NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPIC INTERPRETATION CENTER THE YEARS OF PROJECT HTAUTOMAT, 1956 - 1958 VOLUME I

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00184R000400010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 192
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA Internal .Use. Only
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Staff and DD/S&T
NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
THE YEARS OF PROJECT HTAUTOMAT, 1956 - 1958
VOLUME I
by
Secret
NPIC 3
December 1974
Copy 1 of 2
PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
DO NOT DESTROY
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WARNING
"ibis document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
:~, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
:~ transmission or revelation of its otinteats to or rc-
,~ by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
w~INC NomcE
~IT111E 1lRELLIOENCE f01llCES
AND MEIMODS INVOLVED
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Aeeess Controlled by CIA History Staff and DD/S&T
NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
THE YEARS OF PROJECT HTAUTOMAT, 1956 - 1958
VOLUME I
by
Copies:
#1 - CIA-HS
#2 - DD/S&T
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Foreword
This segment of the history of the National Photo-
graphic Interpretation Center, covers the years of
HTAUTOMAT, the organization devised to exploit photog-
raphy collected by the U-2 reconnaissance system.
HTAUTOMAT consisted of a confederation of ORR photo
interpreters and OCR information-handling specialists
under a single operating head, the chief of the ORR
Photo Intelligence Division. Collocated with CIA
personnel in the HTAUTOMAT Steuart Building were the
Army, Navy, and, at times, Air Force photo interpreters.
This segment covers the exciting discoveries on
photography from the initial group of missions that
penetrated western European Russia in July 1956 and the
abrupt transition to use of the U-2 to gather indica-
tions and tactical information relating to the Suez crisis
later that year. It continues with the acquisition, in
the summer of 1957, of photography covering nuclear and
missile installations in Soviet Central Asia and the
spectacular success of JAM SESSION, the unprecedented
all-source effort undertaken to exploit that
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photography. It closes with the termination of Project
HTAUTOMAT and the establishment of a permanent organi-
zation at the Office level, the CIA Photographic Intel-
ligence Center, to carry on the interpretation of high-
resolution photography from the U-2 and from advanced
overhead reconnaissance systems then under development.'
As in the earlier history, documents such as
monthly reports, memorandums, minutes of meetings, and
photographic intelligence publications provide most of
the basic facts and dates. Recollections of key
HTAUTOMAT personnel add the human interest. Unless noted
otherwise, references cited in this volume are available
in the NPIC Historical Collection, housed in the NPIC
Library.
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Contents
Volume I
Page
Foreword iii
I. The First Looks Behind the Iron Curtain. 1
A. The Anatomy of HTA 3
1. Office of the Chief . 4
2. Special Projects Branch. 4
3. Industrial and Geographic Branches 6
4. Technical Intelligence Branch. 8
5. Support Staff . 10
6. Administrative Staff 12
7. Statistical Branch, OCR. 12
8. Military Liaison Components. 14
9. Central Branch 16
B. The First Eight Missions Dominate Events of
July and August 18
1. The Eight Missions and Their Objectives. 20
2. Immediate Exploitation of the First
Eight Missions. 21
3. Detailed Exploitation During July
and August 1956 24
4. Technical Support. 27
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Page
5. Support Activities
29
6. OCR Statistical Branch Charges
Forward
3 0
7.
Task Force: Headquarters
Outpost
34
8. Return from Europe
35
II.
The Middle East Crisis
45
A. U-2s Assume a Tactical Role.
45
B. HTA and the PARAMOUNT Committee.
47
C. Functioning of the PARAMOUNT Committee
54
D.
E.
HTA Continues Work on the First Eight
Missions .
58
F. A Stirring Giant .~.
60
G. PI Training.
67
H. Looking Back
69
III.
Back on Course
72
A.
74
B. Organizational Incongruity
75
C. Briefing-Aid Books
77
D. Soviet Long-Range Airfields.
80
E. Mozhaysk
84
F. Testing. Testing
100
G. Signs of Drought
105
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?
Page
IV. Reorganization and Renewal 109
A. Training and Orientation 110
B. Training and Orientation Offered by HTA. 121
C. New Tools for Eager Hands. 122
D. Familiar Tasks 132
E. Reorganization and Reassignment. 148
V. On to Greater Accomplishments. 159
A. First Aerial Coverage of Russian
Scientific and Technical Installations. 159
B. Rejuvenation and Resumption of
Discoveries 162
1. Changing Faces and Responsibilities. 163
2. New Discoveries Dominate Work at HTA 166
C. Other Mouths to Feed 171
D. New Administrative Procedures. 178
E. Specter of a Job Freeze. 182
Volume II
VI. JAM SESSION Steals the Show. 184
A. Establishment of JAM SESSION 184
C. GMIC Targets 203
1. The Tyura Tam Missile Test Center and
Test Range. 208
2. The Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center
and Test Range. 217
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Page
3. Good-Bye to GMIC Consultants 240
D . Show and Te 11. 2 4 2
E. Other PI Exploitation and Reporting. 251
F. Making Equipment Function Better and
Getting Better Equipment. 258
G. The HTAUTOMAT Organization Reacts to JAM
SESSION 271
VII . Winds of Change . 2 85
?
D. Not by JAM SESSION Alone 320
E. How to Proceed With the Publication
of Reports . 327
F. Carpenters, Plumbers, and New Equipment. 334
G. People and Hierarchies 340
Volume III
VIII. HTAUTOMAT Becomes the Photographic
Intelligence Center 355
A. The Last Months of JAM SESSION 355
1. COMINT Comes to MSB. 356
2. A Bear by the Tail 357
3. The Show Goes On 366
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Page
4. A General on His Knees and PI Keys
376
5. Two Soviet Heavy Water Plants.
386
6. Uranium Mining and Milling Sites
390
B .
Keeping Busy
418
C.
Operating Procedures for HTA -- and PIC.
427
D.
Automated Mensuration -- With Bugs
438
E.
"Playing Footsie" With the Norwegians.
446
F.
A Center at Last
Appendices
449
A.
Index . 4 57
B.
Chronology 477
C.
Source References. 482
Volume IV
Figures, No. 1 through No. 39
Volume V
Figures, No. 40 through No. 86
Volume VI
Figures, No. 87 through No. 129
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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
THE YEARS OF PROJECT HTAUTOMAT, 1956 - 1958
VOLUME I
I. The First Looks Behind the Iron Curtain
With removal of the OCR Statistical Branch* and
most of the ORR Photo Intelligence Division to new
quarters in the Steuart Building on 9 July 1956, 1/**
full-scale implementation of Project HTAUTOMAT*** had
begun (Figure 1).**** Here, on the upper floors of a
* The Statistical Branch was established to provide
non-PI support to photo interpreters; its formation is
described in DDI history, NPIC-2, Antecedents and Eartz~
Years, 1952-56, pp. 139-147. See also pp. 3, 12-14,
below.
** For serially numbered source references, see Ap-
pendix C.
*** It is explained in NPIC-2, cited above, p. 139,
that Arthur C. Lundahl who became chief, Project HT-
AUTOMAT, chose the name base AUTOMAT because he "en-
visaged the operation as the Horn and Hardart of the
Intelligence Community, with its doors never tightly
closed and with customers going in and out, day and
night."
**** The figures (photographs) are bound together in
Volumes IV, V and VI.
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building housing a downtown automobile sales and ser-
vice organization, photo interpreters from the Office
of Research and Reports (ORR) working with collateral
and other support personnel from the Office of Central
Reference (OCR) joined forces as an all-source photo
interpretation and publication unit to exploit U-2
photography (Figure 2) and report the results to the
Intelligence Community. Any lingering concern about the
ability of the new organization to exploit the photog-
raphy or cope with the flow of inputs was almost imme-
diately dispelled. HTAUTOMAT (HTA) quickly became the
toast of Very Important Persons in the US Government.
Others in the Intelligence Community who were witting
but lacked the prestige needed to obtain desktop
briefings in their own offices or presentations in
their own briefing rooms beat a path to the door of
1014 Fifth Street, Northwest, situated between the
Steuart Insurance Agency on the one hand and the auto-
mobile parts department on the other. There were those,
mostly security types, who felt that this arrangement,
augmented by an ancient and completely irrelevant
directory in the lobby, provided a disguise impenetrable
to all save the .most aggressively curious, but they either
conveniently forgot or were never aware of the sign,
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"Rented to CIA," that was displayed at the entrance
?
for some days prior to the arrival of the new tenants.
A. The Anatomy of HTA
For the first year of its existence, Project HT-
AUTOMAT preserved the outward form decreed'on the oc-
casion of its approval. Whatever the turn of events,
whatever the task to be done, it was accomplished
within the framework of an organization based on a
hypothetical set of circumstances. Even the name,
Project HTAUTOMAT, suggested the measure of uncertainty
in the minds of its creators who made no pretense of
concealing the fact that it was a pilot operation.
The major element in the organization was the
Photo Intelligence Division, D/GP, responsible to
of Research and Reports. In turn, D/GP was divided into
four branches and two staffs (Figure 3). Three of the
branches were intended primarily for interpreting the
photography and the other for photogrammetric support.
A Support Staff was oriented toward exploitation oper-
ations, and an Administrative Staff functioned as the
housekeeping unit.
The lesser of the two elements of Project HTAUTOMAT,
the Statistical Branch of the OCR Special Register,
chief of the Geographic Research Area, Office
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operated under the leadership of the chief of HTAUTOMAT
but retained its administrative ties to OCR. This
branch provided a wide range of reference and production
services not available from the D/GP Support Staff.
Though the T/O for the ORR element provided for
92 persons plus two IAC slots for military personnel,
only about half were in place when HTA components moved
into the Steuart Building. Moreover, those on duty
were very unevenly distributed among the staffs and
branches.
1. Office of the Chief
When the ORR photo interpreters were placed
under Project HTAUTOMAT, their chief, Arthur C. Lundahl,
became chief of the project. With him went
his deputy, and
who had been working with Lundahl to build the new
organization since the previous fall.
ferred to the D/GP table of organization on 12 August
1956 as an administrative officer-executive. 2/
2. Special Projects Branch
During the first year, the Special Projects
Branch (SPB) was the largest and most active of the ORR
components; in August 1956 this branch consisted of 17
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professionals* and one clerical under the dynamic and
?
autocratic leadership of
3/
Initial projections of U-2 operations had envisaged
frequent undetected deep penetration flights over the
USSR with correspondingly frequent inputs .of photog-
raphy requiring rapid exploitation and immediate re-
porting to the Intelligence Community. This first
phase of the exploitation process would involve
plotting and scanning of the photography, communicating
the results of exploitation by word of mouth and with
the aid of photographic briefing boards if the targets
were of national intelligence interest, and feedback
to the collectors concerning quality of the imagery
and coverage of targets reached. Completion of all
these tasks for each mission was planned for six days
or less after receipt of the material at HTA. 4/
The level of staffing in SPB reflected the heavy
workload expected to result from such an ambitious
schedule. Obviously, this involved staffing to meet
peak-load requirements; any interruption or irregularity
The last four were graphics personnel.
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in the receipt of new materials would be bound to create
a need for self-initiated work to take up the slack.
Though was never at a loss to provide produc-
tive work whenever it was needed, this arrangement
evoked from the other two PI branch chiefs misgivings
about the level of their staffing as well as SPB en-
croachments on their domain and boded ill for the
durability of such a solution.
3. Industrial and Geographic Branches
The Industrial Branch,
and the Geographic Branch, led by
eaded by
the detailed reporting responsibility. Almost immediately,
however, the division of work implicit in the branch
titles was rendered out of date. The so-called Indus-
trial Branch became heavily committed to the analysis
of military and scientific targets in support of OSI,
whereas most studies of conventional industries in
support of the ORR Economic Research Area were assigned
to the Geographic Branch. In~any case, the magnitude
of the demand for detailed work had been very unclear
from the beginning, though it was generally assumed to
be large. Even so, the detailed interpretation would
have to give way to first-phase exploitation in any
competition for staffing, since no delay could be
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tolerated in reporting important intelligence finds
to the Community .
These facts of life were reflected in the number
of persons assigned to the two detailed interpretation
branches. By 15 July 1956, the Geographic Branch had
four PIs on board.* 5/ In August 1956, the Industrial
Branch had just five interpreters.** 6/ Nor could any
of these be called highly trained specialists with
reference to the types of targets on which they would
be expected to report. Most could be described as
competent and experienced PIs reasonably well versed
in PI techniques and their application to the inter-
pretation of traditional targets on reconnaissance
photography.
For the Geographic Branch which was concerned
primarily with area studies and the photo readout of
conventional industrial plants, this posed no great
problem. Circumstances in the so-called Industrial
Branch were entirely different. PIs in this branch
would be faced with the identification, description,
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and functional analysis of exotic targets unknown,
heretofore unseen, and only vaguely understood, if at
all, by US intelligence analysts and even by American
scientific and engineering talent involved in the
devlopment of advanced US military weapons systems.
In this case, the penalties would be delays in fully
exploiting the photography, a heavy commitment in
orientation and training, and the painful development
of complex and productive working relationships, with-
in and outside the Intelligence Community, between
organizations and persons, each of whom had some criti-
cally needed ability or information to contribute but
none of whom alone could provide all the required facts
or insights.
4. Technical Intelligence Branch
ligence Branch, which consisted of only four persons
for most of the first year,* 7/ faced an exceedingly
diverse array of responsibilities and problems that
were well beyond its capability to handle. There were
critical measurements to be made in support of projects
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in the detailed reporting branches and even occasional
jobs of the same type for the Army liaison shop and the
Special Projects Branch. More basic to the rapid ex-
ploitation of the new photography was the need to com-
pute and publish scale tables for use by the PIs them-
selves in making routine measurements, a staggering job
of computation. As if this weren't enough "just for
openers," the branch had heavy collection systems
development and testing commitments for the Deputy
Director for Plans (DDP).*
With so few people spread over so many demanding
tasks, the branch, though officially activated as an
organizational entity, was hardly able to function as
a cohesive unit. Indeed, the branch chief was absent
much of the first two months on TDY in Europe and sub-
sequently faced an extremely heavy schedule of travel
in connection with one of the DDP projects. Moreover,
the others in the branch also made many similar trips
during the first year of HTA operation. Fortunately,
three of the four were senior employees and all were
capable of working productively on their own initiative
* Since 1973, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO).
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and without close supervision. Nevertheless, the effect
of these absences worked counter to branch development
and made more difficult the job of meshing TIB activities
with those of other division components.
5. Support Staff
Coming into existence as a unit with broad
responsibilities but ill-defined authority, the Support
Staff, under
struggled to strike a 25X1
satisfactory balance between peremptoriness and persua-
sion in assisting the Chief, HTA, to coordinate and
control project work .being undertaken by the several
different branches. Specific functions included liaison
with requesters, researching and assigning requirements,
obtaining collateral aerial and ground photography,
controlling or monitoring of production, assigning of
photo lab priorities, and editing of manuscripts for
detailed reports.
During most of the summer of 1956, professionals
on the Support Staff consisted basically of
both of whom were primarily concerned
with requirements, liaison, and production control. For
about two months, the staff also included
who transferred to DDP on 14 September 1956. 8/ The
editorial function remained dormant until the arrival of
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from Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI) on
17 September. 9/
Most significant among the problems was the
question of how much authority the staff would have in
dealing with the branches. Though a serious attempt
was made by the staff to establish itself as a focal
point in handling requirements, in coordinating liaison
on project work, and in exerting some measure of produc-
tion control through the assignment of priorities and
the monitoring of progress toward the completion of
projects, these goals proved too ambitious to realize
fully in competition with line managers. The editorial
function, a difficult one at best, presented further
complications involving the role of the editor, his
relation to the analysts, and the extent of his re-
sponsibility and authority in revising manuscripts and
in preparing copy for publication. As if these problems
weren't challenging enough, there was the obvious
question as to why the Support Staff should provide
collateral photography when the Information Section of
the Statistical Branch furnished all other reference
materials. Moreover,~in any future dispute:, the logic
implicit in this question would have strong sympathetic
support from PI branches annoyed by the inevitable
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tensions over such matters as requirements, liaison,
production controls, and editing.
6. Administrative Staff
The Administrative Staff was responsible for
security, personnel matters, and finance, and had no lack
of work during the first year of operation, but lagged
in its internal development. For the entire first year
-- and longer -- it lacked a formally designated chief. 10/
Senior incumbents, in terms of grade, were 25X1
11/ who were security officers
not permanently assigned to the staff. They had no
prime interest in affairs of the staff, other than those
involving security, and operated in a semi-autonomous
manner. De facto leadership was provided by
who, though slotted in the office of the chief,
had a strong interest in personnel and other administra-
tive matters and assumed many of the duties of the non-
existent chief. Within the staff, leadership in the
handling of routine work was provided by
an administrative assistant occupying a GS-09 slot. 12/
7. Statistical Branch; OCR
With a T/O of 53 persons, the Statistical
Branch of OCR was by far the largest branch in HTA. Its
mission was to obtain reference materials needed by the
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PIs and render documentary support to them in their
exploitation activities, provide HTA with an information
storage and retrieval capability, index TALENT System
reports prepared by other agencies, furnish photo lab
and reproduction facilities, and to control, file, and
distribute TALENT materials. 13/ At the time of the
move to the Steuart Building, the Statistical Branch
comprised only 18 persons, but by the end of July 1956
the count was 30 and continuing to rise. 14/
With the growth in size and with the diversity of
functions, the Statistical Branch lost little time in
developing its internal structure and naming appointees
to key positions. As initially planned, there would be
three sub-units, now called sections: the Information
Section, under Dino Brugioni; the Technical Section,.
who had just arrived from OCI; and
the Support Section, under All these
operated under the nominal leadership of
of the OCR Special Register, with
his deputy, functioning as resi-
he Statistical Branch (Figure 4),
dent managers in the Steuart Building. 15/
As part of the glamorous and growing HTA organization,
the character of the Statistical Branch was set by a
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resourceful and ambitious leadership anxious to capi-
talize on every available opportunity to complement
the capability of ORR photo interpreters and to serve
interagency committees and boards concerned with the
collection and exploitation of U-2 photography. A
fiscal-year-end report issued in August 1957 by the
Statistical Branch catalogued seven major activities
in which it had become involved beyond the original
concept of the project. At the same time, attention
was called to the urgent need for additional person-
nel. This was, indeed, a dynamic group, ever pressing
forward with imagination and invincible determination.
It was a worthy partner for D/GP in their historic
joint effort to bring intelligence developed by the
exploitation of high-resolution aerial photography
against a background of all-source information to bear
on the solution of problems of national significance.
8. Military Liaison Components
Though each of the participating services was
originally expected to have only two liaison officers,
the Army, from the beginning, had decided to join HTA
in conducting exploitation activities in the Steuart
Building. Known as the HTAUTOMAT Liaison Branch, Col-
lection Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
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Intelligence, the Army group was initially under
who was soon succeeded by
By August 1957, the branch had a T/O
?
for several months by
of 60, with 25 persons on board at HTA. The Navy,
slower than the Army to make a commitment to assign
PIs to work in the Steuart Building, was represented
By early 1957, however
a civilian, were assigned to work in
the Steuart Building as PIs, and by August of that
year the number of Navy personnel had grown to six. 16/
The presence of these service PIs had a small
but significant impact on HTA operations. During the
year ending in July 1957 the effect was felt mainly by
support components, such as the Technical Intelligence
Branch which provided critical measurements for several
Army projects, 17/ the graphics personnel in the Special
Projects Branch who produced many illustrations for both
the Army and the Navy, 18/ and the Statistical Branch,
OCR, which furnished reference materials, photo lab
support, and reproduction services. 19/
Though it had no functional relation to the presence
of Navy liaison officers in the Steuart Building, until
February 1957 20/ the HTA photo lab supplied LogEtronic
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prints for use by Navy photo interpreters, pending
completion of their TALENT-cleared facility. By December
1956 the number of these prints had increased from
several hundred to several thousand a month. 21/ To
help cope with this increase, the Navy assigned lab
personnel to the Steuart Building for the duration of
the arrangement. 22/
Beyond the then current impact, the early entry
of the Army into the Steuart Building in some force
and the later assignment of Navy PIs to work there had
profound long-range implications. Lundahl had long ad-
vocated, at least as an ideal arrangement, centralization
of photo interpretation in support of national intelli-
gence objectives. Though the major thrust of Army work
in the Steuart Building during the first year was di-
rected to the answering of departmental requirements,
the close association of Army and CIA personnel, as
well as the small Navy working presence, set a precedent
and established working relationships that constituted
first steps toward the realization of a joint National
Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).
9. Central Branch
Officially, the Central Branch, headed by
didn't exist. This ad hoc
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arrangement created obvious staffing difficulties for
the parent organization as well as supervisory problems
for the chief, who officially occupied a special assistant
slot in the office of the division chief. Nevertheless,
it did provide an informal scheme for serving the needs
of those not witting of the larger operation in the
Steuart Building. Not only did it provide a point of
contact for Agency requesters outside the TALENT System,
but it also handled the exploitation of non-systems
photography, including that from DDP, the planning and
operation of the D/GP photo interpretation course, and
the housing and temporary employment of HTA/DGP recruits
who had been granted their TS clearance but were not
yet briefed into the COMINT System.
Initially consisting of four PIs* who were left
behind on an indefinite assignment, 23/ the unit was at
first alluded to as the "Task Force" until the move from
Que Building to new quarters in the Central Building in
late September 1956 suggested a more appropriate name
(Figure 5). Though the branch had no facilities in the
* formed the 25X1
initial nucleus of the Central Branch. Until early 1957
also spent up to several days a week at Central 25X1
Building, primarily as a personal convenience with respect
to his part-time program of study at Geor a Washin ton
University. Late in the summer of 1956, who 25X1
(footnote continued on following page)
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Central Building for handling TALENT or COMINT materials,
all permanently assigned members were both TALENT and
COMINT cleared. The bulk of Central Branch work
during the first year of its separate existence in-
volved interpretation of non-systems aerial photography
of the Far East, GENETRIX coverage of the Sino-Soviet
bloc, and support to DDP in the collection and exploi-
tation of clandestine photography.*
B. The First Eight Missions Dominate Events of July
anc~ Augus t
In any given case, a handful of prime targets
determined the route of a U-2 mission and, hence, cir-
cumscribed the limits of what might be captured on the
photography. In July 1956, highest priority targets,
all within the USSR and China, fell in seven categories:
(footnote continued from preceding page) entered on duty
in D/GP 20 August 1956, joined the initial group. At any
given time, this basic work force was augmented by the
transients on their way to permanent assignments in the
Steuart Building.
* Monthly reports of the Photo Intelligence Division
provide the only periodic record on activities of the
Central Branch for more than the first year of its exis-
tence. Since these reports were held to the SECRET level,
by far the larger portion of details under the heading,
"Projects and Reports," referred to work done in Central
Branch. Entries under other headings, such as "Administra-
and Planning," "Coordination," and "Miscellaneous," covered
events and personalities both in Steuart Building and Cen-
tral Building; those assigned to the latter can only be de-
duced from the persons involved or from the context.
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1) long-range bomber bases and program, 2) air defense,
3) atomic energy installations, 4) guided missile in-
stallations, 5) naval bases and shipyards, 6) industrial
complexes, and 7) disposition and capabilities of mili-
tary forces. 24/ The somewhat diffuse nature of these
targets reflected the paucity of existing intelligence
as well as the unrepresentative nature of targets
covered by the first eight missions, which had recently
been completed.
A second factor important in determining the poten-
tial coverage on any single mission was the range of the
U-2, approximately 3,400 nautical miles without refuel-
ing. 25/ At the time collection operations were
initiated, early in the summer of 1956, there was but
one base of operations -- Wiesbaden, AFB, Germany. 26/
Thus, missions over the USSR from this base were neces-
sarily confined to western or southern Russia; it was
not possible to reach targets in the Urals or Soviet
Central Asia from Germany. Moveover, coverage of the
Middle East during the Suez crisis in the fall of 1956
proved difficult, or, in some cases, impossible from
Germany (Figure 6).
Spurred on by these limitations, a second unit was
deployed
in August 1956. 27/ From this
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base, coverage of the entire Middle East could be ob-
tained with little loss of time over lands of transit.
In addition, many parts of the Urals and Soviet Central
Asia were within reach from ~ but almost no attempt
was made during the first year of operations to realize
this potential.
1. The Eight Missions and Their Objectives
Between 20 June and 10 July 1956, eight missions
were flown out of Wiesbaden. The first three covered
only portions of the European Satellites. The next five
penetrated the USSR (Figure 7); of these five, the first
two and the last one were the most important. Following
the 10 July mission, there was a long stand-down of
further penetration flights as a result of official
Russian protests charging violations, albeit understated,
of Soviet air space. 28/
The first Russian penetration mission was flown,
by sheer coincidence, on 4 July 1956. It reached Lenin-
grad and covered portions of the Baltic States, inclu-
ding Poland and Finland, en route. 29/ The chief goal on
this mission was the naval shipyards in Leningrad. 30/
It was hoped that coverage of these shipyards-would shed
light on the construction of submarines, including possible
e~iidence of any that might be nuclear powered or armed
with missiles.
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The second of these five missions, flown the next
day, 5 July 1956, penetrated to Moscow. 31/ The course
flown described a loop over the Fili airframe plant,
where Bison's, the Russian counterpart of the B-52,
were built, and Ramenskoye Airfield, the ultimate fly-
away field for Bison's assembled at Fili. It was also
expected to provide coverage of the Kaliningrad missile
plant and the Rhimki rocket engine plant. 32/
The last of the five missions, flown on 10 July 1956,
reached the Crimean Peninsula, 33/ where it was hoped
coverage could be obtained of naval storage and missile
testing facilities.
In addition to the ultimate goals set, each of the
missions over the USSR was expected to provide coverage
of numerous other targets of intelligence interest, such
as the Soviet long-range air bases, 34/ fighter bases in
both Russia and the Satellites, other types of military
installations, and industrial and urban complexes.
2. Immediate Exploitation of the First Eight
Missions
Consistent with the immediate reporting respon-
sibility of HTA, the first products from each mission
were large photographic briefing boards depicting high-
priority installations in the USSR or the European
Satellites. Each briefing board consisted of a
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photographic enlargement measuring approximately 18
by 20 inches mounted on a piece of drawing board 22
by 30 inches so as to provide space for titling and
annotations at the right side of the photographic panel.
These were used primarily as adjuncts to an oral pre-
sentation of the facts revealed from the photography.
The pattern thus set for the initial dissemina-
tion of information from U-2 photography was to continue
for years to come. Though the basic approach -- oral
presentations with the use of briefing boards -- was
neither original with nor unique to HTA, it was a
method extremely well suited to the job at hand. Some
of the photography was little short of spectacular, and
Lundahl, who gave most of the briefings when he was
available, had no peer as a dynamic and articulate
apostle of photo intelligence.
By-the end of August 1956, all the initial ex-
ploitation work on the first eight missions had been
completed, thanks in part to the stand-down on additional
penetration missions. This included not only plotting,
scanning, and technical evaluation of the photography,
but also the preparation of ELINT plots required by the
AQUATONE Project Director, Richard M. Bissell, and the
Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). 35/
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As far as substance was concerned, the greatest
immediate impact was obtained from photography of
Soviet bomber bases with their associated nuclear
weapons loading and storage facilities. The first
five Russian penetration missions had covered no less
than nine of them. Not only were these airfields of
high interest because of their facilities for handling
offensive weapons, they were also an object of much
speculation because of the aircraft that were not found
there. At the time of the July 1956 U-2 missions, not
one Bison was present at any of the nine long-range
airfields. This was a datum that did not go unnoticed
by the foes of the Air Force. It was not long before
the so-called "Bomber-Gap" was proven a myth, 36/ and in-
formation obtained from U-2 photography played a key role
in the reassessment.
Of longer range interest was the perplexing in-
stallation with the big domed structure, near Mozhaysk.
This was reported in a Mission Coverage Summary during
the summer of 1956 simply as an unidentified housing
and institutional area with one building hemispherical
in shape. 37/ Though it would be several months before
a crash effort could be undertaken in an attempt to
solve the enigma, by the end of August it was already
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recognized as a target of considerable interest. 38/
3. Detailed Exploitation During July and
August 1956
Interesting discoveries during the initial
or immediate exploitation phase gave rise to require-
ments from analysts desiring specific, detailed in-
formation concerning installations of special interest
to them. Some of these requests resulted from the
high-level briefings on targets of the greatest interest,
but even more were generated by Mission Coverage Sum-
maries, the. index-type publications resulting from
scanning the photography. Work on these requirements
for detailed exploitation of photography covering selected
installations was carried on in the Geographic and In-
dustrial Branches. The level of effort and volume of
products were much smaller, however, than those associ-
ated with first-phase exploitation in SPB, which had nearly
twice as many interpreters as the other two PI branches
together.
Production from the two detailed reporting branches
during July and August 1956 consisted of two Photo In-
telligence Alerts, 14 Photographic Intelligence Briefs,
and two Photographic Intelligence Memorandums. All were
issued in August. At this early date there was as yet
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little departure from the traditional approach to PI
reporting. Whatever the format, there was, typically,
an introductory paragraph or section followed, when
details were available, by a list of items explaining
annotations made on an accompanying photograph or line
drawing.
Subjects covered reflected Community interest in
prime targets covered by the first eight missions as
well as a number of installations of minor importance.
The latter reflected not only the interest of individual
analysts in their particular targets, whatever their
importance from a national point of view, but also the
fact that at this early date there was no clear focus
-- indeed, there could be no clear focus -- on the
precise type of work that should engage the limited
resources of the photo interpreters.
The first Photographic Intelligence Brief issued
was dated 8 August 1956 and gave a description, keyed to
a line drawing, of major components of Fili Airframe
Plant No. 23, 39/ one of the prime targets on the
5 July mission over Moscow. It was done in the Indus-
trial Branch. Between 22 and 24 August, five briefs
originating in the Geographic Branch reported on Lenin-
grad shipyards, which had been the ultimate goal of the
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4 July mission. 40/ On 28 August, a brief done in the
Industrial Branch reported that the 4 July photography
revealed no evidence of SAM sites, like those around
Moscow, in the Leningrad, Riga, and Kaliningrad areas. 41/
Though negative in thrust, this answered a question of
considerable interest to those concerned with problems of
penetrating Russian defenses.
In spite of the considerable accomplishments re-
sulting from the exploitation of photography obtained
on these early missions, not one of the early publica-
tions reported anything of outstanding importance or
-enduring interest. Ironically, not even a brief was
issued during the first two months on the Russian SAC-
type airfields. Nor was there any reporting at this time
on the installation near Mozhaysk, except the obscure
and uninformative item in the Mission Coverage Summary.
In addition to work completed and publications
issued during July and August 1956, work was under way
in the Geographic and Industrial Branches on many other
projects, some of which were of real importance and long-
term interest. Potentially most rewarding was work tied
up in the Geographic Branch on five Russian bomber bases
pending a decision as to whether or not concurrent PI
reports emanating from the military services would
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satisfy the OSI requester. 42/ By the latter part of
August several informal PI-analyst conferences had been
held concerning the Mozhaysk installation and two re-
quirements had been received in the Industrial Branch,
but little work had been accomplished. 43/ There were,
in addition, numerous requirements for routine PI re-
porting on such things as industrial plants, storage
facilities, rail line and rail yard studies, and the
like. The majority of these were levied by the ORR
Economic Research Area and were assigned to the Geo-
graphic Branch.
4. Technical Support
During July and August 1956, technical support
was focused primarily on matters pertaining to the ex-
ploitation of U-2 photography. In August 99$ of all
Technical Intelligence Branch project time was devoted
to this type of work. 44/ Computations were made for
grids for the tracker camera and for scale computations
for the oblique cameras in the A-2 configuration. Tech-
nical Intelligence Branch personnel were also called
upon to make critical measurements, particularly in
connection with detailed photo analysis. One, among
the earliest tasks, was undertaken to support the Army
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liaison group in their work on the Yo-Yo* guidance
facilities at the Moscow SAM sites. 45/
The U-2 collection system was planned as an
aerial reconnaissance system, though one that would
yield a product of higher quality than any previously
known. Since there was no experience factor, it was
not possible to project either the volume or the scope
of technical intelligence requirements that might be
forthcoming, except in a very general way. Consequently,
HTA was ill prepared to cope with the volume of requests
for precision mensuration evoked by the excellent photog-
raphy. Not only were analysts asking for more such
measurements than they had ever seemed interested_in
previously, but some of the camera data needed to facili-
tate accomplishment of the mensuration tasks was also
lacking. 46/
By August 1956, recognition of the dimensions of
the problems ahead of TIB led to the establishment of
two continuing projects to develop ways and means to
adapt this reconnaissance photography to precise
* NPIC-2 (See p. 1, above), footnote p. 166, explains
that the term "Yo-Yo" was applied because "the con-
figuration of this radar reminded division [D/.GP] photo
analysts of a Yo-Yo."
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mathematical and geometrical manipulation. 47/ It was
these developmental projects that provided a means for
charging time that went into such activities as the
exploratory work leading to the selection of a computer
and preliminary planning for automating the mensuration
readout.
5. Sup ort Staff Activities
With but two experienced professionals for
most of the summer of 1956, the Support Staff struggled
to process a deluge of requirements and assign them to
the branches. By the end of September, when statistics
were first compiled, a total of 173 requirements had
been received in HTA since its inception, 114 from ORR
and 59 from OSI. Of this total, 143 were assigned or
about to be assigned to the branches and 30 more were
returned to the requester because of inadequate photo
coverage-and inadequate or incorrect background in#orma-
tion. 48/ Certain others were challenged on the basis
that the requirements were satisfied by reports done
by the Air Force or the Navy. 49/
The Support .Staff also maintained a heavy program
of coordination, particularly with requesters about re-
quirements. Conferences were held with representatives
of other Offices, including of OSI, and 25X1
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of ORR, relative to
the screening and levying of requirements. 50/
Though procurement of collateral photography,
particularly World War II German coverage of targets
of interest in the USSR and Satellites, was kept current
with PI needs, the bigger job of expanding contacts
with the several major sources of aerial photography
in the Washington, D.C., area would have to await the
arrival of additional personnel who were under recruit-
ment. Moreover, the Support Staff and HTA were without
an editor throughout the summer of 1956.
6. OCR Statistical Branch Charges Forward
From the beginning of operations in the Steuart
Building, the OCR contingent vied with the PIs for recog-
nition as a "can do" organization. Just as
25X1
25X1
Director of the Office of Central Reference,
had been forthcoming in designating some of his best
people to staff the Statistical Branch, these same
people now threw themselves with gusto into the task of
supporting the ORR photo interpreters. Though it might
be said that many of their actions bore the stamp of
enlightened self interest, they also demonstrated un-
mistakably that the Statistical Branch would work in
harmony with the ORR PIs and respond without reservation
to Lundahl's leadership.
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Among Statistical Branch components, the Information
Section, under Brugioni, was most intimately involved
with the PI exploitation effort. Analysts in this sec-
tion assembled the maps and charts for each mission
and made them available to the PIs in the Special Projects
Branch for use in plotting missions and in scanning
photography. In addition, packets of collateral infor-
mation -- documents, books, manuals, clippings, attache
photographs, intellofax runs, and the like -- were pro-
vided not only to D/GP photo interpreters but also to
those in the military liaison groups for background use
in the preparation of all types of PI reports. 51/
During the first two months a major effort was made to
work out procedures for bringing these materials and
the expertise of the intelligence officers from OCR to
bear on the job of exploiting the photography.
Classification and coding of PI reports emanating
from or received by HTA for entry in the Minicard system*
was begun in the summer of 1956, almost as soon as the
reports were produced, even though Minicard processing
* For additional information on the Minicard system,
see pp. 128-129, and its ultimate fate, pp. 337-338.
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equipment was not yet available. 52/ This task also was
one of the functions of the Information Section.
The Technical Section, under was a
vital cog in the HTA operation from the outset. As
far as the official T/O was concerned, this section con-
sisted of two units, the photo lab and the Minicard. 53/
In reality, however, the Minicard unit was rendered
inoperative for lack of equipment far beyond the summer
of 1956 and personnel earmarked for it were used to
extremely good advantage in the photo lab and to assist
in the reproduction of publications. 54/ Without this
opportune circumstance, it is difficult to imagine how
the photo lab could have met its heavy commitments
during these difficult early days.
Not only was HTA dependent on the photo lab~for~_
the spectacular enlargements used on briefing boards,
but PIs in the Steuart Building, whether attached to ORR
or the Army liaison group, were also dependent on the
lab for all kinds of special orders for photography to be
used in their interpretations. In fact, the HTA photo
lab was the source of all photography over and above
the mission film and prints obtained on routine distribu-
tion from the processing site. When reports began to
flow, the photo lab was also the producer of prints
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used as illustrations in early PI reports.
At this point in history, before PIs had turned
to the use of positive transparencies, LogEtronic prints
produced by the HTA photo lab were much in demand. The
LogEtronic printer eliminated conventional methods of
dodging* and constituted a real technical breakthrough.
Through 31 August 1956, the lab produced 1,299 of these
prints, nearly half of them for the Navy. 55/
During the summer of 1956, photo lab personnel
demonstrated again and again that they were truly cast
in the mold of the HTA elite. In spite of delays in
receipt of equipment and inconveniences caused by its
installation, the photo lab met its commitments. Even
the potential impasse resulting from delays, due to the
steel strike, in delivery of a large chiller unit -- for
temperature controlled water -- and a dilution tank, was
deftly averted when lab personnel got the facility into
operation by improvising a temporary hookup of equipment. 56/
Though the reproduction function was officially rec-
ognized in the T/0 as one belonging to the photo lab, it
was quickly, though officially, treated as the respon-
sibility of a separate unit of the Technical Section.
* For further information on "dodging" see p. 335, below.
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Doubtlessly, the inactive status of the Minicard unit
invited this bit of improvisation. At any rate, re-
production of the many different types of PI products
soon became a very lively business. In July and August
1956 alone, more than 33,000 pages were duplicated. 57/
The huge task of controlling documents and classi-
fied materials of all kinds, including those within the
TALENT system, as well as filing the film, disseminating
HTA products, and providing courier services fell to the
Support Section, under
possessor of one
of the most flamboyant and uninhibited personalities in
HTA. At the beginning, a Chevrolet carryall was pur-
chased 58/ to carry classified materials between HTA and
TALENT centers in the Agency and the Department of De-
fense. From 16 July 1956, armed couriers made two daily
runs between the Steuart Building and these centers,
leaving HTA at 0900 and 1400 hours. 59/
Task Force: Headquarters Outpost
During the summer of 1956, the stay-behind
unit, under and known at that time as the
"Task Force," still occupied space in Que Building and
continued to carry on the traditional task of exploiting
non-systems photography.
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?
Among the 17 Photographic Intelligence Memoran=
dams issued at the SECRET level in July and August 1956,
there was a crash report for OCI and ORR on MIG aircraft
shipping crates at Chu-hsien airfield, in southeast
China. 60/ Also, two projects for the DDP were completed
and two publications relating to them issued: one, en-
titled "Project PEGMATITE," reported on the training of
clandestine personnel in ground photography and in the
analysis of aerial photography; 61/ the other was a
memorandum, subject: "Amateur Photography from Com-
mercial Aircraft." 62/ Information in the body of this
eminently practical publication was prepared in such a
manner that it could be separated and handled without
security controls.
The Task Force unde~~ was also involved in 25X1
the evaluation of Clandestine Services reports using
photography. In August 1956 information provided the
Far East Division in DDP enabled a reporting officer to
stop distribution of inaccurate reports on at least six
occasions. 63/ a former DDP case officer 25X1
himself, was the leading proponent in the work on these
so-called CS evaluations.
8. Return from Europe
As the exploitation activity on the first eight
operational missions was approaching a peak, Arthur C.
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nical Intelligence Branch, followed eight days later. 65/
The main goal of both travelers had been the
VIII International Congress of Photogrammetry held in
Stockholm, Sweden, from 17 to 26 July 1956. Both spent
several days in England prior to the Congress and a few
to several days elsewhere on the Continent after it was
over. 66/
At the Congress, Lundahl had an opportunity to
renew many earlier acquaintances as well as meet many
people he had never known, particularly in the Soviet
delegation. When meeting the Russians, Lundahl was
curious to see how they might react to an American in
view of the recent penetrations of Soviet airspace by
the U-2's, but they displayed not the slighest hint
that they even knew of the incidents. On the contrary,
they were very gracious to Lundahl and openly pleased to
meet an American who could exchange the usual civilities
with them in their mother tongue. 67/
Lundahl, chief of Project HTAUTOMAT, returned from
Europe, on 2 August 1956. 64/ chief, Tech- 25X1
of their being scheduled in concurrent sessions, the most
important benefit to HTA from the Congress was the
Apart from the technical papers, which Lundahl and
were able to cover very well individually in spite
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information gained from the wide range of photogram-
metric equipment displayed by manufacturers from all
over Europe. Several pieces of equipment of potential
interest to HTA were either unobtainable in the United
States or inferior in design or performance to those
manufactured in Europe, particularly in Germany, Italy,
and Switzerland. When the Congress was over
Lundahl shipped some 20 pounds of technical papers and
brochures back to Washington, where it would be available
in D/GP for future reference. 68/
The post-Congress travel was mainly a follow-up
on contacts made during the meetings, particularly to
obtain more information about equipment potentially
useful to HTA. Lundahl's sojourn on the Continent was
brief. He visited the Zeiss plant in Munich, where he
identified three instruments having immediate applica-
tion to HTA work and assigned detailed follow-up inves-
tigation to ~, and he established liaison with the 25X1
TALENT Control Officer at USAFE Headquarters in Wies-
baden, Germany. 69/
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visit on the Continent was longer and
covered more territory. After a stop at the Zeiss
headquarters office in Munich
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he visited the Ober-.
kochen plant and paid particular attention to the Radial
Secator, a two-level slot cutter; the SEG V Rectifier,
an autofocusing rectifier for use with photographs up
to 9 by 9 inches; and the Stereoplanigraph, a first-
order, high-precision plotting instrument for use with
vertical, oblique, or terrestrial photo pairs. 7D/
Though Zeiss photogrammetric equipment was among the
finest, it was primarily designed for mapping and
ultimately proved to have but limited application to HTA
needs.
Following his visit to the Zeiss Plant, went
on to Wild at Heerbrugg, Switzerland. At this factory
he saw the VG 1 Enlarger, which was capable of pro-
ducing essentially distortion-free 7X enlargements; the
STK 1 Stereocomparator, a precision mensuration device
so new that it was neither displayed nor mentioned at the
Congress in Stockho]m,and a great many smaller instru-
ments used in the technical exploitation of photography. 7i/
Wild equipment, particularly the VG 1 Enlarger, proved
adaptable to HTA needs and several were procured later.
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next stop was in Rome at the Ottico Mec-
canica Italiana plant headed by a former Italin Sena-
tor, Umberto Nistri. The dirt and disorder of this
plant, as contrasted with the antiseptic cleanliness
of the Zeiss and Wild plants, were almost overwhelming.
Nevertheless, the Italians managed somehow to produce
some very fine equipment which was noteworthy for the
number and type of innovations featured. 72/ Among the
instruments that ~ inspected were the Photostereo-
graph Model Beta/2, a first-order, high-precision stereo
plotter featuring electrically operated servo-motors
instead of the usual hand cranks, a single "steering-
wheel" guidance of the flotation mark, and a speed con-
trol lever analogous to the gearshift in an automobile.
The Photocartograph Model V was similar in function to
the Kelsh plotter that HTA had on order, but, again,
it was operated by servo-motors. The Stereographometer
Model 90 by Nistri was similar in capability to the
Zeiss Stereotope but featured an unusual pantograph that
yielded orthographic positioning of the plotted detail.
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In view of the innovative approach of Nistri designers
and engineers, it is not surprising that HTA turned to
this manufacturer when ordering the first automated,
precision stereocomparator a few years later.
After the Congress, also visited the Old
Delft Instrument Co. and the International Training
Center for Survey in the Netherlands. D/GP had earlier
obtained one or more Old Delft scanning stereoscopes,
and a pending contract was under negotiation by the Air
Force for a number of 9-inch by 18-inch scanning stereo-
scopes for the benefit of both the Air Force and CIA.
The International Training Center offered a wide variety
of courses in five different fields of photo interpre-
tation and photogrammetry and was widely regarded as the
best in the world. Courses were open to students seeking
no degree at all or degrees up through the doctorate.
a limited number of HTA personnel to the Training Center,
as work loads might permit. 74/ In later years, HTA
successor organizations did, in fact, send several
trainees to this school.
strongly urged consideration be given to sending
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errand for Bissell.
spent his time in England
25X1
25X1
visiting the Williamson Manufacturing Co., Ltd., where
he examined several aerial cameras in production, and
the Royal Aircraft establishment at Farnborough, where
he met personnel in the night photography department. 75/
At this point in time and some of his coworkers 25X1
were already deeply involved in support to Project
OSTIARY, the night photography system under develop-
ment by DDP.
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Lundahl's return to the United States on 2 August
projected him into a maelstrom of activity. The dis-
coveries resulting from the photographs taken on the
first eight missions were still red hot news, the move
into the Steuart Building was still recent enough to in-
vite expressions of concern from above and generate
problems from below, and, in spite of the initial suc-
cesses in coping with the work, there were lingering ap-
prehensions that something could still go wrong. By the
middle of the month Lundahl was getting his feet on the
ground and settling down to a steady round of briefings
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with senior CIA officials. 78/ A pattern was emerging
that would provide Lundahl and HTA and its products
excellent exposure before important decision makers.
And both were destined to take full advantage of the
opportunity. But, first, there would be some last
minute changes in the script.
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II. The Middle East Crisis
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Just as HTA was settling down after the move into
the Steuart Building and the best show in the Community
appeared to be headed for a long and successful run,
the USSR lost its major supporting role to a pushy
little upstart. In retaliation for the decision by
Western nations to withdraw offers to help finance the
Nile River project, Egyptian President Nasser on 26 July
1956 proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal
Company. 79/ Following this announcement, relations
between Egypt on the one hand, and Israel, France, and
England on the other, deteriorated rapidly. The united
States, with whom the three Western powers in the dispute
were less than forthright, needed good intelligence on
events that might lead to some kind of military action.
A. U-2's Assume a Tactical Role
At a time when U-2 photography of the Soviet Union
had captivated the attention of those in the highest
echelons of government, at least one solution to the
problem of obtaining information was obvious. The U-2,
which had been conceived as a high-flying strategic
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reconnaissance vehicle, would now be used in a tactical
role, albeit still a passive and surreptitious one.
At least until such time as hostilities might
erupt, it would seek indications of military prepara-
tions, and, in particular, evidence of any dramatic
increase in British or French forces in the area. It
would monitor ship movements in harbors such as Toulon,
Valetta, and Rhodi; aircraft deployment in Cyprus,
Israel, and Egypt; and troop concentrations and
military installations in Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt. 80/
Once the decision was made, no time was lost in
initiating the surveillance, even though some of the
more distant areas of interest in the Middle East were
beyond reach of U-2's based in Germany. The first two
missions were flown on 29 August and covered parts of
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. 81/
Two more followed the next day and repeated coverage of
the same countries. 82/ When flights took off from
Incirlik Air Base, at Adana, Turkey, in September, the
entire Miaclle East was brought within easy flying range
and increased substantially the time available over
target areas.
As the fall wore on, it became apparent that a
serious crisis was brewing. Consequently, the number of
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missions flown increased in September and again in
October. When the 10-day war finally broke out on
29 October, 83/ U-2 reconnaissance was used to pro-
vide information on the course of military events.
Aerial reconnaissance reached a peak in November when
14 missions were flown, all out of Adana. Following
the 7 November cease fire, 84/ U-2 photography pro-
vided information for damage assessment, for identi-
fication of refuges used by fleeing Egyptian aircraft,
for pinpointing acts of sabotage, and for surveillance
of other possible military buildups in the area. 85/
B. HTA and the PARAMOUNT Committee
The need of policymakers and the White House was
for finished intelligence based on all available sources.
HTAUTOMAT had the only capability in the Agency for
adequately exploiting U-2 photography, but lacked the
expertise and broadly based representation to do the
all-source evaluation. The problem was solved on 12 Sep-
tember 1956, when the Intelligence Advisory Committee
(IAC) created the PARAMOUNT Committee to handle the
all-source reporting. 86/
The committee was chaired by Frederick A. (Fritz)
Voigt and included representatives from CIA, Air Force,
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Army, Navy, NSA, and Department of State. 87/ Among
the CIA representatives was Enno H. (Hank) Knoche, who
functioned as executive secretary. Bringing the ex-
pertise of HTA photo interpreters to bear on the work
of the committee and providing secure handling of TALENT
system materials were accomplished with a single stroke:
the committee would meet in the Steuart Building.
Pursuant to this decision, a specially cleared
and secured room thenceforth called the PARAMOUNT room,
was provided on the seventh floor of the Steuart Building,
in the Special Projects Branch work area. Here HTAUTOMAT
photo interpreters and collateral support specialists
serving in an advisory capacity attended all committee
meetings, along with the regular members. In addition,
one or more PIs were customarily posted outside the
door of the PARAMOUNT room, where they were available
to respond immediately to spot requests for information
supposedly available from the photography. HTA also
provided support to the committee in compilation of a
comprehensive list of requirements for photo-based
information; in the preparation of numerousc~aphics; and
in the typing, reproduction, and dissemination of com-
mittee materials and reports.
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Since the PARAMOUNT Committee would be working in
the field of indications intelligence, it was impera-
tive that the information available be as current as
possible. Whereas information other than photography
could be made available in a matter of hours, that from
U-2 photography would be many days old if it followed
established handling procedures, which called for
processing at the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester,
N.Y. Something had to be done to speed up PI repor-
ting. The obvious solution was to process the film
and read it out at, or close to, the base of operations
and cable the information to Washington.
On 12 September 1956, the same day the IAC
established the PARAMOUNT Committee, Lundahl and James
Q. Reber, the latter in his capacity as CIA TALENT
Control Officer, arrived in Frankfurt, Germany. 88/
the chief of SPB, had departed Washington for 25X1
Wiesbaden two days earlier, 89/ and was there when Lun-
dahl and Reber arrived in Frankfurt. 90/ Negotiations
were carried on at two levels. Policy matters and ar-
rangements were discussed with the Commander in Chief,
US Army, Europe, and the Commander in Chief, US Air Force,
Europe, both of whom, with their intelligence chiefs,
were briefed by Reber. Technical and procedural problems
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involved in the development, duplication, and ex-
ploitation of the photography were discussed with
service liaison officers and personnel already present,
91/
Equipment was judged .inadequate. It was reluc-
tantly, if somewhat hopefully, decided that
~, chief of the HTA photo lab, working
with their Air Force counterparts, could jury-rig a lab
facility that would admit of processing the film at the
base, without an unacceptably high risk that it would be
irreparably damaged. A major concern was to ensure be-
yond reasonable doubt that processing the original nega-
tive in the field would not significantly degrade it for.
future, more exacting, exploitation in Washington. 92/
Security was another worrisome problem.
in the survey of facilities from this point of view.
Conditions were far from ideal and required substantial
improvement to permit the handling of TALENT system
materials. Not only did physical facilities and equip-
ment require upgrading, but better control had to be
exercised over foreign nationals employed on the base in
areas where codeword system materials were to be
handled. 93/ More difficult to cope with were the
the CIA/HTA TALENT security officer, participated
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potential hazards presented by the Valhalla, a local
night spot favored by base personnel. Though no
security problems involving HTA personnel at the Valhalla
ever arose, the vulnerability to Communist blackmail of
the unattached females who frequented the place was a
source of continuing concern to those responsible for
safeguarding knowledge of TALENT operations.
Deliberations concerning the organization, who
should be in charge, and the staffing were not immediately
conclusive. The Air Force, having lost the controlling
interest in the U-2 program, was understandably reluctant
to acquiesce to any proposal that overseas processing
and interpretation centers be managed by HTA personnel.
Yet, initially, HTA possessed the technical expertise
needed to establish and operate the centers. The politi-
cal climate was, thus, less than favorable for initiating
operations, but the Middle East crisis couldn't be .halted
until this problem was resolved.
With an egotistical perfectionist like as
the senior HTA representative, the undertaking was
predictably a stormy but successful one. It was not
until the end of October that the thorny question of who
would give the orders was settled by a CIA--Air Force
agreement. The Air Force would henceforth name the
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commanding officer. His deputy, for technical and
substantive intelligence matters only, would be desig-
nated by CIA.' 94/ Instead of running the show,
became the deputy to
Assignment of HTA photo interpreters on normal
90-day tours of duty was begun just a few days after
departed in September. First to go were
who had long been identified with the U-2
program, and
a more recent recruit. 95/
25X1
25X1
'~~Y~
25X1
25X1
25X1
Both were on the Special Projects Branch, T/O.
Strong support was provided by the Statistical
Branch, OCR, in supplying reference materials and in
setting up the photo lab. Prior to the departure of
the first group of PIs, a sizeable number of reference
materials were assembled to accompany the team. 96/
The Chief of the Photo Lab, spent some 25X1
time in Germany assisting in the setting up and activa-
tion of the processing facility.
Later, fast moving developments called for an
auc~entation in the number of HTA photo interpreters
overseas. At the same time, with the shift of Middle
East operations from Germany to Turkey, the PIs in Ger-
many were scarcely better situated to provide current
information to the PARAMOUNT Committee than they had been
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at the outset, when the base of operations was in
Germany and they were in Washington. On 19 November
1956, at a special meeting attended by 25X1
Bissell, Reber, Lundahl, 25X1
and others, the decision was made to establish a second
processing and interpretation center on Adana AFB and
shift the PIs to Turkey. 97/
In response to these evolving requirements, nine
more PIs were sent overseas by the end of November,*
three from each of the three PI branches; one returned. g$/
The Statistical Branch also responded with an October
shipment of three crates contai.riaig over 1, 350 reference
items. 99/ In addition, once again found
himself reluctantly overseas, this time in Adana for
Thanksgiving, scrounging construction materials and
overseeing Turkish carpenters equipped with simple tools
like the saw, adz, and knife, construct counters, shelves,
and sink stands to measurements and mitering gauged by
the eyeball. 100/ Further assistance as well as moral
* It is not practicable to indicate the place of assign-
ment of each PI. Suffice to note that most spent at least
part of the time at both bases, and there was some short-
term rotation between bases. Spartan conditions, inclu-
ding lack of attractive off-base recreational facilities,
made assignment in Adana too confining to satisfy
typically venturesome personnel.
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support was provided by 25X1
deputy chief, Statistical Branch, and 25X1
a special assistant occupying an IAC 25X1
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slot in Lundahl's office. Both of the latter were sent
overseas to troubleshoot the inevitable problems and to
procure lab equipment. In spite of animated efforts by
HTA personnel to get the Adana facility into operation
during November, it was a month later, thanks to a lack
of photo processing materials, before the first mission
was read out by HTA and service PIs on the base. By that
time the Middle East crisis of 1956 was virtually over.
C. Functioning of the PARAMOUNT Committee
PARAMOUNT Committee inputs consisted of three
types of material: information derived from U-2 cover-
age of the Middle East and Mediterranean
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Committee members were on 24-hour standby duty.
Whenever a new cable arrived, the committee convened
again, sometimes for the third or fourth time in a
single day and at any time of the day or night. 102/
Facilities and support at HTA were also available on an
around-the-clock basis. By 13 November when the IAC
deactivated the committee, there had been 64 meetings;
63 reports and 13 supplements had been issued. 103/
With a PI complement that did not exceed 50, in-
cluding supervisors, at any time during the fall of
1956, work at Headquarters and overseas in support of
the PARAMOUNT Committee constituted a substantial
diversion of manpower from other tasks. In the Special
Projects Branch, the group most directly involved in
the operation, nearly 50$ of all man-hours worked in
the months of September through November 1956 were charged
to the project established to support intelligence activ-
ities related to the PARAMOUNT Committee. 104/ The two
detailed-reporting PI branches also felt the pinch of
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crisis work. In October, the Geographic Branch pre-
dicted a drastic decline in production in the next few
months, and gave as one reason the overseas assignment
of one of its PIs,
105/ A month later
the same branch noted that production had in fact de-
clined and ascribed it in part to the continued absence
of ~ overseas and to the departure, during November,
for similar duty. 106/
Though the Industrial Branch also had three PIs over-
seas by November, its plaint was couched in different
terms. Both the October and November IB monthly reports
claimed that branch problems arose mainly from "lack of
personnel." 107/
The work of the PARAMOUNT Committee, with a big
assist from HTA, was a great success. The Watch Com-
mittee and the President were kept well posted on the
military buildup and had adazance warning about the im-
pending military action. In just a matter of months,
HTA had again scored high marks for its resourcefulness
and accomplishments.
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E. HTA Continues Work on the First Eight Missions
In spite of the extraordinary effort in support of
the PARAMOUNT Committee, HTA continued detailed ex-
ploitation work begun but not completed during the sum-
mer. New projects were also established in response
to requirements received during the fall, and work on'
them was undertaken as time and staffing permitted.
The Geographic Branch turned out a steady stream
of conventional plant studies plus a scattering of other
publications dealing with such subjects as rail yards,
train movements, and new highway and powerline construc-
tion. Most of these were briefs and all were
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indistinguishable in format and mode of presentation
from those of a few months earlier. Though of minor
importance from a national point of view, they did
provide ORR analysts with a continuing flow of infor-
mation in response to their requests.
The Industrial Branch, on the other hand, was pre-
occupied with a more limited volume of military and
scientific reporting of much higher interest and of
greater significance to national security. Because
this work was more analytical in nature and dealt
largely with imperfectly understood and previously un-
known facilities, progress in reporting was slow. On
7 September, a PI Alert was issued to inform the Intel-
ligence Community that the unidentified installation
under construction near Mozhaysk might be for nuclear
reactors. 113/ Nothing further was issued during the
fall on this perplexing riddle. On 21 September, another
Alert was issued, again on the basis of July photography,
calling attention to a pair of large circular pads on
a bluff overlooking the Black Sea, just south of
Sevastopol. The Alert speculated, with some success,
that this installation was probably for the flight testing
of missiles. 114/ Throughout the fall work continued on
the analysis of two different types of special weapons
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storage and loading facilities at Soviet long-range
bomber bases. Though discovery of these had excited
the Community during early weeks of the summer, Novem-
ber passed without the issuance of a formal publication.
F. A Stirring Giant
Though Lundahl arrived in CIA with a keen interest
in research and development and with a head full of
fresh ideas, the organizational climate and the exploi-
tation requirements were hardly conducive to big thinking.
The advent of Project AQUATONE,* however, not only in-
vited but demanded sharply increased R&D activity. Nor
was it merely a question, and a very challenging one at
that, of shifting into a higher gear. The heavy cloak of
secrecy surrounding AQUATONE severely restricted the
options for organizing the effort and staffing to get
the job done. The short-term solution was an ad hoc one,
with and his small task force doing much of the
early work, and with ~ and others cleared in only as
evolving developments permitted. As a result of this
pragmatic approach, research and development had no well
* For the creation of Project AQUATONE see NPIC-2,
footnote p. 1, above, p. 112.
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defined home even after Project HTAUTOMAT came into
being in the summer of 1956.
Though it was to be some years before an indepen-
dent component would be charged exclusively with respon-
sibility for research and development, the locus of such
activity in the fall of 1956 began to shift from
and TIB. At the same time,
Lundahl's high personal interest and guiding hand in
R&D were retained and augmented in the person of ~ 25X1
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who spent most of his time on 25X1
these matters and operated out of the office of the
division chief.
Interestingly enough, the stirring that took
place in the fall of 1956 stemmed only in part from
Project AQUATONE. October of that year was the first
in a succession of months during which more than 40$ of
all project time logged in the Technical Intelligence
Branch was charged against two DDP projects. Only a
minor part of the effort was devoted to augmenting the
existing capability to exploit TALENT photography.
One of the two DDP projects was calibration of the
MM 50 surveying camera, an instrument that had been pro-
duced for the Clandestine Services by Photogrammetry,
Inc., of Silver Spring, Maryland. In its development,
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the Photo Intelligence Division had provided technical
support to DDP as well as some liaison with the manu-
facturer. This instrument was the first photo theodolite
ever made in America (Figure 8). It was designed to
establish latitude and longitude to five arc seconds,
and azimuths to two arc seconds.
Now, in the fall of 1956, D/GP was called upon to
calibrate the camera. The task, to which
fell heir, was a demanding one, particularly with
respect to the amount of computation involved. The
theodolite utilized a technique of stellar observation
developed by
of Photogrammetry, Inc., where- 25X1
by direct and reverse observations could be made of the
zenith without disturbing the level bubbles. Each ex-
posure -- and the direct and reverse images were double
exposed on the same frame of photography -- provided data
for several dozen observational equations. These were
reduced to the normal to solve for the directional cosines
of the true zenith, which could be determined to five arc
seconds. Though weather caused some delays in taking
observations, they were completed in three or four
nights. Hand reduction of the data, however, took ap-
proximately two months.
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The second of the two DDP projects, though not as
demanding of time in the fall of 1956 as work on the
MM 50 surveying camera, had much more serious long-range
implications. It involved Project OSTIARY, a DDP under-
taking to equip the P2V-7U aircraft for taking low-level
night photography over denied areas.
The Photo Intelligence Division had been intro-
duced to the project early in 1956 when TIB represen-
tatives had been asked by of DDP/FI to
make recommendations concerning a camera system for the
project. 115/ An abortive recommendation followed. 116/
By the end of March, D/GP involvement grew to a point
where were participating with DDP repre- 25X1
sentatives in negotiations with the camera manufacturer.
At this late date, they discovered that the amount of
light available for photographic exposures would be
on the order of only two lumens per square meter. A
revised camera recommendation, the one finally adopted,
fol]awed on the spot. It was made as a sort of last
resort, and with full realization that the available
light was very probably submarginal at best. 117/
The system envisaged would utilize a P2V-3U air-
craft manufactured by Lockheed, a CAX-12 camera manufac-
tured by Fairchild, a camera mount produced by Aeroflex
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Laboratories, lenses fabricated by the Grimes Manu-
facturing Co., and lighting equipment by Air Research,
a subsidiary of the Garrett Corp. Lockheed would be the
prime contractor. 118/
During the summer and fall of 1956, TIB personnel,
chiefly participated very actively with
DDP representatives in monitoring progress in the fabri-
cation of the several component parts of the camera
system and in providing technical guidance to the
contractors. By the end of October, the photographic
system had been tested at the Fairchild and Aeroflex
plants and accepted for delivery to Lockheed and instal
lation in the aircraft. 119/ A month later, made
a trip to the air proving ground at Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida, to participate in the formulation of a program
to field test the photographic system. This completed
plans for the test flights which were schec'_uled to
begin the latter part of January. 120/
The lesser part of the TIB research and develop-
ment effort during the fall of 1956 was devoted to the
exploitation of TALENT photography and involved a con-
sideration of alternatives for solving photogrammetric
computational problems. As early as September, Lundahl
and ~ called these mounting problems to the attention 25X1
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and Bissell. It was hoped that the latter
might be able to offer some assistance in the form of
project funds to help in their solution. 121/
Basically, the problems stemmed from the fact that
the unique nature of TALENT photography rendered in-
adequate many of the orthodox photogrammetric solutions
then used in the metrical exploitation of aerial photog-
raphy. In his memo, suggested three alternatives:
1) early acquisition of more photogrammetrists, 2) con-
tracting some of the extensive computations to private
industry; and 3) lease or purchase by D/GP of a small
digital computer. 122/
The first alternative was deemed impractical be-
cause of the scarcity of trained photogrammetrists and
the long lead time that would be needed to get them on
board. With a T/O of seven professionals, the branch
was already experiencing great difficulty in filling the
three remaining vacancies. The second alternative
offered some attractions. At least one firm, Spica,
Inc.,* had a computer and had personnel cleared for
He was a member of the CIA Scienti is visory oar an
had been intimately involved in the design of the B camera
for the AQUATONE collection system. The performance of
the B camera is described pp. 124 and 263,below.
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handling the data. 123/ Adoption of this alternative
would provide a relatively simple solution to short-
term computational problems without committing D/GP
to the lease or purchase of a computer. The third
alternative, though extremely desirable, was generally
judged to be beyond the grasp of D/GP, primarily, be-
cause of cost. Nevertheless, its attractions were
such that) authorized
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who initially
suggested this solution, to investigate the range of
computer capability required to satisfy D/GP computational
requirements, and to determine which, if any, of the small
computers then just coming on the market would satisfy
those needs. 124/ It was this matter of computers that
engaged a considerable amount of attention
during the fall of 1956.
In addition to defining the scope of computations
involved in D/GP work, investigations included
the examination of brochures issued by manufacturing
firms and attendance at conferences and expositions.
During the fall of 1956 , made at least three
trips to New York, where he heard papers, viewed exhibits,
and participated in "clinics "devoted to discussions of
specific pieces of equipment on display. 125/ At the
suggestion of
also established contact with 25X1
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of the Management Staff, who provided some
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assistance in establishing contacts with manufacturers
representatives and with computer users in the Washing-
ton area. 126/ Though no serious attempt was made to
order a computer, the spadework done by ~ at this
time provided basic terms of reference that could be
used, with a minimum of updating, by D/GP to capitalize
on any unexpected opportunity to procure one.
Thus it was that in the fall of 1956, of four pro-
fessionals in the Technical Intelligence Branch, two
were heavily engaged in support of DDP research-and-
development activities, and a third was spending a sig-
nificant amount of his time on questions related to the
possible procurement by D/GP of a digital computer. This
left only one man,
~ more or less free of
other commitments to provide mensuration support for
photo interpretation projects. The burden of R&D work
was definitely shifting to the Technical Intelligence
Branch.
G. PI Training
During the first few hectic months of HTA opera-
tions, photo interpreters were given virtually no training,
technical or otherwise. Nor had D/GP been able to jus-
tify a resumption of the in-house course in photo
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interpretation which had been offered several times
during the previous year. It had already become ap-
parent, however, that short-run improvisation to re-
spond to new situations and to answer requirements could
not be justified as a continuing method of operation
at the expense of the professional growth and develop-
ment of the very people on whom the success of the
operation depended.
The influx of new recruits which had assumed large
proportions in the spring of 1956 and continued into the
summer and fall of that year had included many young
PIs with limited experience. Though possessed of a
basic competence in PI, their training and experience
were such as to admit of room for further development
of their basic skills. The plan adopted at this time
was to send these junior PIs, a few at a time, to the
first half of a course given at the Navy Photo Inter-
pretation Center, Anacostia. Following some initial
difficulties posed by the request for training at a
non-CIA facility, 127/ two PIs -~
-- were enrolled in the course
beginning 19 November 1956 and ending 1 February 1957. 128/
These two were but the first of a number of professionals
who took this course over the next few years.
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The fall of 1956 also marked a brief resumption
of the D/GP course in Basic Industrial Photographic
Interpretation. The ninth presentation, which was
"Task Force," began on 30 October. 129/ When this
offering of the course was completed in December,
further presentations were again temporarily suspended
because of the pressure of other work. 130/
given in the new Central Building quarters of
H. Looking Back
HTAUTOMAT instituted operations in the Steuart
Building in July 1956 with confidence, but with the ex-
pectation of a challenging and exciting future. And no
one was disappointed. The Middle East crisis had even
added a new dimension and further demands beyond those
expected from the exploitation of TALENT coverage of the
USSR.
Now, late in the fall of 1956, though the momentum
of the Middle East crisis was still producing ground
swells resulting from the imminent establishment and
activation of the film processing and photo interpreta-
tion center at Adana AFB, Turkey, the generation of new
demands seemed to have subsided. HTA had confronted
and succeeded in the initial exploitation of the Russian
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penetration missions. Then, in the ensuing months,
there had been no more such coverage. Lundahl and
had returned from their TDY in Europe with enough
information on the latest exploitation equipment fabri-
cated by European manufacturers to satisfy most of the
immediate needs not capable of being met by the
products of domestic manufacturers. The unexpected
test of the Middle East crisis had been faced and passed
with flying colors. Overseas processing and interpreta-
tion sites had been established. Even though the struggle
to manage them had been won by the Air Force, HTA had
the satisfaction of knowing that it was they who had
set them up and would pass them on to their new managers
in operating condition.
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Though it could only be regarded as a figure of
speech to say that things were about to return to
normal, when no norm had yet been established:for such
an unprecedented operation, things were beginning to
calm down. There would be a respite from the repeated
call for immediate reaction to a succession of crises
and problems. There would be time. to reflect on
internal operations and to initiate constructive action.
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III. Back on Course
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By December 1956 HTA operations were reverting to
what might be regarded as a more normal condition and
changes were instituted to adjust to the new circum-
stances. First and foremost was the status of detailed
reporting, particularly in the Industrial Branch.
Though many publications had been issued during the
summer and fall, the majority were one-page briefs.
Indeed, the first HTA Photo Intelligence Report was yet
to be issued. There had been, for example, no detailed
reporting on the Soviet long-range bomber bases. Though
PI Alerts had 'called attention to the installation near
Mozhaysk and the supposed missile-launching site south
of Sevastopol, further written details were lacking.
When new photographic inputs arrived, when a world crisis
loomed, or when higher authority levied a new requirement,
the manpower needed to provide a typically expeditious
HTA response had been provided at the expense of detailed
reporting. Moreover, in-depth reporting on exotic mili-
tary and scientific installations and equipment was
further hampered by lack of expertise both inside and
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outside HTA. Nevertheless, relaxation of the dizzy
pace set during the summer and fall was bound to improve
the milieu for detailed reporting, even if it didn't
automatically solve all the procedural and substantive
problems.
There were other potential beneficiaries of the
easing crises. HTA had experienced a meteoric rise in
importance. There was as yet, however, no tangible ex-
pression of just what had been accomplished. If in-
telligent plans were to be made for the future, the
first step would be to assess accomplishments of the
recent past.
The continuing stand-down in deep Russian penetra-
tion flights was proving to be a mixed blessing. It had
given HTA a chance to cope with the ramifications of
the Middle East crisis without fighting for its existence
on a second front. It also afforded the Technical In-
telligence Branch, which largely escaped involvement in
the Middle East crisis, an opportunity to proceed with
plans for testing photographic components for the P2V
night reconnaissance system. At the same time, the
suspension of missions over the USSR, coupled with the
fading Middle East crisis, was about to create severe
internal problems relative to the level of staffing
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in the Special Projects Branch and the means used to
keep personnel in that component busy.
One reminder of the heady experiences of the fall,
when the Middle East crisis held sway, was the continuing
overseas commitment that resulted from the activation
of the processing and interpretation center at Adana and
its orderly transfer to Air Force control. Moreover,
the Wiesbaden facility would need time to adjust to the
shift of collection and exploitation activity to the
Middle East. Thus, several months would pass before
most of the PIs assigned overseas returned to their
regular Headquarters assignments.
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B. Organizational Incongruity
The easing of the Middle East crisis was felt more
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rapidly at home than it was in the field. Whereas the
backup scanning of Middle East missions had kept state-
side members of the Special Projects Branch very busy
during the crisis, the waning of mission activity was
marked by a declining work load. This situation was
aggravated by the continuing stand-down in deep penetra-
tions of the USSR.* In a branch initially staffed to
handle voluminous inputs, other work had to be found.
The decline in mission exploitation activity and
the consequent search for other work brought into play
another very significant factor. Even at this early
date, it was apparent that mission scanning was a
deadly business. Not only was the routine scanning
of hundreds of feet of film day after day a tedious task,
it was also one offering little opportunity to main-
tain and improve the technical capability of the PIs
assigned to the job. To a man, photo interpreters
worth their salt longed for the opportunity to do work
that would challenge them and improve their PI skills.
It is not surprising, therefore, that one solution
chosen should have been detailed or summary-type reporting.
* Between 10 July 1956 and 19 June 1957 only one U-2 mis-
sion penetrated Russian airspace. Mission 4016, flown out
of Adana on 20 November 1956, reached Baku and covered parts
of the Caucasus region. 135/
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The first such project undertaken by SPB was an inves-
tigation of Soviet and Satellite ammunition and un-
identified storage installations having both maximum
security and some form of blast protection. In re-
sponse to requirements from OSI and OCI, 136/ three SPB
photo interpreters undertook work on this project, under
the leadership of
on 3 December 1956. 137/
By the time the study was completed and the results
published in the summer of 1957, the report covered 87
installations and had an appendix identifying 72 others
which met only some of the stated criteria. 138/
Projects such as this met the objections raised
by ambitious PIs who desired work more challenging than
routine scanning. It also provided productive employ-
ment between missions. On the other hand, it invited
questions as to why SPB should continue to be the
largest PI branch at a time when the two detailed-
reporting branches were struggling under heavy backlogs
of work. Though it was premature to expect any 'showdown
at this time, the dimensions of the problem were destined
to grow to critical proportions by the following summer.
C. Briefing-Aid Books
In December 1956, Lundahl, and Brugioni 25X1
met to plan a set of books for use in briefing high-level
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government officials inside and outside the Agency on
the accomplishments of HTA during the first six months
of its existence. 139/ Such briefings would be useful
in summing up at one time and place the succession of
achievements to which many such officials had been
exposed in piecemeal fashion. The briefing-aid books
would also be useful in justifying continued support
of HTA operation. Internally, the information compiled
would serve to sum up and quantify HTA accomplishments
and to provide a point of departure for planning over
the next several months.
The first planning session was followed almost
immediately by a second meeting to develop working
details. The latter meeting was attended by
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under whose general direction the work would be ac-
complished; Brugioni, under whose direction much of the
who would be the focal point for providing information
on PI material to be included.
Six books were originally planned, but only four
were completed: one book gave a statistical summation
of U-2 inputs and of HTA products and accomplishments,
another was directed to HTA work on the Middle East
crisis, and two examined the results of the first eight
compilation and writing would be done; and
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missions over the USSR and Satellites. Work was begun
almost immediately on the first of the USSR books. 140/
Measuring 20 by 19 inches, these books were an
impressive example of institutional advertising and a
demonstration of the alertness and aggressiveness with
which HTA capitalized on its opportunities. Photographs
were all glossy prints, many of them page-size save
for the space needed for titles, captions, and small
inset maps. Lettering, including the text was done
with a Leroy guide, providing large, easy-to-read
material. All reproduction, including text, was done
photographically, with successive pages dry-mounted
back to back.
The product that resulted was extremely attractive
and had great visual impact. Produced at first in a
few copies for desktop briefings of a few key officials,
the volumes almost immediately became a prestige item,
and many additional copies had to be produced to
satisfy the demand.
Production work on these books was largely a
graphics job, done in the Special Projects Branch. From
December 1956 through March 1957, 50$ of all the time
logged in the branch on graphics jobs was charged to
this project. 141/ Indeed, 10$ of all SPB time,
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? including that spent on graphics, was so charged. As
in the case of summary-type projects like the one on
secure storage areas in the USSR and Satellites, the
availability of so much time, albeit much of it over-
time, for a project not directly concerned with the im-
mediate reporting responsibilities of the branch high-
lighted the broad guage functions assumed by the branch
and raised additional questions, particularly in the
minds of those in the two detailed-reporting divisions,
concerning the high level of staffing in SPB.
Notwithstanding the obvious questions of cost and
manpower utilization, these books constituted the most
? ~ impressive historical record of any series of episodes
in the history of NPIC or any of its predecessor or-
ganizations. They were used by Lundahl to brief ,key
Agency officials, including the DCI, Allen Dulles, as
well as high-ranking military officers. They are also
reported to have been used to brief selected members
of Congress.
D. Soviet Long-Range Airfields
The winter of 1956-57 marked the first noteworthy
reporting by HTA on Soviet SAC-type airbases covered by
U-2 photography the previous July. In part, this delay
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was caused by the generally high level of first- and
second-phase exploitation at HTA and, more specifically,
the diversion of PI effort in support of the Middle East
crisis both at Headquarters and at overseas sites. It
was also a reflection of the lack of knowledge by the
PIs and by intelligence analysts in general of Russian
offensive weapons and airborne delivery systems. Two
milestone reports on this subject were issued in the
form of PI memorandums, one in December 1956 and the
other less than three months later. Both were products
of the Industrial Branch.
The first of the two was entitled, "Probable Special
Weapons Storage and Loading Installations," dealt with
facilities at Baranovichi, Bobruysk, Bykhov, Orsha, and
Siauliai Airfields. 142/ The weapons storage areas
associated with these airfields were located four-to-six
miles away. Hard-surfaced roads connected the airfields
and storage areas. The weapons loading areas were ad-
jacent to the airfields and served by taxiways from the
runways (Figure 9). When these airfields were photographed
in July 1956, all were in varying stages of construction,
suggesting that they were to utilize a newly developed
or recently modified weapons system.
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The second of the two publications, also a PI
memorandum entitled, "Special Weapons Loading and
Storage Installations (Stryy Type)" 143/ dealt with
facilities at Karankut, Minsk/Machulishe, Soltsy, and
Stryy Airfields. At these fields both the storage
and the loading facilities were situated adjacent to
the airfields (Figure 10,). All were complete at the
time of photo coverage in July 1956.
The obvious evolution that had taken place in
PI confidence and capability in a period of less than
three months was indicative of the learning process in
which PIs in the Industrial Branch were engaged. The
first memorandum spoke of "probable" special weapons
storage and loading installations. In the second, no
qualifier was used. Moreover, in the second, the
qualifier was dropped in alluding to sites covered in
the earlier publication. Similarly, by the time of the
second publication, the differences between the two
types of sites had been recognized as significant
enough to merit the application of special designators.
The group treated in the February memorandum was called
the Stryy type; those reported in December were belatedly
dubbed the Orsha type.
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Though the precise function of the facilities was
not definitely settled at this time, it was believed
that they were used to store and load
airborne missiles because of their design and construc-
tion as well as the heavy security associated with them.
The loading pits at the newer Orsha-type facilities
and the largest one of four at each of the older Stryy-
type sites were of similar size. They were thought in-
tended for use by large aircraft, such as the Badger.
The smaller pits at the Stryy-type were believed to be
for servicing smaller aircraft like the Beagle. Interest-
ingly, details of the loading pit configuration and
widths of the loading ramps and taxiways at both sites,
as revealed by U-2 photography, raised serious doubt
whether they could be used by Bison's, with their main
landing gear directly below the fuselage and with out-
riggers extending from the wingtips.
Neither of these types of Soviet loading and
storage installations was previously known to US intel-
ligence. At a time when intercontinental missiles were
still in the R&D stage and airborne systems for the
delivery of nuclear weapons were the immediate threat,
this information was of high intelligence interest.
Quite apart from the information itself, these reports
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helped further to dramatize the unique capability of
the U-2 and interpreters of U-2 photography to breach
the curtain of Soviet secrecy and spread before US
planners and decision makers painstakingly detailed in-
formation concerning some of the most closely guarded
Russian military installations.
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E. Mozhaysk
Determination of the purpose and functioning of
the perplexing installation under construction near
Mozhaysk, USSR, was a much more difficult task than
reporting on the long-range airfields. Interest in this
installation rose sharply during the winter of 1956-57 in
those quarters of the Intelligence Community witting of
the TALENT coverage.
The installation was located in rural surroundings,
about 75 miles west-southwest of Moscow (Figure 11).
Within the site, which covered about three square miles,
attention was centered on a large earth-covered dome
190 feet in diameter and 85 feet high, with a cap on top
(Figure 12). A second structure, the mirror image of
the first, was situated one kilometer to the north (Figure
13). This second one was still under construction at the
time of photography, revealing, among other internal
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details, a vertical shaft) )under the
position of the cap in the earth-covered dome (Figure 14).
The operational part of the site contained many
other buildings, some with massive walls up to 10 feet
thick. Four major structures were buried or about to
be buried to a depth of 20 feet or more (Figure 15).
The entire site was surrounded by a double fence
separated by a cleared strip 10 feet wide. Access was
limited to one entrance provided with a guard post.
All housing, which, it was estimated, would accommodate
up to a few thousand persons, was within the security
fence, but separated by another fence from the opera-
tional area. Some 10 miles of hard-surfaced roads with
wide-angle turns connected the housing areas and
facilities within the operational area. Many of the
latter were individually fenced.
Access from the outside was by first-class road;
there was no direct rail service. There was likewise
no evidence of unusually large sources of water or
electricity, or of large-capacity facilities to dis-
sipate heat from industrial processes. 144/
On 20 December 1956, the Assistant to the DDI for
Planning sent a memo to the Army, Navy, and Air Force
designating 3 January 1957 as the date for the first
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general meeting on the Mozhaysk problem. On the latter
date, 49 persons, about half from the military services
and half from CIA, plus three from NSA and two from
the AEC, met at the Steuart Building. Four days later,
on 7 January, a second general meeting attended by 30
persons representing the same organizations was also
held at HTA. On 9 January, HTA received a new require-
ment from OSI/GMD to study the Mozhaysk installation. 145/
During the next week military intelligence and
Agency personnel briefed USAF, US Army, and USN consul-
tants on the installation and sought their uninhibited
speculations about its possible uses. 146/ Persons
briefed included Dr. Werner von Braun, Dr. Herbert York,
Dr. Edward Teller, Dr. Mark Mills, Dr. Louis Alvarez, and
Rear Admiral Hyman Rickover. During the same period, OSI
representatives briefed
then serving as consultants to that
Office. The eminence of the scientists involved and
the dispatch with which the Army, Air Force, Navy, and
CIA arranged and accomplished the briefings emphasized
the importance that the Intelligence Community attached
to the problem.
The insights and ideas obtained from this series
of interviews were stimulating, even foreboding, but
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bore little resemblance to the final solution. Von
Braun thought the installation might be intended to
launch long-range nuclear-powered missiles. Teller.
and Mills also entertained the same idea, but regarded
its probability as being no higher than 10$. Alvarez
also speculated that it might be for launching ICBM's,
but conventionally powered ones. He ruled out the use
of nuclear power because of the radiation hazard to
which the large housing area, less than a mile away,
would be exposed. Rickover confined his comments to
possible nuclear applications of the site. He ruled
out consideration of the facility as a nuclear-fueled
electrical power plant for lack of cooling towers or
apparent sources of water, but he seemed intrigued by
the possibility that it might be used for testing of
nuclear equipment, including nuclear rocket propulsion
speculated more
cautiously. They discounted the possibility that the
site might be for launching missiles, but suggested that
it was probably related to the Soviet nuclear program. 147/
In coming to this conclusion,
neatly avoided the difficulties inherent in trying to
imagine how missiles could be assembled, checked out,
fueled, and launched from such an installation, while at
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of OSI/GMD and of AFOIN, as representatives
of GMIC and JAEIC, respectively, in connection with a
forthcoming joint assessment of the Mozhaysk installa-
tion. 148/ Even if the purpose of the facility was still
an enigma, it was evident that the Intelligence Community
and HTA was asked to provide support to
the same time accounting for the thick concrete walls
and general impression of hardness conveyed by the
nature of construction at the site. These speculations,
particularly the ones envisaging use of the facility
for launching missiles, caused considerable agitation
in the small circle of persons witting of their content
and import. At a time when overhead reconnaissance had
yet to provide evidence indicating whether or not the
USSR might have achieved a spectacular breakthrough in
the development of missile systems, the result was to
conjure up, in the minds of those concerned, a vision
of clouds of Russian missiles raining down on Western
Europe and/or the United States following any refusal
by Western powers to submit to Russian blackmail.
Further action involving HTA followed swiftly on
the heels of the consultant briefings. As of 18 January
1957, the OSI/GMD requirement carried a triple-A priority,
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thought it was either a missile-launching enigma, a
nuclear enigma, or both.
Between 18 and 31 January, when the desired in-
formation was issued in hard copy form, 149/* the In-
dustrial Branch, which was responsible for HTA substan-
tive work, engaged in a crash effort that took precedence
over every other project in the branch. For the month
of January as a whole, nearly 41~ of all Industrial
Branch project time was charged against the Mozhaysk
problem; one-half of all branch overtime was spent on
just one phase of Mozhaysk, namely, the special study
done in support of the joint JAEIC-GMIC assessment. 151/
Nor was this the total, in all probability, of even the
major portion of the HTA commitment on this phase of the
Mozhaysk study. The OCR collateral researchers, the
photo lab, and reproduction personnel were all very
heavily involved, and the Technical Intelligence Branch
provided critical measurements. 152/ In January 1957,
and for the next two months, Mozhaysk was the biggest
thing in the world of HTA.
Not surprisingly, results of the joint JAEIC-GMIC
* Essentially the same interpretive material in revised
form -- plus a stunning volume of photographs, line draw-
ings, and perspective sketches, prepared for use by con-
sultants, and comparable to the four HTA briefing-aid
books -- was issued as HTA/R-1/57, the first Photographic
Intelligence Report produced by HTA. 150/
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assessment were. inconclusive. They did, however,
represent some progress toward the ultimate solution.
The assessment substantially discounted the possibility
that this was to be a missile launching site, though it
did not end such speculation. On the other hand, it
suggested somewhat vaguely that the site was probably
an atomic energy installation, 153/ an hypothesis that
was more compatible with the observable facts, and one
that was elastic enough to cover the ultimate solution.
But the solution was still a few years away.*
The assessment did one more thing. It pointed out
the lack of COMINT information or~other source material
that would clarify the intended function of the Mozhaysk
installation. In all this Community-wide, high-level
deliberation one fact was obvious, namely, that without
TALENT photography and without .the keen eyes of the
photointerpreters in identifying the Mozhaysk site as
something of potential intelligence interest, noth2ng
about this ominous installation would have been known to
US intelligence. The dependence on photography was
further emphasized by the recommendation that additional
* For the solution, see p. 97, below.
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TALENT coverage of the installation be obtained on
a priority basis. 154/
This recommendation touched on a su~aject already
begging attention. Nearly a week earlier, on 24 Janu-
ary, a group of analysts had met to discuss possible
need for new photographic coverage of the Mozhaysk in-
stallation. 155/ Their verdict was, predictably, in
the affirmative. Location of the installation north
of 56? N, however, prompted questions about sun angle,
snow cover, and their effects on the interpretability
and information content of aerial photography taken at
such high latitudes during the winter season. HTA was
assigned the task of trying to arrange for an early
test flight over high latitude portions of North
America, and of .examining World War II German photog-
raphy taken at the latitude of Mozhaysk in the winter to
determine the significance of snow and shadow factors at
various times of day. 156/ In spite of animated interest
by analysts in obtaining new photographic coverage of
the Mozhaysk site, the proposal was not adopted. For
the time being, analysts would still have to struggle to
determine the purpose of the installation without.com-
parative coverage and on the basis of just two frames of
photography taken on 5 July 1956.
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Even if new photo coverage was not forthcoming im-
mediately, the Intelligence Community was as yet un-
willing to settle for the inconclusive findings stemming
from the information on hand. In a further effort to
achieve a breakthrough, the Agency arranged a conference
at Headquarters that would bring together at one place
and at one time a cross-section of the country's best
scientific talent representing disciplines that might
be involved in matters analogous to those likely to be
carried on in the Mozhaysk installation. Consistent
with the key importance of photography, HTA would play
an important role in the presentation of the photographic
evidence.
On 25 February 1957, an invitation was issued over
the signature of
Director, Scientific Intelligence, to eight eminent
scientists, representing government, private industry,
and research facilities managed by institutions of
higher learning. 157/ These men were invited to meet
with key intelligence officers and photo interpreters to
discuss "certain new intelligence information."
On Thursday, 7 March 1957, the panel was convened
at 0915 hours in the DCI conference room in the old Ad-
ministration Building for a day-long session. 158/
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The conference was to consist of a morning and an
afternoon session interrupted only by lunch in the
Director's dining room. Both morning and afternoon
sessions would be opened with presentations of the evi-
dence. Appropriately, in view of the key role of photog-
raphy, Lundahl made the initial presentation of evidence
at the morning meeting. 159/
Leaders of the conference and conference members
were especially interested in getting first-hand Werner
von Braun's ideas about the installation. His earlier
speculation that nuclear-powered intercontinental mis-
siles might be launched from Mozhaysk was the most
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exciting and ominous of all the hypotheses. On the
other hand, they were reluctant to reveal the true
nature or source of the photography because of von Braun's
former Nazi connection. He had previously been shown no
TALENT photography as such, and it was decided in March
1957 to continue the deception. Accordingly, a cal-
culatedly degraded photograph was prepared to back up
the elaborate engineering-type drawings and perspective
sketches prepared for the consultants, all of whom were
TALENT-cleared. When Lundahl dutifully showed von Braun
the photograph and explained it was taken with a 35-mi1-
limeter camera surreptitiously from an aircraft von Braun
exclaimed, "You get all this information from one picture
like this? You must have the world's greatest photo in-
terpreters. I never saw anybody who could do such a
thing as this. How you all do that?" 160/
Von Braun had waited outside the conference room
until it was time to hear his interpretations and ob-
servations. When the consultants had finished with his
testimony he left, and the conference continued with-
out him. 161/ This shabby treatment of one of the great
figures in missile technology struck a discordant note
in an otherwise memorable meeting.
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leading a recapitulation of ideas developed during the
presentations and discussion. No formal conclusions
were drawn up, but the summation indicated:
1. That the installation might be for the
launching of ICBMs, but not ICBMs, and that,
in any case, it would not be used to launch
nuclear-powered missiles.
concluded the afternoon session by
2. That the installation was not intended
as a nuclear power plant, but that it could
conceivably be used for the testing of proto-
type nuclear reactors.
3. That more effort should be devoted to
studying the installation from an applied
engineering point of view, with particular
reference to the scheduling of construction
in the light of research developments two or
three years prior to early 1957. 162/
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Within the next several days, the consultants came
to the Steuart Building to see HTA and to talk with
photo interpreters about the Mozhaysk installation.
Even this additional chance to think and talk about
Mozhaysk provided no further insights or opinions on
the purpose of the installation, however.
Though HTA photo interpreters stuck to the task
of extracting as much information as possible from the
photography and presenting it to intelligence analysts
and consulting engineers so that they could form their
judgments, the long hours the PIs spent poring over the
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two frames of photography could scarcely have left them
without their own speculations. And it didn't. To a
man, the HTA photo interpreters gave little credence
to the supposition that the Mozhaysk installation was
a missile launch site. Their strongly held opinion was
that it was somehow nuclear related, but, like others
more expert in such matters, they were unable to identify
the function precisely.
Having failed once again to achieve a breakthrough
in solving the Mozhaysk riddle, Community effort devoted
to the achievement of this objective waned in the
ensuing months. Though there were to be further limited
efforts during the spring and early summer of 1957, it
In spite of the unique role played so successfully
by photography and photo interpreters in revealing and
stimulating discussion about the Mozhaysk installation,
the incident also demonstrated the fact that without
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collateral information or knowledge, photography alone
may be insufficient to identify and determine the
functioning of an unfamiliar installation. The Mozhaysk
experience thus provided dramatic confirmation of the
philosophy of operation espoused by Lundahl and others in
the founding and development~of the CIA Photo Intelligence
Division. From the beginning, they had emphasized the
need for all-source information as an adjunct to the
successful exploitation of photography.
Any assessment of the significance to HTA of
work on the Mozhaysk installation would certainly reveal
that it was an important milestone. This importance
transcended mere considerations of time expended,
number of PIs involved, or acceptance of around-the-
clock work as a periodic necessity, although these were
all noteworthy. As the first major unidentified Russian
installation, Mozhaysk introduced HTA to the glamour,
apprehensions, and frustrations that were typically
associated with the discovery and interpretation of
such targets. The Mozhaysk problem provided further
opportunities for HTA personnel to develop and elaborate
their working contacts with intelligence analysts in
CIA and elsewhere in the Intelligence Community. In-
deed, it demanded them. More important still, it
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projected HTA and its personnel into a position of
national prominence, albeit a carefully guarded one, among
selected leaders in the American scientific community,
particularly in the fields of guided missiles and nu-
clear energy. Work on Mozhaysk brought with it the AEC
Q clearance for a few HTA photo interpreters, giving
them access to "Restricted Data." The effect of these
growing contacts and burgeoning knowledge would be re-
flected in rapidly increasing opportunities for training
and on-site trips, with a consequent increase in the
ability of the PIs to deal effectively with exotic targets
in the military and scientific fields.
The fall-out from the Mozhaysk project was not
without its detrimental effects, however. The ad-
vantages thus gained by PIs in the Industrial Branch
further widened the gap between them and their fellow
workers in the Geographic Branch. The latter, doomed
to unexciting work on more conventional geographic and
industrial targets and without an opportunity to share in
all the glamour and advantages deriving from work on the
highest-priority targets in the Intelligence Community,
began to feel that they were being neglected. In-
dustrial Branch PIs, not those in the Geographic Branch,
met and worked with high-ranking Agency and military
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personnel, and with renowned scientists. When on-site
trips were planned to US missile and nuclear installa-
tions and related manufacturing facilities, it was PIs
from the Industrial Branch, not Geographic Branch, who
did the traveling. When Q-clearances were first ob-
tained for HTA photo interpreters, it was PIs from the
Industrial Branch who were first cleared, not those in
the Geographic Branch. Though the morale problem did
not become a serious one at this early date, circum-
stances were inexorably defining and widening the dif-
ferences between the two types of assignment. Unless
something unexpected intervened, the day would come when
something would have to be done about the situation.
F. Testing. Testing
With the arrival of 1957, D/GP support of the
OSTIARY* program entered a new phase. Preparations for
testing the system at Eglin Air Force Base were pro-
ceeding right on schedule. Photo Intelligence Division
personnel, particularly had already
spent a substantial amount of time in support of develop-
ment and contract work. Now they would be called upon
* For further information on the OSTIARY program, see
pp. 41 and 63, above, and p. 175, below.
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to spend even more time during tests, a prospect made
all the more likely by the marginal nature of the
lighting system. Obviously, such a situation called
for the exercise of some prudence, and D/GP gave
evidence of having diagnosed the potentially extra-
ordinary demands that might be levied on limited
division resources.
Indeed, as early as the previous fall reports of
trips to contractors' plants were being directed all
the way up to Otto Guthe, Assistant Director, ORR. 164/
Now, in January 1957, Guthe was being tied into the
commitment for testing the equipment. In a memo prepared
for Guthe's signature by
the chief, Psychological
and Paramilitary Staff, DDP, was promised that
and Pearse would be available for duty during
the testing phase at both Eglin AFB and Headquarters,
and that they would prepare interim as well as compre-
hensive reports of photographic testing for the Air
Maritime Division, DDP. 165/ All was now in readiness
for D/GP participation (Figure 16).
On 29 January 1957,
departed
Washington bound for Pensacola, Florida, and Eglin AFB
to begin tests on the photographic system. Four times
between that date and the end of March,
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made the trip, spending all or parts of 37 days in
transit or at Eglin field. 166/ On two occasions they
were also accompanied by who provided
technical support with reference to the projected use
of radar sensors in the P2V aircraft. Though several
more trips were made later in the spring and in the
summer of 1957, the peak of D/GP participation was
reached in March.
Field testing at Eglin field involved three items:
1) calibration of the CAX camera; 2) checking of the
altitude of the aircraft, and 3) monitoring the lighting
efficiency of the Garrett pods, each of which contained
16 ultraviolet lights.
The test range featured a number of survey points,
each of which was marked with a stake. A battery with a
flashlight bulb on top was taped to each stake prior to
test runs. Since the precise location of each of these
survey points was known, this network of points could
be used to calibrate the camera. It was also possible
to use these points to calculate the height of the air-
craft from photographs taken as it passed over them.
To check the effectiveness of the lighting pods,
as well as to provide another check on the altitude of
the aircraft,
took photographs lying 25X1
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flat on their backs on the ground as the airplane
passed directly above them. These photographs would
reveal how many of the lights were functioning. Be-
cause the distance between the pods was known, they could
also be used to calculate the altitude of the aircraft. 167/
Prolonged testing was ensured by a whole host of
problems that developed almost immediately. Some were so
serious as to cast doubt that they could ever be solved
successfully. Most fundamental was the persistent
failure of the lighting pods to meet specifications.
Designed so that they were powered by propeller-
driven air turbines, the speed of the aircraft while
operating on its two reciprocating engines was insuf-
ficient for the air turbines to generate enough power
to light all the bulbs. When the small jet motors
under the wings were cut in, the increase in air speed
was adequate to light all the bulbs, but the increase
in fuel consumption then reduced the range of the air-
craft by a factor of about seven. 168/
Malfunctioning of the lighting pods created or
exacerbated other groblems. Insufficient light called
for compensating measures, such as use of a faster film,
increase of exposure time, lower flying altitudes, and
increased speed to keep the lights on. Faster film
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increased processing problems and degraded the image.
Longer exposures, lower altitudes, and increased speed
aggravated image motion compensation problems. Lower
flying altitudes were difficult to achieve and, in any
case, hazardous. The dangers inherent in flight down to
an altitude of 150 feet at night over unfamiliar terrain
virtually precluded operational use of the photographic
system.
D/GP personnel also frequently flew with crews on
test flights to check operation of the cameras. The
arduous regime of flight testing at night, developing
film and performing rudimentary measurements in the wee
hours of the morning, and then briefings at 0700 hours
for those in charge of the program were sometimes
relieved by unexpected diversions. On one such oc-
casion, with
aboard, the sensing system
failed to operate. On the spur of the moment, the crew
decided to fly to Andreties Air Force Base for a short visit
home. The unanticipated arrival of an Agency-owned, Navy
plane with Air Force markings was calculated at best to
create some difficulties in communications. The fact
that a rain and hail storm through which they had passed
washed off the identifying Air Force decals virtually
precluded satisfactory communications. When the tower
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operator at Andrews AFB saw the big, black, unmarked
P2V on the ground, he ordered it parked out of sight
of the operations building. He wanted no questions
asked about that bird. 169/
In spite of months of effort, attempts to bring
flight testing of the photographic systems to a suc-
cessful conclusion ended in failure. The basic problem
of providing sufficient light remained unsolved, and
the night photographic system was never used operation-
ally. The "Warthog," as this reconnaissance version of
the P2V was appropriately known because of the many
protuberances on its surface, did, however, fly opera-
tionally in the Far East at a later date using other
sensing systems. 170/
G. Signs of Drought
As March 1957 drew to a close, activity at HTA was
showing signs of easing. In an organization that had
scarcely known a tranquil moment since its inception,
these signs were something new. Heretofore, in spite
of the arrival on board of many new and willing hands, the
backlog of requirements seemed to increase, and the
number of tasks seemed to grow. Now, for the first time,
there was reason to wonder what the future might hold.
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It was not as though there was widespread un-
employment. Rather, the change in mood was based on
a number of different indicators. Chief among them was
the fact that there were as yet no more deep U-2 penetra-
tions of Russian airspace. Most of the jobs under way
-- and there were many, chief among them the current
excitement about Mozhaysk -- were based on photography
obtained the previous July. Many in HTA were aware,
moreover, of the pilot-type operation that was HTAUTOMAT.
If there were no more penetration flights because of
Russian protests, what would the future hold? And then
there was the unresolved question as to whether CIA
would continue to control the TALENT program, or whether
it would be turned over to the Air Force.
In a closely knit organization like HTA, where
togetherness was emphasized by stringent security con-
trols and compartmentation, there were no signs of un-
rest or undue concern. No one, from the lowest-paid
clerk to the most knowledgeable PI, was without some
appreciation of the importance of HTA accomplishments
and contributions to national intelligence. All seemed
to have an abiding faith that there would be no
curtailment in the strategic photographic reconnaissance
capability that had been developed so brilliantly.
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Their faith was, indeed, well placed. Though not
generally known in HTA, work was already under way by
March 1957 to bring into sharper focus the highest-
priority strategic targets against which collection
efforts should be directed at such time as the stand-
down in U-2 flights ended. On 27 March 1957, James Q.
Reber, as chairman, Ad Hoc Requirements Committee,
prepared a memo for Bissell giving guidance concerning
the "highest" and the "high" priority targets in western
USSR, the Soviet Far East, and the European Satellites. 171/
The main object of this memo was to identify 35 highest-
priority targets, on which information was needed to
fill gaps about the Soviet guided missile capability
against the United States, the Soviet long-range bomber
capability, and the Soviet nuclear production capability.
The seven categories of targets aginst which the U-2 col-
lection effort had been directed in July 1956 was now
narrowed to three of paramount interest. Clearly the
concern now was to learn about the Russian nuclear
capability and the Soviet ability to deliver nuclear
weapons against targets in the United States. It was
hardly likely that the United States or the US Intelli-
gence Community would permit the impairment of the only
good means for collecting and exploiting materials
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yielding this vitally important information.
On the other hand, if there were a temporary
drought in work, HTA would be provided a welcomed op-
portunity to take count of stock and to prepare for
vitally important tasks that were almost certain to
come. Above all there would be an opportunity to
modify the organization and reassign personnel on the
basis of lessons learned over the previous nine months.
There would also be a chance to provide additional
training for HTA photo interpreters and to familiarize
them with scientific and technical targets for which
they would be searching in the USSR by exposing them to
on-site inspection of analogues in this country. These
were among concerns that would dominate the thinking
and the work in HTA during the next several months.
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IV. Reorganization and Renewal
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Experience during the first nine months under HTA
proved different in many respects from initial expecta-
tions. Management of the operation, ever alert and
adaptable, undertook to assess the situation and pre-
scribe the indicated changes. As early as 1 February
1957, Lundahl had noted that the mission under which
HTA was operating was obsolete and he called for a
revision of mission, functions., and operating proce-
dures with a view to HTA becoming a ". separate
office or PI center in CIA." 172/
In addition to organizational changes, it soon
became apparent that there should be improvement in the
efficiency and effectiveness with which D/GP personnel
performed their tasks. Expanded PI training would be
sought for the younger recruits to ensure a thorough
understanding of fundamentals, including those having a
bearing on mensuration techniques. Broader contacts
would be cultivated with other intelligence analysts
and organizations in the Community through conferences,
attendance at briefings, and joint work on problems and
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targets. On-site trips would be arranged to acquaint
PIs, senior as well as junior grade, with exotic US mili-
tary and industrial installations. Finally, efforts
would be redoubled to develop key equipment needed to
maximize the exploitation of photography for scientific
and technical purposes.
In spite of all these plans and programs, photo
interpreters and production personnel persevered with
the exploitation tasks on hand in air attempt to bring
them to completion as soon as possible. HTA managers
who knew of Reber's memo on revised targets for col-
lection were only too well aware of the impact the
receipt of the first photographic coverage of Soviet
missile launching and nuclear production facilities
would have. They wanted to clear away as much of the
backlog as possible before any such inputs were received.
A. Training and Orientation
Most significant of the several facets of the
professional development program was the inauguration of
on-site trips to US missile and nuclear installations.
Though conceived as necessary the previous summer, 173/
little progress had been realized toward getting the
trips under way, chiefly because it was difficult to
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justify interruption of project work in favor of training,
however desirable the ultimate objective.
Arrangements for the on-site trips required support
from intelligence analysts and supervisors in components
for whom the PIs were providing information. Work done
over the first three months of 1957 by HTA on Mozhaysk
did much to dramatize the need and enlist additional
support from supervisors and managers in other intelli-
gence components for these trips, particularly in OSI
and in the military services. The main impetus came
from the Industrial Branch where supervisors and photo
interpreters were struggling to identify and explain
the functioning of installations with which they were
quite unfamiliar. Thus it was that personnel chosen
for the first several trips, including all those in
the spring of 1957, came from the Industrial Branch.
On the first such trip, as in the case of many
subsequent ones, several HTA photo interpreters joined
their counterparts in OSI. On 3 April 1957,
left Washington for a trip to south-
eastern United States missile and nuclear installations.
of OSI/GMD an of OSI/NED
accompanied them throughout the trip
DAD/OSI,
joined the others briefly for the tour of Cape Canaveral.
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The first stop was at Cape Canaveral where, among
other things, they saw the first Atlas missile in place
for a scheduled firing later that month. In addition,
the second Atlas brought to the Cape was still on its
cross-country trailer in the hangar. Members of the
group also examined several completed Atlas launching
sites as well as Titan sites in early stages of con-
struction. They observed servicing towers, handling
vehicles, LOX and nitric acid storage facilities, con-
trol blockhouses, underground cable and water lines,
and water pumping stations. To PIs who would be ex-
pected to identify and interpret such items on photog-
raphy of Russian missile testing centers at such time as
the anticipated coverage should be obtained, this op-
portunity to examine these observable features of the
landscape and to have their functioning explained was a
revelation. For the first time, they would be aware of
what to look for.
Following a two-day stay at Cape Canaveral, they
moved on to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Hunts-
ville, Alabama. Here, the vistors were introduced to
the entire Redstone and Jupiter programs, from blueprints
to the static testing of engines. The next day they saw
some of the smaller tactical weapons at nearby Redstone
Arsenal.
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a construction engineer ~ a boyhood friend
who pointed out to him how advantageous it 25X1
would be to identify and study the relationships of key
facilities from the air, and arranged a helicopter
flight. This was the highlight of the trip from a PI
point of view. Here at last, was an opportunity to view
those things that the PI would be called upon to identify
and explain on photography, and to see them from over-
head as the camera would record them.
At all installations, of course, there were il-
lustrated briefings as well as tours. HTA members in
the party saw many slides, models, pictures, and movie
films. As time permitted, they selected slides and
pictures, copies of which were deemed desirable for
use at the Steuart Building. They also noted sources
where movie films could be obtained, with the intention
of borrowing them for showing at HTAUTOMAT. From the
models and from the briefing rooms and displays, they
brought back ideas which were subsequently used by HTA
in its presentations. In closing his trip report,
pronounced the value of all they had seen and learned
"inestimable."
made three recommendations based on the
experiences of this first trip:
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1. All Industrial Branch personnel should have
a "Q" clearance.
2. The photo files at each of these and similar
installations should be exploited by HTA
personnel for the purpose of procuring copies
of those pertinent to the HTAUTOMAT operation.
3. Regardless of work load and staffing, more
such on-site trips should be scheduled, and
Industrial Branch PIs should attend available
courses of instruction in atomic energy, guided
missiles, electronics, and related fields. 174/
With the benefit of historical perspective, this
on-site inspection trip proved to be notable for reasons
far more important than the fact that it was the first.
This trip not only demonstrated the way to fill a con-
spicuous void in the capability of HTA photo interpreters,
but also expanded the horizons of their supervisors by
introducing them to a whole new world, of whose existence
and dimensions they were only vaguely aware. Moreover,
the close association of PIs and intelligence analysts
on the trip served'to demonstrate, with examples, the
types of things in which PIs were interested and needed
to get their jobs done. This, in turn, enhanced the
intiati~es that intelligence analysts and their
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supervisors might take in making suggestions for PI
participation in additional trips and courses. Indeed,
this trip, together with the consultant contacts begun a
month earlier during the Mozhaysk exercise, marked the
first steps in the development of a broad-gauge PI
capability in HTAUTOMAT and successor organizations
that were to set HTA photo interpreters apart from
others in the Intelligence Community. Before many years,
it would be established clearly that HTA PIs excelled
all others in dealing with critical targets of national
intelligence interest.
The second, and only other, on-site trip during
the spring and early summer of 1957 took place between
of the Industrial
Branch, accompanied by
of ORR/S/GM visited several US guided missile
research and production facilities. Among the sites
visited were the Air Technical Intelligence Center and
Wright Air Development Center at Wright-Patterson AFB,
Dayton, Ohio; the Soviet Missile Technical Intelligence
Group at Kelly AFB, San Antonio, Texas; White Sands
Proving Ground, Sandia, New Mexico; North American
Aviation facilities at Downey, California; Hughes
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Aircraft Corporation at Culver City, California;
Douglas Aircraft Company at Santa Monica, California;
and Convair Aircraft Corporation facilities at Pomona
and San Diego, California.
Like the earlier trip, this one involved the
usual briefings and ground tours at each site visited.
also had an opportunity to fly over, but not
hover above, the missile range at White Sands at low
altitude in a light conventional aircraft. Unlike the
earlier trip, this one was confined to just one type of
target, namely, to guided missiles and associated elec-
tronics. Moreover, considering the number of sites
visited and the distances involved, the pace was faster
and afforded little opportunity to do more than look,
listen, and then hasten to the next stop. Even so, it
provided a valuable introduction to a wide range of
installations and information not previously familiar to
HTA personnel. It was also the first trip to some of
the very important installations in the West.,
In his trip report, made just two recom-
mendations. He echoed and refined
plea for
more such trips by suggesting that all PIs should visit
facilities falling within their own spheres of speciali-
zation. He also urged that, in planning future trips,
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time be allowed for searching photo files at installa-
tions visited so as to facilitate selecting items that
should be copied and forwarded to HTA. On his trip,
had been frustrated by a lack of time to peruse
such files. As was the case with felt
that these photo files held much information of vital
importance to photo interpreters who would be called
upon to interpret similar Russian installations. 175/
Apart from the on-site trips, HTA stepped up
training in photo interpretation techniques. During
the spring of 1957, eight PIs completed the 10-week
portion of the course at Navy PIC. 176/ In July 1957,
five more enrolled in the next offering of the same
course..177/ In this PI training, there was no distinc-
tion between PIs in any of the branches; IB, GB, SPB,
and Central Branch were all represented.
Central Branch, with its traditionally oriented
PI tasks, chose still another way to augment the com-
posite skills of its personnel. In May 1957,
completed the Agency report-writing workshop. 178/
A month later,
chief of the branch, and
one of his photo interpreters,
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the course in report writing. 179/ This concern for
writing reports revealed an uncommon appreciation by
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of the need for effective communications to
complete the reporting cycle. In a technical field,
such as photo interpretation, where the primary capabil~
ity and interest of the person was in the extraction
of information from the photography, the careful
preparation of the written report frequently required
more than routine attention on the part of the supervisor
plus an above-average capability and interest on the
part of the PI. Moreover, under circumstances where
PIs were laboring on a sizable backlog of high-priority
items, information on which was initially disseminated
by word of mouth, this chronic deficiency was aggravated
by the pressure of work. In Central Branch, where there
was more time to reflect and then act, something was
being done to correct the deficiency.
Nor were those in PI positions the only ones whose
capability and career development became the objects of
interest to HTA managers and supervisors. From 15
through 26 July 1957,
Intelligence Branch and of the Special
Projects Branch were sent to a two-week summer course
in photogrammetry at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. 180/
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Internal training of a non-technical nature was
also provided HTA personnel, at least selectively.
Though key managers and supervisors were, generally
speaking, still too busy to be spared from their duties,
the pervasive conviction that D/GP and HTA were headed
for bigger things argued for developing further the
managerial and supervisory talents possessed by those
immediately under them. Thus, prior to his going on
the first major on-site trip in April 1957 , com-
pleted the Agency course in Basic Management. 181/ In
May the acting deputy to in the
Support Staff, finished the Agency course in Basic
Supervision. 182/
Finally, though several newcomers had been sent
to the CIA Intelligence Orientation Course over previous
months, attempts were now made to respond more freely
to the Agency requirement that new employees get their
basic orientation as soon as possible. Thus, during
the spring of 1957 many of the older hands, who had
previously been withheld from such training on the plea
of crash work such as the preparation for and receipt
of early U-2 inputs, were now scheduled for this course.
Thus, some of the PIs who had been on board from several
months to a year or more joined newcomers in the IOC. 183/
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B. Training and Orientation Offered by HTA
In turn, training was offered by HTA for others
in the Agency. The spring of 1957 also marked a
resumption of the D/GP photo interpretation course,
which had been suspended the previous fall after one
offering. On 5 June 1957, the course was offered in
Room 206 Central Building, under the immediate direc-
184/ Though some lectures were
presented by Central Branch personnel, many others, such
as the one on mensuration by of the Tech-
nical Intelligence Branch, were given by specialists
from other D/GP branches.
This offering of the course, in which the number
of sessions was increased from 11 to 18 by the in-
corporation of material on landforms, vegetation, land
use, urban development, military installations and
weapons, and electronics facilities, 185/ was regarded
as the first in a new series of courses and was alluded
to as Basic Photographic Interpretation Course No. 1. 186/
The course featured another and more exciting departure
from previous custom, namely, the addition of an over-
flight in an Agency aircraft of industrial facilities
along the Middle Atlantic seabord. 187/ Because of the
expansion of the scope of the course, it was agreed
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that it would soon be followed by a special course
designed to provide those who had taken earlier PI
courses with an opportunity to cover the newly added
material. 188/
During the spring and early summer of 1957, HTA
continued to provide exhibits and briefing personnel,
as in the recent past, for the Intelligence Products
Exhibit. 189/ Lecturers were also provided for the
Intelligence Orientation Course. 190/ In both cases,
however, the exhibits, discussions, and lectures had
to be restricted to the SECRET level, precluding any
inkling of exciting developments in connection with the
exploitation of U-2 photography. Partly because of
this restriction as well as the fact that Central Branch
was the focal point for training in the division, sup-
port for the Intelligence Products Exhibit and IOC was
provided by personnel in that branch.
C. New Tools for Eager Hands
In spite of the lead time needed to define require-
ments and obtain equipment, and the even longer lead
time needed to develop specialized devices, by the
spring of 1957 HTA was beginning to make progress away
from the traditional pocket stereoscope, tube magnifier,
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PI slide rule, and desk calculator toward a more
sophisticated and higher capacity type of operation.
And it was none too soon. Even with the exploitation
tasks provided by a meager eight missions -- those over
the Middle East were primarily tactical and provided
little challenge -- PIs and Photogrammetrists were taxed
severely at time to get the job done.
One of the most critical areas was technical
exploitation of the photography. Once analysts saw
the high quality of the photography, they began to ask
questions of a type and in a volume that had not been
anticipated. Indeed, many requirements dealt with
matters beyond the ken of interpreters whose previous
experience was bounded by tactical military reporting,
work in the earth sciences, and mapping.
To provide better quantitative information, during
the first year of operation HTA acquired two comparators.
One was a Mann borrowed from Navy PIC, the other a
machine developed by Photogrammetry, Inc., of Silver
Spring:, Maryland (Figure 17). Both instruments, which
were probably accurate to two microns, were dial read.
To reduce possibility of error in recording information,
each value was read twice by the operator before being
recorded by a second person (Figure 18). Data, consisting
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of x and y coordinate measurements, were reduced with
aid of a desk calculator. 191/ This was the general
extent of automation and sophistication of the men-
suration capability at HTA at the close of the first
year of operation. If it seems unimpressive, at least
the trials and frustrations to which it was exposing
TIB personnel were surely pointing to the obvious
solutions that lay beyond the terra incognita yet to
be transversed.
May 1957 witnessed the arrival of the so-called
Reed rectifier and Reed transforming printer (Figures
19 and 20). 192/ These pieces of equipment, which had
been modified for use at HTA from similar rectifying
printers developed under auspices of the Wright Air
Development Center for use at ACIC, 193/ were made
necessary by the advent of the B camera,* which was
capable of photographing from horizon to horizon. When
the rectifier was installed, it was the only one in the
United States capable of handling photography with
tilts up to 75 degrees, but it could not accomplish as
much as this in one step. Common practice was to per-
form the first step on the transforming printer, a
* For further information on the B camera, see p. 65,
above, and 263, below.
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fairly rapid operation, and the second and final step
on the rectifier, a much slower and more tedious opera-
tion. The greatest use for these two pieces of rec-
tifying equipment at HTA was in the production of
matched prints for use in laying photo mosaics.
With the end of the fiscal year approaching, HTA
was confronted with the perennial problem of what to
do with unexpended funds. One day who func-
tioned mainly as spokesman for the office of the chief
in matters involving R&D and equipment procurement,
burst into ~ office with the words, "Hey, John,
what computer do you want? We'll get it for you." 194/
There was a residue of $50,000 in the budget which had
not yet been committed to other uses. The painstaking
investigation that had conducted the previous fall
of available small computers and their adaptability
for use in HTA was about to pay off.
In his investigation had considered the
computer as part of a complete system for achieving the
maximum exploitation of U-2 photography to serve Com-
munity needs. In May 1957, there were over 110,000
frames of photography in the HTA library, two-thirds
of which were oblique photography requiring rectifica-
tion for precise exploitation. The system conceived
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would consist of comparators with flexowriter readout,
the Reed rectifier and transforming printer, and the
small digital computer. Requirements for rectification
to provide services not only for CIA but also for the
military were estimated to total 3,020 25X1
cases per year. The system was designed to handle up
to 3,480 rectifications per year.
HTAUTOMAT estimated that without the proposed
computer it would take nearly 14 man-years of desk com-
putation each year to provide the minimum estimated
services mentioned above. On the other hand, the
computer was expected to require only 1/6 to 1/3 years
of computer time to handle the capacity output of
3,480 rectifications per year. This would leave 2/3
to 5/6 years of computer time each year for handling other
exploitation problems.
In addition to the expected on-going computer
load for rectification work, an estimated 11-year back-
log had already accumulated. -This could be materially
reduced by preparing scale number tables for use by the
PIs in situations where non-critical measurements were
needed. Whereas the time required to produce each
such table for a given camera orientation was estimated
at 16 to 20 man-hours using a desk calculator, it was
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estimated that the computer could do the same job in
15 minutes or less. Such tasks as these would utilize
some of the computer capability not needed to fulfill
minimum rectification requirements.
Beyond these straightforward, basic jobs, there
were others that promised rich rewards but were so
complex as to preclude even considering with a desk
calculator, such as analytical bridging or cantilever
extension to determine camera orientation for areas
where no control information was available and the ac-
complishment of computer-assisted analytical stereo-photo-
grammetric measurements with least squares adjustment in
cases where maximum obtainable accuracy was imperative. 195/
The decision to buy rather than lease the computer
and the choice of brand and model were quickly made by
HTA and concurred in by
of the Management 25X1
Staff. 196/ The choice was an ALWAC (for Axel L. Wenner
Gren, the Swedish industrialist), Model III-E, costing
just under $50,000. 197/ Of the small digital computers
then becoming available, the ALWAC was the only one
having a combination of word length, memory capacity,
and flexibility of command structure judged necessary
to perform the tasks envisaged at HTA. 198/ This judg-
ment and the degree of confidence with which it was
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made were materially enhanced by a visit to Arlington
Hall where saw the NSA ALWAC-III in
operation. 199/ After this visit, during which the
capabilities and functioning of the machine were
discussed with NSA personnel, the formal justification
for purchase was prepared and the computer was ordered.
It was.some months, however, before it was delivered.
Though Minicard equipment which had been expected
in the fall of 1956 was still lacking in the spring of
1957, hopes were rising again that the date of arrival
was not many months away. Accordingly, plans were already
being made to provide orientation and training for those
who would supervise the operation as well as those who
would use the equipment. By May 1957, it was opti-
mistically predicted that this orientation and training
would begin almost immediately. Plans called for
Branch, along with
the deputy chief of the Statistical
of the Technical Section of that branch, to go to the
Eastman Kodak Plant at Rochester, N. Y. Later,
was to join them.
was to stay long
enough to participate in setting up the training
were to spend a month or
more in learning to operate all components of the system.
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much more specialized, was to get a complete indoctrina-
tion on the operation and maintenance of the Minicard
camera. 200/
Even at this late date, in the spring of 1957,
Statistical Branch managers had not yet abandoned hope
of using Minicard to store, recall, and reproduce
TALENT photography. The trials and tests at Eastman were
to feature use of live U-2 photography from Mission 202?,
one of the five that penetrated the USSR in July 1956.
Photography from this mission was chosen because of the
excellent range in quality that it afforded. 201/
Though the choice of personnel remained firm, the
orientation and testing did not begin until the summer
of 1957. Moreover, when it did take place it consisted
of several trips of short duration that continued into
the fall. It did, however, provide HTA personnel with
the capability to operate the equipment at such time as
it should arrive.
Not all the changes in techniques and equipment
took place in the support elements of the organization.
The summer of 1957 marked the start of a general retreat
by photo interpreters from their traditional preference
for photographic prints, as opposed to positive
whose duties and responsibilities were to be
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transparencies, for use in doing interpretive work.
For the first several months of the HTA operation,
virtually all the interpretation, including scanning,
was still done from prints. Though the loss of ex-
ploitable detail on prints -- generally believed to be
on the order of 30~ -- was not unknown to technical
people and technically oriented PIs in HTA, prints were
the first type of material provided for exploitation.
For one thing, experienced photo interpreters were ac-
customed to using them, and they fitted into their habits
of work. For example, PIs had an ingrained habit of
marking notations on the prints with a grease pencil.
The same pencil used inadvertently on the emulsion side
of the film -- a not unusual occurrence at first -- was
attended by results that caused PIs to shy away from use
of transparencies.
In spite of PI reactions that ran the gamut from
enthusiastic support in the case of a few imaginative
souls, through indifference, to outright opposition,
there were several influences at work that gradually
tipped the scales in favor of transparencies. Whereas
the quality of the photographic prints, compared with
that of the original negative, was generally less than
had been anticipated, the quality of the duplicate
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positives had generally met expectations. This was
recognized by the keener and more adaptable PIs, who
demonstrated in some of their work the greater poten-
tial of the transparencies. Other PIs, observing their
success, began to realize the advantages. Much impetus
was added to the use of transparencies when the Special
Projects Branch, beginning in January 1957, used dup-
licate positives with great success in their major
effort to resolve previously conflicting and incomplete
reports on the number and type of aircraft reported
from U-2 coverage of Soviet airfields. 202/ Later,
when SPB photo interpreters were assigned to other
branches and faced difficult and critical interpretation
problems, they turned to transparencies. This was
particularly true in the Industrial Branch where targets
and projects covered many high-priority installations
about which critically important questions were asked.
As PIs began to acquiesce, the chief deterrent to
wider use of duplicate positives was lack of equipment
adequate to realize the full potential of transparencies
in detailed exploitation work. The sought-for break-
through came as a result of the interest, initiative,
and technical competence of a photo
interpreter who jury-rigged a microstereoscope by
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gluing a pair of prisms to a cardboard mount which, in
turn, was taped to a binocular microscope (Figure 21).
This instrument was so successful that it was avidly
sought by other PIs making critical, detailed inter-
pretations (Figure 22). In response to the growing
demand as well as to provide a buffer against his own
needs, modified at least two other binocular
microscopes for stereo viewing.
The Machine Division of OCR was requested, as
early as 6 March 1957, to construct a microstereoscope
to ~~ specifications, 203/ but no such instrument
was yet available early in the summer of 1957. Later
design would form the basis of an instrument
produced by a commercial firm (Figure 21).
D. Familiar Tasks
In .spite of the ferment caused by travel, training,
the acquisition or anticipated arrival of new equipment,
and new exploitation techniques, the bread-and-butter
work of interpretation, coordination, and consultation
proceeded during the spring and early summer of 1957.
The pace, however, was noticeably slower than at any
time since the inception of HTA.
Reflecting the lack of new photographic coverage
of strategic targets, the number of requirements and
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proportion of PI time spent on projects declined
sharply compared with figures for the previous fall
and ~'. 'The nadir point in receipt of new re-
quirements was reached in June 1957 when only eight
new ones were logged into the Support Staff, compared
with an average of 26 a month for the previous eight
months. Five of the eight new requirements originated
in D/GP itself. 204/ As work continued on old require-
ments and projects, the backlog began to shrink, par-
ticularly in the Geographic Branch, which had but
five projects on the books by July. 205/
The decline in new requirements gave release to
pent-up pressures for travel, training, and leave
taking. The proportion of available time spent on
projects in the Industrial Branch plunged from 89~ in
February to 37$ in April, 206/ primarily as a result
of a heavy schedule of on-site orientation trips and
other more formal training. The comparable decline in
the Geographic Branch, which saw the proportion of time
spent on projects drop from 67$ in April to 42$ in
June, 207/ was both later and less precipitous. In the
latter case the primary cause was an unusual amount of
leave taking, both annual and military, as well as a
heavy program of training. By July, however, time spent
on projects in the Industrial Branch had rebounded to
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79~ of the total; 208/ for the Geographic Branch the
? comparable figure was 56~. 209/
Though long-deferred training and leave-taking
did. much to ameliorate adverse effects of the shrinking
workload, the continuous arrival of new employees,
selected months earlier, complicated the situation.
Concern over the vanishing backlog,. greatest in the
Geographic Branch, was reflected in attempts to generate
new requirements. On 30 April 1957,
the Geographic Branch, met with
the Cartography Division, concerning the possibility of
providing PI support for work in that division, but
without positive results. 210/ In July, Geographic
Branch representatives met with
of ORR concerning require-
ments for PI studies of certain USSR rail lines. Re-
sponse from ORR was more encouraging and, with the low
ebb of projects in the branch, work was begun on several
rail-line studies in anticipation of forthcoming require-
ments. 211/ Even the Support Staff got into the act.
In June,
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conferred with) of D/GG 225X1
concerning possible future requirements from that
division. 212/
At a time when all of the strategic coverage
and a majority of the requirements dated back many months,
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project work and reports published during the spring
and early summer of 1957 had a familiar ring to them.
The unidentified installation near Mozhaysk was one such
project. After lying dormant for several weeks as far
as HTA was concerned, it came to life again in May when
OSI sponsored a two-day meeting for nuclear-energy con-
sultants on the problem.
meeting. 213/ Mozhaysk was active again in June when
attended three more meetings, one held by the
IAC and two in Barton Hall. 214/
The 28 June meeting in Barton Hall was devoted to
a recently issued Air Technical Intelligence Center
(ATIC) report which supported the theory that the Mozhaysk
installation was an operational IRBM launch site. In a
memo dated 21 May 1957 , had cogently questioned
some of the key interpretations given in this report and,
in a reasoned summation, expressed serious doubt as to
the validity of the theory. 215/ As time went by, HTA
doubts were completely vindicated. HTAUTOMAT was dis-
playing early signs of the astuteness and the expertise
that were eventually to earn its PIs the reputation of
being the most able in the Community.
The critical examination of this ATIC report in
HTA also revealed that analysts at ATIC had access to
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technical information concerning US missile systems
that was not available to HTAUTOMAT photo interpreters.
HTA requested that it be made available. 216/ On
19 June 1957, 22 such reports were forwarded on loan
from ATIC to CIA for use by HTA and OSI analysts. 217/
Slowly but surely, HTA was taking its place as a full
fledged partner in the analysis of high-priority targets
of national intelligence interest.
Preoccupation with the Mozhaysk problem at this
time was not to end with the stir over the questionable
ATIC contribution to the solution. In July, nuclear
energy analysts were back in the running with an OSI
consultant meeting dealing with the nuclear aspects of
the installation. This meeting was attended by
of HTA. 218/ The struggle to explain the function of
this puzzling installation was continuing, but pre-
occupation with Mozhaysk was soon to be eclipsed by a
flood of new photography on highly important identifiable
installations.
The spring of 1957 was also marked by interest in
two Crimean installations covered by 10 July 1956 photog-
raphy and thought to be related to the Russian missile
program. April 1957 saw publication of a report on
"Twin Eyes," an installation that had been the subject
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of a PI Alert the previous September. 219/ This
heavily secured installation was situated on the Black
Sea coast, five miles south of Sevastopol. It comprised
what were called two probable missile launching pads,
a probable control facility, three probable storage
or assembly areas, and a probable electronics site
(Figure 23). With benefit of hindsight, this proved
to have been in the right ballpark; it was a cruise
missile test site.
The second, which was under construction in July
1956, was located farther east, on the Black Sea coast
of the Kerch Peninsula near the former village of Karan-
git. It featured what was called a main operational
area with a huge concrete pad and several associated
buildings situated near the foot of a hill, a nearby
facility occupying a commanding position on the hill,
a support area, and several possibly related sites
along the nearby coast (Figure 24). Characterized as
an unidentified installation in a report issued late in
the summer, 220/ the clear implication of the description
and interpretation was that the site was missile related.
This carefully hedged interpretation also proved to
be in the right ballpark.
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Another familiar activity, meetings of the PARAMOUNT
Committee, had been resumed in March and continued at
weekly intervals during the spring. This revival coin-
cided with the declaration of the "Eisenhower Doctrine,"
in a Joint Congressional Resolution approving and sup-
porting the integrity of Middle East nations against
Communist aggression. 221/ After a low-key effort com-
pared with the tumult of the previous fall, the PARA-
MOUNT Committee. was permanently disbanded following the
meeting of 20 June 1957. 222/ Thus ended an early and
highly successful experiment in the production of all-
source intelligence involving close and continuous col-
laboration between photo interpreters and other analysts.
In addition to work on PI projects as such, HTA
engaged in a busy round of activity in support of Pro-
ject AQUATONE during the spring and early summer of
1957. At the request of Richard M. Bissell, James Q.
Reber sought from HTA an evaluation of the comparative
quality of film processed in the field and at Eastman
Kodak. The conclusion reached by HTA was that the
image quality of the film processed overseas was, un-
expectedly, better than that done in Rochester, whereas
the chemical quality of the latter was superior. 223/
Included with the HTA findings were recommendations
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for correcting the chemical deficiency in field pro-
cessing. The greatest significance of the findings,
perhaps, was the fact that a capability had been
developed to process film in the field without degrada-
tion that might affect its subsequent usefulness.
Additional washing could be accomplished, if necessary,
once it arrived in the United States.
The results of the film-processing study provoked
a reassessment of the million-dollar-a-year contract
with Eastman Kodak for the processing of film. If field
processing units turned out a product with a higher
quality image, was there a need for the much-vaunted
expertise of Eastman? In a memo dated 28 June 1957,
Bissell directed Reber to proceed promptly with an
assessment of the situation and to respond with recom-
mendations concerning three alternatives; (1) continue
the contract with Eastman, (2) assign certain processing
functions to HTAUTOMAT or the Air Force, or (3) a general
request for any other alternatives. In undertaking
this assessment, Bissell requested that Lundahl as well
as certain operations people be included in the study
group and authorized them to visit the Eastman plant in
the course of their investigations. HTA was, thus,
intimately involved in fact-finding and recommendations
concerning the film processing. 224/
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On 24 July 1957, a select group, under the leader-
ship of Reber and including
from HTA, but not Lundahl, visited the Eastman
Kodak facility in Rochester. It is apparent from the
Memo for the Record prepared by Reber that Eastman rep-
resentatives managed to grasp the initiative and deflect
much of the discussion to their own proposals and
problems. At the same time, the record shows that East-
man was the benefactor of many appreciative remarks from
HTA representatives. Indeed, in his concluding comments
Reber noted the apparent hurt feelings of Eastman rep-
resentatives over the displeasure of "Washington" with
their work, and that, as a result of the constructive
approach taken by the select group in assuring them that
they could expect a sympathetic response to their pro-
posals and complaints, their feelings were "assuaged."
Reber made just one recommendation, namely that there
be, in the very near future, a discussion of the contents
of the Memo for the Record, and that the discussants
include Bissell. 225/
Insofar as HTA participation in the conference at
Eastman was concerned, their testimony was clearly in
favor of maintaining the status quo. As an exploitation
organization, HTA would have little or no interest in
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assuming any substantial burden of film processing or
reproduction. Nor could HTA be expected to view with
anything but apprehension the possible involvement of
the Air Force in the stateside processing and distribu-
tion of the film. D/GP managers and interpreters still
had many scars from the struggle to gain access to
SENSINT materials. Moreover, the prospect of having
the Air Force get its hands on the film first was enough
to frighten any prescient Agency PI. Clearly, the ar-
rangement that established Eastman as a competent,
neutral middleman with primary allegiance to CIA was
one that couldn't be beat.
In still another way, HTA provided significant
support to Project AQUATONE early in the summer of 1957.
With planning under way for a series of highly signifi-
cant penetration missions into the Urals and Soviet
Central Asia, HTAUTOMAT was asked by of
AQUATONE for an opinion concerning the relative merits
of using the A-2 and B* cameras for photographic
missions in the immediate future. In spite of the
larger scale of B-camera photography, HTA expressed a
* For further information on A and B cameras, see p. 124,
above, and p. 210, below.
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strong preference for the A-2 because of its alleged
greater "reliability." 226/ Perhaps HTA was considering
not merely reliability, as such, but also quality of
the product. For many months after its introduction the
B camera was plagued by severe vibration problems. The
minutes of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee meeting
held on 16 August 1957 reveal that the unanimous
opinion of those present was also in favor of the A-2
camera because of its reliability and the increasing
quality of "its product." 227/ All USSR penetration
missions flown for the next several months subsequent
to the 16 August ARC meeting utilized the A-2 camera.
Cooperation between collectors and exploiters was con-
tinuing productively, and HTA was leading the way.
Easing pressure in consequence of the shrinking
backlog of projects provided opportunity for increased
contacts between HTA and the analytical world at a time
when emerging problems, like Mozhaysk, demonstrated the
need for greatly improved PI familiarity with highly
technical subjects as well as for closer collaboration
between HTA photo interpreters and analysts in other
components in the Intelligence Community. This situation
only confirmed the wisdom of the philosophy that HTA and
D/GP had embraced over the years. From the initial
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? proposal by throughout the Lundahl 25X1
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years, access to and?use of all-source information, in-
cluding COMINT, by the PIs had been a cornerstone on
which the success of the organization was postulated.
Moreover, as early as 1954 Lundahl had called
attention to the need for Community-wide coordination
and control in the planning of collection activities,
the storage and retrieval of photography, the inter-
pretation of photography, and the training of PIs. To
achieve overall coordination and control, he had suggested
establishment of a reconnaissance board with representa-
tion from all pertinent organizations in the Intelligence
Community. 228/ When asked, however, about implementa-
tion of the suggestion to create the board, Lundahl
deemed the time not propitious to press for its forma-
tion. 229/ Now, nearly three years later, Guthe, the
Assistant Director for the Office of Research and Reports,
with the advice and strong support from Lundahl, was
reporting to Lyman Kirkpatrick and General Lucien Trus-
cott, Jr., who were working on a revision of the NSCID's,
that existing coordination in matters related to photo
intelligence was inadequate to meet national requirements.
He indicated that the precise nature of the necessary
arrangements was as yet unknown, but said it would be
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the subject of a forthcoming staff study. From the
context, it seemed clear that the recommended solution
could well be the establishment of a subcommittee on
photographic intelligence at the IAC level. 230/ Move-
ment toward such a potentially controversial proposal
was taking place very slowly, but the problem had not
dissolved nor had it been forgotten. Though it was yet
to be revealed whether CIA and HTA were ready to
challenge the military services in a field where they
had been pre-eminent, it was clear that HTA plus U-2
photography added up to considerably more muscle than
a handful of PIs in .D/GP three years earlier.
Despite the deficiencies noted in coordination of
photo intelligence activities, Guthe conceded there had been
some limited successes, particularly the work of the
Committee for Coordination and Standardization of Intel-
ligence Ground Photographic Procedures and Equipment,
chartered under the Joint Chiefs of Staff but nominally
chaired by Lundahl; and the Graphics Research Coordinating
Group, which provided a forum for joint mutual assistance
on problems of exploitation and requirements. 231/ Both
had broad representation from Community PI organizations.
Though the time had come when Lundahl was no longer able
to attend or chair many of the meetings of the former, the
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committee was kept functioning smoothly and working
productively by who had long served as an
chaired the meetings in Lundahl's absence. HTA rep-
resentation on the Graphics Research Coordinating
Group, an informally organized committee chaired by the
executive secretary and now, alternating with
Air Force, consisted of
Support Staff, representing D/GP, and any of several
representatives from the Statistical Branch, representing
the OCR contingent. In the affairs of this committee,
HTA played a more passive role.
Simultaneously with the reawakening interest in
coordination at the highest levels, HTA increased the
tempo of coordination with organizations in the US In-
telligence Community
Thus, HTA personnel, in- 25X1
cluding representatives from the office of the chief,
the Industrial Branch, and the OCR Statistical Branch
were regularly attending meetings of the Ad Hoc ~tequire-
ments Committee, chaired by Reber, as observers.
Indeed, in April 1957, Reber wrote a memo to Guthe ex-
pressing great pleasure over his dealings with Lundahl
and with HTA. In addition, he commented very favorably
on the competence and dedication of HTA personnel. 232/
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Moreover, Reber pointed out that the remarkable coopera-
tion and support he had received was achieved without a
chain-of-command relationship. Here was one of the many
precincts in which HTA and its chief were held in high
esteem.
On 25 and 26 June 1957, in response to a request
from the Assistant to the DDI for Planning, 11 hours of
briefings were provided for
part of Reber, was given a tour of all HTA components,
including the OCR Statistical Branch. He was briefed
on Sovbloc TALENT materials and intelligence products
derived from them, plus selected Middle East materials.
Two days later, also at HTA, met Army representa-
tives on the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee to discuss
his own particular service interests. Among materials
provided ~ in response to his expressed interests
were an organization chart for HTA, with the names of
key managers and supervisors, and a summary of R&D items,
with pictures and brochures. Though not the only
visitor to HTA during the spring and early summer of
1957 , visit was particularly noteworthy because
of the wide scope, and great detail of the briefings
as well as the precision of his inquiries. The
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searching nature of the latter was reflected in the
careful rein kept on him. At all times he was accompanied
who recorded questions and requests and
maintained custody of
notes. 233/
With the widening of HTA horizons resulting from
the multiplying external contacts with organizations
and individuals, Lundahl's renown as a briefer and news
of the exciting work being done in the Steuart Building
spread fast throughout the Community.. More and more,
he was being called upon to brief high-level military
and civilian personnel on the TALENT system and its
products. In June alone, over 100 individuals from
various agencies of the US Government were briefed and
escorted through HTAUTOMAT. Some 64 of these, including
10 admirals, were from the Navy; nine others were from
the Army and three from the Air Force. 234/ This was but
one evidence of the growing rapport between the Agency
PI element and the military services. As such, it rep-
resented a significant milestone on the road to a joint
national PI center.
E. Reorganization and Reassignment
If there was one word that best characterized the
nature of HTA and the organizations that preceded it
and followed it, perhaps it was the word "change."
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Change in the case of HTA was both purposeful and
constructive. At one time or another it meant growth,
or exploitation of dramatically different photography,
or .the arrival of major new equipment, or changes in PI
techniques, or any of a host of significant events or
developments. Just now, early in the summer of 1957, it
meant changes in the initial HTA organization and in
the assignment.. of personnel to increase the effective-
ness with which existing manpower could be utilized.
It did not involve any increase in the 92 CIA slots
that had been allocated to D/GP more than a year
earlier. Also, it did not involve any change in the
functional and administrative relationships between
D/GP and the OCR Statistical Branch.
By July 1957, HTA had 74 professionals on board
compared with 40 the year before. However, the manner
in which these people were organized and assigned, was
a result of decisions that had been made more than a
year earlier, before receipt of the first operational
inputs of TALENT photography, when the problem of how
to realign and staff the organization to cope effectively
with TALENT inputs and the resulting requirements was
first considered.
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The first documented reference to plans for change
was recorded in the minutes of an HTA staff meeting
held on Friday, 1 February 1957. 235/ At this meeting,
Lundahl stated that the mission and functions under
which HTA was operating were already out of date and
pointed up the need to revise the concept of operations
to fit the situation as it currently existed. He sought
the comments and suggested revisions of branch chiefs,
who would be given copies of the current mission and
functions for review.
Plans and suggestions for changes passed back
and forth between the branches and ~ the executive
officer, during the spring of 1957. By the end of June
there was a reasonable consensus on the problems, and
possible solutions were already under study. Needless to
say, not all branch chiefs were .in complete agreement
with the context in which any given problem was con-
sidered, particularly when it boded ill for the future
growth and development of the branch as envisaged by its
incumbent chief. Similar exceptions applied to the
emerging solutions.
First and foremost were the problems of the
Special Projects Branch; the functions to be retained
by the branch, the number of persons needed to accomplish
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the new and more limited tasks, the position of the
branch in the organization, and the question of who
should manage it. The SPB view, which was closely
identified with the strong personal convictions of
was that scanners and plotters had to have
project work that would maintain and increase their
proficiency as PIs as well as keep them busy between
missions and compensate for the boredom of their
routine assignments. To accomplish all this
estimated he would need 21 professionals. 236/ To keep
the record straight, however, it should be pointed out
that even the chief, SPB, was alluding to the needs
of the new "Operations Support Branch," thus recognizing
as an accomplished fact a change that was not as yet
made public. Obviously, by this time, much of the SPB
empire had already been lost, and prospects for what
was left were at best uncertain.
The chief, Geographic Branch, who, with the chief,
Industrial Branch, was most directly affected by the
size and uninhibited approach to work that had become
the hallmark of the Special Projects Branch, somewhat
arbitrarily set the manpower requirement of the new
Operations Support Branch at not more than 15 pro-
fessionals. He added, moreover, that he seriously
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doubted that legitimate needs exceeded nine, and sug-
gested dividing the six positions comprising the dif-
ference between the two totals between the Geographic
and Industrial Branches. chief, Geographic
Branch, said his proposal had the concurrence of all
branch and staff chiefs except the chief, SPB, whose
concurrence he had, with some foresight, not sought. 237/
A second problem, neither as urgent nor as well
defined as the first, was the question of functions and
authority vested in the Support Staff, whose responsi-
bilities encompassed several potent and controversial
functions, such as research on requirements, production
control, and editing. All these impinged on the sub-
stantive interests and responsibilities of the PI branches
and, unlike them, the Support Staff had no line authority.
The situation in the staff was complicated somewhat by
its leadership which consisted of a conciliatory member
of the original PI group paired with an aggressive deputy
who had a propensity for making command decisions. Though
there was no discord between the two leaders or within
the staff, differences in viewpoint made more difficult
the setting of firm goals and a single-minded pursuit of
them. In any event, in the summer of 1957, the Support
Staff initiated no evasive action and, in effect, chose
to stand pat on the existing arrangement.
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Opposition was led by the chief, Industrial Branch.
Without attacking the Support Staff directly, he called
for leaving "OCR functions to OCR," and for direct
dealings between D/GP branches and OCR/SB. 238/ In the
complex and uncharted areas of military and scientific
interpretation requirements and projects, the procedures
and controls instituted by the Support Staff were more
confining than those established for the routine handling
of requirements for industrial and geographic studies.
In addition, the chief, IB, animatedly supported pro-
posals to establish an enhanced graphics unit, a develop-
ment that involved some curtailment of editorial respon-
sibilities. At the same time, he expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the responsiveness and speed of editorial
services. 239/ Under the circumstances, it was obvious
that the Support Staff was the object of concern that
could cause trouble in the future, if not in the present.
A third problem, dramatized and presented by
and strongly endorsed by the chief, IB, 240/ was the
production of graphics. Though SPB had no less than six
an ambitious PI with capability as an illustrator,
graphics personnel, among whom was
complished illustrator, the emphasis was on mission
plotting and briefing board preparation rather than on
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support for detailed reporting. Discovery of installa-
tions like Mozhaysk and "Twin Eyes" emphasized the need
for a first-class graphics shop geared to the prepara-
tion of drawings of all types in support of PI analysis
and reporting, and, in particular, of high-priority
work on military and scientific targets.
Plans for the establishment of the graphics shop
created jurisdictional problems with the editors. Where-
as the editors had previously, if briefly, controlled
the publication following preparation of the manuscript,
the prospective leaders of the new graphics shop were
proposing to take over the planning, preparation, and
production of PI reports, leaving to the edibc~rs the task
of doing a copy edit of a manuscript in otherwise final
form for reproduction.
Heretofore HTA reports had been strictly utilitarian,
lacking visual appeal. The new proposals would impose
controls and discipline in the determination of format;
in the selection, sizing, and preparation of graphics,
and in the presentation of text and graphics. Profes-
sional quality would be achieved by replacing Leroy
lettering guides with Headliners, by use of a Varityper
for composing annotations and tables, and by the use of
a Justowriter in typing the text. Multilith mats would
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be superseded by camera-ready copy typed on bond paper.
Management and control by graphics personnel would re-
duce the role of editors to one of support in the re-
finement and correction of text and illustrative
materials already essentially in final form. The editors
demurred, thus initiating a long game of cat-and-mouse
which continued as long as editors and graphics person-
nel were administered by separate components.
A fourth problem or change was proposals for
revisions to the mission and functions of the Industrial
Branch, and the adoption of a new branch name to reflect
the evolution of branch responsibilities in the direction
of military and scientific targets. In his comments on
the reorganization dated 21 June 1957 , was al- 25X1
ready calling his organization the Military Scientific
Branch and proposing a new set of functions. He said
that these proposed changes had the concurrence of
Beckett, chief of the Geographic Branch. 241/
A final problem was one raised discreetly in a
as TALENT Security Officer,
CIA,
organization as a member of the Administrative Staff,
pointed out his far-ranging responsibilities as well as
the fact that his office was, in effect, headquarters
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for the entire TALENT Control System, not just HTA.
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He added that both) the administrative assis-
tant, and Lundahl had agreed that the Security office
should be separate from the Administrative Staff and
that it should report directly to the chief, HTA, or to
the executive officer. Not to overlook the value of the
right name dropped, closed with the observation
that Lundahl had requested that this information be com-
municated to ~ 242/
At the HTA staff meeting on 12 July 1957
announced the organizational changes and new allocation
of personnel. The Special Projects Branch, with its
broad charter of operation, was dissolved and replaced
by an Operations Support Branch having 15 slots. For
the time being, at least, would still be chief.
The Geographic Branch, temporarily alluded to as the
Sov Bloc Branch, and the newly named Military Scientific
Branch would also have 15 slots each. The Central Branch,
which had no official existence and would continue to be
staffed informally out of the Geographic and Military
Scientific Branches, was allocated eight slots. The
former Technical Intelligence Branch, now called the
Technical Intelligence Services Branch, would be in-
creased in size to 17 positions with the acquisition of
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the graphics unit, which was to be transferred from SPB
as soon as possible. The Support Staff would have slots
for 10 persons. 243/ There would be no change in the
organization or responsibilities of the Support Staff
(Figure 25).
The first changes resulting from the announced
decisions took place on 15 July 1957 when graphics
personnel moved to their new quarters in the TISB work
area on the sixth floor of the Steuart Building. 244/
became chief of the new Graphics Section and
his deputy. During the same month,
six persons transferred from SPB to the new Military
Scientific Branch and five from SPB to the Geographic
Branch. Though
announced at an HTA staff meeting on
26 July that all transfers were then completed, 245/ the
last documented transfer took place on the last day of
the month. 246/
With the reorganization an accomplished fact, HTA
was ready for the next big challenge, the arrival of
photography covering Russian missile test centers and
nuclear production facilities. HTAUTOMAT now had a
component, the Military Scientific Branch, organized
and staffed to handle just such targets. Moveover, key
personnel in the branch had made a very small but highly
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significant start in familiarizing themselves with
nuclear- and missile-related installations in the
United States. Moreover, the inadvertent mistake of
a year earlier that had led to the creation of an
overly large immediate exploitation unit, the Special
Projects Branch, had been rectified, and, in the process,
the capability to do detailed exploitation, particularly
of highest-priority targets, had been enhanced. And,
with the benefit of hindsight, this proved to have been
accomplished none too soon.
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U-2 's
One more was accomplished before mid-October.* 248/
It was not, moreover, just a question of frequency.
These missions, which were planned in response to
sharpened requirements for coverage of targets of the
highest scientific and technical interest, gave the US
Intelligence Community its first look at Russian missile
test centers, nuclear energy production plants, and
suspected biological warfare manufacturing and test
facilities.
A majority of the targets were in Central Asia,
far beyond the range of U-2's operating out of Germany.
Indeed, most were also out of range of the base at
Adana. This problem was solved temporarily by basing
flights could reach urban and
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industrial complexes in the valleys of Central Asia and
along the Trans-Siberian railroad as well as range over
sensitive Russian installations hidden in the empty
lands of Kazakhstan.
The results of these Central Asian missions, known
as Operation SOFT TOUCH, were sensational. Unlike the
* In the 46 months between July 1956 and May 1960, the
beginning and end of the U-2 collection program over the
USSR, 27 penetration missions were flown for the collec-
tion of intelligence information by photography. 249/
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first series of missions over European Russia more than
a year earlier, these produced a veritable bonanza of
scientific and technical information that kept scores
of PIs and other analysts in the Intelligence Community
busy for more than a year. Indeed, there was but one
U-2 mission over the USSR in 1958, and only five more
after that before the ill-fated Gary Powers flight of
1 May 1960. Thus, these Central Asian missions, along
with others flown in the late summer and fall of 1957,
constituted the bulk of strategic coverage on which HTA
photo interpreters and many others in the Intelligence
Community kept themselves productively engaged for the
next three years, until the receipt of photography from
the first successful satellite mission.
Aside from the SOFT TOUCH missions over Central
Asia, one of the sought-for targets was the Kapustin Yar
Missile Test Center situated in the lower Volga basin.
The far-flung facilities of this huge installation were
covered by a mission out of Adana. 250/ Another cluster
of targets to which the Intelligence Community assigned
a high priority consisted of the submarine bases and
fabrication shops in the Murmansk area. These were
covered from Germany. 251/
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A mission flown from Fairbanks, Alaska, photographed
military targets in the Soviet Far East. 252/ Thus,
during the last half of 1957, U-2's were crossing the
Russian border with impunity all the way from Finland
to the Pacific coast of Siberia (Figure 26). This was
to be the high-water mark, however; never again would
so many U-2's fly over so many different parts of the
Russian homeland.
B. Rejuvenation and Resumption of Discoveries
The hectic pace set by a rejuvenated HTA organi-
zation in the initial exploitation of the new Russian
photography in August and much of September 1957
ushered in a dramatic change from the somewhat relaxed
air earlier in the summer. It also banished thoughts of
uncertainty concerning the future viability of the or-
ganization and its work. Not since the summer and fall
of 1956 had HTA witnessed anything even faintly re-
sembling the scope of photography covering strategic
Russian targets, and never before had they seen any-
thing like the vast array of super-secret Soviet military
and industrial facilities spread before their eyes in
painstaking detail.
For everyone in HTA, this was a new lease on life.
Each of those most intimately concerned with exploitation
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of the photography and dissemination of the product --
Military-Scientific Branch PIs, Information Section
collateral support personnel, photo lab technicians,
visual-aid producers, and document control clerks and
couriers -- could imagine himself personally a player
in the historic drama that was being enacted for a very
select and important audience.
1. Changing Faces and Responsibilities
As HTA regrouped for this new action, changes
in the organization that had been announced in July
1957 253/ proceeded at an uneven pace. Though announced
personnel reassignments took place almost immediately,
major changes affecting established functions and or-
ganizational units were accomplished gradually.
One personnel change not announced but made almost
inevitable by the reorganization was the reassignment or
resignation of
25X1
25X1
long delayed, however. On 30 September as
relieved of his duties as chief of the former Special
Projects Branch "because of performance deficiencies."
leave without pay through 13 December 1957. 254/ While
on leave he made plans to go into the aerial surveying
requested and was granted annual leave and
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business in Iowa.* On 16 December he reported for duty
as an analyst "on a temporary basis" in the Geographic
Branch. 256/ He resigned from the Agency on 31 January
1958. 257/
When
was relieved of his responsibilities
as branch chief, he was replaced by who
had served in a similar capacity several times previously
when was on TDY. was named acting
chief, a title that reflected not merely doubt as to
who the permanent chief should be but also uncertainty
concerning the organizational fate of the component it-
self.
40
The ultimate disposition of the former Special
Projects Branch as an organization took longer than the
departure of
The clear intent was to subordi-
nate the new Operations Support Branch to the Technical
Intelligence Services Branch. This was not yet feasible
on paper, however, since both were officially branches
under the chief, D/GP.
For the time being, the importance of OSB compared
with its predecessor organization was much reduced.
25X1
25X1
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The reassignment of 11 former SPB photo interpreters,
six to the Military-Scientific Branch and five to the
Geographic Branch 258/ effectively curtailed latent
tendencies to transgress very far beyond the bounds set
by the necessity of plotting the new missions, scanning
them and preparing mission coverage summaries, and
evaluating the photography and accomplishing other tech-
nical tasks in support of operations. The transfer of
the immediate-reporting function for Russian penetration
missions (preparation of the ODE report) to a task force
under the control of the chief of the Military-Scientific
Branch constituted a further erosion of the power formerly
enjoyed by SPB. Lastly, establishment of the graphics
shop in the newly named Technical Intelligence Services
Branch and the reassignment to that component of four
former SPB graphics personnel, 259/ including the only
talented illustrator, likewise degraded the capability
of the Operations Support Branch compared with SPB.
These changes in functions and personnel had
several significant implications for HTA as a whole as
well as for the organizational units involved. Most im-
portant was the vesting of responsibility for production
of the ODEs in the Military-Scientific Branch. The
July reorganization had recognized the evolutionary
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changes that had resulted in the transformation of the
former Industrial Branch into a component responsible
for exploitation of military and scientific targets so
lacking in precedence that no adequate provision had
been made for them in the initial HTA organization.
Now, the first-phase exploitation of Russian penetration
missions, whose primary collection objectives were just
such targets, would be in the hands of the emerging
experts in these matters. Such a move not only brought
a maximum of expertise to bear from the outset on the
exploitation of these newly covered targets but, be-
cause in many cases one and the same PI would be handling
both the immediate and detailed reporting on a given
target, it substantially eliminated the potential for
contradictions in initial and subsequent reporting.
Moreover, at such future time as additional coverage
might be obtained, the advantage of continuity in re-
porting by PIs familiar with individual targets would be
further enhanced.
2. New Discoveries Dominate Work at HTA
As photography from the renewed collection
effort flowed into HTA in August and September 1957, its
exploitation tested the mettle of the rejuvenated organi-
zation. Main focus of this initial effort was in the
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newly refurbished Military-Scientific Branch. This
was the hub of around-the-clock work producing ODES,
the initial hard-copy report disseminated in cabled
and printed form, on targets of the highest national
interest. The ten ODEs produced in August and Sep-
tember 1957 reported, among other things, the first PI
information on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Center, the
Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center,
260/ Though most of the photo
interpreters involved in exploitation of the photography
had much to learn about the analysis of these exotic
targets, their morale was high and they were working
under supervisors who had recently been introduced to
many similar installations through trips to their domes-
tic counterparts.
With the August and September 1957 missions,
ODEs became a joint product of CIA, Army, Navy, and Air
Force PIs working at HTA under the immediate supervision
of the chief, Military-Scientific Branch. 261/ Most
noteworthy was the agreement by the Air Force to join
with the other services and CIA in this exploitation
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effort_.* Agreement on the joint first-phase exploita-
tion of photography covering targets of the highest
national. interest and on the procedures for accomplish-
ing it had been reached at a meeting in August attended
262/ Circumstances prompting this
meeting as well as the expeditious manner in which
decisions were reached were most fortunate in view of
the extraordinarily important information on targets of
the highest national interest that was about to be spread
before key members of the Intelligence Community.
The intense exploitation activity in the military-
Scientific Branch spilled over into supporting compo-
nents as well. The Information Section of the OCR
Statistical Branch which provided collateral information
to assist the photo interpreters in identifying and
analyzing targets, was virtually as busy as the PIs
themselves. In August 1957, the Information Section
provided over 28,000 items of information, 263/ the
* The level of military participation varied with the suc-
cess of the mission and the volume of information expected.
On the more important and productive missions, service rep-
resentatives were many, and they worked with CIA PIs on
many of the exploitation teams. In the case of less pro-
ductive missions, a token one or two PIs might represent
each military service.
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largest monthly volume to that date. The photo lab in
the OCR element was also a key support facility. In
August it produced more than 8,000 prints, including
over 1,000 enlargements. 264/ OCR couriers also felt
the impact of accelerated exploitation in the same
month, as both the number of pouches prepared at HTA
for delivery throughout the Community and the number of
miles traveled hit new peaks. 265/
The newly established graphics shop in the Tech-
nical Intelligence Services Branch was another component
that experienced the effects of the new information explo-
sion. Top priority was given to the preparation of
briefing boards for use by Lundahl. Considerable pre-
liminary work was also done, however, on line drawings
and illustrations of selected facilities within these
installations. In August, the first month of the new
inputs, five of the six persons in the new graphics shop
logged 291 hours of overtime. 266/
During both August and September 1957, Lundahl
engaged in a busy round of briefings to bring word of
the new discoveries to key officials at the highest
levels in the national security establishment. Initial
presentations were for upper-echelon Agency officials --
Bissell, the director of AQUATONE, Cabell, the DDCI, and
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sometimes to Dulles himself. In short order, key DOD
officials, especially from the Army and Navy were
treated to Lundahl's animated and impressive recitation
of Russian scientific, technical, and military achieve-
ments. In September alone, military personnel briefed
included nine admirals and generals as well as members
of their staffs. 267/ Though HTA relations with the
military were especially close, not all those from
outside CIA who were briefed by Lundahl came from the
Department of Defense. The Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles, whose counsel was sought by President
Eisenhower prior to approval of U-2 missions, was one.
On Friday, 6 September 1956, Lundahl was called out of
his own staff meeting to participate with Cabell and
Reber in briefing the Secretary of State. 268/
For Lundahl, the high point in the summer briefing
cycle was reached on the afternoon of Saturday, 7 Sep-
tember, when he briefed President Eisenhower at the White
House. One purpose was to support General Cabell in a
request for Presidential approval for a proposed mission
to cover the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center. Another
related objective was to brief the President on the suc-
cesses of some of the recent missions, including the
spectacular photography
269/
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C. Other Mouths to Feed
Though first-phase work on the new Russian mis-
sions overshadowed all other activity in HTA during the
late summer of 1957, life went on more prosaically in
some quarters, such as the Geographic Branch, the
Operations Support Branch, the Central Branch, the
Support Staff and, at first, the greater part of the
Technical Intelligence Services Branch.
Coverage of the Soviet Arctic and Far East by the
U-2 was extremely limited at this point in history. On
the other hand, rather more Air Force photography had
been collected over these areas, but its availability
was seriously limited by the reluctance of its proprietors
to share it with other agencies in the Government. At
the same time, numerous requirements existed. There was,
for example, much concern about the nature of any po-
tential Soviet military threat from these regions as
well as considerable interest in economic development in
the Russian Arctic.
OSI concerning the use of SENSINT photography to satisfy
some of their requirements. 270/ A month earlier
had discussed with
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the possible use of SENSINT coverage to 25X1
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answer ORR requirements. 271/ Though previous experiences
in working with SENSINT photography had been frustrating,
the expanding number of analysts cleared into the system
coupled with the urgency they attached to the acquisition
of information about certain targets led to the estab-
lishment in HTA of projects requiring the exploitation
of SENSINT photography. These projects were assigned
to the Geographic Branch.
In August 1957, for the first time since the move
to the Steuart Building, the Geographic Branch reported
substantial work on non-TALENT projects. 272/ Coverage
of Norilsk, USSR, was used to support an urban study
undertaken by the ORR Geographic Division as well as
work on the copper and nickel refineries by ORR economic
analysts. Documentation of two rail transfer points on
the USSR-China border was undertaken for ORR economic
analysts. For OSI, three briefs were issued in response
to requirements asking about special weapons storage at
Soviet Arctic airfields. A study of Pevek, in the
Soviet Arctic, was also begun. In addition, work was
well along on a shipping count and shipyard facilities
in the Vladivostok area. 273/ Exploitation of this SEN-
SINT photography yielded no very important intelligence
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information, certainly nothing that could begin to compare
with the exciting discoveries obtained from the current
U-2 missions.
In August, the Utilization Advisory Board (UAB)
discussed the problem of getting certain information out
of the TALENT system by means of "simulated" intelligence
reports. The immediate item under consideration. was
the unidentified installation near Mozhaysk. Since the
function of the installation and its significance were
still debatable points, it was desirable that as many
avenues of information as possible be opened up, in the
hope that one might lead to a solution of the problem.
At the 5 August meeting of the UAB, the DDP representa-
tive disseminated a proposed simulated report on the
Mozhaysk site with a special photographic attachment.
The proposal was approved with the stipulation that
controls on the final report permit dissemination
274/
The draft of this fabricated Mozhaysk report was
prepared by the DDP with the cooperation of HTA analysts.
It was written in the HTA Support Staff working area.
Is
The record shows that, in August 1957
met with of the DDP an
the DDI office to discuss the content and handling of
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25X1
25X1
225X1
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this report, which was to be distributed through the
DDP. 275/ This report set the pattern for subsequent
simulated reports issued to provide a wider dissemina-
tion of TALENT information on selected high-priority
targets than was possible within the TALENT system.
During the early stage of exploitation of the new
Russian photography in August and September 1957, the
chief commitment of the Technical Intelligence Services
Branch was in the support rendered by the newly acquired
graphics section. Though photogrammetrists in the branch
were engaged to some extent in mensuration support for
first-phase reporting, their main tasks in connection
with these missions would come later when the major em-
phasis shifted to detailed exploitation of the newly
photographed targets. Thus it was, in mid- and late-
summer of 1957, that many of the older TIB hands were
engaged in activities having no close relationship to
the hectic first-phase exploitation going on elsewhere
in HTA.
Early August, for example, found 25X1
in New York City taking a course of instruction 25X1
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on programing for the ALWAC III-E computer.* 276/ This
* See pp. 127, 128, above.
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course was scheduled to last two weeks, but as 25X1
branch chief, took only the introductory portion. 25X1
who would be personally responsible for 25X1
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programing, took the full course. At this early date,
thinking about the computer and its utilization was not
big enough to envisage the hiring of programers as such
or the letting of contracts for programing. Having been
pleasantly surprised by the success of the proposal to
purchase the computer, HTA was regarding everything
short of maintenance as a do-it-yourself proposition.
No stone was being left unturned, however, in preparations
for bringing the computer capability to bear on the
mounting computational problems as soon as possible
after delivery of the equipment.
In spite of discouraging prospects for the Project
OSTIARY* photographic system, contingent plans for opera-
tional deployment of the aircraft and its collection
systems were still being formulated. Doubtlessly, the
fact that sensors other than cameras were involved kept
the program moving forward. In August 1957, 25X1
made another trip to Eglin Air Force Base to provide
technical support. 277/ During the previous year Pearse
* See pp. 104, 105, above.
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had developed considerable expertise in the interpreta-
tion of radar photography, and it was in connection
with that type of sensor system that he was now sent
to Florida. In early September, spent a week at 25X1
Air Force installations in Germany, briefing and on
standby for briefings on the OSTIARY photographic
system. 278/ This trip was the outgrowth of contingent
plans for deployment of the P2-V for collection over
East Germany.
The Central Branch, far removed from the excitement
in the Steuart Building, was also setting a few precedents
of its own. One resulted from the requirement levied by
the Agency Building Planning Staff and the Physical Se-
curity Office for periodic reporting on security and
work progress, based on aerial photography, at the
Langley site.'279/ Whereas the earlier ad hoc coverage
had provided support in selection of the site and in
planning, these new aerial inspection flights provided
information on site security and progress of the construc-
tion. Formal work on this reporting began in August
1957. 280/
The conclusion in early August of Basic Photographic
Interpretation Course No. 1, with the expanded treatment
of landforms, vegetation, land use, and urban development,
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gave new impetus to demands for training in the inter-
pretation of these non-industrial subjects of interest
to those who had taken the earlier PI course. In re-
sponse to these demands, a special PI course covering
just these subjects was offered on 27 August. 281/
Generally alluded to as the "Geographic Photographic
Interpretation Course," this was a one-shot offering
tailored primarily to meet the needs of geographers
who had taken the earlier industrial course. 282/ Like
the new Basic PI course, this one was taught in Central
Building under the administrative control of the Central
Branch.
September 1957 marked completion in the Central
Branch of a collection guide on ground photography in
response to a DDP requirement. 283/ Entitled "A Guide
to the Collection of Ground Intelligence Photography
on Ports and Harbors," this publication was intended to
assist in the selection of intelligence targets suitable
for photographic collection as well as to provide
details on the choice of equipment, techniques for using
it, and the recording of essential photo data. 284/
In addition to contributing toward the satisfaction of
a specific need, this publication might be considered
another down payment on the eventual production of a
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comprehensive ground photography handbook that DDP had
requested from D/GP soon after Lundahl's arrival in
CIA. 285/
D. New Administrative Procedures
Research and development activity in HTA was con-
tinuing, with three major participants. Within HTA,
a loyal and imaginative Naval
liaison officer with a somewhat uninhibited approach
to R&D, still spoke for the office of the chief. At
with other Government agencies and industry. 286/ 25X1
this time,
was rapidly expanding his contacts
25X1
, who had inherited the mantle formerly worn by 25X1
as head of the HTA component providing the 25X1
principal support in such matters, was the other. Outside
HTA, the DDP Technical Services Staff provided funds
and technical support in the development and procure-
ment of some equipment.
The increasing size of the R&D account, coupled
with growing problems of control, accountability, and,
within HTA, need for greater coordination between the
developers and the potential users of equipment, called
for better organization of the effort. The solution
adopted was creation of the HTA Research and Development
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Board. Chaired by the board included a member
from each branch and staff. 287/ The secretary was
by
of the Administrative Staff. Minutes kept
provided an orderly and coherent record of the
R&D proposals and work in progress; they paved the way
for better communications in R&D matters and, as a
faithful record of business transacted, set the stage
for improved accountability; and, also, by no means
least in importance, they gave who was functioning
more and more as plant manager for Project HTAUTOMAT, a
useful tool for coping with this somewhat exotic and
elusive activity.
The first meeting of the board was held on 9 Sep-
tember 1957. 288/ Subsequent meetings followed at
intervals of approximately one month.
In a parallel development, on the initiative of
HTA, a joint working group consisting of Army, Navy, and
CIA -- but not Air Force -- representatives, was or-
ganized to consider items of mutual interest for tech-
nical development. 289/ Considerable joint procurement
of equipment was already under way, even including the
Air Force. This small step in the direction of earlier
and more active coordination in the development and
procurement process was an important milestone on the
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road to more effective Community-wide exploitation of
photography and a wiser expenditure of tax dollars.
A second administrative change involved project
control. There was, in HTA, no lack of appreciation
of the requester's needs, and no lack of desire to
provide him all available information as quickly as
possible. The chief question was how to attain the
desired objectives, whether by centralized control or
by delegating the responsibility for the speedy comple-
tion of each project to the chief of the branch to which
it was assigned.
If left to a vote by the branch chiefs, there
would be little doubt about the choice of method. The
question was not merely one of competence and good faith,
however. Even at this early date, the HTA organization
provided for a substantial division of labor with a
consequent need for much coordination, not merely bi-
lateral but multilateral in nature. Some workable
system of priorities or agreed-upon deadlines was es-
sential to establish the order of work, and a monitoring
system was needed to detect whether or not work was
progressing according to plan.
This difficult job of middleman had been vested
in the Support Staff, which had already managed to
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establish a reasonable degree of order in the handling
of requirements and in monitoring production. The
struggle was an endless one, however, and required con-
stant adjustment to meet the needs of an organization
whose production commitments fluctuated as widely as
those of HTA.
On 29 August 1957, the office of the chief, HTA,
announced that thenceforth each branch would submit
a weekly report, by the close of business on Friday, on
the status of each project undertaken in response to
a specific requirement. 290/ Projects in support of
other HTA components and those of a continuing nature
were excluded.
This commendable demonstration of interest in
production control soon revealed the almost insurmount-
able difficulties inherent in any attempt to codify HTA
production procedures. In less than a month, the in-
auguration of full-scale detailed exploitation of photog-
raphy of the highest-priority targets covered by the
new Russian missions would begin under unprecedented
circumstances. The result would be the creation of
exceptions so broad in scope as to permit this activity,
by far the most crucial in HTA at that time, to operate
outside the system.
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E. The Specter of a Job Freeze
On 8 August 1957, just as the spectacular series
of missions over the Soviet Union was getting under way,
Lundahl was advised that the HTA/ORR Table of Organiza-
tion was to be reduced by 12 positions. 291/ A cut of
eight positions for the OCR contingent in HTA was also
announced in the same month. 292/ These reductions were
the HTA share of an overall reduction in the Agency's
personnel ceiling. 293/ The timing couldn't have been
worse. From an HTA point of view, the announcement came
when the workload was on the threshhold of a quantum jump.
From an Agency-wide point of view, if the AQUATONE collec-
tion effort then getting under way were as successful as
CIA hoped, the announced cut in the HTA personnel ceiling
could only be a futile gesture.
HTAUTOMAT managers were dismayed but bided their
time. Lundahl agreed to make every effort to carry out
the mission of the organization with his on-duty staff of
85 persons. He curtailed some services, extended dead-
lines, and restricted the use of overtime for high-priority
work only on the basis of the health and personal well-
being of his people. 294/ The OCR Statistical Branch
revealed the cut only to key supervisors and hoped for
reconsideration of the decision. 295/ Twice before,
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once in 1953 and once in 1955, the PI component had
been caught in a job freeze. 296/ Though the result in
the first case had been to arrest development of the
fledgling division, the ill-effects of the second were
substantially avoided by staffing increases required
for the onrushing U-2 program. If historical precedent
was any indication of the probable outcome this time,
the prospect of emerging unscathed from this encounter
was excellent. This untimely decision to impose a
freeze on unfilled HTA slots provided a strange backdrop
against which to begin exploitation of the most exciting
and important photography yet obtained over the Soviet
Union.
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