation with a reasonable degree of confidence.
The Kapustin Yar range head had the heaviest
concentration of instrumentation observed on any photog-
raphy covering the two Russian missile test centers and
their ranges. Indeed, it appeared to JAM SESSION con-
sultants to be as heavily instrumented as any of the US
missile test ranges. The pattern of instrumentation
facilities observed on photography of the Kapustin Yar
installation indicated that each launching area had its
own network, located so as to provide optimum coverage
for collecting data on the missile system undergoing
testing. Many large, permanent structures were built
to house instrumentation equipment. In addition, the
system of roads through the range head, the small cleared
areas along them, the many cable scars connecting these
cleared areas, and the large number of van-type vehicles
in the motor pools at launch support areas all pointed
to use of mobile instrumentation to augment the perma-
nent systems.
Though it was possible to identify some instru-
mentation or guidance sites associated with most of the
SSM launch areas, the obliquity of photography covering
Zone 4, which was adjacent to the SAM area, was so
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severe as to preclude indentification of any guidance
or instrumentation sites associated with it. Unlike
facilities in the nearby SAM area, where obliquity
was also a limiting factor, this was a missile system
with which the PIs had no previous experience.
At Zone 7, the photographic evidence was better.
What was described as a "trailerized" installation was
located 3,300 feet west of the launch pads (Figure 54).
A partially cleared area in front of a "major" trailer
provided clear line of sight to both main pads. It was
believed that this installation served as a single-
point radio guidance station designed for a range on
the order of 300 miles. Consultants compared it with
that used with the US Corporal system. Forward instru-
mentation for Zone 7 was net up along two legs 58,000
feet long, with the junction at the Zone 7 support area.
Possible instrumentation sites were located at the ends
of the legs and near the middle (Figure 72). Orienta-
tion of the presumed direction of fire was on an azimuth
of 100 degrees.
At Zone 8, buildings in the support area, which
immediately adjoined the launch area, blocked any clear
line of sight to the rear. Moreover, drive-in roads
serving some of the support buildings suggested that
they were used as clean rooms for testing precision
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instruments, such as gyroscopes and accelerometers.
This evidence, coupled with the closeness of the sup-
port facility to the launch area suggested the testing
of inertially guided short-range missiles.
At Zone 9, with its larger, long-range missiles,
probably in the first generation of development, in-
strumentation was more elaborate. The launch control
center was connected by cable to forward instrumenta-
tion stations in a V-pattern, 58,000 feet on a side
(Figure 73). Domed buildings were present at some
stations. It was believed by JAM SESSION consultants
that a single-point radio guidance was probably pro-
vided by "trailerized" sites located 5,260 feet behind
each launch area with clear line of sight to the pads.
There was some indication from ELINT, however, that a
radio-inertial system might be used, with inertial
instruments in the missile as part of the guidance
system.
Compared with the guidance and instrumentation at
any other existing launch site at the Kapustin Yar Mis-
sile Test Center or even at Tyura Tam, those at Zone 10
were unique. At the latter, there were two L-shaped
instrumentation patterns. One, with the longer baseline,
was situated just over 100,000 feet forward from the
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launch site, and the other more than 38,000 feet to the
rear of the launch site (Figure 74).
The L to the rear had legs approximately 18,500 feet
long. It was oriented with one leg on an azimuth of 100
degrees and the other on an azimuth of 10 degrees. A
fenced instrumentation site was located at the vertex
of the L, and unfenced instrumentation sites were posi-
tioned at the extremities of the legs. Cable scars con-
nected the instrumentation sites forming the L. Other
cable scars reached from the L to the vicinity of a radar
site in Zone 11 and to two other electronics sites.
The L-shaped instrumentation pattern downrange
from the launch site had legs approximately 66,000 feet
long, with one leg extending north and the other east
from the vertex. Instrumentation sites were located at
the vertex and at the ends of the legs. The site at
the vertex and the one at the end of the north leg each
had three buildings with domes. There was a 34,000-foot
extension on the east leg, at the end of which there was
another instrumentation site. The presumed direction
of firing for the launch sites at Zone 10 bisected the
north-south leg. Cable scars extended between the in-
strumentation sites and reached back to the launch area.
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Aside from the L-shaped instrumentation patterns,
there were the two poles with 10-foot objects 25X1
at the top in the nearly completed launch site in
Zone 10. The more easterly of the poles had an azimuth
of 110 degrees from the launch point and the other an
azimuth of 20 degrees. The great circle thus defined
passed through Guryev and south of Tashkent. If these
were, in fact, collimation poles, an inertial guidance
system was indicated. Failing that, and since no radio
guidance sites were identified, it was believed that
radio guidance aboard a rail car might be planned for
Zone 10.
If the foregoing account of the highlights of in-
telligence resulting from all-source exploitation of
September 1957 photography covering the Kapustin Yar in-
stallation seems lengthy, it should be observed that
the length is a reflection of the vastness and complexity
of the test center. There was, of course, much more in-
formation available from the photography. In addition,
there were further details from collateral sources, par-
ticularly data obtained by electronic means, that could
not be correlated with what was revealed by the photog-
raphy. Considering the mass of material that was screened
and exploited, the accomplishments of the PIs, intelligence
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analysts, and consultants over a period of a few months
was extremely impressive.
Though the results and recommendations based on
the all-source exploitation were completed and published,
attempts to refine and publish the results of the photo
interpretation, as such, were not so successful. After
the initial effort was over, competition with other
commitments coupled with the massive effort needed to
assemble and prepare for publication in smooth form such
a large body of material first delayed and then pre-
cluded publication. No detailed PI report dealing with
the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center, based on the
September 1957 photography alone, was ever published
by HTA.*
3. Good-Bye to GMIC Consultants
From 2 to 5 December 1957, soon after the pub-
lication of the findings of the Special Engineering
* Intermittent efforts to complete the job and publish
what would have been the most voluminous detailed HTA PI
report ever issued, probably over one hundred 14 by 18 inch
pages, resulted in an edited manuscript, complete with
graphics, and ready for production work. This manuscript
was at last completed and approved for publication by rep-
resentatives of the Army, Navy, and CIA several days after
the Kapustin Yar installation was covered a second time by
U-2 photography. Though the latter accomplishment made
publication of the manuscript inopportune, the agreed-
upon facts and interpretations were indispensable as base-
line information.
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Analysis Group, the GMIC Scientific Advisory Panel met
at HTA to examine the evidence and to draft a brief
statement of their conclusions and recommendations. 314/
On 2 December, Allen Dulles visited HTA to greet these
distinguished visitors and, incidentally, to meet JAEIC
consultants who were also in the building at that
time. 315/ This occasion is still remembered by senior
NPIC personnel as the only time that Dulles came to the
Steuart Building.
The interpretations of the PIs, which in general
had met with the enthusiastic approval of the engi-
neering consultants, were also endorsed by members of
the Scientific Advisory Panel. Every aspect of the work
done by HTA photo interpreters and support personnel
was warmly praised by all outside participants in JAM
SESSION. 316/
writing to Lundahl on
6 December 1957 on behalf of the Special Engineering
Analysis Group, emphasized the excellence of the infor-
mation and responsiveness of the support provided by
HTA. 317/ A few weeks later, Herbert Scoville wrote
Lundahl in a similar vein, commenting on the excellence
of the information and materials produced by HTA and to
express his "deep appreciation for the truly superb
job you and your people have done." 318/ Some months
is
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later chairman of GMIC, wrote belatedly
to Lundahl to thank him for the "splendid assistance"
rendered by him and his organization in the exploitation
of GMIC targets. 319/
These were euphoric days in HTA. At least those
most actively engaged in JAM SESSION were filled with a
sense of accomplishment, of having played a vitally
important role in the production of intelligence of the
greatest significance to their country. The eager
reception given the photography and intelligence derived
from it at the highest levels within the government en-
hanced this sense of accomplishment and gave impetus
to plans for establishing permanently the capability
represented in pilot form by Project HTAUTOMAT. Though
JAM SESSION was far from over, at least as far as HTA
was concerned, these days, late in the fall of 1957,
saw the peak of accomplishment and eminence achieved by
the CIA PI component up to that time, and one not to be
equalled for another five years.
D. Show and Tell
The cycle of briefings based on SOFT TOUCH,
initiated late in the summer, continued unabated through
the fall. As more top level government officials whose
positions entitled them to know about these important
and fascinating discoveries heard the news, they joined
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in beating a path to the Steuart Building. Not only
was the information electrifying and the photography
stunning, but Lundahl, who was rapidly gaining a reputa-
tion as one of the most dynamic briefers in the In-
telligence Community, regularly left his audience
virtually spellbound.
Among the more memorable of these briefings in the
Steuart Building were those presented to Adm. Arleigh
Burke, USN, then Chief of Naval Operations, and members
of his staff and guests on Saturday, 21 September 1957;
to Gen. James Doolittle on 11 October; to Adm. Arthur
W. Radford, USN, a special Presidential advisor on
29 October 1957; and to Gen. Nathan Twining, USAF, then
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his staff
assistants on 26 November 1957. In each instance, Lun-
dahl received responses that were far more than perfunc-
torily polite in expressing appreciation for the briefing
and in stressing the highly stimulating nature of the
presentation. A letter of appreciation written on be-
half of the Chief of Naval Operations after his briefing
in September commented at some length on the "superb
presentation." 320/
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contribution to the furtherance of the mission of
this Agency." 326/
Though the Dulles memo was dated nearly a week
after the GMIC Scientific Advisory Panel completed its
work and brought to a close the initial phase of JAM
SESSION, it was a fitting postscript. Never had the
name of Lundahl been known so favorably by so many im-
services, and never had the work of HTA photo interpreters
and support personnel been held in such high esteem.
There were, on the other hand, several European
briefings for which some preparations were made but
which were never given. In a memorandum to General
Cabell dated 31 October 1957, James Q. Reber reported
that in response to oral instructions given to him that
morning by the general, the Army, Navy and Air Force
had agreed ". . . to transmit notification on the arrival
at the appointed time of Art Lundahl for presentation of
photographs resulting from the recent missions along
with an oral briefing." This carefully worded statement
was followed by the announcement that representatives
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force would meet at HTA the
next morning, 1 November, to aid in selecting briefing
materials of the greatest interest to their respective
portant persons in the US
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offices. Reber proposed an itinerary for Lundahl that
would include stops in Paris to brief key officials at
SHAPE and EUCOM, in Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Wiesbaden
to brief the principals at CINCUSAREUR, CIA Frankfurt
Station, and USAFE, and finally in London to include
CINCNELM,
Force liaison officers
and Army, Navy, and Air
The
memo noted that Lundahl should be instructed to provide
technical facts but should avoid making estimates or
drawing conclusions from the material displayed. 327/
HTA lost no time in preparing for this ambitious
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The October
1957 monthly report for the OCR Statistical Branch said
that numerous slides and 20 by 24 inch briefing books
had been prepared in anticipation of the projected
briefings by Lundahl of key officials in "SHAPE, EUCOM,
USAFE, USAREUR,
CINCSOUTH,
, CINCNELM,
The Statistical
Branch monthly reported in a matter of fact manner that
after weighing "political considerations," the IAC ruled
against the tour. 328/
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Minutes of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Requirements
Committee on Project AQUATONE held on 7 November 1957
noted that the Chairman, James Q. Reber, reported that
General Cabell had informed him subsequent to the IAC
meeting on 5 November that the projected European
briefing tour of Lundahl had been cancelled. Reber
gave no reason. 329/
Though the historical significance of these non-
briefings, as such, was virtually nil, the elusive
reasons for aborting the attempt to carry them out were
symptomatic of future problems that would plague HTA, PIC,
and NPIC. The admonition, in Reber's 31 October memo,
that Lundahl be instructed to stick to the facts and
avoid conclusions or estimates was revealing. Similarly,
the initial reaction of the military services, who agreed
to notify their principals overseas of the appointed time
of Lundahl's arrival, was far short of enthusiastic con-
currence in the proposal.
At the time when HTA stock was at its zenith, when
HTA PIs were working harmoniously and successfully with
analysts and others from elsewhere in CIA and from the
military services, and when Lundahl was repeatedly
briefing VIPs from many parts of the government, there
was, nevertheless, a reluctance to permit HTA to encroach
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too far beyond established areas of responsibility.
Much of the U-2 photography covering critically im-
portant installations was so good that information just
popped out of it. Moreover, the dramatic overhead view
of an installation with its array of interrelated parts
invited informed speculation concerning the functions of
the various facilities or the significance and purpose
of the overall complex. These were the elements that
made the difference between a dull recitation of facts
and an animated and stimulating presentation that ex-
cited people in the audience and prompted thinking. It
also raised questions of responsibilities, competence,
and, in the case of HTA's competitors, even survival.
An incident in December 1957 gave further evidence
of such concern. In a "Dear Art" letter of 20 December
1957 referring to a briefing given by Lundahl eight days
earlier of OSI challenged several hypotheses
advanced in the course of the briefing on the grounds
that they were different from those currently held in
memo, Lun-
dahl noted that he had called and thanked him for
his constructive suggestions. He stated further that he
would add the appropriate qualifying words or phrases
to make his remarks "even more conservative." 330/
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He added, somewhat ruefully, that it was his custom to
indicate in his briefings that final judgments and con-
clusions rested ultimately on the decisions of the
"substantive experts." This competition between PI and
intelligence analyst was something that would ebb and
flow over future years and would be an important con-
sideration in making decisions concerning the responsi-
bilities and functioning of NPIC.
E. Other PI Exploitation and Reporting
While PIs in the Military-Scientific Branch were
heavily involved in JAM SESSION during the fall of 1957,
those in other branches, such as the Geographic Branch,
the Central Branch, and the newly named Operations Sup-
port Branch were busy on a variety of lower priority
tasks.
The Operations Support Branch,* now without
was informally structured into three functional
groups. One group plotted the photography, another evalu-
ated its quality, and the third performed a variety of
more conventional photo interpretation tasks. The latter
* In spite of organizational changes in the summer of 1957
that resulted in reduced staffing and a new name, branch
monthly reports continued to bear the name "Special Pro-
jects Branch" until it was officially subordinated to the
Technical Services Division with the creation of the CIA
Photographic Intelligence Center.
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group, consisting in the fall of 1957 of
constituted the photo interpreters who, though oriented
to photo interpretation as such, had not attempted to
abandon the foundering Special Projects Branch by seeking
transfer to one of the two detailed-reporting PI divisions.
A fortunate development, beginning in the fall of
1957 and continuing for several months, provided these
interpreters with some very interesting photography for
exploitation. The DDP had just succeeded in establishing
a channel for obtaining 35-millimeter photography taken
with a hand-held camera from an Iranian passenger air-
craft flying periodically into the Transcaucasus region
of the USSR. When of the DDP received the
photography, he sought the assistance of HTA in exploi-
ting the material and publishing the results. The task
of interpretation fell to OSB and the group of four PIs
just named, with the senior man, as leader.
For each mission, the PIs prepared a list of targets
of intelligence interest captured on the film. When
coverage of important targets was of good quality, in-
dividual, detailed reports were prepared. These were
essentially DDP reports on' which the editing and pro-
duction work was done by HTA and differed from other HTA
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reports in format, in cover used, and in the manner in
which they were bound. Moreover, the distribution and
dissemination of the reports was controlled by DDP.
This special arrangement not only enabled DDP to enjoy
the convenience of having both exploitation of the photog-
raphy and production of the PI reports done by an organi-
zation with competence in handling such tasks, but it
also kept the entire exploitation and production opera-
tion, which involved very sensitive materials, in one
place and under exceptionally tight security.
There was another bonus that was not publicized.
The existence of U-2 coverage over many of the targets
exploited on the 35-millimeter photography permitted
utilization of the former to confirm details and thus
enhance the value of the small format material. It goes
without saying, however, that only information plausibly
obtainable from the 35-millimeter photography -- albeit
through the efforts of exceptionally gifted PIs -- was
included in the DDP reports, which were published at the
TOP SECRET non-codeword level.
Most significant among things discovered from this
photography were several FISHBED, delta-wing, aircraft
lined up at the Tblisi Airframe Plant, ready for flyaway.
This was the first recorded sighting of the Model B
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FISHBED. This lucky find -- on 35-millimeter photog-
raphy and without any backstopping by U-2 coverage --
enabled HTA photo interpreters to produce the first
detailed description of the aircraft, including measure-
ments. 331/
The fruits of this working arrangement between HTA
and the DDP evoked at least one unenthusiastic response.
At the Geographic Research Area staff meeting on 25 Feb-
40
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chief of the GRA, commented 25X1
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reports that came to his attention and other HTA pub-
lications. He recommended that D/GP establish "a method
of production control over these projects." 332/ Per-
haps this critical comment was inspired by tensions en-
gendered by the widening rift that was developing between
D/GP components at HTA and its nominal overseers in the
Geographic Research Area and in ORR. Though there were
no open clashes, D/GP, as the key component in HTA, was
functioning in a progressively more independent manner as
it proceeded to burst through bonds that had been fash-
ioned in pre-HTA years. The glamour and success of JAM
SESSION were significantly accelerating the process
already under way.
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During the fall of 1957, work in the Geographic
Branch continued the pattern established in the middle
and late summer. By the end of October, PI work on
projects utilizing SENSINT photography of the Soviet
Arctic and Far East was essentially complete, though
several reports were yet to be edited and published. All
were disseminated, however, before the end of the calendar
year. As in the case of similar reports completed several
weeks earlier, the results were of minor significance.
Accordingly, analysts lost interest in this source of in-
formation and, to some extent, in the geographic areas
themselves, with the notable exception of parts of the
Soviet Far East.
The brief spate of interest in SENSINT photography
during the summer of 1957 begot changes in the system.
In a memorandum dated 6 September to General Cabell,
Gen. Millard Lewis, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelli-
gence, USAF, observed that there was continuing increase
in the number of persons cleared for SENSINT throughout
the Intelligence Community to the point where it
threatened to defeat the very purpose of the system. He
added that he had taken action in the Air Force to stem
the increase, and he requested that Cabell take similar
action in CIA. 333/
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In a response dated 29 October 1957, Cabell said
that, although the Agency had always implemented SENSINT
directives faithfully, he concurred in the expressed
desire to curb further expansion of the system. At the
same time, he advised Lewis that he was designating
Arthur C. Lundahl CIA SENSINT Intelligence Officer. He
added that Lundahl had instructions to review personally
all future requests for expansion of the system and to
make periodic reviews of those authorized access to it,
with a view to reducing the number wherever practica-
ble. 334/ On a covering memo attached to a draft of the
memo to Lewis prepared for his signature, Cabell added in
his own hand a "Memo for Mr. Lundahl: Be very rigid in
your implementation. In case of any doubt, consult
me." 335/
With the transfer of the center in CIA for authoriz-
ing access to the SENSINT system from OCI, where it had
previously resided, to HTA, the stage was set for more
direct control within the Agency by HTA of this photog-
raphy. The change was only of minor functional signifi-
cance, however, because of the rapidly declining interest
in SENSINT photography as a source of intelligence infor-
mation. Success of SOFT TOUCH missions in the summer of
1957 left SENSINT with but a minor supporting role in
future photographic intelligence production.
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Geographic Branch PIs were also engaged in the
exploitation of U-2 photography during the fall of 1957.
Typically, their work consisted of "documenting" the
components of numerous Soviet industrial plants for ORR
analysts, but they also did a few studies of communica-
tions sites and the flow of traffic on selected Russian
rail lines. In October they initiated a series of escape
and evasion studies based on U-2 photography for areas
in Eastern Europe at the request of the ORR Geographic
Division. As these projects were drawing to a close in
November, work was getting under way on a comprehensive
review of available recent photo coverage to correct and
update, wherever:possible, information being compiled by
D/GG to serve as a basis for the preparation of a map of
the entire rail net of the USSR. 336/
This mixed bag of work, TALENT and SENSINT, kept
Geographic Branch PIs busy through the fall of 1957.
The type of targets with which they were dealing and the
manner in which they did their work produced a fairly
rapid flow of PI facts which were passed on to intelligence
analysts either orally or in the form of PI publications.
Very little of the information with which they dealt
came even close to being esoteric. There was very little
analysis or evaluation, and there were no prolonged
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deliberations or conferences with consultants. One
result of this mode of operation was a fairly expeditious
clearing of the backlog of work. With the virtual stand-
down in Russian penetration missions following the bril-
liant achievements of late summer, the Geographic Branch,
by early December 1957, was rapidly approaching the time
when some new requirements would be welcome.
As usual, Central Branch was involved in a variety
of tasks involving materials and activities outside code-
word channels. There was one task, however, that de-
served special mention as a harbinger of things to come.
In November 1957, Central Branch completed and sent to
DDP a memorandum entitled, "Analysis of Four Selected
Areas of Indonesia." 337/ The information conveyed to
the DDP in the report generated another request for sup-
plemental information on the Sibolga area, situated on
a bay on the west coast of Sumatra. 338/ This was but
the beginning of D/GP support for the DDP operation in
Indonesia.
F. Making Equipment Function Better and Getting Better
Equipment
In spite of preoccupation with JAM SESSION during
the fall of 1957, HTA personnel found time for making
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well as for the acceptance and debugging of new equip-
ment. The latter consisted largely of off-the-shelf
items; the pace of research and development, which was
not yet the sole responsibility of any single organiza-
tional component of HTA, was too slow to have produced
any great accomplishments at this early date. The
technical problems involved the quality and exploitability
of photographic inputs and how to improve them.
In order to review and evaluate the performance
of collection systems and take corrective action so as
to achieve the maximum capability possible for the next
collection season, Project HTAUTOMAT headquarters
scheduled a "photographic suppliers" meeting at Boston,
Massachusetts, on 9 October 1957. In preparation for
that meeting, a preliminary conference was planned at
HTAUTOMAT a week earlier, on 2. October.
The conference at HTA actually took place a day
late, with participants from Project AQUATONE, manufac-
turers, and HTA -- the same organizations that would be
represented later at the Boston meeting. At this pre-
paratory session, held in the Steuart Building, emphasis
was placed on the quality of the photography obtained
from each of the camera systems. Bausch and Lomb stereo
viewers and light tables were set up in the PARAMOUNT
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room on the seventh floor of the Steuart Building, and
samples of photography were made available for study
and discussion. 339/
The meeting in Boston six days later included
representatives from Project AQUATONE, led by Bissell
himself, as well as from Eastman Kodak, Hycon, Perkin-
Elmer, and Lockheed. Also present were 25X1
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As might be expected, the range of topics covered the
whole gamut of the collection effort, including many
items of no more than peripheral or passing interest to
HTA. Among the latter was the observation by Bissell,
who chaired the meeting, that the program would continue
. . . at least one more season and possibly longer."
is
Even as late as the fall of 1957, the duration of the
program on whose inputs the survival of HTA depended was
still uncertain, though hopeful.
Among topics of greatest interest of HTA were the
functioning of the camera systems, processing of the
film, and, ultimately, quality of the U-2 photography
the PIs were exploiting. Each of the three major systems
in use, the tracker, the A-2, and the B, was discussed
in detail, with special reference to the quality of photog-
raphy produced by each and malfunctions typical of the
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system. In all these discussions, data produced on a
continuing basis by photo evaluation personnel under
in the former HTA Special Projects
Branch -- then the Operations Support Branch --
as well as the sample evidence displayed at the pre-
liminary conference nearly a week earlier in the Steuart
Building constituted the source of the information. As
a result of the discussions, an action was agreed upon
for each specific problem and the responsible person and
organization designated.
In the case of the tracker, banding and loss of
definition toward the horizon, with a complete loss of
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the horizon line, were the chief problems.
bf Perkin-Elmer suggested that the banding might
result from a clutch problem. He also added that most
of the tracker material displayed at HTA seemed over-
exposed. It was agreed that all tracker cameras would
be overhauled by the manufacturer, Perkin-Elmer Corp.
of Eastman Kodak suggested that his company under-
take tests to see if a change in processing techniques
and methods in the field might improve the quality of
tracker photography. To this end, arrangements were
made to provide Eastman with an "appreciable amount" of
exposed but unprocessed tracker film.
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Other problems involving the tracker camera
system included suggestions for a better clock and
removal of the level bubble, which obscured part of the
format. The HTA representative concurred in both these
proposals. He also pressed for consideration of what
HTA claimed was excessive scratching, dirt, and grease
pencil markings on original tracker negatives received
from overseas detachments. deputy to
Bissell and under whose parent service overseas de-
tachments were run, directed that units be told to re-
vert to the use of duplicate positive film at the sac-
rifice of a few hours in the timeliness of reporting.
The A-2 camera produced very good quality photog-
raphy -- the best obtained from any of the systems at
this point in history -- but the quality was not
consistent. Main problems involved "soft spots" and
blurred fans and frames. of Hycon thought
these might be caused by vacuum pulsing. It was also
suggested that they might result from image displace-
ment caused by auto pilot fluctuation.
heed agreed that his company and Hycon, manufacturer
of the camera, would investigate this problem.
also stated that there was a focus problem
He thought it possible that faulty
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collimation techniques might be used and/or the length
of focus posts was incorrect. Hycon was assigned the
task of investigating this problem.
Though the B camera had already been in limited
operational use for nearly a year, the photographic re-
sults left much to be desired. According to design
criteria, the photography should have been much better
than that obtained with the A-2. With a foot longer
focal length, the nominal scale of vertical photography
obtained with the B camera was on the order of 1:23,000
whereas that of the A-2 was about 1:35,000. Moreover,
the design of the B camera provided uniform focus
throughout the field whereas on the A-2 it fell off at
the edges. In spite of superior design, however, much
of the B photography was not sharp and crisp, and some
was blurred.
At the Boston meetin who designed the B
camera,* expressed disappointment in its performance to
that date. As he saw it the problem was threefold:
reliability, focus, and need for better maintenance
techniques. If all three facets of the problem could
* For further information on the B camera, see p. 124,
above, and p. 395, below.
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be solved, he expressed confidence that the superior
potential of the B camera could be realized.
of Hycon stated that a modified shutter 25X1
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with new bearings and microswitches was currently under-
going bench tests. As of 8 October, the day before the
Boston meeting, the shutter had completed 50,000 cycles
without a malfunction. In addition to the shutter,
McFadden thought that there was a problem of vibration,
which could be caused by the image motion compensation
mechanism, by the film drive, or by shutter or mirror
vibration. It was agreed that all B cameras and shutters
would be returned to Hycon for overhaul and for the in-
corporation of all the latest modifications. Plans were
also made for a joint test by Eastman Kodak and Perkin-
Elmer of the red and yellow filters used on the B cameras.
Finally, Hycon complained that some malfunctions in the
feeding of film to the camera was caused by dished
flanges on the spools holding the film. Hycon provided
Eastman with drawings of internal supports for flanges
in the film shipping containers. Project headquarters
authorized Eastman to put in a pilot order for 20 of
these modified shipping containers. 340/
This involvement of HTA in technical problems as-
sociated with the collection systems was no gratuitous
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excursion into matters that had no detectable relation
to exploitation of the photography. On the contrary,
the ultimate success of the multimillion dollar collec-
tion effort could be measured only in terms of the quality
and exploitability of the photography obtained. HTA, as
the prime customer and the one having the greatest famil-
iarity with the collection system, was in a key position
to assist in evaluating the effectiveness of the effort.
Indeed, Project headquarters and the manufacturers de-
pended primarily on feedback in the form of mission photo
evaluation reports, produced on a continuing basis by
HTA, and on special exhibits, like the one held on 3 Oc-
tober in the Steuart Building, as a source of information
to help them correct deficiencies in the functioning of
the systems.
In a broader sense, experience to date was demon-
strating the wisdom and necessity of close working rela-
tionships between the collectors and exploiters in both
the planning phase of the collection system and, later,
in the operational phase. The extraordinary success of
the AQUATONE Project was dramatic proof of the produc-
tiveness of such an approach. The small size of the
AQUATONE effort and the open handed stance taken by
both Bissell and Lundahl and their people were doubtlessly
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important factors in the smooth and effective relation-
ships that developed. In the future, as the size of
the national effort grew, there would be many occasions
on which the need for joint participation and effective
communications would be overlooked and, at least for a
time, the lessons of the past would be forgotten. In
the fall of 1957, however, things were moving along
just fine.
The arrival of new equipment affected several com-
ponents, chiefly those providing support to the photo
interpreters. The greater success in procuring this
type of equipment was due largely to the fact that it
had been developed for other users,whereas the paucity of
new PI equipment -- particularly that of a sophisticated
nature -- was a reflection of the vanguard position of
HTA in the exploitation of photography.
The ALWAC III-E computer, the first electronic
computer in the Agency, arrived at. the Steuart Building
on 17 September 1957. 341/ Although the scheduled time
of arrival was 0900 hours, a succession of mishaps made
it fortunate that the ALWAC was delivered safely at HTA
at all on the appointed day.
The computer came by truck from Cleveland, where
it had been on display at a business show. The address
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given the driver was 2430 E Street, Northwest. This
was the first mistake. The driver got stuck trying to
wind his way around the complex of driveways and parked
cars in the area, and after much travail during which he
built up a sizable head of steam, he finally offloaded
the computer on a mail dock at Que Building and drove off.
In the meantime at the Steuart Building,
was concerned over the whereabouts of this valuable piece
of equipment. Once during the day he got a telephone
call telling him that a cursing truck driver was at-
tempting to deliver a computer. It was:.late afternoon,
however, before discovered where the computer had
been deposited. Fortunately, he was able to get a GSA
moving crew and a truck with a lift gate to get the
computer off the mail dock and into the Steuart Building
that evening. remembers.the expressions on the
faces of the ALWAC engineers, who had been standing by
to get the computer in place in the Steuart Building, as
they shoved the half-ton main logic cabinet from the
bed of the truck onto the lift gate. The gate sagged
about six inches in the rear and three inches in the
front before it steadied. There was a look of dismay
and then relief-as it became evident that the cabinet
would not topple over and fall on the pavement. It was
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not long thereafter that all three cabinets were safely
inside the Steuart Building and out of the rain (Fig-
ure 75).
The machine was operational about three days after
it was delivered to the Steuart Building. Within about
a week after its arrival, one or two useful programs
were in operation, thanks to the lapse of a few weeks
between the completion of the programing course in New
York City by and the delivery of the
computer. As
recalls it, the first of these was 25X1
a scale number computation program to determine the
scale at a particular point on a photograph. 342/ This
was a noteworthy accomplishment in view of the difficul-
ties to be expected in breaking in such a complex piece
of equipment. It was also a most timely beginning,
coming as it did during the early stages of work on
JAM SESSION.
Monthly reports from the Technical Intelligence
Services Branch, beginning with the one for October 1957,
noted that computation problems were being programed and
solved by the ALWAC. 343/ According to~ during
the fall of 1957, the chief uses of the newly acquired
computer were (1) the determination of scale at a given
point on a photograph in response to specific requests
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from other photogrammetrists in the branch who, in turn,
were providing mensuration data to photo interpreters,
and (2) the calculation of settings for the Reed rec-
tifier, a fairly lengthy computation that involved a
trial and error approach. Before the fall was over, the
computer was producing scale tables for any given angle
of obliquity, flying height, and focal length of cam-
era. 344/ These tables, which were later published,
made it possible for PIs to make non-critical measure-
ments themselves and free the few photogrammetrists for
work on more critical and demanding calculations.
Once HTA acquired the ALWAC, it became a member
of the "ALWAC Users Association," a loose confederation
of 25 or more owners. HTA, primarily in the person of
was quite active in the association from the
start. Because of security constraints, HTA gained
considerably more from the association than it was able
to give. 345/ Monthly reports from the Technical In-
telligence Services Branch during the fall of 1957
record visits by~ to meetings of this association
and to other computer meetings and demonstrations. 346/
This was a new and promising field, the goals set in
justifying purchase of the ALWAC were ambitious, and HTA
was vigorously pressing forward to realize the full po-
tential of the computer.
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The fortunate circumstances created by
suggestion a year earlier, the foresight of HTA super-
visors in encouraging him to proceed with the screening
of available computers, and the lucky surplus of ap-
proximately $50,000 in the equipment budget that made
purchase of the ALWAC possible were of the utmost signif-
icance in extending the technical intelligence capabili-
ties of HTA far beyond those of its competitors in the
intelligence field. They were also of definitive im-
portance in providing the volume of technical intelli-
gence made available to JAM SESSION participants in the
fall of 1957. Whereas it would have been technically
possible to do the job using mechanical calculators,
since all important SOFT TOUCH missions were flown with
the A-2 camera, which did not pose the almost insurmount-
able metrical problems of horizon-to-horizon photography,
it would have been physically impossible to handle the
volume of requests in the time available by such
means. 347/
Although the ALWAC was by far the most significant
and interesting piece of equipment delivered at HTA
during the fall of 1957, there was one other that merits
mention. In September 1957, the photo lab received its
first VG 1 enlarger from the Swiss firm of Wild, where
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after the VIII International Congress of Photogrammetry
a year earlier. HTA was very proud of this enlarger,
then the only one of its kind in the United States. 348/
With excellent optics and the capability to enlarge
photography up to seven times in one step, the VG 1 was
especially useful in the production of briefing boards.
It was also convenient and fast to use, qualities that
made it a godsend at a time when JAM SESSION was just
beginning. The fact that the original VG 1 and three
others purchased subsequently by HTA and its successors
are still in use by NPIC is convincing testimony of the
excellence of this piece of equipment and the good
judgment used in selecting it.
had visited and inspected this piece of equipment
G. The HTAUTOMAT Organization Reacts to JAM SESSION
During the fall of 1957, the seemingly endless
struggle to establish and carry out some system of ef-
fective project control continued. In November, the
Support Staff announced the introduction of a new form
for the weekly reporting of progress on projects assigned
to the branches. This form provided for the entry of
data on the identity of each project assigned to the
branch, the name of the responsible analyst, the date
the project was assigned, any changes during the
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reporting period in the estimated date of completion,
and, for each project, a comparison of the percent of
total estimated work accomplished by the end of the
previous week and at the end of the current week. The
form was designed so that the report for the last week
of each calendar month would sum up the project assign-
ments and accomplishments for that month. 349/
The devising of this form was a further step in
carrying out the dictum endorsed by Lundahl in his memo
of 29 August 1957 that thenceforth each branch should
submit a weekly status report on specific projects as-
signed to it. 350/ Whereas that earlier announcement
had exempted not only the so-called continuing projects
(i.e., such as those for preparing mission plots, the
mission coverage summary for each new mission, and the
like) but also projects in support of other HTA compo-
nents, the latter were in certain cases now being brought
into the system with the concurrence of those in charge.
Thus, the December 1957 monthly report of the
Support Staff noted that discussions were held between
of the Support Staff and
of the Technical Intelligence
Services Branch to ping work in that branch within the
weekly reporting system. It was further stated that
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who was chief of the graphics shop, agreed to
enter all support projects assigned to his component
on the weekly reporting form. Other types of projects
in TISB which were no doubt included in the discussion
were requests for photogrammetric services, chiefly in
support of the PIs, and the varied services of the re-
organized Special Projects Branch, now designated in
administrative circles by the new name, Operations Sup-
port Branch.
The December 1957 Support Branch monthly report
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also noted that had conferred with
chief of the unofficially constituted Central Branch,
concerning the possibility of bringing the monitoring
and reporting of projects in that branch within the
weekly reporting system. esponded favorably
and agreed to place all Central Branch projects in the
HTA weekly reporting system.
During the same month, met with
of the Military-Scientific Branch
concerning the weekly reporting on the status of projects
assigned to that branch. As a result of the meeting, it
was agreed that the Military-Scientific Branch would im-
mediately begin using the new weekly reporting form. In
an apparent quid pro quo,F__-Irequested and received
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tacit agreement to keep all projects assigned to his
branch, though many had been totally inactive during the
hectic months of JAM SESSION. 351/ Aside from projects
being done in response to the GMIC and JAEIC requirements,
MSB monthly reports for October and November 1957 showed
only four other projects completed by that branch.
The success achieved by the Support Staff in bringing
virtually all project work within the weekly reporting
system was an accomplishment of some technical significance.
It could hardly be regarded, however, as an enduring solu-
tion to attempts by the Support Staff to centralize con-
trol of HTA production. Supervisors in the branches were
unanimous in their desire to manage their own people and
production without encroachment by the Support Staff on
their responsibilities as line officers. There is no
evidence that higher authority. disagreed with this eminent-
ly sound position. The Support Staff was getting coopera-
tion in differing degrees and information of varying
precision, but could only monitor production. At best,
the weekly report provided information for responding to
queries by requesters, or to suggest the need for cor-
rective action in cases when the record revealed obvious
production problems.
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JAM SESSION also broadened the use of COMINT by
photo interpreters. Though all persons working in
Project HTAUTOMAT were cleared for Special Intelligence,
COMINT information was not permitted in the PI and other
work areas. All such documents were held and used in a
small vault within a vault in that part of the Steuart
Building occupied by the Information Section of the OCR
Statistical Branch. Here persons, chiefly PIs, having
a need for such information would squeeze into the room,
sign the log sheet, and read the pertinent document or
documents under the watchful eye of a bleached blonde
named
Not only was access to COMINT materials awkward to
the point of almost discouraging their use save in the
most urgent circumstances, but no regular dissemination
of such documents was made to HTA prior to JAM SESSION.
Only those specifically requested were received for use
in the Steuart Building. Though inconvenient, this mode
of operation had not seriously compromised the effective-
ness of operations because of the limited need for such
information. With the acquisition of photographic
coverage of Russian scientific and technical targets,
on which COMINT constituted some of the most important
collateral information, the situation changed.
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Exploitation of GMIC targets provided the extra
measure of urgency needed to overcome the inevitable
resistance to change. The critically important role
of COMINT in providing information on installation con-
struction and missile firings at the test centers drama-
tized for all concerned the need for access to such
materials in the exploitation of photography covering
those targets. Impetus to change was added by the re-
quirement of the Special Engineering Analysis Group for
use of all available COMINT, ELINT, and RADINT in the
preparation of their all-source report. Obviously these
consultants had to use COMINT materials in their working
area, the Minicard Room. This effectively breached the
earlier rule that required PIs to consult such materials
in the small vault in the OCR Statistical Branch.
The result of these inexorable forces was action.
The monthly report of the Support Staff for November 1957
noted that of that staff,
of the HTA security office, and
had met to "discuss the transfer of special materials"
to HTA. 352/ This statement, which displayed the effects
of sanitization for inclusion in a document classified
SECRET, was illuminated by the OCR Statistical Branch
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status report for October.* For the first time in that
series of monthly reports, mention was made of the
receipt of COMINT documents. One hundred and twenty-
eight such documents were reported to have been received
on regular dissemination and 248 more in response to
six requirements levied by HTA on the Special Register. 353/
These developments during the fall of 1957 also
demonstrated to both HTA and NSA that the limited contacts
that had been developing since the inauguration of U-2
operational flights should be greatly expanded. It was
obvious that the intelligence to be expected from the
joint use of COMINT and TALENT information was far
greater than the sum of the component parts. The Decem-
ber 1957 status report of the OCR Statistical Branch
noted that plans were being made for closer working re-
lationships between HTA and NSA. It referred to forth-
coming briefings at both HTA and NSA to familiarize
certain of their analysts with the capabilities and po-
tential contributions of their counterparts. After that,
weekly or other periodic meetings were planned to
* Date of issue of the October 1957 Statistical Branch
monthly report was 19 November. It was customary to
include information, aside from the monthly statistics,
down to date of issue. Hence, the reflection of events
of early November in the report for October.
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facilitate the exchange of information on a continuing
basis. 354/ All-source exploitation was entering a new
phase at HTA.
The extraordinary accomplishments during the fall
of 1957, the favorable impressions made on people in
higher authority, and the thousands of hours of over-
time spent on JAM SESSION work by HTA PIs and support
personnel were setting the stage for reconsideration of
the job freeze announced the previous August, as it ap-
plied to the ORR and OCR components in Project HTAUTO-
MAT. By the time JAM SESSION was well under way, senior
ORR and OCR managers in HTA lost no time in making known,
in circles where it would do the most good, that more,
not fewer, positions were needed on the T/O.
The first attempt to avoid the August 1957 cut in
positions was forwarded to Amory on 23 October 1957 over
the signature of Paul Borel. It recommended that the
Statistical Branch be reconstituted as a division of OCR
and that its strength be raised to 62 positions. This
proposal would, in effect, restore the eight positions
cut in August and add nine more. It further established
an order of priority for the nine new positions. One
additional courier would be added, and the number of
personnel engaged in the reproduction, dissemination
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control, classification, and research activities would
each be augmented by one person. Second priority would
be given to additional personnel in reproduction, dis-
semination control, and reproduction. The photo lab
would have third priority.
In justifying this proposal, Borel pointed out the
wide-ranging responsibilities acquired by the Statistical
Branch, the advisability of freeing the chief, Special
Register, from supervision of a branch physically removed
from the Special Register and having rather different
functions, and his desire to exercise more direct super-
vision of the OCR operation in the Steuart Building from
his own office. As far as the additional positions were
concerned, Borel observed that the program developed in
response to the realities of the HTA operation were of
far greater dimensions than those expected, and he cited
numerous statistics showing the enormous volume of
materials handled by the Statistical Branch. i~_5/
Borel's memo was an extensive rewriting of a draft
memo prepared in
office for Borel's signa-
ture. 356/ Thel (draft, dated 26 September, was 25X1
tangible proof of the alertness and aggressiveness with
which Statistical Branch supervisors set and pursued
their goals. The proposed augmentation of staff by 17%,
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and elevation of the branch to division status, confirmed
the fact that they were in no danger of being regarded
as timid. It remained to be seen what reaction this
expansionary proposal would evoke from higher authority.
The-next move in HTA to circumvent the August T/O
cut was made by D/GP. In a memo dated 28 October 1957
and directed to DDI Robert Amory, Lundahl recapitulated
the August decision that had postulated a reduction of
12 positions in D/GP Table of Organization and the
agreement that permitted him to continue with the on-duty
staff of 85 persons. He also pointed out that he had
made every effort, albeit with a liberal use of over-
time, to provide the minimum of services short of
jeopardizing Agency responsibilities in the exploitation
of U-2 photography. He further called Amory's attention
to the deleterious effect on the well-being of HTA em-
ployees as well as the considered opinion of his super-
visors that overtime work was already beginning to result
in decreased productivity.
In consideration of all these unfavorable circum-
stances, Lundahl made a strong plea for restoration of
the 12 positions plus the addition of six more. With
the initial 92 positions plus the two military slots in
the January 1956 T/0, this would bring to an even 100
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the number of positions in D/GP. Lundahl pointed out-
that restoration of the 12 positions would reestablish
the earlier organizational balance, whereas the six new
positions would provide for augmentation of the photo-
grammetric and graphics capability in response to new
requirements.
Lundahl closed with the observation that HTA was,
in effect, passing from the pilot stage to a condition
of expanded responsibilities contingent on the success
of the initial effort. With a fine sense of propriety
Lundahl continued, "This is not to say that expansion
is inevitable, rather that it might be logically ex-
pected if the intelligence effort behind it were suc-
cessful. I feel certain that I can conservatively
assert that this effort has been much more than merely
'successful'."
A note L__~ andwriting was appended to a
draft of this memo. It was directed to Chief GRA/ORR
Brammell, for consideration by him and AD/ORR Guthe.
noted that the attached memo was related to the OCR
memo and claimed that the HTA memo had been drafted at the
behest of the DDI. observed that the memo had not
yet been forwarded to the DDI and that it would be re-
written for submission through the chief, GRA, and the
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AD/ORR, if they so desired. The document was returned to
with the notation that it had been shown to Guthe,
who said to submit it as drafted. With this perfunctory
exchange of civilities, the ties that bound the ORR
element in HTA to its parent organization were eased
another notch. 357/
The handling of this situation by Lundahl and his
associates in D/GP merits examination. If it were only
possible to learn well what history teaches instead of
having to relive it, the astute manner in which this
situation was handled had the potential for saving much
future travail.
First of all, D/GP managers held their fire; they
didn't force the issue prematurely. Though the record
doesn't reveal whether or not they were prescient about
events as they developed during the fall, they waited to
build their case. By the time JAM SESSION was well under
way and the whole Intelligence Community was agape over
the information already available as well as the promise
of extraordinary accomplishments to come, it would be
hard to imagine circumstances more conducive to sympathetic
consideration of the D/GP plea.
Secondly, it is apparent from F-~ memo to Brammell
and Guthe that Lundahl and his people had the DDI on their
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side. Though it is difficult to discern the extent to,
which phrasing was intended to intimidate as well 25X1
as inform Brammell and Guthe, it seems certain beyond
reasonable doubt that the subject had been discussed
with the DDI on one or more occasions and that his re-
sponse was encouraging.
Thirdly, the size of the bite was small. There
was no doubt by October that there was far more work
than could be handled by the on-board strength, and the
request for six additional positions was very modest.
Moreover, the purposes for which they were needed left
no room for suspicion. The heavy requirements for men-
suration on Russian scientific and technical targets
and the impressive array of mensural detail being ex-
tracted were already known. The need for additional
graphics personnel was also an obvious and highly
visible need. With so many intelligence analysts and
consultants lacking training in the exploitation of over-
head photography and relying on the extremely helpful
line drawings and perspective sketches being turned out
by the small cadre of illustrators, the request for just
a few more slots for that activity was a very plausible
one. Indeed, the proposal gave evidence of careful
planning and suggested prudent management.
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Finally, the allusion to the success of Project
HTAUTOMAT and the disclaimer that expansion was in-
evitable concluded in a persuasive manner. HTA managers
had analyzed the situation carefully and presented a
proposal that was sound in substance and couched in
tactful language. They were certainly entitled to look
forward to the outcome with optimism.
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VII. Winds of Change
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With the conclusion of the highly successful work
on GMIC targets in early December 1957, emphasis on JAM
SESSION shifted smoothly back to JAEIC targets. Before
Christmas, consultant meetings on two installations of
interest to JAEIC were held in the Steuart Building. 358/
No more were held for another two months.
To managers and supervisors, this hiatus brought
no easing of the torrid pace set during the fall. To
them, this was an opportune time to consider changes in
the allocation of space in the Steuart Building, to
examine critically the success of the organizational
changes made the previous summer, and to develop a pro-
posal for a basic reorganization in response to lessons
learned during the fall.
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D. Not by JAM SESSION Alone
Though JAM SESSION dominated all other activities
in HTAUTOMAT during the fall of 1957, by early winter
it began to wind down. Even so, HTA employees still
charged much time to JAM SESSION as work and consulta-
tions continued on the remaining installations. More-
over, on those for which consultations were already con-
cluded, HTA was still committed to publish photo intelli-
gence reports. Photo interpreters and their supervisors
were well aware that the extension of this effort under
the guise of JAM SESSION would provide some insulation
from bureaucratic red tape as well as priority support
in competition with other less glamorous production work.
Thus, JAM SESSION continued through the winter months
on a rather broad front.
Though the flow of new discoveries and fresh ideas
on JAM SESSION installations was diminishing, Lundahl was
still engaged in a heavy schedule of briefing. In spite
of the many high-level officials, domestic and foreign,
who had been treated to the joint delights of JAM SESSION
revelations from U-2 photography and Lundahl's stimula-
ting presentations, there were still others sufficiently
well placed to request and get briefings once the word
got around. And it did. Among the briefings given
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by Lundahl during that winter, three deserve special
mention.
As a shower of accolades fell on Lundahl following
his performance he slipped smoothly back into
the round of briefings on the Washington circuit. Late
in the afternoon of 16 December, he was at Headquarters,
in the DCI's briefing room, arranging briefing boards in
conspicuous positions against the walls and on the tables.
The occasion was the visit to Headquarters of the Vice
President of the United States, Richard Nixon, and his
good personal friend, William Rogers, the Attorney
General.
Soon, the door from the DCI's office opened. Allen
Dulles brought the Vice President and Rogers into the
room and introduced them to Lundahl. Without missing a
cue, Lundahl led them around the room, among the photo-
graphic exhibits, giving the technical characteristics
of the system and describing and explaining the factual
information imaged on the photography. According to Lun-
dahl, the Vice President displayed high interest in what
he was shown and asked Dulles why the United States was
not getting more such information. As Lundahl recalls,
the DCI responded, "Now, Dick, that's why we've got you
here." To Lundahl, the purpose of the presentation seemed
crystal clear. 369/
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when the aircraft was flown from its base
Another briefing, on 23 December, was notable from
the point of view of human interest. On that date, Lun-
dahl briefed Kelly Johnson, designer of the U-2. Though
Johnson had previously seen random samples of U-2 photog-
raphy, particularly during the early days of testing
this was his first formal briefing on U-2 photog-
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raphy by Lundahl. At this time, with the aid of selected
photography from SOFT TOUCH missions, Lundahl brought
Johnson up to date on recent accomplishments of the col-
lection system in whose creation the latter had played a
key role. 370/
Then, as winter was drawing to a close, on Saturday,
8 March 1958, Lundahl briefed Robert Cutler of the White
House Staff, along with
The response to this presentation was relayed
in a letter from Cutler to Allen Dulles on the same day.
In this letter, which was far from. perfunctory, Cutler
waxed lyrical about what he characterized as ". . . these
great accomplishments which are being carried on under
your auspices." Cutler alluded to the briefer, whose
name he thought best not to mention, as "the gifted
individual" and pronounced him "most extraordinarily
qualified." 371/ The Lundahl charisma continued to amplify
the visual impact of the stunning photography.
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During the winter of 1957 and 1958, while JAM SES-
SION and related matters were still engaging the efforts
of many within HTA and commanding the attention of those
outside the Steuart Building, there were many others in
the organization engaged in less glamorous tasks. Among
the latter were PIs in the Geographic Branch, who were
witnessing a progressive widening of the gap between them
and their counterparts in the Military-Scientific Branch
in terms of type of work as well as in career opportuni-
ties and prospects.
By December 1957, chief of the Geographic
Branch, reported that a continuing lack of specific re-
quirements from Agency components had led the branch to
initiate work on urban studies of Omsk, Novosibirsk, and
Stalinsk, USSR. He further justified such a course of
action by pointing out that the expected identification
and reporting of items of intelligence interest in these
cities would not only fulfill existing needs in the In-
telligence Community but would probably generate further
specific requirements as well. 372/ It was apparent that
the quick, simple "documentation" of facts from the photog-
raphy of conventional industrial-type installations was
not sufficient to keep upwards of 10 photo interpreters
continuously engaged in answering externally generated
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requirements based on spasmodic inputs of U-2 photography.
By January 1958, there was a further elaboration of
the urban studies program. Work was suspended on Stalinsk
but initiated on the cities of Chimkent and Stalinabad,
whose study was judged to have higher priority. Growing
interest in the use of U-2 photography in these studies
was reflected in a town plan seminar chaired by
and held at HTA on 22 January 1958. At this meeting,
requirements, priorities, and town plan programs in the
Intelligence Community were discussed. Representatives
were present from several Agency components as well as
the Air Force, Navy, and Army.
The month of January also marked the commencement
of another self-initiated type of project in the Geographic
Branch. This was the production of intelligence overlays
for selected World Aeronautical Chart (WAC) areas in the
USSR and its Satellites. In this program, the Geographic
Branch undertook routinely to provide information on
known installations or confirmation of suspected instal-
lations of intelligence interest located in the area of
the chart. Like the urban studies initiated the previous
month, it was hoped that the program would fulfill existing
needs and stimulate the levying of requirements for more
detailed exploitation of at least some of the installa-
tions. 373/
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By the close of February 1958, photo interpreters
in the Geographic Branch were spending 50% of their
project time on the WAC overlay and urban studies pro-
grams. Moreover, the ramifications of the latter were
proliferating, though there was as yet no clear indication
of its long-range viability. On 12 February, a second
town plan seminar was held at HTA to discuss ways of co-
ordinating town plan programs then under way in the In-
telligence Community. At this meeting, it was decided
that HTA and GRA's Cartography Division would begin work
on select urban areas and present sample maps to the
Urban Areas Branch (UAB) to provide data for use in
making policy decisions concerning sanitizttion proce-
dures with reference to the use of TALENT photography in
town plans. Agency representatives also acceded to the
suggestion that CIA initiate correspondence intended to
encourage the formal establishment of a joint urban
studies group composed of members of all the military
services and CIA. 374/
This groping to find productive work and to test the
utility and feasibility of using U-2 photography in fields
other than military and industrial installations and
facilities directly related to strategic threat, was in-
viting reconsideration of the mission and functions of
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HTA in the light of changing circumstances. It was also
raising further question about the desirability of having
detailed photo interpretation responsibilities split
between two branches.
Aside from the problems being experienced by the
Geographic Division, the other noteworthy activities in
the winter of 1957-58 involving D/GP photo interpreters
took place in the Central Branch. The third in the new
series of PI training courses was concluded on 19 Decem-
ber 1957, and the fourth started on 7 January 1958. 375/
These courses were so popular that, upon the conclusion
of the latter offering in March 1958, the Central Branch
reported that the ORR Administrative Staff advised there
was a two-year backlog in prospective students. They
added that, were the course to be advertised in the OTR
Bulletin, the response would be overwhelming. 376/
Doubtlessly, the furor created by JAM SESSION was augmen-
ting the general interest in photography as a source of
intelligence information.
February 1958 was also marked by the issuance of a
third photo intelligence memorandum in answer to a DDP
requirement on Indonesia. This publication, done on a
crash basis, reported on a drop zone. 377/ Though the
civil war was well under way by the end of that month,
D/GP support was still minimal.
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E. How to Proceed with the Publication of Reports
When 1958 arrived HTA was still without a publica-
tions unit. Until that time, manuscripts whose component
parts had been produced by the PIs were usually passed
on to the Support Staff for editing. During editing,
interpreters were consulted about problems and proposed
changes in the manuscript, and their approval was ob-
tained for the final version of the manuscript prior to
sending it to reproduction. Thus, from the receipt of
the manuscript in the Support Staff until it was delivered
to reproduction, the initiatives lay largely in the hands
of the editors. Moreover, from this point on neither the
PIs nor the editors saw the publication again until it was
disseminated. Unless the whole mechanism for editing
and publishing HTA reports were singularly troubleproof
and adaptable, which it was not, this was a facet of
operations that could scarcely escape an overhaul.
Two events of the then recent past set the stage
for a change. One was the establishment of the graphics
shop in the summer of 1957. The other was JAM SESSION.
As a result of the painstakingly detailed exploita-
tion during JAM SESSION, the type of PI reports envisaged
for these highly important installations was different
from any earlier HTA publication. They would include
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much interpretive material instead of being merely a
readout or a documentation of PI facts. The level of
detail was such that many line drawings were needed to
convey all the facts. The intense interest by consumers
in certain key facilities required their portrayal in
perspective sketches. The excellence of the photography
invited the use of photographic enlargements. The page
size contemplated was 18 by 20 inches. The completed
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in one of his rare meetings with the editors and graphics
personnel, alluded to in quite uncharacteristic terminology
as "Dago dazzlers."
The capability to produce such illustrations had,
of course, been enhanced by the establishment of a sepa-
rate graphics shop the previous summer. It was also a
dividend derived in part from the hand-in-glove relation-
ship that existed at that time between the chief of the
Military-Scientific Branch and the.leaders of the new
graphics unit, in the establishment of which had
played a strong supporting role. Moreover, with the in-
creasingly complex task of page composition created by
the introduction of so many graphics and the general up-
grading of the physical appearance of HTA publications,
the chief of the graphics shop,
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exerted a decisive influence, it was apparent that
graphics personnel would want much to say about the prep-
aration of materials for reproduction as well as the
composition and appearance of the resulting publications.
This was also a claim in support of which the graphics
shop could expect a strong assist from in whose
branch all reports would originate.
Though the foregoing circumstances set the stage for
changes in publications procedures, the action that trig-
gered the initial skirmishes in the competition to develop
new procedures was the issuance of a Support Staff pro-
posal entitled "Procedures Governing the Establishment,
Assignment, Progress Reporting and Final Disposition of
HTAUTOMAT Projects." This proposal, which was a further
extension of work undertaken by the Support Staff a few
months earlier to bring all HTA components under provi-
sions for weekly reporting on the status of projects,
was directed to all branch chiefs and circulated by
who was already functioning as the plant manager.
who believed in centralized control of all project work.
It would have vested in the Support Staff the power to
accept or reject requirements submitted to HTA. It would
have left the ordering of TALENT coverage of the target
This proposal was largely the work of
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as well as the procurement of collateral aerial photog-
raphy to the Support Staff. Only after receipt of the
TALENT coverage would the resulting project be assigned
to the appropriate PI branch -- also to be determined
by the Support Staff. Moreover, it would have perpetu-
ated the physical control of the manuscript by the
editors subsequent to their receiving it as well as the
preparation of printing specifications and delivery of
the manuscript directly to the OCR reproduction unit. 378/
In a memo of transmittal)
who obviously
smelled trouble, advised the branch chiefs to study the
proposal carefully and invited them to submit any re-
visions that they believed would improve the proposal.
He closed with the assurance that their opinions would
be given "full consideration" and that they would be
contacted personally concerning any suggested revi-
sions. 379/
The response by who challenged all the
controversial points mentioned above, was swift and
pointed. With a surprising show of conciliation --
presumably because he tacitly conceded that requirements
handling was clearly the business of the Support Staff --
he suggested that the acceptance or rejection of require-
ments submitted to HTA be done by the Support Staff in
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consultation with the branch concerned. Taking a less
compromising view, he firmly insisted that the PI branches
should order the TALENT coverage. He emphasized that the
effort thus saved could better be spent in improving pro-
curement of collateral aerial photography, a service
already provided by the Support Staff. Warming up to the
subject, he pointedly criticized the proposed delay in
assigning the requirement to the PI branches until after
the Support Staff had received the pertinent TALENT
photography. With some justification, he averred that
this should be done as soon as a copy of the requirement
was given to the OCR Information Branch for the pro-
curement of collateral.
Having disposed of the preliminaries ad-
dressed himself to the heart of the matter -- the re-
spective responsibilities of the PIs, graphics personnel,
and editors, together with the checks and balances to be
employed in controlling those engaged in preparing and
processing the emerging manuscript. These he spelled
out in a series of 14 steps. Basically, they provided
for continuous control of the substance of the report
by the photo interpreters and transferred the responsi-
bility for report layout and the preparation of printing
specifications from the editors to the graphics unit.
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They specified that the editors would confine their ef-
forts to changes involving "readability, grammar, or-
ganization, punctuation, etc." 380/ The reasonableness
and logic of this counterproposal -- at least insofar
as it emphasized that substantive responsibility must
rest with the PIs -- was somewhat vitiated, however, by
the common practice of the photo interpreters to deliver
all or any considerable part of a manuscript, whatever
its condition, to the Support Staff and then advise
their supervisors that the photo interpretation, or even
the project, was completed.
In an apparent attempt by to ensure that
all MSB projects were handled as he wished, at least
until uniform HTA procedures were agreed upon and
issued, he addressed a memo to all MSB personnel and
military participants engaged in joint work on projects.
In much more explicit language than that used in the
response to he specified just how he wanted work
on MSB projects handled. He attached a cover sheet with
the names of each photo interpreter and supervisor in
MSB and directed that each read and initial the memo to
indicate that he had seen it. further provided
that it be returned to him for filing. He also asked
that it be shown to all service PIs working on joint
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projects and that they, too, be requested to read and.
initial it.
Further, to monitor implementation of the rules
as well as to ensure that liaison with other components
was handled in a businesslike manner, at least for the
interim, the memo announced establishment of the position
of production assistant in MSB and named
to fill the job. It was duty to arrange for
consultations between PIs on the one hand and editors
and graphics personnel on the other. It was also his
duty to receive and transmit graphics and manuscripts
between MSB and support components. In discharging his
duties _ was likewise obliged to initial, along
with the PI, the acceptance or approval of work done in
other components. 381/
Though no other comments or counterproposals to
the Support Staff proposal can be found, the other
branches were not unsympathetic to the firm position
taken by
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in defense of the supremacy of the PIs 25X1
in substantive matters. The aggressive position taken
by foreclosed the possibility that the Support
Staff proposal would be adopted without substantial re-
vision. In the meantime, the operations and products of
other branches were not critically affected by a continua-
tion of the status quo. Though it was apparent that
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the ultimate decision was at least a few months away,
everyone could wait.
F. Carpenters, Plumbers, and New Equipment
Experiences of the first year or more in the Steuart
Building revealed a need for certain changes in physical
accommodations. The longest standing need was for
vaulting of the Support Staff working area on the fifth
floor. At first, this unvaulted area just across from
the elevator seemed ideal for the Support Staff, which
would not be directly involved in the exploitation of
sensitive materials and, additionally, would have many
contacts with persons outside the building. Before long,
it was quite apparent that the handling of requirements,
many of which contained highly sensitive background in-
formation, and the editing of manuscripts, which in-
cluded TS CODEWORD text and graphics, made it awkward to
work in an area where all sensitive materials had to be
loaded on carts and wheeled into the adjoining OCR vault
at night. Also, all such materials not in immediate use
had to be stored in the vault.
Another and somewhat different space problem
involved briefings. The rapidly growing demand for
briefings following the SOFT TOUCH missions and JAM SES-
SION could only be held at the expense of intrusions in
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areas needed for production work. It was clear that HTA
needed a briefing room. The decison was made to carve
this space out of the Support Staff quarters.
The solution to both problems was achieved in the
course of renovations during the winter of 1957-58. By
December work was already well advanced, and completion
of vaulting the Support Staff work area and partitioning
of the briefing room was expected early in January. 382/
Construction was also under way at the same time in
OCR work areas, on the fourth and fifth floors. Addi-
tional space was provided for the photo lab, reproduction
machinery, and the assembling of publications. 383/ By
February most of this new construction had been com-
pleted. 384/
New lab equipment included a LogEtronic continuous
strip printer, a second eight-compartment processor for
use in processing film, and the HEICO dessicant drier.
The LogEtronic continuous strip printer arrived in Decem-
ber 1957. 385/ This printer combined the automatic
dodging which was the hallmark of LogEtronic equipment
with the ability to handle roll materials, thus giving
the lab a continuous printing capability. This printer
was used mostly for the making of duplicate positive
copies on film which were beginning to be popular with
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the PIs. It could also be used to make paper prints.
Procurement of another processor, which was in-
stalled in February 1958, provided the capability to
process both film and paper prints simultaneously. 386/
A closely related piece of equipment, the HEICO drier,
was received in the same month and made possible the
drying of roll film or paper prints that had been exposed
in the LogEtronic printer and developed and washed in the
processor. Completion of the installation and use of the
HEICO was delayed several weeks, however, until PEPCO
provided additional electrical power to satisfy the
rapidly expanding demands of the new equipment. 387/
December 1957 also marked the arrival of the IBM
Model 519 Reproducer and the Model 079 Collater. Prior
to this, the OCR unit had on hand a keypunch and veri-
fier. 388/ With the arrival of the new pieces of equip-
ment, it was now possible to reproduce IBM cards already
.punched and to sort them. It was still necessary, however,
to take the cards to the Riverside Stadium facility to
print a listing. Thus, in the winter of 1957-58, HTA
still lacked the capability to automate the preparation
of highly formatted publications, such as first- and
second-phase PI reports, but it was moving closer to the
day when this pioneering step would be possible.
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In February 1958, the long-awaited Minicard equip-
ment arrived. It consisted of a copying camera, a film
processor, a film conditioner, a film cutter, an in-
spection viewer, and several analysis viewers. 389/ The
December 1957 monthly report for the OCR component
reported that, based on several two-to-three week tests
that had been conducted in the previous summer and fall,
the equipment was judged to be acceptable and arrangements
would soon be made to move it to Washington. 390/ Com-
pletion of the installation of this equipment was delayed
a few weeks, however, by the need for special plumbing
for the processor. 391/
After installation of the Minicard was completed
in March 1958, sample prints of U-2 photography were made
and shown to Bissell. These included materials that had
been photographed at a 20-times. reduction and then printed
at a 20-times enlargement. Others had been reduced by a
factor of five and then printed at,20X. The monthly re-
port for the Statistical Division stated that Bissell was
pleased with what were called "excellent results." 392/
Even though Bissell was pleased, there is no indi-
cation that the PIs shared the enthusiasm imputed to
Bissell by the Statistical Division monthly report.
Having narrowly avoided, nearly two years earlier, the
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pitfall of being tied to an unproven system as well as
the disadvantage of using third or fourth generation
photography, the PIs were sitting on their hands. The
two years that had elapsed had provided ample oppor-
tunity to establish more conventional procedures for
storing and retrieving less degraded imagery. They had
also demonstrated the crucial importance, in many in-
stances, of having the very best imagery for exploitation.
Indeed, it had been proven in several instances during
the exacting technical exploitation of SOFT TOUCH
materials that image enhancement techniques, such as
density cuts, were needed to extract all the desired in-
formation from the photography. By the time Minicard
arrived, any chance that it might have had in the competi-
tion to store and retrieve photography for use by the PIs
was already foreclosed.
The other noteworthy piece of equipment delivered
in the winter of 1957-58 was the Model 2066 Addressograph
Multigraph offset press, which arrived in January. 393/
This press accommodated sheets up to 18 by 20 inches.
It made possible the transfer of reproduction materials
up to this size to multilith plates from copy camera
negatives. At last, it was possible to produce half-tone
prints of photography up to this size in HTA reports.
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Heretofore, in publications such as the oversize con-
sultant workbooks line work had usually been reproduced
on the Ozalid machine; any oversize photographs had to
be reproduced photographically, a slow and expensive
process.
One other space problem was also solved during the
winter of 1957-58. Ever since the previous summer, the
much reduced staff in the newly designated Operations
Support Branch had scarcely filled the old SPB work
space on the seventh floor of the Steuart Building. On
the other hand, with the advent of JAM SESSION the
Military-Scientific Branch found its old quarters on the
sixth floor, between the Geographic Branch and Technical
Intelligence Services Branch, entirely inadequate. It
was, indeed, customary for MSB to make frequent use of
the PARAMOUNT Room, on the seventh floor, for briefings
and consultant meetings.
The solution to this problem.was obvious. On
31 January 1958, the Military-Scientific Branch moved to
the seventh floor of the Steuart Building. 394/ The
Operations Support Branch moved to the space vacated by
MSB on the sixth floor. 395/ Apart from the more
suitable physical accommodations, this placed the opera-
tions Support Branch in close proximity to the Technical
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Intelligence. Services Branch, to which it seemed
destined to be subordinated at the earliest opportunity.
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G. People and Heirarchies
When HTA was established, the initial proposal to
do so at the Office level was rejected. 396/ This was
a fact not forgotten by either the ORR or OCR managers.
The extraordinary success of JAM SESSION during the fall
of 1957 as well as the lessons learned as a result of the
manifold activities connected with it invited a recon-
sideration of organizational relationships. Now, in the
winter of 1957-58 with many of the consultant meetings
concluded, there was an opportunity to examine the ex-
isting organizational relationships with a view to
charting the future course of HTA.
Ever since HTA became a reality, joint work with
the military services had been a major theme running
through the operation of the project. The Army had
joined in force from the beginning and, after a slow
start, the Navy participated to a significant degree.
Even the Air Force, which had demurred about joint PI
work, relaxed its opposition sufficiently to join CIA
and the other services in the first-phase exploitation
of SOFT TOUCH missions. Though the Air Force remained
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Register. It further stated that
aloof from the joint detailed exploitation of photography
in support of JAM SESSION, they did have some represen-
tation at the consultant meetings. What they learned
further weakened their earlier resolve to compete rather
than cooperate. By December 1957, the Air Force ex-
pressed a desire to increase its liaison force at HTA
from one to six persons. 397/ Lundahl's dream of a
national center for the exploitation of intelligence
photography had moved a halting step closer to reality.
Though the chief thrust of planning at this time
was in the direction of major organizationa-1 changes,
there were a few loose ends that needed attention first.
Some involved the ORR component in HTA, and some their
co-workers from OCR. Most important of these untidy
leftovers was the question of slots lost during the job
freeze announced in August 1957. By early winter the
success of the counterproposals made in the fall seemed
assured. An OCR Notice dated 13 November announced that
as of 15 November the Statistical Branch, Special Register,
would become the Statistical Division, OCR, and that it
would no longer be formally associated with the Special
would be chief and
his deputy. 398/
News of the restoration of Statistical Division slots
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lost the previous August and approval by the DCI of the
nine new ones was recorded in the December monthly re-
port of the division. 399/* The same report announced
that all vacancies were being "advertised."
Meanwhile, the T/O request of the ORR Photo Intel-
ligence Division seemed headed for approval. By early
December,
meeting that the "new increased T/O" was then on General
optimistically re-
quested branch chiefs to submit names of qualified persons
for the new positions. 401/ By early January, the news
was official; in a memo from the office of the DDI to
Lundahl,
approved an increase in the ceiling for Project HTAUTOMAT
of 35 positions -- 17 for the OCR component and 18 for
D/GP to be used only for HTAUTOMAT.** This memo also
asking that he set up the specific positions needed. 402/
requested that a memo be submitted through
* A summary of the entire proposal and a comparison of
the previous and new tables of organization was included
in a memo from Paul Borel, Assistant Director, OCR_,
to the Deputy Director, Support. 400/
** These figures included both the slots lost the
previous August and the new ones requested in the
fall.
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At least from an HTA point of view, this personnel
operation had been exceedingly smooth and highly suc-
cessful.
There were two other sticky organizational problems
whose course had to be set toward an ultimate solution.
One was what to do with the Operations Support Branch,
which was still without recognition in the official T/0.
A somewhat analogous case was the Central Branch, whose
existence had never enjoyed formal recognition.
The course of the Operations Support Branch had
been reasonably clear from the time it emerged from the
empire. It would one day become
part of the Technical Intelligence Services unit. This
was still proving to be an awkward change to accomplish
officially, since both components were nominally accorded
branch status. Nevertheless, the course of events was
inexorably pointing in this direction. Soon after the
removal of OSB to the sixth-floor quarters vacated by the
Military-Scientific Branch, right next to the Technical
Intelligence Services Branch, the ingestion began.
The January 1958 monthly report for the Technical
Intelligence Services Branch stated baldly that the
"Special Projects Branch. . . is being integrated into
the Technical Intelligence (sic) Branch." 403/ The
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February 1958 TISB monthly report stated that "much
effort was devoted to developing record and report
systems for the combined Special Projects and Technical
Intelligence Branches." 404/ A month later, TISB re-
ported that the record and reporting systems were al-
ready functioning and that plans were submitted for
rearranging personnel and equipment so as to admit of a
more efficient functioning of the "combined branches." 405/
In May 1958, the TISB monthly report said the rearrange-
ment of work areas had been completed, and, in the same
month, the Special Projects Branch* report first mentioned
the subject and acknowledged that it had begun to operate:
as part of the Technical Intelligence Services Division
(sic). 406/ The ingestion was complete.
The disposition of the Central Branch was, perhaps,
no less clear to discerning students of the problem,
which undoubtedly included all those in the branch. Be-
cause of distance, however, the process of ingestion
that resulted in the final demise of the Special Projects
* Old names died hard in D/GP. The name "Special Pro-
jects Branch," didn't disappear until it was absorbed into
the Technical Intelligence Services Division as the Opera-
tions Support Branch. The name "Technical Intelligence
Branch," continued to be used at the branch level -- though
probably not because this was still the name on the official
T/O -- until the component officially became the Technical
Intelligence Services Division of the CIA Photographic In-
telligence Center.
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Branch was impractical. First, Central Branch would have
to move and there was no immediate plans for that in the
winter of 1957-58.
The nature of the impending solution was recorded
in comments on the proposed reorganization of D/GP in-
chief of the Central Branch,
to Lundahl. The major portion of this memo consisted
of a spirited justification of the continuance of the
functions of the branch as a Central Division in the new
PI organization. At one point, however, digressed
to decry the proposal to incorporate the Central Branch
as part of a Geographic-Industrial Division, insisting
that this would cause administrative problems and preclude
effective management of the branch. 407/
The proposed reorganization was the most important
subject on the minds of managers in HTA during the winter
of 1957-58. That this activity involved the expenditure
of much effort was indicated by the D/GP monthly report
for January 1958. 408/ It is clear, moreover, from the
comments on reorganization by that the proposal
was already available for branch comments by the middle
of January. 409/
On 7 March 1958, the proposal for the reorganization
was forwarded to the DDI, Robert Amory. 410/ It provided
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for the establishment of a CIA Photographic Intelligence
Center at the Office level. The Center would consist
not only of ORR personnel in the Photo Intelligence
Division, but also the OCR personnel in the Statistical
Division. All would be subordinated administratively
as well as functionally to the director of the new Center.
There was no request for additional positions beyond
those added earlier in the winter, which brought to 162
the number of positions in HTA, and no stated require-
ment for additional space or operating funds at this time.
There was, however, an increase in the average grade
from 8.8 in the combined HTAUTOMAT organization to 10.1
in the proposed Photographic Intelligence Center.
Major features of the table of organization for the
proposed Center were reminiscent of HTA (Figure 106).
The former OCR Statistical Division would now become the
PIC Data Management Division and its former sections,
which had been designated branches at the time the
Statistical Branch became the Statistical Division, would
retain their existing names. Each of these branches
would consist of two or three sections, a reflection of
the fact that, with a T/O of 62 DMD would be the largest
division in the new Center.
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Line personnel in the ORR component would be orga-
nized. in three divisions. One, the Industrial-Geographic
Division, a name that the Geographic Branch had acquired
in the semiofficial realignment of the previous summer
but never used, would be organized in a European and
Satellite Branch, an Asian USSR and China Branch, and the
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lost his obviously belated bid
for an independent Central Division.
A second line division, also devoted to photo in-
terpretation, was the Military-Scientific. As its name
suggested, this division consisted of two branches, the
Military and the Scientific. The latter was to be re-
sponsible for producing PI reports and services with
reference to the foreign production and the research and
development of guided missiles, long-range aircraft,
nuclear energy, electronics, and chemical and biological
warfare. The Military Branch would be responsible for the
military applications of the above.categories of things.
The academic distinction thus applied to the division of
labor between the two branches probably reflected the
relative immaturity of this whole exotic field of photo
intelligence. In view of the great imagination already
displayed by and his PIs, there was little cause
for concern about the workability of the suggested
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arrangement. It would change whenever necessary.
The third line element was the proposed Technical
Intelligence Services Division. It was to consist of a
Technical Intelligence Branch, composed of photogram-
metrists, an Operations Support Branch, consisting of
what was left of the old SPB, and a Graphical Analysis
Branch, the new graphics shop now elevated to branch
status.
In each of the four photo interpretation divisions
-- DMD, IGD, MSD, and TISD -- the chief was slotted at
GS-15 and the deputies at GS-14. Chiefs of branches
engaged in photo interpretation occupied GS-14 slots,
as did the chiefs of the DMD Information and Technical
Branches and the TISD Technical Intelligence and Opera-
tions Support Branches. The chief of the Graphical
Analysis Branch was slotted at GS-13, thanks to some
tenacious and astute arguing by the incumbent,
Chief of the DMD Support Branch was pegged at GS-12.
The proposed Center would have three staffs. The
desire of the senior security officer,
to 25X1
be independent of the Administrative Staff was recognized
in this proposal by the proposed establishment of a
security office. The third staff, called Coordination
and Control, was the old Support Staff under a new name.
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It alone among the staffs had any official organiza-
tional articulation. It was divided into two branches,
the Coordination and Requirements Branch, which handled
requirements, project coordination, procurement of col-
lateral overhead photography, and liaison with many
organizations outside HTA, and the Editorial Branch.
The mission and functions statement for the Co-
ordination and Control Staff revealed trends in HTA thinking
at higher levels with respect to issues then being contested
at the branch and staff level. If adopted, the missions
and functions accompanying the proposed reorganization
would provide that the staff "coordinate" incoming re-
quirements among Center and military components to de-
termine interest in and feasibility of accepting them.
It was not entirely clear whether or not the CCS would
procure TALENT coverage; but one of its stated functions
was to "provide for the procurement" of special photo-
graphic material. Doubtlessly, this referred to TALENT
photography and, if so, it left considerable room for
interpretation and maneuvering for position.
The functions of the Editorial Branch revealed that
editing of Center publications would be for organization,
pertinence, consistency, clarity, grammar, and for agree-
ment between text and graphics. The latter function,
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correlation of text and graphics was a real sleeper.
No one but the editors came anywhere close to an ap-
preciation of the wide disagreement that almost always
existed between the content of the text and the portrayal
by the numerous graphics. In the years that followed,
the discharging of this duty was a very significant
factor in the editorial work load. Surprisingly, the
proposed Editorial Branch functions provided explicitly
for the preparation of reproduction specifications and
dissemination instructions and the transmittal of the
final manuscript to the reproduction facility. This
could hardly be regarded as a lasting victory, however.
In the escalating controversy between the editors and
the chiefs of MSB and the graphics unit, both of whom
wanted this function transferred to the latter unit, it
was only a question of time before the assignment of
this function to the Editorial Branch would be rendered
null and void. Slotting in both the security office and
the CCS would be at the GS-15 level but the chief of the
Administrative Staff would occupy a GS-13 position. The
chiefs of both the Editorial Branch and Coordination and
Requirements Branch, like most branches in the line
divisions, was at the GS-14 level.
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In charge of this whole operation there would be
a director occupying a GS-16 slot, and a deputy di-
rector and an executive officer, both of whom occupied
GS-15 slots. Though the GS-16 for the director would
replace a GS-15/17 slot in the former T/O, this modest
upward tilt would impose no troublesome ceiling. Lun-
dahl had already made his mark. If future operations were
as successful as seemed likely, this would not hamper his
upward movement.
The big change took place in the relationship be-
tween who was the deputy, and who was
the executive and coming on strong. The proposal would
place them in slots at the same grade. In view of the
reluctance displayed by Stallings to take a firm hand in
the internal operation of the organization as well as
his preoccupation with less demanding peripheral chores,
his long-standing official position as the number two
man in the table of organization was already precarious.
The foregoing reorganization, though spelled out
in detail in the 7 March 1958 memo to Amory, could
scarcely have come by surprise. All the elements of
staffing as well as slot restoration and augnentation
leading up to it displayed abundant evidence of a well-
coordinated effort. Moreover, more than two years
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earlier and lacking tangible exploitation accomplish-
ments with which to justify the proposal, Amory had recom-
mended establishment of HTAUTOMAT as the Office of Sta-
tistical Research. Nevertheless, it was appropriate to
include justification for the reorganization now being
proposed, and such justification was an integral part of
the memo to Amory.
Among major points developed in this connection
were (1) the critically important accomplishments already
made in the use of photo intelligence in assessing the
then current threat as well as the economic, military,
and scientific potential of the Soviet Union, (2) the
prospect of breakthroughs in US photo reconnaissance
programs that promised to surpass achievements of the
U-2 system by a considerable margin, (3) the success
realized in the establishment of an Agency-sponsored
facility -- HTAUTOMAT -- devoted to the joint all-
source exploitation, with military and other Intelligence
Community personnel, of high resolution photography, and
(4) the discrepancy between the official administrative
and organizational structure of HTA and the actual command
and reporting channels, particularly in critical situations
requiring rapid response. In short, it was the position
of HTA managers that the earlier subordination of the
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project had outlived its usefulness and was totally
inadequate to serve the needs of a permanent photo in-
telligence operation having the scope, importance, and
future potential of HTA.
Thus, by the close of the winter of 1957-58 HTA
was ready for the next leap forward. The substantive
work of the previous fall had been a smashing success.
The ill effects of the job freeze had been weathered,
and HTA had emerged from it with more positions than it
had the previous summer. Organizational problems that
had developed as a result of initial miscalculations, for
which HTA could scarcely be faulted, had been identified
and seemingly rectified. Related organizational problems
had also been diagnosed and proposals made to solve them.
Above all, the prospect of getting out from under the
wing of ORR and achieving Office status seemed virtually
certain. Approval of the proposed reorganization would,
moreover, provide further headroom, particularly for
those in intermediate and higher grades. As the spring
of 1958 approached, all that seemed necessary was to
keep striving for further creditable accomplishments and
to exercise a little patience. This is precisely what
HTA personnel did.
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