COLLECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1917-1949 VOLUME 4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04-01460R000100030001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 309
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 10, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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COLLECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG
(1917 - 1949)
VOLUME 4
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA
1 Report No.
JPRS 71911 -3
2?
3. Recipient's Accession No.
SHEET
4. ! u r ui I ~ubt a It
5. Report Date
10 October 1978
COLLECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG
6
(1917-1949), Volume 4
7. Author(s)
8. Performing Organization Rept.
No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.
Joint Publications Research Service
1000 North Glebe Road
11. Contract/Grant No.
Arlington, Virginia 22201
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address
13. Type of Report & Period
Covered
above
A
s
14.
15. Supplementary Notes
MAO TSE-TUNG CHI, Hong Kong, 1975
16. Abstracts
This report contains selected speeches, arti
cles, essays, reports, letters,
interviews, declarations, decrees, telegrams
, poems,. inscriptions of Mao
Tse-tung covering a multitude of subjects.
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17o. Descriptors
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Behavioral and Social Science
Political
Mao Tse-tung
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms
17c. COSATI Field/Group 05
18. Availability Statement
19. Security Class (This
21. No. of Pages
Unlimited Availability ,
Report)
306
Sold by NTIS
2 . Security Class (This
22. Price
Springfield, Virginia 22151
Page
UNCLASSIFIED
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COLLECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG
(1917 - 1949)
VOLUME 4
Hong Kong MAO TSE-TUNG CHI in Chinese, Vols 1-10, Oct 1975
CONTENTS PAGE
VOLUME 4 (pp 9-65, 67-217, 219-357, 359-397)
Carry Out the Land Investigation Movement (1 September 1933) ............ 1
This Year's Election (6 September 1933) ................................. 4
Declaration to the Toiling Worker-Peasant Masses of the World
(6 September 1933) .................................................... 12
On Education Work (15 September 1933) ................................... 16
Provisional Agricultural Tax Law (17 September 1933) .................... 18
Correct Commandism in Selling Bonds (23 September 1933) ................. 21
Order No 49 of the People's Committee of the Central Government of the
Soviet Republic of China (10 October 1933) ............................ 23
Decision on Certain Issues in the Land Struggle (10 October 1933) ....... 25
Resolution on the Repromulgation of the Labor Law (15 October 1933) ..... 42
Labor Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic (15 October 1933) ............... 44
Regulations Governing Punishments for Violating Labor Law (15 October
1933) .................................................................. 65
[II - CC]
[III - CC - 80]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Emergency Mobilization Order Issued by the Central Government for Smash-
ing the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression Campaign' (18 October 1933). 67
Work Report of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet
Republic to the Electorate on the Second Anniversary of Its
Establishment (24 October 1933) ........................................ 71
Supplementary Regulations to Provisional-Agricultural Tax Law
(26 October 1933) ...................................................... 78
Open Letter to the People of the Whole Country on 'Direct Negotiations
Between China and Japan' (11 November 1933) ........................... 83
On the AWOL Problem in the Red Army (15 December 1933) .................. 86
On Punishments for Corruption and Waste (15 December 1933) .............. 88
Investigation in Ch'ang-kang Township (15 December 1933) ................ 90
Investigation in Ts'ai-hsi Township (1933) .............................. 124
Mass Work in the Land Investigation Movement (1933) ..................... 142
First Cable Message from Provisional Central Government to Fukien
People's Revolutionary Government and the 19th Route Army
(20 December 1933) .................................................... 148
Decisions of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet
Republic (January 1934) ............................................... 149
Second Cable Message from the Provisional Central Government to Fukien
People's Revolutionary Government and People's Revolutionary Army
(13 January 1934) ..................................................... 150
Inscriptions on Red Army Martyr Monument (15 January 1934) .............. 152
A Solemn Opening Speech Outline of Chairman Mao's Speech (At the Second
All-Soviet Congress) (22 January 1934) ............................... 153
Report of the Central Executive Committee and the People's Committee
of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the Second All-Soviet Congress
(25 January 1934) ..................................................... 155
Conclusions of Report of Central Executive Committee (27 January 1934).. 207
Closing Speech (1 February 1934) ...................................... 215
On Election at Second All-Soviet Congress and the Central Executive
Committee and People's Committee (3 February 1934) .................... 217
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Declaration on the Fukien Incident (11 February 1934) ................. 221
Organic Law of the Central Soviet (17 February 1934) .................. 225
Provisional Regulations Governing the Utilization of Auxiliary Labor
(20 February 1934) .................................................. 235
Judicial Procedure (8 April 1934) ..................................... 240
Regulations Governing Punishments of Counterrevolutionaries (8 April
1934) ............................................................... 243
Marriage Law (8 April 1934) ........................................... 250
How Do Township Soviet Governments Work? (10 April 1934) .............. 254
Declaration of Central Government on 1 May Labor Day (April 1934) ..... 268
Comrade Mao Tse-tung on Schemes of Japanese Imperialism (April 1934).. 270
Declaration of the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army on Its Intention To
March North To Combat Japanese Aggression (15 July 1934) ............ 273
Comrade Mao Tse-tung Talks on Current Situation and the Anti-Japanese
Vanguard Unit of the Red Army (July 1934) ........278
Order of Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic
(15 August 1934) .............................. 283
Six-Point Program Proposed by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung (1934) ......... 285
Final Decision of CCP Central Committee Against Enemy's Fifth
Encirclement (8 January 1935) ....................................... 287
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CARRY OUT THE LAND INVESTIGATION MOVEMENT
Announcement No. 27 of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet
Republic of China
1 September 1933
[Text] In order to eliminate the remnant feudal forces, the Central Govern-
ment promulgated the Land Investigation Directive and called a mass meeting
in June, appealing to the masses to rise up and firmly launch the land in-
vestigation movement in all rural areas. In the past several years, great
achievements have been made. Nevertheless, many areas have not launched
the movement. In some areas, people either protect the landlords and rich
peasants, encroach upon the middle peasants, fail to hold mass meetings or
make propaganda, confiscate without the approval of the masses, fail to
distribute the confiscated articles to the masses, or fail to be firm in
suppressing the counterrevolution. These are grave errors. In order to
eliminate the feudal remnants promptly and enable the middle and poor peasants
and the worker masses to receive all the benefits of the land revolution, the
Central Government now makes this announcement to the governments of all
areas and the broad worker-peasant masses, asking all of them to rise up and
support the order of the Central Government and, under the following methods,
pursue a firm class struggle and strive for the complete success of the land
investigation movement.
(1) The governments and land investigation committees of all areas must
closely tackle the leadership of the land investigation and activate the
labor unions, poor peasants' leagues and all mass organizations to soundly
prosecute the land investigation movement. They must first make extensive
propaganda to the masses, so that everyone understands the significance of
the movement and personally takes part in the land and class investigations.
(2) Land investigation is not land division. And class investigation is not
an investigation of the middle peasants, poor peasants and farm laborers.
Therefore, it must not be carried out household by household, farm by farm,
or by staking, but by activating all the revolutionary masses and concen-
trating on investigating the landlords and rich peasants.
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(3) Because the poor peasants' league is the central force of the land in-
vestigation movement, it must be vigorously developed. Any and every poor
peasant may join the league without requirement of sponsorship. All rural
workers should join it so that they will lead the land investigation strug-
gle. The middle peasants may attend the meetings of the poor peasants'
league as observers.
(4) The interests of the middle peasants absolutely must not be encroached
upon. The middle peasants must not be mistaken for rich peasants. In re-
gard to some well-to-do middle peasant elements, although they might have
been guilty of some slight exploitation in the past, they must not be re-
garded as rich peasants. All the middle peasant masses must rally around
the poor peasants and together attack the landlords and rich peasants.
(5) The rich peasants rely on their own labor and exploitation for their
livelihood. Therefore, they can only be allocated inferior land, and they
must not be regarded as middle peasants. Nor must they be regarded as
landlords. Confiscation of all their assets is wrong.
(6) The landlords perform either no, or only incidental, labor. They be-
long to the feudal exploiting class, and all their land and assets must be
confiscated. The able-bodied among them must be organized into a labor
team, given training and made to take part in state or local labor work.
(7) After confiscation, the assets of the landlord class, except cash, must
be promptly distributed to the impoverished masses of the particular village.
Besides reserving the public enterprise field, the confiscated land must be
promptly divided among the masses.
(8) In regard to the landlord and rich peasant elements and those guilty
of corruption and decadence, negative slowdown, commandism and coercion and
sheltering the landlord and rich peasants who have infiltrated the soviet,
the worker-peasant masses must, under the leadership of the worker-peasant
procurators' department, struggle against them, rectifying those committing
minor mistakes. and purging those guilty of grave errors, in order to con-
solidate the soviet political power.
(9) All those participating in counterrevolutionary activities must receive
severe suppression and those guilty of major crimes must be executed by
shooting. The worker-peasant masses must successfully coordinate with the
security bureau and judicial department of the soviet and thoroughly elimi-
nate the counterrevolution.
(10) The work of the land investigation movement should be concretely co-
ordinated with the expansion of the Red Army, reinforcement of the Red Guard
and Young Pioneers, sale of economic construction bonds, development of the
cooperative, promotion of agriculture and industry, development of import
and export trade, total enforcement of the labor law, development of the
Lenin school and literacy movement, repair of bridges and roads and launch-
ing of the Soviet election movement. All the broad worker-peasant masses
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must, under the leadership of the local soviet and with one mind and a
unanimous effort, perform all necessary tasks, in order to smash promptly
the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the imperialist Kuomintang and
strive for the victory of the revolution throughout the whole of China.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
1 September 1933
? "Announcement No. 27 of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet
Republic of China"
6080
CSO: 4005
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THIS YEAR'S ELECTION
Report at the Election Movement Meeting of the 18 Southern Counties
6 September 1933
[Text] Comrades, the election meeting of the 18 northern counties has been
held. Today, we hold the election meeting of the 18.southern counties.
Comrades, we hold elections every year. Is there any difference between
the election this year and that of the last? Yes, there is a great differ-
ence. The election this year will result in a more consolidated Soviet--
the most important class weapon. We will use this weapon to further improve
the welfare of the masses, smash the enemy's new "encirclement and suppres-
sion," resist the imperialist policy of dividing up China like a melon and
expand the soviet movement throughout the nation. Comrades, this is the
significance of the election this year. My report is to explain this sig-
nificance. I will discuss it in several sections.
(1) This year's election is at a time when we have smashed the enemy's
fourth "encirclement and suppression" and continue to strive for victory
over its fifth "encirclement and suppression."
From last year until the time of the victory of the battle of Tung-huang-p'o,
the fourth enemy "encirclement and suppression" was completely smashed. We
have expanded the Red Army, consolidated and developed the Soviet areas and
led and helped the nationwide great revolutionary struggles against imperial-
ism, the Kuomintang and the landlords and capitalists. The victories of the
revolution have been greater than any previous year. What about the counter-
revolution? They are weaker than ever before. The counterrevolution, however,
is still waging a desperate struggle, especially imperialism. Confronted by
imminent world revolution and war, the imperialists are desperately invading
China. Japan has already established Manchukuo under its artillery and plans
to form a nation of Mongolia.' England wants to set up a nation of Tibet in
west China. France invades Yunnan and Kweichow. America hopes to divide up
the Yangtze provinces. All these imperialists are directing their running
dog, the Kuomintang, to turn China into a colony, and the imperialist Kuomin-
tang is carrying out its fifth large-scale "encirclement and suppression"
against us. Our current task is to smash the fifth "encirclement and sup-
pression" with a gigantic effort and resist the imperialist diyision of China.
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Revolution and war of a larger scale are spread before our eyes. The Soviet
under the leadership of the Communist Party is the organizer and leader of
the revolution and war. The Soviet election this year is at the time of
smashing the fifth "encirclement and suppression." We must elect a powerful
Soviet to organize and guide the war. This is the momentous significance of
this year's election. This is also the year when the Second All-Soviet Con-
gress will be convened, and a new Central Government, the organizer and leader
of the revolution and war on a national scale, elected. To enable the Second
All-Soviet Congress to shoulder its great historical mission, the election
this year cannot be regarded as an ordinary one.
(2) In order to understand the importance of the election, we must explain
the functions of the soviet.
There are two aspects in the functions of the Soviet, which is a worker-
peasant democratic dictatorship, and both aspects are completely contrary
to the government of the old ruling class. First, the Soviet of worker-
peasant democratic dictatorship is a weapon to hit the counterrevolution.
It eliminates the external counterrevolution by means of war--our resistance
to the enemey "encirclement and suppression" in the past and at present, our
victorious attacks, and our task to prosecute a revolutionary war against all
the counter-revolutionary forces in the nation. Meanwhile, the Soviet sup-
presses the internal counterrevolution by means of the court--our handling,
in the past and at present, of the AB League, the Reorganization Faction,
the Social Democratic Party, the Trotskyites and all the landlords and capi-
talists in the soviet areas. The moment they perform any counterrevolutionary
activity, we immediately suppress them. The revolutionary class--the toiling
worker-peasant masses--handles internal and external counterrevolution with
the Soviet as the weapon. This is the first function of the Soviet. Only
when all the counterrevolutions are overcome will our class become the ruling
class and our political power the ruling political power. As you can all
see, we are in control today because we have overcome innumerable enemy
attacks and suppressed the counterrevolutionary activities all along.
Now we will discuss the second function. The Soviet of worker-peasant demo-
cratic dictatorship is a tool for the masses to manage their own lives. The
lives of our worker-peasant masses were entirely managed by the landlords and
bourgeoisie in the past. Because they possessed political power, they enjoyed
freedom, while withholding freedom from us. The peasants had no land. The
workers had no labor law for their protection. What about today? The peasants
have land, and the workers enjoy the protection of the labor law. Our own
political power gives us freedom, and we promote all kinds of necessary con-
struction under our own political power. We completely manage our own lives.
We are truly free and equal, without interference from any landlord or capi-
talist, while we enforce dictatorship over the landlords and capitalists,
excluding them from participation in our political power. We formulate all
kinds of laws to control them, giving them no political freedom at all. This
is the function of the Soviet in the second aspect.
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All revolutionary struggles in the world are for the purpose of seizing
political power and consolidating it, while the desperate struggle of the
counterrevolutionaries against the revolutionary forces is solely for the
purpose of defending their political power. The worker-peasant masses in
the Soviet areas have already seized political power. We must defend and
develop it so that it can fulfill the momentous functions of hitting internal
and external counterrevolutionary forces and improving the living condition
and welfare of the workers and peasants. We must elect large groups of the
most advanced and most positive elements, with the greatest awareness, into
the Soviet, and eliminate unsatisfactory elements among the existing per-
sonnel. This is important.
Many people do not understand clearly the solemn significance of political
power and elections. If. they do not understand the functions of the Soviet,
they will not participate in the election in a positive manner. When the
Soviet personnel do not understand them, they will not guide the election
successfully. Comrades, the election will soon be held. To spread the
effect of the Soviet and the election among the masses, Soviet personnel
must first understand it clearly. Only then will the election this year be
successful. Only then will we mobilize unanimously and struggle for the
building of a powerful Soviet of worker-peasant democratic dictatorship!
(3) There are the favorable conditions in the election this year.
We are at the most critical point of the revolution and war, while the effect
of the Soviet and its election is momentous. Can the task be accomplished
in the election this year? Our answer is, Yes, because we have many-favor-
able conditions. First, although the scale of the fifth enemy "encircle-
ment and suppression" is very large, we already have initial successes. In
the past 2 months, we won three successive big battles. We captured Lien-
deleted and defeated the 19th Route Army in the first battle. We took Wu-
chiang and routed the 80th Division in the second battle. We laid siege
to Yen-p'ing and repelled enemy reenforcements in the third battle. Over
6,000 weapons were captured. We will hold the election during the great
victories of the Red Army.
Second, the election this year will cover a wider area because we have
greatly expanded the Soviet territory by smashing the fourth "encirclement
and suppression." We will hold elections this year in 10 soviet provinces--
Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung-Kiangsi, Fukien-Kiangsi, Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi,
Hunan-Kiangsi, Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi, Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei, Hunan-Hupeh-deleted
and Szechwan. The scale of the election will be bigger.
Third, in many Soviet provinces, the rural urban class struggles are more
intensive this year than last year. Many achievements have been made in the
land investigation movement, the enforcement of the labor law, culture and
education and economic construction. Especially in the land investigation
movement, many hidden landlords and rich peasants have been uncovered and
their right to vote deprived. Undesirables concerned in the Soviet organs
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have been purged in large groups. All these constitute the foundation for
a more successful election this year.
Fourth, we possess experiences of past elections, especially last year, which
are valuable lessons for the election this year. We must continue with the
good achievements of past elections and bring them to a greater light, but
we must avoid and discard the defects and errors and guard against their
repetition. The Central Government has made a correct summary in its
directive and clarified the achievements and the errors of past elections.
The comrades must study them carefully, and each and every Soviet work com-
rade must do likewise and explain them clearly to the voting masses. Only
when the lessons of the past are correctly understood will the election this
time become even more successful.
(4) How to guide the election this year.
Comrades, as we know that the election this year is at the time when the
imperialist Kuomintang divides up China and carries out the fifth "encircle-
ment and suppression," the political task of the election has been greatly
increased. Because we also know the great revolutionary effect of the Soviet,
while the election will be held under many favorable conditions, we must
properly guide the election and strive for its complete success with a mighty
effort. In regard to the principle and methods of election, the Central
Government has made them very clear in the Election Law and Election Directive,
and I will not repeat them item by item. Today, I wish only to bring several
important issues to the comrades' attention. These are the propaganda and
agitation of the election, basic election, voter registration, work reporting,
election units,, candidates' lists, voters' mass meeting and the duties of the
election committee. Let me present a simple explanation of these issues,
because they are extremely important and require the attention of each and
every comrade.
The first issue concerns the propaganda of the election. For the election
this year, we must perform the most extensive propaganda in the 3 weeks be-
fore the election, explaining the relationship between smashing the fifth
"encirclement and suppression" and resisting the imperialist division of
China and the election this year, the revolutionary functions of the Soviet,
and the fact that the election is held on the foundation of victory. Then
the masses will regard the election as something vital, participate in it
with full confidence and elect many advanced elements to the Soviet. Those
elected will undertake the affairs of the state with courage. Such propa-
ganda and agitation are the prerequisites of a successful election. With-
out them, the masses will not understand the current political situation, the
functions of the Soviet and the foundation of victory of the election. Then,
they will not enthusiastically participate in the election, nor will the
elected increase their courage. The propaganda for the first election last
year was relatively good. Therefore, the achievement was also relatively
good. The propaganda for the second election was inferior. Therefore, the
achievement was also inferior. This year, the election propaganda must sur-
pass that of the first election last year in order to encourage the greater
majority of the masses to participate in it.
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Second, the urban and rural congresses are the basic organizations of the
Soviet. Therefore, their election is the Soviet's basic election. The urban
and rural soviets are the level closest to the masses. All decrees and
policies of the higher level soviet and all tasks of expanding the Red Army,
land investigation movement, the labor law, economic construction and cul-
tural construction must go through them before practical implementation. The
election of the urban and rural soviets is, therefore, the most basic and
important election. Moreover, a successful all-Soviet congress will require
good representatives from the provincial soviet congresses. A successful
provincial soviet congress will require good representatives from the county
soviet congresses. A successful county soviet congress will require good
representatives from the district and town soviet congresses.
What is required for a successful district soviet congress? It will require
good representatives from the township soviet congresses. The election of
the town and township soviets is linked with the entire Soviet election of
the district, county, province and nation. That is why the election of the
town and township soviets is the most basic and most vital. Comrades, a Red
Army patriots' memorial tower is being erected along the side of our meeting
ground. The tower has a 15-foot rock foundation. To build a strong tower,
we must begin with a strong foundation. To build a strong Soviet, we must
also begin with a strong foundation, which is the urban and rural soviet
congresses.
Third, to build firm urban and rural soviets, not only must we make the most
propaganda to get the greater majority of the masses to come to the election
meetings, but we must be sure that all the voters coming to the meetings are
genuine workers, peasants and others entitled to vote and that no person who
has been deprived of his voting right infiltrates the meetings and that no
person who should have his voting right deprived misrepresents himself as a
worker or peasant. This task is called voter registration. The strict demar-
cation between those with and those without the voting right is the basic
starting point of the Soviet political power and the most important item in
the Soviet constitution and election law. Look. Isn't the tower foundation
made of stones? The tower is, therefore, firm. If some dirt and manure
are mixed in it, the tower will not be so firm. If we want to build a firm
Soviet, we must start by guarding against any landlord, rich peasant, or
capitalist stealing the voting right.
Fourth, the election unit last year was too big. This year, it is reduced.
Article 11 of the Election Law provides that the workers will hold a separate
election meeting, the peasants will use the village as the unit and the urban
poor will elect according to the neighborhoods. This change has a close con-
nection with the complete success of the election, because when the election
unit is small, it will not only enable most or all of the voters to come to
the election meeting, but make it easier for the voters to select among the
candidates, improve the quality and quantity of the voters' proposals and
facilitate the exercise of. the recall rights in the future. Therefore, the
comrades must refrain from making the election unit any larger.
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Fifth, 'in regard to the work reports to the voters by the town and township
soviets, the Central Internal Affairs Department has drafted an outline.
The district soviet must guide the township soviets to call mass meetings
in the various villages and make reports, according to the outline. In the
election last year, many areas did not follow the report system. This year,
it must be followed, because, by reporting to the masses, government work
will have a chance to undergo mass inspection, and the enthusiasm of the
voters will reach a higher pitch. The governments of the district level and
above must make work reports when the lower level governments hold their
congresses.
Sixth, in regard to the list of candidates, its proper preparation is an
important link for the success of the election. As stated in the directive
of the Central, the opinions of the masses on the candidates must be collected
before the election and published, so that the voters will be able to give
full consideration to the candidates. Primary attention must be given to the
components of the candidates' list. Not only the proper numbers of workers
and peasants must be elected according to the Election Law, but at least 25
percent of the elected must be laboring women, in accordance with the Election
Directive. Next, attention must be given to the candidates' political mani-
festations. All those guilty of corruption, decadence and negative slowdown
and all those compromising with the landlords, rich peasants and capitalists
must not be elected. All those elected must be positive in their work and
correct in their concept. Next, suitable attention must be given to the
work capacity. Those whose ability is too inferior must not be elected into
the government. Then, among the current Soviet work personnel, such as dele-
gates, committee members and chairmen, all those who are guilty of grave mis-
takes such as corruption and decadence, negative slowdown, bureaucraticism
and sheltering landlords, rich peasants and capitalists and have not reformed,
must not be reelected. But those comrades who are positive in work and cor-
rect in concept may be reelected without question. It is entirely wrong to
think that election means electing new people for all the posts and discard-
ing all the existing personnel.
The seventh point concerns the election mass meeting. Election itself re-
quires only 1 day, but its preparation will take weeks, because the many im-
portant tasks discussed above must have several weeks for their preparation.
It is absolutely necessary, therefore, to make the preparations in advance.
We must not put it off day-after-day and only become busy 2 or 3 days before
the election. Now the 18 northern counties have scheduled 1 September to
5 October as the period for urban and rural elections. The various districts
must schedule the election in the last 10 days and devote the several weeks
before 25 September to the work of election propaganda, voter registration,
work reports and candidates' lists before full success can be achieved on
election day. The 18 southern counties may hold the election a month later,
at the end of October, and devote the months of September and October to
preparation. Next, on election day, the voters must be mobilized to attend
the meeting. This year, we must be able to get the greatest majority of the
voters to come to the election meeting and succeed in completing the election
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at one meeting. We must avoid having to call a second meeting because of
the lack of a quorum for the first meeting. Still next, when the list of
candidates is proposed at the election meeting for discussion and voting,
the masses must be activated to express their opinions, similar to the en-
thusiastic criticisms at the election meeting in Hsing-kuo last year. The
masses must not be forced to pass the list of candidates if they do not
approve of any one of them. Should there be any evil elements making trouble
and forcing the masses to pass the candidates' list prepared by them, they
must be severely punished upon discovery. Lastly, after the election, the
proposals of the masses must be discussed and their opinions collected and
presented to the Soviet to serve as the administrative policy of the new
government.
Eighth, the tasks discussed above require a special organ for their handling.
This is the election committee of the town and district soviets. According
to Article 46 of the Election Law, the election committee is formed by the
representatives of the government and the various mass organizations and
approved by the county soviet. It is responsible for all the work of the
election. Most of the election committees last year did not produce any
effect, and the election was directed by government personnel only. There-
fore, the election was not carefully guided in many areas. There were also
instances of undesirables in the government manipulating the election. To
avoid such shortcomings, election committees must be organized this year,
to be formed by the government and mass organizations.
Comrades, I said much. I have discussed the significance of election and
the important points of election work. As for what I have not touched upon
--that the county soviet must guide all the district soviet congresses of
the county with plans, that the provincial soviet must guide all the county
soviet congresses of the province with plans, that the Central must guide all
the provincial soviet congresses with plans, and individual items concerning
the election--detailed instructions are given in the Election Law and the
Election Directive, which I shall not reiterate here. In regard to the
important points discussed by me here, I hope the comrades will repeat them
to the comrades of the county and district soviets and bring them up at the
presidium meetings for detailed discussion. Comrades, this year's election
is not an ordinary one. It is an election with great historical significance,
a sharp class struggle. We must handle it with our full attention. Besides
the many tasks connected with the election itself, we must seize the oppor-
tunity and launch the land investigation and class investigation struggles
and the Soviet prosecution movement.
Only through class investigation and the prosecution movement will we uncover
those stealing the voting right, purge the undesirables infiltrating the
Soviet and make the election this time more successful. This is especially
true with the 18 southern counties, because there are still 2 more months
for us to proceed with the land investigation movement. In addition, in areas
where the administrative divisions have not been defined, they must be prompt-
ly. By so doing, we firmly believe that this year's election will be a com-
plete success. Currently, the proletariat and oppressed nations of the whole
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world are hoping for the success of China's soviet movement. And the toiling
masses of the entire nation are looking for the Soviet banner. They under-
stand that only the Soviet can save China. In these few days, the delegates
of various nations are holding an anti-imperialist war rally in Shanghai.
They, likewise, eagerly hope for the success of China's soviet. Comrades,
we must respond to all such eager hopes. How do we do so? We will respond
to them with the success of the election of all the soviet areas, with our
Second All-Soviet Congress.
Our slogans are
Strive for the complete success of the election!
Smash the fifth enemy "encirclement and suppression"!
Resist imperialist division of China!
Long live Soviet China!
RED CHINA, No 108, 6 September 1933
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DECLARATION TO THE TOILING WORKER-PEASANT MASSES OF THE WORLD
6 September 1933
[Text] Dear Brothers, Sisters, Comrades, Friends!
We are China's workers, peasants, urban and rural poor and revolutionary
soldiers and intellectuals. We are unwilling to remain forever the slaves
of imperialism and domestic landlords and capitalists. We are creating our
own new life of freedom. We are in the process of leading the 450 million
people of China to wage a struggle of liberation. On one-sixth of China's
soil (in many areas in the provinces of Kiangsi, Fukien, Hupeh, Hunan,
Szechwan, Anhwei, Honan and Shensi), we have, by our own effort, begun to
create the one and only true people's political power--the Soviet political
power and the one and only true people's army--the Worker-Peasant Red Army.
China's Soviet government and Red Army struggle for the fundamental improve-
ment of the political and economic conditions of China's toiling worker-peasant
masses. China's Soviet government and Red Army wish to attain this point
right from the beginning--to let the workers, peasants, poor people and revo-
lutionary soldiers and intellectuals do what they want to do freely and de-
cide on their own destiny. We want to enable those who are without food,
clothing, housing and jobs; who are illiterate and live as beasts of burden
to have food, clothing, housing and jobs; be able to read and to live human
lives. In order to achieve this, the Soviet government has given them land,
houses and jobs; opened many free schools, literacy classes, libraries and
clubs for the adults and children; and started many free hospitals and sana-
toriums for the sick and the old.
Yet, the small group of parasites controlling China--foreign imperialists and
Chinese warlords, bureaucrats, landlords, capitalists, usurers--are always
unwilling for us to live a human life.
Precisely because we have begun to create our own new life of freedom, because
we only work 8 hours a day at higher wages, because those of us with little
or no land now have land and because our women have gained liberation, Chiang
Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei and all the Kuomintang beasts revile us as "Red
bandits" and "communists bandits' and continually launch "encirclement and
suppression" against us.
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When Japanese imperialism wildly slaughtered our compatriots and occupied
China's Northeast and northern territory province by province, and when
American, British and French imperialists actively divided China, we de-
clared to the people and troops of the entire nation, time and again: The
imperialists want to divide up China completely. All the people of China
must rise up as a man to defend the nation!
We have openly proposed over and over to all the troops--any troops, as long
?
as they support our three simple conditions--they may sign battle agreements
with us, in order to arm ourselves and resist Japan and other imperialists,
defend our national existence and strive for national liberation. The neces-
sary conditions to truly organize and arm the people for the sacred national
defense against Japan and other imperialists are: (1) immediately cease
attacks on Soviet areas; (2) give the people the minimum democratic rights
--the freedoms of speech, publication, meeting, association, demonstration
and strike; and (3) permit the people to organize and arm the anti-Japanese
volunteer army.
Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei and all the Kuomintang traitors always reply
to us in the same way: Intensify and expand the cruel attack of the Soviet
areas!
The Kuomintang has now begun its sixth '-'.encirclement and suppression" against
our free Soviet China! For this "encirclement and suppression," just around
our central Soviet area alone (Kiangsi, Fukien, Hunan and Kwangtung), over
442,000 Nanking and Kwangtung troops are assembled. These troops are equipped
with new model superior weapons, including artillery, tanks, planes and poison
gas.
Where did the Kuomintang warlords and politicians acquire so many new weapons
and large sums of money for their troops? They acquired them from the Ameri-
can, British, Japanese, French and German imperialists.
These imperialists utilize the weapons manufactured by you and the money
extracted from you to destroy the people of China who are struggling for
their own national and social liberation!
You and we still remember clearly that, not long ago, the troops of England,
America and Japan shelled our Canton Commune and Ch'ang-sha Soviet, and the
planes of French bombed our Lung-chou Soviet in Kwangsi!
In the Kuomintang's sixth "encirclement and suppression," the role of the
imperialists is clearly revealed. Besides the 50-million dollars of so-
called "cotton and wheat loans" and the 40-million dollars of so-called
"aviation loans" to the Nanking government, American imperialism gave the
Nanking troops 150 military planes and artillery, tanks, machine guns, chemi-
cal poisons and ammunition loaded in several dozen ships and sent several
hundred pilots and all kinds of military and technical experts. The British
ambassador to China (Lampson) personally went on an inspection trip to
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Szechwan and gave Liu Hsiang 20 million English pounds to attack our Red 4th
Army there. Though the British, American and Japanese imperialists vigorously
compete against one another in the division of China, they take unanimous
action against soviet China. They order their own running dogs--the warlords
of the Nanking, Kwangtung and northern factions--to conduct a common "en-
circlement and suppression" of the liberated people of our Soviet areas. The
German fascist government sent 70 military experts (including the former
National Defense Chief (Sai-k'o-t'o)) to Nanking. Chiang Kai-shek organized
them into a special unit in the Nan-ch'ang General Headquarters, in order to
direct the combat activities against the Red Army. The so-called "Technical
Committee" sent by the League of Nations to Nanking precisely at this time
actually is to help Chiang Kai-shek plan and attack China's Soviet and the
Red Army.
Brothers, Sisters, Comrades, Friends!
Look! The pilots and the military and technical experts of the so-called
"democratic" America and other nations are, under the direction of Germany's
fascist generals and China's Kuomintang warlords, carrying out the cruelest
air and chemical warfare with American, British, French and German planes,
poison gas, tanks and artillery in the territory of the Soviet China and
slaughtering large numbers of workers, peasants, soldiers, poor people and
intellectuals, in order to eliminate the free Chinese Soviet Republic and
Worker-Peasant Red Army
Brothers, Sisters, Comrades, Friends!
In order to defend their own Soviet Republic, thousands and tens of thousands
of men and women, old and young, did not hesitate to use their own flesh and
blood, brains and lives to repel courageously the five successive "encircle-
ment and suppressions" of the Kuomintang, superior in number and weaponry.
Today, this young Chinese Soviet Republic faces a grave crisis.
At this critical point, we request you
To help us resist the executioners who want us to relive the dark inhuman
life and slaughter us!
To make us relive the dark life of slavery of the past, the international
imperialists are determined to drown China's soviet revolution in a sea of
blood. The British, American, Japanese and French imperialist bandits are
concentrating warships, airplanes and marines around Soviet China and all
its large cities and coastal ports. They want to massacre us first before
proceeding with a new imperialist world war, causing gigantic sacrifices and
misery to mankind in the whole world!
The Central Executive Committee, the supreme organ of the Soviet Republic of
China, solemnly appeals to you to join us in a courageous mass struggle:
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Resist imperialist intervention in the Soviet China!
Resist imperialist division of China! Resist imperialist preparation of a
new imperialist world war while massacring the people of China!
Resist the massacre of the toiling people of Soviet China by the imperial-
ists with poison gas, planes, tanks and artillery! Oppose the shipping of
all arms to China! Demand the immediate recall of American pilots and mili-
tary experts and German generals and staff!
Demand the immediate withdrawal of American, British, Japanese, French and
Italian navies, infantry and air force;
Long live the international sympathy of the proletariat and oppressed people
of the whole world!
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic
of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
Chu Teh, Chairman of the Revolutionary
Military Affairs Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China and Commander in Chief
of the Worker-Peasant Red Army
6 September 1933, Jui-chin, Kiangsi
? "Soviet China," Soviet Union Foreign Workers' Publishing House (Moscow),
1933
(The introduction to "Soviet China" was written by Wang Ming. In it, Wang
Ming quoted the entire text of this article with the following prefix:
"...We wish to reprint in the introduction the Declaration of the Central
Government of the Soviet Republic of China to the Toiling Worker-Peasant
Masses of the World which we received from China 3 days ago. The text of
the said declaration is as follows ...)
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ON EDUCATION WORK
Directive No 17 of Central People's Committee
15 September 1933
[Text] Culture and education occupy an important position in the entire
soviet movement and constitute an indispensable force in the current mobili-
zation against the fifth enemy "encirclement and suppression." Intensifying
education to raise the political and cultural levels of the broad masses,
enhance their class awareness and train revolutionary successors is one of
our major tasks.
The education work at present apparently lags behind other, soviet work and
still cannot truly keep pace with the need of the successful development of
the revolutionary war. It is due to the many errors and defects in the work
of the Education Department so far, the neglect of education by some soviet
organs and responsible comrades, the failure to understand the importance
of education in the current domestic war, and even the opportunist viewpoint
that it is impossible to pursue education in an environment of war. This
situation must not be allowed to continue.
The biggest defect of education so far is the lack of a clear policy. Though
the issue was mentioned in Directive No 1 of the Central Education Depart-
ment, it was inadequate and not completely correct. The Education Department
has so far, as shown in its work and documents, neglected to build a popular
free education system. It has not properly linked popular education with
social education and developed them. Instead of placing the task of com-
munist education in the forefront, it limits education to the realm of the
bourgeois democratic tasks of opposing feudalism and superstition. Meanwhile,
it must also be pointed out that the lack of planning to wipe out illiteracy,
an extremely important cultural-educational task, and the "leftwing" oppor-
tunist error on the issue of utilizing bourgeois intellectuals are, so far,
the big defects of the work of the Education Department.
While mobilizing for the current revolutionary war, we must establish a free
popular education system, create revolutionary successors according to the
communist spirit and spread Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theories. We
must completely eliminate in the shortest possible time the most vicious
legacy left by the evil gentry and landlord bourgeoisie--illiteracy. We
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must set up Lenin teachers' schools and all types of cadre training schools,
cultivate a powerful educators' army that can popularize education and give
full attention to and organize the development of social education work such
as worker-peasant drama associations, blue-shirt leagues, clubs, libraries
and reading rooms. These constitute the education policy and central task
at the present time.
Besides training large groups of worker-peasant education work cadres, we
must utilize those bourgeois intellectuals and experts who are willing to
serve the Soviet.
Whenever possible, we must educate and give preferential treatment to ele-
mentary school teachers. At the very least, we must give government funds
to the elementary school students for their books and stationary and meals
to the elementary school teachers.
The People's Committee is in complete agreement with the Central Education
Department's suggestion to hold a culture and education rally with the League
Central Bureau in October. Without doubt, such a rally will be extremely
important in the future of the culture and education of the Soviet areas.
For its complete success, the Central Education Department is charged with
the responsibility of making full preparations.
The People's Committee believes that the education work assistance movement
recently initiated by the League Central Bureau will serve as an effective
surprise attack on the culture-education front of the Soviet areas and help
to expedite the elimination of the backward situation of education.
For the prompt and thorough change in education work and the successful com-
pletion of the central task of education at the present time, we must ruth-
lessly struggle against the neglect of education and all the'incorrect con-
cepts in education work. Only under such an ideological struggle will the
culture-education construction of the Soviet areas urgently needed by the
war be truly developed. It is so ordered.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet Re-
public of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
15 September 1933
? "Directive No 17 of the Central People's Committee of the Soviet Republic
of China" (mimeographed), 15 September 1933.
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PROVISIONAL AGRICULTURAL TAX LAW
17 September 1933 (passed)
[Text] Article 1. In regard to the criteria of the graduated agricultural
tax, the tax rates, after the peasants have received their land allocations,
are determined according to the amount of harvest of major crops of the entire
household per year, the actual harvest of each person from his land alloca-
tion and the number of persons in the household who have received land allo-
cations. The tax rates on the rich peasants must be higher than the poor
and middle peasants.
Article 2. The Agricultural Tax Rate Table is formulated and promulgated by
the People's Committee.
Article 3. Taxes are only levied on major products (grain, wheat), not on
supplementary products. Where there are two grain or wheat crops a year,
however, taxes are levied twice.
Article 4. Tea hills, mu-tzu [2606 2737]. wooded hills and vegetables gardens,
which are considered producing major products in the same caregory as rice
and wheat fields and so allocated, must also be taxed.
Article 5. Red Army families (limited to the soldier himself, his parents,
wife and those brothers and sisters-who are without labor)are tax exempt,
according to the Red Army Preferential Treatment Regulations, but the exemp-
tion is limited to those enlisting before harvesting.
Article 6. The provisions on tax exempt workers are as follows:
1. Farm laborers and land manual laborers, their wives (or husbands) and
children are tax exempt.
2. Aquatic manual laborers and their wives'(or husbands) are tax exempt.
3. Store clerks, handicraftsmen, ship workers and other industrial workers
who have received land allocations are tax exempt.
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4. The above categories of tax-exempt workers are limited to those working
continuously for 2 years or more. Those who have not worked continuously
for 2 years are not tax exempt.
Article 7. In case of natural disasters or enemy destruction, or in case of
families orphaned, widowed, crippled, or otherwise losing their labor force,
the tax may be reduced or exempted according to the situation.
Article 8. Taxes on the personnel of the Soviet government themselves and
their parents and wives are levied at half the rate. In regard to those who
are workers and tax exempt, but whose family members are not tax exempt ac-
cording to the provisions of Article 6, the taxes on the family members are
reduced to half. The reduction, however, is limited to those joining govern-
ment work before harvesting.
Article 9. Tax is exempt on additional agricultural income due to improved
seed or improved cultivation.
Article 10. Tax exemptions on agricultural products harvested from reclaimed
land are granted according to the number of years the land remained unculti-
vated and the class classifications of the taxpayers as shown in the following
table.
No of years of tax exemption
No of years Reclaimed by middle Reclaimed by rich Reclaimed by
uncultivated or poor peasants peasants landlords
1 or more
2 or more
3 or more
2 1
3 2
5 3
Article 11. This tax law becomes effective 18 September 1933. Upon the
promulgation of this tax law, the provisions on agricultural taxes in the
Revised Provisional Tax Law promulgated 15 July 1932 are abolished.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic
of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
18 September 1933
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Poor and Middle Peasants' Land Tax Rate Table
Actual dry grain obtained per person
No or
persons
rec'ing
land in
house-
hold
1 or
more
tan
2 or
more
tan
3 or
nore
tan
4 or
more
tan
5 or
more
tan
6 or
more
tan
7 or
more
tan
8 or
more
tan
or
9
more
tan
10 or
more
tan
11 or
more
tan
12 or
more
tan
13 or
more
tan
14 or
more
tan
H.
15 or
more
tan
1
xempt
exempt
3.8
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
15.0
16.0
2
xempt
exempt
3.9
5.1
6.1
7.1
8.1
9.1
10.1
11.1
12.1
13.1
14.1
15.1
16.1
3
xempt
1.5
4.0
5.2
6.2
7.2
8.2
9.2
10.2
11.2
12.2
13.2
14.2
15.2
16.2
4
exempt
1.7
4.1
5.3
6.3
7.3
8.3
9.3
10.3
11.3
12.3
13.3
14.3
15.3
16.3
5
exempt
1.9
4.2
5.4
6.4
7.4
8.4
9.4
0.4
11.4
12.4
13.4
14.4
15.4
16.4
6
exempt
2.1
4.3
5.5
6.5
7.5
8.5
9.5
0.5
11.5
12.5
13.5
14.5
15.5
16.5
7
exempt
2.3
4.4
5.6
6.6
7.6
8.6
9.6
0.6
11.6
12.6
13.6
14.6
15.6
16.6
8
exempt
2.5
4.6
5.8
6.8
7.8
8.8
9.8
0.8
11.8
12.8
13.8
14.8
15.8
16.8
9
exempt
2.7
4.8
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
1.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
15.0
16.0
17.0
10
exempt
2.9
5.0
6.2
7.2
8.2
9.2
10.2
1.2
12.2
13.2
14.2
15.2
16.2
17.2
11
exempt
3.1
5.2
6.4
7.4
8.4
9.4
10.4
1.4
12.4
13.4
14.4
15.4
16.4
17.4
12
xempt
3.3
5.4
6.6
7.6
8.6
9.6
10.6
11.6
12.6
13..6
14.6
15.6
16.6
17.6
13
exempt
3.5
5.6
6.8
7.8
8.8
9.8
10.8
1.8
12.8
13.8
14.8
15.8
16.8
17.8
14
exempt
3.7
5.8
7.0
8.0
9.0 '
10.0
11.0
2.0
13.0 X
14.0
15.0
16.0
17.0
18.0
15
exempt
3.9
6.0
7.2
8.2
9.2
10.2
11.2
2.2
13.2
14.2
15.2
16.2
17.2
18.2
Tax rates on higher receipts by analogy.
? "Provisional Agricultural Tax Law," published by the Central People's Finance Committee Department,
18 September 1933.
* "Collection of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents," Vol 4, 1935.
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CORRECT COMMANDISM IN SELLING BONDS
Letter From the Central Government to the Governments of All Levels
23 September 1933
[Text] Provincial Soviets of Kiangsi, Fukien, Fukien-Kiangsi and Kwangtung-
Kiangsi, County Soviet of Jui-chin and Soviet Governments of All Levels:
Because of the issuance of the economic construction bonds, great achievements
have been made within a short time. In all areas where the means of mobili-
zation is good, the broad masses enthusiastically arose to support the bonds,
such as Yun-chi District in Jui-chin and Ts'ai-ch'i and Hung-fang districts
in Fukien, which are all good examples. In many other areas, nevertheless,
there has been the grave error of commandist allocation. The People's Com-
mittee has issued Directive No 16, an announcement, and propaganda outline
pointing out that full mobilization is the guarantee of bond selling and
severely opposing commandism. In its letter of instruction to the bond com-
mittees of all levels, the Central People's Finance Committee extended the
time limit for bond selling to December. The number of bonds to be sold is
determined according to the local situation to avoid coercive allocation and
afford the local areas ample time for mobilization and selling. Since the
issuance of such instructional documents, methods of selling bonds in all
areas is changing.
The change, nevertheless, is extremely inadequate. Many areas are still
practicing coercive allocation. The most serious instance occurred in Lo-
fang District in Yu-tu, where a middle peasant and the district soviet
chairman committed suicide due to the coercive allocation of bonds. The
400 or more people who fled their homes in Hsiao-ch'i District in Kwangtung-
Kiangsi were also connected with coercive allocation. These were shameful
incidents which should never have occurred. Yet, they did. Upon hearing
the news, the Central sent men to investigate and will severely punish the
Yu-tu county soviet. When this letter is received, the provincial soviets
must immediately instruct the county soviets to inspect the mobilization
method of bond selling in the districts and townships. They must warn the
soviet personnel with the example of Yu-tu, immediately launch a campaign of
intense self-criticism, concentrate the firepower against coercive commandism
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in all work and never resort to it whether in expanding the Red Army, the
land investigation movement, the election movement, the sale of bonds, or
the development of cooperatives. Yu-tu's commandist error has occurred
seriously in its work in all aspects, but more apparent*in the sale of
bonds. The lessons of Lo-fang and Hsiao-ch'i districts also serve as the
gravest warnings to the soviets of all levels.
In order to complete the sale of bonds successfully, attention must be given
to the time and amount. In the competition agreements of the various areas,
many of them have set mid-October as the deadline. It is too short. They
must follow the 15 September instruction of the People's Finance Committee
and appropriately extend the time limit. In areas where the harvest or
bond selling is late, it may be extended to mid-December for the final com-
pletion of sale, in order to afford them sufficient time for mobilization work.
They must not, however, follow the example of Hui-ch'ang and other areas
that put bond selling aside, wait for an extension, become slack on the
performance of the work and try to reach the goal by coercive allocation
in December. This is absolutely not permitted. In regard to the amount,
it depends entirely on the practical local situation and the extent of the
mass positivity. There may be increases and reductions. There must be no
mechanical allocation. The county and district soviets must increase or
decrease the amounts of bonds according to the different situations of the
various counties and district, in order to adapt to the local conditions.
They must not issue the bonds all at one time and consider their tasks as
ended, thus forcing the lower level to the path of coercive allocation. This
bureaucratic pattern must be immediately rectified.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet Re-
public of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
23 September 1933
"RED CHINA" No 113, 27 September 1933
6080
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ORDER NO 49 OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
SOVIET REPUBLIC OF CHINA
[Text] (1) The decision of this committee on 10 October 1933 on certain
issues in the land struggle is hereby published.
(2) All the class classifications prior to 10 October 1933 in the various
areas which are incompatible with this decision must be revised accordingly.
In regard to those who, due to the change in their class classifications,
should have their land and assets handled differently. Concerning the land,
houses, woods, ponds and gardens belonging to the middle peasants, poor
peasants, poor people and workers which have been divided, a means must be
found to return them to the original owners. As for assets other than land,
houses, woods, ponds and gardens, they should be returned to the original
owners only when possible (for instance, if there are still landlord assets
in the local area which can be confiscated). Concerning the land, houses,
woods, ponds, gardens, draft animals and farm tools to which the rich peas-
ants are entitled, and the assets to which the capitalists are entitled, they
are returned to the original owners only when possible.
(3) In regard to the cases decided by the judicial organs of the various
areas prior to 10 October 1933, where the judgments have been carried out,
they will not be changed. Where they have not been carried out, or are in
the process of being carried out, they must be revised according to this
decision.
(4) In regard to the class classifications or the disposal of land and
assets according to such class classifications prior to and after 10 October
1933 which are compatible with this decision and not erroneous, no one may
request a change.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China
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? "Decision of the Central Government concerning Certain Issues in the Land
Struggle" (mimeographed), Central Government People's Committee, 1933
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DECISION ON CERTAIN ISSUES IN THE LAND STRUGGLE
Passed by the People's Committee
10 October 1933
[Text] In the struggle of land division and land investigation, many prac-
tical issues arose. Such issues were a result of lack of provision in
previous documents, ambiguity in the provisions, or incorrect interpretation
on the part of soviet personnel. To rectify and prevent errors, the People's
Committee, besides approving the principles of analyzing the landlords, rich
peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants and workers in ""How To Analyze the
Classes," hereby makes the following decision:
Under ordinary conditions, if one member in the family spent one-third of
his time a year on major work, it is called labor. If it was less than one-
third of his time, or if it was not devoted to major work, even though it
involved one-third of his time, it is called incidental labor.
Attention must be given to the following:
(1) The rich peasants performed their own labor, and the landlords performed
either no, or only incidental, labor. Labor is, therefore, the major cri-
terion to distinguish rich peasants and landlords.
(2) One person is the criterion to determine labor for a household. Where
there were several members in a household, if one of them labored, the house-
hold is considered as performing labor. Some people feel that only when two
members, or the entire household, performed labor can the household be con-
sidered as performing labor. This is not correct.
(3) The criterion to determine the time spent on labor is one-third of the
year, i.e., 4 months. Performing major labor for 4 full months, or less
than 4 full months, is the dividing line between labor and incidental labor
(the dividing line between rich peasants and landlords). It is erroneous
for some people to consider performing major labor for 6 months out of the
year as incidental labor.
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(4) Major labor indicates labor in the major tasks of production, such as
plowing, planting, harvesting and other important production labor. How-
ever, labor is not limited to agricultural production. Firewood chopping,
porterage and other important tasks are all considered major labor.
(5) Non-major labor refers to all kinds of supplementary labor, occupying
a secondary position in production, such as assisting in weeding, assisting
in vegetable planting, looking after draft animals, etc.
(6) Labor is the main criterion used to distinguish the rich peasants and
landlords. Those who only hired permanent help to cultivate the land, did
not exploit by land rents or loan interests, were responsible for directing
their own production, but did not personally perform major labor are still
considered landlords snd will not receive land allocations.
(7) The time element for the landlord classification is computed backward
from the time of the uprising.. Those who lived as landlords for 3 years or
more are considered landlords. Many errors have occurred on the issue of
labor and incidental labor in the land investigation movement. Major labor
was called incidental labor and people were misclassified as landlords. Or,
incidental labor was mistaken for major labor and the people misclassified
as rich peasants. This came from the lack of a clear criterion between
landlords and rich peasants. According to. the above provisions, such errors
can be avoided.
The above provisions, nevertheless, are only "under ordinary conditions."
Under special conditions, different handling is required. If one member of
a household exploited by collecting large sums of land rent or loan interest,
such as collecting 100 tan or more of land rent or lending 1,000 yuan or
more in large currency, and the members in the household were not numerous
nor the expenses high, even if someone in the household performed 4 or more
months of major labor in a year, it is still considered a landlord household,
not a rich peasant household. On the other hand, if the members in the house-
hold were numerous and the expenses high, even if there was 100 tan of land
rent or 1,000 yuan of loans, if someone in the household performed major
labor, it is not a landlord household,. but a rich peasant household. There
are cases, too, of households being considered landlords according to their
exploitation situation, but not landlords according to their living condition.
For instance, an individual who was once a rich or. middle peasant, but who,
a few years before the uprising, suddenly lost his labor force due to ill-
ness or death and had to rent out all his land or hire people to cultivate
for him. His entire household lived as a landlord household, it is improper
to consider him a landlord. He must be classified according to his original
status. Or, an individual who was nominally a landlord but whose land ac-
tually belonged to someone else, whose income from exploitation was small,
who performed incidental labor, and who liveda life even inferior to the
peasants, must be considered a rich peasant and allocated poorer land. In
extreme cases, with the consent of the masses, they may be allocated land
of similar quality as the peasants. Finally, those who were peasants in
the past, but suddenly became wealthy due to special opportunities 2 years
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before the uprising and turned into landlords may, with the consent of the
masses, be allocated inferior land the same as the rich peasants, while
their own land must be confiscated, because they were peasants 2 years ago.
The special situations discussed above have been overlooked in some areas
in the land investigation movement.
Well-to-do middle peasants who engaged in some minor exploitation of others
are a part of the middle peasants. Their income from exploitation must not
have exceeded 15 percent of the total household annual receipt. Under cer-
tain conditions, though the exploitation income exceeded 15 percent of the
total annual income, if it did not exceed 30 percent and if the masses do
not oppose them, the parties concerned are still considered well-to-do mid-
dle peasants. Under the soviet political power, the interests of the well-
to-do middle peasants receive the same protection as middle peasants in gen-
eral.
Attention must be given to the following
(1) The well-to-do middle peasants'are a part of the middle peasants. The.
difference is that they engaged in some minor exploitation of others while
the middle peasants did not.
(2) The difference between the well-to-do middle peasants and the rich
peasants is that the exploitation income of the former did not exceed 15
percent of the total household annual income while that of the latter ex-
ceeded 15 percent. This demarcation is required to determine the class classi-
fications.
(3) The minor exploitation by the well-to-do middle peasants refers to such
acts as hiring shepherd boys, part-time help, or monthly help, lending out
small amounts of money, collecting small amounts on loans or school rent,
or renting out small parcels of land, provided the income from such exploi-
tations did not constitute an important part of the livelihood of the house-
hold, i.e., not more than 15 percent, and that the important source of its
livelihood was the labor of its members.
(4) Those whose amount of exploitation was the same as the rich peasants
close to the time of the uprising, but the time of such exploitation did
not exceed 2 years, are still considered well-to-do middle peasants.
(5) When we say that, under certain conditions, although the exploitation
income exceeded 15 percent of the total household annual income, if it did
not exceed 30 percent, and if the masses do not oppose them, the parties
concerned are still considered well-to-do middle peasants, the "certain
conditions" indicate that, although the exploitation amount exceeded 15
percent, the members of the household were numerous, its labor force small
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and its living condition not luxurious. In the event of flood, drought,
famine, illness or death, they might even find themselves in difficulty.
Under the above conditions, the parties concerned must not be considered
rich peasants, but middle peasants, provided the exploitation amount-did
not exceed 30 percent of the total household annual income. Where such
conditions did not exist, those whose exploitation income exceeded 15 per-
cent of their total household annual income are considered rich peasants,
not well-to-do middle peasants. The' determination on the presence or
absence of the conditions is by the public opinion of the'local masses.
The well-to-do middle peasants constitute a considerable portion of the
rural population. In the land investigation movement in many areas, they
have been handled as rich peasants, which is incorrect. Most of the inci-
dents of encroaching upon the middle peasants which occurred in various
areas involved the well-to-do middle peasants. This must be immediately
rectified.
Examples:
(1) A household of six members in which two of them performed labor owned
50 tan of land, actually producing 35 tan of grain (total value 140 yuan,
at 4 yuan per tan current price) , completely farmed by the house-
hold. They had a 5-room house, a cow and a pond which produced 12 yuan
large currency. Their annual income from sundry grain production and hog
raising was approximately 100 yuan. They loaned out 3 tan of raw grain at
50 percent interest, collecting 1.5 tan a year (value 6 yuan) for 4 years.
They loand out money in the sum of 100 yuan large currency (equivalent to
1,800 mao small currency), at 25 percent interest, collecting 25 yuan a year
for 5 years. Decision: The household depended on its own labor as the main
source of its livelihood and its own production brought in 250 yuan or more.
Although it exploited others by collecting interests, its annual interest
income was only 29 yuan, which was under 15 percent of its total income.
After expenses, it had a surplus and it lived fairly well. Nevertheless,
as the amount of exploitation was not great, it is considered a well-to-do
middle peasant, not a rich peasant, household.
(2) A household of 5 members where 1-1/2 members performed labor had 25
tan of land, actually producing 17 tan of grain. It leased in 75 tan of
land, actually producing 42 tan of grain and paying 25 tan in rent for 10
years. Its annual income from sundry grain production and. hog raising was
50 yuan. It hired a shepherd boy for 3 years. It loaned out 60 yuan large
currency, at 30 percent interest, collecting 18 yuan per year for 4 years.
It had a 5-room house and one cow. It had one parcel of wooded hill pro-
ducing 30 tan of mu-t'ao a year. Decision: The household depended mainly
on its own labor for its livelihood. Its annual exploitation of others was
very small, only over 20 yuan (combining amployment of the shepherd boy and
loans), while it was exploited by others in form of 25 tan of land rent.
After expenses, there was hardly any surplus. Therefore, it is considered
an ordinary middle peasant, not a well-to-do middle peasant, household.
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3. The Time and Amount of Exploitation Practiced by the.Rich Peasants
If a person, besides participating in production, relied on exploitation
as a part, or a large part, of the source of livelihood of his household
for 3 successive years immediately prior to the uprising, and if the exploi-
tation amount exceeded 15 percent of the total annual income of the entire
household, he is called a rich peasant. Under certain conditions, though
the exploitation amount exceeded 15 percent of the total income, if it did
not exceed 30 percent, and if the masses do not oppose him, the party con-
cerned is not a rich peasant, but a well-to-do middle peasant.
Attention must be given to the following
(1) The time of the, uprising is the starting point to compute the time of
exploitation by counting backward, and no other time may be used as the
starting point for computation. Some people reckon old accounts and take
the interrupted exploitation of many years ago as the basis to determine
the class classification. This is incorrect.
(2) Three successive years of exploitation constitute the time criterion
to determine-a rich peasant classification. If the exploitation time did
not exceed .3 years, or if it totaled 3 years but was intermittent (not con-
tinuous), although the exploitation amount was the same as the rich peasants
in the same period, the party concerned is still considered well-to-do middle
peasant.
(3) The exploitation amount must have exceeded 15 percent of the total
annual household income before the party concerned is classified as a rich
peasant. If the exploitation amount was below 15 percent, although there
was continuity of 3 years or more, the party concerned is not considered a
rich peasant, but a well-to-do middle peasant.
(4) The total annual household income indicates the total of a person's
receipts from his own production and his exploitation of others. If a
certain household produced by its own effort 400 yuan and received 100 yuan
by exploitation, the 500 yuan total was the total income. As the exploita-
tion income constituted 20 percent of the total income, the party concerned
is a rich peasant.
(5) The "certain conditions" indicate cases where the family members were
numerous, the labor force small and its living condition not luxurious, or,
where it encountered difficulties due to natural disasters or human calami-
ties. Under such conditions, although the exploitation amount exceeded 15
percent, if it did not exceed 30 percent, and if the masses do not oppose
it, it is considered a well-to-do middle peasant household. Here, the
opinion of the masses is extremely important, and consideration of such
cases must be extremely careful. The well-to-do middle peasants must not
be mistaken for rich peasants, causing the dissatisfaction of the middle
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.peasants, nor must the rich peasants be mistaken as well-to-do middle peas-
ants, causing the dissatisfaction of the poor peasants. Therefore, careful
consideration and the consent of the masses are required.
There have'been many disputes on the issues of time and amount in the land
investigation movement, because of the lack of a clear distinction between
the rich peasants and the well-to-do middle peasants, so far. The well-to-
do middle peasants are sometimes handled as rich peasants, or vice versa.
There have been frequent disputes. Now, with the provision on their de-
marcation, such disputes can be avoided.
Examples:
(1) A household of 11 members in which 2 of them performed labor owned
160 tan of land, actually producing 120 tan of grain (worth 480 yuan).
They had 2 parcels of tea hills, producing 30 yuan large currency annually.
They had a pond, producing 15 yuan large currency annually. Their income
from sundry grain production and hog raising was approximately 150 yuan per
year. They hired one permanent helper for 7 years, until the time of the
revolution, thus exploiting approximately 70 yuan of surplus labor a year.
They loaned 250 yuan large currency, at 30 percent interest, collecting 75
yuan a year, for 5 years, until the time of the revolution. A son of the
household who is a scholar, wrote petitions and handled litigation and
relied on his superiority to take advantage of others. Decision: While
this household had two members performing labor, they hired permanent help
and loaned out much money. Their exploitation income exceeded 15 percent
of the total annual hosehold income. Although the members were numerous,
the household had much surplus money after expenses. Therefore, they are
a rich peasant household and entitled to inferior land. The evil gentry
in the household is not entitled to any land.
(2) A household of three members in which one of them was able to perform
major labor for 4 months in the year had 60 tan of land, farmed 30 tan,
actually producing 18 tan of grain, and rented out 30 tan, collecting 12
tan of grain as rent for 5 years. It regularly hired part-time help for
20 days a year. It had one cow and could earn 2 tan of grain a year from
it. It loaned out 120 yuan large currency, at 30 percent interest, col-
lecting 36 yuan a year, for 3 years. Decision: The exploitation income
of this household exceeded the receipts from its own production. Never-
theless, as one member performed 4 months of major labor, it is considered
a rich peasant household and entitled to inferior land.
4. Reactionary Rich Peasants
The rich peasants who were guilty of serious counterrevolutionary conduct
around the time of the uprising, especially after the uprising, are called
reactionary rich peasants. The land and assets of such reactionary rich
peasants and of their family members who participated in such counterrevo-
lutionary conduct must be confiscated.
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The above provision is applicable to reactionary capitalists.
Attention must be given the following
(1) Only the rich peasants guilty of "serious counterrevolutionary con-
duct" are called reactionary rich peasants. Reactionary rich peasants lead
the Civil League during the uprising to massacre the workers and peasants:
resisted the revolutionary government, especially leading others to organize
counterrevolutionary groups or organs after the uprising or performed seri-
ous counterrevolutionary activities individually, including assassination,
serving as an enemy spy, volunteering as a guide to the White army, fleeing
to the White area in aid of the Kuomintang, actively sabotaging the land
investigation movement and economic construction, etc. In regard to those
who are rich peasants and who were guilty of serious counterrevolutionary
conduct, after verification, their land and assets are confiscated. As for
those rich peasants who were guilty of counterrevolutionary conduct but who
were not leaders or performed no important activities, their land and assets
must not be confiscated.
(2) In regard to the family members of the reactionary rich peasants, only
the land and assets of those who participated in the serious counterrevolu-
tionary conduct are confiscated, but the land and assets of other members
are not confiscated.
(3) Those who temporarily went to the White areas for the purpose of making
a living are not considered reactionary rich peasants, and their assets must
not be confiscated. However, in regard to those who went to the White areas
because they did not wish to reside in the Soviet areas and remained in the
White areas for 1 full year or more, although they are not reactionary rich
peasants, their assets must be confiscated.
(4) The above provisions are applicable in defining and handling the reac-
tionary capitalists. In many areas in the past, the land and assets of many
rich peasants who were not guilty of serious counterrevolutionary conduct
including the land and assets of their family members who did not participate
in any counterrevolutionary conduct were confiscated. This was erroneous.
The source of the error was Article 3 of Kiangsi's Land Confiscation and
Distribution Law: "In regard to the rich peasants who joined counterrevolu-
tionary organizations (such as the AB League, the Social Democratic Party,
etc.), the entire household is confiscated," without distinction of princi-
pal or accessory, participant or non-participant \ In regard to family mem-
bers, the second half of the same article states: "In regard to family mem-
bers who did,not join any counterrevolutionary organization, were not guilty
of any counterrevolutionary conduct and have severed relations with the
counterrevolutionaries in the family, when they are not opposed by the
masses, their land may be returned to them." Nevertheless, because all the
assets of the family have been confiscated, to return a portion afterward
is still not the correct answer. Therefore, the article in question must
be revised according to these provisions. In some areas in the past, the
sphere of reactionary capitalists was expanded, and certain stores which
should not have been confiscated were confiscated. This was also wrong.
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Example:
A household of nine members where one member performed labor and another
incidental labor had 160 tan of land, farmed 80 tan and actually produced
45 tan of grain, and rented out 80 tan of land and collecting 40 tan of rent
for 10 years. They had five parcels of hills, producing 70 yuan large cur-
rency a year. They had one permanent helper. They owed 425 yuan large
currency, at 25 percent interest, for 3 years. They loaned out 380 yuan
large currency, at 30 percent interest, for 5 years. One member served
as a company commander of the Ching-wei League for 2 years and fought the
Red Guard five times. Another was a member of the AB League for 6 months,
but not in an important position, and confessed to the government. Other
members of the family had no apparent reactionary conduct. Decision: The
classification of this household is rich peasant. The one member who per-
formed serious counterrevolutionary work is a reactionary rich peasant, and
his assets must be confiscated. The assets of other members must not be
confiscated. In regard to the member who joined the AB League, as he did
not have an important position and he had confessed, nor must his assets be
confiscated.
Under the policy of-weakening, the rich peasants, during the period of the
domestic war, besides such basic means as allocating inferior land to them,
confiscating their surplus buildings, plow animals and farm tools and levying
higher taxes, to demand unscheduled donations from them is proper. Never-
theless, the amount of'donation must not exceed 40 percent of a rich peasant's
cash on hand. The number of times of donations must also be limited.
(1) Recently, there have been two tendencies in regard to rich peasant dona-
tions. One is to shelter the rich peasants and not ask them for donations.
Another is to take all their cash as a donation, which is no different from
fines imposed on the landlords. Both are incorrect and the latter is a ten-
dency to eliminate the rich peasants and may even affect the middle peasants.
The limit has now been set at 40 percent. All areas may, according to the
rich peasants' payment of donations in the past and their current family
situation, ask them to donate a suitable portion of their cash.
(2) Donations are of a temporary nature, different from the regular land
tax. The number of times of donations therefore, must be limited. The rich
peasants must not be asked to donate over and over again, without limit.
(3) The authority to ask for donations from the rich peasants is limited
to the state financial. organs. No other organ may ask them for donations.
6. The Land, Buildings, Plow Animals and Farm Tools to Which the Rich
Peasants Are Entitled
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After the land, buildings, plow animals and farm tools have been decided
as assets to which the rich peasants are entitled, the rich peasants; pro-
vided they observe the laws.of the Soviet, have the right of disposal, and
no one may interfere. Only for the purpose of facilitating production and
with the consent of the rich peasants, may the workers, peasants and poor
people exchange buildings with the rich peasants.
(1) Recently in some areas, there have been incidents of workers, peasants
and poor people exchanging their own land, building, plow animals and farm
tools for those to which the rich peasants are entitled, or'even for clothes
and fertilizer. This is wrong, because there must be a limit to "weakening
the rich peasants." The "weakening" policy of allocating relatively in-
ferior land, confiscating surplus buildings, plow animals and farm tools,
levying higher taxes and demanding a part of their cash as donations has
been enforced. Anything beyond such limit is a tendency to destroy the rich
peasants, which is improper in the current stage of the revolution. Only
for the purpose of facilitating production and with the consent of the rich
peasants may buildings be exchanged.
(2) After the correct solution of the land issue, when the inferior land
allocated to a rich peasant has been improved into good land, no one may
ask for its exchange.
(3) The plow animals, farm tools and buildings acquired by the rich peas-
ants after the arising, although there may be a surplus, must not be con-
fiscated again or exchanged.
7. Rich Peasants' Volunteer Labor
The rich peasants must perform more volunteer labor than the workers,
peasants and poor people for the state and the locality, but such volun-
teer labor must be so limited as not to interfere with their production.
There must be a distinction between compelling the rich peasants to per-
form volunteer labor and compelling the landlords to do so. All the able-
bodies among the landlords must be organized into the labor team for train-
ing and participation in the state and local labor work, thus reforming
their class essence in the process of labor and eliminating the landlord
class. The rich peasants must perform more volunteer labor than the work-
ers, peasants and poor people, but they must not be ordered to perform
unlimited volunteer labor similar to the landlord so as to hinder their
production. Therefore, where the rich peasants and the landlords are or-
ganized into one labor team, in the busy farming season, when the rich
peasants have no surplus labor power nor the means to compensate for the
lack, it is wrong to make them perform long-term volunteer labor severed
from production. Where production is not hindered, where the rich peasants
have surplus labor power, or where there are means of compensating for the
lack, this provision does not apply.
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8. Bankrupt Landlords
Landlords who lost all, or the greater part, of their land or assets used
for exploitation before the uprising, but who still performed no labor,
relying on fraud, plunder, or the help of relatives and friends for their
main source of income are called bankrupt landlords. The bankrupt landlords
are still a part of the landlord class and may not be allocated land.
However, those landlords who, after bankruptcy, relied on their own labor
for the main source of their income for 1 year or more must have their
classification changed. They have the right to land allocations.
Those landlords who, after bankruptcy, relied on their own labor for one-
third of their annual living expenses may be treated as rich peasants.
Calling partially bankrupt landlords bankrupt landlords is incorrect, be-
cause they still possessed a part of their assets to be used for exploita-
tion. Only the amount of their exploitation income had changed.
Calling bankrupt those landlords who performed major labor for 1 full year
or more after bankruptcy is even more incorrect, because, after having per-
formed major labor for 1 full year (before the uprising), an individual
changed from a landlord to a worker, poor man, or peasant.
To treat those landlords who performed partial labor after bankruptcy still
as landlords is also incorrect, because, if such labor was sufficient to
supply one-third of their annual living expenses, they should be treated as
rich peasants.
9. Poor People
Except the workers, peasants, independent producers and those following
freelance occupations, all those depending on their labor to pursue one
or more occupations, relying mainly on their own labor to make a living,
or operating their own business with a small capital for the minimum living,
are called poor people. The unemployed poor in the villages and small towns
must be allocated land. The urban poor having no houses must be allocated
the houses of the landlords.
The urban poor constitute a large portion of the population. A part of them
are also found in the rural villages and small towns. Their occupations
are complex. The occupation of some individuals changes with the season
and is indefinite. Their life is very difficult. Their income often
cannot meet expenses.
Poor people operating their own business with a small capital are peddlers.
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Physicians, teachers, lawyers, news reporters, authors and artists who did
not exploit others are people who follow free-lance occupations.
(1) The intellectuals, by themselves, do not constitute a. class. Their
class classifications are determined according to the class they belong to.
(2) Provided they observe the laws of the Soviet, all landlord and bour-
geois intellectuals must be fully utilized for service to the Soviet.
(3) Intellectuals who performed non-exploiting work, such as teachers,
editors, news reporters, service personnel, authors and artists, are mental
laborers. They must receive the protection of the laws of the Soviet.
(1) The unconditional rejection of intellectuals in many areas recently
is incorrect. Utilizing the landlord and bourgeois intellectuals to serve
the Soviet is beneficial to the Soviet revolutionary policy. During the
time when they serve the Soviet, means must be found to solve their living
problems.
(2) The class classification.of an intellectual is determined by the class
to which he belongs. For instance, an intellectual with a landlord back-
ground is a landlord. One with a rich peasant background is a rich peasant.
One with a middle peasant background is a middle peasant. It is incorrect
to regard the intellectuals as a class by themselves. It is even more in-
correct to consider peasant children who have attended school (the so-called
"graduates") as undesirables.
(3) It is also wrong to regard the work of teachers as non-labor.
11. Lumpen Proletariats
Workers, peasants and others who, immediately before the uprising, lost
their jobs or land as a result of oppression and exploitation by the land-
lords and bourgeoisie and relied on improper means for the main source of
their livelihood continuously for 3 years or more are called lumpen pro-
letariat (customarily known as vagrants).
ti
The policy of the Soviet on the lumpen proletariat is to win the masses
and oppose the leaders and those who depended on the exploiting class and
actively participated in the counterrevolution. The main means to win the
lumpen proletariat masses is to make them return to production, to allo-
cate land and jobs to them similar to the revolutionary people in general,
and to give them voting rights. Nevertheless, in order to receive land
allocations, they must live in the rural village and have the ability to
farm.
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Attention must be given to the following
(1) The "improper means as the main source of livelihood" indicate such
improper occupations as stealing, robbing, swindling, begging,, gambling
and prostitution. It is incorrect to refer to all those who were employed
or semi-employed but spent a part of their time on improper occupations
(not as the main source of their livelihood) as vagrants. It is even more
incorrect to refer to the workers, peasants.and poor people who once had
undesirable habits (such as visiting prostitutes, gambling, smoking opium,
etc.) as vagrants.
(2) In some areas, the lumpen proletariat leaders (vagrant chiefs) who
actively participated in the counterrevolution are not only not punished,
but allocated land. This is wrong. Other areas refuse the demand of the
general lumpen proletariat for land allocations. This is also wrong.
12. Professional Religionists
All those who followed the occupation of religious superstition for 3 full
years (immediately before the uprising), including ministers, Catholic
fathers, monks, Taoist priests, vegetarians, geomancers, fortune-tellers
and diviners, are professional religionists. Professional religionists
have no voting right and may not receive land allocations.
All those who followed the occupation of religious superstition but did
not depend on it as the main source of their livelihood, and all those who
depended on it as the main source of their livelihood for less than 3 years,
must not be called professional religionists. They must be treated accord-
ing to their proper classifications. They must not be all deprived of their
voting right or withheld land allocations. In other words, all those prac-
ticing religious superstition as a sideline, or as their main occupation
for less than 3 years, who were mainly workers, peasants, or poor people,
they must retain their voting rights and those residing in.the rural vil-
lage must receive land allocations. This provision naturally applies to
their family members as well as themselves. It is incorrect to refer to
monks, Taoist priests, geomancers and fortune-tellers as vagrants.
13. Red Army Soldiers With Landlord or Rich Peasant Background and Land
Allocation
Under the condition of firmly waging war in the interest of the workers and
peasants, Red Army members of landlord or rich peasant background, they,
whether officers or soldiers and their family members have the right to
receive land allocations.
(1) Article 1 of the Regulations on the Preferential Treatment of Red Army
Members states: "In regard to all the Red Army soldiers whose families
reside in Soviet areas, the soldiers themselves and their family members
must all receive equal allocations of land, houses, woods and ponds similar
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to the local impoverished peasants." Here, all Red Army soldiers are in-
cluded. Nevertheless, recently, some areas only looked into the social back-
ground, without regard of the political manifestations and repossessed the
land already allocated to Red Army soldiers. This was incorrect.
(2) "Family members of Red Army soldiers" include the father, mother, wife,
sons, daughters and younger brothers and sisters under 16 years of age. No
one else may enjoy this privilege.
(3) In regard to Red Army soldiers of landlord or rich peasant background,
if they are expelled from the army, their land may be repossessed.
14. Workers Who Belong to Rich Peasant or Landlord Families
Where a worker belongs to a rich peasant or.landlord family, the classifi-
cation of the worker himself and his wife is unchanged. Whether he should
receive land allocation depends on whether he is in the village or the city
and handled accordingly. Other members of his family are handled as land-
lord or rich peasants.
(1) In a landlord or rich peasant family, anyone selling his labor for 1
full year or more immediately prior to the uprising is recognized as a worker.
He and his wife are treated as workers. His part of the family assets is
not confiscated. If he and his wife reside in the village, they will re-
ceive land allocations, but no such allocation will be made if they reside
in the city. Where the individual himself resides in the city while his
wife resides in the village,'he will not be allocated land, while his wife
will be. Other members of the family are handled as landlord or rich peas-
ants and may not enjoy the rights of workers. Should there be members of
other classifications in the family, they are handled according to such
classifications. (For instance, if someone in the family residing in the
village relied on rent collection and loans as the main source of his liveli-
hood for 3 full years or more, he is a landlord. Someone who had been sell-
ing his labor for 1 full year or more is a worker. Someone who had been
operating his small handicraft store in a township for 1 full year or more
is an independent producer. Their classifications are determined according
to the source of their livelihood within a certain period of time,, and their
treatment under the soviet laws is determined according to their classifi-
cations).
(2) The rural workers, independent producers, elementary school teachers and
physicians who owned small parcels of land and rented them out because they
had to go elsewhere to make a living, being unable to do so in their home
village, but did not rely on the rental income as the main.source of their
livelihood, will receive land allocations similar to the peasants in general.
They must not be regarded as landlords.
15. The Class Classification of Landlords, Rich Peasants, or Capitalists
Marrying Workers and Peasants
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(1) The act of marriage does not change the class classification.
(2) The class classifications of landlord, rich peasants, or capitalists
marrying workers, peasants, or poor people are determined by whether the
marriage occurred before or after the uprising, the original class classi-
fications and the living conditions after marriage.
(3) In regard to those who married before the uprising: Women of land-
lord, rich peasant, or capitalist families who married workers, peasants,
or poor people and performed labor for 1 full year or more are recognized
as peasants or poor people. Those who did not perform labor, or who per-
formed labor for less than a full year, will retain their original classi-
fication without change. Women.of worker, peasant, or. poor people families
who married landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists are only classified as
landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists if they lived the same kind of life
as the landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists for 5 full years. If they
did not live the same kind of life as the landlords, rich peasants, or capi-
talists, but lived the life of workers, peasants, or poor people (relying on
their own labor as the main source of their livelihood), or if they lived
the same kind of life as the landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists for
less than 5 years, their original classifications are unchanged.
(4) In regard to those who married after the uprising:..The classifications
of women of worker, peasant, or poor people families marrying landlords,
rich peasants, or capitalists are unchanged. In case of women of landlord,
rich peasant, or capitalist families marrying workers, peasants, or poor
people, they must have performed labor for 5 full years before they are
recognized as workers, peasants, or poor people. If they performed no
labor, or performed labor for less than 5 full years, their original classifi-
cations will remain unchanged.
(5) Regardless of the time of marriage and the classifications of the
parents, the classification of the children follows that of the father.
(6) The enjoyment of land and public rights depends on. the classification.
(7) Women of landlord,, rich peasant, or capitalist families marrying work-
ers, peasants, or poor people may not be organized into the labor team. Where
the cash dowry was under 50 yuan, they may not be fined or assessed donations.
(8) In case of worker, peasant, or poor people daughters sold as child-
brides to landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists, or in case of worker,
peasant, or poor people families acquiring a husband into the family for
their daughter from the landlord, rich peasant, or capitalist families, or
vice versa, prior to the uprising, the provisions contained in (1) to (7)
above are applicable to the classification and treatment of the children sold
and the husbands acquired.
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(9) Where, before the uprising, the workers, peasants, or poor people gave
their sons to the landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists as heirs, or vice
versa, regardless of the age of the children at the time of transfer, the
classification of those children under 10 years of age will remain unchanged.
From age 10 on, where the sons of workers, peasants, or poor people were given
to the landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists, if such children lived the
same kind of life as their foster parents for 5 full years, their classifi-
cations are the same as the foster parents. If their way of living was not
the same as their foster parents, but the same as their natural parents,
their original classifications are not changed. Where the sons of landlords,
rich peasants, or capitalists were given to workers, peasants, or poor people
as heirs, if they lived the same kind of life as their foster parents for 3
full years, their classifications are the same as the foster parents. If
their way of living was not the same as their foster parents, but the same
as their natural parents, their original classifications are unchanged.
"Labor" in the foregoing provisions includes household labor.
(1) In case of landlords who were also merchants, their land and their
buildings and assets adjacent to the land are confiscated. Their business
and their stores, residences and assets adjacent to the business are not
confiscated.
(2) In case of rich peasants who were also merchants, their land and their
buildings and assets 'adjacent to the land are handled-according to the rich
peasant classification. Their business and their stores, residences and
assets adjacent to the business are not confiscated.
(3) The fines and donations of landlords and rich peasants who were also
merchants are limited to the landlord and rich peasant portion of their
assets, and must not include the business portion.
(4) Merchants are not organized into the labor team.
17. Managing the Public Hall
Managing the public hall was a kind of exploitation, but managing by the
landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists must be distinguished from managing
by the workers, peasants, or poor people.
Managing the public hall refers to managing the land and assets of all kinds
of ancestral halls, temples, or associations. Undoubtedly, managing the
public hall was a kind of exploitation, especially in case of the landlords
and rich peasants who provided public halls and concentrated large amounts
of land and assets, making it one of the main forms of exploitation. The
fact that a few individuals controlled a public hall and collected large
sums of exploitation is a factor in determining the class classification of
the managers. Nevertheless, the fact that some small public halls were managed
by the worker, peasant, or poor people masses by rotation, and the amount of
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exploitation was very small will not serve as a factor in determining the
class classification of the managers. It is incorrect to regard all those
who managed the public hall as landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists.
18. The Living Problem of Some Work Personnel
Where the work personnel of the soviet organs or other revolutionary organi-
zations have not been allocated land and experience difficulty in their
livelihood, they and the members of their families may be allocated a suit-
able amount of land, or have their difficulties solved by some other means.
In regard to the livelihood of the Soviet work personnel in general who
have been allocated land, the Central Government has issued an order to solve
their difficulties (by activating the masses to cultivate their land). The
provision here refers to the personnel who have not been allocated land.
Family members include father, mother, wife, sons, daughters and younger
brothers and sisters under 16 years of age.
19. Public Enterprise Land
In regard to land division in new areas and redivision of land uncovered in
the old areas, a suitable amount of land must be reserved for public enter-
prises such as bridges, ferries, tea pavilions and agricultural experimental
farms.
In regard to the funds to maintain the public enterprises, such. as bridge
repair, ferry boat repair, wages for the boatmen and tea pavilion repair
and installation, a suitable amount of land must be reserved and the masses
activated to cultivate it. In addition, the country, district and township
soviets must reserve some land in a suitable location near the government
organs for agricultural experimental farms. (The county soviet may reserve
50 to 150 tan, the district soviet 15 to 25 tan, and the township soviet 5
to 10 tan.) Before the agricultural experimental farm is started, the land
may be leased to the peasants for cultivation at a nominal rental.
(1) Where landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists loaned money or articles.
to the workers, peasants, or poor people before the uprising, except for
goods received from the stores, the principal and interest are both can-
celled. Where workers, peasants, or poor people deposited money or articles
with the landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists, the principal and interest
must be paid according to the actual figures.
(2) Those who relied. exclusively or mostly on exploitation by high interest
loans for the main source of the livelihood of the household are called
usurers. The usurers are handled in the same manner as landlords.
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(3) Provided the Provisional Loan Law promulgated by the Central Govern-
ment is not violated, debts incurred after the uprising must be repaid.
Those who were guilty of exploitation by high interest loans (in all areas
controlled by the Kuomintang, whether urban or rural, the great majority of
the debts are exploitation by high interest loans) but who did not rely ex-
clusively or mostly on such loans for the main source of the livelihood of
the household cannot be called usurers and the policy of total confiscation
does not apply. They must be handled individually according to their classi-
fications. It is incorrect to classify all those guilty of exploitation by
high interest loans as "usurers." In regard to those who loaned and borrowed
money at the same time, their "credit" and "debit" must be offset and the
nature and extent of the balance studied. Then, by adding such balance to
his other exploitations, his classification is determined.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Soviet Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
? "Central Government Decision on Certain Issues in the Land Struggle"
(mimeographed), 10 October 1933
* "Collection of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents," Vol 3, 1935
6080
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[Text] According to experience gained after 18 months of implementing the
Labor Law promulgated 1 December 1931, some provisions of the Labor Law were
out of keeping with actual conditions in the Soviet Area and the Law did
not provide for measures to accommodate the middle and poor peasants and
handicraft workers who employ auxiliary labor. As a result, there were dif-
ficulties in enforcing the Law.. Moreover, the Law did not provide for many
other practical matters. Yet, these matters urgently needed to be included
in the provisions of the Law. With a view to improving the interests of the
workers, consolidating the worker-peasant alliance and developing the economy
of the Soviet Area, the Central Executive Committee organized in April 1933
a Labor Law Drafting Committee to redraft a labor law. For the past 5 months,
through discussions of a new draft labor law by worker-peasant masses in
various places, numerous opinions were mustered. In accordance with the
draft labor law and the opinions gathered from various places, the Central
Executive Committee examined the draft and made amendments. Now it is espe-
cially resolved that
(1) The articles of the Labor Law be adopted, promulgated and put into effect
as from 15 October 1933.
(2) After the new Labor Law is promulgated, the Labor Law that went into
effect 1 December 1931 be declared null and void. All other decrees con-
cerning the labor problem that contradict the provisions of the new Labor
Law shall also be without legal force.
(5) Detailed formalities to enforce the provisions of the new Labor Law be
promulgated by order of the People's Council and the Central Department of
the People's Commissioner of Labor.
(4) Any amendments to this Labor Law be made by order of the Central Execu-
tive Committee.
(5) This Labor Law take effect within the territory of the Chinese Soviet
Republic.
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(6) All persons who violate the provisions of this Labor Law be punished
in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations Governing Punishments
for Violating the Labor Law promulgated by the Central Executive Committee
15 October 1933.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
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LABOR LAW OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC
15 October 1933
[Text] Chapter I. General Principles
Article 1. This Labor Law is applicable to all hired workers and binding
on all enterprises, organs, business establishments (no matter whether state-
owned, owned collectively by several organizations, privately-owned, or
people who hire workers to work in their households) and individuals who
use the labor of others and remunerate them with goods or money.
(Note 1) Middle peasants, poor peasants, small boat owners, small handi-
craft workers and handicraft producers' cooperatives who employ auxiliary
labor force may, with the concurrence of the workers and their labor unions,
be exempt from the restrictions of certain provisions of this Labor Law.
Special decrees governing them shall be drawn up separately by the Central
Executive Committee.
(Note 2) In, the event of something special happening (as when there is a
shortage of labor force in famine or disaster prevention or. in war), the
Central People's Council, may, with the concurrence of the All-China Federa-
tion of Labor, promulgate special decrees to dispense with the application
of this Law within a certain time limit.
Workers and labor unions have the right to press for revocation of the above
two exceptions or for shortening of the time limit.
Article 2. This Law is not applicable to officers and men in active service
of the Army, Navy and Air Force of the Chinese Soviet Republic.
Article 3. With regard to agricultural workers, seasonal laborers, rural
handicraft workers, coolies, domestic servants and other workers with extra-
ordinary working conditions, in additiun to those provisions of this Law
which are applicable to them, the Central Executive Committee shall, in ac-
cordance with the working conditions of these workers, separately formulate
supplementary decrees to provide special protection to these workers.
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Article 4. All formal or informal collective agreements and labor contracts
shall be considered invalid in case that their terms are worse than those
prescribed in this Law.
Chapter II. Procedure of Employing and Obtaining the Labor of Others
Article S. All individuals residing within the territory of the Chinese
Soviet Republic and all enterprises, organs and business establishments who
wish to obtain the labor of others through employing them and putting them
to work, apart from the exceptions stipulated in Article 10 of this Law,
shall apply to an organ (labor office) affiliated to the Department of
Labor for recommendations. In the event that such offices have not been
established by the Department of Labor of the local government, they should
apply to the labor union for recommendations.
Article 6. All persons looking for work should go and register at a labor
office affiliated with the Department of Labor, entering their names in the
register of unemployed workers. In the event that labor offices have not
been established by the department of labor of the local government, they
should go and register at the local labor union.
Article 7. The recruiting of workers and staff through private placement
agencies or employment agencies or commissioning foremen to recruit them
and the private hiring of workers by compradors or any individuals shall be
prohibited without distinction. Requiring people to pay money or goods as
a reward for finding employment for them or deducting money from their wages
for such a purpose shall also be prohibited.
Article 8. All enterprises, organs, business establishments and private
employers who want to take workers into employment shall apply to labor
offices for recommendations according to the following procedure:
(a) A list containing the various qualifications of the labor force needed
shall be drawn up and submitted together with the applications for recommen-
dations in the name of the management of that enterprise or organ or the
private employer or his agent to the labor office of the competent authori-
ties.
(b) If, among those people registered with the labor office, some have
qualifications required in the preceding clause, they will be recommended
for the jobs in accordance with the bylaws of the labor office.
(c) No matter whether he rejects or accepts the people allocated the jobs,
the employer shall notify the labor office of the competent authorities in
accordance with the regulations laid down by the Department of Labor.
Article 9. The employer shall assume full responsibility in the event of
any of the following things happening.
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(a) When the qualifications of the labor force needed as submitted by
the employer to the labor office are not justified by actual facts.
(b) When the employer does not abide by the procedure required to be
carried out due to the hiring of workers.
(c) When the employer illegally rejects the staff sent by the labor
office.
Article 10. In case of the following conditions, the employer may of his
own accord hire. workers to work for him without going through a labor of-
fice. He should, however, register these hirings with the competent labor
office. n
(a) When it is necessary to hire experts, managers and superintendents who
will undertake political responsibility or fill posts that have something to
do with the status of the employees.
(b) When the labor office cannot recruit the necessary staff for the
employer within the period of time stipulated in the regulations governing
labor offices from the date the application is received from the employer.
Article 11. All enterprises and organs and all employers shall submit, with-
in the time limit stipulated by the Department of Labor, a report to the
local department of labor in the prescribed manner on all workers in their
employment.
Article 12. With regard to the hiring of labor force by employers and regis-
tration of people who seek for work in rural areas, the Department of Labor
of the Central Government shall formulate, jointly with the All-China Federa-
tion of Labor, special regulations to handle these matters.
Chapter III. Working Hours
Article 13. The actual working hours of all hired workers who are engaged
in all sorts of work shall normally not exceed 8 hours per day.
Article 14. The actual working hours of the following kinds of people shall
not exceed 6 hours per day:
(a) Minors from 16 to 18 years of age;
(b) All those performing mental labor with the exception of those whose work
has a direct bearing on manufacturing; and
(c) People working in the various branches of industry where work is detri-
mental to health or done beneath the earth's surface.
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(Note) With regard to the various branches of industry where work is
detrimental to health, the Department of Labor of the Central Government
shall promulgate regulations governing them.
Article 15. The actual working hours of minors below 16 years of age shall
not exceed 4 hours per day.
Article 16. With regard to the working hours stipulated in articles 13, 14
and 15, the Department of Labor of the Central Government may, after obtain-
ing the concurrence of the All-China Federation of Labor, specify that several
types of working personnel under special 'circumstances (e.g., responsible
working personnel who are in charge of political work or attending confer-
ences, workers who are working in producers' cooperatives or in other spe-
cial circumstances) shall not be bound by the working hours stipulated above
and formulate measures to deal with them separately.
Article 17. Working hours of all people who work at night should be shorter
than the usual working hours during the day. However, under the conditions
of continuous production or working in shifts, working hours at night should
be the same as in the day, but wages for night work should be increased. (If
wages pertain to the stipulations contained in Article 13, they should be in-
creased by one-seventh of the wages for work done during the day. If wages
pertain to the stipulations contained in Article 14, they should be increased
by one-fifth.) In the case of people who are paid on a piecework basis, if
their work is done at night, apart from the wages earned at the piece rate,
they should receive an increase of either one-seventh or one-fifth.
(Note) What is called "night" in this article refers to the period from
2200 hours to 0600 hours the following day.
Article 18. Between the daily working hours there should be a rest from work
from 1/2 to 1 hour to provide the time needed by the workers to eat and to
rest. This break, however, should not be considered in figuring the working
hours.
(Note) With regard to those workers-in an industry which cannot suspend
work, the Department of Labor of the Central Government shall formulate
separately special measures to enforce such a break.
Article 19. Work done beyond the number of working hours prescribed by law
(overtime work) shall be prohibited in accordance with universal fundamental
principles. In case of necessity, however, overtime work may be performed
after the concurrence of the workers and labor union and the sanction of the
local department of labor are obtained.
(Note) If in an emergency (e.g., taking precautions against a public disas-
ter or doing away with an obstacle in a project) it is necessary to do over-
time work, and there is not enough time to obtain the concurrence of the
labor union and the department of labor, the management should notify the
labor inspector the following day in order to keep the record straight.
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Article 20. Overtime work carried out on two consecutive days shall not
exceed 4 hours altogether.
(Note) In agriculture and other seasonal work, when it is necessary to do
overtime work beyond that stipulated in this article, the management may
think about increasing the amount of such work after obtaining the concur-
rence of the workers and labor union and the sanction of the department of
labor.
Article 21. With regard to delays in beginning work due to the fault of the
management, the workers must not be made to work overtime so as to make up
for lost time.
Chapter IV. Holidays
Article 22. All hired workers shall have at least 42 hours of rest without
interruption in-a week.
(Note) If in work there are special circumstances which make it impossible
to allow the workers to take a rest by turns each week according to the
usual procedure, they should be bompensated for this with a number of days
of rest within a proper period of time.
Article 23. Work shall uniformly be suspended'on the following anniversaries
and festivals:
(a) 1 January New Year's Day
(b) 7 February Anniversary of the Massacre of Peking-Hankow Railways
Workers by Warlords
(c) 18 March Paris Commune Anniversary
(d) 1 May International Labor Day
(e) 1 August Anti-Imperialist War Day and Birth of the Chinese Workers
and Peasants' Red Army
(g) 7 November October Revolution of the Soviet Union and Proclamation
of the Founding of the Chinese Soviet Republic
(h) 11 December Canton Uprising Anniversary
(i) The department of labor at various levels, in consultation with local
labor union councils, may, according to local conditions, stipulate local
anniversaries and festivals as holidays, but these local holidays shall not
exceed two per year.
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Article 24. Wages shall be paid as usual for the weekly day of rest and
the anniversaries and festivals stipulated in the proceding article when
work is suspended. In case it is necessary to continue work on these days,-
the wage paid shall be double.
Article 25. The working hours shall not exceed 6 on the day before the
weekly day of rest or any of the anniversaries and festivals stipulated in
Article 23. The wage paid for that day shall be the same as that for a full
working day. Wages paid monthly shall not be deducted.
Article 26. All hired workers who have worked continuously for more than
5-1/2 months shall have at least 2 weeks' leave each year with pay. Minors
under 18 years of age and people who are employed in an industry where work
is detrimental to health shall have at least 4 weeks of leave in a year with
pay.
Article 27. Workers may select as they see fit the time to take the leave
stipulated in Article 26. But this shall be limited by not obstructing the
conduct of business in the enterprises and organs and the performance of
chores in the households concerned.
Article 28. The leave granted an employee for illness or for childbirth
shall not be counted in the leave stipulated in Article 26.
Chapter V. Wages (Remuneration of Labor)
Article 29. The amount which an employee gets as remuneration (wage) for
selling his labor should be set down in a collective agreement or labor
contract.
(Note) The term wages, as termed in this article, includes both the currency
portion and goods portion (in case the employer supplies meals, clothing and
natural goods to his employees).
Article 30. The wages of all hired workers shall not be lower than the
minimum wages established by the local government, in accordance with the
local living standard and grades of the workers in their occupations during
the period in question.
Article 31. The wage scale of all hired workers shall be set forth at least
once every 3 to 6 months by the Department of Labor of the local government.
Article 32. For extra work performed beyond the number of working hours
prescribed by law, there should be extra pay. The amount of extra pay
should be set down in the collective agreement or labor contract. However,
pay for extra work performed in the first 2 hours should be increased by 50
percent of the regular pay and extra work performed in excess of 2 hours
should be paid double.
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Article 33. All females and minors should have equal pay if the work they
perform is equal to that of male workers. Minors should perform the number
of hours of work stipulated in Article 14 or Article 15, but they should
still be paid a day's wages according to the wage scale in their respective
occupations.
The method of figuring the wages of minor workers and the'fixed amounts of
wages shall be formulated by the Department of Labor of the Central Govern-
ment in accordance with conditions in various enterprises and the nature of
work.
Article 34. In case an employee is transferred to a job with different
working hours, which pays a lower wage than originally, for 2 weeks from
the date of transfer he should still be paid the same amount of wages as
before.
Article 35. Wages for all long-term work should be paid by installments,
but at the most every half month. Wages for temporary. work or work that does
not last more than 2 weeks should be paid when work is completed.
(Note) Wages calculated monthly, quarterly, or yearly are not subjected to
the restriction of this article after the agreement of the employees and
labor union is obtained.
Article 36. Wages shall be paid in the ordinary currency of the place in
question, but with the concurrence of the employees, a part of their wages
may be substituted by goods. The amount of goods that may be substituted for
wages and the method of figuring the value of the goods shall be set down in
the labor contract or collective agreement.
Article 37. Payment of wages should be made during working hours and at
the place of work. Moreover, it should be delivered directly into the
hands of the employee or a representative designated by him.
Article 38. If a fixed payday falls on a statutory holiday, wages due on
the holiday should be paid before the holiday.
Article 39. The piece rate for work to be paid for on a piecework basis
should be set forth in the collective agreement or labor contract. Moreover,
the daily standard rate should be set down in accordance with customary pro-
duction per day. The methods of fixing a piecework rate and paying it should
also be laid down in the contract. Making use of the piecework method to de-
duct money from the wages due to a worker or squeeze money from him shall be
prohibited.
Article 40. With regard to a standard of productivity, it shall be fixed
by agreement between the management of an enterprise or organ or employer
and the labor union. If employees, through their own fault, fail to attain
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the standard of productivity under the proper working conditions, they may
be paid wages according to their finished work, but these wages shall not
be less than two-thirds of the originally fixed amounts of wages. If
employees repeatedly fail to attain the standard of productivity, they may
be released from their respective contracts according to paragraph 3,
Article 12 of this Law.
(Note) The proper working conditions referred to in this article are as
follows.
(a) The machinery and its handling are all in good order.
(b) Materials and tools needed in work are supplied on time and in suffi-
cient quantities for use.
(c) There are suitable facilities (e.g., lighting, temperature) in the place
of work for health and physical movement.
Chapter VI. Labor of Women and Minors
Article 41. Women and persons under 18 years of age shall not be employed
to work at jobs that are especially hard and cumbersome, detrimental to the
health of the workers, or required to be performed in places beneath the sur-
face of the earth. Places where women and minors are prohibited shall be
promulgated by the Departments of Labor of the Central Government and various
provinces.
Article 42. Women workers who are with child, or are nursing mothers, and
persons under 18 years of age shall not be employed to perform night work.
Article 43. Women workers who perform manual labor are entitled to 8 weeks'
leave of absence from work before and after childbirth. Women workers who
perform mental labor are entitled to 6 weeks' leave of absence from work
before and after childbirth.
(Note 1) In case employees are insured with the Social Insurance Bureau,
wages due them during the leave period referred to in this article shall
be paid by the Social Insurance Bureau.
Otherwise, they shall be paid by the employer.
(Note 2) In cases of miscarriage, women workers upon certification by a
doctor are entitled to leave as for the sick.
Article 44. A woman employee, who has been with child for more than 5 months,
shall not be sent to work in another place which will require her to leave
her original place of residence, without her consent. Five months before
her confinement she shall not be discharged by the employer. Barring the
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conditions stipulated in paragraph 7, Article 102, she slao shall not be
discharged 9 months after confinement.
Article 45. During working hours, in addition to enjoying the usual rest
period stipulated in Article 18 of this Law, a nursing mother should take
1/2 hour off every 3 hours to nurse her child. This time off should be
counted toward her working time. Moreover, factories should set up nursery
rooms and crib rooms and hire people to look after them.
Article 46. Employment of boys and girls under 14 years of age shall be
prohibited. Employment of minors between 14 and 16 years of age shall be
with the sanction of a labor inspection organ.
Chapter VII. Apprentices
Article 47. Apprentices are people who are learning all sorts of art, craft,
or trade in a factory or workshop, under the guidance of a master craftsman,
or in a technological school affiliated with a factory.
Article 48. The training period of an apprentice shall be fixed respec-
tively by the Department of Labor of the Central Government in conjunction
with the All-China Federation of Labor and Department of Education according
to the nature of the trade in question, but the longest training period shall
not exceed 3 years.
(Note) Supplementary decrees governing the protection of various kinds of
apprentices shall be promulgated separately by the Department of Labor of
the Central Government.
Article 49. No matter which class, apprentices shall not be compelled to
undertake other kind of work or odd jobs that have nothing to do with the
art or craft they are learning. Likewise, they shall not be compelled to
observe ceremonial rules and usages of any kind of religion.
Article 50. An apprentice shall have at least 1 hour per day to devote
himself to learning his art or craft.
Article 51. After learning his art or craft for 3 monthp,.an apprentice
shall be paid a suitable wage. Thereafter, this wage shall be increased in
accordance with his training period and the standard of his productivity.
The proportion of wages which an apprentice merits shall be fixed by the
Department of Labor in conjunction with the All-China Federation of Labor.
Article 52. All organs, enterprises, business establishments and special
instructors of apprentices shall, in accordance with the decrees promulgated
by the Department of Labor, Department of Education and Department of the
National Economy, be responsible for trying to sustain, protect and super-
vise apprentices below the required age as to whether their training is being
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conducted properly or not. The abuse and maltreatment of apprentices
shall be strictly prohibited.
(Note) Supervision of the training of apprentices and checking whether
this training is proper or not shall be the responsibility of an organ of
the department of labor in question.
Chapter VIII. Guarantees and Subsidies
Article 53. All workers and staff members who are selected as delegates
to conferences convened by the soviet or labor union are entitled to draw
their wages during the time that they attended such conferences.
Article 54. All workers and staff members who are summoned by a law court
as witnesses, expert witnesses, or jurors are entitled to draw their wages
if the time during which they perform the duties-entrusted by.the judiciary
does not exceed 1 week.
Article 55. All workers and staff members who are conscripted for service
in the Red Army or sent to serve in the soviet, labor union, or other social
organizations, thereby losing their positions of employment, shall be given
beforehand a subsidy equivalent to their respective wages for 1 month.
Article 56. In case of cancellation of labor contract for any of the causes
set forth in clauses (a), (b) and (c) in Article 102, or the causes referred
to in articles 93 and 94, or the causes referred to in Article 103, the
employee in question shall be given a termination pay equivalent to his
wages for 2 weeks.
Article 57. All enterprises shall guarantee that employees are entitled
to make use at all times of the necessary, tools and articles in the course
of work and not demand payment for use from them. In case the employee's
own tools are used because of the requirement of work, the employer should
be responsible for compensating the employee if they are damaged. If the
clothing of an employee is damaged due to work, the employer shall be re-
sponsible for compensating the employee for the loss of the clothing at its
net cost.
(Note) This article is not applicable to short-term hired handicraft workers.
Article 58. The original positions of all workers and staff members who
temporarily lost their ability to work shall be reserved for them. This
is limited to 3 months for those who are sick and for those who are with
child or in confinement, 3 months in addition to the leave set forth in
Article 43.
Article 59. All organs and enterprises which suspended work in the interim
and did not announce the cancellation of labor contracts shall pay wages to
their employees as usual.
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Article 60. If due to negligence on the part of an employee or noncompli-
ance with the regulations of the factory or organ governing internal manage-
ment, instruments, articles in use, manufactured goods, or materials were
damaged as a result, money shall be deducted, with the concurrence of the
factory committee of the labor union, from the wages of the employee to com-
pensate for the loss, but the sum shall not exceed one-third of the monthly
wages of the employee.
Article 61. Due to insufficiency of financial resources, wages owed by an
employer to his workers and staff members under a collective agreement or
labor contract shall have priority over all his other debts. The wages
shall be paid as soon as possible.
Chapter IX. Protection for Workers
Article 62. Irrespective of type, no enterprise may open up or resume busi-
ness or move its structures without the approval of a labor inspection organ.
Article 63. All enterprises and organs shall adopt proper equipment and in-
stallations to eliminate or reduce dangers to workers so as to prevent inci-
dents from happening and maintain health within the work premises.
Article 64. All workers undertaking various kinds of work that is especially
detrimental to health (e.g., working in temperatures which are not regulated,
engaging in work which dampens or stains clothing) or having jobs in an enter-
prise that deals in poison shall be furnished by the owners with working
clothes and various kinds of protective devices (e.g., goggles, face masks,
respirators, soap), disinfectant and special foodstuffs (e.g., meat, milk,
eggs). A physical examination of people working under conditions mentioned
above should be conducted regularly.
Article 65. All presently valid decrees governing protection for workers
shall be implemented under the supervision of the labor inspection organs
affiliated to the Department of Labor of the Central Government. Labor in
spectors shall be elected within a certain period of time in a meeting by
the labor for sanction of the election. Special regulations governing the
limits of the functions and powers of the labor inspection organs shall be
promulgated by the Department of Labor of the Central Government.
Chapter X. Social Insurance
Article 66. Social insurance shall apply to all workers who are employed,
whether in state, cooperative-owned, or private enterprises, business
establishments, or household service and irrespective of the nature of
their work and length of working hours and the form of payment of their
wages.
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Article 67. All enterprises, organs, business establishments and private
employers, aside from paying wages to their workers and staff members,
shall pay to the Social Insurance Bureau a sum equal to 5 to 20 percent of
their respective total payrolls as social insurance fund. A proportional
scale shall be set forth by order of the Department of Labor of the Central
Government. The social insurance fund shall not be collected from the in-
sured, nor shall it otherwise be deducted from the wages of the insured.
(Note) Social insurance funds are not to be expended for any purpose other
than that of social insurance.
Article 68. Social insurance shall be implemented as follows.
(a) Free medical assistance.
(b) Workers who temporarily lose their ability to work (e.g.; in sickness,
injuries, quarantine, pregnancy, childbirth, or having to take care of a
sick member of the family) shall be given an allowance.
(c) Workers who lose their jobs shall receive an unemployment dole.
(d) Workers who retire because of complete disablement or old age shall
receive a pension.
(e) In the event of childbirth, death, or a missing person, financial aid
shall be given to the family of the worker.
Article 69. In case an insured worker temporarily loses his ability work,
no matter for which of the reasons stated in paragraph 2, Article 68, he
shall receive an allowance equal to the wages he drew from the enterprise
or organ employing him from the day he loses his working ability until such
time as he regains that ability or until his disablement is ascertained.
Article 70. In case a female worker loses her ability to work because of
pregnancy or childbirth, she shall be paid her wages during her maternity
leave as stipulated in Article 43 of this Law.
Article 71. A social insurance organ may, due to a shortage of funds, reduce
to a certain extent the amount of allowance paid to workers who temporarily
lose their ability to work.
Article 72. If, after childbirth, an insured female worker or the wife of
an insured male worker lacks the ability to rear the child, she shall re-
ceive a one-time subsidy. Essential articles and expenses for bringing up
the child in the first 10 months shall also be paid. However, the total
amount of these payments shall not exceed 2 months' wages of the insured.
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Article 73. In case of the death of an insured worker or a lineal de-
pendent of an insured worker, a funeral benefit shall be paid. The amount
shall be determined by the local social insurance organ, but it shall not
exceed 1 month's wages of the insured.
Article 74. An insured worker who loses his job shall receive an unemploy-
ment allowance. A worker who belongs to a labor union, has been working for
more than 6 months, and for whom his employer has been contributing to the
social insurance fund, may get his unemployment, while a worker who belongs
to no labor union, but has been working for more than 1 year and for whom
his employer has been contributing to the social insurance fund may also
receive unemployment. To receive unemployment, a worker shall first go to
a labor office and register for an unemployment certificate. If he is a
member of a labor union, he shall.produce his membership card as proof.
The length of time during which he is entitled to receive unemployment shall
be limited according to local conditions and the situation of the social
insurance fund.
(Note) Special measures governing the receiving of unemployment by coolies
and pieceworkers shall be promulgated by the Department of Labor.
Article 75. Insured workers who are disabled partially or completely as a
result of sickness or accident or who lose their ability to work because of
old age shall be paid pensions after being investigated and certified by a
special committee. The amount of pensions to be paid shall be determined by
the degree and nature of disablement of the insured and the financial situa-
tion of his family.
Article 76. If an insured worker, dies or is missing and, as a result, there
is no way for his lineal dependents to make a living, a relief benefit shall
be paid to the insured's lineal dependents after it has been investigated and
certified by a special committee. The amount and form of relief benefit shall
be determined by the local social insurance organ depending on the ages of.
the beneficiaries and their financial situation. However, only the following
among the lineal dependents of the insured are entitled to the relief benefit
stipulated in this article.
(a) Children and brothers and sisters of the insured who are under 16 years
of age.
(b) Parents and spouse of the insured who have no working ability.
(c) The above-mentioned lineal dependents have the ability to work, but
there are children of the insured who are under 8 years of age.
Article 77. Special regulations governing social insurance for agricultural
workers, coolies, domestic workers and pieceworkers shall be formulated and
enforced by the Department of Labor of the Central Government.
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Article 78. Employers shall pay to the social insurance fund, but they
shall not interfere with the administration of the social-insurance organ
or inquire about uses of the social insurance fund.
Chapter XI. Collective Agreement
Article 79. A collective agreement is a written contract concluded be-
tween a labor union representing workers and staff members, on the one hand,
and an employer, on the other hand, to set forth the working conditions and
terms of employment of each enterprise, organ, or business establishment in
hiring workers. It also i.s used to determine the content of the labor con-
tract to be entered into by the individual worker.
Article 80. The provisions of a collective agreement are applicable to the
entire working personnel of the enterprise, organ, or business establishment
in question, whether or not they are members of the labor union that is a
party to the agreement.
(Note) The validity of a collective agreement shall not be as good as that
of management who enjoys the rights of discharging and hiring workers.
Article 81. The term of a collective agreement. concluded shall be stipulated
by the Department of Labor of, the Central Government jointly with the All-
China Federation of Labor.
Article 82. The terms stipulated in a collective agreement are null and
void in that they are worse than those stipulated in this Law and other
presently valid decrees concerning labor.
Article 83. A collective agreement shall be in written form and be regis-
tered with an organ affiliated with the Department of Labor. The organ in
question shall have the right to abrogate certain portions of the provisions
in the agreement which it considers to be prejudicial to the workers or staff
members in the light of presently valid labor decrees. The procedure of
registration of a collective agreement shall be formulated by the Department
of Labor of the Central Government.
(Note) In the event that an organ affiliated to the Department of Labor
abrogates certain provisions of a collective-agreement, registration of the
rest of the agreement shall be granted if both parties announce their will-
ingness to have it registered.
Article 84. A duly registered collective agreement shall come into force
from the date of its signing by both parties or from the date stipulated in
the agreement.
Article 85. In the event that an enterprise, organ, or business establish-
ment comes under a new management, a duly registered collective agreement
shall be valid as usual during the period of its validity.
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(Note) In such a situation, either of the two parties to the agreement
shall have the right to declare that the agreement be renegotiated. They
must, however, give 2 weeks' advance notice to the other party. Until a
new agreement is concluded, the agreement in question shall remain in force.
Article 86. In case a collective agreement has not been registered with an
organ affiliated to the Department of Labor, no matter for'what reason, any
dispute concerning the agreement between the workers and the employer shall
be settled not in accordance with the agreement in question but according to
presently valid labor decrees.
Chapter XII. Labor Contract
Article 87. A labor contract is an agreement concluded between two or more
persons. One party (the employee) furnishes his labor because he accepts
remuneration from the other party (the employer). A labor contract may be
concluded irrespective of whether there is a collective agreement or not.
Article 88. The terms of a labor contract are fixed by agreement of both
parties after negotiations. However, in case the terms of the labor con-
tract are worse than those stipulated in presently valid labor decrees and
in the collective agreement and internal management regulations of the fac-
tory or organ in question or put restrictions on the political rights or
civil rights of the workers, they shall be rendered null and void.
Article 89. Following the conclusion of a labor contract, the employee
shall forthwith be given a workbook whose content shall be formulated by
special order of the Department of Labor of the Central Government.
(Note) No workbook shall be given in case the labor contract is valid for
a period of less than 1 week.
Article 90. In a labor contract a minor shall enjoy equal rights as an
adult. However, in the. event that continuation of the labor contract is
harmful to the health of the minor, his parents and-the organ responsible
for supervising the enforcement of labor decrees and its personnel may de-
mand cancellation of the contract even if it has not yet expired.
Article 91. Labor contracts are valid for periods that may be classified
into three types:
(a) A definite period'of less than 1 year;
(b) An indefinite period; and
(c) The entire period of a construction project until its completion.
Article 92. An employee may not assign the work which he has undertaken
to do to another employee without the approval of the employer. He is
not, however, subject to the restriction of this Article under the follow-
ing conditions.
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(a) The labor contract is one in which the majority of the workers have
jointly contracted for work; and
(b) The employee loses his ability to work and under the circumstances
then existing he positively has no way to notify the employer.
Article 93. An employer must not ask an employee to do work other than
that stipulated in the contract, work that endangers the life of the employee,
or work that violates labor decrees.
An employer hires a worker for a certain type of work. In case for the time
being such type of work is unavailable in that locality or there is no way
to carry out that type of work, the employer may ask the employee to make
a switch and undertake another type of work, which is similar in nature to
the work he originally contracted for. Should the employee refuse the offer,
the employer may cancel the contract but must pay him 2 weeks' wages as separa-
tion pay. If the employee is a pieceworker, the employer must pay him his
wages for that day. If the employee is a monthly laborer, the employer must
pay him 5 days' wages. In case of special necessity to avert danger or a
public disaster, the employer may ask the employee to undertake work which
is completely different in nature from the employee's trade.
In such a situation the employer must not reduce the employee's original wages.
If wages for such temporary work are higher than the employee's original wages,
he must be paid wages according to the higher rate.
Article 94. Before transferring an employee from organ A to organ B or from
A place to B place, although sometimes the organ in question may move with
him, it is necessary to obtain his consent. In case the employee does not
agree, the labor contract involving him may be canceled unilaterally, but
he must be paid 2 weeks' wages as separation pay.
Article 95. With regard to work of a long-term nature, there must be a suit-
able probationary period for an employee before a labor contract is concluded
with him. The length of the probationary period, however, shall not exceed
6 days for an ordinary worker, 1/2 month for a staff member or technician
and 1 month for a responsible official. The results of the probation should
determine whether the work is to be hired permanently or not. In the event
that he is not to be hired, he should be paid a remuneration according to
the wage scale of the work done during the probationary period.
The results of the probation (whether to hire or not) should be reported to
the local labor office. During their probationary periods all workers are
still to be regarded as unemployed so that their names may be retained in
their proper positions on the list of eligibles for job placement.
Article 96. Surreptitious dealings and exchange of information among employers
in an attempt to fix the conditions of employment of labor force shall be
prohibited without distinction.
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Article 97. An employer or the management of an enterprise or organ shall
be prohibited from imposing a fine on an employee apart from acting in ac-
cordance with special decrees or the internal management regulations of a
factory or organ.
Article 98. A labor contract shall be rendered null and void in the event
that
(a) Both parties agree to abrogate the contract;
(b) The contract expires;
(c) Work as stipulated in the contract is completed; or
(d) Either party declares the contract abrogated according to the provisions
stipulated in Articles 93 and 94 of this Law.
Article 99. A labor contract shall not be abrogated in the event of a move
or change of management of the enterprise or organ in question.
Article 100. In the event that the term of the labor contract has expired
but labor relations are still being carried on and neither party to the
contract has demanded its abrogation, the labor contract with its original
conditions shall continue to be valid and the term of validity shall be in-
definite.
Article 101. An employee may demand cancellation of a labor contract of an
indefinite term at any time, but an ordinary worker should give 1 week's
notice to the employer. A responsible official or technician, 2 weeks' notice.
Article 102. With the exception of the conditions stipulated in Articles 93
and 94, an employer may demand cancellation of a labor contract of an indefi-
nite term or an unexpired labor contract of a definite term in the event that
(a) Business is suspended or work is reduced. wholly or partially in the
enterprise, organ, or business establishment in question;
(b) Work ceases for more than a month on account of insurmountable economic
difficulties;
(c) The employee is incapable of undertaking the work;
(d) The employee does not discharge his responsibilities as stipulated in
the contract or internal management regulations of the factory or organ
without a good reason;
(e) The employee commits a crime directly related to his work and is con-
victed in a law court, or imprisoned for more than 3 months;
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(f) The employee absents himself from work without cause more than 5 days
in succession or more than 7 days altogether in a month; and
(g) The employee who temporarily lost his work ability does not return to
work after 3 months from the day or the woman employee who lost her working
ability because of pregnancy or childbirth does not return to work after 3
months in addition to the maternity leave stipulated in Article 43 of this
Law.
(Note 1) In the event that the employee whose labor contract is being can-
celled is a member of the factory branch committee or a committee member of
an organ, the concurrence of the labor union should be obtained before can-
cellation is carried out.
(Note 2) Cancellation of a labor contract in accordance with the conditions
stipulated in Clauses (c) and (d) of this Article can be implemented only
after the concurrence of the labor union is obtained.
(Note 3) In case a labor contract is cancelled for reasons stipulated in
Clauses (a), (b) and (c), the employee shall be paid 2 weeks' wages as
separation pay.
Article 103. Although a labor contract with a definite term has not expired,
the employee may at his own initiative cancel it in accordance with the fol-
lowing conditions.
(a) The employee is unable to receive on time the remuneration due him;
(b) The employer acts contrary to the responsibilities he was charged with
under the contract or violated labor laws and decrees;
(c) The employee is treated unjustly by the employer or his manager of their
family dependents;
(d) Working conditions have become relatively bad; and
(e) Other conditions prescribed under the law.
Article 104. Labor contracts, no matter what type, may be cancelled at the
request of the labor union.
Article 105. All organs, enterprises and business establishments shall
notify the branch committee of the labor union within 3 days of hiring new
workers and staff members and do likewise 3 days before discharging workers
and staff members.
Chapter XIII. Labor Unions and Their Organizations in Enterprises, Organs
and Business Establishments
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Article 106. Labor unions are organizations formed by uniting workers em-
ployed in enterprises, organs, business establishments and households. The
All-China Federation of Labor is the general organ of the labor unions through-
out the country. The organization of all kinds of labor unions shall be regis-
tered with the respective central councils of the industrial labor unions and
the All-China Federation of Labor, in accordance with the regulations adopted
by the All-China Congress of Labor Unions.
Article 107. All other unions which have not registered with the respec-
tive central organs of the industrial trade unions and the All-China Federa-
tion of Labor, according to the provisions of the preceding article, shall
not be called labor unions and shall not enjoy what according to the law are
the rights of a labor union.
Article 108. The rights of a labor union and branches affiliated to it are
(a) To declare and lead a strike;
(b) To represent workers and staff members.in signing contracts with the
managements of enterprises and organs and private employers;
(c) To publish newspapers and periodicals, establish schools, libraries
and clubs and buy and manage property;
(d) To help labor inspection organs to supervise various enterprises, or-
gans and business establishments in the carrying out of the Labor Law and
all other labor decrees;
(e) To set up special organs in private enterprises to supervise production;
(f) To take part in enterprise management in state-owned enterprises; and
(g) To propose various labor decrees to the soviet government for promul-
gation and to nominate and elect staff members of various organs affiliated
to the Department of Labor.
Article 109. Labor unions may enjoy all kinds of material assistance from
the soviet government. They may also enjoy various privileges under the
preferential treatment regulations of the postal service, telegraph service,
telephone service, municipal public utilities supplying electricity, water
and streetcar transportation, railway and shipping.
Article 110. Branch committees of a labor union in military organs shall
be organized according to the special regulations formulated by the Depart-
ment of Labor of the Central Government jointly with the Revolutionary Mili-
tary Affairs Committee and All-China Federation of Labor.
Article 111. The managements or employers of various organs, enterprises
and business establishments shall in no way interfere with the action of all
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organs of the labor union. Under ordinary conditions, however, the con-
vening of a meeting or congress of the workers and staff members in the
organs, enterprises and business establishments shall be done outside
working hours. But the sending of delegates to attend meetings of the soviet
or representative meetings of a labor union at a higher level still should be
done during working hours.
Article 112. In addition to paying wages to their workers and staff mem-
bers, various organs, enterprises and business establishments shall make
allocations equal to 2 percent of the total payroll as labor union funds
and another 1 percent as cultural and educational funds of the labor unions.
Article 113. Committee members at different levels of a labor union, when
provided with credentials issued by their respective committees, shall have
the right to inspect freely any and all work places within the various organs,
enterprises and business establishments.
Chapter XIV. Management Regulations
Article 114. In an enterprise or organ or a business establishment with a
working. personnel of 5 persons or more, internal management regulations shall
be formulated for the purpose of regulating work order internally. After
finalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law (Articles
116 and 118), the regulations shall be made known to the working personnel
and then, and only then, shall come into force..'
Article 115. In the internal management regulations stated in the preceding
article, the ordinary and special responsibilities of workers and managerial
personnel as well as the extent of responsibility to be borne for any viola-
tion of the regulations and the procedure of shouldering responsibility shall
be defined clearly and in detail.
Article 116. The internal management regulations shall not contradict various
current decrees and orders concerning labor as well as presently valid collec-
tive agreements of the enterprise, organs, or business establishment in ques-
tion.
Article 117. A standard set of internal management regulations shall be
formulated by the Department of Labor of the Central Government jointly
with the All-China Federation of Labor and the Department of the National
Economy. Prior to drawing up their own internal management regulations or
before these management regulations are approved (Article 118), various enter-
prises, organs and business establishments shall observe the standard set of
management regulations stated in this article.
Article 118. All internal management regulations of various enterprises,
organs and business establishments, after they have been established in
agreement by the respective managements and local labor unions, shall be
submitted for sanction to an organ affiliated to the Department of Labor.
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Chapter XV. Organs for Settling Disputes and Handling Cases of Violation
of the Labor Law
Article 119. All cases of violation of the Labor Law and other decrees
concerning the labor problem and of collective agreements shall be dealt
with in a labor court.
Article 120. In the event of disputes or conflicts arising from all sorts
of questions of working conditions between employees and managements or owners
of organs, enterprises and business establishments, labor departments at
different levels may, with the concurrence of the parties concerned, con-
duct mediation or arbitration. When a big dispute arises, however, labor
departments at different levels may engage in arbitration even without the
concurrence of the parties concerned.
Article 121. In a state-owned enterprise, state organ, or cooperative .
enterprise, a wage disputation committee may be formed.with an equal number
of representatives from the management and the factory workshop branch com-
mittee of the labor union participating. Its functions are
(a) To determine the merited wages of workers and staff members of the
enterprises or organ in question;
(b) To settle disputes arising from the carrying out of labor decrees and
collective agreements between the management and workers and staff members;
and
(c) The decisions of the wage disputation committee shall be made by mutual
agreement of the two parties. Cases that cannot be settled by the committee
shall be submitted to an organ affiliated to the Department of Labor or a
labor court for disposal.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committees of the Soviet
Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
? "Soviet Law," No 2
7682
CSO: 4005
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REGULATIONS GOVERNING PUNISHMENTS FOR VIOLATING LABOR LAW
Promulgated by Central Executive Committee
15 October 1933
[Text] Article 1. These Regulations are promulgated specially for the pur-
pose of making known punishments on employers (private, state, or coopera-
tive-owned) who violate the Labor Law. All acts of violation of the Labor
Law shall be punished according to these Regulations.
Article 2. All employers who violate the provisions in each chapter of the
Labor Law shall be punished respectively as follows:
(a) In an enterprise or organ with less than three hired workers, the em-
ployer who violates the Labor Law shall be fined not less than 3 silver dol-
lars or sentenced to no less than 3 days' compulsory labor or imprisonment.
(b) In an enterprise or organ with more than three but less than seven hired
workers, in case that the employer's violation of the Law concerns only a
small portion of the hired workers, he shall be fined not less than 10 silver
dollars or sentenced to not less than 10 days' compulsory labor or imprison-
ment. In case that the employer's violation of the Law concerns the majority
or all of the hired workers, he shall be fined not less than 20 silver dollars
or sentenced to not less than 2 weeks' compulsory labor or imprisonment.
(c) In an enterprise or organ with seven hired workers or more, in case that
the employer's violation of the Law concerns only the minority of the hired
workers, he shall be sentenced to not less than 1 month's compulsory labor
or imprisonment or fined not less than 30 silver dollars.
In case that the employer's violation of the Law concerns the majority or
all of the hired workers, he shall be sentenced to no less than 3 months'
imprisonment or fined not less than 100 silver dollars.
Article 3. All employers who violate presently valid decrees concerning
the labor problem shall be punished in accordance with the various provisions
in Article 2 of these Regulations, depending on the degree of their respec-
tive violations of the Law and the number of employees affected.
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Article 4. In the event that a private employer or the manager of a state
or cooperative-owned enterprise violates the collective agreement concluded
with a labor union and that collective agreement has been registered with
the local labor department, he shall be judged as having violated the tabor
Law and punished according to the provisions in Article 2 of these Regula-
tions.
Article 5. All employers who interfere with the lawful acts of the respon-
sible officials of a labor union or an organ at any level or their represen-
tatives or obstruct them in exercising their functions and powers shall be
sentenced to not less than 3 days' compulsory labor or imprisonment or fined
not less than 3 silver dollars, depending on the degree of the offense.
Article 6. All employers who use intimidation or bribery to deter workers
or staff members from joining a labor union in an attempt to achieve the
purpose of violating the Labor Law or collective agreement shall be sentenced
to not less than 5 days' compulsory labor or imprisonment or fined not less
than 5 silver dollars, depending on the degree of the offense.
Article 7. All cases involving violations of the Labor Law or other presently
valid decrees concerning the labor'problem and of collective agreements shall
be dealt with in labor courts according to the fundamental principles of these
Regulations.
Article 8. In the event of violations of the Labor Law or collective agree-
ments occurring in state-owned or cooperative-run enterprises, these viola-
tions may be settled by a special committee organized by the Department of
Labor, Department of the National Economy, and the labor union concerned. In
case that these violations cannot be settled by the special committee, they
shall be turned over to a labor court, which shall render judgment on them
according to the fundamental principles contained in articles 2, 3 and 4 of
these Regulations and carry out this judgment arbitrarily.,
Article 9. With reference to middle and poor peasants, handicraft workers
and small boat owners who employ other people's labor to make up their own
deficiency of labor, they should not be punished in a mechanical way accord-
ing to the provisions in articles 2, 3 and 4 of these Regulations in case that
they, with the concurrence of the workers and their labor union, do not comply
with the provisions of the labor decrees.
Article 10. These Regulations may be amended or abrogated by the Central
Executive Committee at any time.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Execu ive Committee of the Soviet Republic
of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
15 October 1933
? "Soviet Law," No 2
7682
CSO: 4005
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
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EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION ORDER ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOR SMASHING
THE FIFTH 'ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION CAMPAIGN'
[Text] The large-scale decisive battle to smash the fifth "encirclement and
suppression" of the enemy has begun! We are striving for an even greater
victory!
After sustaining an initial serious blow to its large-scale invasion in
Ch'ing-liu, Lien-ch'eng, Yang k'ou, Wu-chiang and Li-ch'uan, the imperialist
Kuomintang is frantically waging a desperate attack. This engagement is a
crucial moment in the decisive battle between the two roads of sovietism and
colonialism!
To mobilize all our strength and fight for a way out for the Soviet and to
strive for our complete victory in this decisive battle are the crucial
tasks of the Soviet regime at present. The result of an inspection by the
Central Government of the work of the soviets at different levels, however,
revealed that many local governments displayed an attitude of extreme uncon-
cern toward war mobilization. Manifestations of enthusiasm for enlarging
the Red Army, enlarging and training regional armed forces and mobilizing
transport teams to go to the front recently were utterly lacking in many
places. People in many places did not link all kinds of work--land investi-
gation campaign, economic development, cultural and educational work and
sovietization--closely with the mobilization for revolutionary war so as to
really rally the masses and lead them to struggle for the sake of complete
victory in smashing the fifth "encirclement and suppression."
Because a number of local governments adopted an attitude of unconcern, even
negligence, toward war mobilization, the following serious incidents came
about recently. On the northern front a small unit of the enemy dared to
penetrate deeply into the Yung-feng and Pei-k'eng soviet area and raided the
district government, and on the southern front enemy scouts infiltrated into
the vicinity of Yun-men-ts'en in search of military intelligence. Yet our
district and township governments were completely unaware beforehand. In
Fukien Province, this July, preparations to fight for victory at Lien-ch'eng
in coordination with the Red Army were utterly insufficient and efforts made
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after victory to win over the new area of Lien-ch'ing-kuei were extremely
slow. In Fukien and Kiangsi provinces, more than 300 rifles were unexpectedly
intercepted and seized by the enemy recently.
At the front there are not enough coolies to move the large quantities of
war booty and recently a great deal of rifles taken from the enemy at Li-
ch'uan had to be moved entirely by fighters of the Red Army. For the people
in these places to adopt such an attitude of unconcern and negligence toward
maintaining vigilance against the enemy and toward war mobilization is vir-
tually to commit a crime against the Revolution! This is a phenomenon that
cannot go on for even a short time longer! It should be rectified at once.
Beginning with the date of receipt of this order, the governments at dif-
ferent levels should promptly carry out the following kinds of work:
1. Provincial, county, district, township governments and all units of the
Red Army should forthwith convene all kinds of meetings, and particularly
at election meetings of the soviets, to explain in detail the tense present
situation in the Revolutionary war and to use all their strength to proceed
with mobilization for war. Likewise, all kinds of mass organizations should
convoke meetings to report on the war situation and their own roles so as to
be certain that every worker and every peasant in the Soviet Area will under-
stand the significance of this most important battle to smash the fifth "en-
circlement and suppression" and come forward enthusiastically to carry out
the work for participation in the war.
2. Bearing in mind the experience gained and lesson learned in our smashing
of the fourth "encirclement and suppression" the government at different
levels must fulfill the plan of the Central Revolutionary Military Affairs
Committee to enlarge the Red Army and enthusiastically rally whole battalions
and whole companies of the Red Guards and Young Pioneers to join the Red
Army before the decisive battle to smash the fifth "encirclement and sup-
pression." At the same time, they must separately rally large numbers of brave
activists to join the Red Army. They should carry on the experience of the
Red month of May and perpetuate the splendor of the Red month of May to en-
large the Red Army sharply. At the same time, they should apply the experi-
ence of Hsing-kuo County's rejoin-one's-regiment campaign and make all de-
serters return to the army.
3. The governments at different levels must rally citizens between the ages
of 18 and 40 to join the Red Guards of their own free will in large number
and the broad masses of workers and peasants to join the Young Pioneers.
They should revive and expand model Red Guards battalions and model Young
Pioneers organizations, send them down regularly for drilling and step up
their military and political training. Where no model Red Guards battalions
and model Young Pioneers exist, they should be established in the shortest
possible time. Under a unified plan of operations (to be decided by mili-
tary organs), they should rally the Red Guards and Young Pioneers to engage
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in battle in coordination with the Red Army. Under the orders of the
Military Affairs Committee, all guerrilla units must thrust deeply into
the rear of the enemy in order to pin down enemy forces and then attack
them.
4. The governments at different levels must assure the supply of materials
to the Red Army. Every single item of economic development should be linked
closely with the war. They must also rally the broad masses to complete
selling of economic development work before the end of December and begin
levying the land tax in November and be through with it within 2 months.
The governments at different levels must intensify the work of fund raising
and particularly in the new areas and border areas. The equalization bureau
and trade bureau of the governments at different levels must use all their
strength to insure the supplies of the Red Army so that the difficulties of
the spring-summer period this year in procuring staple foods for the Red Army
will not arise again and affect its movement. It is imperative that the
worker-peasant masses be mobilized to stand ready to render economic aid
to the Red Army at all times.
5. The governments at different levels should, in accordance with the
Voluntary Labor Law promulgated by the Central Government, mobilize the
broad masses to take up transport work. Every member of the Red Guards
should have a carrying pole and a bedspread, and five of them should together
have a stretcher. As soon as they hear a command from the government, they
will be able to assemble immediately to undertake transport work and help to
attack the enemy. And when the route of communication is damaged, they must
immediately make repairs so as to facilitate the movement of the Red Army.
6. The governments at different levels must especially step up the work of
suppressing counterrevolutionaries and enforcing the Red state of siege.
Counterrevolutionary cases should be rapidly resolved within a few weeks
and escape of prisoners should be done away with. Sentry posts must be set
up so as to tighten up the inspection of safe conduct passes. In the border
areas, it is even more essential-to guard against any surprise attack by
enemy plainclothes corps. The necessary alarm signal should be set up accord-
ing to the orders of the Military Affairs Committee.
7. The governments at different levels must pay attention to work in the
border areas and new areas and transfer the most capable cadres there to work.
In the new areas occupied by the Red Army, they should immediately strive to
establish provisional regimes, distribute land, build up regional armed
forces and bring into existence various mass revolutionary organizations.
8. The departments of worker-peasant prosecutors at different levels must
step up the prosecution of passive and bureaucratic elements who are sabo-
taging the work of war mobilization. The departments of labor and the de-
partments of education at different levels, in enforcing the Labor Law and
carrying out cultural and educational work respectively, should link up their
functions closely with the work of war mobilization.
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All sovietization work should be subordinate to the war!
In the great and difficult battle immediately before us, it is necessary
to deal a severe blow to alarm and to retreat and escape. At the same time,
it is necessary to oppose resolutely all suggestions of taking enemy attacks
lightly and relaxation our efforts in mobilization work. It is imperative
that we make.a supreme effort to tighten up all our work and plunge into
propaganda and agitation to mobilize the broad masses of workers and peasants,
concentrate all our strength, prepare to make all sacrifices, and fight for
total victory in smashing the fifth "encirclement and suppression campaign":
Fight for Soviet new China!
The governments at different levels must conduct the most detailed report
and discussion of this order and the 5 October order of the Military Affairs
Committee at various meetings and draw up the most concrete measures to imple-
ment these orders. Stern administrative punishments should be meted out
immediately to those who are either passive or remiss in implementing these
orders. Such is the order!
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committees of the Soviet
Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
? "Red China," No 123, 2 November 1933
7682
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WORK REPORT OF THE PROVISIONAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CHINESE SOVIET
REPUBLIC TO THE ELECTORATE ON THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF ITS ESTABLISHMENT
[Text] Comrades of the Electorate!
Today is the second anniversary of the Provisional Central Government of the
Chinese Soviet Republic since its establishment. Last year this day we de-
livered a simple work report to you comrades. On this second anniversary
we ought to report briefly to you on the process of work in the past year.
We hope to receive your views about our work in the past and your suggestions
regarding administrative guidelines for the future.
Comrades, under the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and
with the initiative?of the broad masses of workers, peasants and toiling
people as well as the courageous struggle of the worker-peasant Red Army,
the Provisional Central Government is moving forward victorious on all fronts.
The situation today is vastly different from that of a year ago. Below we
discuss these developments separately:
1. Victory in the Revolutionary War and Expansion and Strengthening of the
Red Army
In the past year the central task in the revolutionary war was the smashing
of the four "encirclements and suppressions" of the enemy. This war resulted
in our complete victory in the various soviet areas throughout the country.
According to incomplete statistics, during the past year upward of 100,000
troops of the White army were liquidated and an equal number of rifles were
seized. Statistics for the period from January to June show that altogether
41 regiments, 6 battalions and 10 companies of the White army were wiped out;
8 divisions, 33 regiments, 19 battalions and 9 companies were routed; over
31,700 rifles and 1,000 machine guns and automatic rifles were captured;
20 divisional, brigade and regimental commanders were taken prisoner; 2
divisional commanders were killed, and innumerable commanders from brigade
commanders down were either killed or wounded.
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Because of our magnificent victories, the rule of the imperialist Kuomintang
began wavering to a considerable degree. They had to organize five "en-
circlement and suppression" campaigns to make desperate attacks against us.
We, relying on the Party's line on attack and on the bravery of the Red Army
and enthusiastic support of the worker-peasant masses in both soviet and
White areas, dealt a telling blow to the enemy right from the beginning in
all five of their "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. In the battles
of Lien-ch'eng, Yang-k'ou, Wu-chiang and more recently Li-ch'uan, we won a
victory and seized over 8,000 rifles. In the past year, due to the fact
that the worker-peasant masses courageously came forward to join the Red Army,
the Red Army has grown to twice its size of last year, and fighting heroically
in many a bloody battle it has forged itself into a strong and invincible
revolutionary army of iron. The Red Guards, Young Pioneers and guerrilla
units in various places have also been strengthened. Under the leadership
of the Soviet government, the worker-peasant masses and the Red Army have
smashed the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaigns with revolution-
ary war. This is the core of our revolutionary tasks. Therefore, all our
work and our livelihood are, therefore, subordinate to the revolutionary war.
To strive for victory in the war is the primary duty of every worker or peas-
ant comrade in the soviet areas.
II. Sharp Expansion and Further Consolidation of the Soviet Areas
Since last year the Northeast Region of the Central Soviet Area has soviet-
ized the six counties of Chien-ning, T'ai-ping, Li-ch'uan, Kuang-tse, Tzu-
ch'i and Chin-ch'i to form an area contiguous to the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi
Soviet Area and there the new Fukien-Kiangsi Province has been established.
The recent victory scored by the East Region army has placed a large area
from the border between Lung-yen and Hsin-ch'uan in Fukien'Province through
Lien-ch'eng, Ch'ing-liu and Kuei-hua to the vicinity of Yen-p'ing in northern
Fukien within the territorial limits of the Soviet. In the course of smashing
the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, Kiangsi Province
added portions of territory, totaling several hundred square li in area, to
each of the six counties of Nan-feng, I-huang, Ch'ung-jen, Lo-an, Yung-feng
and Hsin-kan. As to soviet territory beyond the Central Soviet Area, such
as the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi, Hunan-Kiangsi, Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi, Hunan-
Western Hupeh and Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei soviet areas, although there were small
portions of territory which were temporarily occupied by the enemy, some
were recovered shortly after and some even made new progress. Making espe-
cially rapid progress on a broad front was the newly created soviet area in
the northern part of Szechwan Province. Owing to the heroic struggle of
the Red Fourth Front Army there, in less than a year they have sovietized
more than 10 counties and called on the worker-peasant toiling masses and
soldiers of the White army in the entire province of Szechwan to lean toward
soviet revolution. Elsewhere, in the provinces of Shensi, Honan, Hopeh,
Kiangsu, Kwangtung and Kwangsi, there is in existence either a soviet area
or a guerrilla area of ours. In the Northeast Provinces, the broad masses
of anti-Japanese volunteer army forces are continuing to fight stubbornly
against Japanese imperialism.
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The soviet areas have not only grown, but also have been more consolidated.
For example, previous manifestations of shoddy implementation of the class
line have, by and large, been rectified. As a result of the realistic im-
plementation of the Labor Law and promulgation of a new Labor Law, the eco-
nomic life of the worker masses has been improved still more, the enthusiasm
of the workers in participating in the revolutionary war and soviet construc-
tion has been raised further and the class unions of the workers have been
organized widely and have grown and progressed. The extensive unfolding
of the inspection of fields campaign has dealt the greatest blow to remnant
feudalist influences in the soviet areas, heightened to an enormous degree
the revolutionary potentialities of the toiling masses in rural areas and
promoted poor peasants' groups far and wide. By relying on the development
of the initiative of the worker-peasant masses, we have attracted a great
number of new worker-peasant cadres to participating in soviet work and got
rid of many of the bad elements hidden in the soviets. The leadership style
and working style in the soviets have been improved further and the soviets
are now linked even more closely with the masses. This year the administra-
tive area of a soviet has been reduced in size. This move enables the soviet
to come even closer in the system to the masses. In the light of experience
gained in past soviet election campaigns and soviet work, the Central Govern-
ment promulgated a new Election Law and Organic Law of Local Soviets, making
it possible for this year's election campaign to be unfolded even more cor-
rectly and for local soviets to be organized even better. All this has made
the soviet a government in which the masses truly manage their own affairs.
It has made this government meet the needs of the revolutionary war to be-
come an organizer as well as a leader of the revolutionary war.
Because of splendid victories of the Red Army and the development and con-
solidation of the soviet areas, on the one hand, and, on the other, the
total capitulation of the Kuomintang government to imperialism as a result
of the occupation of the Northeast Provinces, Jehol Province and North China
by Japanese imperialism and the economic catastrophe in the Kuomintang areas,
the broad masses of workers, peasants and toiling people, revolutionary
soldiers and revolutionary students in the Kuomintang areas have been aroused
and oppose as one Japanese imperialism and all imperialists, the Kuomintang
government and landlords and capitalists. Revolutionary struggles are un-
folding in vast areas throughout the country. The exploited and oppressed
masses in the whole of China enthusiastically support the Soviet and the Red
Army because the Soviet and the Red Army are the only government and mili-
tary forces fighting for national freedom and independence and only the
Soviet and the Red Army can save China.
The bitter and protracted civil war demands that the Soviet pay maximum
attention to undertakings for the development of the economy. Concerning
work in this respect, the Soviet is making great effort to carry it out.
Here the primary task is to develop agricultural production. Thanks to the
correct leadership of the Soviet and the heightening of the enthusiasm of
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the broad masses of toiling people during spring cultivation and summer
cultivation, the autumn harvest this year on the average. increased one and
a half times over last year. The yield of miscellaneous. grain crops regis-
tered an even bigger increase. Cattle for plowing cooperatives and labor
mutual aid societies have been established in a number of-places.
There is only one kind of development which can insure the supplies of the
Red Army and the masses and guarantee the exchange with the outside for in-
dustrial products, and that is a development that depends on agricultural
production. The development of industrial production is our second task in
economic construction. The production of farm implements and lime here is
closely linked with the development of agricultural production. The supply
of a number of handicraft products for daily use depends upon our own pro-
duction in the soviet areas. In the past, cigarettes, paper, lumber, grass
cloth, wolfram and camphor were produced and exported in large quantities,
but later they went into a decline. Since the beginning of the year, the
Soviet has been planning to resore these industries and in some of them
we have achieved initial success. To develop an export and import trade
is our third task in economic construction. This year the government estab-
lished the bureau of foreign trade, which has begun to work along this line.
For the purpose of carrying out the above-mentioned tasks, we must develop
cooperatives. Since the Central Government got down to promoting the co-
operative movement, consumers' cooperatives and foodstuffs cooperatives have
been spreading like a storm in various places. The development of all kinds
of producers' cooperatives is also being planned, while the planning of credit
cooperatives has just begun. Economic construction bonds floated by the
Central Government in order to launch economic construction are winning the
support of the masses. Bonds issued so far have exceeded 3 million yuan.
In all likelihood, the sum of 5 million yuan can be realized. The develop-
ment of the economic construction will certainly provide the revolutionary
war with a solid material basis and bring about further improvement in the
livelihood of the broad masses of workers and peasants. Comrades, let us work
hard together!
The revolutionary war and soviet construction demand that we generally raise
the cultural level of.the worker-peasant masses in the soviet. areas. Only
under the Soviet. regime are the worker-peasant masses able to enjoy the right
to get an education. In the past year, the Soviet has begun to get cultural
and educational enterprises under way. Primary schools, night schools,
literacy movements and club campaigns have begun in various places. The
establishment of Marxism-Communism University, Soviet University and Red
Army University and the development of the worker-peasant theatrical group
and blue-gown group movements, all show that the Soviet cultural construction
undertakings have entered the stage of expansion. Recently, the Central
Government has proclaimed Marxism-Communism to be the fundamental guideline
of Soviet culture and education. The Central Government is formulating a
system of primary education and promulgating concrete measures to carry
out social education. To enable the laboring people in the soviet areas to
acquire an education and to unfold a struggle on the cultural front have
become an important portion of our task in Soviet construction.
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Comrades of the electorate, in the foregoing paragraphs we have briefly
reported on the situation of the development of the Revolution and on our
progress and achievements in Soviet work. Now, we want to point out to you
comrades our deficiencies in Soviet work in the past and our tasks in the
work from now on. You, comrades of the electorate, must, under the correct
leadership of the Soviet, make every effort to substantiate these deficiencies
and realize these tasks before we can fight for the complete smashing of the
fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and the victory of the Soviet
throughout the country. What are our tasks? Where do our deficiencies lie?
First, expansion of the Red Army. Comrades, although the Red Army has been
enlarged, it is still not large enough... To defeat the vast forces of the
white army in the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, it is still
necessary to expand the Red Army. Every. brave worker and every brave peasant
ought to go to the front on their own initiative.' For the sake of coordinating
with the Red Army in fighting the enemy and defending their own localities at
the same time, it is imperative that the Red Guards and Young Pioneers be
expanded considerably and model Red Guards battalions and model Young Pioneers
be increased in number. The work of putting out sentries to check safe-con-
ducts must be tightened so as not to allow even one enemy scout to sneak into
a soviet area under cover. Transport teams must stand ready from time to
time to go to the front to carry the wounded or move the spoils of war.
Second, work in new soviet areas should be unfolded even more rapidly. Al-
though in the past year.we developed many new soviet areas, we still feel it
is a little bit slow. One reason for this is that we in the central area have
not sent enough worker-peasant activist comrades to work in'the new soviet
areas. In order to expand the new soviet areas even more drastically in the
fighting to smash the "encirclement and suppression" campaign, comrades in
the central area should be delighted to go to work in the new soviet areas
and comrades in the new soviet areas should redouble their efforts in perform-
ing their work.
Third, although we made great achievements in Soviet construction in the
past year, there is still much work that remains to be done. First of all,
to protect the usual interests of the worker we must enforce the Labor Law
even more generally and correctly. Next, the land investigation. movement.
We must make all possible efforts to launch movement and check up on classes
in places where remnants of feudal influence have not yet been wiped out.
But we must not start a quarrel with middle peasants and treat rich peasants
the same as landlords. Then, economic construction. We must strive for
winter cultivation this year and prepare for spring cultivation next year.
We must develop the cooperatives so that they will-have a membership of 1
million and set up central organizations of various consumers' cooperatives
at different levels to carry out the plan to engage in trade. We must carry
out the development of export and import trade to. break the enemy's block-
ade and solve our salt difficulties. We must repair bridges and roads so
as to facilitate economic development. We must sell effectively 3 to 5
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million yuan worth of economic construction bonds to raise the capital for
all kinds of economic construction undertakings. Next is cultural construc-
tion. We must establish a complete primary education system and unfold a
campaign to eliminate illiteracy. Then we must intensify the suppression of
counterrevolutionaries?so that not a single counterrevolutionary will remain
in the soviet areas to take advantage of an enemy attack to create trouble
in our interior. Moreover, we must step up fund raising so as to secure
insurance for our war chest.
In order to realize rapidly the above tasks, it is necessary to eliminate
thoroughly bureaucratism from among the working personnel of the soviet.
Comrades of the electorate should heed supervising the soviet personnel so
that bureaucratism cannot exist. It is necessary to see to.-it that this
year's election campaign will culminate in success so that a great many
worker-peasant activists will through their winning in the elections come
to work in the soviet and clear out bureaucratic elements among members of
the old administration. In this way, the realization of the different combat
tasks of the soviet will be assured.
Comrades of the electorate, every item of work mentioned above is a combat
duty of ours and an indispensable prerequisite to smashing the fifth "en-
circlement and suppression" campaign of the enemy. And as we make this re-
port to you today, the enemy is attacking us in.force and we are concentra-
ting our forces for a decisive battle against this enemy. The fighting is
getting to be extremely tense. Our work, therefore, must be tightened up
to the highest degree. The Central Government has promulgated an emergency
war mobilization order to call upon the entire working personnel in the soviet
to employ the spirit of shock troops to unfold their own work so as to make
soviet work in its entirety meet with the demands of the frontline. All mem-
bers of the electorate must rally forthwith under this call of the Central
Government. Comrades, let us make use of this kind of work to exchange for
final victory! First of all, we would like to exchange for a great victory
that will come before the opening of the Second National Congress of Soviets.
Comrades, let us dedicate such a victory to the Second National Congress of
Soviets!
Expand the Red Army drastically!
Enlarge the soviet areas drastically!
Unfold soviet construction work in combat fashion!
Smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign of the imperialist
Kuomintang!
Long live the Second National Congress of Soviets!
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Long live Soviet China!
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic
of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
24 October
? "Red China," No 122, 27 October 1933
* "Struggle," (Shanghai), No 59, 9 December 1933
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[Text] For the purpose of defining in explicit terms exemptions and reduc-
tions in agricultural tax, supplementary regulations governing tax exemptions
and tax reductions to the Provisional Agricultural Tax Law are hereby promul-
gated. In the event that the Provisional Tax Law contradicts these Regula-
tions, matters shall be dealt with according to these Regulations.
I. Concerning Workers
1. Tenant farmers, land coolies and long-term. longshoremen and their wives
(or husbands) and children below 16 years of age shall be exempt from taxes.
2. Coolies who work on the water (on wooden-boats, bamboo rafts, or wooden
rafts) and their wives (or husbands) shall be exempt from taxes.
3. Shop employees, handcraft workers (e.g., masons, carpenters, barbers,
textile workers), workers in the papermaking industry and other industrial
workers (in the mint or in printing plants) who have been allocated fields
shall be exempt from taxes. (Independent producers who sell what they pro-
duce shall not be exempt from taxes.)
Note 1. Workers and tenant farmers, referred to above, are limited to those
who have worked continuously for more than 2 years (close to before and after
the Revolution). Those who have worked for less than 2 years shall not be
exempt from taxes.
Note 2. The above-mentioned workers and tenant farmers who are exempted
from.taxation shall be dealt with according to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, ir-
respective of when they joined a labor union or what kind of labor union
they joined. Tenant farmers and coolies who joined a shop employees and
handicraft workers union shall be exempt from taxes in accordance with para-
graph 1. Handicraft workers who joined an agricultural workers union shall
be exempt from taxes in accordance with paragraph 3.
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4. Post-office workers, printing-plant workers, arsenal workers, clothing
and bedding factory workers and workers and employees of state-owned and
non-state-owned factories, mines, business establishments who have been
allotted fields shall be exempt from taxes, provided that they have worked
for more than 2 years. Those who have completed 2 years of service,in banks,
foodstuffs regulation bureaus, trade bureaus, telegraph offices.and tele-
phone offices and draw regular wages shall be exempt from taxes.
5. Those who work in state-owned factories, mines, banks, customs, business
establishments and organs, but do not draw regular wages shall, as the work-
ing personnel of the Soviet government, have their taxes reduced to one-half
(meaning their own taxes and the taxes of their parents and spouses) accord-
ing to Article 8 of the Agricultural Tax Law.
6. Tenant farmers, coolies, handicraft workers and shop employees who, after
finding work in state-owned and non-state owned factories, mines, business
establishments, banks and cooperatives, draw regular wages but have not worked
for more than 2 years shall be exempt from taxes in the same way as tenant
workers, coolies, shop employees and handicraft workers.
7. All kinds of workers who are exempt from taxes shall have as proof a
labor union membership'card or a formal certificate issued by the state-
owned factories or organs in question.
8. People who work in banks and regulation bureaus and draw allowances (which
are different from wages) shall be given the same treatment as extended to the
working personnel of the soviets and have their own taxes as well as the taxes
of their dependents reduced to one-half.
II. Concerning the Red Army
1. Red Army dependents (parents, children, spouses and brothers and sisters
under 16 years of age) shall be exempt from taxes in the year that a death
occurs in the family.
2. Coolies who have completed 5 months of work in the Red Army shall be
exempt from taxes. Those who have worked for 3 months or less shall not
be exempt from taxes. In case the length of their service is less than 5
months at the time of tax collection, but is 5 months or more after tax .
collection, they shall not be exempt from taxes in that year but shall be
given an exemption in the following year.
3. A divorced wife of a Red Army member shall not be exempt from taxes.
4. Laundry-team members and nurses of Red Army hospitals who have com-
pleted 6 months of work shall be exempt from taxes the same as family
dependents of the Red Army.
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5. Red Army members who returned after going AWOL shall not be exempt
from taxes, but those who rejoined the army shall be exempt from taxes.
6. Red Army members who returned after going to the front for 1 or 2 months
in an attempt to obtain a tax exemption shall make good all taxes outstand-
ing.
7. Those who fell ill due to work in'the Red Army and lost their ability
to work and were granted leave to return home shall, prior to recovery of
the ability to work, be exempt from taxes in the same way as members of
the Red Army.
8. Those who sacrificed their lives while participating id Red Army action
at the front shall be exempt from taxes for 3 years in the same way as a
member of the Red Army. Rich peasants in labor service corps who sacrificed
their lives at the front shall be exempt from taxes for 1 year.
9. Members of regional armed forces removed from production who sacrificed
their lives for the Revolution shall be exempt from taxes for 3 years the
same as a member of the Red Army.
10. Red Army fighters of landlord or rich peasant origin who have been
allotted fields shall similarly be exempt from taxes.
11. When a member of the Red Army has been taken prisoner by counter-revo-
lutionaries, and this was verified by other people, he shall be exempt from
taxes the same as family dependents of the Red Army.
12. If the wife whom a disabled armyman has married is a poor woman, besides
being exempted from taxation herself, the children that she brought with her
shall similarly be exempt from taxes. In case she is the daughter of a rich
peasant, she and her husband shall be exempt from taxes and. the children that
she brought with her shall be exempt from taxes if they are 10 years of age
or under.
13. Red Army fighters who have reached 45 years of age and completed 5 years
of military service and have been authorized to be deactivated and furnished
with a certificate as proof shall be exempt from taxes, together with their
dependents.
14. Red Army fighters who are exempt from taxes shall be limited to those
who enlisted before the initiation of taxation.
III. Concerning Working Personnel of the Soviet Government
1. Those who have completed 6 months of government service shall have their
taxes reduced to one-half.
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2. Those who sacrificed their lives while in government service shall,
together with dependents, have their taxes reduced to one-half for 3 years.
Those who died of disease shall, together with dependents, have their taxes
reduced to one-half for 2 years.
3. When a government worker marries a woman of.rich peasant origin, he
shall continue to have his taxes reduced to one-half, but his wife shall
enjoy no tax reduction.
4. All working personnel of mass organizations, such as labor unions, Young
Pioneers, Children's Corps, the Party and the League and anti-imperialist and
support-the-USSR mutual aid societies, shall not enjoy any tax reduction.
1. In case allotted fields became barren, those who deliberately laid
them waste shall not be exempt from taxes. Those who truly had no means to
cultivate them and were confirmed by the Hsiang Soviet shall be exempt from
taxes.
2. During the period that a worker is serving a hard-labor term or suffer-
ing punishment for a crime, in case his dependents are exempt from taxes,
they shall enjoy that exemption as usual.
3. Individual peasants who seek tax reduction or exemption on account of
losses sustained in a natural calamity should submit their requests to town-
ship representatives who shall make a decision after discussions. If the
whole village seeks tax reduction or exemption, a resolution should be passed
by the presidium of the district soviet and approved by the county government.
If the whole district seeks tax reduction or exemption, a resolution should
be approved by the provincial government.
4. If a coolie dies, his dependents shall be exempt from taxes for 1 year
in the same way as the coolie himself. If other workers die, they shall be
exempt from taxes for 1 year.
5. When a poor worker or peasant has married a woman of rich peasant origin
for less than a year, they shall be taxed according to their original class
composition. After a year of marriage they shall be taxed according to the
rates for poor workers and peasants.
6. When the, daughter or former wife of a rich peasant has married a poor
worker or peasant, for the reason that she was allotted half a share of
fields when she was young and had no work points, she shall be taxed according
to the rates for rich peasants, but the number of family members shall be
figured according to the number in the household of her new husband.
7. Poor workers and peasants, whether male or female, who have married into
rich peasant families shall be taxed according to their original class com-
position.
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9. Middle peasants and poor peasants who are disabled, orphaned, or widowed
and have no one to support them shall be exempt from taxes. Those who have
someone to support them shall not be exempt from taxes.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic
of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
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OPEN LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY ON 'DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS
41 BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN'
[Text] People of the whole country!
Ever since the Kuomintang Nanking Government concluded an agreement with
Japanese imperialism (calling for the sale of Manchuria and Mongolia to Japan
and a truce in North China and the holding of the Dairen Conference in which
China, Japan and "Manchukuo" gathered for a "social") the Kuomintang Nanking
government not only has sold off Manchuria and Mongolia and the so-called
"neutral region" of Lo-tung, but also has directly mobilized its armed
strength to force, in coordination with troops of Japanese imperialism and
"Manchukuo," anti-Japanese Manchurian soldiers to withdraw from Mongolia.
It also has, under the name of "suppression of bandits," massacred thousands
of troops of the Northeast Anti-Japanese volunteer armies and revolutionary
soldiers. All over China, Chiang Kai-shek, the ringleader of the Kuomintang,
issued a blatant proclamation to the effect that "people who talk wildly of
resisting Japan will be summarily executed without leniency" and that "to
extirpate the bandits it is necessary to stop resisting Japan." Then he
proceeded to suppress all anti-Japanese revolutionary movements with the
most ruthless White terror, withdraw his North China garrisons according to
plan and concentrate all his military might to launch a new, fifth "encircle-
ment and suppression" campaign against the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist
main force--the Chinese Soviet Government and the Chinese Workers and Peasants'
Red Army--to demonstrate his loyalty to imperialism and realize his prede-
termined plan of holding "direct negotiations between China and Japan."
Since key figures of the Kuomintang held their third Lu-shan conference in
September, direct negotiations between China and Japan have been carried
out at an accelerated pace. The scope of the negotiations obviously is not
limited to the public acknowledgement of the Kuomintang government that
Manchuria and Mongolia are colonies of Japanese imperialism. In addition,
it is certain that the Nanking government will be further submissive to Japan
in its betrayal of the nation. It will recognize North, China as within the
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sphere of influence of Japan in exchange for the latter's aid in money
and arms to extend the reactionary influence of the Kuomintang government
and carry out its fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign. What is
described as Japan's willingness to relinquish its "extraterritoriality in
China" is, of course, nothing but a trick to hoodwink the Chinese people.
People of the whole country! The Kuomintang Nanking Government has sold
off the Northeast Provinces and Inner Mongolia. Now it soon will sell off
all of North China. At the same time, the Kuomintang Nanking Government and
the Kuomintang governments of various other factions have sold off Tibet,
Sikang and the greater portions of Szechwan to British imperialism and nine
islands in the South China Sea and Yunnan and Kweichow to French imperialism.
They also have sold off to British imperialism a multitude of political and
economic privileges. The big loan of several hundred million yuan and large
quantities of murderous weapons that the Kuomintan Government has obtained
from various imperialist countries in Europe and America were the price
paid to it for selling out China.
Its sell-out of the whole country, capitulation to imperialism and its
serving as a scavenger of the imperialists in their partition of China have
been the standing foreign policy of the Kuomintang government. Precisely
because of this, it is opposing all anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist revo-
lutionary movements and carrying out its frenzied, desperate fifth "encircle-
ment and suppression" campaign against the only anti-Japanese, anti-imperial-
ist, people's own Soviet Government and Workers and Peasants' Red Army. Pre-
cisely because of this, it is helping the imperialists to intensify the
exploitation of the Chinese people and create the total breakdown of China's
national economy so as to cause flood, drought and famine to spread widely
over China, workers to lose their jobs, peasants to lose their land, students
to lose their opportunity to attend school and the overwhelming majority of
Chinese people to live in grievous and deplorable hell and eventually die
of cold and hunger!
People of the whole country! The road that the Kuomintang wants us to take
is one that will lead to the conversion of China into a colony, one that
will lead to the complete destruction of the Chinese nation!
The only way ahead for the revolutionary masses of the whole people is to
unite as one, arm themselves, unfold a national revolutionary war against
the invasion of Japanese imperialism and all other imperialism countries,
overthrow all Kuomintang warlords who betray the country and bring shame
on the nation, first of all, the principal cat's paw of the imperialist--
the Nanking Kuomintang government headed by Chiang Kai-shek--and fight for
the Chinese nation and the ultimate liberation of the Chinese people!
The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic once more
proclaims to the people of the whole country that for the sake of striking
down Japan and all imperialists, overthrowing all traitorous Kuomintang
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The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic firmly be-
lieves that this proposal can win the sympathy and active support of the
laboring masses of the whole country and all other Chinese people with even
a slight amount of patriotic blood running in their veins. Such sympathy and
support will guarantee the total victory of the soviet road in the decisive
battle between the two roads of colonialism and sovietism and enable the
Chinese nation and people of the whole country to win ultimate liberation
from the iron heels of imperialism!
Down with Japan and all other imperialists!
Down with the traitorous Kuomintang, the Nanking government and all other
Kuomintang governments!
Struggle for an independent and free soviet new China!
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic
of China
warlords and maintaining the independence, unity and territorial integrity
of China, it stands ready at all times to shed the last drop of blood. In
order to maintain the independence, unity and territorial integrity of China,
the Soviet Central Government is in the process of concentrating all its
strength and preparing to make all sacrifices to smash the fifth "encircle-
ment and suppression" campaign of the imperialist Kuomintang. The struggle
to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign is a struggle to
prevent China from taking the road of colonialism and struggle for a free
and independent Soviet new China!
In order to concentrate all the strength of the people of the whole country
to engage in a decisive battle against China's most vicious enemy, the Pro-
visional Central Government and Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee of
the Chinese Soviet Republic once again propose hereby to all armed units taking
part in attacks against soviet areas throughout the country the conclusion of
a combat agreement on the current anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang fighting under
the following three conditions: (1) Cease all attacks against the soviet
areas immediately; (2) guarantee immediately the democratic rights of the
people (freedom of assembly, of association, of speech, of the press and of
strike); and (3) arm the people and create armed volunteers immediately to
defend China and fight for its independence, unity and territorial integrity.
Chu Teh, Chairman of the Revolutionary
Military Affairs Committee
? "Red China," No 126, 17 November 1933
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ON THE AWOL PROBLEM IN THE RED ARMY
Order No. 25 of the Central Executive Committee
15 December 1933
[Text] Desertion is a sinister enemy of the Red Army and revolutionary war.
The struggle against desertion is an important work to insure the combat ef-
fectiveness of the Red Army. In the past there was no uniform procedure to
deal with the problem. By this Order it is specially announced that
(1) Those who desert with their rifles shall be summarily executed by shoot-
ing, without distinction, as soon as they are apprehended.
(2) Those who organize desertion (such as forging trip tickets) and lead a
squad, a platoon, or a company in desertion shall be executed by shooting,
without distinction, after being apprehended and put on public trial.
(3) Those who repeatedly desert and spread rumors to undermine the Red Army
and the return-to-the-army campaign shall be uniformly apprehended and handed
over to the courts for sentencing to penal servitude for a limited term or
execution by shooting.
(4) What about those who desert individually for lack of political conscious-
ness? The various governments shall intensify propaganda and agitation directed
at them and organize work to extend preferential treatment to their family
dependents, so that they will return to the army of their own free will. The
governments must in no way adopt measures of arrest and imprisonment. Any-
one who does shall be dealt with as having violated the laws of the Soviet.
(5) If deserters stubbornly refuse to return to the army after having been
subjected to propaganda and given explanations, the governments may, having
obtained the countenance of the masses, require them to indemnify the state
(army uniform and blanket) and the masses (labor force expended in connection
with giving preferential treatment to their family dependents) for losses
incurred, and strip them of the right to vote.
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(6) It is absolutely not permissible to harbor a deserter and let him work
or serve in various organs, army units, and public bodies in the rear. In
case the deserter is harbored in an organ, then the responsible official of
the organ in question shall be subject to punishment by demotion, dismissal,
or imprisonment.
(7) Those who fail to execute this order shall be dealt with as having aided
and abetted desertion and undermined the Red Army.
(8) This order shall come into force from the date of promulgation.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
15 December 1933
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ON PUNISHMENTS FOR CORRUPTION AND WASTE
Directive No. 26 of the Central Executive Committee
15 December 1933
[Text] For the purpose of setting down strict punishments for corruption
and waste, disciplinary measures are specially formulated as follows:
(1) All working personnel of soviet organs, state-owned enterprises and
public bodies who make use of their positions to appropriate public money
fraudulently to their own use shall be dealt with according to the follow-
ing clauses.
(a) Those who fraudulently appropriate upward of 500 yuan shall be sentenced
to death.
(b) Those who fraudulently appropriate more than 300 yuan but less than
500 yuan shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than 2 years
but less than 5 years.
(c) Those who fraudulently appropriate more than 100 yuan but less than
300 yuan shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than 6 months
but less than 2 years.
(d) Those who fraudulently appropriate less than 100 yuan shall be sentenced
to compulsory labor for a term of less than 6 months.
(2) Apart from the punishments set forth in the clauses of Article (1), the
competent authorities may confiscate the entire family property, or a portion
of it, of those who violate any of the clauses in Article (1) and recover the
sum of public money fraudulently appropriated.
(3) All those who embezzle public money for their own gain shall be reckoned
as having committed corruption and be dealt with in accordance with Articles
(1) and (2).
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(4) All working personnel of soviet organs, state-owned enterprises and
public bodies who waste public money through dereliction of duty, causing
losses to the state, shall be admonished, dismissed, or sentenced to im-
prisonment for a term of more than 1 month but less than 3 years, according
to the degree of waste.
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
? "Red China," No 140, 4 January 1934
7682
CSO: 4005
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INVESTIGATION IN CH'ANG-KANG TOWNSHIP
[Text] The actual implementation of all soviet work rests with the township
and city soviets. Everyone understands this. As to how the township and
city soviets should perform their work, many people do not understand. Not
understanding the work of the township and city soviets will make it impos-
sible to truly lead the work of the soviet or truly follow the principle
that "all soviet work must be subordinated to the demands of the revolutionary
war." We have encountered the following situation among the work personnel
of higher level soviets. They issue many orders and decisions, but they are
ignorant of the practical work condition of any township or city soviet.
Comrades! This won't do. This is bureaucraticm, a hindrance to Soviet work!
Our tasks have been proposed, and many plans, from expanding the Red Army to
building bridges and roads, have been published. The question is how to
mobilize the masses to carry out the tasks and plans completely and. practically.
The extraordinarily tense revolutionary war demands our prompt and general
solution of this question. Yet such a solution cannot be produced out of our
mind. We must collect all kinds of fresh and concrete experiences in the pro-
cess of mobilizing the masses to implement the various tasks, bring such ex-
periences to a greater light and expand our mass mobilization, in order to
adapt ourselves to greater tasks and plans.
Currently, such serious errors as perfunctory performance of duty and coercion
have occurred in the soviet organs of many areas. The relationship between
such soviets and the masses is extremely bad, greatly hampering the implemen-
tation of the tasks and plans of the soviet. On the other hand, innumerable
lower level soviet work comrades in many areas have created excellent means
to mobilize the masses. Becoming one with the masses, they have been very
successful in their work. One responsibility of the higher level soviet
personnel is to collect and arrange such good experiences and spread them over
a vast area. This work must be started immediately in all the provinces and
counties. The most effective means against bureaucraticism is to demonstrate
by live models.
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Limited by time and the material of the informants, the experiences of
Ch'ang-kang township collected here only include a brief summary of the
major items of their work. Nevertheless, just such summary alone is suf-
ficient to arouse our serious'attention and make us solemnly praise their
work as "the model of Soviet work." As their relationship with the masses
is extremely close, they have produced a great effect in their work. Our
goal is to bring to light such experiences and to collect more experiences
to serve as concrete models to all the backward township and city soviets,
so that their work will be raised to the level of the advanced, rally mil-
lions of people around the soviet and adapt all soviet work to the demand
of smashing the enemy encirclement.
Subdivided from Lang-mu township in the same district, Ch'ang-kang township
belongs to Shang-she District, Hsing-kuo county, Kiangsi Province.
The work levels of Shang-she District were: First, Ch'ang-kang and Lang-mu;
second, Yang-ch'en; third, Ho-fu, Hsiu-shui and T'ang-shih; fourth, Jen-
t'ien and Shang-she.
Ch'ang-kang township includes Ch'ang-kang, Tang-pei, Hsin-ch'i and Szu-
kang, a total of four villages.
1. The township had 437 households, including 1,784 persons. Of these,
320 were away serving in the Red Army or performing work and 1,464 (including
part-time laborers and district and township work personnel) resided in the
township. Among the township residents, there were 1,286 middle and poor
peasants, 102 workers, farm laborers and coolies and 76 landlords and rich
peasants.
2. Serving in the Red Army or working out of town:
Joined the Red Army between 1928 and 1932: 80
Joined the Red Army in 1933: 139
With the guerrilla camp: 7
Transferred to the county or above: 34
Transferred to the rear hospital: 24
Transferred as full-time laborers: 36
Total: 320
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3. Landlords and rich peasants:
Existing. landlords: 2 households, including 5 persons
Existing rich peasants: 11 households, including 72 persons
Wives and daughters of landlords marrying workers and peasants uncovered in
the August land investigations: 6 persons
36 tan, 6 tan of land were repossessed from the 6 persons. No other land-
lord or rich peasant was uncovered.
II. Delegates' Congress
1. The Congress
The daily agenda was always: (1) opening of meeting; (2) reports; (3) dis-
cussions; (4) others; (5) adjournment. The agenda was written on paper and
posted. The concrete issues for discussion were written down by the chair-
man but not posted. In regard to "reports," the chairman would first report
on the reason for the meeting, some 20 or 30 sentences. Then the "attending
comrade" of the district soviet would make his report about the political
situation and the work condition. (Someone from the district soviet attended
almost every meeting, mostly department members, 5 or 6 times out of 10,
seldom department chiefs, only about 2 or 3 times out of 10. The chairman
and vice chairman rarely came, only once out of 10 times.) The chairman and
the branch secretary would supplement his report with matters not covered by
him. "Discussions" always concerned concrete issues. At the meeting on
8 November, for instance, the following items were discussed:
(1) Military mobilization. The subject was subdivided as follows:
(a) Expanding the Red Army: The Ch'ang-kang Village delegate promised to
recruit 5 persons, the Tang-pei Village delegate 4, the Hsin-ch'i Village
delegate 3 and the Szu-kang Village delegate 3, totalling 15, to be accom-
plished by 30 November. (b) Preferential treatment of Red Army families.
It was decided that the model cultivation team and the labor mutual aid
association would mobilize together. (c) Return-to-the-ranks movement:
There were 7 AWOL's in the township. It was decided that the propaganda
teams (township village) and the surprise attack teams (organized by Red Army
wives) would carry out the work. (d) Comforting the Red Army: Each village
promised to give 4 towels and a quantity of yellow hemp and cloth straw-
sandals. Ch'ang-kang pledged 110 pairs, Tang-pei 100 pairs, Hsing-ch'i 90
pairs and Szu-kang 100 pairs.
(2) Economic mobilization. The subject was subdivided as follows:
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(a) Economic construction public bonds: The township pledged to sell 5,456
yuan of bonds. It had received 822 tan of grain, valued at 4,110 yuan and
127 yuan in cash, totalling 4,237 yuan. It was still 1,219 yuan short of
the goal. It was decided that the delegates must "devote their effort" to
propaganda and fulfill the pledge by 25 November. (b) Cooperatives: Only
the district had a consumer cooperative in the past, but now the township
organized a branch cooperative. However, it had only collected 100-odd yuan
in shares. The masses had pledged 350 yuan. It was decided that the dele-
gates must propagandize in order to collect the money, and the propaganda team
must also put in its effort. (c) The thrift movement: It was decided that
more vegetables must be planted and grain saved in preparation for spring
famine.
(3) Repair of river dikes and roads: It was decided that in the 10 days
between 20 and 30 November, the 6 li of thoroughfare at Chiang-pei-tung must
be completed, 6 ch'ih wide. Other roads, 4 ch'ih wide, would be undertaken
afterward. Five preparation committee members were elected. After the roads
were completed, the 10 ch'ih wide river dike destroyed by flood would be
repaired. The large wooden bridge will be repaired jointly with Lang-mu
township.
(4) "Supporting the district soviet." For the masses of the entire hsiang
to show their support of the third district wide soviet congress beginning
12 November, it was decided that a red tablet made with 1.4 ch'ih of red
cloth with an inscription of 4 characters, would be presented as a gift. On
12 November, 90 percent of the masses of the township were mobilized into
teams to proceed to the soviet and set off fireworks. (Finally, 800 percent
of them set off 5,000 or 6,000 firecrackers, all bought by the masses themselves.)
The two last items were discussed under "Others" in the agenda. All the
subjects of discussion were proposals of voters at the election mass meeting,
which were transmitted to the township soviet for discussion.
2. 'Inspection System
Of the two delegates' congresses, one was to discuss problems and the other
to inspect work.
Before each work inspection congress, the on-duty delegates of the villages
summoned the delegates under them to hold a meeting. The on-duty delegates
then reported the results at the delegates' congress. Afterward, items which
had not been carried out, or successfully carried out, were discussed in
order to carry them out or correct them.
This method was started in Lang-mu township. Ch'ang-kang township adopted
it after being subdivided out of Lang-mu township. Subsequently, Yang-ch'en
township also followed suit. Recently, the district soviet called a district
wide work inspection meeting and asked all the townships to adopt the method.
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3. On-duty Delegates
The numbers of delegates of the villages:
Ch'ang-kang Village: Over 500 population (at the time of land division)--
14 delegates.
Tang-pei Village: Over 490 population--14 delegates.
Hsin-ch'i Village: Over 300 population--13 delegates.
Szu-kang Village: Over 400 population--14 delegates.
Work levels of the villages: First, Ch'ang-kang; second, Tang-pei; third,
Hsin-ch'i; fourth, Szu-kang.
Each village had an "on-duty delegate" by rotation among the delegates for
10-day periods. It was started in September. Before that, it was the "chair-
man delegate" system, and one person was designated to serve as the chairman.
After 2 years, the chairman, system was found defective. As the responsibili-
ties were given to one person, the others had no chance to practice, while
rotation would remedy the defect. But the on-duty system (actually 10-day
duty) also had its defects. The weak delegates were unable to lead the vil-
lage.
4. Standing Committee
Since the formation of the soviet, there was always a standing committee.
The standing committee included a chairman, vice chairman, secretary, Chinese
Communist Party branch secretary and Young Communist League branch secretary,
totalling five persons. When necessary, the on-duty delegates attended the
meetings.
5. Delegates in Charge of Residents
Each delegate was in charge of over 20 to over 50 residents. Delegate Li
Ch'iu-ying of Ch'ang-kang village, for instance, was in charge of over 50
residents.
Each delegate had a residents' handbook, divided into sections on adult male,
adult female, male vanguard team (could serve as full-time laborers), female
vanguard team (could serve as part-time laborers), male children and female
children. The male adults were further divided into those serving in the
Red.Guard (could serve as full-time laborers) and those not serving in the
Red Guard (could serve as part-time laborers). The female adults were also
divided into those serving in the Red Guard (could serve as part-time laborers)
and those not serving in the Red Guard (could receive preferential treatment
as families of the Red Army).
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6. Changes of Delegates
Before the new administrative divisions were made, Lang-mu township (7
villages, population 3,000) elected over 70 delegates and 11 substitute dele-
gates in the November election last year, totalling over 80, including 16
women and over 60 men. By the time of reelection on 1 November this year,
only 5 men delegates were left. Most of them had joined the Red Army and
a small number had been transferred in their work. Some 29 of them left
at one time in Red May. Before leaving, every department delegate called
a meeting of the masses under his charge to elect an "acting delegate."
7. Political Manifestations of the Delegates
Excellent--60 percent.
Medium--35 percent.
Inferior--5 percent (4 persons).
The four inferior ones included two men and two women. Very stupid and not
positive, they attended only 4 of the 10 meetings and would not listen or
express themselves at the meetings. Their attitude toward the masses was
"crude." The masses did not like them and elected others to replace them in
July.
8. The 16 Women Delegates
Excellent--8 of them. They looked for work to do and performed well.
Medium--6 of them. They did not look for work to do, but only did what was
assigned to them. They did not do the work well, and required help.
Inferior--2 of them. They did not do what was assigned to them.
The delegates' congress of Ch'ang-kang township has many excellent creations,
such as the standing committee, on-duty delegates, delegates in charge of
residents, and inspection system, which all deserve emulation by other areas.
The standing committee, however, should be renamed the presidium (7 members
for the large townships; 5 for the small townships). The on-duty delegate
should be changed to the "chairman delegate," selecting the best delegate
to serve a 1- or 2-month term. It is too frequent to change every 10 days.
The problems discussed at the meetings were very practical,. but the five empty
items on the daily agenda should be abolished. Why not post the list of
concrete issues to be discussed? The inspection system of Ch'ang-kang
township is very good. It is a means for the full performance of work and
speed in performance. The inferior delegates should have been replaced much
sooner. Replacing them by reelection 8 months later was too long. Electing
a replacement immediately upon the departure of a delegate was correct, but
the replacement should not be called an "acting delegate."
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1. The Election Committee
Nine members:. Chinese Communist Party branch secretary, Chinese Communist
Women's manager, farm laborers' branch chief, handicraft branch chief, poor
peasants' league chairman and a member, production brigade leader, and two
township delegates. The branch secretary served as the chairman. It was
organized in September.
The county soviet originally decided to hold the election at the end of Sep-
tember, but the date was changed twice, and was finally set at the beginning
of November.
2. Election Propaganda
In the propaganda, it was explained that the classes had not been clearly
distinguished in the past, but now they were clearly distinguished. There-
fore, there must be an election. It was also explained that, for the pur-
pose of breaking the encirclement and for the purpose of inspecting the work
and making it more advanced, there must be an election.
3. Voter Registration
All four villages made up record books for the delegates to register the
residents under their charge. The books were then submitted to the election
committee which compiled the lists and posted them. Those with voting rights
were on the first list, those under age 16 who had no voting rights on the
second list. And landlords and rich peasants who were also without voting
rights on the third list. The first and second lists were red in color and
the third one white. The three lists were posted at the gates of the four
villages and the township soviet. The voters' books were actually completed
in September but, as the family members of workers were not classified as
workers in the books, the error was rectified last month, and the lists re-
published. Some people among the masses were not clear about the distinction
of criteria btween electing "worker" and "peasant" delegates. Less than 10
percent of the people in the hsiang correctly understood the issue of "work-
er leadership."
Each of the four villages was an election unit, and there was also a worker
unit.
5. Work Report
Voters' meetings were held on 2 different days (19 and 20 October), 2
villages on the first day and 2 on the second.
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The chairman made reports in Ch'ang-kang and Tang-pei villages on 2 differ-
ent days. The vice chairman (who was the branch secretary) made reports in
Hsin-ch'i and Szu-kang villages also on 2 different days. The reports included
military mobilization, economic construction and other work, altogether three
items.
After the report, the candidates' list was voted on. The masses attending
the meeting were asked to criticize the work of the hsiang soviet, but no one
did.
The party branch managers' committee held a meeting on 19 October. All the
villages were represented (11 persons attending). According to the ratio
of workers and peasants in the villages, a list of 55 persons was drafted,
exactly the number of delegates to be elected. It was then distributed to
the party cells, labor unions and poor peasants' leagues of the various vil-
lages for discussion, proposed by the party members of the cells who made
work reports at the voters' mass meetings, and passed, thus eliminating the
procedure of preparing the list by the election committee.
The list was published by posting it at the gates of the four villages and
the township soviet.
7. Election Mass Meeting
The workers' meeting, which was held at the township soviet, had a 90 per-
cent attendance, the remainder being absent due to illness. The peasants'
meetings were held separately in the four villages, with a 93 percent
attendance. The meetings were started in the forenoon. Upon entering the
door, a voter would write the word "present" on his own name on the list.
(The list had 24 spaces, printed and distributed by the county soviet, and
the names of 24 voters were written thereon). One man was posted at the
door as guard. Some children loitered outside, and a few of them came in.
Knowing that they had no share in the election, no landlord or rich peasant
showed up.
Procedure: Reports were made by the election committee member, the town-
ship soviet chairman and the district soviet attending comrade. The voters
were asked whether they had any opinion. (None). The names on the candi-
dates' list were introduced one by one and voted on. (No vote in the nega-
tive). The proposals were discussed. (Someone proposed that all those in
the township age 16 to 45 in good health should proceed to the front line.
It was passed by the majority. In addition, the "military affairs," "eco-
nomy" and "dikes and roads" proposals discussed at the delegates' meeting
on 8 November were all proposed at the election mass meeting this time.)
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The meeting opened at 1000 after all participants had arrived, and adjourned
at 1600. (The spirit was very good.)
8. Delegate Components
Among the 55 delegates, 36 were most positive and 19 medium. No inferior
ones were discovered. -
Among the. delegates, 60 percent (over 30 of them) were old delegates who
were reelected to their current positions, and 40 percent were newly elected.
9. Delegates' Congress After the Election
The first delegates' congress was held the next day after the election
(5 November) in the forenoon, and it elected a chairman, a vice chairman,
a secretary, and the delegates to the district mass meeting (10 persons).
Three comrades from the district soviet attended the meeting. The second
congress was held the 4th day after the election (8 November) to discuss
the proposals of the election mass meeting (see above).
The defects in the election in Ch'ang-kang township this time were:
(1) In the propaganda, it was not pointed out that the Soviet was the
political power for the masses to manage their own life, and that it was
the most important right of the masses. (2) The number of people on the
candidates' list was exactly the same as the number of delegates to be
elected when it should have'been twice as many. Therefore, the masses
did not express any criticism of the candidates' list. The election com-
mittee did not produce any effect on the issue of formulating the candidates'
list. There was only party activity. (3) The work report meeting did not
do its best to urge the masses to criticize the work of the township soviet.
Aside from such defects, everything was successful.
IV. Committees Under the Township Soviet
The following were the mass organizations, divided into village and town-
ship levels. The village committees had five members, and the township
commissioner served as the chairman.
Most of the township committees had 5 members, because there were village
committees, but at times there were 7, 9, or 11 members.
1. Committee to Expand the Red Army
A total of 7 members, including 3 delegates, to discuss "expansion," "pre-
ferential treatment," "comforting" and "welcome." The comforting team (7
members, including a team leader and 4 delegates, 1 man and 3 women; the
remaining 3 consisted of 1 man and 2 women) carried peanuts, beans, vege-
tables and straw sandals to the hospitals and county seat, and once to
Huang-p'o Hsiao-pu, to comfort the Red Army.
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Seven members. Several meetings were held during the land investigation
movement in September, and the 36 tan of land uncovered in the previous
month were disposed of. No meeting has been held since.
It should be changed to the agricultural experimental farm managing com-
mittee. A farm products exhibition hall should be established in the ex-
perimental farm.
3. Land Registration Committee
Five members, 1 in each village. The chairman was regularly stationed
there. Organized in July, it was active for 2 months. After the regis-
tration was completed, the meals for the chairman was discontinued.
Method: The committee members went to the villages and gathered the in-
formation from the delegates for registration. When the delegates did not
have the information, the committee members visited the households concerned.
The registration was not completed in August because they did not understand
the contents of the forms. It was completed after a 1-month extension.
Five members. Besides the chairman, there was one in each village, in
charge of planting and protection.
Some trees were planted, but did not flourish because of inferior soil.
They should have been planted along rivers, roads, and houses.
If many trees on a private hill were to be chopped down, the owner must
consult the committee member, but if only a few, he did not have to do so.
There was provision as to the size of the trees.
Five members, in charge of directing the "water conservation" and "bridge"
committees.
6. Water Conservation Committee
Five members. Besides the chairman, there was one member in each village.
7. Bridge Committee
Five members, in charge of bridge and road repairs. Should be called bridge
and road committee.
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8. State Owned Property Committee
Five members. It was there, but what it did is unknown.
9. Granary Committee
It was in charge of the care of public bond grain and the grain of Red
Army public fields.
The famine preparation granary was also under its care. The grain from
the 36 tan of confiscated land, totalling over 10 tan, was stored for
famine preparation.
10. Confiscation Committee
Three members, in charge of fines and donations.
From September on, the landlords paid 9 yuan in fines and the rich peasants
donated 225 yuan (11 households, donating from 10 to over 40 yuan each).
In the past, the farms, hills and woods, buildings, plow animals and farm
tools of the rich peasants were all confiscated, and the rich peasants were
only allocated some inferior land, but no hills. Now, they had to lease plow
animals and farm tools from others. As for their cash on hand, they were
either "fined" in the past or at present. One could not call it donation.
Currently, their living condition is even worse than the farm laborers. (It
must be pointed out that Ch'ang-kang township's policy on the rich peasants
is erroneous.)
11. Land Investigation Committee
Nine members. No longer in existence.
12. Education Committee
Nine members.
13. Public Health Committee
Five members. Organized in April.
14. Air and Poison Defense Committee
Five members. Organized in October; 4 or 5 meetings were held.
15. Preparation Committee
Organized for the purpose of the commemoration meeting.
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The "village" committees of Ch'ang-kang township (the villages have many
of the committees) have expanded the contact of the Soviet with the masses.
It is an excellent creation when Soviet work has developed to a high degree.
As the villages have 5-member committees, many of the township committees
only need 5 members. Moreover, as 4 of the 5 members of each of the town-
ship committees serve as the chaimen of the 4 village committees, a network
is formed, and it is a great help to the work of the delegates' congress.
However, the comrades of Ch'ang-kang township regard the committees as mass
organizations in the same category as the labor unions and poor peasants'
leagues. They do not know that they are a part of the Soviet. This is not
proper. The "construction committee" can be abolished. In regard to the
"land committee," in areas such as Hsing-kuo where the land struggle is in-
tense, it should be changed to the agricultural experimental farm committee.
"Grain," "census," "worker-peasant procurators" and "Red alert" committees
should be added. Provisions on these have been made in the "local Soviet
Organization Law" promulgated by the Central Government.
V. Local Troops
1. Organization
(1) One platoon of men's Red Guards
Age 24 to 45; the township had a total of 66 men within this age bracket.
Except the chairman, the secretary and the seriously ill or crippled, total-
ling over 20 persons, who were not included, all those of this age bracket
were organized into it, totalling 46.
One platoon leader, 1 assistant platoon leader, 6 squad leaders, and 6
assistant squad leaders; one flag.
(2) One company of women's Red Guard
Of the same age bracket; the township had a total of 146 women (more than
twice the number of men). Except the 20 or more sick or crippled, all were
organized into it, totalling 120. One company commander, one assistant com-
mander, one political director, three platoon leaders, three assistant platoon
leaders, nine squad leaders and nine assistant squad leaders, all female;
one flag.
(3) One brigade of Young Pioneers
Both men and women, age 16 to 23, were included in the brigade. The town-
ship had 21 men and 80 women (4 times the men) of this age bracket, total-
ling 101. Except about 15 crippled (club-foot, etc.), all were organized
into it, totalling 86.
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Brigade commander and assistant commander one each. Divided into one men's
platoon and two women's platoons, each with a leader and an assistant leader.
2. Training
(1) Platoon drill
The village as the unit, twice a month, separating the Red 'Guard and the
Young Pioneers, men and women drilling together.
Instructors: Women's assistant company commander in Ch'ang-kang; women's
company commander in T'ang-pei. Young Pioneers had one woman and three men
as instructors. Items of drill: Attention, at ease, left and right face,
ch'a-tang-tzu, marching, running (seldom women), dispersal, and field work
(3- or 4-li distance).
Weapons: Mostly sights, some wooden guns.
Politics class: Drill first and lecture afterward. The political director
lectured on the revolutionary situation, imperialism, tasks of the Red Guard,
etc. No set text (lecturing at random).
Time: Afternoon, roughly 1400 to 1800, 2-1/2 hours of drilling and 1-1/2
hours of lecturing.
Attendance: Averaging 70 percent.
(2) Company drill
The township as the unit, on the 15th of every month.
Items of drill: Each platoon went through the drill to determine the
superior ones. The accomplishments of the platoons in drilling were in-
spected.
Politics class: After the drill, the director discussed the political
situation.
Time: 4 hours in the afternoon. Currently, as the weather was cold in
winter and there was more time, it has been changed to the forenoon.
3. Service Work
(1) Transport
Men served as full-time laborers (those over 45 years of age and not
organized into the Red Guard served part-time).
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Women served as part-time laborers (some of them were selected and assigned
to areas such as inside the city, Kao-shing-yu and Ch'a-ling). Women also
were assigned to rescue and nursing work (some of them were selected to
organize rescue and nursing platoons; in readiness; no work) and laundry de-
tail (more than 10 from each village who were not tied down by young children
were selected and organized into laundry details; went to the replacement
division and instructors team in Shao-chi-wo several times and Ch'a-ling
two or three times to do laundry).
(2) Night patrol
Ch'ang-kang, T'ang-pei and Szu-kang had a total of three patrol stations,
one shift per night, 5 or 6 persons%per shift. The Red Guard and the Young
Pioneers each sent several members to take turns performing the task, under
the supervision of the squad leader or assistant leader. One person stood
guard and the rest slept. The patrol would ask for the password (answer:
"Ordinary citizen," followed with name, destination and purpose. Actually,
the people did not know the password) and check the road slip (someone from
another township passing through). No bad people have ever been caught.
(3) Daytime inspection
Three persons were responsible during the day, one from the Red Guard, one
from the Young Pioneers, and one from the children's league. When anyone
passed through, one would check his road slip (children's leaguer) and another
would question him (Red Guard or Young Pioneer). Messages would be delivered
when necessary. The Tang-pei patrol station caught four or five deserters
and delivered them to the district government. "Ordinary citizens" arrested
someone without a road slip (when he took a small path in the hills), who
came from another county, was very ferocious, suspected of being a spy and
delivered to the county government.
(4) Air defense
The air and poison defense committee of the township instructed the masses
on air defense and asked them to give their attention to the following:
They must not run around when the planes come.
They must dig air-raid caves. Several households could dig one together.
In process, but not yet completed.
In case of poison gas, they must cover their noses with a handkerchief. Those
returned from field maneuvers said that charcoal dust should be wrapped in
a handkerchief to cover the nose.
Every village had a signal gun station, manned by two persons. When one
was away, the other reamined ready to fire the signal gun:
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All young and adult laboring masses should be organized into the Red Guard
or the Young Pioneers and given the proper military and political training,
in order to defend the locality on the one hand and be ready to go to the
front on the other. It is an important task of the soviet in the domestic
war. Ch'ang-kang township has been successful in this aspect.
VI. The Living Condition of the Masses
1. Famine was encountered this year. Some 80 percent of the masses ac-
tually had no grain before spring planting this year, and rice had to be
procured from such distant areas as Tung-ku, Sha-ts'un, Fu-t'ien, and Shui-
nan. The 80 percent of the masses averaged exactly 1 month of grain shortage.
Each person needed 5 tan a year, or 4 tan a month. Eighty percent of the
1,500 population of the township was 1,200, and 1 month's grain for them
amounted to 480 tan. The amount was procured from distant areas, and no one
went hungry.
2. Though spring cultivation this year was good, the fall harvest was in-
ferior due to insects, only equivalent to that of last year. Nevertheless,
(1) the fall cultivation was good, and there was a 40 percent increase in
both potatoes and beans over last year. (2) Vegetables, broadbeans, snow
peas and rape were added in winter planting. (3) After fall harvest last
year, the masses sold large volumes of grain to the merchants, at only 2,800
wen per tan, not quite 1 yuan. While they needed the money, they could have
sold less, but no attention was given to it. This year a county-wide meeting
was held. It was decided that grain would not be sold for less than 4 yuan,
and the volumes would be smaller. (4) After fall harvest last year, much
was wasted on feeding hogs and ducks and chicken, but this year, less would
be used for this purpose. (5) Last year, for the public bonds of the first
and second periods, 2 yuan of public bonds required 2.5 tan of grain. This
year, 10 yuan of public bonds would only require 2 tan of grain. There would,
therefore, be no famine in the coming spring.
3. Surplus in Oil. The peanut harvest this year was better than last, and
peanuts could be made into oil. Every household had been allocated some wooded
hills, and they also had some oil. Oil was ample. There was even a surplus.
4. Beans could be traded for oil, but the amount of edible salt had been
greatly reduced. The bean harvest this year was good (watering was even;
last year, almost the entire crop was ruined by flood), and the price of beans
was good (last year it was 9 yuan per tan; this year, it was 12 yuan). Beans
could be traded for 60 percent of the edible salt needed by the township.
The 40 percent remainder could be made up by trading the surplus oil (30 per-
cent surplus in oil).
The average per capita need of salt was 4/10 ounce [Chinese unit] per day
(or 12 ounces a month). It was reduced to half in July this year--2/10 ounce
(or 6 ounces a month). In November it was a little over 3/10 ounce (or appoxi-
mately 10 ounces a month). The masses used sour pickle juice and declared
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that it was not much different from salt. (This was the crime of the
Kuomintang. Only by breaking down the blockade would there be salt).
5. Meat eating poor peasants doubled and workers tripled. About 85 percent
of the households "raised hogs," and 15 percent of them were unable to do so.
They sold an average of 20 yuan's worth of hogs a year and bought about 12
yuan's worth of pork per household, leaving a surplus of 8 yuan. Before the
uprising, they only bought an average of 10 yuan's worth of pork per house-
hold per year. According to the classes, before the uprising, the middle
peasants bought about 12 yuan's worth of pork, the poor peasants about 6
yuan's worth and the workers about 4 yuan's worth. Now, almost all of them
spent 12 yuan. (Some among them did not spend so much.) In the past, let
alone market days, not much meat was eaten even for the New Year and festi-
vals. Now, in addition to the New Year and festivals, everyone would buy
some meat on market days.
6. The chickens and ducks, which were mostly sold in the past, were now
mostly consumed by the peasants themselves.
7. The living condition improved, and less firewood was sold. There was
no lack of firewood in the locality. In the past, more firewood was carried
to the city to be sold. Now, the amount sold was 30 percent less, because
many people did not need to sell it any more.
8. The amount of clothes doubled. For all wearing apparel, the average need
per year per capita was one new unlined suit. The middle peasants remained
the same as before, but the poor peasants and workers had a 100 percent im-
provement. They now had the ability to spend twice as much on clothes than
they did before.
9. The living condition of the farm laborers improved. There were about 22
households of farm laborers in the township and 60 percent of them were bet-
ter off than the poorest of the poor peasants, because they had been allocated
things. The township had only 2 landowner households, but many things were
confiscated from the rich peasants (12 households) and sent down from the
cities. The living condition of the remaining 40 percent of the farm laborers
was the same as the poor peasants.
10. The middle peasants remained at the same position. Generally speaking,
the living condition of the.middle peasants was about the same as in the past.
(The soviet must give attention to improving the living condition of the
middle peasants.)
11. Rest and Labor of the Masses. Each person averaged 5 full days of meet-
ings (totalling the many meetings) a month, which served as rest periods for
them. As many people had left the area and the labor force in the township
had reduced, the labor intensity of the masses was the same as before the
uprising, but the significance of labor had changed.
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The soviet is the organizer of the mass life. Only when it devotes all
its effort to solving the problems of the masses, improving their living
condition and gaining their confidence before it can mobilize the broad
masses to join the Red Army, help in the war and struggle for the smashing
of the enemy encirclement. We must know that the great achievement of Ch'ang-
kang township war mobilization was indivisible from its achievement in im-
proving the life of the masses.
VII. Balancing of the Labor Force and the Plow Animal Problem
Each of the 4 villages had 1 team, totalling about 70 persons. They were
organized with Red Army family members who had labor force. Led by a team
leader, each team was divided into subunits. The 20 or more members of the
Ch'ang-kang village model cultivation team, for instance, was divided into
3 subunits of 3 to 7 members according to the proximity of their residences.
Each subunit was in charge of several to a dozen or more households nearby,
giving constant attention to their proper handling of production. The teams
were organized last August at the time of rice harvesting, and their function
was to balance the labor force.
Method: The labor mutual aid association helped the Red Army families to
farm the land (no charge for wages), while the model team helped the masses
with their cultivation (wages charged). For instance, when a mutual aid
association member had to help a Red Army family to cultivate while his own
farm required cultivation, the model team would send someone to help culti-
vate his land for him, or to take his place to help the Red Army family in-
stead, and he would pay wages to the model team member. The labor force was
thus balanced. Therefore, the model team and the mutual aid association must
keep in close contact.
Each of the four villages had a labor mutual aid association. Except the
Red Army families, 80 percent of those possessing labor power joined. The
township had over 300 association members.
Among the population of the hsiang:
Persons performing full labor--10 percent (about 150 persons).
Persons performing half labor--20 percent (about 300 persons).
Persons performing half labor--20 percent (about 300 persons).
Persons performing incidental labor--35 percent (about 525 persons).
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Persons performing no labor--30 percent (about 450 persons).
Most of the first two categories, totalling about 450 persons, joined the
mutual aid association.
Of the 320 persons away from their homes in township (226 serving with the
Red Army, and 94 performing work), except for 10 or more belonging to the
half-labor category, they all belonged to the "full-labor" category. Com-
pared with the remaining 150 persons performing "full-labor" in the township,
the ratio was 68 percent to 32 percent. Therefore, organized balancing of
labor power became a central issue in production and the masses enthusiasti-
cally welcomed the labor mutual aid association.
The function of the mutual aid association was the preferential treatment
of Red Army families, mutual aid among members and helping the "orphaned and
aged." All the goals were reached. As a whole, the farms of Red Army fami-
lies were successfully cultivated. The method was as follows:
Preferential treatment of Red Army families: In regard to the Red Army
families in the township during busy seasons, each household required an
average of about 25 work units of help per month; during ordinary times, an
average of about 10 works units. The masses rendered help according to their
ability. Those with more labor force rendered more help, those with less
rendered less help and those without rendered no help. Women with young
children seldom rendered help. Generally, during busy seasons, where all
members in a household could perform labor, the household would contribute
13 or 14 work units. Where it had only 1/2 labor force, it would contribute
1 or 2 units of light work. In regard to those who rendered less help than
they should, they must pay those who rendered more help. During a busy season,
for instance, when household A contributed only 5 work units a month to Red
Army families when it should have been 7 units while household B contributed
9 work units when it should have been 7, household A must pay household B
the wages for the 2 units.
Mutual aid among members: The work units were mutually offset. Those who
did less work would pay wages to those who did more work according to the
number of work units.
Helping the orphaned and aged: Only meals for the members rendering help
were provided; no charge of wages.
Over-all production plans with the village as the unit were formulated and
the manpower balanced.
Account was settled at the end of every month and the wages computed. (More
people took money in payment. Less took articles. Accounts were always
cleared.)
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Wages: Rice harvesting work this year was divided into three levels. The
highest was 800 wen (such as threshing), next was 640 wen (such as cutting
rice stalks, and carrying the stalks), and the lowest was 320 wen (such as
taking the rice and bean dibbling). The above was decided at the membership
mass meeting in July (attended by up to 100 members). In regard to the rice
harvesting wages last year, it was 800 wen at the beginning and rose to a
maximum of 1,400 wen at the busiest time.
Wage reduction: Wage reduction was supported by the farm laborers union
because, with the land allocation, they were short of manpower. .
Those with more labor force did not object either, because they must con-
tribute much work to Red Army families.
The mutual aid association had five committee members, including a chairman,
an organizer and a propagandist. It was under the guidance of the fall har-
vesting and fall cultivation committee of the township.
The great effect of the labor mutual aid association on agricultural produc-
tion has been clearly demonstrated in Ch'ang-kang township. According to
the desire of the masses, overall planning of production with the village as
the unit can be introduced in all areas, especially in areas where there have
been many Red Army recruits. When necessary, township or even the district
can be taken as the unit for overall planning. It was what Ts'ai-ch'i Dis-
trict, Shang-hang, did. The cultivation team may be merged with the labor
mutual aid association, in order to unify the organization. There is an
important issue here: Mobilizing the women to join production. The young
people and adults between age 16 and 45 in Ch'ang-kang township numbered 733.
Of these, 320 left home, to join the Red Army or perform other work, leaving
413 in the township, consisting of 87 men and 326 women (a ratio of 1 to 4).
Therefore, Ch'ang-kang township relied mostly on women for its production.
The township proposed the slogan that "women must learn to plow," and entire
groups of women had joined the production front. It proved that organized
balancing of manpower and activating women to join production are tasks which
cannot be separated. That Ch'ang-kang township's production not only did not
drop, but increased, was because they had successfully solved this problem.
Ch'ang-kang township began to organize the plow animal cooperative in Sep-
tember, one in each village, but had not yet completed the task. Not many
people joined the cooperative. There was a five-man committee.
The average was 25 cows per 100 households. The township had a total of
110 cows.
No household had two cows.
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Among those owning cows, 50 percent of the households had one cow (mostly
calves, costing 10 and odd yuan per head).
15 percent of the households had one cow per two families.
30 percent of the households had one cow per three or four families.
5 percent of the households had one cow per five families (at times per seven
families--large buffaloes).
25 percent of the households had no cow. Among the 437 households in the
township, 109 had no cow. The plow animal cooperative had not yet discussed
its solution.
No cow was permitted to be slaughtered. When an animal should be slaughtered
due to illness or age, the owner must notify in advance the hsiang soviet,
which would inspect the animal before granting permission. No one dared to
kill a cow deliberately.
Under the current agricultural technical condition, the function of the plow
animal is just below manpower. According to information of Shih-shui town-
ship Jui-chin (30 percent of the households had no cow), Ch'ang-kang township,
Hsing-kuo (25 percent) and Ts'ai-ch'i township, Shang-hang (20 percent), we
know that peasants without plow animals constitute about 25 percent of the
peasant population. This is a big problem. For its solution, nothing can
surpass leading the masses to organize plow animal cooperatives and buy animals
by pooling their funds. Under the voluntary principle (with the approval of
the cooperative membership mass meeting), every household will contribute 2
to 3 sheng of grain per tan of land according to the amount of land allocated
to it. In Ch'ang-kang township, for instance, each person was allocated 6
tan 2 ton of land, and 109 households have no cow. With an average of 4
persons per household, the total number of persons is 436, and the total area
of land allocated to them is 2,703 tan. At 3 pints per tan, there will be
81 tan of grain. At 5 yuan per tan, there will be 405 yuan. At 20 yuan per
animal, there will be 20 head. With each animal plowing 80 tan of land, the
20 animals will plow 1,600 tan. Thus, more than half of the 2,703 tan of land
will be plowed by animals. By contributing 2 sheng per tan next year, the
entire problem will be solved. On the other hand, when leasing an animal to
plow, the animal rent is 5 sheng per year per tan of land. The method was
suggested by the masses of Shih-shui township. They have already put it to
practice. We hope that all areas will follow suit. It will not only solve
a big difficulty of the impoverished peasants, but produce an even greater
significance in increasing agricultural production.
The public bonds issuance committee consisted of five members. Every village
had a chairman.
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The township chairman attended the county and district meetings and under-
took to sell 5,000 yuan of bonds. Subsequently, 456 yuan was added, total-
ing 5,456 yuan.
Upon his return, the township chairman called a delegates' meeting, and the
various village delegates pledged the amount to be sold in their particular
villages.
The on-duty delegates of the villages called mass meetings in their own
villages. The delegates. and propaganda teams propagandized to the masses
beforehand, led the masses to the meetings and explained the significance
of bonds. At the meetings, the delegates and the responsible persons of
the various organizations took the lead and made their pledges, and the
masses followed. All the pledges were recorded on site.
The bonds were not entirely sold.
In regard to those who did not buy bonds or bought too little, the delegates
and the propaganda teams propagandized from household to household. "Such a
large amount this year!" Some of the masses could not understand. The dele-
gates and the propaganda teams compared last year's grain price (2.5 tan of
grain for 2 yuan's worth of bonds) with this year's bonds (only 2 tan for 10
yuan's worth of bonds), explained the benefits of the cooperative (2 dividends
would exceed the cost of the shares; those having no shares would not receive
dividends), and expounded the significance of enemy blockade and economic con-
struction.
A village-wide mass meeting was again held, and an additional amount of bonds
was sold, but the bonds were still not completely sold.
Propaganda was made again.
A third village-wide mass meeting was held, and an additional amount was
sold. The bonds were still not completely sold, but not much was left.
At the fourth village mass meeting, all the bonds were sold.
A total of 5,456 yuan of bonds was sold, averaging over 3.70 yuan per person
for the 1,464 population of the hsiang. One household bought 45 yuan of
bonds, which was the largest sale; 5or 6 households bought 30 yuan of bonds;
many bought 20 yuan of bonds; very few bought 1 or 2 yuan, only around 10
households; and none bought 0.50 yuan. Some 10 or more "orphaned and aged"
households did not buy any. "The masses were completely satisfied." From
beginning to end, it took 15 days to sell all the bonds.
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The special feature of Ch'ang-kang Township in its work was. to devote their
entire effort to mobilizing the masses and persuading them with a great
patience. As a result, their tasks were completely fulfilled and at the
greatest speed. Selling public bonds was only one of the instances. The
sale of over 5,000 yuan of public bonds was entirely done at the meetings,
not by visiting the households. It depended entirely on propaganda and
agitation, not on coercive allocation. It required four propaganda cam-
paigns and four village mass meetings. Yet, it took only 15 days from be-
ginning to end. Other townships while the sale was only 1/5 or 1/6 that
of Ch'ang-kang township, resorted to coercive allocation, and could not
even complete the job after 2 or 3 months. Compared with Ch'ang-kang town-
ship it was truly heaven and earth!
IX. The Cooperative Movement
The cooperative began in Ku-lin village, Lang-mu township (Ch'ang-kang
township being then a part thereof), in 1931, upon the conclusion of the
third war. At 0.50 yuan per share, the masses of the village collected
over 80 yuan, began to do business, and were successful. In January 1933,
it was changed, to the Lang-mu township cooperative. No additional shares
were solicited, the merchandise was cheaper than the market, and it was
popular with the masses. By September, it had gross receipts of 300 yuan
and showed a profit. In September last year, the district cooperative was
formed, 800 shares (at 0.50 yuan per share) were subscribed for and collected,
and the Lang-mu township operative was merged into the district.
Staff members: During the village cooperative period, cooperative chief
(Li K'uei-ying, who subsequently became the chief of the township district,
and county cooperatives), purchasing (Li, who subsequently became the pur-
chasing officer of the township district and county cooperatives), and
accounting and business (Wang Jen-sen, who subsequently became the account-
ant of the township and district cooperatives) had their meals provided by
the cooperative, but they received no wage. After the cooperative was changed
to a township cooperative, it was decided to pay them 3 yuan per month each,
but they refused.
The merchandise was directly procured from,country stores. During the vil-
lage and township cooperative period, the cooperative members and Red Army
families were given a discount of 50 wen for every 1,000 wen of purchases,
or 5 percent. The non-members did not enjoy the discount, but the prices
were cheaper than the market. They could save 20 wen for every string of
coins spent on purchases, or 20 percent. In November this year, the dis-
trict cooperative changed the discount on salt and cloth to 20 wen per
string of coins (because salt and cloth were expensive and not profitable),
while for other merchandise, the discount remained at 50 wen. The non-
members were charged market price. At this time, there was a profit of 2
yuan for every 100 yuan of gross receipt.
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From September last year to March this year (6 months), the district opera-
tive made a profit of over 600 yuan on a capital of over 400 yuan. It
designated 50 percent as public reserve fund, 10 percent as bonus to the
business personnel and the managing and inspection committees, 10 percent
as culture-education expenses (stationary for the clubs, schools, and
children of Red Army families), and 30 percent as dividends. To increase
the dividends and encourage the members, the education expenses were tem-
porarily abolished (should be resumed in the future), and the dividends
increased to 40 percent, paying 1 string of coins to every shareholder. At
the time of dividend payment, the accounts were cleared and published by
posting. After dividend payment, there was a big increase in capital.
In July this year, there was a total of 2,000 shares for 1,000 yuan. In
November, at the second dividend payment, each share was entitled to 0.50
yuan, but actually only 0.30 yuan was paid, leaving the 0.20 yuan as addi-
tional share. It was decided to change the share unit to 1 yuan, and no
one was permitted to have more than 10 shares.
The managing committee had 11 members, and the inspection committee 7.
It was decided that the townships should establish branch cooperatives.
The Ch'ang-kang township branch cooperative collected over 260 shares (at
1 Yuan per share) and started business.
The Ku-lin village cooperative was the first of its kind in the entire
county. Its operation was successful and it was known as a model coopera-
tive.
The grain cooperative of the township solicited over 220 shares (at 1 yuan
per share). Most of the subscribers paid in grain (at 5 yuan per tan),
which was all stored in a granary in Ch'ang-kang village. It had not started
business. A managing committee was organized.
Every township and every district must emulate the consumer cooperative of
Ch'ang-kang township and Shang-she district.
X. Culture Movement
1. Elementary Schools
Four Lenin elementary schools one in each village, each with a principal
and a teacher.
Students: 55 in Ch'ang-kang; 53 in Tang-pei; 33 in Hsin-ch'i; 46 in Szu-
kang; total 186, constituting 65 percent of all the school age children in
the township. As for the remaining 35 percent, it was not because their
parents.did not want them to go to school, but because they would rather
play than study. The students went to "catch" them. Their punishment was
sweeping the floor or being shut up, or even going without meals for those
"big and savage." The students initiated struggles among themselves, with
"very good spirit." The mischievous children spent less time in school than
out. The parents would see them out of the door, and they would then "sneak
off into the hills to fight battles." (Some of the punishments were not
suitable.)
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All schools were divided into classes A, B and C.
The age of the students was 7 to 13. There were also some who were 14 or
15 years old, but they only attended half day because of production.
Those living far away brought their lunch, and those nearby went home for
lunch.
The students provided their own paper.
The teachers were volunteers. They were considered in the same category
as work personnel severed from production, and the labor mutual aid asso-
ciation helped farm their land. The teachers themselves would not say so,
but the delegates' congress decided to give them preferential treatment.
(Those regularly stationed in the township soviet received preferential
treatment, but the delegates and the responsible persons of mass organiza-
tions not severed from production received no preferential treatment). In
Ho-fu and Hsiu-shui townships, the students collected rice for the "teacher,"
2 ton a month. Yang-ch'en township had another method. Where there was an
elementary school in a certain village, the township soviet permitted the
masses to select two persons (age 50 or more who could not perform full-
time labor) to work as peddlers, do some small business, and provide the
meals for the "teacher." The amount was the same as the. township soviet
personnel (0.09 yuan a day). Meanwhile, the township soviet would not
assign the two peddlers any service detail, and the two peddlers must be
willing to undertake the task.
Most of the teachers were "not profound in learning."
2. Night Schools
9 in the township: 3 in Ch'ang-kang; 2 in.T'ang-pei, 1 in Hsin-ch'i; 3 in
Szu-kang.
Each school had an average of 32 students, totalling about 300 for the 9
schools, 30 percent men and 70 percent women. Most of the 412 young people
and adults, age 16 to 45, in the township enrolled in the night school. Some
few "old comrades" over 54 years old also came to the school. The masses
were very pleased. They declared that "the night school is excellent!"
All schools were divided into A, B and C classes.
A small number of students brought their own lamps and some 4 or 5 persons
shared one lamp. Mostly, they depended on the one wood-oil lamp furnished
by the school, shared by 10 to 20 persons. Each person contributed 2 or
3 p'ien a month.
The students provided their own paper, pens and ink.
Teaching material:
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Class A--newspaper reading; arithmetic.
Class B--Adult reader.
Class C--Children's reader.
Each school had a principal and a teacher. The principal did not have to
be literate as long as he was enthusiastic. When the students were absent,
"the principal's instruction is requested." The principal also attended
the class. Most of the principals were "old comrades." Of the 9 night
school principals, 5 were women. There were no women teachers, of the 9.
night school teachers, 7 were township soviet delegates, and all were volun-
teers.
3. Literacy Classes
Those tied down with children, those more advanced in age, and those with
too few members in the family and too far away were organized into literacy
classes.
Organization: According to the proximity of residences, as few as 3 and as
many as 10 were organized into groups, and a group leader, who could read a
few words, was elected. Most of the group leaders were night school students.
Teaching method: Any time, any place, any number of persons, while resting
or drinking tea, one, three, or five persons. At the beginning, characters
were traced on the ground. Later on, each student would have a notebook to
learn how to write, beginning with such characters as "table, chair, bench,
pig, cow, chicken and duck." Every 10 days, the group leader collected the
notebooks from the students for correction by a "night school teacher," and
those who "wrote more and well" were praised verbally. The group leader would
ask the night school teacher when he did not know how to write certain
characters, and the latter, when he did not know how to write them, would
ask the day school teacher.
By this method, those who did not know how to read at all before could now
read 40 or 50 words, and some few of them could read 70 or 80.
This method was introduced in the summer this year, but the literacy class
was started last year.
Literacy placard: One in each village, nailed on walls of houses alongside
the road. Pictures and words were made on it, replaced every 2 or 3 days.
Sometimes, it was replaced as often as once a day or as long as 4 or 5 days;
2 or 3 words were given every time, accompanied with pictures. The day
school teacher was responsible for it. It was very effective.
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(1) Sweeping: No ashes or manure was stored in hallways and bedrooms.
Stagnant mud was cleaned out from ditches in front and behind. Open, level
spaces were swept and cleaned. The people took turns sweeping and cleaning
public ditches and level spaces. (2) Food: They only went as far as for-
bidding the people to eat dead things. (3) Clothes were washed. In regard
to those who failed to perform the above items, the children's league was
activated to ridicule them, especially those wearing dirty clothes. The
modern plays also depicted the hygiene movement.
From April on, the first time was "fairly good," but it then petered out.
Nothing was done in May and June. Upon discovery, the township soviet
criticized the hygiene committee chairmen, held another meeting of the
committees (besides the township hygiene committee, every village had a
committee, all consisting of five members), and called on the villages to
compete against one another "to see which ones are better." It was put
into effect under supervision in July. There were great achievements in
the 4 months since. It was twice as clean as before.
4. Public Opinion
The township had four clubs, one in each village. Every club had many com-
mittees, such as "physical education," "wall bulletin,." "evening meeting,"
etc. Every village ran a wall bulletin, located in the Lenin elementary
school. Of the 10 articles, 8 of them were written by the elementary stu-
dents and two by the masses. All the clubs presented modern plays.
Every township soviet must emulate the culture and education work of Ch'ang-
kang township.
XI. Hygiene Movement
? The residents were organized into hygiene details, according to the proxi-
mity of their residences, consisting of 4 or 5, 7 or 8, 11 or 12 households
per detail, mostly 7 or 8, with a leader.
Though a major sweeping every 5 days was called for, actually it was mostly
once every 7 days, and at times even every 10 days. Supervision was neces-
sary. "Without supervision, it would not be remembered, and there is so
much work to do."
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"The Red Army and the Communist Party think of everything!" "The govern-
ment work personnel are truly concerned about us!" But some few people also
remarked: "Opening the windows! If we don't die of illness, we will die
from the wind blowing on us!" More intensive propaganda was needed.
Illness is a big enemy in the soviet areas, because it weakens our revolu-
tionary force. Activating a broad mass hygiene movement and reducing, even
eliminating, diseases similar to what Ch'ang-kang township did constitute
the responsibility of each and every township soviet.
The township committee of the mutual relief association had five members
(including chairman, propagandist, and organizer). The village had no com-
mittee. It had a chairman, and there were small groups under him. The
association had 611 members. Only about 20 households, mostly "orphaned
and aged," in the hsiang did not join the association. The monthly charge
was 1 p'ien, which everyone paid.
1. Comforting the Red Army.
2. Soliciting donations for refugee relief and anti-imperialism. This
was done twice this year. Once when over 70 refugees from Hsin-feng came
to Hsing-kuo city (in the Lang-mu township period), over 20 strings of coins
were collected. Another time was in aid of the Northeast Volunteer Army,
also during the Lang-mu township period (the population at that time was
2,900, and the number of members about 800), when over 40 strings of coins
were collected. Donations started at 5 p'ien, up to 100, 200, or 1 string.
Most of them were 100, about 60 percent of the members. Only a few persons
gave as little as 5 p'ien or as much as 1 string.
3. Donations were solicited to relieve those whose houses had burned down
and the unemployed workers who were sick and had no medicine. One house-
hold had a fire last spring and one and one-half rooms were burned down.
More than 6 strings of coins were collected and given to the owner.
4. Belief of the hungry. In the summer this year, three or four persons
in Lang-mu township had nothing to eat (were beggars in the past, still very
poor now) and asked the district mutual relief association for money and rice.
They were given 1 to 3 pints each and every time for 3 or 4 times during the
summer.
5. Relief of Red Army families. To relieve those among the Red Army
families who were sick or had difficulties (no one hungry), more than 11
strings of coins were collected at one time in the summer. In April, the
cooperative loaned the money for capital and several volunteers among the
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masses went to purchase rice, carried it to Ch'iao-t'ou Chiang-pei-tung to
sell, and made a profit of over 100 strings of coins for the relief of those
who were sick or had difficulties among the Red Army families. The volun-
teers did not take any money besides their meals.
The soviet of many areas gives no attention to relief work. The mutual re-
lief association in such areas only collects the monthly dues but does not
perform any relief work. The social relief work of the township soviet and
mutual relief association of Ch'ang-kang township is commendable. Ch'ang-
kang township solved every difficult problem of the masses in the west con-
crete and practical manner.
The women worker and peasant delegates' congress had a chairman in every vil-
lage. All the village chairmen and a women's director formed the presidium
of the township women worker and peasant delegates' congress. The township
had a total of 43 delegates, 12 from Ch'ang-kang, 11 from T'ang-pei, 9 from
Hsin-ch'i and 11 from Szu-kang. It was organized in November last year.
There was a reelection in March this year. The third election was held in
September. There was one meeting every 7 days in all the villages, all held
according to schedule, with only a handful absent every time (tied down by
children). The delegates had separate responsibilities, each in charge of
5 to 10 households, mos ly 6 or 7.
The township soviet delegate was in charge of the first election upon the
creation of the congress. The village was the unit, and all the laboring
women age 16 and above were asked to come to the meeting. An average of
60 percent of them in all the villages attended the meetings. According to
the proximity of their residences, several households (not the same numbers)
elected one delegate. The delegates elected at that time were slightly
fewer than now. At that time, as the women still did not understand the
function of the women delegates' congress, they were not very enthusiastic.
After the delegates were elected, some few of them were not very positive.
The delegates' congress had no presidium, only a chairman. The villages
did not even have a chairman.
There was a reelection in March this year. The method was the same as be-
fore, but the women's chairmen were in charge. The township soviet dele-
gates of the villages also participated to render help. The number of house-
holds to be under the charge of the women's delegates was determined, and
the township was to organize a presidium, but there was no chairman in the
villages.
For the third election in September, the method was changed. No village-
wide women's mass meeting was called. The women delegates called election
meetings of the women in the households under their charge, and the town-
ship soviet delegates participated to render help.
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During the first and second election meetings, only the delegates were
elected, but no problem was discussed. At the third election, such prob-
lems as "expanding the Red Army," "comforting the Red Army," "preferential
treatment of Red Army families," "women learning to plow," and "women buying
public bonds with silverware" were discussed. The marriage issue was dis-
cussed among the problems brought up at the regular meeting every 7 days.
The women declared: "We want the correct freedom, not vagabond freedom.
We must not ask for a divorce whenever there is an argument." During the
election movement this year, the women's candidates' list was discussed.
However, other intimate problems concerning women, such as "women's di-
seases," "children" and "women's education," were not discussed.
There was complete freedom of divorce in the township. The husbands seldom
scolded their wives, but there were more wives who scolded their husbands.
(Neither should scold the other.) Spanking of children had not been com-
pletely stopped, but it was reduced. (There should be no spanking at all.)
The children had become more intelligent. In the past, when spanked or
scolded by their parents, they seldom retorted, but now more of them re-
torted. (If the parents did not spank or scold them, the children would
not be retorting.)
About 1 percent of the women married 3 times in the 4-1/2 years after the
uprising. Clandestine love affairs constituted about 50 percent before
the uprising, but they were reduced to 10 percent after the uprising. They
were further reduced this year because of land allocation, freedom to divorce
or marry, and busy revolutionary work.
Their clothes were shortened and "fancy borders" eliminated. Except "old
ladies," the women cut their hair. Some "old ladies" also had their hair
cut. Older women with long hair constituted about 20 percent of the women.
Among the masses, in the past (before the uprising), there were frequent
quarrels and fistfights, and even more arguments. Now, there are no more
fistfights, and even arguments decreased. When there was an argument in
the past, no one would explain matters to the parties, and even when some-
one tried to pacify them, they were "not convinced in their mind." Now,
the moment an argument occurs, a delegate comes out to explain matters to
them, and they immediately "became convinced." Arguments mostly occurred
among the older comrades. They attended less meetings and did not under-
stand revolutonary work clearly. When asked to render preferential treat-
ment to Red Army families, they would sometimes argue. However, the majority
who did not understand, they were mostly "old ladies" who "always refused
to go to the meetings."
Since last year, no old lady has worshipped the gods (burning incense and
offering rice; begging the gods and bowing to the Buddha), but every vil-
lage still has one or two persons who try to "summon the spirit of the dead."
The reasons for such prompt elimination of superstition were (1) knocking
down of local tyrants and land division, (2) the anti-superstition propa-
ganda of the children's league and Young Pioneers and the soviet movement
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to save the money on incense and candles, and (3) direct interference by
the Young Pioneers (taking away the incense and candles). (Should be
persuasion rather than interference). However, although they did not dare
to worship the gods openly, some old ladies still believed in the gods.
Most of those had no son.
The great strength of women in the revolutionary war has been clearly demon-
strated in the soviet areas. In the land investigation movement and all
types of mass struggles, on the economic front (Ch'ang-kang township relies
mainly on them), on the cultural front (many women are in charge of rural
education), in military mobilization (their movement to expand the Red Army
and comfort the Red Army; their service as part-time laborers), and in the
sovietorganization (the effect of the women delegates in the township soviet),
their heroic bearing and great achievements have been manifested. Here, the
leadership and motivation of the women's worker and peasant delegates' con-
gress are the crucial link. It must first closely tackle the problems con-
nected with the intimate interest of the women masses and coordinate all
political mobilizations with the mobilization on such problems. On this
point, the attention of many areas is extremely inadequate, and even Ch'ang-
kang township has not rendered it full attention. The soviet of each and
every township must place the work of guiding the women's worker and peas-
ant delegates' congress on its daily agenda.
The children's league committee in the township had 5 members, with a secre-
tary. In the villages, there was a chairman. Of the children age 7 to 15
80 percent joined the children's league. Those who had not joined were
mostly 7-year-olds (too small) and 15-year-olds (because they had joined
the Young Pioneers. Ordinarily the minimum age for the Young Pioneers was
16, but some joined earlier because of their size). More boys than girls
joined.
Work: (1) They propagandized on expanding the Red Army and the return-to-
the ranks movement. (Only when a person refused after three or four propa-
ganda efforts would he be ridiculed. The township had never had a ridicule
team.) (2) They held competitions to collect dog excrement for the "ferti-
lizer station" and shovel up grass roots for the "fertilizer room." (3) The
members paid 1 p'ien of monthly due to comfort the Red Army. (4) They
promoted the thrift movement--eating less fruits and buying more public
bonds, 0.50, 1, 2 or 3 yuan. Most of them bought 0.50 yuan. Sixty percent
of the children bought public bonds. (5) They played games, drilled and
practiced fighting battles in the drill field on Sundays. A program was
formulated. (6) The majority of them were enrolled in the Lenin school.
The discipline of the children's league was very strict. Some mischievous
children who defied their parents and teachers obeyed the discipline of the
children's league. Punishments consisted of sweeping the floor or being
shut up. They always "listen to reason and admit their errors." (Should
be more persuasion and less punishment.)
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In the past, 9- and 10-year-olds took care of cows for the landlords and
rich peasants,,but this was no longer true. In the past, whether at home
or working outside, the labor time of children was always 10 hours or more,
the same as for adults. They had no time to rest or study. Now, they spend
the greater portion of their time studying and playing games, and only about
1-1/2 hours in the morning taking care of cows or doing other jobs. In busy
farming seasons, they worked longer periods. They would ask the teachers
for leave to help their parents. In the past, they were spanked and scolded
by their parents. Now, they were seldom spanked or scolded.
Carpenters: 30 percent unemployed; only 7 work units available for each
10 work units; daily wage 550.
Tailors: Most of them unemployed; daily wage 400.
Masons: 30 percent unemployed; daily wage 550.
Bamboo workers: 10 percent unemployed; daily wage 400.
Barbers: 10 percent increase. Each customer paid the barber 8 sheng of
grain a year.
Part-time laborers: Daily wage at ordinary times 400 (2 mao); during busy
time 800 (4 mao).
XVI. Poor Peasants' League
The township committee had three members (chairman, propagandist organizer)
and the village committee 5 members. There were 271 members in July this
year, which was increased to 386 in November.
In the past, "the poor peasants' league is called on for everything," but
attention was not given to making sound its organization.
In the land investigation movement this year (July), the organization was
readjusted, the village committee abolished, and the membership developed.
Before July, sometimes no meeting was held for 2 months. After July, the
village poor peasants' league held a meeting every 5, 10 or 15 days, depend-
ing on the need of the work. The township league held one meeting a month.
The problem discussed included "class investigation," "each member saving
0.12 yuan," "developing the membership," "making sound the organization,"
"developing production" and "fines and donations." In regard to expanding
the Red Army, preferential treatment of Red Army families, economic con-
struction and culture and education, only reports were made to the members.
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When the township congress made decisions on such matters, they were "an-
nounced" at the poor peasants' league meeting and there was no special dis-
cussion. (There should be discussion). No monthly dues were charged.
There were small groups under the village.
In all areas where the land investigation movement has not become intensive,
the poor peasants' league is specially important. The township soviet must
be responsible for its leadership. There should be a poor peasants' league
committee in the village. The village should serve as the unit for meetings,
and meetings with the township as the unit may be decreased. Ch'ang-kang
township's practice is correct.
XVIII. Propaganda Teams
The township had a propaganda middle team, 7 members, 1 leader. Every vil-
lage had a propaganda small team, 5 members in the large villages (Ch'ang-
kang and Tang-pei) and 3 in the small villages (Hsin-ch'i and Szu-kang),
with a leader. They made propaganda for "expanding the Red Army," "economic
construction," and the "commemoration festival."
Patterns of propaganda: (1) Individual propaganda, most numerous. (2) Mak-
ing propaganda when the on-duty delegate gathered the masses of the village
to discuss work. (3) Propagandizing to the masses when the district county
held commemoration festival mass meetings; also propagandizing to the "ranks"
of other township and ch'us.
Every 7 days, the township soviet called together the middle and small team
leaders, altogether five persons, for a "propaganda meeting." The district
soviet held meetings of all the propaganda team leaders in the district, at
least twice a month, sometimes three times. Every meeting lasted at least
4 hours. The participants went home to eat after the meeting.
The township had a total of 23 team leaders and members, about 60 percent
of them women. They were all "relatively articulate," but not necessarily
literate. They were not replaced. Only in case of transfers would there
be replacements. They concentrated on studying propaganda material and
methods and "how to make the masses understand even better." Organizing
was started in last February.
XVIII. Surprise Attack Teams
Five persons under the township soviet, one team leader. In regard to the
villages, Ch'ang-kang, Tang-pei and Hsin-ch'i had surprise attack teams
and Szu-kang had none. They were organized by Red Army wives.
In any village where the work had become stagnated, the surprise attack
team of another would go there to inspect and render help, explaining to
the villagers the methods followed by other villages to perform the work.
The township surprise attack team had the same function, inspecting and
helping any village where the.work had come to a standstill.
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The surprise attack team performed less work than the propaganda team; it
did not demonstrate a great effect. The township soviet called them together
for meetings three or four times. Organizing began in Augus.
Propaganda and surprise attack teams are excellent. All the townships
should organize them.
XIX. Revolutionary Competition
The measure of holding competitions was started during the spring cultiva-
tion movement this year and the items of competition included "comparatively
early," "comparatively good," and "no uncultivated land." All the township
chairmen, holding a meeting at the district soviet, signed a competition
agreement among the townships. The district called a meeting of the village
on-duty delegates to sign competition agreements among the villages. The
on-duty delegates of the villages each called a meeting of the village dele-
gates to sign the competition agreement in the village. There was no com-
petition among the households. (Could also be signed.) The following items
were included in the agreement: The maximum standards for the items of com-
petition; the competing villages; the kinds and numbers of prizes (first
class, red flag; second class, 100 sheets of writing paper; third class,
50 sheets of writing paper); the period of competition; the responsible
person and the referee. During the period of competition, the township
congress held an inspection meeting, and the on-duty delegates made reports
covering the progress of the various villages. After the meeting, the chair-
men (referees) made an inspection tour of the villages to verify the reports
of the on-duty delegates.
In April, there was another competition. The goal was "military mobiliza-
tion," divided into "expanding the Red Army," "comforting work" and "pre-
ferential treatment of Red Army families." (There was no return-to-the-
ranks movement, because there was no deserter at that time. This item was
added in May.)
On 20 May, the hsiang congress held a summation meeting on the competition
in "spring plowing" and "military affairs." Hsin-ch'i won the red flag,
Ch'ang-kang 100 sheets of writing paper, Tang-pei 50 sheets and Szu-kang
nothing.
In July, competition agreements on "military affairs" and "economy" were
signed. There has been no summation yet, but Ch'ang-kang is known to be
the best.
To strive for speed in work, the method of revolutionary competition should
be introduced in every township. The township soviet is the leader of the
competition, but only the "leader," because it is mainly a competition among
the masses, not the village delegates.. Therefore, for the signing of every
competition agreement, it must be reported to the masses at the mass meeting,
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with the village as the unit, for their approval, and the agreement posted.
For competition on production items, a meeting of the several dozen residents
under the leadership of every delegate must be held, and the competition re-
ported to them for their approval. The results of achievement inspections
for any one period must also be reported at such meetings, in order to pro-
mote the progress of the work. Whenever a competition produces no achieve-
ment, it is always because the competition agreement is put in the pockets
of a few persons, and the broad masses are not motivated. A summation must
be made for each competition, and the prizes awarded. As a whole, Ch'ang-
kang township accomplished all these in its two competitions. That was why
they made practical successes.
? "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," Vol 1, 1947 edition
* "Models in Township Soviet Work (1) Ch'ang-kang Township" (mimeographed),
published by the Central Government, December 1933
* "Struggle," Nos,42, 43, 44, 12, 19, 26 January 1934
* "Rural Survey," Liberation Press, July 1949
60 80
CSO: 4005
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INVESTIGATION IN TS'AI-HSI TOWNSHIP
1933
[Text] I Administrative Divisions
The well-known Upper and Lower Ts'ai-hsi of the Central Soviet Area belong
to Ts'ai-hsi District of Shang-hang County, Fukien. After recent division
of administrative areas, Ts'ai-hsi District is divided into the following
8 townships: Upper Ts'ai-hsi, Lower Ts'ai-hsi, Ling-pao, T'ung-k'ang, Tseng-
k'ang, Wen-ts'ai, T'ai-ti and Hsia-sheng.
Upper Ts'ai-hsi: 523 families, 2,318 persons.
Divided into 4 villages: Li-wu (population about 600), Yang-hsia (500),
Chung-hsing (500) and Shang-wu (600).
Regularly stationed in township soviet: chairman, secretary.
Because this is a big ship the secretary regularly posted here to help with
the work of the township soviet.
Lower Ts'ai-hsi: 503 families, 2,610 persons.
Divided into 4 villages: Chang-k'eng (population about 600), Hsia-k'eng
(500), Fa-k'eng (800), Sun-wu (700).
II Representative Conference
1. Number of Representatives
Upper Ts'ai-hsi: Formerly 53 representatives. In the recent election work-
ers' dependents were counted as workers, increasing the number of represen-
tatives to 75 (22 are newly added, mostly bricklayers of the tnw nship). Of
the original 53 representatives, 13 are workers. With another 22 added,
there are now 35 worker representatives. The remaining 40 are peasant
representatives. There are 183 workers in the township belonging to 163
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families averaging 3 persons each, bringing the total worker population to
489. Because there is one representative for every 13 persons, the above-
mentioned number has been elected.
Lower Ts'ai-hsi: Formerly 73 representatives. Now there are 91, with 28
[sic] newly added, also because of an increased election ratio of workers'
dependents.
2. Delegation of Representatives
There are 10 to over 20 representatives in each village. The representa-
tives of each of the 4 villages hold separate meetings to elect one of their
number to form a "delegation" to the township soviet, so that there are 4
members. In the delegation. Minor work is settled at conferences of the dele-
gation called by the chairman. Every time the representatives hold a con-
ference, the delegation meets beforehand (either in the morning or the day
before) to make preparations. The representatives meet once about every 5
days. This procedure began in 1931. (Delegation should be called chief
representatives instead).
3. Relationship Between Representatives and Residents
Each representative is in charge of 10, 20, 30, 40, or, at most, 50-odd
residents. Worker representatives have fewer residents in their charge,
while peasant representatives have more. This arrangement began in 1932.
4. Political Showing of Representatives
Of the 53 representatives of Upper Ts'ai-hsi:
The most active: more than 20;
Medium active: more than 20;
The worst: One.
This worst representative attends only 3 meetings out of every 10. He
busies himself with making his own living, but works reluctantly at jobs
assigned to him. After repeated criticism, he has been removed from his
office by the conference of representatives.
There is no worse representative among the 73 representatives of Lower
Ts'ai-hsi.
5. Transfers of Representatives, Election To Fill Their Vacancies
The 53 representatives of Upper Ts'ai-hsi were elected in November last year.
By the time a new election was held on 14 November this year, 27 had joined
the Red Army (they all went at the same time in November last year) and 11
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were transferred to other posts. Altogether 38 left, leaving 15. Meetings
of electors were held at each of the villages to elect new representatives
to replace the old ones. Worker representatives were elected to fill va-
cancies left by workers, and peasant representatives were elected to fill
those left by peasants. Where there were alternate representatives, the
vacancies were filled by them. This additional election meeting was held
in November last year. After that, no election meeting was held until
October this year, when there were only 42 representatives left because 11
of them were again transferred one after another in the interval.
There were 73 representatives in Lower Ts'ai-hsi. In Red May this year, 11
of them joined the Red Army. Additional election meetings were held at the
village level to fill their vacancies. In July another 15 joined the Red
Army, and another additional conference was held to fill the vacancies.
The vacancies left by 18 others who were transferred to other posts were
filled by alternate representatives.
6. Women Representatives
Of the 53 representatives of Upper Ts'ai-hsi at the time of the October
election last year, 16 were women, or 30 percent of the total. Of the 73
representatives of Lower Ts'ai-hsi, 21, or also 30 percent, were women.
After the additional elections and up to the October election this year,
of the 53 representatives of Upper Ts'ai-hsi, 33, or almost 60 percent,
were women. Of the 73 representatives of Lower Ts'ai-hsi, 43, or also 60
percent, were women. After the recent election, of the 75 representatives
of Upper Ts'ai-hsi, 43, or still 60 percent, are women. Of the 91 repre-
sentatives of Lower Ts'ai-hsi, 59, or 66 percent, are women.
The system of having a chief of village representatives and fixed relations
between representatives and residents is a great advance in soviet organiza-
tion and leadership. Like the townships of Ch'ang-wang and Shih-shui,
Ts'ai-hsi township has gained results in this regard. The heart of the
township is in the village. Therefore, village organization and leadership
is a problem that deserves the utmost attention. The whole area of the
township is divided into so many villages. By relying on the strong leader-
ship of the township soviet representatives of the people themselves, the
village committee and mass organizations of the village, the masses of the
whole village are organized like a network under the soviet to carry out all
work of the soviet. This is the most obvious superiority of the soviet
system over all other political systems in history. The system adopted
in Ch'ang-wang, Ts'ai-hsi, Shih-shui and other townships should be extended
to the whole soviet area.
III. This Election
(1) The election was led by the election committee.
(2) Residents and electors were registered. Three rolls of names were made
public.
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(3) The namelist of candidates contained more than 160 in Lower Ts'ai-hsi
(91 of them were elected). The namelist was posted in each village, and
each list contained more than 160 names. Many of the people wrote comments
of 2, 5 or 6, or more than 10 characters under the names of candidates. Even
children jotted down theirs. Most of them wrote "good" or "not good."
Some of them wrote "agree" or "negative." One of the candidates had the
word "bureaucratic" written under his name. Over 20 were criticized in
wall posters. The criticized candidates were those who were concerned only
with making their own living, neglected the interests of the masses, and
worked passively for the public. There were some poems and songs, three of
which criticized the township soviet for handling the problem of paper-
making badly.
(4) Congress of electors was held with townships as the unit. The township
soviet reported on its work.
(5) Workers of the whole township formed a unit. Peasants of each village
formed a unit (4 of them).
(6) The election rally was attended by 80 percent of the electors. The
sick, those on sentry duty, those who worked for the cooperative and were
out on buying missions, and women in their final month of pregnancy, total-
ing 20 percent in all, did not attend. Old people came, leaning on staffs.
(7) Many meetings were held for the election. The labor union, poor peas-
ants leagues, women's association, mutual-aid association and antiimperialist
alliance held a rally of members together. The children's league and.Young
Pioneers also held meetings. The Party and the League were the first to hold
meetings. There were slogans and pamphlets. So this year's election propa-
ganda was far more extensive than last year's and most people realized the
meaning of election.
Last year youngsters under 16 clamored for the right to vote. They asked,
because many of them had already joined the Red Army and their work was far
better than that of others, why were they not given the right to vote? This
year they understood why their age was a barrier, and they clamored no more.
Propaganda teams went to all villages to make propaganda. During the day
they made speeches. At night they gave shows.
(8) At the rally of electors there was agitation to buy bonds. More than
1500 yuan's worth of bonds was bought by those at the rally in Lower Ts'ai-
hsi. Another 630 yuan's worth was bought in Upper Ts'ai-hsi.
At the rally of electors in T'ai-ti township, 13 persons were persuaded to
join the Red Army. One of the 2 squads of the Model Battalion of the Red
Guard Army of the whole township joined the Red Army.
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(9) Election of new cadres:
Of the 75 representatives of Upper Ts'ai-hsi, 21 are re-elected from the
former 53 representatives and 54 are newly elected. Thirty-two former
representatives are not re-elected. Of the 91 representatives of Lower
Ts'ai-hsi, 50 are re-elected from the former 73 representatives and 41 are
newly elected. Twenty-three of the former representatives are not re-elected.
In general, ,the elections in Upper and Lower .Ts'ai-hsi were successful. In
their election propaganda, organization of lists of candidates and urging
of the masses to criticize the candidates,_correlation of the election to
other work and organization of workers and women so they might be elected,
they have fully implemented the Central Government's instructions regarding
the elections, so that they become models of the election campaign in the
soviet area. On the other hand, in urging electors at the election rallies
to make proposals for discussion by the new representatives, they have not
made a good showing. The model in this respect should be Ch'ang-wang town-
ship of Hsing-kuo.
IV. Committees Under the Township Soviet
There are many committees under the township soviet. The following are
several examples:
"Support the Red Army": Upper and Lower Ts'ai-hsi each has 5 committee
members. Each of the 4 villages has a committee, also of 5 members each.
"Preferential Treatment for Red Army Dependents": Upper and Lower Ts'ai-
hsi each has 5 members. Each village also has 5 members.
"Land Investigation": The two townships each has 11 members. The villages
have none.
"Election": The two townships each has 7 members. None for the villages.
"Land": Upper Ts'ai-hsi has 11 members and Lower Ts'ai-hsi 7. None for
the villages.
"Labor": The two townships have 7 members each. There is no such committee
at the village level, but only groups, which are committees of the labor co-
operative.
"Forestry": Upper Ts'ai-hsi has 7 members, Lower Ts'ai-hsi has 11.
"Return of Deserters": Each of the two townships has 12 members.
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There are no "spring plowing," "summer plowing"...committees. Only "land
tilling teams" are organized. Five persons form a group, 10 a squad, 30 a
medium team and 100 a large team. Upper and Lower Ts'ai-hsi each has a
large team. Land tilling teams are organized principally for the sake of
giving preferential treatment to dependents of the Red Army.
The organizing and leading of the many committees under the township soviet
becomes an important part of its work. This is again demonstrated in Ts'ai-
hsi township. The Central Government has adopted the experience of various
localities and incorporated it in the "Organic Law of Local Soviets." This
provides that a, township may organize more than 20 regular and ad hoc com-
mittees. The number may be appropriately increased or decreased in accord-
ance with the requirements of the work of the localities. An "urban" soviet,
on the other hand, will have to organize a number of committees different in
character to the rural ones, in accordance with the special character of
urban centers. The clearly defined and unified establishment of this sys-
tem will draw still closer the relationship between the soviets and the
masses, and will lend enormous strength to the execution of all work of the
soviet. One problem is that the village should also set up certain important
work committees (people's organizations with large memberships should like-
wise set up their village-level leadership organs). This is because if there
are only township-level committees, it will be impossible to carry out thor-
ough, careful work in townships with a large population of about 1,000. This
will be assured if many village-level committees are set up.
V. Expansion of the Red Army
In the 3 months of August, September and October:
Upper Ts'ai-hsi: 60 persons. Two platoons of a model battalion mobilized.
In addition, 11 persons have rejoined. There are still 2 or 3 who have not
rejoined owing to illness.
Lower Ts'ai-hsi: 65 persons. The model battalion mobilized 52 persons all
at once. On another occasion, when men were individually mobilized, 13
persons joined up.
In addition, 11 persons have rejoined. There are still 14 others who have
not yet rejoined.
There were 12 townships in the district (before division). On 15 August
273 persons were mobilized to join the model battalion. The redivided
district comprises 8 townships. In all, more than 50 persons have not yet
rejoined.
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Of the whole district, the two townships of Upper and Lower Ts'ai-hsi have
produced the best results in expansion of the Red Army. The principal
reason is that they have always done well in giving preferential treatment
to Red Army dependents and comforting the Red Army. Previous to Red May,
an average of 500 pairs of cloth and straw sandals a month could be col-
lected from each of the 8 townships. The quantity was recently slightly
reduced owing to the blockade and scarcity of cloth. Nevertheless, Upper
and Lower Ts'ai-hsi have been able to produce the following results: Upper
Ts'ai-hsi, over 500 pairs in August, over 100 pairs in September, and over
90 pairs in October.
Lower Ts'ai-hsi, over 300 pairs in August, 280 pairs in September, 300
pairs in October and 630 pairs in November.
These results have been obtained mainly owing to mobilization by the Party
and League branches of Party and League members to provide leadership to
conferences of women worker and women peasant representatives: (1) Party
and League members first held meetings; (2) women representatives held
meeting; (3) women held mass meeting.
The women representatives meet once every 10 days. There is a presidium
of 5 at the township level. One of these is elected director. The re-
maining 4 are assigned to the 4 villages, one for each village, serving
as chief of the village.
The women representatives discuss all problems which are also discussed by
the township soviet. They make particular exertions in matters of comfort-
ing the Red Army, selling bonds and expanding production. In addition, they
also frequently discuss matters of interest to themselves, such as the mar-
riage problem. They explain marriage regulations to the womenfolk.
Mobilization of large numbers of the masses to join the Red Army depends
on: (1) Politically, full propaganda and encouragement, abolition of all
methods of coercion; (2) full preferential treatment for dependents of Red
Army men; and (3) healthy and sound organization and training of local armed
forces. Preferential treatment for dependents of Red Army men is a funda-
mental work that would make the masses gladly join the Red Army and con-
tentedly stay with the Red Army. This is fully borne out by the experience
of the townships of Ch'ang-wang and Ts'ai-hsi. There are 407 young and
adult males (16 to 45 years of age) in Ch'ang-wang.township. Of this num-
ber, 320, or 80 percent, have left to join the Red Army and work. There
are 554 young and adult (16-55 years of age) males in Upper Ts'ai-hsi,
485, or 88 percent, of them have left to join the Red Army and work. In
Lower Ts'ai-hsi there are 756 males, 526 of whom, or 70 percent, have left
to join the Red Army and to work. Such large scale expansion of the Red
Army would certainly have been impossible if the problem had not been solved
thoroughly from the viewpoint of economy and production. Only by correlating
economic with political mobilization will it be possible to create a high
tide of Red Army expansion and accomplish results like those accomplished
in Ch'ang-wang and Ts'ai-hsi townships.
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(1) Problem of Labor Force
Upper Ts'ai-hsi: Of the total population of 2,318 (during the uprising),
554 are males capable of labor (16-55 years of age, same below), and 581 are
females capable of labor. Of these, 419 have joined the Red Army and 88
(66 males and 22 females) have been transferred to outside areas for work.
Of the 554 males of the age group of 16-55 and capable of labor, 485 (419
plus 66) have left for the Red Army or to work, and only 69 remain behind.
Thus the male labor force is only 11 percent of the female labor force of
559 (581 minus 22). There are 258 families of Red Army dependents in the
whole township.
Lower Ts'ai-hsi: Of the total' population of 2,610, there are 1,207 males
and females able to labor (765 males and 442 females). Of these, 442 have
joined the Red Army and 98 (91 males, 7 females) have been transferred to
outside areas to work. Of the 765 males capable of labor, 533 have joined
the Red Army or left for work, and only 232 remain in the township. Thus
the male labor force is only 33 percent of the female labor force of 435
(442 minus 7). There are 355 families of dependents of the Red Army in
the whole township.
As a result, it is mainly women who farm the land. In Upper Ts'ai-hsi
this year, about 300 women can use cattle and more than 60 can plant seed-
lings. Before the uprising only 1/10 of these 300, that is, 30 women, could
use cattle. The increase is obtained after several years' effort.
Meanwhile, the "old comrades" are very energetic. They make up a large
number of those who cultivate hills and mountains and some can plant seed-
lings and harvest crops. Children, too, take part in production. Hence
production is developing. The development of production also depends on
mutual adjustments of the labor force, apart from the participation of women,
old persons and children in production. Within the same village, families
with labor power to spare help those with little labor power. Within the
same township, labor-surplus villages help labor-deficit villages. Within
the same district, labor-surplus townships help labor-deficit ones. In
this way, the labor force is adjusted with the district as a unit for the
purpose of doing labor. In addition, Party and League members also work
"Saturdays." Hence production gains still greater development.
Labor is adjusted mainly through the labor cooperative and land farming
teams, whose task is to help Red Army dependents and make possible mutual
aid among the masses.
Help for Red Army dependents: Carrying rice packs (but not other food) and
farm implements for them. The same when planting seedlings and harvesting.
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Mutual-aid among the masses: Daily wages agreed at 2 hao, the same for
males and females, rush and slack seasons. This has been the practice
since 1930. When one Red Army dependent helps another, the pay is 1.5
mao a day. When Red Army dependents help other people, the pay is 2 mao
a day. When the masses help Red Army dependents, no wages will be paid.
The labor cooperative plans for the whole township. There is a 5-man com-
mittee of the labor cooperative of the township which takes charge of the
whole, and one committee member for each of the 4 villages who plans for
the village.. When labor is required, it must be procured through the vil-
lage committee member. There can be no private employment, other-
wise labor adjustment may be upset. Pay is agreed on between
the employer and the employee without the intermediation of the
committee member.
The labor cooperative of this township was set up in 1931. It is the fore-
runner of the "Labor Mutual-Aid Cooperative" which now functions all over
the soviet area.
Each of the committee members keeps a record of those who are or are not
able to labor, or who are short of labor power, so that labor can be im-
mediately supplied whenever anyone wants to employ it. Those who are un-
familiar with the situation may ask the intermediate team leader of the
land farming team. (There is one intermediate land farming team for each
of the villages. Five persons make a group, 2 groups of 10 persons make
a squad, and 3 or 4 squads make an intermediate team). The intermediate
team leader also keeps a record. "It is agreed upon to combine the land
farming team with the labor cooperative."
Production situation: After the uprising (1929-1931), production dropped
by about 20 percent. In 1932 half the loss, or 10 percent, was recovered.
This year (1933) it increased by 20 percent compared with that of last year,
(output of miscellaneous crops such as sweet potato, bean, taro and yam in-
creased by 51 percent. compared to that of last year) exceeding that of the
pre-uprising year by 10 percent. After the uprising many of the fields
throughout the district were not tilled. Last year a small part of them
was redeveloped. This year there has been a massive development to the
extent of over 1,300 piculs. More hills have been developed than fields,
as hills make up three-fourths and fields only one-fourth of the land de-
veloped. Because all fields have been opened, hills are now developed.
Not a single ridge that divides the fields is not planted with miscellaneous
crops. All fields suitable for sweet potatoes are planted with sweet po-
tatoes. Female comrades "vie" with one another in developing hills. Every-
one wants to do it. The effect of the competition is great. The district
was far short of grain before the uprising (and besides, many people made
flour in those days). Last year there was enough for consumption, and this
year there is a surplus. Now no one in the whole district makes flour or
"cakes," and no one produces liquor by distillation.
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(2) Consumer Cooperatives
There are 14 consumer cooperatives in the 8 townships of the whole district.
Two are in Upper Ts'ai-hsi:
One is an oil, salt and meat cooperative. It originally operated on a
capital of 4 yuan, which was subsequently increased to 185 yuan at 50 cents
a share.
It was organized in October 1930. There was a distribution of dividends in
July 1933. Each share was paid 50 cents. One person is regularly posted
in the cooperative. He is helped by two others on market days.
The other is a cloth cooperative. It originally operated on a capital of
144 yuan which was subsequently increased to 255 yuan at 1 yuan a share.
This was formed at the same time as the former. There was a distribution
of dividends in September 1933. Each share was paid 1 yuan. Two persons
are regularly posted in the cooperative. They are helped by another on
market days.
One cloth cooperative: Original capital 120 yuan, subsequently increased
to 240 yuan at 1 yuan a share. It was formed in January 1930. There was
a distribution of dividends in February 1932. Each share was paid 1 yuan.
Two persons are regularly posted in the cooperative.
One oil, salt and meat cooperative: Original capital 35 yuan, subsequently
increased to 157 yuan at 50 cents a share. It was formed in October 1929.
There was a dividend distribution in March 1933. Each share was paid 50
cents. Two persons are regularly posted in the cooperative. On market
days they have a helper.
One beancurd, candy and piglet cooperative: Original capital 125 yuan,
subsequently increased to 180 yuan at 50 cents a share. It was formed in
January 1931. There was a dividend distribution in February 1933. Each
share was paid 50 cents. Three persons are regularly posted in the office.
Accounts of the cooperatives are audited twice a month (auditor eats. at
home after checking accounts). Members meet once a month (no meals pro-
vided). Officers are elected once every 3 months at members meeting. New
officers are elected immediately to fill the vacancies of those who have
been transferred to county or district cooperatives, or who are young and
have joined the Red Army (in which case older persons take their place), or
who do not want to serve another term. In practice, most of them serve
consecutive terms and few are transferred. Only dependents of Red Army
men who are in financial difficulty may buy on credit. They may pay on
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the next or the next two market days, but must pay on the third market day
(there is a 10-day interval between 2 market days). Debts may be repaid
in kind, e.g.,.in rice, beans, etc. Outstanding debts not paid on market
days shall be fully paid in July and October each year.
Sixty percent of the families of Upper Ts'ai-hsi and 90 percent of those
of Lower Ts'ai-hsi have joined the cooperatives.
Red Army dependents are given first priority when buying goods in short
supply. Next come members of the cooperatives, and lastly non-members.
Price: Red Army dependents (those who have certificates) are given a 5 per-
cent discount on the market price. No discount is given members of the co-
operatives. The same applies to Red Army dependents from other townships
or districts. Red Army dependents of the old country, Nan-yang and Kuan-
chuang districts sometimes come to buy goods.
"Cooperatives are tops"--this is public opinion.
With the single exception of a medicine store kept by a Kiangsi native, there
is no private store that sells goods from outside areas in the whole dis-
trict. (This situation is brought about by gradually whittling down the
number of privately owned stores). But on market days one or two persons
privately sell salt. There are also those who still privately sell bean-
curd and other native produce.
(3) Food Grain Cooperatives
These were formerly called Grain Adjustment Bureaus. They began to be formed
in 1930, with capital raised by the masses. Funds were not generally col-
lected, but were collected only from families who were comparatively well
off. Each share was 1 yuan. One adjustment bureau was formed in each
township. There were 8 bureaus in the district, with a total capital of
1,810 yuan.
Method of adjustment: When buying paddy from the masses every year, the
bureau gets 2 sheng less than the private buyer for every yuan's worth.
For example, a private buyer buys paddy at 1 tou 7 sheng per yuan, while
the adjustment bureau buys only 1 tou and 5 sheng per yuan. Grain is offered
for sale first to Red Army dependents and next to the masses who are in dif-
ficulty. Whether the masses are in difficulty or not is decided by the con-
ference of township representatives after investigation. Grain is sold not
at the market price, but at cost after a slight deduction of losses and
spoilage. For example, when grain is bought at 1 tou and 5 sheng per yuan,
it is sold at 1 tou sheng and 5 ho, 5 ho being deducted for loss and spoil-
age. Red Army dependents who do not have cash and the masses who are par-
ticularly in difficulty may borrow grain, to be repaid in kind at harvest
time without interest. Every year when the work of collecting or selling
grain is completed, the township soviet tell the masses to elect representa-
tives who will check the accounts with the responsible person of the adjust-
ment bureau. After that, a statement of account is made public. Every
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year after fall grain is collected, measured and stored in the granaries,
which are then sealed by the township soviet with long strips of paper.
Grain is sold once or twice in spring and summer. When the masses need
grain, the granaries will be opened so the masses may buy grain. In gen-
eral grain is sold every year in March when it is planting time and in May,
when last season's grain is consumed while the new crop is not yet ready
for harvesting.
The bureaus were renamed grain cooperatives in February this year, but the
organization remains the same. Since the launching of the economic con-
struction campaign this year, the grain cooperatives of all the townships
have been expanded. For example, the grain cooperative of Upper Ts'ai-hsi
originally had a capital of 215 yuan. Its capital is now increased by 203
yuan to 418 yuan. That of Lower Ts'ai-hsi originally had a capital of 137
yuan. It is increased by 200 yuan to 337 yuan. The 5-man committee of the
adjustment bureau and a chairman are regularly posted at the bureau. They
get paid for their meals.
In May this year there was famine in the two townships of Shang-ts'un and
Chang-wen (now incorporated in T'ung-hsien District). The two townships are
mostly bamboo hills. Each person gets only 1 tan of arable land, and the
paper-making industry has failed. The grain adjustment bureaus of all other
townships.of the district cooperated in giving relief. The price of paddy
was then 8 sheng per yuan, but the adjustment bureaus lent these townships
paddy at last fall's price of 1 tou and 8 sheng per yuan, to be repaid after
fall. The whole district lent a total of 36 tan, in addition, miscellaneous
food (dried sweet potatoes, etc) and cash were collected for relief. As a
result, no one starved. There has been no famine in the other townships of
Ts'ai-hai District this year, thanks to the efforts of the adjustment bureaus.
In Lower Ts'ai-hsi there is also a "Rice Sales Cooperative" with a capital
of 130 yuan at 50 cents a share. This is set up exclusively for the conveni-
ence of Red Army units in transit, travelers, government personnel and the
masses victimized by disasters who went to buy grain. The cooperative is
government by a committee of 5, who are not regularly posted at the coopera-
tive. On market days one person works there for a half a day. At other
times its work is carried on by some other consumer cooperative. The worker
who buys rice for sale is paid his wages plus money for his meals. No divi-
dend is distributed. The ordinary masses rarely buy their rice here. Only
1 or 2 percent of them buy rice here. Rice is sold at market price. Since
.this cooperative was set up with capital raised by the masses, Red Armymen
and disaster victims no longer have to buy rice from door to door.
(4) Draft Cattle Cooperatives
This cooperative has been set up only by Upper and Lower Ts'ai-hsi townships
in the whole district. Each cooperative owns 3 head of cattle.
About 20 percent of the families of the two townships have no cattle.
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No solution has as yet been found to this situation.
(5) Everyday Life
Rice: Before the uprising, poor peasants and hired hands had an average
of only 3 months supply of rice a year for their own consumption. In the
remaining 9 months they had to live on miscellaneous crops. In the period
before harvest, when the old stock was exhausted and the new crop was not
yet ready, they had to subsist on goat weed and some on chaff. Now they
have 6 months reserve of rice and another 6 months reserve of miscellaneous
crops, so they have enough to last them a whole year. The region produces
little rice, so the people still have to depend on miscellaneous crops half
the time. Production of miscellaneous crops has now increased. Before the
uprising, a meal was far from satisfying. Now people can eat their fill.
Moreover, they have a surplus which they can sell to the Red Army or use
for paying land tax, buying public bonds or exchanging for oil and salt.
In short, the food situation has improved 100 percent (6-month reserve of
rice compared with 3-month reserve).
Meat: Before the uprising, poor peasants and hired hands consumed on average
of 1 yuan (ta-yang) of meat a year per capita. Now it is 2 yuan, an increase
of 100 percent. Before the uprising only 60 families in a 100 kept pigs.
Now 95 families in a 100 keep pigs.
Clothing: Before the uprising each person could make an average of one suit
every 2 years. After the uprising each person could make an average of 1 1/2
suits every year, an increase of 300 percent. This year the situation has
again changed. Cloth is scarce as a result of the blockade, so each person
can make an average of only half a suit, a return to the pre-upsiring status.
Before the uprising an unlined suit was worth 18 mao (15 mao for cloth and
3 mao for labor). Last year one suit was worth 21 mao (17 mao for cloth and
4 mao for labor) or equal to 1.5 yuan. This year one suit is worth 34 mao
(30 mao for cloth and 4 mao for labor, or the equivalent of 2.4 yuan in ta-
yang). Counterrevolution has jacked up the price of our clothing to this
extent!
Salt: Before the uprising each person consumed an average of 1 catty of
salt a month. In November this year each person consumed only 3.2 Jiang
of salt a month. In other words, a family of 5 who consumed 5 cattles of
salt a month before the uprising consumed only 1 catty in November this year.
There will be no salt for anyone unless the Kuomintang is overthrown!
Oil: Before the uprising the per capita consumption (of wood oil from
Kiangsi and local lard) was 6 Jiang a month. There is now no reduction or
increase. But because wood oil from Kiangsi is reduced, the masses are con-
suming more lard.
(6) Prices
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Paddy--Before the uprising it was 10 yuan per tan (100 catties). In 1929
it was 2.5 yuan. In 1930 it was 5 yuan. In 1932 it was 6.2 yuan. In
May 1933 it was 10 yuan, but in October it was 5 yuan.
Pork--Before the uprising it was 1 yuan for 2.5 catties (with bone). Now
it is also 1 yuan for 2.5 catties (but without bone).
Fish--Owing to the blockade after the uprising, there is no fry from Chiu-
chiang (via Wu-p'ing County). The ponds are empty. There is no market.
Chicken--8 mao per catty, the same before and after the uprising.
Duck--4 mao per catty, about the same before and after the uprising.
Chicken eggs--3 for 1 mao, about the same before and after the uprising.
Duck eggs--3 for 1 mao, about the same before and after the uprising.
Lard--Same as pork.
Lime--Not used in the fields, but used for paper-making. One yuan buys 1
tan (80 catties), about the same before and after the uprising.
Beans--Before the uprising it was 10 yuan a tan (8 tou). In 1932 it was
20 yuan. This year it is 8 yuan.
Tobacco--Before the uprising it was 1 mao for 2 Jiang. Now it is 1 mao
for 1.6 Jiang.
Tea--l yuan buys 3.5 catties, about the same before and after the uprising.
Rapeseed oil--Before the uprising it was 1 yuan for 3.5 catties. This spring
it was 2.5 catties. This winter it is 1 catty and 13 Jiang.
Paper--Before the uprising grass paper was 4.5 yuan a roll (40 catties).
In 1931 it was 6 yuan. In 1932 it was 5 yuan. In 1933 it was 1.5 yuan.
As a result, no one makes paper now.
Timber--Cannot be exported, so no market. Paper and timber constitute the
largest exports of the region. Now both have failed. The hateful Kuomintang
blockade!
Wood oil--Before the uprising wood oil was 1 yuan for 3.5 catties. Now
little comes here, so the people have to consume more lard.
Iron--Price has doubled compared with that before the uprising.
Cloth--Before the uprising cotton cloth was 1 yuan for 1 bolt.(2 change 3
ch'ih). In 1932 it was 1 yuan and'4 mao for 1 bolt. This year it was 2 yuan
and 2 mao for 1 bolt.
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Salt--Before the uprising it was 1 yuan for 10 catties. From 1930 up to
spring 1932 it was still 1 yuan for 10 catties. That summer it was 1 yuan
for 7 catties. In 1933 it was 1 yuan for 1 catty. In November 1 yuan could
buy only 14 Jiang. The biggest problem is to break the blockade.
Kerosene--Before the uprising 50 percent of the families used kerosene for
their lamps. It was then 1 yuan for 7 catties and 14 Jiang. In 1933 1 yuan
could only buy 1 catty and 5 Jiang. As a result, with the exception of pub-
lic offices, no one uses it. The people all use "pine light."
Firewood--Before the uprising 1 catty was 2 chips. Last year it was 3 chips.
This year it is from 5 to 9 chips.
Mao-yang--Same before and after the uprising. Each mao is 16 catties.
Silver dollars--Miscellaneous silver dollars worth 13.5 mao each; silver
dollars with Yuan Shih-k'ai head worth 14 mao each. Soviet notes have the
same value. Only soviet notes are now in circulation. Silver dollars have
completely vanished. It is Kuomintang sabotage again!
The 8 townships of the newly demarcated Ts'ai-hai District consist of 2,188
families of 8,782 persons, who together have undertaken to buy bonds with
a total value of 13,600 yuan. About 1,000 yuan worth of bonds still remains
to be sold.
Upper Ts'ai-hsi township, with 513 families of 2,318 persons, has taken up
4,000 yuan.
Lower Ts'ai-hsi township, with 503 families of 2,660 persons, has taken up
4,146 yuan.
Methods:
(1) Mobilization at Party and League rallies.
(2) Mobilization at meetings separately held by all organizations.
(3) Mobilization at meeting of representatives of township soviets.
(4) A mass meeting at the village level was held exclusively for propa-
ganda, not for the sale of bonds.
(5) A mass rally was held at the township level to sell bonds. Over 1,500
worth of bonds was sold in each of the two townships. Work not yet finished.
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(6) Sales committee of township representatives (3 from each village) and
propaganda team (organized by township with 5 persons from each village)
carried out propaganda from door to door.
(7) At a rally of electors, over 600 yuan of bonds was sold in Upper Ts'ai-
hsi and another 1,600 yuan was sold in Lower Ts'ai-hsi. Up to that time
over 2,000 yuan was sold in Upper Ts'ai-hsi, with over 1,000 yuan still un-
sold. Over 3,000 yuan was sold in Lower Ts'ai-hsi, with about 900 yuan still
unsold.
(8) After that the representatives, sales committee and propaganda team
.carried out door-to-door agitation, and sold all the bonds. The people
pledged to buy the remaining bonds, but certificates had not yet been re-
ceived.
The buying of bonds was entirely voluntary without coercion. At every one
of the meetings there was talk about economic construction. Because the
county trade bureau has been set up and the masses can buy salt and cloth,
they all the more realize the importance of the economic bonds.
We repeat. Only by coordinating economic construction with political mobi-
lization is it possible to create a higher upsurge of the expansion of the
Red Army and spur the broad masses to the battle front. After the adult
and young males have left Ts'ai-hsi en masse to join the Red Army or for
work, production exceeds that before the uprising by 10 percent. All waste-
land is developed, so it is necessary to carry development to the hills.
There is not a single piece of arable land that is not planted with some
crop. The life of the masses is improved by more than 100 percent.
The labor cooperative (called labor mutual-aid cooperative elsewhere),
consumer cooperative and grain cooperative have organized .the economic
life of the masses of the whole township. Economic organization has reached
a very high level, so Ts'ai-hsi becomes the first glorious model in this
respect throughout the soviet area. This economic achievement buoys up
the spirit of the masses. They can now take up arms and go to the front
for the defense and development of the soviet area entirely free of worry
for their dependents at home. Of the total population of 4,928 of the two
townships, 1,018 (485 from Upper Ts'.ai-hsi and 533 from Lower Ts'ai-hsi)
have left to join the Red Army or for work. This ironclad fact gives us
an effective weapon with which to smash the humbuggery of all opportunities,
who for example declare that economic construction is impossible during
the Civil War, that the life of the masses of the soviet area has not im-
proved, that the masses are unwilling to join the Red Army, or that expan-
sion of the Red Army will leave no manpower for production. We call upon
the hundreds and thousands of townships throughout the Soviet area to emu-
late the townships of Ch'ang-wang, Ts'ai-hsi and Shih-shui. We hereby
solemnly place the glorious achievements of these several townships before
all the worker-peasant masses, so they may build the several thousand town-
ships like Ch'ang-wang, Ts'ai-hsi and Shih-shui and make them a strong
advanced position for'winning victory in all China.
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Upper Ts'ai-Hsi:
Day schools: Four, under one principal, each with one teacher. The masses
collect funds for the teachers' meals, set at 13 cents a day. Total number
of pupils: 141, mostly between 6 and 10. Most of those of the age group
of 11-14 go to the district soviet voluntary labor school (from reorganized
children work cadre training center). There are over 600 children between
the ages of 1 and 15 in the whole township. Of the 323 children of the age
group of 6-15, 141 go to the day school and 37 go to the district soviet
voluntary school. There are 146 children without any school to go to.
Evening schools: Four, without principal. Teachers are the same ones who
teach in the day schools. Pupils number more than 120, all girls. Expenses
for each school amount to 50 cents a month. The money is collected from the
masses.
Literacy Class: Twenty-four groups of 10 persons each, totaling 240 persons.
Every 5 days the evening school teachers give them 5 new characters to learn.
Each group has a leader. Students include men and women. Those who cannot
go to the evening schools because they are old, too busy or have to look
after small children, go to the literacy classes.
Newspaper reading group: Based in the club house, under one chief. On
market days (every 5 days), "Struggle," "Red China," "Notice," or "Class
Analysis" is read. At least 50-60, sometimes as many as 80-90 persons listen
to the reading each time.
Character recognition boards: There are 6 placed in thoroughfares.
Club house: One. Over 50 persons work for the club, including over 30
members of the new theatrical troupe.
Wall newspapers: Displayed at 4 places outside the entrance to each of the
day schools. Most articles are written by the pupils and their teachers.
Only 10 percent is written by the masses.
Day schools: Five, under one principal, each with one teacher. Teachers'
meals are provided as in Upper Ts'ai-hsi. There are over 150 pupils.
Another 60-plus go to the district school. The total is over 210.
Evening schools: Eight, without a principal. Five of the teachers are the
same ones who teach in the day schools. The other 3 are secured elsewhere.
Each school has an average of 30 pupils, totaling 240. Expenses amount to
50 cents a month.
Club house: One, with working personnel of more than 50.
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Literacy class: Twenty-six groups, totaling 260 persons. The same method
of teaching is used as in Upper Ts'ai-hsi.
Character recognition boards: Five pieces.
Wall newspapers: Displayed in 5 places.
Newspaper reading group: One. Meets once every 5 days on market day.
? 1947 edition Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung Vol 1.
* Township Soviet Work Model (2) Ts'ai-hsi Township (mimeographed) Printed
by Central Government Dec 1933.
* "Struggle," Nos 45, 46, 48, 2 Feb, 9 Feb, 23 Feb 1934.
* Rural investigation. Liberation Publishing Society. July 1949.
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[Text] The land investigation movement is a violent, ruthless class strug-
gle. It is necessary to mobilize the largest number of the masses to take
part with fervor in the struggle and form a mass movement, so as to insure
the correct implementation of the class line and attain the object of strik-
ing down the remnant forces of feudalism. All bureaucratic modes of work
that are alien to the masses are the greatest enemy of the land investigation
movement. Mass work in the land investigation involves mainly the telling
apart of classes, confiscation and redistribution according to classes, cor-
rect leadership for labor unions and poor peasant corps, etc.
I. Discussing Classes (Doing Propaganda)
1. Strategy of the land investigation movement: In order to weaken rich
peasants and liquidate landlords by making workers the leaders, relying on
poor peasants and uniting with middle peasants. Content of the propaganda:
Explaining this strategy very clearly to the masses.
2. In order to explain this strategy, it is necessary to make clear the
difference between landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants
and workers. In the course of the explanation, it is necessary to demon-
strate how landlords are feudal exploiters and rich peasants are semi-feudal
exploiters, so that only by adopting the policy of liquidating landlords and
weakening rich peasants will it be possible to give all the benefit of the
land revolution to middle peasants, poor peasants and workers.
3. But there is a difference between rich peasants and landlords. Rich
peasants do no labor themselves. So against landlords a policy of liquida-
tion is adopted, but against rich peasants a policy of weakening them is
adopted. Hence the tendency to liquidate rich peasants is wrong. At the
same time, rich peasants should not be treated as landlords.
4. Strategy toward middle peasants: Uniting with middle peasants is the
innermost core of the strategy of the land revolution. Support or opposi-
tion by middle peasants makes the difference between success or failure of
the land revolution. Hence it is necessary to explain this strategy to
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the masses again and again, and make it clear that impingement on the
interests of middle peasants will absolutely not be allowed. To unite
with middle peasants and avoid impinging on their interests, it is neces-
sary to make clear what middle peasants are with the example of "well-off
middle peasants." It is necessary to make clear emphatically the boundary
line between rich peasants and middle peasants, so as to stabilize the well-
off middle peasants. It is necessary to expose the deceiving of middle
peasants by landlords and rich peasants, so middle peasants may free them-
selves from the influence of landlords and rich peasants, rally around the
poor peasants, and together with them wage struggle against landlords.
5. It is necessary to expose every deceptive slogan put forward by the
landlords and rich peasants, and explain it broadly to the masses. Care
must be taken against the use by landlords and rich peasants and clannish,
local backward ideas to deceive the middle and poor peasants and sabotage
the movement.
6. It is necessary to make clear that land investigation is a weapon for
smashing the enemy's encirclement and suppression campaign, because it will
wipe out the remnant forces of feudalism. Once enemy troublemakers concealed
in the soviet area are removed and the revolutionary fervor of the broad
masses is heightened, expansion of the Red Army, economic construction and
other work will be easier to carry out.
7. Concrete slogans should be put forward according to local conditions.
In a backward village, for example, it is necessary to find the cause for
the backwardness and put forward concrete slogans for mobilizing the masses.
Again, if there is a reactionary landlord in the area who intimidates the
masses so they dare not rise to struggle actively, it will be necessary to
put forward slogans mentioning the landlord by name. Furthermore, if some
local government personnel commit the grave error of drifting away from the
masses so the masses are dissatisfied, propaganda will have to be done by
exposing the error of such personnel so as to mobilize the masses for strug-
gle.
8. All the above concerns the content of propaganda. The following will
deal with the way of doing propaganda. Propaganda on land ownership inves-
tigation should be directed first to township-level cadres (representatives
of township soviets and responsible officers of all mass organizations) to
make them understand first so they may in turn do propaganda among the
masses. Second, to conferences of labor unions and poor peasant corps to
make the members understand; and third, to mass rallies in villages to make
every one of the masses understand.
9. Propaganda makers are chiefly township-level activist cadres, who will
prepare to speak at mass meetings. Next, propaganda teams will be organized
which will speak to the masses after some training.
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10. Modes of propaganda: first, speech making, second, posting notices;
third, writing slogans; fourth, distributing leaflets, fifth, staging new
plays; sixth, writing articles, and so forth.
II. Investigating Classes
1. Land investigation is investigation of class status, not investigation
of land holdings by the mou. This will create fear among the masses and is
absolutely wrong.
2. Investigation of class status is. to find out landlords, rich peasants.,
exploiters and those who are hidden among the peasants but who are not
peasants. It is investigation of this handful of people, not investigation
into the class status of middle and poor peasants. Therefore, there must
not be door-to-door investigation, which will create fear among the masses
and is absolutely wrong.
3. Investigation of class status must be preceded by a period of propa-
ganda, that is, a period of telling the classes. Investigation without
first universally speaking about classes will create fear among the masses,
and is absolutely wrong.
4. In the investigation of classes, members of labor unions and poor
peasant groups and large numbers of the masses must be mobilized to do the
investigating. Results of the investigation should be immediately reported
to poor peasant corps and the land investigation committee. Investigation
should not be done by only a few people, because this will create fear
among the masses and is absolutely wrong.
5. Investigation of classes must be made thoroughly. No matter whether
the ones investigated are landlords or rich peasants, the way they ex-
ploited others and the way they lived in the past must be found out in
great detail. Only by so doing can they be willing to admit their crime
and the masses can be satisfied. If a conclusion is made after a cursory
examination, it will be easy to make mistakes. The persons investigated
will be unwilling to admit their guilt and the masses will not be satis-
fied. This will hamper the land investigation movement. In dealing with
middle peasants, all the more care must be exercised so as not to label
them rich peasants or rich peasants as landlords.
6. All information gathered from a family in a class investigation must
be written down in a "class status investigation form," so the people may
comment on it and checks can be made in the future. If details are only
memorized, or if only a few lines are scribbled in a notebook, the infor-
mation may be easily lost. That will be bad.
III. Passing Class Status
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1. Passing class status means deciding a person's class status. Because
that will decide the person's life or death, extreme care should be taken.
Everything must be made clear before a case can be put forward for passing.
2. Order of passing: First the poor peasant groups must hold a general
meeting. After discussion at the meeting and the cases are approved by the
majority by a show of hands, they can be considered to have passed the poor
peasant groups. If there are any doubts about a case, it should not be
passed at the meeting, but should be discussed again at the next meeting.
3. Second, the township land investigation committee will examine the view
of the poor peasant groups. If it is found correct, it will be passed;
if incorrect, it will be rectified. If in doubt, another investigation
should be made.
4. Third, it is the turn of the district land department. If it cannot
make a decision, the cases will be-referred to the district land investiga-
tion committee. If the district committee in turn cannot make a decision,
they will be referred to the county land department.
5. Fourth, the village mass meeting. A mass meeting must be held in the
village of the person investigated, when he will report details of his ex-
ploitation of others and his way of life, to see if the masses approve of
his case. If they approve, the case is passed. If they do not approve,
another investigation should be made. There must be no forced passing.
If passage is forced, the masses will not be satisfied. It will be command-
ism, which must be resolutely and firmly opposed.
6. The above four steps of passing a person's class status are indispensable.
Passing at a mass meeting is particularly important. In some places land
has been confiscated without first passing a mass meeting. That is wrong.
7. If a case has been passed wrongly, such as passing a middle peasant for
a rich peasant, a rich peasant for a landlord, or a landlord for a rich
peasant, the decision should be overturned. It will be necessary to ex-
plain at a mass meeting the past error and the reason for correction, so
as to make the masses satisfied.
8. In overturning a wrong decision, restitution of land and property must
be made to the wronged person if he is a middle peasant. Even if his land
has already been redistributed, it must be resumed and given back to him.
If the person is a rich peasant, restitution of land should also be made
to him if such land is available. If there is really no land available,
some other way should be worked out in the future for him. Such restitu-
tion always wins the approval of the masses. It is completely wrong to let
errors go unremedied.
IV. Confiscation and Redistribution
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1. Confiscation of a landlord's land and property and confiscation of a
rich peasant's land and surplus cattle, farm implements and houses should
be carried out only after approval by the masses at a village mass meeting.
There must be no confiscation without prior consent from the masses. There
must be no confiscation at night.
2. All property confiscated from landlords, with the exception of ready
cash and valuables which must be handed over to the finance department of
the government, should be distributed. among the masses. This is one way
of increasing the enthusiasm of the masses for struggle.
3. While the village mass meeting is in progress, an ad hoc committee to
take charge of confiscation and distribution should be elected. Confis-
cation should be made immediately and so should distribution. There must
be no delay in confiscation or distribution. Property should not be
brought to the government office and then distributed after discussion.
4. Distribution should be made within the village where the confiscation
is made and must not be equally distributed in the whole township. (This
does not apply to the property of big landlords).
5. Pigs, chicken, etc. should be cooked and then consumed at the mass
meeting. They must not be eaten by a small number of work personnel.
[Editor's note: There is no paragraph 6 in the original]
7. Government workers are the ones most eager to demand a share of the
distribution so as to set an example. It articles of everyday use are
extremely short, the consent of the masses must be obtained and distribu-
tion should be approved at the mass meeting. Work personnel must be pre-
vented from freely taking things.
8. With the consent of the masses, those who receive a share of the con-
fiscated land should form a cattle cooperative so they may jointly use the
draft cattle and important farm implements confiscated.
9. It is not right to delay distribution of land that is confiscated.
That should be distributed as soon as possible after setting aside Red
Army common land and public business land. Land should be distributed
first to those who received no or very little land in past distributions.
If there is land left after that, it should be equally distributed among
the villages as a unit. Forests, fish ponds, houses, latrines should like-
wise be promptly distributed among the masses.
10. Every time a distribution is made, while the enthusiasm of the masses
for struggle is at its height, slogans of Red Army expansion and develop-
ment of cooperatives should be opportunely put forward so the masses may
be led to take part enthusiastically in the revolutionary war and the con-
struction of the soviet.
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V. Labor Unions and Poor. Peasant Groups
1. Optimum results can be obtained from talking about classes, investiga-
tion of class status, passing of class status, confiscation and distribu-
tion and other work only by mobilizing the labor unions and poor peasant
groups. Labor unions should be leaders in class struggle in rural villages
and poor peasant corps the pillars and keystone of rural class struggle.
2. Correct development of the land investigation movement depends on the
labor unions directing their own members to join the poor peasant groups
and play an active role in the corps.
3. Poor peasant groups should be developed, so they may become organiza-
tions which the broad mass of poor peasants can freely join.
4. Poor peasant groups must be purged of concealed bad elements.
5. Poor peasant corps should frequently hold meetings during the land in-
vestigation movement. They should grasp the movement as their central work.
6. Middle peasants should be made to rally around the poor peasant groups.
They should be induced to attend meetings of the poor peasant groups to
.listen to the proceedings.
7. In leading the work of land investigation and struggle, the-labor unions
and poor peasant groups must not run counter to the principles mentioned in
the foregoing paragraphs.
Only by mobilizing the broad masses in accordance with the aforementioned
strategy and methods will it be possible to obtain satisfactory results in
the'land investigation movement. Any failure to do propaganda or to do it
properly, seriously and univer.sally, and any failure to comply with the
class line and mass line and to obtain the approval or consent of the masses
in the investigation and passing of class status and in the work of confisca-
tion and distribution will not achieve results in the land investigation move-
ment. On the contrary, it will make the masses dissatisfied and hamper the
progress of the land investigation movement. Therefore, opposition to Left-
ist opportunism in the movement which trespasses against middle peasants and
wipes out rich peasants, to Rightist opportunism which shelters landlords
and rich peasants, and to bureaucratic methods of leadership and work is
an essential condition for the correct development of the land investigation
movement.
? "Red Flag Weekly," No. 63 (Written by hand) December 1933.
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FIRST CABLE MESSAGE FROM PROVISIONAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO FUKIEN PEOPLE'S
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AND THE 19TH ROUTE ARMY
[Text] Fukien People's Revolutionary Government and Officers and Men of the
People's Revolutionary Army:
More than a month has passed since representatives of the Soviet Government
and Worker-Peasant Red Army and your representatives concluded an anti-Japan,
anti-Chiang draft agreement, but up to now we have not seen you taking active
anti-Japan, anti-Chiang action, nor have we seen any concrete, practical'
work on your part in mobilizing the masses for struggle and arming them to
oppose Japan and Chiang. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek has already sent
three columns to attack Foochow and Yen-p'ing, and Japanese imperialism is
already prepared to occupy Foochow and Amoy in response to Chiang Kai-shek's
military action. You and the broad mass of people of Fukien are in the midst
of extreme danger. The Soviet Government and Worker-Peasant Red Army want to
tell you solemnly that any passivity, hesitancy and indecision in the face of
such danger will be a very great crime against the Chinese revolution.
Therefore, the Soviet Central Government and Worker-Peasant Red Army demand
that you take immediate, resolute action in accordance with the basic
principles decided upon in our anti-Japan, anti-Chiang draft agreement,
concentrate all your armed forces and immediately begin an anti-Chiang
battle of decision. At the same time you must resolutely mobilize and arm
the broad masses, organize a truly popular revolutionary army of volunteers,
and truly give the people the democratic rights of speech, publication,
assembly, association and strike to develop mass struggle against the
Japanese and Chiang. We believe that we can win ultimate victory only by
relying on the strength of the millions of broad masses. Our Soviet
Government and Worker-Peasant Red Army are ready to join forces with you
any time and conclude with you an operational military agreement to oppose
and strike down our common enemies--Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek's
Kuomintang government in Nanking. We hope you will let us know your de-
cisions as soon as possible.
. Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, 20 December.
? "Red China," No 149, 14 February 1934.
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DECISIONS OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC
January 1934
[Text] The Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic fully
concurs with Comrade Chang Wen-t'ien's report on the foreign policy of the
Soviet, approves all measures taken by the Presidium of the previous Central
Executive Committee and People's Committee concerning the 19th Route Army
in Fukien and the Fukien People's Revolutionary Government, and decides to
publish the following three principal documents.
Mao Tse-tung
Chairman, Central Executive Committee of
the Chinese Soviet Republic
Hsiang Ying, Vice Chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Vice Chairman
...day of January 1934.
? "Red China," No 149, 14 February 1934.
(The three principal documents decided here to be published were:
"Anti-Japan and Anti-Chiang Preliminary Agreement," "First Cable Message
From Provisional Central Government of Chinese Soviet Republic to Fukien
People's Revolutionary Government and the 19th Route Army," and "Second
Cable Message From Provisional Central Government of Chinese Soviet Repub-
lic to Fukien People's Revolutionary Government and People's Revolutionary
Army." Because the first document bears different signatures, we do not
include it in this collection.)
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SECOND CABLE MESSAGE FROM THE PROVISIONAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO FUKIEN
PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY
13 January 1934
[Text] Committee Members Li, Ch'en and Chiang of the People's Government:
Judged on the basis of the present situation, Foochow is about to fall and
the People's Government is in danger. In accordance with our bilateral
agreement of the past, the Soviet Central Government ventures to make the
following emergency proposals to your esteemed government in the spirit of
the anti-Japan, anti-Chiang united front:
1. The People's Government should immediately put in practice the people's
democratic rights it has promised in its declaration and in the agreement.
2. The People's Government should immediately arm the masses of Foochow
and its environs, Ch'uan-chou, Chang-chou and other places, and encourage
and support the broad masses in their participation in the anti-Japan, anti-
Chiang front to defend Foochow, Ch'uan-chou, Chang-chou and other areas.
3. Encourage the masses to organize at once anti-Japan, anti-Chiang fight-
ing bodies, but do not obstruct or ban the development of such organizations
under the excuse of the critical state of the war.
4. There should be practical encouragement to armed organizations of the
masses and their anti-Japan, anti-Chiang activities in enemy Chiang's rear
(such as the coastal areas of Fukien and Chekiang).
5. There should be determination to purge from your ranks those elements
who are ready to capitulate to Chiang Kai-shek or who want to ask imperial-
ism for protection.
6. Conduct propaganda among all officers and men of the 19th Route Army
and let them know that only by cooperating to the end with the Soviet and
the Red Army can they oppose the Japanese and Chiang. Take all effective
measures and united military. action.
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Obviously, Chiang Kai-shek and Japanese imperialism are coordinating their
action with the common object of wiping out the 19th Route Army. If your
esteemed government wishes indeed to implement what you have advocated,
then our above-mentioned proposals will be the only way to save the People's
Government and the 19th Route Army from the present danger. They will also
be the final test of your esteemed government's resolve to fulfill the
promises made in your own declaration and in the agreement. It should be
realized that if an anti-Japan, anti-Chiang front of the masses and the
armed forces is truly established, Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese imperial-
ists will not be able to rule in peace for long even if Foochow falls,
and this united front will undoubtedly develop steadily day by day through-
out the country. Moreover, if your esteemed government is willing to arm
the masses and encourage the people of Fukien, firest of all the people of
Foochow, to defend themselves, there will be new development in the
situation and Foochow may not necessarily fall. The matter is urgent. We
hope you will consider it and let us have your reply.
Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, 13 January.
? "Red China," No 149, 14 February 1934.
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15 January 1934
[Text] In the great fight against imperialism and for land revolution, many
comrades have gloriously sacrificed themselves! The sacrifice of these
comrades demonstrates the invincible courage of the proletariat and lays
the foundation for the Chinese Soviet Republic. The worker-peasant toiling
masses of all China are advancing by treading on the bloodstains of these
comrades, to overthrow the rule of imperialism and the Kuomintang and win
victory for the Soviet over all China.
Mao Tse-tung, 15 January 1934.
? "Inscriptions on Red Army Martyr Monument."
* Collection of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents , Vol 5, 1935.
8564 .
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A SOLEMN OPENING SPEECH OUTLINE OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S SPEECH (AT THE SECOND
ALL-SOVIET CONGRESS)
22 January 1934
[Text] Comrades! On behalf of the Central Executive Committee I declare the
Second National Soviet Congress open. (Band plays)
Comrades! Today is the day the Second National Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet
Congress opens. On behalf of the Central Executive Committee I give the
whole body of delegates the revolutionary salute!
Comrades! It has been 2 years and 2 months since the First National Soviet
Congress. Developments in the past 2 years have completely shown and proved
that the counterrevolutionary ruling classes are further shaken and collaps-
ing, while the soviet movement and the nationwide revolutionary struggle
are developing greatly.
China is a country oppressed and invaded by imperialism, a country in which
the Kuomintang Government of the landlord - bourgeoisie carries out slaughter,
repression and enslavement. The vast territory of the country is surrendered
by the Kuomintang to the imperialists, so that all China is being threatened
with partition and joint rule by imperialism and is rapidly approaching a
.state of doom. In such a situation China's toiling worker-peasant masses,
led by the Chinese Communist Party, have united and armed themselves and
created their own government and state. Our First All-Soviet Congress
declared the inauguration of this state, which is our Chinese Soviet
Republic. Since then there has been extremely acute opposition between
two governments in all China.
Developments of the revolution in the past 2 years have even more developed
the revolutionary situation throughout the country. The broad worker-
peasant masses, rallying around the banner of the Soviet, have been attack-
ing our enemies, imperialism and the Kuomintang. We have won great victories
in the past 2 years. In the face of our victories imperialism and the
Kuomintang are trembling. Following three "encirclement and suppression"
campaigns they have organized the 4th and even the 5th "encirclement and
suppression" campaigns. But we have shattered the four "encirclement and
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suppression" campaigns of the enemies, and have already won an initial vic-
tory in smashing the 5th "encirclement and suppression" campaign. At
present we are in a battle of decision against the 5th "encirclement and
suppression" campaign and in a most crucial moment.
In the past 2 years the Red Army of the whole country has won a great vic-
tory in the bloody struggle. In this many of our comrades have shed their
last drop of blood and gloriously sacrificed themselves for the Soviet.
Many of those who led the revolutionary struggle in Kuomintang and White
areas have been murdered by the Kuomintang. Among these comrades were
Huang Kung-lueh, Chao Po-sheng, Wei Pa-ch'un, Yun Tai-ying, Ts'ai Ho-sen,
Teng Chung-hsia, Ch'en Yuan-tao, Lu I, Shen Tse-min, Wang Liang, Hu A-lin,
Chang Hsi-lung, Wu Kao-ch'un, P'eng Ao and others. They gloriously
sacrificed themselves under the enemy's bullets and butcher's knife on
the fronts and various frontlines. I propose that we show our grief and
respect for these comrades by observing a 3-minute silence. (All delegates
stand up in silence for 3 minutes)
The tasks of the Second National Soviet Congress are to utterly smash the
enemy's 5th "encirclement and suppression" campaign, to push the soviet
movement all over the country and to oppose the scheme and vicious plot
of imperialism and the Kuomintang to put China into extinction. Our
Congress shoulders a great responsibility. Our Congress should call upon
the toiling worker-peasant masses throughout the Soviet area and all China
to struggle for expansion of the Red Army into 1 million ironlike men. We
should call upon the masses throughout the Soviet area and all China to arm
themselves, concentrate all forces and shatter the 5th "encirclement and
suppression" campaign to win the biggest, most thorough victory of the
revolutionary war and victory of the revolution in all China.
Our Congress is the supreme organ of state power of the.whole country. It
has immense strength to solve these problems. We believe it certainly
can solve them and is fully confident of doing so. Our Congress will make
the 5th "encirclement and suppression" campaign end in utter rout, develop
the revolution in the whole country, extend the territory of the Soviet to
all regions ruled by the Kuomintang, and unfurl the red flag all over the
country. Let us shout:
Long live the Second National Soviet Congress!
Long live the soviet new China! (Overwhelming applause)
? Red China Special Edition for.Second All-Soviet Congress, No 2,
24 January 1934.
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REPORT OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF
THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC TO THE SECOND ALL-SOVIET CONGRESS
25 January 1934
[Text] (The report of the Central Executive Committee
and the People's Committee was the first item of
business on the agenda after the Second All-Soviet
Congress opened. The report was delivered by
Comrade Mao Tse-tung of the Central Executive Committee
and the time of delivery was the afternoon of
24 January and the morning of 25 January. The report
delineated the situation in the Chinese Revolution
and world revolution, summed up very valuable exper-
iences gained from the soviet movement since the
establishment of the central government and set forth
the current concrete fighting tasks. The outline of
this report includes 1) The current situation and the
progress of the soviet movement; 2) The attacks of
imperialism and the soviet leadership of the anti-
imperialist movement; 3) The struggle between the
"encirclement and suppression" of the imperialist
Kuomintang and the Soviet Government's anti-
"encirclement and suppression" campaign; 4) The imple-
mentation of the various-basic policies of the Soviet
during the past 2 years, with the contents divided
into arming the people and the construction of the
Red Army, on the suppression of counterrevolution,
labor policy, agrarian revolution, fiscal policy,
economic policy, cultural development, the marriage
system and the nationalities policy--a total of
nine parts; and 5) The concrete, fighting tasks of
the soviet in the face of smashing the 5th
"encirclement and suppression" and winning nation-
wide victory. The full text is as follows:)
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1. The Current Situation and the Victory of the Soviet Movement
Two full years have passed since the first All-Soviet Congress. The develop-
ment of revolutionary events during these 2 years has fully revealed the
further vacillation and collapse of the Kuomintang rule, and the accelerated
unfolding of the soviet movement and its victory! The period we are in today
is a period of further intensification of the Chinese revolutionary situation,
and it is precisely also the interim of the world's entrance into the new
period of war and revolution.
The confrontation of the socialist world and the capitalist world has become
extremely acute now. On the one hand the socialist economy of the Soviet
Union has achieved final consolidation, its First Five-Year Plan was com-
pleted within 4 years, and great achievements were attained in the first
year of its Second Five-Year Plan. The Soviet Union very early eliminated
unemployment, and the cultural level and standards of living of its entire
working people have been greatly heightened. The Soviet Union's national
defense has been greatly consolidated. With the support of the people
throughout the world, the peaceful policies of the Soviet Union have been
successful everywhere, and even the most obdurate U.S. imperialism has been
compelled to establish diplomatic relations.
For the capitalist world it was a picture of another kind, the economic
crisis has reached its apex, the entire production of the capitalist world
has dropped to an unprecedented low, its unemployed workers are counted by
the tens of millions, the temporary stability of capitalism has ended, and
the peril of capitalism in general has entered a new stage. The various
imperialist countries are frantically preparing for war. The result of
Japanese imperialism's occupation of Manchuria was to bring about an unfold-
ing of contradictions among the various countries on a new basis--especially
the contradictions between Japan and the United States--and the imperialist
bandit war for redistributing the world is threatening all the people.
Nevertheless, imperialism is again attempting to mitigate the contradictions
within its ranks for awhile and find a way out by sacrificing the Soviet
Union and China. The preparations for war against the Soviet Union have
never ceased. The war'to divide China and attack the Chinese Revolution
is now being carried out even more openly.
The revolutionary movement of the oppressed people of the world and the
world's proletariat, however, was born and has grown under the influence
of the success of the Soviet Union's socialist construction and the threat
of war and peril of the imperialists. Fierce class struggles and national
revolutions are unfolding in all capitalist colonial and semi-colonial
countries. The flames of global war and revolution are pressing in on us.
The Chinese Revolution is part of the world revolution. But the deepening
of the national peril, the collapse of the national economy, and the
victory of the soviet movement have caused the further development of the
Chinese Revolution and pushed it into special prominence in the world
revolution.
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The core of the current situation in China is the vast Civil War, a life-and-
death struggle between revolution and counterrevolution, and the intense
confrontation between the political power of the worker-peasant Soviet and the
political power of the Kuomintang landlord bourgeoisie.
On the one hand, the Kuomintang landlord bourgeoisie wholly capitulated to
imperialism and led imperialism into occupying vast expanses of Chinese
territory and monopolizing all of the primary political and economic powers.
And it led the national economy into general collapse, bringing unprecedented
suffering to the lives of the hard-working worker-peasant masses. It stripped
all freedom from the revolutionary people, suppressed all revolutionary
movements and carried out frenzied, fascist terrorism. Under the direction
of imperialism, it organized all counterrevolutionary forces to launch
desperate attacks against the Soviet area and the Red Army. All these have
one objective. That is to merge the interests of the Chinese landlord
bourgeoisie and the interests of capitalism and lead China into becoming
a colony.
On the other hand, the Soviet regime called upon all the people of all China
for a resolute war of national revolution, organizing and leading the Red
Army and the masses in a struggle to defend and expand the Soviet terri-
tories. It sought to smash the repeated "encirclement and suppression"
campaigns of the imperialist Kuomintang with determined attacks, and mount
a strict guard against the counterrevolutionary attempts of all exploiting
elements within the Soviet territories. All land is to be given to the
people and the soldiers of the Red Army. The workers are to be placed on
an 8-hour work day system, wages are to be increased and aid is to be given
to the unemployed. The social insurance system is to be implemented. All
the people are to have complete freedom of assembly, speech, publication
and strike. The broad masses of workers and peasants are to participate
in the administration of their own government organizations, but no element
of the exploiting class is to take part. The economic life of the people
is to be organized so as to bring about a change from the former situation,
under the rule of the landlord bourgeoisie, of suffering cold and hunger,
to a position that is not only wholly free of hunger and cold, but is also
improving with every passing day. The broad masses of people who had no
possibility whatsoever to enjoy education under the rule of the landlord
bourgeoisie are to gain to a position where their cultural level is
heightened daily. There is only one objective--to overthrow the rule of
the landlord bourgeoisie throughout the country, drive imperialism out
of China, liberate several hundred million people from oppression and
exploitation under the role of the imperialist Kuomintang, obstruct the
path of colonization that will doom China and establish a Soviet China
that is free and independent, with territorial integrity.
The daily mounting intensity of the opposition between two political powers
cannot but help stimulate the daily intensification of the life-and-death
struggle between these two powers. The current period is the historic
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period deciding the victory or defeat of the struggle between the two sides.
Following on the heels of the fourth "encirclement and suppression" which
was smashed, the counterrevolutionaries' fifth "encirclement and suppres-
sion" is now advancing against us on a massive scale. The historic task of
the Soviet Government is to call upon, organize and lead all revolutionary
people throughout the Soviet areas and in all China to take part in this
great and decisive battle, mobilize the broad masses of workers and peasants
to join the Red Army. We must improve the political education and military
techniques of the Red Army, enlarge the local armed forces and the
guerrilla units, launch guerrilla warfare on a broad scale and strengthen
the centralized and unified leadership of the Soviet over the Red Army in
the various Soviet areas. The speed and quality of work carried out by the
Soviet will improve. Fiscal and economic organizations of the Soviet are to
ensure that the material needs of the revolutionary war will be met. We will
launch a workers' class struggle, organize a revolutionary activism of the
worker masses and bring it to bear on the struggle to smash the enemy. The
peasants' land struggle will unfold and we will organize the broad masses
of peasants to struggle to seize land and protect it. We call on the toil-
ing masses of workers and peasants in all China to sacrifice everything
and exert all efforts for the war. By so doing we shall thoroughly smash
the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the imperialist Kuomintang,
prevent China from becoming a colony, and win victory, first, for the
Soviet, in one or several provinces, and then within the entire nation.
2. The Imperialist's Offensive and the Soviet Government's Leadership of the
Anti-Imperialist Campaign
In the 2 years since the Provincial Central Government was established, the
most momentous event in the country was the attack of imperialism and the
counterrevolutionaries' fourth and fifth "encirclement and suppression"
campaigns launched against the revolution.
In the bandit war of Japanese imperialism which began on 18 September 1931,
the eastern provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning and Jehol Province
were occupied under the butchery carried out with planes and artillery.
The P'ing-Tsin area fell under its control, and preparations are now under-
way for an even more massive and murderous war against Inner Mongolia and
all of North China. The British imperialists attacked Szechwan from Tibet.
The French imperialists attacked Yunnan and Kweichow provinces. U.S. im-
perialism wanted the Yangtze River basin and Fukien Province to be placed
under its direct rule. All these imperialists extended their poisonous
hands and schemes over the vast territory of China in order to enslave
China, wipe out the Chinese Soviet regime, prepare for the offensive
against the Soviet Union and, at the same time, prepare for World War II
among the imperialist bandits. But the landlord bourgeoisie Kuomintang,
under a policy of giving everything to imperialism, gave away several
million square li of territory, adopted the shameful policy of non-
resistance against the attacks of the imperialists. They bargained the
interests of the Chinese working people for political and military assistance
from imperialism so as to facilitate the concentration of its forces to
attack the Soviet and the Red Army.
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At this time the revolutionary people of China were faced with actions of a
contradictory nature from two political powers. The Kuomintang completely
capitulated to the imperialists and suppressed, in every way possible, the
people opposing imperialism. The Soviet resolutely opposed imperialism,
and in every conceivable way tried to give help to and lead the anti-
imperialist movement.
Under such an unprecedentedly grave national crisis, the anti-imperialist
movement of the revolutionary people throughout China unfolded in an ex-
tremely fierce manner. The struggle of volunteer forces, several hundred
thousand strong, in the Three Eastern Provinces and the bloody battle of
Shanghai fought by the soldiers of the 19th Route Army caused the anti-
imperialist movement to spread throughout China and surged to unprecedented
levels.
In the past 2 years the Provisional Soviet Central Government has repeatedly
cabled its opposition to Japanese imperialism's war of banditry and of the
Kuomintang's capitulation and betrayal of the nation. On 14 April 1932, the
Provisional Central Government officially declared war on Japan. Simultane-
ously, it issued the mobilization order for war agaisnt Japan, and called
upon the people of all China to launch a national revolutionary war and keep
the imperialists from enslaving China and oppose the Kuomintang which is
betraying China. The Provisional Central Government and the Revolutionary
Military Committee previously called upon all Kuomintang units attacking
the Soviet and the Red Army,making it known that they were willing to con-
clude a fighting agreement to oppose Japan and all imperialism under three
conditions. These were 1) immediately cease attacks on the Soviet area;
2) guarantee the democratic rights of the people (freedom of speech,
publication, assembly and association and strike); and 3) arm the people
and organize an anti-Japanese volunteer army. When the Kuomintang concluded
the Tangku agreement with Japan and when it held the recent direct Sino-
Japanese negotiations, the Provisional Government repeatedly proclaimed
to the nation, and to the world, its opposition to such policies and
actions, which betray the national interests. The Soviet gives aid to
the people's struggle against Japan in various areas. The anti-Japanese
strike of the Hu Hsi Factory of Shanghai alone was given 16,000 yuan in
aid by the Soviet. Also, there was the soliciting of funds by the people
in the Soviet area to help the anti-Japanese North China volunteer army,
and much other aid in material and moral support were also given to other
anti-imperialist struggles. In the Soviet territories the special rights
of imperialism were completely abolished long ago. The influence of
imperialism was wiped away. The preachers and priests were driven out by
the people. The people's property occupied by the missions has been
recovered and mission schools have been abolished. In China it is only
the Soviet territories which have shaken off the rule of imperialism.
All these facts clearly indicate that the Soviet Government is the only
government that is opposing imperialism. The Soviet Government should
point out to the people of the country that it is the greatest responsi-
bility of the Soviet and the entire people to wage direct warfare against
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imperialism and defeat it. In order to discharge this responsibility, the
only way is to rely on the unfolding of the anti-imperialist struggle of
the broad masses. First of all, unite all forces and defeat the Kuomintang,
the running dog of imperialism, because it is the biggest obstacle to the
opposition put up by the Soviet and the people against imperialism. The
people must understand that precisely because of the Kuomintang's obstruc-
tion--spreading across the area between the Soviet territories and the
advance of imperialism,. and concentrating all its forces on attacks against
the Soviet territories--it is impossible for the Red Army to engage the
imperialists in direct warfare. They have forced the Soviet and the Red
Army to take, as their first step, the clearing of the pathway with resolute
attacks, to smash the Kuomintang's "encirclement and suppression." The direct
and massive conflict between the Soviet and imperialism draws nearer every
day. This makes it necessary for the Soviet to fully strengthen its leader-
ship of all anti-imperialist struggles. The Soviet should become the
organizer and leader of the people's anti-imperialist struggle throughout
the country. Only by exerting all efforts to make the people understand
the current peril and the crimes of the Kuomintang, and depending upon the
heightening of the anti-imperialist, anti-Kuomintang consciousness of the
broad masses of people and their organizational strength, can the Soviet
Government carry out its sacred task to topple the rule of the imperialist
Kuomintang in China with national revolutionary and the revolutionary civil
war.
3. The Struggle Between the "Encirclement and Suppression" of the Imperialist
Kuomintang and the Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" of the Soviet Government
Because the Chinese Soviet area is the revolutionary base area of the nation-
wide anti-imperialist movement, because the Chinese Worker-Peasant'Red Army
is the main force of the nationwide opposition against imperialism and
because the Soviet movement and the revolution are fiercely advancing in
their development, the Kuomintang, with the direct assistance of imperialism,
concentrated all its forces to launch hopeless attacks against the Soviet
and the Red Army one, two, three, four and even five times in an attempt to
wipe out the strength of the Chinese revolution and to clear the way for
imperialism to carve up China.
But each attack of the imperialist Kuomintang has met with crushing defeat.
With the support of the people throughout the country, and under the correct
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Soviet and the
Worker-Peasant Red Army have become an invincible force. Simultaneously,
the victories of the Soviet and the Red Army have greatly heightened the
enthusiasm of the working people of China. It has made them realize that
only the Soviet and the Red Army are truly fighting for national inde-
pendence and freedom, and only the Soviet and the Red Army can save China.
The 4th "encirclement and suppression" began right, after the Kuomintang
sold.out the Three Eastern Provinces--Kirin, Liaoning and Heilungkiang--
and concluded the Shanghai cease-fire agreement. The Kuomintang national
traitors did not station even a single soldier to oppose the aggression of
Japanese imperialism, and ignored the repeated announcements of the Soviet
Central Government and the Red Army stating their willingness to conclude
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a combat agreement to fight Japanese imperialism with any troops truly
opposing Japan. On the contrary, the arch criminal of national betrayal
in the Kuomintang, Cliiang Kai-shek, concentrated several hundred thousand
troops to attack Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei and the western Hunan-Hupeh Soviet areas
to force the Red Army and to withdraw from the area surrounding Wuhan. On
our side, although there was a need to avoid battle with vastly superior
enemy forces, the Red Fourth Front Army was forced to withdraw from the
Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border Soviet area due to our subjective errors in
strategy. It made the famous long march and created a new, vast Soviet
base in the area along Szechwan, Nan-chiang [0589 3068], Yu-han [1335 3352]
and Sui-ting [4840 1353]. From the long march of the Red Fourth Front Army
came the unfolding of a widespread people's revolutionary struggle in the
distant northwestern area of China, spreading the seeds of the Soviet
into an area where the revolutionary situation was relatively backward. The
courage and skill of the Red Fourth Front Army in battle turned more than
10 counties into Red areas in less than a year, induced the hard-working
workers and peasants and soldiers of the White army in all of Szechwan Pro-
vince to lean favorably toward the Soviet revolution. In spite of them-
selves, Chiang Kai-shek and the Szechwan warlords were forced into a state
of trembling and fear when faced with the great victories of the Red Fourth
Front Army. At the same time, the 2d Red Army Corps, which withdrew from
the Hung Hu [3163 3275] area, not only did not suffer any appreciable
losses, but, in positive actions taken in coordination with the Red Fourth
Front Army in the Szechwan-Hupeh-Hunan border Soviet area, won new victories.
As for the area around Hung Hu, guerrilla units were still present there.
In the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Soviet area our base not only did not sustain
any great losses, but won a consolidated position and has mounted guerrilla
warfare on all fronts.
The Central Soviet Area is where the Central Government is located, and it
is the homebase of the Soviet movement throughout the country. It is also
the prime target of the enemy's attack. The enemy concentrated the greater
part of his forces to wage a tenacious campaign against us, deploying the
so-called "Central Government Forces the forces of warlords Chiang and
Tsai, the warlords of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, and the Hunan
warlords to surround the Central Soviet Area and various neighboring Soviet
areas from all directions. After a year of arduous struggle we won an
unprecedented victory. The biggest victory was won in the first half of
1933. In this half year period.alone, the Red Army of the Central Soviet
Area wiped out 24 regiments, 6 battalions and 2 companies of the White Army,
smashed 3 divisions, 12 regiments, 5 battalions and 2 companies of the
' White Army and captured about 20,000 rifles, and some 1,000 machine guns
and side arms. Especially in the Tung Huang Pi [2639 7806 7095] campaign,
the most tenacious basic column of the enemy was wiped out and a final
and most disastrous defeat was inflicted on the enemy's fourth "encirclement
and suppression."
In the great victory of the campaign that smashed the fourth "encirclement
and suppression," the Red Army not only grew in numbers but also strengthened
in quality. Enormous improvements were attained in the political resolute-
ness and military techniques of the Red commanders and fighters as compared
to the period before the fourth campaign. The Soviet territory has been
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enlarged. Except for the Soviet area in Szechwan Province,'the vast Soviet
areas in northwest Fukien Province and east Kiangsi Province have been
expanded with an increase in population of nearly 1 million and the new
Min Kan [7044 63731 Province was established. The old Soviet areas have
become even more consolidated, and this is manifested in the improvement
of the functions of the Soviet, the heightening of the revolutionary
enthusiasm of the worker-peasant masses, the development of class struggles
in the rural and urban areas, as well as the strict suppression of remnant
counterrevolutionary forces in the Soviet areas. Simultaneously, this
victory had a great impact upon the Kuomintang areas. Under the influence
of this victory, the courage to struggle was heightened even further among
the worker-peasant masses in the vast White area. Not only was there general
vacillation-among the soldiers of the Kuomintang participating in the
"encirclement and suppression," there was great fear among the cadres, which
resulted in forcing Chiang Kai-shek to openly proclaim the desperate order:
"Those who do not suppress the bandits but want to fight Japan will be shot
without mercy."
However, the winning of these victories did not happen by chance. It was
dependent upon the correctness of the Chinese Communist Party's political
line, the centralized leadership of the Soviet Government, and the correct-
ness of its plans and policies, the courage and skill of the Red Army in
battle, and the enthusiastic support of the broad masses of workers and
peasants in the Soviet areas, as well as the daily struggles of the worker-
peasant masses of the White areas and the unfolding of the anti-imperialist
and anti-Kuomintang movement. All these fare the basic conditions of de-
feating the enemy. Without these conditions there would be no victory.
After its disatrous defeat in the fourth "encirclement and suppression"
campaign, the only way out left for the Kuomintang warlords was to
capitulate to imperialism in an even more shameless manner. It obtained
large loans and huge quantities of armaments from imperialism and hired
foreign advisors in large numbers. It assembled the forces it formerly
had and organized new forces (such as training new soldiers, training new
units and training the blue shirt society of the officers corps). They
concentrated all counterrevolutionary forces and, under the direction of
imperialism, launched the fifth "encirclement and suppression" against
the Soviet and the Red Army.
The Soviet, with regard to the fifth "encirclement and suppression," was
completely in accord with what the Party Central Committee had pointed
out: "It is a struggle to prevent imperialism from extricating itself
from the peril it is in, and it is a struggle to win freedom and
independence for Soviet China." The campaign to smash the fifth "encircle-
ment and suppression" will decide "whether China will be divided up by
imperialism and ruled by it jointly, or wholly become a colony,"or
whether it will become a new Soviet China, independent, free and with its
territory intact."
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The Soviet should call on all the masses in the Soviet and White areas who
are participants in the struggle to clearly recognize the gravity of this
struggle. Only by uniting with all revolutionary forces to strengthen our
own forces and uniting with great enthusiasm under the leadership of the
Soviet, can we achieve complete victory in this campaign.
The Soviet should give instructions to all the masses participating in the
struggle: In smashing this "encirclement and suppression," especially
after smashing the fourth "encirclement and suppression," we have all the
basic conditions for defeating the enemy. The correct leadership of the
party and the Soviet, the powerful Red Army and its expansion, the activism
in struggle of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the Soviet and
White areas--all these form the foundation for our victory over the enemy.
Through our efforts and through the development of contradictions inside
the ruling class, the new and massive attacks of the imperialist Kuomintang
have been dealt a severe blow. The original plans of the enemy have failed,
and they have been forced to launch the final offensive against us under
a new plan and on a new front. We are now face-to-face with the final,
decisive battle of the fifth "encirclement and suppression." Although
the blockhouse policy and the policy of economic blockade of the Kuomintang
warlords are extremely vicious, they are not impregnable walls of iron and
bronze that cannot be overcome. These policies of the enemy disclose only
their own weakness. We will raise the level of our military techniques
and skills, concentrate all our forces and overcome all these difficulties.
Victory belongs to us.
We should point out that the difficulties of the enemy greatly exceed ours.
The vacillation of the White Armies' soldiers, the hate and dissatisfaction
of the workers and peasants and the broad masses of petite bourgeoisie under
enemy rule, the struggle and division of the various warlord factions in
the ruling class, the contradictions and conflicts among the imperialists
helping the Kuomintang and the bankruptcy of the Kuomintang's finances and
economy--all these are objective conditions of victory for the revolution.
Here we should point out that while the imperialist Kuomintang was carrying
out its fifth "encirclement and suppression," a people's government emerged
in Fukien Province. The emergence of this people's revolutionary government
indicates the further disruption of the Kuomintang's system.
The great victory of the Soviet movement and the Kuomintang's bankruptcy
in the eyes of the people throughout the country has forced a part of the
reactionary ruling class of China to adopt a new method, attempting to find
a third road outside of the road of the Kuomintang and the Soviet so as to
preserve the lot of the reactionary ruling class, which is near death.
However, this plan is futile, because if an organization such as the People's
Revolutionary Government does not truly proceed from the interests of the
hard-working masses of. workers and peasants and does not carry out many
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basic policies similar to the ones that have been implemented by the Soviet,
does not resolutely accept the three conditions already announced by the
Soviet Government in April of last year and conclude an agreement with the
Soviet Government to oppose imperialism and the Kuomintang and carry it
out, it will merely be empty talk and a swindle. Then, the broad masses of
revolutionary people will not see the difference between the Kuomintang
and the People's Revolutionary Government. It can also be predicted that
they will fail tragically. With the trust and confidence of the people
throughout the country in the Soviet growing day by day, and with the daily
bankruptcy of the swindles perpetrated by the Kuomintang and all counter-
revolutionary factions, the Soviet will resolutely smash the fifth
"encirclement and suppression," obstruct the path of imperialism to turn
China into a colony and proceed from victory, first in one or more provinces,
to nationwide victory. These will give proof to that well-known saying:
"Only the Soviet can save China!"
4. The Formulation of Various Basic Policies of the Soviet in the Past Two
Years
When we talk about the various basic policies of the Soviet, we must first
ask from what basis do these policies proceed? In answering this question,
we should understand the past and present situations of the Soviet and the
tasks that emerged from these situations.
In the past, the Soviet was born in the midst of guerrilla warfare. It
emerged from various very small places, places which were independent from
each other and were not united. All around each Soviet area was the world
of the enemy, and the enemy wreaked destruction and carried out suppression
of the Soviet areas every minute of the day. However, it could defeat all
these enemies. It emerged and developed from the oppression of defeating
the enemy countless times. This was the situation of the Soviet.
There are many differences in the present situation of the Soviet compared
to that of the past. It now has vast territories, a broad mass of people
and a powerful Red Army. It has assembled many dispersed forces (although
they have not all been concentrated), and it has organized and become a
nation--our Chinese Soviet Republic. This nation has its place and central
organizations, and it has already established a provisional central govern-
ment. This government is a centralized organization of power. It relies
on the broad masses and on the armed forces of the people--the Red Army.
It is a government of workers and peasants, it has implemented the revolu-
tionary dictatorship of workers and peasants. With regard to the workers
and peasants it is a broad democracy, but it absolutely does not permit
any landlord bourgeois elements to take part in it. It is a dictatorship,
a dictatorship that already has great powers. This dictatorship is already
having a widespread impact within the country, and there is great trust
in it among the people.
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There is a great change in the situation from the guerrilla era of the past.
War, nevertheless, is a daily way of life for it and, furthermore, the war
has intensified and spread even more. The reason is because the confronta-
tion between this dictatorship and the dictatorship of the Kuomintang
landlord bourgeoisie is becoming more acute with each passing day. It has
now entered the decisive period of victory or defeat for both sides, and it
is faced with the massive "encirclement and suppression" of the imperialist
Kuomintang. This is the current situation of the Soviet.
This kind of situation has decided its tasks, which are that it must exert
all of its efforts toward mobilizing, organizing and arming the people. It
must not cease even for a night its attacks on the enemy so as to smash
the enemy`s "encirclement and suppression." Its task is revolutionary war,
the concentration of all its forces to wage revolutionary war, and the use
of revolutionary warfare to overthrow the other dictatorship of the enemy.
It must also overthrow the rule of the powerful imperialists, because
imperialism is the supporter and leader of that other dictatorship. The
objective of overthrowing imperialism and the Kuomintang is to unify China
and carry out a democratic revolution of a bourgeois nature, and, further-
more, it must make it possible for this revolution to be transformed into a
socialist revolution in the future. This is the task of the Soviet.
Can we understand what the purpose of the Soviet is in implementing various
basic policies in such a situation and under such tasks? Its purpose is to
consolidate the already victorious dictatorship of the workers and peasants,
to spread this dictatorship throughout the nation, and to mobilize, organize
and arm the hard-working worker-peasant masses throughout the Soviet areas
and in all China to overthrow the rule of imperialism and the Kuomintang,
so as to consolidate and develop this dictatorship. The Soviet, moreover,
must implement various necessary and basic policies in preparation for the
future transformation of the current worker-peasant dictatorship of a
bourgeois nature into a socialist proletarian dictatorship. This is the
point of departure for all Soviet policies.
The Central Executive Committee and the People's Committee, holding to the
instructions of the First All-Soviet Congress, have adhered resolutely to
this kind of general line in policy during the past 2 years and attained
immense achievements. From experience it has proved to all of the revolu-
tionary people in China that only the Soviet Government's policy is a policy
in the interests of the people and for the people's political power, a policy
of resolute opposition against the counterrevolutionary policies of
imperialist Kuomintang for toppling the rule of the imperialist Kuomintang
throughtout the country, and for rescuing the nation from doom and liberat-
ing all hard-working people from oppression.
Needless to say, in the China where two regimes are in acute opposition,
each and every one of the concrete policies of the Soviet must immediately
win the support of the broad masses of people. To the people who have
drunk the dregs of oppression and exploitation under the counterrevolutionary
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policies of the imperialist Kuomintang, each and every one of the concrete
policies of the Soviet is like a magnet attracting iron filings. This kind
of situation has caused great alarm in the reactionary ruling class. It
did not hesitate to use the most shameless sort of rumor-mongering to
slander the policies of the Soviet. However, ironclad facts powerfully
refuted the shameless rumors. Provided he is not a fanatical Kuomintang
landlord capitalist, every Chinese who has eyes will have to admit that
there is a vast difference between the policies of the Soviet Government
and that of the Kuomintang Government.
Let Us First Talk About the Soviet Arming of the People and the Building of
the Red Army
For the purpose of opposing the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" and
waging the revolutionary war, the first task of the Soviet is to arm the
people, organize a powerful Red Army, local troops and guerrilla units and
organize supply and transport for waging war. In the resolute struggle
against the enemy's fourth and fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns
during the past 2 years, the Soviet forces have achieved great success.
First of all, the establishment of the Central Revolutionary Military
Affairs Committee unified the leadership of the Red Army throughout the
country. It brought about the beginning of mutual help and coordination
of the Red Army units on the various fronts of the various Soviet areas
under a unified strategic purpose. This is the key to the transformation
from activities of dispersed guerrilla units to activities of a regular
and massive Red Army. In the past 2 years, the Revolutionary Military
Affairs Committee, leading the Red Army throughout the country, primarily
the Red Army in the Central Soviet Area, conducted a glorious and
victorious war, smashing the fourth "encirclement and suppression" of the
enemy and also winning the initial victory in the campaign against the
enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression."
In 2 years the Red Army expanded very rapidly, growing several times larger
than it was 2 years ago. The success achieved in this respect was dependent
upon the enthusiasm of the broad masses of workers and peasants for parti-
cipating in the revolutionary war. It was also dependent upon the improve-
ment of mobilization methods and the implementation of the Soviet law and
decrees on preferential treatment of Red Army members. In the month of
Red May, 1933, there was an increase of nearly 20,000 new fighters in the
several counties of the Central Soviet Area. In many areas, masses of
workers and peasants rushed into the Red Army as a surging tide. The
opportunist contention of the impossibility of enlarging the Red Army
in the new and border areas or that the masses were unwilling to enlist
in the Red Army were proven wrong in practice. The key to the rapid
accomplishment of the mobilization plan lies in the correctness of
mobilization methods and the thorough implementation of the Soviet law and
decrees on preferential treatment of Red Army members. Abolishing coercive
orders, carrying out ample propaganda and persuasion and placing restraints
on class alien elements sabotaging the expansion of the Red Army and giving
leadership to deserters were important program items of the mobilization
methods. It is necessary to raise the social status of Red Army fighters
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to a higher standard, giving all possible and necessary spiritual and
material support to each individual Red Army fighter. We will distribute
land to Red Army fighters of non-native residence and mobilize the masses
to farm the land for them and to cultivate the land well for the family
of each individual Red Army fighter. There is a 5-percent discount for
families of Red Army members at the consumer cooperatives and we run special
shops supplying daily necessities to them, giving 10 percent of the profits
made by state enterprises and cooperatives to the families of Red Army
members. We call on the masses to raise funds and aid families of Red Army
members afflicted with sickness and to give moral and material comfort to
the families of Red Army members. These practical and thorough implementa-
tions of the laws and decrees on the preferential treatment of Red Army
fighters and their families are necessary and very important measures
ensuring that the Red Army members will proceed to the front without worry
and that their will to fight will be consolidated.
A great many models of such work exist in the various Soviet areas. The
broad masses of workers and peasants in these areas regard as their sacred
trust to protect and expand the Soviet areas with guns in their hands,
and they march to the fronts in large numbers. Among these, for example,
is Chang-kang [7022 1481] Village in Kiangsi Province. Of the 407 youths
and adults between the ages of 16 to 45, 320 left the village to join the
Red Army or work for it. The ratio of those who left the village and those
who remained, 87 persons, was 80 percent to 20 percent. Of the total
number of 554 youths and adults of Upper-tsai-chi [0006 2088 3305] Village
in Fukien Province, only 67 remained. The comparative ratio between those
who left and those who stayed behind was 88 percent to 12 percent. What
about the production of the village and the livelihood of families when
such large numbers of able-bodied persons so heroically and courageously
took to the fronts? Not only was there no adverse effect, but there was
even greater expansion and improvement. What was the reason for this?
Because of the mutual-help cooperatives, cultivation units and all other
methods used have gone about in an organized and planned way to arrange the
distribution of the labor force in the village and resolved every one of
the difficulties of the families of Red Army members. I think such
glorious lessons are worthy of study by all the Soviet areas. The trans-
formation of the Red Army into an iron-like consolidated body should be
closely linked with its expansion. Similarly, good results have been
achieved on such work in the past 2 years. The present Red Army has stepped
onto the road of becoming a regular, revolutionary armed column of steel.
This is demonstrated by: 1) increase in (class) elements, putting into
practice (the principle of) only the hard-working masses of workers and
peasants have the glorious right to bear arms and resolutely driving out
those class alien elements who have infiltrated (into the ranks);
2) worker cadres have increased and the system of political committee
members has been established on a general scale, and the command of the
Red Army is held in reliable hands; 3) political work has improved, firming
up the determination of Red fighters to struggle to the end for the Soviet,
heightened the discipline of class consciousness and the liaison between
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the Red Army and the broad masses of people has become closely linked;
4) military techniques have been improved. Although the Red Army at present
lacks the adoption of the most modern weapons and the training in their use,
there have been great improvements in general military techniques in compari-
son with the past, and 5) changes have been made in organizational structure,
strengthening the Red Army organizationally. All these have greatly
increased the combat effectiveness of the Red Army, transforming it into
an invincible Soviet armed force.
The expansion of Red Youth Units and guerrilla units on a large scale is an
extremely important enterprise of the Soviet in the arming of the people
to wage revolutionary war. The Red Guard Army and the Young Pioneers are
existing reserve forces in the rear area of the Red Army on the front
lines. These are the local forces for defending the Soviet areas, and they
are also the bridge spanning the present voluntary enlistment system to
the obligatory service that will be implemented in the future. As for the
guerrilla units, they are the creators of new (Soviet) areas and an indis-
pensible detachment of the Red Army main force. In the past 2 years, these
units have been developed in the various Soviet areas and their military
and political training have also been considerably strengthened. Their
participation in the Red Army, the defense of local areas, attacks on and
creating havoc among the enemy, have been clearly demonstrated in the many
smashings of the "encirclement and suppressions" to have achieved extremely
great results. These have caused the enemy to fear and wonder and they
have become the greatest difficulty facing the enemy's aggression of the
Soviet areas. Their functions were specially demonstrated in the Central
Soviet Areas and the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Soviet area.
It is an important responsibility of the Soviet to spread this system to
all newly opened Soviet areas, vigorously strengthening their training so
as to transform these troops into the most reliable brothers of the Red
Army in the revolutionary war. The fleshing out of the Red Army's rations
and supplies, organizing military transportation to maintain liaison between
the front lines and the rear lines, and organizing military hygiene and
medical treatment are enterprises all of which have similar decisive
significance to the revolutionary war (efforts). Under the situation of
economic blockade by the enemy and where we have not yet captured some
central cities, the implementation of this task is extremely difficult.
But in the past 2 years, we have been able to establish a considerable
foundation in this work by relying upon and drawing from the enthusiasm
of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the Soviet and White areas.
In this respect we had ensured the supply and transportation of rations
to the Red Army over extended periods of time. This, we are forced to
admit, is an extremely great achievement. However, in the current decisive
campaign to smash the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" and in
the even more massive war to follow, we are required to use our greatest
power to strengthen the forces in this respect and ensure that there is an
even more adequate supply.
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We are faced with a revolutionary war on an even more massive scale, and
the Soviet policy of arming the people demonstrates its top priority nature.
Without slackening the arming of the people for even a moment, we must realize
the formation of a million strong iron-like Red Army, by carrying out our
work with the greatest of speed. This is the basic fighting task of the
Soviet.
The basic task of the Soviet is revolutionary war, the mobilization of all
forces of the people to wage war. Revolving around this basic task are
other pressing tasks for the Soviet. It should carry out extensive demo-
cracy for the broad masses of people. It must resolutely suppress counter-
revolution within its ranks. It must launch the workers' class struggle,
unfold the agrarian revolution of the peasants and, under the principle of
uniting workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class,
heighten the enthusiasm of the worker-peasant masses. It should carry out
correct financial and economic policies so as to ensure the material needs
of the revolutionary war. It should carry out cultural revolution and arm
the minds of the worker-peasant masses. All these, as well as very many
other basic policies, are geared to one objective. That is to topple the
imperialist Kuomintang's rule with revolutionary war, consolidate and develop
the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants as well as preparing
for the transition to the stage of proletarian dictatorship.
Let us now discuss the democratic system of the Soviet.
The Soviet of worker-peasant democratic dictatorship is the people's own
political power, and it is directly dependent upon the people. It must
maintain to the highest degree of intimacy the relationship between itself
and the people, and only following that can it play its role. The Soviet
is imbued with mighty powers. It has already become the organizer and
leader of the revolutionary war, as well as organizer and leader of the
lives of the masses. The greatness of its powers cannot be compared with
any form of government in history. It is entirely dependent, however,
upon the people and cannot be separated from the people for even a moment.
The Soviet regime must use force in handling all class enemies, but toward
its own class--the hard-working masses of workers and peasants--it cannot
use force of any kind, and what it demonstrates is only the most extensive
form of democracy.
The most extensive democracy of the Soviet is, first of all, displayed in
its own election. The Soviet wholly grants to all exploited and oppressed
people all the rights to elect and be elected. Women have equal rights
with men. For the hard-working workers and peasants, obtaining such rights
was a historical precedent. In summing up the election experiences of the
various Soviet areas during the past 2 years, generally speaking, the
achievements made were very great.
First, on the registration of voters. A strict segregation of those
residents with voting rights and those without is carried out with the use
of Red and White placards. A mass meeting of voters, which strictly
prohibits any exploiting elements from participating, was substituted for
the mass meeting held in the past for election purposes.
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Second, the ratio of constituent elements. In order to ensure the proletariat
forming the core of leadership in the Soviet regime the method of electing
one representative out of 13 workers and their families and one representa-
tive out of 50 peasants and their families was adopted. These elements
were used to organize urban and rural congresses of representatives. A
suitable ratio of worker and peasant representatives was included in all
levels of congresses of representatives and executive committees from area
governments to the central government. By so doing, it ensures the alliance
of workers and peasants in the organization of the Soviet Government, and
places the workers in the position of leadership.
Third, regarding election units. In order to ensure that the majority of
the voters participate in elections, and to enable workers to elect suitable
representatives of their own to the Soviet, the new election law proclaimed
by the Central Executive Committee in September 1933 provided that each
township or city Soviet was to be divided into several election units to
carry out elections. That is, the peasants carry out elections with the
village as a unit, while the workers carry out elections with each individual
as a unit. This made the participation of the masses in elections a very
convenient matter.
Fourth, on the number of people participating in the election. The develop-
ment of the Soviet election campaign has made the voter masses become
greatly aware of the relationship between election and their own lives.
Many of those who were not enthusiastic about participating in elections
in the past became more active. In the two elections held in 1932 and in the
one held in the latter half of 1933, more than 80 percent of the electorate
participated. In some places only those who were ill, giving birth or on
sentinel duty did not take part in the election meetings.
Fifth, on the candidates' list. In the election held in the latter half
of 1933, the system of listing candidates was implemented so as to enable
the voter to be prepared, before the election, as to whom he should, or
should not, vote for.
Sixth, on the candidacy of women. Currently, in most of the rural and
urban soviets, women candidates elected as representatives account for
more than 25 percent. In some areas such as Upper-tsai-chi Village in
Shang Hang, there were 43 women among the 75 representatives, accounting
for 60 percent, and there were 59 women among the 91 representatives from
Lower-tsai-chi Village, accounting for 66 percent of the total. The broad
masses of working women are now participating in the management of the
country.
Seventh, work report. The village and city soviets called voters to a
meeting before the election. A report on the work of the Soviet is made
to them and they are led to comment on this kind of report. This method
was applied on a more general scale in the election held during the latter
half of 1933 than the one that was held the year before. All these gave
the people a satisfactory method of conducting and managing state organi-
zations--the election of the Soviet--and it ensures the consolidation
.of the foundation of the Soviet regime.
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Next, Soviet democracy can be seen working in the city and village representa-
tives congresses. The system of urban and rural congresses of representatives
is the organizational foundation of the Soviet. It is the agency through
which the Soviet can maintain close liaison with the broad masses of people,
and the improvements attained in the past 2 years have made this system even
more perfect. Its most prominent characteristics as follows.
1. In order to have the representatives of the township and city soviets
maintain a very close relationship with the local residents and facilitate
the absorbing of suggestions from the residents, the entire resident popula-
tion, in accordance with the distance between the residence of the repre-
sentatives and the local residents, are suitably allocated under the leader-
ship of each representative (usually 30 to 70 people are placed under the
leadership of one representative), thereby creating stable relationships
between each representative and the people under his leadership. This,
then, enables the people to link up with the Soviet, organizationally,
as one.
2. For township and city soviet representatives, in accordance with how
far away he lives, one from among 3 to 7 representatives is elected as
chairman of the representatives. His task is to allocate and guide, under
the instruction of the presidiums of township and city soviets, the work
of each representative under his leadership, relay to each representative
the notices from the presidium, call meetings of residents under his
leadership and resolve comparatively minor matters. In a village there
should be a chairman of representatives with the responsibility to lead
the work in the entire village. There will be a close link between the
representatives and the city and township presidium. And the work in the
village will have strong leadership.
3. Under the township and city soviets permanent and provisional commit-
tees of various types are organized, such as committees for the preferential
treatment of Red Army members, committees for water conservancy, education
committees, committees for provisions and committees for health. There
can be as many as 10, and attract large numbers of activists from the people
to participate in the work of these committees. Not only does the township
have committees, but the village should also have some committees that are
necessary to it. In doing so, the work of the Soviet is organized into a
network, and the broad masses of people are brought in to participate
directly in the work of the Soviet.
4. Elections of township and city soviets are scheduled to be held once
every 6 months (half a year for area soviets and once a year for county
and provincial soviets). Thus, it will be easy for new suggestions from
the people to reach the soviets.
5. Between elections, representatives who have committed grave errors are to
be recalled after more than 10 voters petition and more than half of the
voters concurred, or they may be expelled after a resolution has been passed
by the congress of representatives. This will prevent bad elements from
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maintaining a position in the Soviet organizations for a long period of time.
These are the characteristics of the township and city soviets which are
being implemented in many Soviet areas. Everybody can see that the develop-
ment of the democracy of the Soviet political power reaching to such a
degree has never before happened in history under any type of political
system. In depending upon this system and closely linking up with the
broad masses, the Soviet has become an organization most capable of develop-
ing the creativity of the masses and mobilizing the masses to meet the needs
of the civil war and revolutionary construction. This is also something
which has not been achieved by any government in history. The political
power organizations of the various levels of the Soviet above the area
level are all built on the foundation of the township and city soviets,
and it is organized from the various levels of worker-peasant-soldier
representatives congresses and executive committees. Government function-
aries take their appointments to positions through elections, and those
who are not trusted are replaced by public opinion. The discussion and
resolution of all problems are up to the people. Therefore, the Soviet
Government is truly the regime of-the broad masses.
Besides, the democracy of the Soviet can be seen in the giving of complete
freedom of assembly, association, speech, publication and to strike to the
revolutionary masses. At a time when all freedom and rights of the people
have been stripped from the revolutionary people in areas under Kuomintang
rule, and fascist terrorism is being frantically carried out, each revolutionary
citizen under the Soviet Government has the right to freely express his
opinion, and the Soviet also provided by all possible means conveniences
in material conditions (such as assembly halls, paper and printing press).
The Soviet constantly goes all out to give leadership to all anti-
imperialist, anti-Kuomintang assemblies, associations, speech and publica-
tions. What the Soviet does not permit is the counterrevolutionary freedom
of those exploiting elements.
The Soviet, furthermore, in order to consolidate the democratic dictatorship
of the workers and peasants, must induce the broad masses of people to
supervise and criticize its work. Every revolutionary person has the right
to expose the errors and shortcomings of Soviet functionaries. Corrupt
officials of the Kuomintang cover the whole country, and the people of
the country only dare to be angry but fear to speak out. Such a phenomenon
is absolutely not allowed under the Soviet system. If corruption, de-
generacy, negativism and feet dragging, as well as bureaucratic elements,
are discovered among the Soviet functionaries, the people can immediately
expose their errors and the Soviet will immediately punish them. There
will be absolutely no leniency. This kind of amplitude in the democratic
spirit can only exist under the Soviet system.
Finally, the democratic spirit of the Soviet can also be seen in the de-
limiting of its administrative areas. The Soviet abolished the former
bureaucratic administrative areas which are larger and unweildy. It has
reduced the jurisdictional areas of all levels of the Soviet from
provincial to township. What does this mean? It means that the Soviet
can keep close contact with the people and, because its jurisdictional
area is not big, have general knowledge of what the people want, very
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quickly reflecting the opinions of the people to the Soviet which then quickly
discusses and resolve them. It makes the work of mobilizing the masses for
the war and for Soviet construction very convenient. The Kuomintang warlords'
use of the system of large provinces, counties, districts and townships of
the feudal era tends only to isolate the people. The Soviet has no use for
it. We should point out here that the delimiting of villages is a very
important program, because, below the township soviet, the most convenient
way to carry out the work of the Soviet is to mobilize the people with the
village as a unit. Only by relying on suitable delimiting of villages,
establishing of village people's organizations, and the strong leadership
of the village by representatives and chairman of the representatives will
the work of the township soviet achieve its greatest affects.
Next, we discuss the Soviet's attitude toward the landlord bourgeoisie.
The Soviet has realized the most perfect democratic system in the world.
It is open to direct participation by the masses. It provides the broad
masses with all democratic rights, and it absolutely will not, and has no
need to, use any kind of force. However, with regard to the landlord
bourgeoisie, that is, the exploiting elements overthrown by the revolution-
ary people, the Soviet reserves for them a different attitude.
The landlord bourgeoisie, because they are the exploiters and, in the past,
were the rulers, hold extremely deep hatred for the Soviet. Because they
have not been wiped out, although they have been overthrown, they still
possess a deep-rooted social base, superior knowledge and technology.
Although they have been toppled, they do not cease for a moment to plan
a comeback, overthrow the Soviet political power and resume their former
system of exploitation. Especially in this era of Civil War when the enemy
is unceasingly carrying out military attacks against the Soviet areas, the
overthrown exploiters are even more active in planning, every minute of
the day, to respond to the enemy's attacks with counterrevolutionary
activities. The Soviet regime is forced to take strict punitive and
suppressive measures in an all-around manner against these elements. The
first item in the Soviet policy of restraint against these exploiting
elements is to keep them outside the regime. With regard to landlord
bourgeoisie and all others who stand in enmity to the revolution, their
voting rights have been wholly abolished, and their right to serve in
the Red Army and local forces has been voided. These elements are always
resorting to a thousand and one ways to attempt infiltration of Soviet
organizations and into the ranks of the Red Army and local forces.
Especially in the newly opened areas, the mass struggle has not been fully
developed, and it is even easier for these elements to utilize opportunities
and infiltrate. Past experiences have demonstrated that the launching of
a ruthless and merciless struggle against those elements who have infil-
trated into the revolutionary government is, for the Soviet, a task of the
most gravest importance.
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The second item is the stripping of all freedom of speech, publication,
assembly and association from all the landlord bourgeoisie. This kind of
freedom the Soviet gives only to the revolutionary people and not to any
elements of the landlord bourgeoisie. Because these elements of the land-
lord bourgeoisie will inevitably use this kind of freedom as a tool for their
counterrevolutionary campaign, it is absolutely necessary to strip them of
it. Stripping these class enemies of their freedom and lessening the
opportunities for them to become active under the pretext of these freedoms
is also an important reason why the Soviet is becoming more consolidated
daily.
The third item is the use of revolutionary armed forces and revolutionary
courts to suppress all counterrevolutionary activities. Basing itself on
the task of arming the people, the Soviet has established a powerful Red
Army and widespread local forces. These form the iron strength on which
the Soviet is directly dependent. Only by relying on them can the Soviet
defeat the armed forces of the imperialist Kuomintang, and suppress counter-
revolutionary activities within the Soviet areas. The Soviets also have
an important weapon to suppress counterrevolution. This is the Soviet
courts. The Soviet courts are directly dependent upon the armed forces,
the activities of the state's political defense bureau and the class
struggle of the broad masses to enforce strict suppression of all counter-
revolutionary attempts in Soviet areas. In the past several years, serious
counterrevolutionary activities have flared up in every one of the Soviet
areas, such as the AB group in the central and Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet areas,
the social democratic party of Fukien, the reorganization faction of the
Hunan-Hupeh-Kwangsi, Hunan-Honan-Anhwei, Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi, and
Fukien-Kiangsi areas, and the Tuo Chen Chu Hsiao [2094 7115 0648 31941
faction of the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi area, all of which have attempted or
are even carrying out counterrevolutionary uprising. But it resulted in
all being severely suppressed by the Soviet courts, their plots to stage
uprisings were overcome and the Soviet regime was consolidated. With
regard to this matter, the Political Defense Bureau and the Soviet courts
have compiled rich experiences and rectified the errors committed in the
past of not implementing a clear class line in many areas. The transforma-
tion of Soviet courts into people's courts, that is, the punishment of
counterrevolution, should be linked with the struggle of the broad masses
to suppress counterrevolution. Great improvements have also been made
in this respect, of which general use of mobile courts is proof.
From an overall view, the Soviet is equipped with an extremely extensive
revolutionary democracy with regard to the broad masses. Simultaneously,
it is within this democracy that its greatest powers are formed, powers
erected on the foundation of solid trust and consciousness of tens of
millions of worker-peasant masses. Usi.n, these powers, the Soviet formed
its own dictatorship, organized the revolutionary war, organized the Soviet
courts and launched fierce attacks against the enemy on various fronts.
The Soviet courts thereby played a magnificant role in the suppression
of counterrevolutionary activities within the territories of the soviets.
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If a comparison is made between the courts of the Soviet under the dictator-
ship of the workers and peasants and the courts of the Kuomintang under the
dictatorship of the landlord bourgeoisie, a wonderful picture appears.
The objective of the Soviet courts is the suppression of crimes committed
by the landlord bourgeoisie, and sentences meted out are generally light on
crimes committed by worker-peasant elements. The Kuomintang courts have the
suppression of the worker-peasant class as their objective and are generally
lenient in sentences passed on crimes committed by the landlord bourgeoisie.
The roles of the courts have been completely shaped by their class nature.
On the one hand, the Soivet courts severely suppressed the activities of
counterrevolutionary elements, and the Soviet should not display any
leniency whatsoever toward such elements. On the other hand, inhumane
treatment of prisoners is prohibited. The Soviet Central Government has
proclaimed an open order abolishing physical punishment. This is a major
reform in history. But the Kuomintang courts are still full of the inhuman
and cruel tortures of the Middle Ages.
Except for capital crimes, the Soviet prisons have adopted a policy of
conversion. They apply the spirit of communism and labor discipline to
educate the prisoners and transform their criminal nature. But the
Kuomintang prisons are hells on earth for the working masses and revolu-
tionaries filled with purely feudalistic barbarous killings and fascist
tortures.
Wiping out the counterrevolutionary plot of the enemy against the class,
establishing the revolutionary order in the Soviet territories, abolishing
all barbarous, feudal'vestiges from the sphere of judicial administration
is the target of the Soviet courts. The reforms carried out by the Soviet
in this respect similarly have their own historic significance.
The Soviet labor policy is to be discussed next.
Proceeding from the basis of the class nature in its political power and
from its glorious task of arming the working masses to overthrow the
imperialist Kuomintang by waging revolutionary war, the Soviet must
resolutely promote the workers' class struggle, ensure the daily interests
of the workers, develop the revolutionary activism of the workers and
organize such activism to bring it to bear on the revolutionary war,
as well as transform the workers into active leaders of the revolutionary
war and the pillars supporting the consolidation and development of the
Soviet. This is the starting point of the Soviet labor policy.
The interests of the workers is given complete protection under the Soviet
labor policy. The difference is as great as that between paradise and
hell when they are compared with the era of Kuomintang rule in the past
and the present areas under the Kuomintang.
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In the era when the Soviet areas were still under Kuomintang rule, the
workers were slaves of their employers. Work hours were long, wages small,
treatment was cruel and there was no legal guarantee of the workers' status.
These are things no worker will ever forget. In the areas presently under
Kuomintang rule all these not only still exist, but have become ever worse.
According to the latest situation the real wages of the workers in the White
areas has decreased by more than 50 percent, while decreasing work, laying
off workers and closing factories are the usual methods used by the
capitalists in their attacks against the workers. They created mass
unemployment, with over 60 percent of the workers of production enterprises
unemployed. In all of-the areas under Kuomintang rule, strike is a criminal
offense, and the Kuomintang openly announced in Hankow in March 1933 that
strikers would be sentenced to death. In all disputes between the workers
and the capitalists, the Kuomintang always takes the side of the capitalists
to oppress the workers.
Under Soviet political power the workers are masters. The workers leading
the broad masses of peasants have shouldered the glorious responsibility
of consolidating and developing the Soviet. Therefore, the principle
underlining the labor policy of the Soviet is the protection of the workers'
interests and the consolidation and development of the Soviet regime. In
accordance with this principle the Labor Law was proclaimed in December 1931.
In 1933 it was revised and reproclaimed. The revised Labor Law is suitable
for application to all urban and rural, big and small enterprises.
The Soviet areas have generally implemented the 8-hour work system, and have
concluded labor contracts and collective labor contracts. In the cities
and in many townships and villages labor inspection stations with labor
inspectors have been generally established to inspect whether employers
have broken the Soviet Labor Law. The punishment of offenses committed by
employers is handled by labor courts especially set up for this purpose.
To guard against capitalist manipulation of labor and protect the unemployed
workers, the Soviet has monopolized the right to find employment for workers.
All applications for labor submitted by the capitalists must be made at the
employment offices set up by the Soviet. The establishment of agencies
to help the unemployed is spreading daily, and unemployed workers are
receiving concrete assistance. Also, workers in the rural areas have been
distributed land. The system of social insurance has been firmly established,
and social insurance bureaus have been set up in each of the cities in the
Soviet areas. None of these has ever been available to the workers under
the Kuomintang regime, while the Soviet considered the implementation of
these policies as its greatest responsibility.
Due to the resolute implementation of the Soviet's own policies the well-
being of the workers in the Soviet areas has been greatly improved.
First, with regard to labor wages. The actual wages in the various Soviet
areas have generally increased in comparison with pre-revolution period.
The following is an example from Ting-chou [3060 1558].
[See attached table "A."]
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From this table
it
can
be
seen that
the wages
of
have increased
at
least
32
percent
over that
of
revolution, and the largest increase (carpenters) was 1,450 percent, an
increase of 14.5 times textile industry workers. Such startling increases
wholly reflect the shockingly low levels of the Kuomintang era. Of course,
the wages of Ting--chou workers are especially high when compared with other
cities and towns (the workers meals are also included in the computation),
but the wages in other towns and cities have also increased. For example,
during the most recent period, the masons and carpenters of Jui-ching [3843
6855] township received increases of 80 percent in wages from the 2 chiao
5 fen daily in the period before the revolution to 4 chiao 5 fen. Wages
have increased not only in towns and cities but also in the rural areas.
The following is a comparison table of wages received by workers in miscel-
laneous enterprises during different periods in the Tien-chun [3944 2625]
area of Kan Hsien [6373 4905]:
[see attached table "B"]
This table represents one rural area. The wages in other rural areas have
generally increased. With regard to the wages in state-run enterprises,
a general increase of 20 percent has been made within the recent 2 years of
the various types of enterprises directly under the jurisdiction of the
Central Government, with the largest increase registering 40 percent.
Generally speaking, wages are paid on time, and there are very few cases of
employers owing wages, due to overseeing by the Soviet. After being
punished by the labor courts, a handful of obdurate capitalists also did
not dare to create difficulties for the workers.
The application of the 8-hour day system to the work period of the courts
has become generla during the past 2 years in all of the towns and cities
in Soviet areas. The hours of the hired workers in rural areas are generally
less than those for adults.
The protection of women and minors, such as equal work, equal wages, rest
before and after birth, prohibition of child labor under 14, has been
fully implemented.
With regard to the protection of apprentices, the age limit has been general-
ly shortened, treatment of apprentices has been improved and the feudal
oppression of apprentices swept away. Considerable improvements have
been made in the well being of the apprentices, and their wages have been
increased (for example, apprentices in the Kiangsi area receive at least
15 yuan subsidy annually, and some as large as 3 yuan monthly). As for
treatment in general, great improvements have been made in cities,
especially in state enterprises, with regard to workers' meals and hygiene.
The monthly meal allowance for city workers is generally over 6 yuan. The
meals of workers in the rural area are, at least, the same as that of the
employers.
workers in Ting-chou city
the period before the
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The workers in the Soviet area have organized a powerful class trade union.
Such trade unions are the pillars of the Soviet, the bulwark defending the
interests of the workers. At the same time, they have become schools for
the broad masses of workers to study communism. With regard to the trade
unions the Soviet guaranteed their right by law. There has been a great
growth in union membership. In accordance with the statistics compiled
by the All-China General Trade Union, taking into account only the central
Soviet area and the nine areas in its vicinity, there are 229,000 members
in the trade unions of the Soviet areas, with their distribution as
follows: 110,000 in the central Soviet area, 23,000 in the Hunan-Kiangsi
area, 40,000 in the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi area, 25,000 in the Fukien-Chekiang-
Kiangsi area, 6,000 in the Fukien-Kiangsi area and 5,000 in the northern
Fukien area. Based on the materials of the central Soviet area, there are
only 3,676 persons who have not joined the trade unions, which is less
than 5 percent of all the workers. That is to say, 95 percent of the workers
are members. In some places, such as Hsing-kuo [5281 0948], 98 percent of
the workers joined trade unions. Could this, I ask, be dreamed of in the
Kuomintang areas? Not only in China, but also the whole world, with the
exception of the Soviet Union, which imperialist country enjoys such a
situation?
In brief, the Soviet Labor Law has been implemented in all the towns and
cities in the Soviet areas during the past 2 years, and the important
articles of the Labor Law have also been implemented in the rural areas.
Although opposition by quite a few capitalists and rich peasants to the
Labor Law has been encountered during the 2 years, such opposition came
to nought due to the spirited struggle of the worker masses and the strict
supervision of the Soviet. At the same time, cases of transgression of
the Labor Law arise from time to time in the hiring of workers by inde-
pendent producers, middle and poor peasants, and these should be handled
through sincere remonstrations until they understand and voluntarily
support the Labor Law. Therefore, great improvements were made in the
well-being of the workers. This has led to the development of the
enthusiasm of workers on a massive scale, and the workers were able to
play a glorious role in the revolutionary war and in Soviet construction.
In accordance with the compilations made by the 12 counties of Kung-lueh
[0361 3970], Wan-tai [8001 3141], Lung-kang [7893 1481], Hsing-kuo [5283
0948], Hsing-li [0524 0448], Hsi-chiang [6007 3068], Yu-tu [0061 6757],
Hsun-wu [1416 0839], Shang-hang [0006 2635], Ning-hua [1337 05531,
Chang-ting [7022 3060] and Hsin-chuan [2450 3123], in the central Soviet
area, the 19,960 union members, out of a total membership of 70,580, who
are serving in the Red Army and in guerrilla units are equivalent to
20 percent of the entire membership. The 6,752 working in revolutionary
Soviet organizations account for 10 percent of the membership, and they
are'mostly in responsible positions in the Soviet organizations. The
above two items, totaling 26,712 persons, account for 38 percent of the
membership. There are 43,868 members who are still at home. Second
issue bonds valued at 43,855 yuan have been redeemed from the members
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remaining at home in these 12 counties. Recently they bought economic
construction bonds valued at 197,803 yuan, averaging out at 4 yuan 5 chiao
per person. Of the trade unions members who remained at home, 12,435 have
become members of the Communist Party and the tuan,accounting for 28 percent
of the total number of members at home. These statistics prove that the
worker masses are actively participating in the Red Army and they are parti-
cipating and supporting the revolution, and supporting the Chinese Communist
Party. This resulted from the Soviet's protection of workers' interests,
thereby sparking the enthusiasm of the workers. Those remarks about
workers not having received anything after the revolution began, and that
the enthusiasm of the workers has not been developed, can all be written
off as pure nonsense.
,Q Let us now discuss the agrarian revolution of the Soviet areas.
The.Chinese Soviet and the Red Army emerged and developed in the midst of
the agrarian revolution. Only agrarian revolution could liberate the broad
masses of peasants from the ruthless oppression and exploitation of the
landlord class and the Kuomintang warlords. The land policy of the Soviet
is based on the principle of completely overthrowing all of the feudal
and semi-feudal oppressions and exploitations of the landlord class and
the Kuomintang warlords.
Now,as in the past, shocking land rents (60 to 80 percent), shocking
usurious rates (.30 to 100 percent) and shockingly exorbitant taxes and
miscellaneous levies (over 1,700 kinds of taxes and levies throughout the
country) prevail in the rural villages in the Kuomintang areas. As a result,
land was concentrated in the hands of the landlord class and the rich
peasants. The greatest majority of the peasants lost their land and fell
into a terrible situation of suffering from which there was no escape.
Because of the ruthless plunder of the land the peasants lost their ability
to protect themselves against the disaster of famine. As a result, the
entire country had floods, droughts and famines. In 1931, the area struck
by disasters covered 809 counties; and over 44 million people were affected
by them. Due to the layer-upon-layer of rapacious plunder the peasants
lacked the ability to produce again. Much cultivated land became unfruit-
ful and much just turned into wasteland. At the same time, the only
produce the peasants had was overwhelmed by the imperialist's dumping of
agricultural products. For this reason the rural economy of China fell
into a state of complete bankruptcy. It was from this basis that the
flames of agrarian revolution exploded with powerful force in the rural
areas. The might of the Soviet agrarian revolution swept away all vestiges
of feudalism. Millions and tens of millions of peasants have been jolted
into awareness from a long period of darkness, seized all the landed
estates of the landlord class, confiscated the lands of the rich peasants,
abolished usury and liquidated exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies,
overthrew all who stood against the revolution, and established their
own political power. The first time they emerged from hell, the peasant
masses became masters. This is the difference between the rural situation
under the Soviet political power and that under the Kuomintang political
power.
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The First All-Soviet Congress promulgated the Land Law and created a correct
basis for the solution of land problems throughout the country. Because of
the intensification of the class struggle in the rural areas many disputes
arose from the problem of class analysis. The people's committee, in
accordance with experiences gained from land struggles of the past, set
forth the "resolutions on various problems in land struggle," and correctly
resolved many problems such as landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants,
poor peasants and vagrants. Struggles in the rural areas will become
even stronger. As with many problems on land distribution such as distance,
fertility, green sprouts, forests and ponds, we urgently need to collect
the experiences of various areas and make the necessary decisions. This is
imperative in the leadership of land distribution in new areas.
In order that the remnant forces of feudalism are thoroughly eliminated and
to enable the fruits of agrarian revolution to fall completely into the
hands of tennant farmers, poor peasants and middle peasants, the Central
Government has launched a widespread and penetrating movement`of land in-
vestigation. According to the statistics compiled in the 3 months of July,
August and September 1933, a total of 3,980 landlord families and
6,638 rich peasant families was unearthed in the three provinces of Kiangsi,
Fukien and Kiangsi-Hupeh in the central Soviet area. From the hands of
these exposed landlords and rich peasants 307,539 tan of land were recovered,
and cash from landlords and contributions from rich peasants totaling
606,916 yuan were confiscated. The revolutionary enthusiasm of the peasant
masses developed even further and the tenant farmer trade union and the poor
peasants group became the pillars of the Soviet in the rural areas. Gaining
such great results in 3 months proves that the Soviet must still give its
full attention to the class struggle in the rural areas, and the land
investigation movement being a powerful method to continue the development
of struggles in the rural areas for thoroughly wiping out the remnant forces
of feudalism has also been wholly proved.
The class line of the land struggle is to rely on tennant farmers and poor
peasants, unite with the middle peasants and exploit the rich peasants and
wipe out the landlords. The correct application of this line is the key
to guaranteeing the victorious development of the land struggle, and it
is the basis of each concrete policy of the Soviet formulated for the rural
areas. The Soviet should place severe restraint on erroneous tendencies
toward infringing upon middle peasants (primarily toward rich middle
peasants) and elimination of rich peasants. But, at the same time, there
absolutely should not be any slackening toward those errors of seeking
compromise with the landlord rich peasants. Only by opposing such errors
can the land struggle be led onto the correct path.
With regard to the work done on the masses with respect to land struggles,
considerable experiences have been accumulated during the past 2 years.
In summary, its principal points are:
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1. In both the movement of land distribution and the land investigation
movement, an all-out effort must be made to mobilize the broad masses of poor
and middle peasants and the broad masses of workers in the rural areas to
struggle personally against landlord rich peasants. The work of land
distribution and land investigation must be carried out with the concurrance
of the masses. The handling of each one of the class elements must be done
through meetings of the masses. There is the danger of decreasing enthusiasm
of the masses fur struggle if Soviet personnel, alone or with a handful of
others, were to carry out the distribution of land or investigation of class.
2. When assets of the landlord class, besides land, and surplus plow oxen,
farming implements and buildings are confiscated, the greater part of it must
be distributed to the poor people. If this is not done and they are given
over to a handful of people for use, it will also lower the spirits of the
masses and will land itself to the opposition of the exploiting elements.
3. Distribution of land over a long and erratic period of time is not appro-
priate. It should be completed within a considerably short period of time
so that the land will remain firmly in the hands of the peasants. Later,
redistribution of land should not be lightly undertaken in the absence of
a request from the majority of the local people. If we do not adhere to this,
we will be going counter to wishes of the peasants. We would not only
adversely affect the attitude of the peasants toward producing from the land,
but would allow exploiting elements to obstruct the progress of the land
struggle.
4. The object of land investigation is to ferret out exploiting elements
and not to expose the exploited elements. Therefore, house-to-house
and mou-to-mou inspections should be avoided. What should be done is the
mobilization of the greatest number of people to ferret out those landlord
and rich peasant elements who are in hiding.
5. Those counterrevolutionary elements who impeded land distribution and
land investigation must be severely dealt with. With the concurrance of
the masses use the most severe method to control them, from the time they
were arrested, imprisoned and publicly tried by the masses, right up to
the time of their execution. This is absolutely necessary, because if it
is not done in this manner, the land struggle will be greatly impeded.
6. Class struggle should be developed in an all-out manner, but avoid strug-
gles between localities, between clans and between nationalities. The
landlord class and the rich peasants desire wholeheartedly to replace class
struggle with this kind of struggle and obstruct the progress of agrarian
revolution, and personnel of the Soviet should not be taken in by them.
7. The progress of agrarian revolution is dependent upon the enhancement
of the level of organization and class consciousness of the basic masses
in the rural areas. Soviet personnel, therefore, must carry out propaganda
on a wide and intensive scale and make sound the organization of poor
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peasant groups and tenant farmers trade unions. The agrarian revolution not
only gets land to the peasants, it must also make the peasants develop the
production force of the land and due to the leadership of the Soviet and the
enhancement of the peasants' enthusiasm for labor, agricultural production
has recovered over a wide area in the Soviet areas. In some places it has
developed even further.
On this basis the peasants' well-being has been vastly improved. The peasants
overthrew the exploitation of landlords and the Kuomintang and, as a result,
production came into their own hands. The current standard of living of the
peasants has been at least doubled, in comparison with that under the
Kuomintang. The majority of the peasants were hungry many times in the
past year, and in times of difficulty they had to eat tree bark and grain
chaff. But, generally speaking, there is no more hunger now, and living
conditions have improved with each passing year. In the past, the majority
of the peasants had very little meat during the year. Meat is eaten more
frequently now. In the past, the majority of the peasants were clothed in
rags. This is generally improved now, sometimes by 100 and even 200 percent.
What kind of life and what kind of political power do the peasant masses
want? Let the peasant masses in all of the Kuomintang areas answer this
question themselves!
We then discuss the financial policy of the Soviet.
The object of Soviet finance is to guarantee provisions and supply for the
revolution and the disbursement of all other revolutionary expenditures.
The Soviet Republic, required to meet outlays in vast revolution war and
revolutionary work expenditures and constituting a small portion of the
entire country, which is also an area with a comparatively backward economy,
is carrying out a taxation policy favorable to the broad masses. Many
outsiders do not know where the solution for Soviet finances will come from.
Meanwhile, why did the Kuomintang become bankrupt, with it occupying a
vast area and extracting the wealth of the people in vast quantities?
There is nothing strange about it. There is a basic difference between the
financial policy of the Soviet and its application of funds with that of
the Kuomintang.
The Soviet financial policy is 'founded on the principle of class interests
and the interests of the revolution. The Soviet's sources for funds are:
1) confiscation or forceful collection from all feudal exploiters;
2) tax revenue; and 3 development of the national economy. What confisca-
tion or forceful collection from all feudal exploiters means is to make
collections from landlords and rich peasants in the Soviet and the White
areas. Based on past experience, this revenue frequently accounts for the
lion's share. This is exactly opposite to the Kuomintang's fiscal policy.
The Soviet places the main financial burden on the exploiters,?whereas the
Kuomintang places it on the hard-working masses of workers and peasants.
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The tax collection of the Soviet is a unified excalating:tax. It is current-
ly being carried out in a simple manner on two sides, that is, commerce tax
and agricultural tax. The principle of taxation is similarly placing the
burden on the exploiters.
The collection of commercial taxes is divided into custom tax and business
tax. The custom tax is for the purpose of regulating the export and import
of commodities in accordance with the degree of need of the Soviet areas.
The rates include complete exemption, and some going as high as 100 percent.
Only the Soviet has implemented a wholly free customs tax system which is
not subjected to any interference from foreign countries. All merchandise
goes into circulation all over the Soviet areas after paying taxes at the
border customs, and there is no second taxation, thereby sweeping away the
Kuomintang's tyranny of the money barrier and the layers of extortion.
Business tax is sales tax (industrial tax is not being collected at present).
In accordance with the size of the businessman's capital and his profit, a
unified, escalated tax is collected. Tax is light on small capital and
small profits, and heavy on big capital and big profits. Where the capital
is below 100 yuan, the people's cooperatives, and surplus products sold
directly by the peasants are all exempted.
The agricultural tax is dependent upon the revolutionary fervor of the
peasants as this tax is collected on a voluntary basis, and it is similarly
progressive. Where there are few in the family and land distributed is
small, the tax is light, and where there are many in the family and land
distributed is large, the tax is heavy. Tax is light on poor and middle
peasants, but heavy on rich peasants. Tenant farmers and families of
Red Army members are exempted from taxation, and in disaster areas tax
is reduced or exempted in accordance with the lightness or severity of the
disaster situation.
The unified, progressive tax system adopted by the Soviet is the best tax
system in the world, and it is a system all capitalist countries dare not
adopt or adopt it in its entirety. As for the Kuomintang's tax collection,
it is one complete mess. Its tax policy is primarily to collect from
peasants and other petit bourgeoisie. Besides the principal tax, there are
countless tacked-on taxes. In accordance with the statistics compiled by
the TA KUNG PAO and published in 22 March 1933 there are as many as
1,756 items of taxations in the Kuomintang areas. And the land taxes in
Szechwan Province have been pre-collected up to 1987, and the land taxes
in Shensi Province have increased 25 times over the period before the
arrival of the Kuomintang. These are the "benefactions" of the Kuomintang
for the hard-working masses!
To increase our revenue by developing the national economy is a basic
principle of our financial policy; it has already brought tangible results
in the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi border area and is beginning to do so in
the central area, too. It is the duty of our financial and economic
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organizations to apply this principle conscientously. In this connection,
we should make quite sure that the issuing of notes by the state bank is
based primarily on the needs of economic development, and only secondarily
on purely fiscal needs.
Thrift should be the guiding principle in our government expenditures. It
should be made clear to all government workers that corruption and waste
are very great crimes. Our campaigns against corruption and waste have
already achieved some results, but further efforts are required. Our o
system of accounting must be guided by the principle of saving every
copper for the war effort, for the revolutionary cause, and for economic
construction. Our method of spending state revenue must be strictly
different from those of the Kuomintang. There are difficulties in the
finances of the Soviet. With the expansion of the Red Army and the develop-
ment of the revolution, the Soviet does face difficulties in its finances.
Overcoming difficulty is inherent in the difficulty itself. The method
for overcoming the difficulty is to develop our revolution, improve our
Soviet work, augment our revenue from all of the Kuomintang areas, place
the burden of Soviet finance on the shoulders of all exploiting elements
and increase the revenue of the Soviet through the development of the
national economy.
We will discuss Soviet economic policy.
Only the shameless Kuomintang warlords will create rumors every day about
the utter devastation of the Soviet region when the people are impoverished
and the finances exhausted in the area under their control. The goal of the
imperialist Kuomintang is to. sabotage the Soviet region, the advancing
Soviet construction, and the welfare of the tens of millions of liberated
worker-peasant masses; therefore, the counterrevolutionaries have not only
organized all their military strength for "encirclement and suppression,"
but also enforced a ruthless policy of blockade in the economic aspect.
Nevertheless, the broad masses and the Red Army led by the Soviet govern-
ment have not only routed the enemy "encirclement" time and again, but also
undertaken all possible and necessary economic constructions to break down
the vicious enemy blockade. Currently, this measure taken by the Soviet
is successful step by step.
As the central task of the Soviet is to strive for victory in the war
against the imperialist Kuomintang, while the current Soviet region is
situated in areas relatively backward in economy and hemmed in by enemy
blockade, the principle of the Soviet economic policy is to undertake all
possible and necessary constructions in the economic aspect and concentrate
strengths to supply the war. Meanwhile, the Soviet is doing its utmost
to improve the people's living, consolidate the worker-peasant alliance
in the economic aspect, assure the proletariat's leadership of the peasants,
and create the premise and superiority for the development of the socialist
construction in the future.
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The nucleus of the Soviet's economic construction is to develop agricultural
production, industrial production, export trade and the cooperative movement.
Currently, the agriculture of the Soviet region is obviously making progress.
The 1933 farm output of the Central Soviet region increased 15 percent com-
pared to that of 1932, while that of the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Soviet
region grew 20 percent. In the first or second year after the uprising,
the agricultural output of Soviet areas often appeared to be dropping.
However, with the decision to divide the land, the promotion effort of
the Soviet, and the growing labor enthusiasm of the peasant masses, produc-
tion recovered. Currently some areas have not only recovered, but also
surpassed the level before the uprising. Other areas have not only
eliminated the land laid waste in the course of the uprising, but also re-
claimed new land. Many areas have organized labor cooperatives and farming
teams to relieve the rural labor force. They have organized plow oxen
cooperatives to solve the shortage of plow animals. Meanwhile, the broad
masses of women have joined the emergency work on the production front.
All these would have been absolutely impossible in the Kuomintang era. In
the Kuomintang era, land was the private property of the landowners, and
the peasants were neither willing nor able to improve the land with their
own effort. Only after the land distribution to the peasants by the Soviet
and the Soviet's promotion and encouragement was the labor enthusiasm of
the peasant masses stimulated, leading to great production victories. Here
it must be pointed out that, under the current condition, agricultural
production takes the first place in the Soviet economic construction.
Agricultural production will not only solve the most important grain issue,
but also shoulder the responsibility of supplying the raw material (cotton,
hemp, sugarcane, bamboo, etc.) for such everyday necessities as clothes,
sugar and paper. In addition, afforestation and livestock production are
also important parts of agriculture. It is both permissible and necessary
to formulate appropriate production plans on the foundation of the small-
peasant economy and mobilize the peasants to fulfill the plans (for example,
so many 10,000-catties of cotton per province). The Soviet must pay further
attention and devote a greater effort in this aspect. In regard to the
many basic conditions of agricultural production, such as manpower, plow
oxen, raw material, seeds and water conservation, the Soviet must vigorously
guide the peasants toward their solution. Here, organizing the manpower to
relieve the shortage and activating the women to participate in production
constitute the most fundamental issue of agricultural production in the
Soviet region. Meanwhile, organizing labor cooperatives and farming teams
and mobilizing and encouraging the entire rural masses during the crucial
spring and summer seasons are the effective means to solve the issue.
The lack of plow oxen by a large portion of the peasants (about 25 percent)
is also a very big problem. Organizing plow oxen cooperatives and mobiliz-
ing all households without plow animals to buy the animals together and
share in their use are matters which the Soviet must give attention to.
Water conservation is the lifeline of agriculture, and the Soviet must give
serious attention to it. Naturally, this is not yet the time to bring
up the problems of soviet and'collective agriculture. However, for the purpose
of promoting agriculture, organizing a soviet experimental farm on a small
scale in every village and ward and establishing agricultural study schools
and farm products exhibition sites are urgently needed.
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Enemy blockade has made our export difficult. Many handicraft enterprises
in the Soviet region have deteriorated, especially tobacco and paper.
However, it is not absolutely impossible to overcome such export difficulties.
Furthermore, in view of the need of the broad masses in the Soviet region,
we possess our own extensive market. We must systematically develop our
industry for export, but mainly for self-sufficiency. In the past 2 years,
especially since the first half of 1933, as the Soviet has begun to pay
attention and as the mass production cooperatives have gradually developed,
many industries have started to recover. Here the main items are tobacco,
paper, tungsten, camphor, farm tools and fertilizer (such as lime), while
textile, drug manufacturing and sugar refining are also not to be overlooked
in the present environment. In the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi region, some of
the areas did not have much industry to start with, such as paper making,
textile weaving and sugar refining, but now such industries have actually
been started and are producing good results. To relieve the shortage of salt,
they have undertaken the manufacture of nitrate. In regard to industry, it
is even more necessary to have suitable planning. Naturally, it is impossible
to formulate general and precise plans on the foundation of the scattered
handicraft industries, but, in regard to certain minor industries, primarily
the enterprises operated by the state and the cooperatives, it is entirely
necessary to formulate appropriate precise production plans. The accurate
estimate of raw material production and the assessment of the market in the
White and Soviet regions are matters requiring the attention of Soviet and
cooperative industries right from the beginning.
Planned organizing of foreign trade and direct handling of the circulation
of certain necessary commodities, such as the import of salt and fabric,
the export of grain and tungsten, and grain circulation inside the Soviet
region, are currently extremely crucial. Such work was begun relatively
early in the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi region, while the Central region started
in the spring of 1933. With the establishment of such agencies as the
Foreign Trade Bureau, preliminary achievements have been made.
Currently, the national economy of the Soviet region is developed in three
simultaneous aspects--state operated, cooperative and private enterprises.
Now limited to the feasible and essential, the state operated economy has
been started in both industry and commerce. Its future is naturally
inestimable.
As for private economy, as long as it stays within the limits of the law,
the Soviet not only will not block it, but will promote and encourage it,
because the development of private economy at the present time is required
by the interest of the Soviet. Needless to say, private economy occupies
a position of absolute predominance at the present time, and such pre-
dominance will remain for a considerably long period of time to come. The
development of private economy in the Soviet region generally follows the
pattern of small capital.
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The cooperative economy is developing rapidly. According to the September 1933
statistics of 17 counties in Kiangsi and Fukien provinces, all types of coopera-
tives totaled 1,423, with the shares amounting to 305,551 yuan. Due to the
promotion by the Economic Construction Mass Meeting, the development of such
counties as Jui-chin and Hsing-kuo in a little over a month after the meeting
surpassed the figures for the entire period before it. Currently, the large-
scale development of cooperatives covers mainly consumer and grain coopera-
tives, with production cooperatives second. As for the credit cooperative,
it is still just beginning. The development of the cooperative movement will
doubtlessly become the pivot of the economic development of the Soviet region.
The cooperative economy and the state operated economy, when coordinated,
will become a tremendous force in the economic aspect. In the long process
of the struggle against the private economy, they will gradually gain the
leading and superior position and form the condition for the economy of the
Soviet region to develop to a socialist economy. Therefore, developing
state enterprises as much as possible and promoting cooperatives on a large
scale must be pursued simultaneously with the encouragement of private
economy.
For the purpose of developing state operated enterprises and aiding the
cooperative movement, the People's Committee, with the support of the masses,
issued 3 million yuan of economic construction bonds. Solving the economic
construction capital problem by relying on the strength of the masses is the
only feasible means at present.
While all of China is engulfed in an economic calamity and the hundreds of
millions of people are hungry and cold, the Soviet government, in disregard
of all difficulties, conscientiously pursues economic construction for the
revolutionary war and in the interest of the people. Very obviously,
only the victory of the Soviet over the imperialist Kuomintang and only
its planned and organized economic construction will rescue the hundreds
of millions of the nation from the unprecedented economic calamity.
[Footnotes] Increasing our revenue by developing the national economy is
our basic financial policy. The apparent effect has been demonstrated
in the Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Border Area and has begun to be demonstrated
in the Central Region. The enforcement of this policy is the responsibility
of our fiscal and economic organs. Here, attention must be given to the
fact that the issuance of paper currency by state banks must be based
on the need of the development of the national economy, and simply
fiscal need can only take second place.
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Fiscal disbursement must follow the policy of thrift. All government
work personnel must understand that corruption and waste are serious
crimes. Some achievement was made in the struggle against corruption
and waste in the past, and we must continue with our effort hereafter.
Saving every penny for the war and the revolutionary cause, and for our
economic construction, is the principle of our accounting system. A
strict distinction must be made between the way we spend our state
revenue and the way of the Kuomintang.
6080
CSO: 4005
Reform of cultural education must be carried out by the Soviet in order to
win victory in the revolution, consolidate and develop the Soviet regime,
mobilize all the forces of the people for the purpose of waging the great
revolutionary struggle, create a new and revolutionary generation and free
the worker-peasant masses from the spiritual shackles placed upon them
by the reactionary ruling class. We must create a new, Soviet culture of
workers and peasants.
It is public knowledge that all educational and cultural agencies under the
Kuomintang rule are in the hands of the landlord bourgeoisie. Their policy
is to carry out lopsided propaganda to eradicate revolutionary concepts of
the oppressed class, on the one hand, and implement a policy of hoodwinking
the people so as to exclude workers and peasants from education on the other.
Educational funds were used by the reactionary Kuomintang to finance
attacks on the revolution, most schools stopped operating and a majority
of the students were idled. The people became ignorant and foolish under
the rule of the'Kuomintang and over 80 percent of the entire population
was illiterate. While extremely vicious White terrorism was adopted against
revolutionary concepts, all left-wing literary figures and sociologists
and revolutionaries in cultural and educational agencies were subjected
to the ravages of the Kuomintang fascist emperor, turning all educational
organizations into dark, hell-holes. This is the Kuomintang's educational
policy.
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Whoever comes to our Soviet area and takes a look will see immediately that
it is a free and bright new country.
All educational agencies are in the hands of the laboring masses of workers
and peasants. The workers and peasants and their children enjoy priority
rights to education. The Soviet Government is using all possible methods
to raise the cultural level of workers and peasants, and for the purpose
of attaining this objective all possible political and material aid are
given to the masses. For this reason, Soviet areas are today speeding up
the revolutionary cultural construction, although they are situated in an
environment of ruthless Civil War and were,'in the past, culturally very
backward areas. According to the compilations of the three provinces of
Kiangsi, Fukien and Hupeh-Kiangsi, there are 3,05.2 Lenin elementary
schools, with 89,710 students, 6,462 supplementary night schools with
94,517 students, 32,388 adult education groups (this does not include figures
from Fukien) with 155,371 members and 1,656 clubs with 49,668 functionaries.
This is only a partial compilation of the central Soviet areas.
The majority of school age children are in Lenin elementary schools in many
of the Soviet areas. For example, 12,806 (8,825 boys and 3,981 girls) out
of 20,969 (12,076 boys and 8,893 girls) school age children in Hsing-kuo
[5281 0948] are attending Lenin elementary schools, and 8,163 (3,251 boys
and 4,912 girls) are idle. The comparative ratios for those attending schools
and those who do not is 6 to 4. Children in many places in the Soviet areas
are most of the time engaged in receiving education and in play, and only a
small part of their time is applied to home chores. This is exactly opposite
to the situation prevailing during the Kuomintang period. The children are,
at the same time, enrolled in the Red Children Group. These groups are
similar to schools for the children to learn about communism. Such
enthusiastic demands of women for education have never before been seen.
Of the 15,740 students attending supplementary night schools in Hsing-kuo,
4,986 are males, accounting for 31 percent of the total and 10,752 are
females, accounting for 69 percent. Of the 22,519 members of the adult
education groups, 9,000 are males, accounting for 40 percent, and 13,519
are females, accounting for 60 percent of the total. Illiterate women
in Hsing-kuo and other areas have achieved initial liberation and are
enthusiastic about activities. Women are not only receiving education but
also presiding over it. Many women have become principals of elementary
and night schools and members of educational committees and literary
committees. Associations of women workers and peasants have become common
in the Soviet areas. The focus is on the entire interests of women workers,
and, of course, the education of women is also a part of it.
The literacy of the masses has grown rapidly. Night schools,!literacy
movements and placards are used to induce literacy. Night schools are set
in location, literacy groups are located in the homes of the masses and
literacy placards are mounted along the roads. The literacy movement is
led by a village committee. Hsing-kuo is an example. There is a general
committee for the literacy movement in more than 130 villages, 3,387 branch
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committees for 561 villages and there are members enrolled in the 12,529
literacy groups below the branch committees. This is a mass movement on
an extremely vast scale to sweep away illiteracy and it should be expanded
to cover all rural and urban areas in the Soviet territories.
We can also see from the publications of newspapers the rapid advances being
made in the cultural movement in the Soviet areas. There are 34 different
kinds of big and small newspapers in the central Soviet areas, of which
RED CHINA has increased its printing from 3,000 to 4,000 copies., THE
TRUTH FROM YOUTH prints 28,000 copies, STRUGGLE 27,100 copies and RED STAR
17,300 copies. All these prove that the cultural level of the masses is
being rapidly elevated.
The revolutionary arts of the masses in the Soviet areas are beginning to
be formed. The theatre of the workers and peasants, the blue shirt group
and the club movement in the rural areas are expanding widely.
The Red physical culture movement of the masses is also developing rapidly.
Track events are available even in isolated rural hamlets and villages
and sports grounds have been established in many areas. Soviet areas are
still lacking in the construction of complete specialized education
apparatus, although we have established the Red Army University, the Soviet
University, the Marxist Communist University and many schools for educating
cadres under the leadership of the department of education for the training
of leading cadres in the revolutionary struggle. Beyond doubt, limiting
the expansion of general education for the development of secondary and
special (vocational) education should be made part of the educational plans.
The forming of worker-peasant intellectuals, developing cultural education
and utilizing intellectuals with landlord bourgeois background to serve the
Soviet should not be neglected in the Soviet's cultural policy.
Where does the general guideline of the Soviet cultural education lie? It
lies in the education of the broad masses of laboring people with the
communist spirit, using cultural education to serve the revolution and
the class struggle, and linking up education and labor.
What are the central tasks of the Soviet's cultural construction? They
are the implementation of obligatory education in full, developing and spread-
ing social education and developing large numbers of high ranking cadres to
lead the revolution.
Everyone should understand that all these policies and tasks can be imple-
mented only under the Soviet political power, because it is a manifestation
of the intensification of class struggle. This is an absolutely great
victory in the spiritual liberation of humankind.
We shall now discuss the marriage system of the Soviet.
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The Central Executive Committee promulgated the Soviet marriage laws in
November 1931, in order to liberate women from the barbaric, feudal system
and implement a marriage system which is truly equal for both men and
women. It established the complete freedom of marriage and divorce,
abolished the marriage system of contracting, coercion and buying and
selling of marriages, and prohibited the rearing of child daughters-in-law.
The law has been implemented in all of the areas under Soviet jurisdiction
during the past 2 years. All those who are not related by blood and are
outside of the 5-generation group, who are not insane and do not have
serious infectious diseases, can be married if the male is 20 years old
and the female 18, and if both agree to it and it has been registered with
the rural or urban Soviet. The only requirement needed for divorce is for
either the husband or wife to make the request and duly register it with
the township or city soviet.
This type of democratic marriage system has smashed the feudal fetters which
have shackled mankind, especially its females, for many thousands of years.
This is also a great victory in the history of mankind. This is a victory
to be attained only after the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship has
been successful. First, the dictatorship of the landlord bourgeois must
be overthrown, the agrarian revolution carried out and the masses of men
and women, especially the women, have political and relative economic
freedom. Only then will the freedom of marriage be finally guaranteed.
The new system can be wholly initiated because the working women in the
Soviet area have the same right to vote as the men, and they have also
been distributed land and assigned work.
The current Soviet marriage law emphasizes the protection of women because
the marriage relationship for the past several thousand years has been
barbarously inhumane. Women are subjected to more oppression than men,
and the obligations arising from divorces have been placed more heavily
on the men to shoulder.
In the society that has passed it was customary not to pay too much attention
to the protection of children. But children are the new generation of
the revolution. There is a law solely concerned with the protection of
children in the marriage laws, and it has underscored the protection of
illegitimate children and the acceptance of their status.
The implementation of the marriage system won for the Soviet the support of
the broad masses. The broad masses of people have not only achieved
liberation economically, but also in relationships between men and women.
With just the marriage system as an example, the Soviet areas and the
Kuomintang areas are two diametrically opposed worlds.
Finally, we shall talk about our policy regarding nationalities. The basis
from which the Soviet nationalities policy proceeds is winning over all
oppressed minority nationalities and rally them around the Soviet, and
increasing the revolutionary forces opposing imperialism and the Kuomintang.
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Many of the minority nationalities such as the Mongols, Tibetans, Koreans,
Annamese, Miao and Li in China have always been ruled and exploited by
Chinese feudal emperors and feudal warlords. After inheriting this rule,
the Kuomintang has made no changes, and the so-called "five nationalities
in harmonious peace" is just so much nonsense used to dupe people. The
Kuomintang's recent "reward" was the massacre of Hui people in Kansu
Province carried out by Feng Yu-hsiang [7458 3768 4382] and the slaughtering
of the Miao people by Pai Chung--hsi [4101 1504 4406] in Kwangsi. On the
other side, the ruling class within the minority nationalities themselves,
such as the kings and princes, living buddhas, lamas and headmen, collaborat-
ed with the Kuomintang landlords of China and brought even more severe
oppression and exploitation upon the broad masses of laboring people of
the minority nationalities. Or they (like Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia)
capitulated to the imperialists and led imperialism to rapidly turn these
areas into colonies and carried the robbing of the working people a step
forward. This was the essence of the lives of minority nationalities in
the past.
The Soviet Government firmly opposes imperialist and Kuomintang warlords'
rule and plunder perpetrated upon the minority nationalities. Article 14
of the Constitution proclaimed by the First National Soviet Congress in
November 1931 says: "The Chinese Soviet political power recognizes the
autonomous right of minority nationalities within the boundaries of China
right up to the time they secede from China and establish their own
independent and free nations. All Mongolians, Huis, Tibetans, Miaos, Lis
and Koreans residing within the boundaries of China will decide in accordance
with the wishes of each nationality whether to participate in the Chinese
Soviet Union or cecede from it. The Chinese Soviet political power currently
must strive to help these weak, minority nationalities to get out from under
the oppressive rule of imperialism, Kuomintang warlords, kings, princes, lamas
and headmen and attain complete liberation. The Soviet should develop their
own language and culture among these nationalities."
This is a resounding answer to. the vicious colonial policy applied to
nationalities by imperialists all over the world (including the Chinese
Kuomintang). The broad masses of workers and peasants of China and their
Soviet Government are not only seeking to get rid of the shackles of
imperialism by waging a resolute national revolutionary war on its own but
also call upon all weak, minority nationalities in the country to do so at
the same time until these nationalities have been able to cut themselves
away and achieve complete independence. Besides, Article 15 of the Soviet
Constitution Outline says:
"The various nationalities in China, as '?iell as revolutionary fighters of
the various countries in the world, who are being persecuted by the
reactionary rulers because of.their revolutionary activities will be given
the right to asylum in the Soviet areas by the Chinese Soviet Government,
and help will be extended to them to recover their strength to struggle
again until the revolutionary movement of these nationalities and nations
have achieved complete victory."
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The existence of many Korean, Taiwanese and Annmese revolutionary comrades
in temporary residence in the Soviet areas, the attendance of Korean repre-
sentatives at the First All-Soviet Congress and the attendance of several
Korean, Taiwanese and Annamese representatives at this Congress prove that
this proclamation of the Soviet is true. The common revolutionary interests
of the Chinese and minority nationality working people have truly united
them.
The oppression of nationality is based upon the exploitation of the nationality
and when this system of national exploitation is overthrown, the free union
of nationalities will be substituted for national oppression.
This is possible only when the Soviet political power has won complete
victory. It is the responsibility of the various minority nationalities
to support and help the Soviet political power to win victory throughout
China.
5. The Concrete Fighting Tasks of the Soviet in Striving to Smash
Thoroughly the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and Win Nationwide
Victory for the Revolution
After we have discussed the current situation, the struggle of the Soviet
political power against imperialism and against "encirclement and suppres-
sion" during the past 2 years, and the basic policies implemented by the
Soviet, we arrived at a determined conclusion and, that is to say, the
Soviet movement is progressing with giant strides. The victory of the
Soviet movement in the past 2 years has brought about a visible change in
the strengths of both the enemy and ourselves. The vacillation and collapse
of the enemy is accelerating while the Soviet movement is vigorously
developing. The forces of revolution have grown even greater, and the
battle lines of the revolution have become even more consolidated. The
national war and the revolutionary Civil War are being waged within the
vast confines of China, and the Red Army has become an invincible force.
The foundation of the democratic worker-peasant dictatorship has been
established. The Soviet's work of construction has achieved great results
in various respects. The centralized leadership of the Soviet Central
Government has not only established a solid foundation in the Soviet
areas, but it has also become the revolutionary banner of the broad masses
in the areas under the Kuomintang rule. All these have become the current
realities of life, they have become realities existing objectively and
which are not to be denied.
But the progress of the revolution has required us to take into consideration
other situations. It required us to apply an intensive spirit of self-
criticism to examine the weaknesses existing in the revolutionary fronts.
This is a responsibility we cannot disregard. In evaluating our weaknesses,
we must first of all realize that although the areas where the Soviet has
already been victorious is very large, it is situated in very small and
narrow confines when the entire country is taken as a whole, and in areas
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where the economy is relatively backward. The counterrevolutionaries still
have their vast areas and occupy the important cities. The task of the
Soviet seeking nationwide victory by first achieving victories in one or
several provinces rests very heavily upon our shoulders. The daily in-
tensifying life-and-death struggle between two political powers requires
us to go all out to resolve this problem. It does not permit the
slightest bit of complacency to exist in our revolutionary ranks, and it
also does not permit the slightest appearance of fatigue in our attitudes.
Second, although the people's anti-imperialist movement has unfolded on a
massive scale in the past 2 years and considerable achievements attained
in the leadership given by the Central Government in the anti-imperialist
movement, the forces engaged in the currently developing struggle against
imperialism is woefully inadequate seen in the light of the grave nature.
of the national peril and the seriousness of our task to stop imperialist
aggression and the capitulation and national betrayal of the Kuomintang.
The Soviet has not yet adopted numerous ways to spark the national and
class consciousness of the broad masses and organize their struggle against
imperialism. Notwithstanding this fact, the Soviet Government's direct
aid and leadership of the anti-imperialist struggle launched at the
initiative of the masses are very much inadequate. The Soviet Government
has not fully discharged its responsibility with regard to the organiza-
tion and leadership of the workers' struggle against the bourgeoisie and
the peasants' struggle against landlords in the vast areas under White
domination. In the Kuomintang areas surrounding the Soviet areas, it also
has not exerted the greatest effort to organize the people's struggle and
create conditions that will rapidly transform them into Soviet areas,
bring about ever-increasing efforts of the masses to coordinate with the
Red Army's campaigns in these areas, and, especially, the situation wherein
soldiers of the White Armies rebel in support of the Red Army.
Third, the Red Army's entire military strength is still far from being able
to accomplish the great task of defeating imperialism and the Kuomintang
and achieving victory for the revolution throughout the country although
numerically and qualitatively it has been increased and improved. The
rear echelon work of expanding the Red Army still cannot meet the require-
ments of the front, and in many respects the organizing and training of
Red Guard Forces and Young Pioneers leave much to be desired. Also,
the organizing of guerrilla units and their activities are generally very
inadequate. In some areas the work of giving preferential treatment to
families of Red Army members is very poorly carried out. These have caused
achievements in the revolution to remain at a standstill and prevented us
from being able to pursue in the flush of victory and win even greater
victories each time we smashed the enemy's "encirclement and suppression."
Fourth, with a mission of giving everything for the war effort, we still
are unable to conform our work to the needs of the revolution. Regardless
of whether it is with respect to land struggle, workers' struggle, economic
construction, finance, suppression of counterrevolution and cultural and
education, each has its own weaknesses. In pointing out these weaknesses
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in general, we would like to say that the revolution requires this work to
garner greater achievements with the greatest speed. But this work is
being carried out very unevenly in the various areas. Many areas have
truly attained the standard of greatest speed and greatest achievements.
Reliance on the work of these areas has been of great help to the revolu-
tion. However, in some other areas work progress has been very slow and,
in some cases, achievements that should have been attained are still
unreachable after a long period of time. Especially in some newly estab-
lished areas and border areas, the work is done even more poorly. The main
reason for this is that in the Soviet organizations of these areas there
exist elements who do not understand and are even unwilling to carry out, the
laws and policies of the Soviet. Some of these elements are people gravely
afflicted with opportunism and bureaucracism, but others are outright spies
e sent in by the landlord bourgeoisie. They do not advance the work of the
Soviet but impede it. They did not subordinate Soviet work to the war
efforts, but caused it to become separated from it. They were not willing
to develop the struggle of the masses and brought it to a standstill.
Instead of proceeding from mobilizing the broad masses and doing education
work on them, they tried to implement the Soviet's work through empty talk
and clamor, even to the extent of using coercive orders of bureaucraticism.
Instead of trying to understand the situation at lower levels, educating
new cadres and soliciting suggestions from the masses, they slandered lower
level cadres and said that the masses do not have enthusiasm. The Soviet
democracy was not fully developed in these respects. It did not attract
a majority of the masses to participate in the election of Soviets or
attract large numbers of intellectuals from the masses to participate in
the work of the Soviet. The system of urban and rural congresses of
representatives has not been firmly established in these areas, nor the
Soviet transformed into a political organization that is truly of the masses.
For these reasons, many aspects of the Soviet's work did not achieve what
should have been achieved in these areas and they were unable to meet the
pressing needs of the revolution. It should be clearly pointed out that
this is the gravest shortcoming in the Soviet's work.
All of these weaknesses have placed us on the highest alert to overcome
them so that the Soviet movement will be able to conform with all objective
and favorable conditions and expand on an even more massive scale over an
even more vast territory.
We already have one great force, and it has become the foundation for our
expansion. But it is insufficient because the requirement of the revolution-
ary situation exceeds its capability, and we must strengthen it.
The Second All-China Congress of Soviet Rrepresentatives must call on the
revolutionary masses in all of the Soviet areas and all of China to resolute-
ly carry out the following concrete fighting tasks in order to thoroughly
smash the imperialists' and Kuomintang's "encirclement and suppression"
and win nationwide victory for the revolution:
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1. On building the Red Army.
Further strengthen and perfect the leadership of the Central Revolutionary
Military Affairs Committee over the Red Army so that the activities of the
Red Army throughout China will, under a unified strategic will, become
even more mutually supportive and mutually coordinated than in the past,
and the local military organizations will be able to discharge their own
duties under the central leadership.
Propagate on a general and penetrating scale the slogan "expand the Red
Army into an iron force at least a million strong" into the ranks of the
worker-peasant masses throughout the Soviet areas and throughout China,
calling upon the broad masses to struggle for the realization of this
slogan in the shortest time possible. The masses must be made to understand
that the imminent struggle to decide victory or defeat between the Sovicet
political power and the Kuomintang political power, and the direct and
massive struggle between the Soviet political power and imperialism is
entirely dependent upon the establishment of the Red Army. This task is a
sacred responsibility of the Soviet and each one of the workers and peasants.
The Central Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee and the various
Soviets should be responsible for collecting the rich experiences gained
in expanding the Red Army in various areas during the last 2 years,
especially since Red May of last year. It is emphatically pointed out that
in expanding the Red Army, is for political encouragement to be used instead
of forceful coercion. We must deal with alien and bad elements who sabotage
efforts to expand the Red Army and lead to desertion by applying merciless
class struggle and the Soviet's laws concerning such matters.
All laws and methods of the Soviet for the preferential treatment of Red
Army fighters and their families must be implemented. We must raise the
social status of Red Army fighters, heightening the spiritual comfort of
the Red Army fighters and their families and resolving material difficulties
in their lives. It is also necessary to point out that cultivating land for
families of Red Army members and providing them with daily necessities are
an important part of the work to give preferential treatment. All those
who drag their feet, are apathetic and feigned compliance with regard to the
preferential treatment of Red Army fighters and their families should be
prosecuted under Soviet law.
Place the work of consolidating the Red Army in a place of importance in the
work of building the Red Army so that it will not only be able to expand
very quickly, but also become strong and healthy very rapidly. Political
education of Red Army fighters should be elevated even further so that each
one of them will consciously struggle to the end for the Soviet New China,
so that the Red Army is transformed into a propagandist and organizer
for the Soviet and a creator of new Soviet territories. The relationship
between the Red Army fighters and the laboring masses of workers and
peasants in both the Soviet and White areas becomes even more closely
linked. Enhance the conscious discipline of the Red Army through political
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education and make them understand that this is an important weapon guarantee-
ing victory in the war. The system of political commissars should be estab-
lished throughout all Red Army, local and guerrilla units, and foster even
more worker elements to become military and political commanders. Transform
the Red Army school to train better than in the past large numbers of senior
and junior grade military and political cadres.
Search for bad elements within the Red Army and deal severely with the
attempts of landlord bourgeois elements who have stolen in to sabotage
the Red Army. The work of consolidating the Red Army so as to transform
it into a form of iron is of the same importance as political work. It is
what the Red Army urgently needs now. Improving the Red Army's military
techniques is of vital importance to us in the face of the daily growing
v scale of the war and the daily adoption of new military techniques by
imperialist and Kuomintang troops. The slogan "Master and improve on new
military techniques" should penetrate deeply into the minds of the Red
Army fighters and the Red Army school should exert its greatest efforts
toward this end.
The new method of organizing Red Guard Forces and Young Pioneers units
should be propagated to reach every nook and cranny of the Soviet areas
and arm all of the youths and adult males and females of the working class.
Every one of the members of the Red Guard Forces and the Young Pioneers
should be made to understand clearly the roles and responsibilities of the
Red Army's rear support troops and local defense forces. The necessity for
and the role to be played by obligatory service in the forthcoming Civil
War which will be waged on an even bigger scale should be suitably propagated
now to the broad masses of working people and members of the Red Guard Forces
and the Young Pioneers. An all-out effort should be made to carry out
necessary military and political training whenever possible. Spread the
method of bivouaking and maneuvers to all Red Guard Forces and Young Pioneer
units in all areas. Under a situation of enemy attacks and attempts at
trouble-making by exploiting elements in the Soviet areas, the responsibility
of the Red Guard Forces and Young Pioneer units for the defense of the area
should be increased in a special manner, and existing slackness in Red
martial law in many areas should be speedily corrected. One of the best
means to expand the Red Army is to mobilize model units of the Red Guard
Forces and Young Pioneers, immediately recognize these troops after
mobilization and enlist them into the Red Army by the whole unit and by
the entire company. It is the Red guerrilla units of new and border areas
and in the areas between the Soviet and the White areas who play the great
role of detachments of the Red Army inseparable from the Red Army in battle.
The most pressing task of the Soviet is to strengthen and enlarge present
guerrilla units, establish new guerrilla units on a most widespread scale,
collect the rich experiences of guerrilla warfare of the past, massively
strengthen education and instruction in guerrilla tactics, send forth
hundreds and thousands of guerrilla units into the White areas and into the
rear and flanks of the enemy to attack them there, develop mass struggle,
create guerrilla areas and expand them into new Soviet areas and, especially,
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be active in the areas between the Soviet territories which have not yet been
linked up in coordination with the activities of the Red Army's main force.
All means should be applied to ensure the supply and transportation of the
Red Army's rations. The finance and economic organizations of the Soviet,
and the supply, transportation and health organizations within the military
system should strive together to attain this common objective. Past short-
comings should be overcome in the mobilization of transport units so that there
will be no shortage of transportation personnel to hinder the mobility and
combat of the Red Army. All for the war effort is the responsibility of every
revolutionary and every worker of the Soviet.
The Soviet should carry out various necessary and feasible economic construc-
tion in a planned manner for the purpose of breaking through the enemy's
blockade, opposing the manipulations of unscupulous merchants, ensuring the
needs of the revolution,,and improve the well-being of the worker-peasant
masses.
First and foremost is the development of the vast agricultural production in
the Soviet areas. The Soviet should use all means to heighten the enthusiasm
of the peasantry for production. It should take advantage of the important
seasons for agricultural work, such as spring and summer plowing and fall
harvesting, to launch a general and widespread movement to increase produc-
tion and mobilize the entire peasantry of the rural areas to plunge together
into the front lines of production. An important method to increase produc-
tion is to organize labor cooperatives and plowing units, distribute the
rural labor force in a planned way and mobilize the broad masses of women
to participate in production. Help and leadership should be provided to the
peasants in solving concrete and important problems of agriculture, such as
plow oxen, farm implements, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation and pest preven-
tion. Plow oxen cooperatives should be set up on a general scale. Based
upon the experience gained from the spring and summer plowing campaign of
last year, "Completely eliminate waste land" and "Increase this year's
harvest by 20 percent" should become battle slogans. Experiences in
planting cotton should be collected and the production of cotton in the
Soviet areas should be developed. A movement to plant trees should be
launched, calling upon every person in the rural areas to plant 10 trees.
The Soviet should pay attention to increasing stock animal raising. The
Ministry of the People's Council on National Economy of the Central
Government and the Departments of National Economy of various provinces
should set forth concrete plans of action in such important departments
of agriculture as food grains, cotton and others. The Soviet's Department
of Food Grains, the Bureau of Food Grains Distribution and food grain
cooperatives of the masses should closely link together in work and strive
hard to ensure the supply of food grains to the Red Army and the people.
The recovery of the large, handicraft enterprises and the construction of
needed military industries are important tasks of the Soviet's economic
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construction. The Soviet's plan to recover and expand industry should be
based upon the needs of the war, the needs of the people in the Soviet
areas and the possibility of exporting to the White areas, wolfram, coal,
iron, lime, agricultural implements, tobacco, paper, cloth, sugar, medicine,
nitre, camphor and lumber should be the main departments. A major effort
should be made to develop people's production cooperatives of these indus-
tries, and organize as many as possible unemployed workers, independent
laborers and peasants and bring them into production cooperatives. At the
same time, permit and reward private capitalists to invest and expand
these productions in the Soviet areas. Currently, the Soviet should not
attempt to monopolize all production enterprises, but the founding and
expansion of especially needed and especially profitable state enterprises
is permissible and should be done. An important way to increase production
is to heighten enthusiasm for labor, launch competitions in production and
reward those making outstanding achievements on the production front.
The smashing of the enemy's economic blockade, developing the Soviet areas'
trade with the outside, exchanging surplus items (such as unhusked grain,
wolfram, lumber, tobacco and paper) produced in the Soviet areas with
industrial commodities from the White areas (such as table salt, cloth and
kerosene) are the pivots in the development of the national economy. The
Soviet Bureau of External Trade and other commercial organizations must be
further improved and strengthened. At the same time, reward private
businessmen and bring them to work hard toward the import and export of
needed commercial commodities. Consumer cooperatives are to be developed
on a general scale and organize the broad masses of workers and peasants
within these cooperatives so that the masses will be able to buy necessary
items from the White areas at a cheap price and sell the products from
Soviet areas at a high price. All these occupy especially important positions
in the Soviet's trade and in the entire project of economic construction.
The Soviet should greatly strengthen its leadership over the general consumer
cooperative of the Central Government and the general consumer cooperatives
of the provinces and counties, and establish general cooperatives as quickly
as possible in areas where they have not yet been established.
In economic construction, the solution of the problem of capital is achieved
mainly through the absorption of capital from the masses. Organize them
into the production consumer and credit cooperatives and attention should
be paid to the development of credit cooperatives so that after usurious
capital has been done away with the credit cooperatives can be substituted.
Absorbing the capital of the masses into the construction of state enter-
prises, expansion of trade with outside areas and assisting cooperative
enterprises through such means as issuing economic construction bonds, issu-
ing bank shares and deposits in banks are equally important. Use all possible
means to encourage private capitalists to invest within the boundaries of
Soviet laws so that capital in the Soviet areas is more viable. The role
of the Soviet Bank should be given free rein by all possible means, issuing
suitable amount of scripts in accordance with the principle of market
demand, absorbing the deposits of the masses, making loans to profitable
production enterprises, allocate the finances of the entire Soviet areas
in a planned way, and lead the people's cooperatives to struggle against
speculative businessmen. All these are the tasks of the banks.
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The establishment of the Central Government provided general leadership to
the Soviet movement throughout the country and it is of absolute significance
to the Chinese revolution. It has achieved a great and glorious victory
in leading the struggle against imperialism and the Kuomintang during the
past 2 years. We should point out that the Central Government, in its
organization and work, is still not sound and adequate enough in many
areas. In order to strengthen the Central Government's general leadership
of the various Soviet areas and the revolution throughout the country it will
be necessary to separate the work of the Central Executive Committee from
that of the People's Committee. Faced with a situation of accelerated develop-
ment of the revolution, it will be necessary to make the work and the
organization of the Central Executive Committee's presidium quite sound,
the staff of the various people's committees must be fleshed out and their
work methods improved and more people's committee departments must be estab-
lished, such as the people's committee department of food grain, so as to
enable the Central Government to play its full role as principal motive
force.
The provincial Soviet is the supreme organization of leadership for the
local political power, and it is the Central Government's link with the
various county and area soviets. We must make a great effort to strengthen
the Central Government's leadership of the various provinces, closely link
the relationship between it and the various provincial soviets (the
provincial soviets in the central Soviet area and those outside) and closely
scrutinize the work of the various provincial soviets, put into effect the
systems of collective discussion, precise division of labor and individual
responsibility. We must scrutinize the work of the various Soviet areas
in the counties and strive hard to correct the phenomena of slackened
efforts and non-centralization which had occurred in the past in some areas.
As township and city soviets are the basic organizations of the Soviet, we
must go all-out to improve the work of these soviets. In those areas
where a congress of representatives does not exist, it must be established.
Further strengthen its work and form a presidium for the Congress. The
many committees under the Congress should be formed and spread this system
of committees into the rural areas, attracting large groups of worker-
peasant activists to join the committees and work in them. A system whereby
close relationships may be maintained between a representative and a
definite number of residents must be set up, a system of chairmen of
representatives formed so that there will be one in each village to oversee
the work of the entire village, and he should be permitted to convene a
meeting between a representative of a hamlet and its inhabitants to discuss
the work being done in the hamlet. The township and city soviets are
organizations directly responsible for mobilizing the masses and carrying
out the work of the Soviet. The focus of its work should be how to mobilize
the masses of the village or township in the soundest and most adequate way
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and struggle to implement successfully each task and each piece of work of
the Soviet. The village and ward soviets must give their greatest attention
to the practical work being done by the village or street, and implement a
system of scheduled examination of their work. An effective way to achieve
speed in work is the revolutionary competition between the various villages
or streets. The speedy and thorough improvement of village and ward soviets
is dependent upon the correct and practical leadership of the area and
municipal soviets. The attention of the area and municipal soviets should
be placed fully upon the improvement of the work of the village and street
soviets, and the key to the leadership of the area and municipal soviets is
full explanations, constant inspections, thorough examinations and tests
by the people. The county Soviet should apply these as criteria in examin-
ing the work of the area Soviet.
The Soviet of various provinces must. place its own attention strongly upon
the newly formed Soviet areas, and regard the work of establishing revolu-
tionary committees and strenthening their work as its important duty. The
essence of the work and the form of the organization of revolutionary com-
mittees are in many places different from those of the village or township.
The transformation of all White areas into Soviet areas has to pass through
the stage of revolutionary committee. The provincial soviets, the soviets
of various new and boundary areas and the county soviet should place the
organizational structure and work of revolutionary committees on a sound
basis so that they will be able to shoulder the responsibility of arming
the people, launching people's struggles, wiping out reactionary forces
and speedily switching over to the establishment of the Soviet political
power.
Although Soviet democracy has developed, we should point out that there is
still much to be desired in many areas, and it is necessary that a serious
struggle be launched against bureaucracy to eliminate those obsolete
things--bureaucraticism and commandism--hidden in the Soviets and among the
people. The functionaries (cadres of the Soviets)should carry out their
work by mobilization and persuasion, and not by compulsory orders. They
should be attentive to, and not ignore, each and every request or suggestion
from the masses. Personnel of the soviets, especially the procurate
committee of the workers and peasants, should induce the broad masses to
launch criticism and struggle against bad elements within the Soviet
organizations and sternly prosecute them under the laws of the Soviet so
as to ensure that there will be good relationship between the Soviet and
the people.
In order to have sound elements in the Soviet, it will be necessary to
popularize the election of soviets, explain the meaning of elections to
the people and induce the greatest majority of the voters to participate
in the elections. In elections, those class alien elements and elements
who are corrupt, wasteful and bureaucratic must be absolutely expelled
and large numbers of worker-peasant activists elected to manage the
state's work. Here, letting in large groups of worker cadres, in accordance
with the election laws to strengthen the workers' position of leadership
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in the Soviet political power, is a key link in placing the work of the
Soviet on a sound basis. The Soviet must maintain close link with trade
unions, poor peasants' groups, representatives' congresses of women workers
and farmers, cooperatives and all other civic groups so as to popularize
the work of the Soviet, and carry out the work of the Soviet by mobilizing
the broad masses of people through these groups.
In order to acquire speed and quality in the work of the Soviet so that all
work will meet the requirements of the revolution, it is necessary to exert
maximum effort to eliminate the relaxed and placid attitudes of Soviet
functionaries and greatly heighten their work enthusiasm so that each one
of them will consciously put out effort in the work of the state under the
democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. Work discipline must
be strict. All those elements who fritter away their time and neglect
their duties and do not give importance to the work of the Soviet must be
struggled against severely until they are expelled from their work. Corrup-
tion and waste must be opposed because not only do these phenomena inflict
loss upon the finances and economy of the Soviet, but they also corrupt
Soviet functionaries, cause'them to lose enthusiasm for their work and lose
spiritual essence. The slogans of "Subordinate all work to the war effort"
and "Achieve speed and quality in work" must be set before the masses, and,
in this respect, the principal responsible persons, especially the worker-
peasant procuratory committee, should adequately carry out the work of
persuasive education upon Soviet functionaries.
Place the burden of thoroughly and conscientiously carrying out the policies
and laws of the Soviet on the shoulders of all Soviet functionaries. Impose
heavy penalties on transgressions against Soviet laws and policies, first
and foremost on such misdeeds by the Soviet functionaries themselves.
The Labor Law must be implemented in full, and every article of it explained
to the broad masses of workers. The application of the 8-hour work system
and the stipulation of minimum wage are the core to ensuring the interests
of the workers. The labor inspection stations and the labor courts must
see to it that they become fully effective. We must conduct resolute
struggle against those personnel who neglect the interests of the workers
and attempt to seek compromise with the capitalists, provide practical and
timely aid to unemployed workers, and organize committees on aid to the
unemployed in all the areas where there are unemployed workers. The system
of social insurance must be put into effect where it is possible and required
attention paid to the work of the social insurance bureau, avoiding past
errors made in some areas with regard to the disbursement of insurance funds.
The labor department of the Soviet should be placed on a sound basis in order
to carry out this work fully, and there should be a close relationship
between the labor department and the trade unions. One of the central tasks
of the Soviet is to fully implement the land law and all the laws governing
the struggle for land by launching a massive campaign of agrarian revolution
throughout the country.
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The struggle to confiscate land owned by the landlord class and big private
land holders should be launched with emphasis and intensity in all the newly
acquired territories of the Soviet. The many experiences accumulated from
methods used in the past to distribute land should be collected and applied
generally to all new Soviet areas. Develop the land inspection movement
in all those areas where the land problem has not yet been throughly
resolved, and rapidly sweep away from those areas the remnant forces of
feudalism. A correct class line and adequate work on the masses in the
agrarian struggle are prerequisites guaranteeing absolute victory in the
agrarian revolution. Implementing the Soviet policy on culture and education,
launching a cultural revolution within the soviet territories, arming the
minds of the masses with communism, enhancing the cultural standard of the
masses, putting into effect the system of compulsory education and
strengthening the ability to mobilize the masses in the course of the
revolution are tasks of similar importance for the Soviet.
The Soviet policy of punishing exploiters and suppressing counterrevolu-
tionaries must be carried out with determination. The state's Bureau of
Political Defense and the Soviet courts must enhance their own levels of
alertness and sternly punish and suppress elements of the exploiting class
who transgress against Soviet laws and all those who are engaged in
counterrevolutionary activities. In this respect, the work of the Bureau
of Political Defense, the popularization of the Soviet courts, the mobiliza-
tion of the broad masses to participate in the struggle to suppress counter-
revolutionaries are of vital importance. The general orientation of the
Soviet's work in acquiring speed and quality in the work of the Soviet and
making all the work of the Soviet meet entirely with the needs of the
revolution.
4. On leading struggle against imperialism and work in White areas.
The Soviet Government must strengthen its leadership of the nationwide
struggle against imperialism and the revolutionary struggles of workers and
peasants in the Kuomintang areas in order to oppose imperialist aggression,
unfold an intense struggle of workers and peasants over the whole country
and expand the Soviet area to cover the entire nation. Apathy in this
respect is tantamount to letting loose the bandit-like aggression of
imperialism, prolonging the life of the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang
and restricting the speed and limits of the expansion of Soviet areas.
The Soviet Central Government and the various provincial soviets must
extend their views into the vast areas under the Kuomintang. They must not
only lead every anti-imperialist movement launched by the masses on their
own initiative, but also utilize each concrete fact of imperialist aggres-
sion and the Kuomintang's capitulation and national betrayal to rouse the
national and class consciousness of the masses in the ranks of the broad
masses of workers and peasants and among the petite bourgeoisie, and, call
them to organize and arm for the struggle to drive out imperialism and
defend the territory of China. Especially in the three eastern provinces
(Kirin, Heulungkiang and Liaoning), Jehol, Chahar, north China and areas
where the Japanese imperialists are attacking, organize people's revolution-
ary armies and volunteer armies, lead the original volunteer army and
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bring them out from under the reaction influence of the Kuomintang to wage
resolute war with the Japanese imperialists. The Soviet Government must
give all possible material and moral support to every one of the anti-
imperialist strikes launched by workers and the anti-imperialist struggle
of the peasants and petite bourgeoisie. The Soviet must use all possible
means to organize, help and lead workers' struggle against, the bourgeoisie
and peasants' struggle against the landlords erupting in the Kuomintang
areas. Every one of the Soviet personnel should understand that they must
place their greatest attention upon the White dominated areas if they desire
to develop the Soviet movement to envelop the entire country, create condi-
tions to transform into Soviet territory the Kuomintang dominated areas
which are several times larger than the Soviet's, establish new Soviet
areas and be able to receive the help of the masses of the White areas in
the struggle against imperialism and the massive "encirclement and suppres-
sion" of the Kuomintang. Prepared with all the material support needed,
personnel must be dispatched from the Soviet areas to organize and lead
the mass struggles in the White areas. Apathy in this respect is tantamount
to apathy toward the expansion of the Soviet area and developing the
revolution. Especially the masses in the Kuomintang areas in the vicinity
of the Soviet territories have been most heavily influenced by the Soviet
and they suffer most from the oppression of Kuomintang's military bondage
and monopoly of salt. The Soviet Government, especially the government of
the various provincial soviets, border counties and border areas must use
every opportunity to achieve a link-up with these people, organize their
daily struggles and develop them into guerrilla warfare and mass uprising,
until a Soviet area has been established and it is linked with the old
Soviet areas. In this respect, great importance should be placed on the
work done in the boundary areas between the Soviet and White territories.
In these areas, the Soviet (or the revolutionary committee) and the
guerrilla units must completely abide by the basic policies of the Soviet.
All indiscriminate beatings of local bullies without class distinction
is prohibited. Confiscated money and property of landlord bourgeoisie and
reactionaries must be distributed among the local people. Besides,
effectively resolve such problems as the confrontation of Red and White,
civilian deserters, the salt blockade and civilian victims in accordance
with the class and mass lines and eliminate the cause of confrontations
between Red and White and civilian desertion. And improvement in the work
carried out in the boundary areas is an important link in securing the
transformation of White areas into Soviet areas.
(The speech ended and was followed by a thunderous ovation.)
? Documents of the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic.
The People's Committee, March 1934.
* "Red China," special edition on the Second All-Soviet Congress, Vol 2,
26 January 1934.
* "Struggle" (Shanghai), Vol 66, 1 March 1934.
* "Only the Soviet Can Save China," 1934.
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- Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-01460R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100030001-4
Manual Trans-
Agricultural
Paper industry
Handi-
portation
worker
worker
craft in-
worker
dustry
worker
Pre-revolution
0.45 yuan
0.28 yuan
0.40 yuan
0.30 yuan
period
0.67 1/2
0.30
0.40
0.30
Prior to
1931
1 Ma
Maximum
y
wage
0.96
0.22
0.45
0.35
Current
Per day
Increase over
0.51
0.04
0.05
0.05
pre-revolution
period
Pre-revolution
0.26
0.10
0.22
0.22
period
Average
0.39
0.15
0.24
0.25
Prior to
1931
1 M
wage
ay
Per day
0.50
0.20
0.30
0.30
Current
Increase over
0.24
0.10
0.08
0.08
pre-revolution
period
Pre-revolution
0.10
0.03
0.14
0.1.0
period
Minimum
0
06
0
11
0.15
Prior to
wage
.
.
1 May 1931
Per day
0.20
0.10
0.25
0.10
Current
Increase over
0.10
0.07
0.11
0.10
pre-revolution
period
8493
CSO: 4005
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 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100030001-4
27 January 1934
[Text] Comrades! You have discussed for 2 days--in the subgroup meeting held
yesterday and in today's general conference--the report I presented on behalf
of the Central Executive Committee and the People's Committee. In these
2 days, you have made many suggestions expressing in an all-round manner the
lessons and experiences from our work done during the past 2 years. In
summation, it can be said that there was unanimous agreement with my report.
With regard to the current situation, the tasks that emerged from this
situation, the implementation of Soviet policies in various areas during the
past 2 years and shortcomings that exist in our work, there was general
agreement in the discussions you held yesterday and today. The speeches made
by the comrades were generally very correct. This should be pointed out in
the first place.
It behooves me to point out that in the discussions of yesterday and today,
mainly in the meeting of the subgroup held yesterday, incorrect views were
encompassed in the speeches made by individual comrades. These were mainly
opinions expressed on the question of the fifth "encirclement and suppression."
On this question the majority of the comrades accepted what I had said in my
report: We have won the initial victory of the fifth "encirclement and
suppression," but the final and decisive battle still faces us gravely. It
is our current most important task to call upon the broad masses, unite all
forces and strive for victory in the final and decisive battle of the fifth
"encirclement and suppression." Some comrades said in the discussion that
"the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' has been completely smashed," and
this viewpoint is obviously incorrect. Other comrades said: "We are pre-
paring to smash the fifth 'encirclement and suppression'," and this viewpoint
is also wrong. We overestimated our own victory and lightly did away with
the Soviet's task to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression," in the
end, while in reality Chiang Kai-shek is concentrating all his forces for
a final, massive offensive against us. This kind of estimation is erroneous,
and it is also very dangerous. It is erroneous not to see that the Red Army
has dealt the enemy quite a serious blow in the past several months of
arduous fighting and has won an initial victory. This kind of victory, in
combination with the great victory of smashing the fourth "encirclement and
suppression," forms a solid foundation for thoroughly smashing the fifth
"encirclement and suppression." Underestimating our own achievements is
similarly very dangerous.
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A comrade said that there was some revolutionary essence in the Fukien People's
Revolutionary Government and that it is not wholly counterrevolutionary. This
view is also wrong. In my report, I have already pointed out that the
People's Revolutionary Government is but a faction of the reactionary ruling
class, and it is a new trick used to swindle the people in order to preserve
itself from death. They regard the Soviet as an enemy, and the facade of
the Kuomintang is too dilapidated. They came up with this People's Revolu-
tionary Government, using the gambit of the third road to swindle the people
in this manner. There is not a bit of revolutionary essence to it. Current
facts have already proven this to be so.
Another comrade made erroneous remarks in the subgroup meeting. He said that
the Soviet has not expanded the Red Army, and it does not have any guerrilla
units, that the peasants still have to pay rent to the landlords. These
remarks are, of course, quite inane, and require no further explanation.
Yet another comrade said that the functionaries in Fukien were all oppor-
tunists. Without the.need of an explanation, everybody will recognize this
as erroneous. We admit that there are opportunists among some of the Soviet
functionaries fomenting trouble and we should launch resolute struggle against
such elements. But remarks such as the one the comrade made vilify the Soviet.
With regard to marriage, I have already said in my report that should one
party of the marriage resolutely request divorce, the Soviet should grant it.
It should be pointed out that the families of Red Army members are exceptions.
In order to strengthen the will to fight in a Red Army fighter, the Central
Government has resolved that a wife of a Red Army fighter can request a
divorce only with the concurrance of her husband. Divorce can be requested
by the wife alone only after 2 years have elapsed with no news from her
husband. Quite a few of the comrades have proposed lowering the eligibility
age for marriage. I do not feel that such suggestions are sound. In the
interests of the race and of the class, the marriage age should not be lower
than 20 for men and 18 for women. We should understand that early marriage
is extremely harmful. Comrades, be a little patient (loud laughter burst
forth in the conference hall). In the days under the rule of landlord
bourgeoisie, poor workers and peasants still could not marry at the age
of 40 or 50, so why is there such impatience now for 1 or 2 years? (more
laughter from the hall).
The preceding has been the first part of my conclusion, but the principal part
is still to follow.
A very important question on which the comrades have not focused their atten-
tion in the discussions is the well-being of the people with the revolution.
This question was not pointed out with emphasis in yesterday's and today's
discussions. I feel that it should be clearly set forth.
The central task of the Soviet at present is to mobilize the broad masses to
take part in the revolution, overthrow imperialism and the Kuomintang by means
of such war, spread the revolution throughout the country and drive imperialism
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out of China. Leading the revolution and organizing the revolution are cen-
tral tasks of the Soviet, and anyone who does not attach enough importance
to this central task is not a good revolutionary cadre. A good Soviet
cadre should have a clear and profound. view of this central task. If he
truly perceives this task with clarity and understands that spreading the
revolution is our basic and pressing task, that the revolution must at all
cost be spread throughout the country, then, he should in no way neglect or
underestimate the question of immediate interests, the well-being, of the
masses. Why? Because the revolution is a war of the masses. It can be
waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them. We must place this
task of waging war before the masses, and mobilize the masses on a massive
scale to participate in the war and support the war effort. Only thus can
we win victory.
If we only mobilize the people to carry on the war and do nothing else, can
we succeed in defeating the enemy? My answer is: Of course not. If we
want to win, we must do a great deal more. We must lead the peasants'
struggle for land and distribute the land to them, heighten their enthusiasm
for labor and increase agricultural production, safeguard the interests of
the workers, establish cooperatives, develop trade with outside areas and
solve the problems facing the masses--food, shelter and clothing, fuel, rice,
cooking oil and salt, sickness and hygiene, and marriage. In short, all the
practical problems in the everyday life of the masses should claim our
attention. If the Soviet attends to these problems, solves them and satis-
fies the needs of the masses, we shall really become organizers of the well-
being of the masses, and they will truly rally round us and give us their
warm support. Comrades, will we then be able to arouse them to take part in
the revolution and sacrifice everything for the war effort? Yes, indeed we
will.
Here is the kind of thing we have found among Soviet organizations. Some
of the cadres talk only about expanding the Red Army, enlarging the trans-
port corps, collecting the land tax and selling bonds; as for other matters,
they neither discuss nor attend to them, and even ignore them altogether.
For instance, there was a time when the Ting-chou Municipal Soviet Govern-
ment concerned itself with the expansion of the Red Army and with mobiliza-
tion for the transport corps, and paid not the slightest attention to the
well-being of the masses. The problems facing the people of Ting-chou city
were that they had no firewood, no salt was on sale because the capitalists
were hoarding it, some people had no houses to live in and the houses
confiscated from local despots have not yet been distributed to them, and
rice was both scarce and dear. These were practical problems for the masses
of Ting-chou and they eagerly looked toward the Soviet Government for help
in solving them. But the Ting-chou Municipal Soviet did not discuss any
of these problems. That is why when the new workers' and peasants' repre-
sentative council was elected in the city, a hundred or more representatives
were unwilling to attend after the first few council meetings had discussed
only the expansion of the Red Army and mobilization for the transport corps,
entirely ignoring the well-being of the masses, so that the council was
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unable to go on meeting. The result was that very little was achieved in
regard to the expansion of the Red Army and mobilization for the transport
corps. This was one kind of situation.
Comrades, you have probably read the pamphlets given you about two model
township soviets. There the situation is entirely different. What a great
number of people have joined the Red Army from Ch'ang-kang township in
Kiangsi and Ts'ai-hsi township in Fukien! In Ch'ang-kang township 80 percent
of the young men and women have joined the Red Army, and in Ts'ai-hsi the
figure is 88 percent. There has been a big sale of bonds, too, and 4,500 yuan
worth have been sold in Chang-kang which has a population of 1,500. Much has
also been done in other fields. What accounts for this? A few examples will
make the point clear. In Ch'ang-kang when fire broke out in a poor peasant's
house destroying one-and-a-half rooms, the township government immediately
appealed to the masses to contribute money to help him. In another instance,
three persons were starving, so the township government and the mutual-aid
society immediately gave them rice. During the food shortage last summer,
the township soviet obtained rice from Kung-lueh County's Shui-nan [3055 0589]
and Fu-t'ien [1381 3944] areas more than 200 li away for the relief of the
masses. Excellent work was done along these lines in Ts'ai-hsi as well. Such
township governments are really models. They are absolutely different from
the Ting-chou Municipal Government with its bureaucratic methods of leader-
ship. We should learn from Ch'ang-kang and T'sai-hsi townships and oppose
bureaucratic leaders like those in Ting-chou city.
I earnestly suggest to this congress that we pay close attention to the well-
being of the masses, from the problems of land and labor to those of fuel,
rice, cooking oil and salt. The women comrades want to learn plowing and
harrowing. Whom can we get to teach them? The children want to go to school.
Have we set up Lenin primary schools? The wooden bridge over there is too
narrow and people may fall off. Should we not repair it? Many people suffer
from boils and other ailments. What are we going to do about it? All such
problems concerning the well-being of the masses should be placed on our
agenda. We should discuss them, adopt and carry out decisions and check up
on the results. We should convince the masses that we represent their
interests, that our lives are intimately bound up with theirs. We should
help them to proceed from these things to an understanding of the higher
tasks which we have put forward, the tasks of the revolution, so that
they will support the revolution and spread it throughout the country,
respond to our political appeals and fight to the end for victory in the
revolution.
The masses in Ch'ang-kang say, "The Communist Party is really good! It has
thought of everything on our behalf." The comrades in Ch'ang-kang township
are an example to all of us. What admirable people! They have won the
genuine affection of the broad masses, who support their call for war
mobilization. Look, 80 percent of the able bodied in Ch'ang-kang township
have gone to the front! Do we want to win the support of the masses? Do
we want them to devote their strength to the front? If so, we must be with
them, arouse their enthusiasm and initiative, be concerned with their well-
being, work earnestly and sincerely in their interests and solve all their
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problems of production and everyday life--the problems of salt, rice, housing,
clothing, childbirth, etc. If we do so, the masses will surely support us
and regard the revolution as their most glorious banner, as their very life.
In the event of a Kuomintang attack on the Red areas they will fight the
Kuomintang to the death. There can be no doubt about this, for is it not a
plain fact that we have smashed the enemy's first, second, third and fourth
"encirclement and suppression" campaigns?
The Kuomintang is now pursuing a policy of blockhouse warfare, feverishly
constructing their "tortoise-shells" as though they were bastions of iron.
Are they really iron bastions? Not in the least! Think of the palaces of
the feudal emperors over thousands of years, were they not powerful with
their walls and moats? Yet they crumbled one after another the moment the
masses arose. The tsar of Russia was one of the world's most ferocious
rulers, yet when the proletariat and the peasantry rose in revolution, was
there anything left of him? No, nothing. His bastions of iron? They
all crumbled. Comrades! What is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses,
the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and sincerely support the
revolution. That is the real iron bastion which no force can smash, no force
whatsoever. The counterrevolution cannot smash us; on the contrary, we shall
smash it. Rallying millions upon millions of people round the revolutionary
government and expanding our revolution, we shall wipe out all counter-
revolution and take over the whole of China.
I am going to talk about the second question. I feel that this question must
also be thoughtfully brought before the Congress. The second question concerns
our methods of work.
The Soviet is the leader and organizer of the revolution as well as the leader
and organizer of the life of the masses. To develop the revolution and to
improve the life of the masses are our tasks and our objectives. With regard
to such tasks and objectives, we must not only discuss them, but also carry
them out. In this respect we are faced with the serious problem of methods
of work. It is not enough to, set tasks and decide on the objectives to be
achieved. We must also solve the problem of the methods for carrying them
out.
If our task is to cross a river, we cannot cross it without a bridge or a
boat. Unless the bridge or boat problem is solved, it is idle to speak of
crossing the river. Unless the problem of method is solved, talk about
the task is useless. Unless we pay attention to giving leadership to the
work of expanding the Red Army and devote particular care to our methods,
we will never succeed even though we recite the phrase "Expand the Red
Army" a thousand times. Like a monk, you may recite Amida Buddha from dawn
to dusk, day in and day out and it will still be Amida Buddha. No Red Army
will materialize. (general laughter).
Are there similar situations in the work of our Government? Of course, and,
indeed, not just a few! Let us take Jui-chin and Fukien as examples.
Jui-chin's recent phenomenal campaign to expand the Red Army is worthy of
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our admiration. Under the direct leadership of the Central Bureau and the
Central Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee, the Red Army was expanded
by nearly 4,000 during the 1 1/2 month period beginning 1 December. They
won the most recent campaign to expand the Red Army with phenomenal speed
by applying correct methods of work, launching struggles against opportunism
and bureaucraticism and by unfolding class struggles of the masses. As for
Fukien, the total achievements of more than 10 counties in the province
barely equal that of Jui-chin. This was possible only because of the change
in the methods of work which took place under the direct leadership of the
Central Political Bureau during the recent half month. Under the leadership
of bureaucraticism, as in December, it would not have been possible to even
equal the achievements of one county such as Jui-chin. Even Jui-chin was
able to achieve an expansion by only 30 people in the entire month of last
August. Compared with the 4,000-men expansion in the recent period of
45 days, it can be seen what a vast difference results between bureaucratic
leadership and effective and concrete leadership. Again, using the storm
troop movement launched by Jui-chin in December to expand the Red Army as
an example, hardly any achievements were made under the leadership of bureau-
craticism in such areas as Ch'eng [1004], Hsia-hsiao [0007 5135] and
Huang-po [7806 2672] in the first half of the month.
In the latter half of the month, after the storm troop leader was replaced
and work methods changed, not only was the quota for the month fulfilled but
it was also exceeded by 100 percent. This was so with the movement to expand
the Red Army. Now let us next take a look at the movement to sell bonds.
By the time Jui-chin has sold and completed collecting the money on
240,000 yuan of bonds, only 19,000 yuan was sold in Yu-tu [7184 6757] County
under the leadership of bureaucraticism, and,till today, they still have in
their boxes over 100,000 yuan of the 190,000 yuan of bonds issued to them.
Ch'ang-kang township sold 4,500 yuan in bonds, averaging 3.80 yuan per person.
If all the townships were like Ch'ang-kang, 12 million yuan worth of bonds
can be issued in the Central Soviet areas alone, but if it were like Yu-tu,
it would be hard to sell even 1 million yuan. We have been taught a very
serious lesson in the matters of leadership and work methods. We cannot
accomplish our tasks in any other field, for instance, in checking upon
land distribution, or in economic construction, or culture and education,
or our work in the new areas and the outlying districts, if all we do is
to set the tasks without attending to the methods of carrying them out,
without combating bureaucratic methods of work and adopting practical and
concrete ones, and without discarding commandist methods and adopting the
method of patient persuasion.
The comrades in Hsing-kuo have done first-rate work and deserve our praise
as model workers. The comrades in northeastern Kiangsi have done good work
and are also model soviet workers. By li=king the problem of the well-being
of the masses with that of the revolution the comrades in both these places
are simultaneously solving the problems of revolutionary methods of work and
of accomplishing their revolutionary tasks. They are working conscientously,
solving problems with minute care and shouldering their revolutionary
responsibilities in earnest. They are good organizers and leaders of bgth
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 Approved For Release 2008/03/19: CIA-RDP04-0146OR000100030001-4
revoLutioti and the welt-being of the masses, Elsewhere, too, the comrades
have made progress in their work and deserve our praise--as in some parts
of the counties of Shang-hang, Chang-t'ing and Yung.-ting in Fukien Province.
In Hsi-chiang and other places in southern Kiangsi Province; in some parts
of the counties of Ch'a-ling, Yung-hsin and Chi-an in the Hunan-Kiangsi
burder area; in some parts of Yang-Hsin County in the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi
border area; in districts and townships of many other counties in Kiangsi
Province and in Jui-chin County, which is directly under our Central
Government, progress was made.
We should, however, point out that the work done by the soviets of some
areas is far from satisfactory. And we should apply the spirit of self-
criticism to enhance our revolutionary vigilance with regard to the work of
these areas. For instance, there are many shortcomings in many places of
the Fukien-Kiangsi, Hupeh-Kiangsi and Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi areas. Similarly,
Fukien and Hunan-Kiangsi are a far cry from Kiangsi and Fukien-Chekiang.
Kiangsi area. For example, the leaders of the Fukien Provincial Government
are seriously afflicted with bureaucraticism. Many of the cadres in these
areas do not enjoy good relations with the masses. They still do not compre-
hend the need to link closely the revolution with the well-being of the masses,
to exert themselves in learning the arts of the masses and giving their
leadership. They do not understand that without good methods of work, they
absolutely will not be able to accomplish their tasks, that they should
coordinate all work with the revolution war effort. There should be a
thorough change in the work of these areas after the conclusion of the
Second All-Soviet Congress. Especially those seriously afflicted with
opportunism and bureaucraticism do not understand the situation prevailing
in the lower levels and the feelings of the masses, engaging only in idle
talk and even resorting to commandism in handling the work of the Soviet.
The Congress should sternly censure these cadres. Their views and work
methods are absolutely wrong. They hinder the work of the Soviet and are
not beneficial to the revolution. These cadres should immediately change
their ways.
In all the places under our leadership, there are undoubtedly many active
cadres, excellent comrades, who have sprung from the masses. These comrades
have a responsibility. That is to conduct a serious self-.criticism campaign
against those opportunists and bureaucrats, instruct and help them to
rapidly rectify their errors, and cleanse the Soviet of those obdurate ele-
ments who refuse to change. We are in the midst of a great revolutionary
war. We must break through the enemy's large-scale "encirclement and
suppression" and spread the revolution to all parts of the country. All
revolutionary cadres have a tremendous responsibility. After this Congress
we must adopt effective measures to improve our work, the advanced areas
should become even more advanced, and the backward areas should catch up
with the advanced. We must create thousands of townships like Chang-kang
and scores of counties like Hsing-kuo. They will be our advance strongholds.
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From these strongholds, we shall sally forth to smash the enemy's "encircle-
ment and suppression" campaigns, overthrow the rule of imperialism and the
Kuomintang throughout the country and win victory for the revolution in all
of China! (loud applause)
The conclusion of the Central Executive Committee and the People's Committee
report ends here. As for the rest, I have brought them up in the report
and will not repeat them. My conclusion,is ended. (thunderous applause)
? "Red China," special edition on the Second Congress, Vol 5, 31 January 1934.
* "Struggle" (Shanghai), Vol 66, 1 March 1934.
* Documents of the Second Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic, March 1934.
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CLOSING SPEECH
(At the Second All-Soviet Congress)
1 February 1934
[Text] Comrades! After 11 days of conference our Congress has been completely
successful. It has come to a victorious end! (applause) We decided upon the
policies and plans for nationwide victory for the Revolution! Nationwide
victory for the Revolution is in our hands! (applause) We must smash
imperialism's and the Kuomintang's "encirclement and suppression." We must
overthrow imperialism and the Kuomintang. We decided upon the policies and
plans to achieve them! (applause)
The current problem is to carry out these policies and plans 100 percent! We
must have the courage to act and act resolutely. We must heighten the en-
thusiasm of all the cadres for their work, heighten the enthusiasm and ac=tivism of the broad masses. Our responsibility is great. We are shouldering
the glorious burden of revolution placed upon us by the Congress. We must
shoulder this burden with enthusiasm, resoluteness and courage and march
forward. We certainly must shoulder this burden until we reach our desti-
nation! (applause) Smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" thoroughly,
overthrow imperialism and the Kuomintang and strive to achieve nationwide
victory for the Revolution!
Victory for the bourgeois democratic revolution throughout the country!
Victory for the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship in all parts of
Chiina! These are our objectives and we must carry the burden handed to
us by the Congress to these areas. We will reach these areas, and reach
them quickly! (applause) Is our mission accomplished after having reached
these areas with the revolutionary burden? Is the worker-peasant democratic
dictatorship our final objective? Comrades! No. The mission is not yet
accomplished, and that is not our final objective. The revolutionary
burden has to be carried to an even more distant place. Today, we shall
point out this place. It is the Socialist Revolution under the Dictatorship
of the Proletariat.
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We have not only to accomplish the democratic revolution, but also bring about
a change in the revolution and head it in the direction of socialism in the
future! We must not only overthrow the rule of imperialism and the Kuomintang
and wipe out the landlord class. We must also prepare as of now for an
opportune moment in the future to wipe out the capitalist system, the system
of man exploiting man. We must, as the Soviet Union is now doing, enter
into communism in the final stage, putting into effect the system of "from
each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," and emerge
into a free, bright and great world. Only when such a time arrives can there
be the final liberation of mankind. Only then can there be a final victory of
mankind!
The Second All-Soviet Congress closes today. We must carry out our responsi-
bilities. We must courageously shoulder the great responsibilities of the
Revolution and march forward to realize our final victory!
Long Live the Soviet!
Long Live the Victory of the Revolution!
Long live nationwide victory for the Revolution!
Long live worldwide victory for the Revolution!
Long live Socialism!
Long live Communism!
(Thunderous acclamations of joy and applause shook the conference hall.)
? "Red China," special edition on the Second Congress, Vol 7, 3 February 1934.
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ON ELECTION AT SECOND ALL-SOVIET CONGRESS AND THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
AND PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE
Notice No 1 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic
3 February 1934
[Text] The Second All-Soviet Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic formally
opened at the Red capital in the Soviet area on 21 January 1934. After
11 days of vigorous and lively debate the Congress closed with complete
success. The Congress summed up the experiences from 2 years of the Chinese
Soviet Movement, set forth the greatest fighting, historical tasks and
held concrete discussions on such important questions as the building of
the Red Army, economic construction and Soviet construction. The Congress
passed a revised Soviet Constitution and resolutions on the aforementioned
questions. Finally, the congress elected the following 175 persons as
members of the Central Executive Committee:
[1756 1795 2037], Yang Shang-kun [2799 1424 2492], Lin Piao
[2651
1753],
Nieh Yung-chen [5119 2837 5271], Tung Cheng-tang [2516 2182
1016],
Liu Po-chien [0491 0130 1017], Huang Su [7806 3836], Ts'ai
Shu-fan
[5591
Po Ku [0590 0657], Ch'en Shao-yu [7115 4801 4416], Ho Ke-ch'uan [0149 0344
0356], Liu Shao-ch'i [0491 1421 1142], Mao Tse-tung [3029 3419 2639],
Hsiang Ying [7309 5391], Wu Liang-p'ing [0702 0081 1627], Chu Chiu-pai
[4234 4428 4101], Chou Yueh-lin [0719 2588 2651], Chin Wei-ying [6855 4850
2503], Huang Fa-kuei [7806 4099 2710], Hsieh Yu-ch'in [6200 3768 2953],
Li Fu-ch'un [2621 1381 2504], Hsieh Ming-jen [6200 0682 0088], Hsiao Shih-pang
[5618 0013 2831], Lin Kuo-sung [2651 0948 1345], Huang Ch'ang-chiao [7806
7022 1293], Ts'ai Chang [5591 2545], Chung Pao-yuan [6988 5508 0337],
Lou Meng-hsia [1236 1125 0204], Chang Chi-chih [1728 4921 0037], Hsu Ta-chih
[1776 6671 1807], Ts'eng Shan [2582 1472], Chung Ch'ang-t'ao [6988 2490 2711],
Liu Ch'i-yao [0491 0796 5669], Chung Hsun-jen [6988 1789 0088], Li Cho-jen
[2621 0587 3544], Liu Kuang-ch'en [0491 1639 5256], Hsieh Hsien-se [6200
0341 [?]], Chu Teh [2612 1795], Chou En-lai [0719 1869 0171], Wang Chia-ch'iang
[3769 4471 5638], Liu Po-ch'eng [0491 0130 2110], Ho Ch'ang [6320 2490],
Ho Ch'ang-kung [0149 7022 1562], Hsi Tai-yuan [5230 0108 6678], Peng Te-huai
2885 5672], Nieh Hung-chun [5119 3163 6874], Wang Ju-ch'ih [3769 1172 4082],
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Wan Yung-cheng [5502 3057 6134], Ch'en Kuang [7115 0343], Hsun Chun-chou
[1416 0402 1558], Lo Jui-ch'ing [5012 3843 0615], Chang Chun-ch'ing [1728
4783 3237], Chou Chien-p'ing [0719 1696 1456], Chou Kun [0719 2492],
Le Shao-hua [2867 1421 5478], Chen Ah'chin [7115 7093 6855], Yuan Kuo-p'ing
[5913 0948 1627], Yeh Chien-ying [0673 0494 5391], Ch'en Yi [7115 3015],
Pi Shih-ti [3968 1102 2748], Ch'en Hung-shih [7115 3163 2514], Hsiao K'e
[5618 0344], Kung He-lung [1313 5440 7893], Chu Jui [2612 3843],
Liu Chou-hsi [0491 3985 6007], Hsu Yen-kang [1776 7346 0474], Ch'en Ch'ang-hao
[7115 2490 3185], Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien [1776 0686 0467], Chang Kuo-t'ao [1728
0948 3614], Chang Ch'in-ch'iu [1728 3830 4428], Ho Lung [6320 7893],
Kuan Hsiang-ying [7070 0686 2019], Hsia Hsi [1115 2569], Sung Pai-min
[1345 4101 3046], Wang Wei-chou [3769 4850 0719], Lo Ping-fei [5012 3521
6540], Hung Shui [3163 3055], Ts'ai Kan [5591 1626], Chang Jen-ho [1728
3544 0735], Yu Hung-wen [0151 1347 2429], Wang Shih-t'ai [3769 0013 3141],
Pan Shih-chung [3382 1102 1813], Chiang Ah-san [1203 7093 0005], Chang Kou-yi
[1728 1379 0001], Chan Ta-ts'un [0594 1129 1317], Cheng Chen-fen [6774 2182
5358], Chu Ch'i [2612 3825], Kao Chun-t'ing [7559 0193 0080], Tsang I-chin
[6124 0110 6930], Cheng Wei-san [6774 0143 0005], Wang Feng-ming [3769 7685
7686], Ch'eng Fang-wu [2052 0119 0710], Kuo Shu-shen [6753 6615 3947],
Chang Te-san [1728 1795 0005], Chu Wei-yuan [4376 4850 0997], Ku Tso-lin
[7357 0155 7207], Shao Shih-ping [6730 1709 1627], Huang Tao [7806 6670],
Chu Chao-hsiang [2612 0340 4382], Kung Shu-an [1313 2579 1344], Liu Hsiao
[0491 2556], Chung Shih-pin [6988 0013 2430], Fu Ts'ai-hsiu [0265 2088 4423],
Chou Yi-k'ai [0719 5030 7030], Liu Ming-huei [0491 2494 6540], Hsiung Hsien-pi
[3574 0103 3880], Liu Kuo-chu [0491 0948 3796], Chung Kuei-hsin [6988 2710
2450], Lo Mai [5012 6701], Ch'en Hsiang-sheng [7115 4382 3932], Lin Po-ch'u
[2651 0130 3255], Liu Ch'un-hsien [0491 5028 0341], Hu Hai [5170 3189],
Fan Le-ch'un [5400 2867 2504], Ts'eng Hung-yi [2582 3163 2496], Wu Tse-yuan
[1566 1311 0337], Chang T'ai-ho [1728 1132 0735], Huang Yi-chang [7806 1355
4545], Chang Ting-ch'eng [1728 7844 0015], Li Chien-chen [2621 6015 3791],
Wu Lan-fu [0702 5695 3940], Wu Pi-hsien [0702 1801 0341], Ch'iu Hsien-ying
[6726 0341 5391], Chang Wen-t'ien [1728 5113 1131], Ch'en Yun [7115 0061],
Wang Sheng-jung [3769 4141 2837], Teng Fa [6772 4099], Chen Tan-ch'iu
[7115 3389 4428], Pan Han-nien [3382 3352 1628], Huang Chia-kao [7806 0502
7559], Chang Yun-hsien [1728 7189 0103], Chang Chin-lou [1728 6855 2869],
Chou Shao-wen [0719 1421 2429], Ho Cheng-wu [0149 2182 0710], Ch'en Shou-ch'ang
[7115 1108 2490], Huang Kuang-pao [7806 0342 0202], T'an Yu-pao [6223 0151
0202], Liu Shih-chieh [0491 1102 2638], Wang Chen [3769 7201], Kuang piao
[2568 1753], P'eng Jen-ch'ang [1756 0088 2490], Jen Pi-shi [0117 1732 25141,
Wu Te-feng [0702 1795 1496], Wang Hsiu-chang [3769 4423 4545], Hsiung Kuo-ping
[3574 0948 3521], Yu Hung-yuan [0151 3163 6678], Li Wei-hai [2621 4850 3189],
Ho Wei [0149 3956], Li Hsien-nien [2621 0341 1819], Tseng Kuang-lan [2582
0342 3482], Chou Kuang-k'un [0719 0342 0981], Li Ch'eng-chia [2621 2052
3946], Ch'en Tse-ch'ien [7115 1311 6197]. Fang Chih-min [2455 1807 2404],
Yu Han-ch'ao [0151 3352 2600], Huang Wan-sheng [7806 5502 3932], Wang Chin-
hsiang [3076 6855 4282], Kuan Ying [7070 5391], T'u Cheng-nung [3205 2182 6593],
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Kuan Ch'un-hsiang [7070 2504 7449], Wu Yu-chang [0702 3768 4545], Shih Ti-yuan
[1136 0966 0337], Yang Chi-hsin [2799 0366 9515], Teng Cheng-hsun [6772 2182
6104], Ho Shu-heng [0149 0647 5899], Kao Tsu-li [7559 5261 4539], Liang Po-t'ai
[2733 2672 0669], Hsu T'e-li [1776 0676 4539], Yuan Hsiao-hsien [7086 0876
0103], Teng Ying-chao [6772 7336 6389], Tung Pi-wu [5516 1801 2976],
Chao Yun [6392 0061], Wang Hsien-hsuan [3769 6343 6693], Lo Tzu-ming [5012
2737 6900], Yang Shih-chu [2799 0013 3796] and Lai Mei-yu [6351 5019 3768].
The following 36 persons were elected as alternate members of the Central
Executive Committee:
Yang Ping-lung [2799 3521 7893], Hsieh Cheng-fu [6200 2182 1381], Chiu Shih-feng
[6726 2514 7364], Teng Yao-sheng [6772 1031 4141], Tung Ch'ang-sheng [5516
7022 0524], Liu Yi [0491 3015], Li Mei-ch'un [2621 5019 5028], Tsou Chung-ts'ai
[6760 0022 2088], Hsu Shun-yuan [1776 7311 3180], Hsu Ming-fu [1776 2494 1381],
Yeh Te-kuei [0673 1795 6311], Teng Tzu-hui [6772 2737 1863], Chu Yung-sheng
[2612 2837 3932], Chia Yuan [6328 0337], Feng Hsueh-feng [7458 7185 1496],
Li Yi-mang [2621 0001 3047], Li K'e-nung [2621 0344 6593], Chang Ai-p'ing
[1728 1947 5493], Lo Yung-huan [5012 2837 2719], Li Tzu-wan [2621 6337 0029],
Yen Li-chi [7346 4539 6068], Yin Jen-kuei [1438 0088 2710], Liu Yen-yu
[0491 3601 3768], Fang Ching-he [2455 2417 0735], Hsieh Ping-huang [6200
3521 3552], Chung Yi-chin [6988 5030 6210], HuangFu-wu [7806 1381 2976],
Fang Cheng-hua [2455 2182 5478], Tsou Tun-hou [6760 2415 0624], Liao Han-hua
[1675 3352 5478], Lung Chun-shan [7893 2504 1472], Hua Hsin-hsiang [5478 2450
3276], Chou Kuei-hsiang [0719 2710 7449], Kuan Chu-ch'uan [2568 2612 2938],
Teng P'ing [6772 5493] and K'ang Ke-ch'ing [1660 0344 3237].
The Central Executive Committee is composed of 211 regular and alternate
members. It will be the supreme political power after the All-Soviet
Congress is concluded.
On 3 February, the Central Executive Committee convened its first meeting,
and the following were unanimously elected to the 17-member Presidium,
which will be the supreme political power organization after the conclusion
of the Executive Committee meeting:
Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Chu Teh, Chang Wen-t'ien, Po Ku,
Chou En-lai, Chu Ch'iu-po, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chen Yun, Lin Po-ch'u, Teng Cheng-
hsun, Chu Ti-yuan [2612 0966 0337], Teng Fa, Fang Chi-min, Lo Mai and
Chou Yueh-lin.
Mao Tse-tung was elected chairman and Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-tao vice
chairmen of the Presidium.
Chang Wen-t'ien [Luo Pu - 3157 3184] was also elected as chairman of the
People's Committee. Eleven people's departments have been set up under the
People's Committee as administrative organs of the Central Government:
Wang Chia-chiang, committee member for foreign affairs, Chu Teh for military
affairs, Teng Cheng-hsun for labor affairs, Kao Tzu-li for land,
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Lin Po-ch'u for finance, Wu Liang-p'ing for national economy, Cheng Tan-ch'iu
for food grains, Liang Po-t'ai for judicial, Ts'eng Shan for interior,
Chu Ch'iu-pai for education and Hsiang Ying for the worker-peasant
procuratorate.
Chu Teh was elected as chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Affairs
Committee, Chou En-lai and Wang Chia-chiang as vice chairmen of the Military
Affairs Committee.
Yuan Hsiao-hsien was elected as chairman of the Committee for Audits.
Tung Pi-wu was appointed as chairman of the Provisional Supreme Court.
Besides accepting in full all of the fighting tasks assigned to us by the
Second All-Soviet Congress, the Central Executive Committee called upon all
cadres to urgently mobilize, step up the pace of their own work, mobilize
the greatest number of workers and peasants to unite solidly around the
Soviet Government, concentrate all forces, develop the Revolution and struggle
to thoroughly smash the imperialist's and the Kuomintang's fifth "encirclement
and suppression'' and win victory for the Soviet throughout China!
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman. Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-tao, Vice Chairmen.
3 February 1934 A.D.
? "Red China," Vol 148, 12 February 1934.
* No 1 notice of the Central Executive Committee, Chinese Soviet Republic
5 February 1934.
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DECLARATION ON THE FUKIEN INCIDENT
11 February 1934
[Text] Masses of all China!
The so-called People's Revolutionary Government of Fukien, due to the armed
intervention of Chiang Kai-shek and the surrender and sellout by the leaders
of the People's Revolutionary Government, is finally defeated.
The leaders of the Fukien People's Revolutionary Government were severely
attacked last year at Lien-ch'eng and Min-pei by our Workers and Peasants
Red Army and Eastern Army. They now know that temporary concessions of the
soviet and Red Army are the necessary condition for maintaining their
available forces and rule. At the same time, the bankruptcy of the
traitorous and oppressive Kuomintang rule, the growing anger and resistance
of the tens of millions of worker-peasant masses to the imperialist Kuomintang
and their sympathy and support for the anti-imperialist, anti-Kuomintang
soviet Red Army gave the bureaucrats, politicians and militarists of the
Fukien Kuomintang Provincial Government and 19th Route Army at that time no
choice but to seek modes of rule besides those of the Kuomintang. They came
to preserve the entire rule of the landlord and bourgeois class.
At that time, the bureaucrats, politicians and militarists of the Fukien
Provincial Government and 19th Route Army first sent a special envoy,
Hsu Ming-hung [1776 0682 7703], to the soviet Central Government where he
indicated he was willing to accept the three provisions of the soviet Central
Government and Revolutionary Military Committee, that is, 1) immediate halt
to attacks on soviet areas; 2) immediate guarantee of freedoms and rights
of the masses to speak, assemble, form associations and strike; and
3) immediate establishment of a volunteer army of the armed masses to safe-
guard China and to strive for the independence, unification and territorial
integrity of China.
The soviet government completely understood this scheme of the bureaucrats,
politicians and militarists of the Fukien Kuomintang Provincial Government
and 19th Route Army of that time. All the empty words absolutely could not
fool the leaders of the soviet government. On the other hand, according to
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its own declaration, the soviet government was willing to provide real impetus
and support to all anti-imperialist and anti-Chiang plans. The soviet govern-
ment and Worker-Peasants Red Army of that time, with the representatives of
the Fukien Provincial Government and 19th Route Army permitted to accept all
of our demands and conditions, and according to our own basic revolutionary
position, drew up a preliminary agreement with them. From the very beginning,
the leaders of the soviet government told the representatives of the Fukien
Provincial Government and 19th Route Army that only if they resolutely wage
and back the anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist, anti-Chiang revolutionary
struggle of the broad masses, arm them and give them all the democratic
freedoms and rights, can they save the Chinese nation from perishing. Any
reformist deceptive propaganda can only serve as an additional tool for the
imperialist Kuomintang.
After the representatives of the Fukien Provincial Government and 19th Route
Army drew up the preliminary agreement with the soviet government and Worker-
Peasant Red Army, they stated that they would separate from the Kuomintang,
announced some "left" reformist political programs and openly published
declarations opposing Chiang Kai-shek of the Nanking Kuomintang Government.
This was just lip service. In reality, they still colluded with the Japanese
and American imperialists as before and toadied to them. They kept silent
and did not make a sound about the provocations of the Japanese ronin in
Foochow. In respect to allowing democratic rights for. the masses and arming
the masses, on the pretext that it was wartime, they did not make good on
any of their promises. As for the workers, peasants and all toilers, not
only did they not have any concrete methods to improve their life but on
the contrary, they made every effort to prohibit the workers' struggle to
strike and the peasants' struggle to resist the landlords and seize land.
Militarily, they completely took the defeatist line. Faced with Chiang Kai-
shek's relentless attacks, first of all they offered no concrete military
deployment whatsoever and then they surrendered and sold out again and
again, from the direct mutiny of Ssu-t'u Fei [0674 1778 7236] and
T'an Ch'i-hsiu [6223 0796 4423] to Shen Kuang-han [3098 0342 3352],
Mao Wei-shou [3029 4850 1108], Ou Shou-nien [0575 1108 1628] and
Chang Yen [1728 3508]. The militarists of the 19th Route Army, the likes
of Chiang Kuang-ting [5592 0342 7844] and Ts'ai Ting-chieh [5591 1694
6946], retreated without a fight and surrendered the Kwangtung militarists
to save themselves. Many other bureaucrats and politicians, the likes of
Ch'en Ming-shu [7115 6900 2873], Ch'en Yu-jen [7115 0645 0088] and Huang
Ch'i-hsiang [7806 3825 5046], spent all day in empty talk and deceiving
the masses. As soon as they heard a shot they flew away as chickens,
scattered as dogs and fled for their lives to imperialist legations and
warships. Although our Red Army had already taken positive action in
Min-pei and occupied Sha-hsien to Yu-ch'i in order to coordinate their
anti-Chiang struggle, it was still of no help to those packs of jackals.
The soviet government and the Worker and Peasant Red Army had already warned
the People's Revolutionary Government again according to the preliminary
agreement that only by realizing every provision of the agreement and
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launching the revolutionary struggle of the broad masses could they defeat
the armed attacks of Chiang Kai-shek and go right on to oppose the Japanese
imperialists. The warning of the soviet government and Worker-Peasant Red
Army could not get the attention of the bureaucrats, politicians and
militarists in the People's Revolutionary Government. They looked on the
masses as enemies and they did not have the slightest difference from other
Kuomintang bureaucrats, politicians and militarists. As a result, just as
we said, the People's Revolutionary Government, faced with Chiang Kai-shek,
concluded its sad fate of over 50 days.
Masses of all China! You can see fully from the preliminary agreement drawn
up by the soviet government and the People's Revolutionary Government and
from the soviet government's delegram how the soviet government and the
4 Worker-Peasant Red Army are unwavering in the struggle to oppose Japanese
imperialism and its lackey Chiang Kai-shek and for the thorough liberation
of the Chinese nation. All the facts prove that only the soviet government
and the Worker-Peasant Red Army are the anti-imperialist vanguard that can
liberate China from the iron heel of the imperialist Kuomintang. All the
reformist factions, from the Productive Masses Party, Social Democratic
Party and Third Party, right down to the Trotskyite Ch'en Tu-hsiu [7115
3747 4423] liquidationists were all nothing but yes-men to the imperialist
Kuomintang and accomplices with the imperialist Kuomintang in opposing the
Chinese revolutionary masses!
The soviet Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Committee declare
once more to the masses of all China, revolutionary soldiers and all armed
ranks, that just because of the defeat of the Fukien People's Revolutionary
Government or the breaking of the agreement by the bureaucrats, politicians
and militarists in the People's Revolutionary Government, the soviet govern-
ment absolutely will not forsake [two characters deleted] the proposals
of the battle agreement drawn up and fought for under the three conditions
of the past. On the contrary, through the Fukien incident, every worker,
every peasant, every soldier, every intellectual and anti-Japanese Chinese
can see even more clearly that the soviet government, not in lip service
but in actual deed, is willing to unite with all the armed forces which can
truly resist Japn and oppose Chiang and strive for the independence, freedom
and liberation of the Chinese nation. All those who can truly resist Japan
and oppose Chiang as well as all anti-imperialist and anti-Kuomintang forces
can obtain strong guidance and support from the soviet government and
Worker-Peasant Red Army but the soviet government and the Worker-Peasant
Red Army will continue to attack and expose mercilessly all counterrevolu-
tionary reformist factions which attempt to preserve imperialism and the
Chinese landlord and bourgeois rule with empty promises and deceptive
propaganda.
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Masses of all China! The disastrous history of the Fukien People's Revolu-
tionary Government pointed out again that only with your own brave,
resolute struggle can you finally overthrow the rule of the imperialist
Kuomintang and assure China's independence, freedom and territorial
integrity. The victorious and successful experience of tens of millions
of workers in the vast soviet areas of China tells you that only the soviet
road can attain the national and social liberation of the masses nationwide!
If you oppose the attacks of the imperialist Kuomintang against the soviet
areas and safeguard the Chinese soviet, you are safeguarding the Chinese
revolution and assuring your own victory!
Anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist forces of all China unite!
Smash the five "encirclement and suppression" of the imperialist Kuomintang!
Down with Japanese and all imperialism!
Down with the traitorous Nanking Kuomintang Government and all Kuomintang
governments!
Long live anti-imperialist soviet China!
11 February 1934
? "Red China," No 149, 14 February 1934
Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China.
Chu Teh, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Committee.
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ORGANIC LAW OF THE CENTRAL SOVIET
17 February 1934
[Text] Order of the Executive Committee, Provisional Central Government,
Chinese Soviet Republic
The Organic Law of the Central Soviet, Chinese Soviet Republic,.is hereby
proclaimed.
First writing
17 February 1934
Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, vice chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, vice chairman
Chapter 1. General Rules
Article 1
This organic law is drawn up in accordance with the general principles of the
Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic. The central organs of political
power of the soviet must be organized in accordance with this law.
Chapter 2. All-China Soviet Congress
Article 2
The All-China Soviet Congress is the highest organ of political power of the
Chinese Soviet Republic.
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The representatives to the All-China Soviet Congress are elected from each
of the provincial Soviet congresses, Soviet congresses of counties directly
subordinate. to the Central Government and Red Army.
The All-China Soviet Congress is convened once every 2 years by the Central
Executive Committee. If it cannot meet due to special circumstances, the
meeting time is postponed.
An ad-hoc Congress of the All-China Soviet is convened automatically when
necessary by the Central Executive Committee or when local soviets represent-
ing one-third of the population of the whole country demand that the Central
Executive Committee convene it.
The All-China Soviet Congress hears reports by the Central Executive Committee
and discusses them, draws up and revises the Constitution and other laws,
decides the general political policy of the whole country and reorganizes
the Central Executive Committee.
Chapter 3. Central Executive Committee
Article 7
The Central Executive Committee is the supreme organ of political power
when the All-China Soviet Congress is not in session.
Article 8
The membership of the Central Executive Committee is not to exceed 585 persons.
Article 9
A plenary session of the Central Executive Committee is convened once every
6 months by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. If it cannot
meet due to special circumstances, the meeting time is postponed.
An ad-hoc session of the Central Executive Committee is convened by resolu-
tion of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee or on.demand by
over one-half the membership of the Central Executive Committee.
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The Central Executive Committee of the All-China Soviet Congress is responsible
for making working reports to the All-China Soviet Congress.
The Central Executive Committee promulgates various laws and orders and puts
them into effect throughout the Chinese Soviet Republic.
The Central Executive Committee reviews and ratifies all nationwide political
and economic policies and changes in the state organs.
The Central Executive Committee has the right to suspend and alter decrees
and resolutions of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, People's
Council and other organs.
The Central Executive Committee elects the Presidium, the membership of which
is not to exceed 25 persons. It also elects one chairman and two to four
vice chairmen.
The Central Executive Committee elects the People's Council and its chairman.
Those elected to the People's Council should be members of the Central
Executive Committee.
Chapter 4. Presidium of the Central Executive Committee
The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee is the highest organ of
political power nationwide when the Central Executive Committee is not in
session.
The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee supervises the implementa-
tion of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the decrees and
resolutions of the All-China Soviet Congress.
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The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee has the right to suspend or
alter resolutions and decrees of the people's commissariats.
The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee has the right to suspend or
alter the resolutions and decrees of the people's commissariats.
The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee has the right to promulgate
various laws and orders and it has the right to review and ratify decrees,
regulations and orders proposed by the People's Council and by the people's
commissariats and other subordinate organs.
The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee settles problems on relations
between the People's Council and the people's commissariats and problems on
the relations between the provincial soviets.
The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee bears full responsibility
to the Central Executive Committee and must make working reports to the
Central Executive Committee.
Chapter S. Powers of the All-China Soviet Congress and Central Executive
Committee
The powers of the All-China Soviet Congress and Central Executive Committee
are stipulated as follows:
(1) To promulgate and amend the Constitution.
(Note) This item is the exclusive right of the All-China Soviet Congress.
(2) To conclude various foreign treaties and ratify international treaties
on behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic.
(3) To draw up the system and organization of courts and promulgate civil,
criminal and litigational laws.
(4) To promulgate the Labor Law, Land Law, Election Law, Marriage Law,
Soviet Organic Law and all special laws.
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(5) To decide the general direction of domestic and foreign policy.
(6) To revise state boundaries.
(7) To define the powers of the local soviets and solve disputes between
local soviets.
(8) To divide up administrative units, with the right to establish and
remold or dissolve local organs of political power.
(9) To declare war and make peace.
(10) To fix weights, measures and currency.
(11) To issue bonds at home and abroad.
(12) To review and ratify the budget and final account.
(13) To set the tax rate.
(14) To organize and direct the armed forces.
(15) To establish the civil rights of the nation of the Chinese Soviet
Republic and the residency and civil rights of other nationalities living
in the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic.
(16) To declare total or partial amnesty.
(17) To establish the general principles of national education.
(18) To appoint and remove the members and chairmen of the People's Council.
(19) To formulate policies and plans for industry, agriculture, commerce
and communications.
(20) To conclude treaties on behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic with
nationalities in the territory of China to organize soviet federal republics.
(21) To exercise the right to replace and alter the membership of the
subordinate Soviet Executive committees.
Chapter 6. People's Council
Article 25
The People's Council is the administrative organ of the Central Executive
Committee and is responsible for directing the political affairs of the
whole country.
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The People's Council consists of the following members:
(1) The Chairman of the People's Council,
(2) The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs
(3) The People's Commissar of Labor,
(4) The People's Commissar of Land,
(5) The People's Commissar of Military Affairs,
(6) The People's Commissar of Finance,
(7) The People's Commissar of National Economy,
(8) The People's Commissar of Food,
(.9) The People's Commissar of Education,
(10) The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs,
(11) The People's Commissar of Justice,
(12) The Chairman of the Worker-Peasant Procurators Committee.
Note (1): As the need arises, the people's commissars may be increased
by the Central Executive Committee at any time.
Note (2) The name, people's commissar, can be applied only to the members
of the People's Council. Other central and local committee members cannot
use this name.
Article 27
With the object of suppressing counterrevolution, the State Bureau of
Political Security is established as a separate organization under the
People's Council.
To reach the objective of Article 25 of this Organic Law, the People's
Council, within the scope set by the Central Executive Committee, promulgates
various decrees and regulations and adopts appropriate administrative
guidelines to maintain speed and orderliness in administration.
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The resolutions of, and the various degrees and regulations promulgated by,
the People's Council must be reported to the Presidium of the Central
Executive Committee.
Resolutions of the People's Council, such as those pertaining to the general
political policy, should be submitted to the Central Executive Committee or
its Presidium for review and ratification. In case of emergency, however,
the People's Council must settle the issue and report to the Central
Executive Committee or its Presidium.
The People's Council has the right to review, revise or suspend decrees and
resolutions proposed by the people's commissariats.
When the people's commissariats and provincial soviet executive committees
disagree with the resolutions and decrees of the People's Council, they
may present their opinion to the Central Executive Committee or its Presidium
but they must not suspend enforcement.
The People's Council is responsible to the Central Executive Committee and
its Presidium for making reports to them periodically.
Chapter 7. Supreme Court
To ensure the effectiveness of the revolutionary laws of the Chinese Soviet
Republic, the Supreme Court is established under the Central Executive
Committee.
The Supreme Court includes a president and two vice presidents appointed by
the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.
Under the Supreme Court, are established criminal courts, civil courts and
military courts, each with a director.
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Article 37
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is stipulated as follows:
(1) To make legal interpretations of the general laws.
(2) To review the decisions and resolutions of the provincial courts and
higher military courts.
(3) To review cases of violation of the law by members of the higher organs,
excluding members of the Central Executive Committee, committed during their
term of office (cases of violation of the law by members of the Central
Executive Committee are handled separately by the Central Executive Committee
or Presidium),
(4) To try cases appealed against decisions of the provincial courts or
higher military courts or cases in which the procurator lodges a protest
in disagreement with decisions by the provincial courts or higher military
courts.
A committee is organized in the Supreme Court, its membership stipulated as
needed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, with the presi-
dent of the Supreme Court as its chairman, to discuss and decide important
questions and cases on the functions and powers of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court includes a chief procurator, a vice chief procurator and a
number of procurators. The chief procurator and vice chief procutator are
appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.
Article 40
The detailed organization of the Supreme Court is set down elsewhere.
Chpater 8. Audit Committee
Article 41
The Audit Committee is established under the Central Executive Committee.
Its functions and powers are:
(1) To audit the state annual revenues aad expenditures.
(.2) To supervise the administration of the state budget.
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The Audit Committee consists of five to nine members appointed by the Central
Executive Committee.
The Audit Committee establishes a chairman and vice chairman. The other
members are installed as needed.
Chapter 9. People's Commissariats and Councils of Commissars
Under the People's Council are established the People's Commissariats of
Foreign Affairs, Labor, Land, Military Affairs, Finance, National Economy,
Food, Education, Internal Affairs and Justice.
The people's commissariats include one or two deputy people's commissars,
appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, to assist in
the work of the people's commissars and to assume the duties of the people's
commissar when the people's commissar is absent.
To facilitate the work of the people's commissariats, councils of commissars
are established under the people's commissariats to discuss and recommend
working organs for the commissariats.
The members of the councils of commissars are appointed by the People's
Council. The membership is increased or decreased as stipulated at any
time by the People's Council. The people's commissars are the ex officio
chairmen of the councils of commissars of the commissariats.
Each people's commissar has the sole-power to solve all problems in his
jurisdiction. However, important problems must be submitted to the Council
of Commissars of the commissariat for discussion. If the Council of
Commissars differs with the decision of the people's commissar, it has the
right to submit it to the People's Council or to the Presidium of the
Central Executive Committee.
The duties and detailed organization of the people's commissariats are set
down elsewhere.
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The functions, powers and organization of the Revolutionary Military Commis-
sion and Worker-Peasant Procurators Committee are set down elsewhere.
Chapter 10. Supplementary Provision
Article 51
This Organic Law goes into effect from the day of proclamation.
? Document of the Second All-China Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic.
March 1934.
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PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE UTILIZATION OF AUXILIARY LABOR
20 February 1934
[Text] Order of the Executive Committee, Provisional Central Government,
Chinese Soviet Republic.
The Provisional Regulations Governing the Utilization of Auxiliary Labor are
hereby proclaimed.
Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, vice chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, vice chairman
Article 1
These regulations are drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Note 1,
Article l of the Labor Law promulgated 15 October 1933. All rely on their
own labor for their livelihood but middle peasants, poor peasants, small
boat operators and small handicraftsmen with insufficient labor who employ
the labor of others to assist their own labor insufficiency, so long as they
observe these regulations, are exempt from the various restrictions of the
Labor Law. However, rich peasants who regularly exploit the labor of others
and enterprises, organs, shops and workshops which regularly employ two or
more persons, cannot apply these regulations.
The labor placement procedures for employing auxiliary labor are carried out
in accordance with the general provisions of the Labor Law on hiring proce-
dures. During the busy farming season or other periods of seasonal work,
the employer who employs seasonal workers must recruit his own laborers but
he must report to the employment agent.
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The average actual working hours per day for laborers hired as auxiliary
labor cannot exceed 8 hours. The worker can, if he wishes, work overtime,
providing the overtime does not exceed 4 hours in 2 consecutive days.
The average actual working hours per day for minors hired as auxiliary labor
generally cannot exceed 6 hours but when the job requires the equivalent of
an adult's working time, with the agreement of the employee, the employer can
require the employee to extend the appropriate working hours and work over-
time but such working hours have the same restrictions as the same job done
by an adult.
The actual working time and break time per day are agreed on by both the
employer and employee before the job. If it amounts to full-time for a
month it must be agreed on in a contract.
There should be one to two breaks in the morning and afternoon every day for
tea and smoking breaks. At noon there should be a longer break for eating
and a nap. These breaks are not included in figuring the actual work hours.
(Note:) Women nurse their children during the break time.
On a full-time, month-long job, for every legal holiday that should be taken
off with pay but that is not taken off on the day of the holiday, within an
appropriate time, a number of compensatory days may be taken off.
Commemoration days stipulated in the Labor Law and local revolutionary
commemoration days stipulated by the local governments are holidays for all.
Those who do conduct work on commemoration days, no matter whether it is
full-time for a month or part-time, must obtain the agreement of the worker
and pay all double time.
Vacation time limits, vacation procedures and wages for vacation periods for
laborers hired as auxiliary labor who work continuously for over 5 1/2 months,
are governed by Articles 26, 27 and 28 of the Labor Law.
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The amount of wages due and payment procedures for all laborers hired as
auxiliary labor, must be stipulated in a contract. If it is part-time work,
it must be agreed upon by both the employer and worker before the job but it
can never be less than the minimum wage promulgated by the local government.
Wages are paid mainly in the local common currency but with the agreement of
the employee, goods may be substituted for wages.'
Wages cannot be postponed. The pay day for each pay period of a full-time
month-long job must be stipulated in a contract.
Overtime wages must be paid for overtime work beyond the legal hours. The
payment procedures for overtime wages must be stipulated in a contract. If
it is part-time, it must be agreed upon before the job.
For all those who perform work hazardous to the health (such as carrying
manure or dismantling or demolishing houses), the employer must provide the
employee with gear such as aprons and must provide special food such as
eggs and meat.
The employee's lodging site must be placed in a clean, healthy location.
The employee cannot be ordered to lodge close to ash sheds, stables or
outhouses. In cold weather, the employee must be provided cotton quilts
and in hot weather, must be provided mosquito netting or mosquito repellent.
The meals the employer serves to the employee must be the same as the
employer's and there must be enough food.
Article 17
Women employees, if full-time, must be given 2 months leave with pay before
and after giving birth. Wages for this leave time must be paid by the
employer.
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If an employee who undertakes a full-time job to last continuously for over
6 months gets sick or injured after completing 2 months, medical care and
wages are provided for 1 month by the employer. Those who have not completed
2 months are governed by Article 19.
If an employee who undertakes a job by the month to last continuously for
over 3 months gets sick or injured after completing 1 month, the employer
is responsible for medical care and wages for 1 week. Those who have. not
completed 1 month are governed by Article 20.
If those working by the month for a month get sick or injured after complet-
ing 10 days, the employer is responsible for medical care and wages for
3 days. Those who have not completed 10 days are governed by Article 21
If an employee on part-time day-work gets sick or injured on the job, wages
and medicine for that day must be provided.
If a laborer who is hired as auxiliary labor dies during the period of
employment, the employer must provide the employee's dependents with
funeral expenses. This allowance is paid according to the following
procedures:
(1) If a full-time employee dies from a work-related illness or injury, no
matter whether the employee is permanent or temporary, an allowance of
2 months of the employee's wages must be provided. If the death is due to
ordinary causes, if the employee has worked 1 full month, the employer must
provide the employee's dependents with 1 1/2 months of the employee's wages
as a death and funeral allowance. If the employee has not worked 1 full
month, the employer must provide the employee's dependents with 1 month of
the employee's wages as a death and funeral allowance.
(2) If an employee hired by the month dies from a work-related illness or
injury, whether the employee is permanent or temporary, the employer must
provide the employee's dependents with 1 month of the employee's wages as
a death allowance. If the death is due to an ordinary illness or injury,
if the employee has worked 10 full days, the employer must provide the
employee's dependents with half-a-month of the employee's wages as a death
and funeral allowance. If the employee has not worked 10 full days, the
employer must provide the employee's dependents with 10 days of the
employee's wages as a death and funeral allowance.
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(3) If a part-time employee dies from a work-related injury, the employer
must provide the employee's dependents with 10 yuan for the employee's
funeral expenses.
Article 23
These regulations go into effect the day of proclamation.
? (Provisional Regulations Governing the Utilization of Auxiliary Labor)
* Compilation of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents, Vol 5, 1935.
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JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
8 April 1934
[Text] By Order of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet
Republic No 5
This is a proclamation of the promulgated judicial procedure of the Chinese
Soviet Republic, 8 April 1934
Mao Tse-tung, chairman
Hsiang Ying, Chang Kuo-t'ao, vice chairmen
In the situation of a civil war, the soviet courts, political security bureaus,
committee for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries and other organs should
adopt speedily resolute and correct methods to suppress counterrevolutionaries
and guarantee the victory of the revolutionary people, and consolidate the
soviet regime. The following judicial procedures have, therefore, been
specially set forth:
1. The special agent of the area Security Bureau, the area Procurator's
Court, the area Committee for the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries
(that is under the Revolutionary Committee of the new soviet areas), the
People's Police, Labor courts all have the authority to arrest counter-
revolutionaries and others who should be apprehended. The law prohibiting
the area from arresting a person without permission from higher levels
should be abolished, and it is also set forth that when there is an emer-
gency, the township and city soviets and the rural and urban revolutionary
committees have the authority to arrest counterrevolutionaries and other
important criminals provided they have received the support of the local
revolutionary masses. After apprehension they are to be handed over to
counterrevolutionary suppression organizations of the area level.
2. The Procurator's Court and the Committee for the Suppression of Counter-
revolutionaries of the soviet area have the authority to bring to trial and
sentence all local criminals (counterrevolutionaries and others as well).
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At times of emergency mobilizations (such as the land inspection movement,
the expansion of the Red Army and launching surprise attacks), the Procurator
Department of the area, the area Committee for the Suppression of Counter-
revolutionaries, with the support of the revolutionary people, have the right
to apprehend criminals such as gentry and landlords in the new border areas,
areas where the enemy is carrying out its offensives and, in areas where
counterrevolution is especially active, have them executed immediately
after they have been tried'. After the sentence has been carried out,
however, it must be reported to higher echelons for handling.
3. The procurator departments of the county and provincial levels, the
c Committee for the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries, the preliminary
level and higher courts of the military all have the authority to apprehend,
bring to trial and sentence, as well as carrying out the sentencing (includ-
ing the death sentence) of all criminals.
4. The state's bureaus of political security at various levels have the
authority to pre-try all cases concerning counterrevolution. They are to be
handed over to the courts for handling afterward. The security bureaus of
the border areas and of the Red Army on the fronts have the authority to take
direct action against enemy spying, against fascist imperialists, armed
groups of bandits and counterrevolutionary landlords and gentry without going
through the courts. Emergency action may be taken by the State Political
Security Bureau and its local bureaus, the branch bureau of the Red Army and
the military zone in serious and urgent cases of counterrevolution. If
disputes arise between the local government and military and political
leaders or other organizations after action was taken, the decision to decide
the correctness or error of the action rests with the People's Committee and
with the provincial presidium in areas which are not connected with the
Central Soviet area.
5. The system of approval from higher levels is abolished and the system of
reporting to higher echelons will be carried out instead. Criminals are
permitted to appeal if they are not satisfied with the sentence meted out.
The period of appeal available will be 7 days at a maximum, beginning from
the day the document of judgment is handed over to the defendant (verbal
explanations must be given to illiterates).
In areas under enemy attack and under other emergency situations, the right
to appeal may be refused in cases of counterrevolutionaor landlords and
gentry who have committed crimes.
6. It is hereby resolved that the soviet courts will function on a two-level
system of preliminary hearings and final trials. If preliminary hearings
are held by the area, the county will carry out the final trial. When the
county is the one that carries out the preliminary hearings, the final trial
will be held at the provincial level. If the military courts happen to be
the organs holding the preliminary hearings, then the final trial will be
held by the Supreme Court. In the structure of trial functions the Supreme
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Court is the final organization. All cases cannot be appealed after proceed-
ing through these two trials and sentence passed. But, should the procurator
feel that there are points of disagreements after going through the two trials,
he can protest against a judicial organization and have the case retried.
7. Except for those organizations so named in this functional system, no
other organizations will have the authority to apprehend, bring to trial
and pass judgment on any criminals. Only emergency situations are the
exceptions.
8. The judicial procedures set forth in the provisional procedures of mili-
tary courts published on 1 February 1932, the provisional trial procedures
and organizations of courts, published on 9 June 1932 and Ordinance No 6
proclaimed by the Central Executive Committee on 16 December 1931 are here-
with rescinded.
? Dictionary of Soviet Laws, Vol 2. Department of the People's Committee
on Judicial Procedures (Moscow), July 1934.
* Compilation of the Red Bandit Reactionary Documents, 1935.
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REGULATIONS GOVERNING PUNISHMENTS OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES
8 April 1934
.[Text] By Order of the Chinese Soviet Republic Central Executive Committee,
Directive on the proclamation of the laws governing the punishment of counter-
revolutionaries, 8 April 1934
Mao Tse-tung, chairman
Hsiang Ying, Chang Kuo-t'ao, vice chairmen
Article 1
Punishment will be meted out in accordance with these laws to all who are
guilty of the offenses listed regardless of whether he is Chinese or a
foreigner, or whether the crime was committed within or without the terri-
tories of the Chinese Soviet Republic.
Regardless of the means used, all attempts to overthrow or sabotage the
authority of the Soviet Government and the authority won by the worker-
peasant revolution in order to preserve or restore the rulers of the gentry
class or the landlord bourgeoisie are counterrevolutionary activities.
(Note:) The term counterrevolutionary criminal activities against the
Soviet or within the Soviet territories includes all criminal activities
against the revolution, against the revolutionary committee or areas under
its jurisdiction.
The death penalty will be passed on those who organize armed forces against
the revolution and groups of bandits to aggress on the territories of the
soviets, or those who incite the people residing within the soviet terri-
tories to engage in counterrevolutionary activities.
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All those who collude with the imperialist Kuomintang warlords to attack
Soviet territories by force, or resist the movements of the Red Army will
be given the death sentence.
Organizers of various counterrevolutionary groups to oppose or sabotage the
Soviet in an attempt to preserve or restore the rulers of the gentry class
and the landlord bourgeoisie shall be given the death penalty. A minimum
of 3 years' imprisonment will be given to those offenders of lesser gravity.
Organizing or inciting the people to refuse payment of taxes or from dis-
charging other obligations in order to harm the Soviet will be given the
death sentence. A minimum of 1 year imprisonment will be imposed on those
with lesser offenses.
The death penalty will be passed on those who deliberately oppose or sabotage
the various laws and other various enterprises engaged in by the Soviet with
the objective to counter the revolution. Lesser offenders will be given a
minimum of 1 year imprisonment.
Those who infiltrated Soviet organizations or Soviet enterprises in order
to rob the Soviet of its political power or its enterprises with the objective
of countering the revolution will be given the death sentence. Where cir-
cumstances are of lesser gravity, a minimum sentence of 2 years will be
imposed.
With counterrevolution as the objective, those who commit murder or harmful
acts against the Soviet Government, the Red Army, workers of revolutionary
groups and other revolutionaries, the person who gave the instructions or
the person who actually performs the act will receive the death penalty, re-
gardless of the means used.
Anyone who spies, or who passes along, steals or collects various sensitive
materials of state on military secrets with the objective of counter-
revolution or to seek rewards in the service of the counterrevolutionaries
will be given the death penalty. Those who are lazy in performance of duties
and unwittingly reveal these aforementioned secrets will receive a sentence
of from 1 to 5 years.
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The death penalty will be given to those who have held positions of high
responsibilities with the counterrevolutionary rulers and actively oppose
the interests of the workers and peasants and the revolutionary movement.
The penalty may be commuted to a lesser one when the circumstances are special.
Those who with counterrevolution as their objective use reactionary litera-
ture, pictures, lectures and discussions to encourage and make propaganda
to residents and Red fighters, or create rumors to bring panic to society,
sabotage the confidence in the Soviet and the Red Army, will be sentenced
to death. Lighter offenses will be given imprisonment of 6 months or more.
Manufacturing and retaining various literature, picrures, of a provocative
nature to use in making counterrevolutionary propaganda will be sentenced
to imprisonment from 1 to 5 years.
Using religious superstition to instigate people to sabotage the Soviet and
its laws with counterrevolution in mind will be given the death penalty.
Lighter offenses will be given terms of imprisonment for a period of
6 months or more.
The death penalty will be given to those (revolutionary renegades) who
surrender to the counterrevolution and turn over to them all State secrets,
or actively help the counterrevolution to oppose the Soviet and the Red
Army.
Those taking weapons and other military supplies and surrendering to the enemy,
persuading or organizing others to surrender to the enemy will all be
sentenced to death.
Article 17
The death penalty will be given to those who infiltrate revolutionary armed
troops in an attempt to sabotage or take over to help the enemy with the
objective of countering the revolution.
Article 18
The death penalty will be given to all who lead or organize Red fighters
to flee. This also applies to individual Red fighters going AWOL.
Penalties may be commuted under special circumstances.
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Those who with counterrevolution as the objective take to deliberately des-
troying or discarding weapons and other military supplies or who secretly
sell military supplies to the enemy will all be given the death penalty.
A minimum of 1 year imprisonment will be given to lighter offenses.
The death penalty is for all who, with counterrevolution as their objective,
deliberately disobey the orders of their commanders in an attempt to
sabotage certain combat tasks, or deliberately fire on their own troops at
the front, or try to create confusion when the opportunity occurs.
Anyone who, with counterrevolution in mind, wantonly kills revolutionary
people or destroys their properties, hurting the honor and trust enjoyed
by the Soviet and the Red Army, will be given the death penalty. A
sentence of 6 months or more will be given to offenses of lighter nature.
Surreptitious stocking of arms, in an attempt to achieve the objective of
counterrevolution, will draw the death penalty.
Those who organize secret organizations, with counterrevolution in mind,
sabotaging land and water transportations, public granaries, state enter-
prises and other buildings will receive the death sentence. For lighter
offenses imprisonment of 6 months and over will be imposed.
Arson activities against buildings and forests, with counterrevolution as
the objective, causing great damages to the State and the people will incur
the death penalty. Six months or more imprisonment will be given for
lighter offenders.
Printing or bringing in counterfeit Soviet currency, bonds or letters of
credit to sabotage the economy of the Chinese Soviet Republic, will result
in the death penalty. Those who instigate the people to refuse acceptance
of Soviet currency or bring about market panic through the manipulation of
Soviet currency, or instigate the people to refuse paying taxes to Soviet
banks or hoard large amounts of cash, or surreptitiously sending out large
amounts of cash to other areas in a deliberate attempt to confuse the money
market of the Soviet will be given,the death penalty. Six months or more
of imprisonment will be imposed on lesser offenses.
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Article 26
Blocking or sabotaging the trade of the Soviet, with counterrevolution as the
objective, causing damages to State enterprises, cooperatives and the
people, or deliberately closing 'down enterprises to bring about an economic
crisis will result in the death sentence. Lesser offenders will receive
imprisonment of 1 year or more.
Anyone posing under the name of the Red Army or a revolutionary group and
forging public and private seals and documents of the Red Army or of the
revolutionary groups, to carry out counterrevolutionary activities, will be
sentenced to death. Six months or more of imprisonment will be imposed for
lesser offenders.
Infiltrating Soviet organizations with counterrevolution as the objective,
deliberately condoning criminal activities of counterrevolutionary elements
or landlord bourgeoisie or allowing them to escape are crimes punishable
by death. Anyone who passes light sentences for serious crimes, falsely
accusing revolutionary elements and subjecting them to cruel punishments,
or suppresses charges brought against counterrevolutionaries shall be
sentenced to death. For lesser offenses, sentences of 2 years or more will
be passed.
Death will be the penalty for those who secretly return to the Soviet areas
after their expulsion, in order to engage in counterrevolutionary activities.
Article 30
Hiding or assisting the various criminals described under articles 3 through
29, will be considered the same as crimes described under those articles.
Article 31
Heavier sentences will be imposed on those who have been sentenced by the
courts for one or more of the crimes listed under articles 3 through 30
and again commit one or more of the same crimes.
Article 32
Penalties may be reduced for those who engaged in the criminal acts listed
under these articles but had not been able to achieve the objective
(uncommitted crime), thereby becoming an accessory.
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Should anyone be threatened by others to commit a crime, or not realize the
ultimate purpose of the criminal act or not be directly connected with the
crime, his sentence could either be commuted or he could be set free, in
accordance with the regulations stipulated in these articles.
Worker and peasant criminals who are not leaders, or whose crimes are not
serious, should be given lighter sentences than those of the landlord
bourgeoisie, in accordance with the stipulations of these articles.
For those who rendered meritorious service to the Soviet, sentences for their
crimes should be lightened, in accordance with the stipulations carried in
the articles.
Those who confess the crimes they commit before being discovered, or who are
detected but repent and honestly report the details of the crime to help
organizations for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries and expose co-
conspirators should have their sentences lightened in accordance with the
stipulations of the articles.
Lighter sentences should be given to those under the age of 16 who commit
the crimes stipulated. Children under 14 years of age should be handed over
to educational organizations or rehabilitation education.
Counterrevolutionary crimes not included in these articles will be handled
under those articles containing stipulations of crimes of a similar nature.
Anyone committing one or more of the crimes listed under these articles shall
have all or part of his assets confiscated, in addition to the sentence.
All or part of his citizenship rights shall be stripped.
The maximum term of imprisonment stipulated in these articles is set at
10 years.
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Article 41
This law becomes effective as of the date of proclamation,
? Soviet Laws, Vol 2, The People's Committee for Judicial Affairs (Moscow),
July 1934.
* Compilation of Reactionary Documents of the Red Bandits, Vol 5, 1935.
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MARRIAGE LAW
8 April 1934
[Text] By Order of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet
Republic, No 7
This is a proclamation of the marriage laws. The marriage laws announced by
the Chinese Soviet Republic on 1 December 1931 are hereby rescinded.
8 April 1934.
Mao Tse-tung, chairman
Hsiang Ying, Chang Kuo-t'ao, vice chairmen
Chapter 1. General Rules
Article 1
Marriage is based upon the principle of freedom. All systems such as con-
tract marriages, forced marriages and the buying and selling of marriages
are voided. Child wives are prohibited.
The law will be based upon monogamy. Polygamy and polyandry are prohibited.
Chapter 2. Marriage
Ages of men and women eligible for marriage will be 20 for the former and
18 for the latter.
There should be mutual agreement between both parties in marriage. Coercion
by one side or by a third party is not permitted.
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Marriage between people who are related within the third generation is pro-
hibited.
Marriage is prohibited for people with such dangerous, contagious diseases as
venereal disease, leprosy and tuberculosis. But those who have been examined
by a doctor and found marriageable are excepted.
People who are insane or suffer from paralysis are prohibited from being
married.
In order to marry the man and woman must go together to the village or city
ward soviet for registration and to obtain a marriage license. Betrothal
fees, presents and dowaries are all prohibited.
Regardless of whether there has been registration, cohabitation is considered
as marriage.
Chapter 3. Divorce
Article 10
It is resolved that there should be freedom of divorce. Divorce may be
granted when either the man or the woman is firm in requesting it.
When the wife of a Red Army fighter requests a divorce, the husband must give
his agreement. In areas where postal communication is feasible and there
has been no correspondence from the husband for 2 years, the wife may request
divorce from the local government. In areas where communications are diffi-
cult, the time required will be 4 years.
Divorces must be registered with the township or city soviets.
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Chapter 4. Handling of Property Matters After Divorce
After divorce, the original land, assets and debts of the husband and wife
will be managed separately and individually. After a full year of marriage,
assets increased through the endeavors of both'parties will be shared
equally. If there are issues then it will be divided in accordance with
the size of the family. Public debts incurred during the period of co-
habitation shall be the responsibility of the husband.
Should the wife move to another village after the divorce she is entitled to
have land distributed to her at the new village of residence in accordance
with that village's distribution ratio. If the new village of residence
does not have any more land for distribution, the woman still holds on to
her original land. Whether the land is to be rented out, sold or exchanged
is for the woman to decide. Children given into the custody of the woman
will live with their mother. The distribution or handling the matter of
their land is to be wholly in accordance with the method mentioned above.
A woman who does not remarry after divorce but is unable to maintain a liveli-
hood due to lack of labor or steady employment will be helped by the ex-
husband in cultivating her land or providing for her livelihood. But should
the former husband be in the same situation this requirement is excepted.
Chapter 5. The Problem of Children After Divorce
Children born before the divorce and those conceived before divorce are to
be placed in the custody of the woman for rearing. If the woman is unwilling
to do so, the man shall assume the responsibility, with the provision that
the wishes of the older children should be respected.
The man shall be responsible for two-thirds of the needs of the livelihood
of children in the custody of the woman until they reach the age of 16.
Payment of such alimony shall take the form of either cash payments or the
cultivation of the land distributed to the children.
Only when the woman remarries and her new husband is willing to bring up the
children can the natural father of the children be released from the afore-
.said responsibilities. The new husband accepting the rearing of the children
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must register with the village or urban soviet. After registration, he
should be responsible for them until they come of age and they are not to be
ill-treated or stopped maintaining their livelihood half way through.
Chapter 6. The Problem of Illegitimate Children
Children born out of wedlock shall enjoy all the rights of legally born
children under this marriage law. Abandonment or ill-treatment of illegitimate
children is prohibited.
Chapter 7. By-Laws
c Article 20
Offenses against this law shall be punishable under the criminal code.
Article 21
This law becomes effective as of the date of proclamation.
? Soviet Legal Code, Vol 2, People's Committee on Judicial Matters (Moscow),
July 1934.
* Compilation of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents, Book 5, 193'5.
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10 April 1934
[Text] The basic organizations of the Soviet Government are the township and
municipal soviets and they are the levels closest to the people. They are the
agencies which directly lead the people in carrying out the various tasks of
the Soviet.
In a Civil War, the work of mobilizing for war is very urgent and the liveli-
hood of the masses needs to be improved. It is of primary importance to go
all out to improve the work at township and municipal soviets, strengthen
the organization and leadership of these soviets so that they will be com-
pletely suitable for developing the revolution and improving the livelihood
of the people.
The orientation of the work to improve the functions of township and municipal
soviets should be directed at being most capable of contacting the masses,
rousing the enthusiasm and creativity of the masses, mobilizing them to carry
out the tasks of the soviets and expediting the, accomplishment of these tasks
so that there will be complete coordination between the work of the Soviet,
the revolution and the well-being of the masses. This is the principle on
which the work of the Soviet is based. There are already many township
soviets in our areas which are capable of meeting these basic requirements
and they have created many good organizational structures and work methods.
There are, however, many other townships which contravene these requirements
in their work or have not completely complied with these requirements. It
is urgently necessary to clearly and concretely set forth regulations in
the work of the township soviets based upon these requirements so that each
township soviet functionary will have a uniform standard to work by.
How shall the township soviets carry out their work? They should be in
accordance with the following regulations.
A. The Work of the Township Soviet Presidium
1. The presidium of a township should constitute seven members if large and
five if small. These are people elected by the Congress, only those who are
most activist and capable should be elected.
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2. The presidium is the supreme political organ of the entire township after
the ending of the Congress. It should resolutely implement the resolutions
and instructions of Congress and higher level soviets, and directly lead the
work of the entire township.
3. The presidium should know how to grasp the central task at each period
and bring these tasks up for discussion at the Congress. It should not busy
itself with various minor matters and neglect the central task.
4. Meetings of the presidium must be well conducted, and the work of the
standing members must be carried out with urgency and thoroughness. There
should be no phenomenon of laxness and laziness and commandism must be
completely done away with.
5. The presidium must understand the situation of each village, the charac-
teristics of each village and they must give their attention to the difficul-
ties of the masses in each village and, in accordance with the actual situation
prevailing in each village and its special characteristics, impel the work in
order to resolve the difficult problems of the masses.
6. For rapid improvement in the work of each village, attention must be given
to motivating the work of the chairman and vice chairman, the representative
meetings of each village, the mass meetings, and the small group meetings
under the leadership. of each member so that they all will be held promptly
as scheduled and conducted properly.
7. The presidium must give attention to keeping the entire body of repre-
sentatives, the various committees and the various mass organizations united
and rally them around itself, motivating them to mobilizing the people of
the entire township to carry out various tasks. They should not become
separated with the mass organizations, the representatives and the committees
and leave only a few to do the job.
8. The leadership of the representatives meeting must be given careful
attention, and the 'residium must have proper preparations made before they
are held.
9. The presidium should meet every 5 days. That is, the presidium must meet
twice before and after the representatives meeting in the in-between periods,
and the chairman of the township may be asked to attend.
On the question of problems to be discussed at the meeting, at first it will
mainly be discussions on how to inspire the chairmen and vice chairmen of the
various villages as well as comrades of the Congress how to implement the
work given to them earlier and carrying out the resolutions of the earlier
Congress, and this meeting is best held 2 or 3 days after the next Congress.
The meeting of the presidium has also had to contend with minor matters.
Do not bring these trivial matters up for discussion at the next Congress.
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The meeting of the presidium should best be held after supper and should not
last longer than 2 hours.
10. The presidium should have a system of division of labor and work should
be assigned to those members who are not on the standing committee to spur
the people of certain villages in carrying out certain types of work.
The chairman of the presidium should naturally direct the work of the entire
township, be the chairman of the presidium when it is in meeting, attend
meetings convened by higher levels and manage daily routines. He should
grasp the central tasks assigned by higher echelon at certain periods of
time (such as the expansion of the Red Army, the land inspection movement,
elections, road construction, collecting land taxes, selling bonds, develop-
ment of cooperatives and spring cultivation movement, etc.). He should pay
attention to routine work (such as the training of Red Youth Units, Red
Martial Law, food grains, education, public health and preferential treatment
of members of Red Army families). He should also be careful of special
situations arising in his own village (such as famine, plague epidemics,
floods and counterrevolutionary activities, etc.). He should constantly
think about these problems and tasks, how such work should be done in the
villages, which village is falling behind in its work and should be prodded
and aid given. He should divide the paper work with his vice chairman and
also have a division of labor in attending the meetings of the various
villages and gathering good experiences gained in each piece of work done
in a village and the poor performance observed. These are to be presented
at the meeting of the presidium or reported at the meeting of Congress
contributing material for the Congress to discuss (when that problem is on
discussion). Attending the meetings of the various mass meetings held by
the villages, by various mass organizations and committees should also be
delegated by the chairman of the presidium.
The vice chairman should share the paper work with the chairman, attending
the meetings of the various villages, and assign to himself the work of one
or two villages. He must be thoroughly capable of motivating and collecting
materials and return to make a report. He is also required to understand
the work of the entire township so that when the chairman is absent he can
work on behalf of the chairman. A permanent vice chairman must help the
chairman with the daily routine and also frequently attend the meetings of
the various committees and mass organizations.
The paper work consists of processing census and land ledgers, registration
of marriages, births and deaths, various investigation reports, writing up
reports to the area soviet, allocating transportation labor, sending notices
to various villages, writing up travel permits, helping members of Red Army
families write letters, reading documents from higher levels to those
chairmen and vice chairmen who are illiterate, underscore the important
parts when reading documents at presidium and congress meetings, keep
minutes of the meetings, and remind the chairman and vice chairmen on those
areas where they have neglected to give their attention. The secretary
should also attend the meetings of the presidiums and mass organizations and
if he is a representative he should participate in the presidium.
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11. The examination and education of representatives should be matter the
presidium should give its attention to. Among the representatives, there
will be some who are activists in their work and some who are apathetic and
go slow. The model work of the activists should be set forth as models for
those workers with pessimistic outlooks. These pessimists must be criticized.
Some should be named in the representative meetings so as to rouse the others
to struggle against them. Educate the entire body of representatives in this
manner, so as to transform the pessimists into activists.
There are some to whom being elected representatives is their first experience
and do not know how to go about their work. They must be taught carefully
how the work is to be done. Those who have often undergone education through
criticism and struggle and still do not show any change or progress (such as
after 1 or 2 months being unable to accomplish the tasks given them, or even
deliberately staying away from meetings 5 or 6 consecutive times) should be
brought to the attention of the Congress and resolution passed to expel
them and substituting alternate members. It would be incorrect not to expel
such worthless members and have them replaced. After reassignment of a repre-
sentative engaged in certain work, he should also be immediately replaced.
Investigations should also be made to see whether landlord, rich peasant and
counterrevolutionary elements fraudulently pose as representatives to sabotage
our Soviet. They should be immediately expelled. It is even more necessary
to apprehend and punish counterrevolutionaries.
12. Inspectors at sentry points and transportation of the township soviet
may be selected from the three methods defined as follows: Appoint someone
permanently to the post. He will have to rely on his own rations, but will
be exempt from various duties. Also, dispatch people to help with the
family's farming. Or dispatch personnel from the Young Pioneer units on a
rotational basis. They will be notified the evening of the previous day to
take up their work the next morning. They shall return home to eat their
meals, but no help will be dispatched to assist with the farming. Or, send
one person to stay permanently on site with the residents providing the
meals through monetary contributions. Each area will decide on their own
which method to select. The first method will be the best. Young comrades
should be selected in all cases for the post of transportation and sentry
point personnel. These people must be highly intelligent and should be
literate. They should be given training in their work.
B. The Functions of the Congress
1. The township congress is the highest organ of political power in the
township. Leadership of Congress is of extreme importance because from the
discussions held in Congress emerge the implementation of all laws and
policies of the Soviet and the accomplishment of various tasks of the Soviet.
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2. Generally, congresses are held every 10 days. It should be held in the
evening when farm work is busy. The duration of the meeting should be 2 hours
at the most, and not to exceed 3 hours.
Each meeting should be divided into the period for reporting and the period
for discussions. The chairman and participants from the area Soviet will each
make a 10-minute report. If there are too many, it should be brought up during
the period of discussion. In discussions about work done in their own
villages, after the village chairman makes his report for several minutes, if
there are many points to be reported they may be taken up during the period
for discussions. In special work investigative meetings more time should
be given to the various village chairmen to make their reports. The reports
must contain factual materials and proposals. Reports made up of empty talk
will be abolished.
3. Each Congress will have but one principal matter for discussion. There
may be one or two problems of secondary importance. A greater part of the
meeting should be devoted to the discussion of the major problem, and less
time given to the secondary problems. If several problems of great importance
are brought up for discussion every time then the meeting will wind up without
any results.
4. Discussions of problems must be on a practical basis. For instance, a
discussion of spring cultivation should include such subjects as "the develop-
ment of labor mutual help cooperatives," "development of plow oxen coopera-
tives," "how the land cultivation troop should give preferential treatment
to the families of Red Army members," "increasing fertilizers," "more plowing
and more raking," "reclaim wasteland and mountains," "repair embankments,
ponds and water-wheels," "planting of cotton," "planting more or less
glutinous rice," "planting more vegetables" and others. These discussions
must be based on the actual situation prevailing in the villages. Precise
methods must be set forth for each item discussed.
For example, on "developing the labor cooperatives," estimates must be made
on how many more people can be expanded in the entire township now, set a
total figure and, in accordance with the actual situation of the villages,
set forth how many more people should each village include. Then. this
task should be handed over to the chairmen and vice chairmen of the villages
to take back with them. In accordance with the number of residents under
the jurisdiction, each representative makes actual allocations. And a period
for the task to be accomplished must also be set. In discussions, each item
must be taken separately. Proceed to the second item after the first item
has been discussed and concluded, with the conclusions of these discussions
deemed to be resolutions and recorded in the registry, to facilitate inspec-
tion during.the next meeting and so that the presidium will be able to spur
the people. Incompleted discussions will be continued at the next meeting.
At the second spring farming meeting, the resolutions made at the earlier
meeting should be examined. When examining a certain item, the various
chairmen of the villages should report the actual situation, the reasons for
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completing or not completing certain tasks with-the main idea of searching
out experiences and lessons for the various representatives to study. After
such an examination, continue with the discussions of new problems of the
spring plowing. Criticism should be made in the light of the circumstances
of those representatives and village chairmen who were discovered not to have
completed their tasks so as to alert them. In the discussion of other
matters this example should be followed.
Many of the township representatives' meetings are not thorough in their
discussions of problems and neglect to shift out the minor items from the
bigger problems, or make a general discussion of all the problems without
going through them one by one. This causes people to return from these
meetings without any clear-cut understanding of the resolutions made. At
these meetings, discussions are made without any regard to the actual situa-
tion and characteristics of the various villages. Nor are quotas set for
each village (this is with regard to those cases where quantity has to be
set). Regulations were not set forth when the task was to be completed.
Village chairmen were not charged with assigning definite tasks to the
various representatives when they returned to their villages, to see to
it that they were completed and encouraging them to do so.
In setting tasks for certain villages with particular characteristics (for
example, requiring certain village to dig ponds), they will not make it a
special point to ask the representatives of a certain village "Do you think
it is right to regulate it so?" But they pass this as a general resolution.
Resolutions were discussed by only certain township soviets. In many
meetings, these resolutions were not brought forth for examination. Even when
examined, the reasons for success or failure of each household or village
were not settled. Nor were those representatives and village chairmen who
were dragging their feet criticized. What is the use of such examinations
and discussions, then? They are empty of substance, bureaucratic and a waste
of time that cannot accomplish the mission of the Soviet. Taking an attitude
of peace toward those pessimists and feet-draggers will cause the Congress to
lose its vitality. It will be unable to encourage those representatives of
backward families and villages to lead the masses and work hard to reach the
level of advanced families and villages. This is wrong.
5. For a Congress to be successful, preparations made by the presidium must
be good. What was said before about the presidium requiring to hold a
meeting before the representative meeting and make careful preparations on
the reports and problems to be presented at the next meeting is indispensable.
The preparation work is the special responsibility of the chairman and the
vice chairman and secretary must assist him.
6. In many instances, chairmen presiding over the meetings were elected on
the spur of the moment. In some areas it is incorrectly regulated that members
of the presidium should not be elected. The presiding chairman should be the
permanently assigned functionary. The chairman of the township soviet would
be best, because only he is knowledgeable about the entire township.
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7. A roll call shall be made at every representative meeting. Those who are
absent shall be so marked on the name list. The presidium should have a list
of the representatives, names, sex, age and class element, in accordance with
each household and village.
C. The Structure and Function of the Village
1. The village is the core of the work of the township. The presidium of
the township soviet should give its entire attention to the organization and
leadership of the village.
2. It is imperative that all townships which have not delimited villages
should do so. Some townships may be delimited to two and some to three
villages, while other big townships may divide into four or five villages.
This delimiting shall be based upon actual situation. Generally, in dividing
the area into villages, the smaller they are the better they will be, because
big areas cannot be easily directed.
3. The village shall have one chairman and one vice chairman, who will be
elected at the representatives meeting of the township. Electees should be
the most capable and most activist of the representatives. In a village
with only a few families (a small village), the chairman and vice chairman
should not be from the same family.
The village chairman has the responsibility to oversee the work of the entire
village and the vice chairman is to help him.
(Note:) In cases of chairmen and vice chairmen who have an inadequate labor
force in their families, the township soviet may designate aid be given them
by the masses during the'busy farming season in the form of pro-rated labor
in order to make up for their time spent (more than the other representatives)
in their endeavors to accomplish the tasks of the Soviet.
Should the people agree, full preferential treatment may be given the village
chairman so that he can devote his entire time to the tasks and seek benefits
for the masses of the entire village.
4. Generally, the village chairman will hold a meeting of all of the represen-
tatives every 10 days (for instance, if there are 15 representatives in the
village, these 15 will be called to the meeting). When work is busy these
meetings may be called every 5 days. In examining the work of the repre-
sentatives, discuss how to accomplish the tasks given to the village by the
township congress in accordance with the characteristics of each family or
household. Resolve minor disputes and problems of mutual.help among the
village residents, prepare reports for the mass meetings to be held by the
village and give impetus to the work of the village committee.
5. Village representatives meeting of this kind should be scheduled by the
township soviet's presidium. It is best to schedule meetings to be held
between the two representatives meetings, but closer to the latter. For
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example, there are three villages in a certain township and the township repre-
sentatives meetings are to be held on the 5th and the 15th. The schedule can
be set for the first village to hold its meeting on the eleventh, the second
on the twelfth and the third on the thirteenth. Then, standing committee
members, especially the chairman, of the township soviet will be able to
attend these village meetings. If the meeting is to be held once every
5 days, then they can be scheduled to be held once several days after the
first township soviet meeting and once several days before the next repre-
sentative meeting of the township soviet. These meetings are mainly for
examining and directing work, and for the village chairman to make this report
on the results of the examinations at the next township congress.
6. Set up a system of a division of labor among the representatives in giving
leadership to the masses. For instance, a certain village has 15 repre-
sentatives and 500 residents. Divide these 500 people into 15 divisions in
accordance with the distances of the representatives' residences to them and
assign one representative over the people of one division. This should not
be done by averaging but should be in accordance with the locations of the
households, the strength and weaknesses of the representative and by assign-
ing to them a suitable number of people. There can be as many as 50 to 60
to a representative, and as few as 30 or 40.
This method of dividing work among the representatives will place responsi-
bilities on all of the representatives. Each representative shall, in
clearly distinguished spheres, lead the masses in the work of the Soviet
(such as supervising the score or so people working under him in spring
farming, propagandizing a dozen or so of the activists among his group to
join the Red Army, participating in cooperatives, supervising children in
the day schools, encouraging adults to attend night schools, encouraging
each family to sweep their houses and clean their sewers to maintain hygiene,
taking a dozen or so people to hold mass meetings,.heep surveillance on the
activities of landlords and rich peasants, etc.). He should solicit the
ideas of the masses and speedily bring them to the attention of the village
and township representatives' meetings, speedily resolve difficulties and
prbblems of the masses. To date, however, there are some areas where such
a system of division of labor among the representatives has not been
implemented. This system should be put into effect immediately.
(Note:) The village chairman should have a ledger in which the population
of the village, the area of land available in the village, the number of
Red youth'troops, the quantity of food grains (the total quantity available,
how many families have surpluses and how many are deficient) and other
necessary items. Each representative should also have a list of names of
the people under their jurisdictions.
7. Each of the representatives must call meetings of those dozen or so people
under their jurisdiction, examine the situation of the Soviet work done by
each family, discuss the work currently to be done, report articles of
competition, the township soviet's resolutions, collect proposals from the
people and report them at the village or township congresses. Such meetings
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will take the form of informal talks with the representative as the chairman
of the meeting. One hour will be enough time for the meeting and it should
be held when everybody has leisure to do so.
Such meetings should be scheduled once every 10 days, and the units under
the jurisdiction of the representatives of the entire village may also hold
their meetings on the same day. Should a representative group by unable to
hold the meeting with due cause they should be made responsible to hold it on
another day. The chairman of the township soviet convened the chairmen of
the various villages and make up a schedule so that there will be no con-
flicts between village, township and other meetings. When this type of
meeting is held, the masses should be directed to launch criticisms of each
other. For instance, is a family receiving a deserter and refusing
to return him to his unit, or is a certain family failing to put its best
efforts in the spring plowing, or is a household apathetic toward helping
families of Red Army members cultivate their lands? If a family is neglect-
ing its aged members, neglecting to encourage its children in their studies
and not maintaining a hygienic standard. they should be criticized. Soviet
resolutions can be very rapidly spread to the masses through such meetings,
accelerating the work of the Soviet, rapidly improving the well-being of the
people and heightening the fervor of the spirit of mass struggles.
Besides attending such meetings, each representative must make time to visit
individual households under his jurisdiction to check on whether they have
any problems that require resolving, whether they have carried out the
resolutions of the Soviet. The first of these visits should be made on
families of Red Army members and on the poorest people in the village.
Visits should also be paid to households of landlords and rich peasants in
order to observe whether they are committing anything improper.
The small unit meetings and household visits of representatives should be
directed by the village chairman who will have that responsibility. From
these observations the quality of the work of the representative can be
evaluated.
8. The mass meeting of the village has the highest potential to educate the
masses, mobilize them to carry out the tasks of the Soviet and enhance the
spirit of struggle among them. It should be regarded as an important method
to mobilize and educate the masses. In many places not much attention is
given to convening such mass meetings and this is incorrect.
In such village mass meetings, reports are made on resolutions passed by
the township soviet, the revolutionary competition that is being carried
out between villages ahd households and explaining the revolutionary tasks
set forth by higher level soviets so that after the masses have completely
understood them these tasks could be carried out with all-out effort.
A bi-monthly schedule should be set for such mass meetings by the township
soviet for the various villages and notifying the village chairman. Do not
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let these meetings conflict with others. So that the township soviet will be
able to dispatch personnel to participate, do not hold these village mass
meetings on the same day.
In villages where the populace is concentrated in one household, the entire
village will be considered as one unit in holding such meetings, and the
village chairman will preside. The majority of the villages in the soviet
areas, however, have two or more households, and the meetings should be
divided into two divisions so that everybody, men, women, old and young can
attend. The village chairman and the vice chairman will each preside over
one of the meetings. There should be proper preparations made before holding
such meetings. How to aid the various representatives to get the majority
of the masses to attend the mass meetings, what to report at these meetings
and how to lead the masses to voice their opinions--these must be discussed
and agreed upon at the village congress. These mass meetings should not
exceed 2 hours, and they must be held when the majority of the masses have
nothing else to do.
Mass meetings at the township level should not be held for good cause, such
as memorial days or festival days. The work of mobilizing the masses and
educating them must be done mainly through utilizing the mass meetings of the
small unit type under the jurisdiction of the representative or the village
mass meetings.
D. The Committees of the Villages and the Township
1. Below the township, soviet committees administrating various special
tasks to aid the township soviet should be organized. Activists among the
masses should join the committees as members and each representative of the
township soviet should participate in one or two committees and play a
leadership role in them. The committee system must be regarded as one of
the principal means to maintain liaison with the masses and propel forward
the work of the Soviet. Make haste to organize such committees in those
areas where there are none.
2. Some committees are constantly being organized, such as those for the
expansion of the Red Army, for giving preferential treatment and comfort
to the Red Army, for maintaining alerts, for defense against air attacks
and poisons, for agricultural production (such as spring and summer culti-
vation, fall harvesting and winter plowing), for education in production,
for forestry and water conservancy, for investigation and registration, for
education, for health, for roads and bridges, for food grains, for State
properties (in townships where there are State properties) and for worker-
peasant surveillance. All these committees always have work to do.
Some of the committees are organized for temporary purposes, such as land
inspection, confiscation and levies, land tax collections, selling bonds,
land reclamation and elections. These committees are temporary in nature,
and they are no longer required after the work has been done. The next
time such work has to be done, these committees are again organized. The
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committees for land inspection, confiscation and levies are also no longer re-
quired after the land problem has been thoroughly resolved.
3. Some committees should only be at township level. Others (such as
committees for the expansion of the Red Army, for the preferential treatment
of the Red Army, for education in production, for spring cultivation, for
forestry and water conservancy, for education and health) need to expand
into the villages. Only when the villages have such committees can the
tasks be easily popularized and intensified.
4. In accordance with the nature of the committee, the personnel could range
from as few as five to as many as seven or nine persons. Do not overstaff. As
for committees which exist at both village and township levels (such as the
spring cultivation committee) five members will be enough for each of the
village and township committees, while the chairman of the village committee
is permitted to be a member of the township committee.
5. At the township level, the chairman and members of the committees should
be elected at the township congress after the presidium has prepared a list
and presented it. At the village level, the village chairman will prepare
a list and have it passed at the village congress.
6. The most activist comrade must be found to head the committee, and the
presidium must educate the various chairmen how to carry out the work and
supervise them to convene their own meetings on schedule and inspect their
work. Chairmen who dragged their feet must be impeached and replaced with
a new chairman.
7. Preparations must be made beforehand by the chairman when holding his
own meeting, ensuring that every meeting will achieve results. After the
meeting, each committee member must be assigned a task and told how to
accomplish it. At the next meeting they must be made to report on the task
performed. Committee members who drag their feet will be dismissed and
others will replace them.
8. A new election of the committees should be held usually every 6 months.
In these elections retain the activists and eliminate the feet draggers.
9. There should be a division of labor within the presidium of the township
soviet so that the members will be able to participate in the meetings of
the various committees at the township level. The best means of doing
this is for each member of the presidium to have several committees under
his jurisdiction. For example, the chairman will have jurisdiction over the
committees for military affairs and finances (such as the committees for
expanding the Red Army, for giving comfort to the Red Army, for the Red
military alert, for defense against air attacks and poisons, for collecting
land taxes, for selling bonds, for the confiscation of land and levying and
the protection of State properties, etc.). The vice chairman will have
jurisdiction over economic matters (such as committees for the preferential
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treatment of Red Army, spring cul.t:i.vation, forestry, water conservancy, food
grains, roads and bridges and education in production, etc.). The secretary
may take over other areas of responsibilities (education, health, worker-
peasant inspection, investigation and registration, etc.). At the presidium
meeting it will be resolved what duties each would be assigned and materials
for the meetings collected so that the reports may be made at the meeting.
When committee meetings are held, the township committee chairmen must attend
the meetings of the committees under their jurisdictions (such as the chair-
man of the township educational committee attending the village committee
meeting on education). The chairman and vice chairman of the village committee
should also make a division of labor and take part.
1.0. The schedules of the meetings of the various committees of the townships
and the villages should be set up by the township presidium in accordance
with the priorities of the work to be done at different periods, such as more
meetings of the spring farming committee should be held in the spring time,
but when winter comes, the winter plowing committee could slacken their
schedule of meetings. Each meeting should not last more than 2 1/2 hours.
E. The Liaison Between the Township Soviet and the Mass Organizations
1. More attention and aid should be given to the various mass organizations
of the township (such as the trade unions, poor peasants groups, women
workers and peasants congress, the anti-imperialist alliance to support the
Soviet, mutual help associations, youth groups, labor mutual help coopera-
tives, plow cooperatives and various types of cooperatives such as the con-
sumers co-ops, production co-ops, food co-ops and credit unions, baby-care
centers, the association to eliminate illiteracy, the committee for the move-
ment to gain literacy and clubs, etc.) rely on their efforts to mobilize
the broad masses to complete the various revolutionary tasks.
The township soviet has full responsibilities for those organizations which
have no higher levels, such as the poor peasant groups, the women worker-
peasant congress, labor mutual help associations, plow-oxen cooperatives
and child-care centers. It must inspect their work periodically and provide
them with full leadership. Should it find errors in the work of these
organizations, discussion should be held speedily anti the errors corrected.
The township soviet has the responsibility to help them resolve difficulties
? regardless of the nature of the organizations.
2. The responsible person for the organization whose work is being discussed
? by the township soviet and the representatives meeting should be invited to
attend the meeting and when meetings are being held by these organizations,
the township soviet should also dispatch personnel to participate. This
holds true with regard to the village congress and village mass organizations.
Consultations should be held by the township soviet's presidium with the
responsible persons of the various mass organizations when schedules of
meetings are being worked out so that there will be no conflicts of meetings
at the village and township levels.
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3. The township soviet must give its attention to giving leadership to the
Red Guards and the Young Pioneer units so that all young men and women and
adults will be participating in these town units. The majority of them must
be made to participate in village and township trainings so that there will
be progress daily. Dispatch personnel to participate in their cadres'
meeting.
F. Revolutionary Competition and Commando Units
1. In order to attain quality and speed in the work of the Soviet so that it
will be done well and with speed, the method or revolutionary competition and
the organization of commando units should be put into effect in every town-
ship and village.
2. Regardless of whether it originated from higher levels or launched by the
village themselves, revolutionary competition must first be discussed at the
township congress and reported at the meetings of the people at village
levels and at small units level. When it concerns a certain mass organization
it must also be reported at the meeting of that organization, so that there
will be clear understanding and acceptance by each and every one of the
representatives and the people. Only by having every one understand and accept
it can they be made to shoulder their responsibilities and ignite their
revolutionary zeal and put their efforts into the work, thereby carrying out
the work in a fast and better manner and completing the work as required by
the competition or even ahead of schedule. All methods of commandism and
coercion must be abolished in this regard.
3. The competition of each item of work is not ended by merely discussing
and reporting about it. A very close inspection must also be carried out.
Each representative examines each household, the chairman and vice chairman
of the villages examine the representatives. The presidium of the township
soviet and the Congress will examine the chairmen and vice chairmen of the
villages. If such examinations are not carried out some person, representa-
tive, village household, will do the work haphazardly and will not be able
to complete the work assigned as scheduled, or even though they meet the
quota the quality will be poor.. The system of examination is a very important
method to achieve speed and quality in the work of the soviet. Decisions
without examinations is but as bureaucratic way of leadership, and it is as
harmful as coercion.
4. In each of these competition events discussions shall be made at the
village and township congress when the period set is over, distinctions will
be made between the superior and the inferior performers, the superior
performance will be rewarded while the inferior one will be criticized.
5. A commando unit consisting of from five to seven persons may be organized
in each village in order to attain speed and quality in the work of the
Soviet. Select on a voluntary basis comrades from among the representatives
and the masses those who are activists and have the capability to work to
participate in these commando units, with each village having a leader of a
commando unit. Members should not be selected from the same household.
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Work of the commando unit will be done in two ways. The first kind will be for
the member of one household to do commando work in the other (such as member
of household A going to household B and vice versa). But the emphasis will
be to have members of advanced household going to the more backward ones.
The other kind is within the sphere of the township, with commando units of
one village going to another village to do commando work (village A going
to village B) and it should primarily be on the basis of units from progres-
sive villages going to more backward ones to do commando work. Doing commando
work is not to cuss at other people but to help with the work that is being
done there, teaching them better ways so that the work there will improve
rapidly and educating them in the work methods of the more advanced villages
and households.
-A unit leader in overall command of the commando units will be appointed under
the township soviet presidium who will administer all the units and who will
have the authority to deploy the commando units of the various villages.
The presidium should call periodical meetings of commanders of village
and township commando units to examine their work and tell them how to go
about their work. These units' leaders will then convene meetings of
commando units members and give them training. The presidium should also
convene all of the members of the commando units on a monthly or bi-monthly
basis to train them.
G. On the Leadership Exercised by the District Soviet Over the Township
Soviet
The district soviet must direct the township soviet to implement all of the
aforementioned items accordingly, explaining these items to the comrades of
the township soviet so that they will have full understanding. Spot checks
will be made on whether the township soviets are carrying out the afore-
mentioned items as described. More frequent explanations and assistants
must be given, especially toward those township soviets whose work is
falling behind. Examinations of the district soviet's work by higher
echelon will be based upon whether the district soviet has given thorough
leadership to the various townships under its jurisdiction in implementing
the aforementioned items to realize the best in quality and speed in the
various tasks set by the Soviet.
(Note: This document is also applicable to municipality and ward soviets.)
10 April 1934
? On the work methods of area and township soviets, by the People's Committee
of the Chinese Soviet Republic, April 1934,
* Compilation of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents, Vol 3, 1935.
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DECLARATION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ON 1 MAY LABOR DAY
April 1934
[Text] Workers and Peasants of the Entire Soviet Areas!
This year's "May Day" falls on a day when we are carrying out a merciless and
decisive campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the
imperialist Kuomintang!
Two-thirds of the regular Kuomintang troops throughout the country, the main
force of Chiang Kai-shek, the bandit chieftain of all fascist imperialists,
comprised of 66 divisions, 8 independent brigades, constituting more than
700,000 White troops, are attacking our central Soviet areas!
On all the battle lines of the front, Kuomintang planes and artillery are
bombarding us, their machine guns and rifles are enfilading us with fire,
their blockhouses are blockading us and they are carrying out inhuman burning
and killings. They want to drown our worker-peasant soviet regime in a sea
of blood!
However, this type of frenzied and hopeless attacks launched by the imperial-
ist Kuomintang cannot frighten the courageous Red Army on the front lines and
make the worker-peasant masses in the entire Soviet areas lose hope. On the
contrary, it further increases the anger and heightened the determination of
every Red fighter and every worker and peasant to struggle on. Tens of
thousands of worker-peasant masses have been engulfed in the flood of parti-
cipation in the war, pledging to fight to the very end in defense of the
Soviet regime.
The fifth campaign is an even more merciless and prolonged campaign than any
others. It is a war determining the survival or death of the Kuomintang
landlord bourgeoisie or the political pow"r of the workers and peasants. It
is possible to achieve final victory only by mobilizing all of the worker-
peasant masses in the entire Soviet areas and vigorously participate in this
campaign!
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On May Day of this year the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic
calls'upon every one of the workers and peasants in the entire Soviet areas
to arm themselves and join the Red Army! Join the Red Guards, the Young
Pioneers, Model Red Youth Units and guerrilla units! Wage a decisive war
with the enemy attacking us,
Comrades of the members of the model Red youth units who took part in the
armed review made during Red May have enlisted in the Red Army by entire
battalions and regiments to struggle to the end and smash the enemy's fight
encirclement and suppression campaign!
Defend every inch of our Soviet areas by launching guerrilla warfare on a
massive scale so as to confuse him, encircle him, tire him out, strike at
him and destroy him thereby helping our Red Army and in coordination with
them win a decisive victory! Only victory through armed struggle--primarily
by destroying the main force of the bandit chieftain Chiang Kai-shek--can
we be assured of the freedom of land possession, the 8-hour work system,
and all revolutionary rights given to us by the Soviet revolution. Only
through victory attained by armed struggle can we ultimately overthrow the
rule of imperialist Kuomintang and establish a nationwise Chinese soviet
regime and finally be emancipated from under the iron heels of the landlord
bourgeoisie!
Worker-peasant masses in the rear areas! Let's pool all our resources in
order to assure the ration supply of our Red Army. Let every worker and
peasant save 3 sheng of rice to help the Red Army, plant more vegetables
and raise more pigs for the Red fighters fighting on the fronts! Let us
complete as speedily as possible the selling of construction bonds, collect
and transport our rations where they are needed, economize on all expendi-
tures in the rear areas, save every penny and struggle for victory on the
front lines!
The masses of workers and peasants in all the areas of the soviets! We are
facing a battle to the death. Let us smash the fifth "encirclement and
suppression" of the imperialist Kuomintang with our iron fists and the unified
and powerful will of the worker-peasant masses to win victory throughout
soviet China! The soviet road is the only pathway leading to liberation
for all exploited people and oppressed nations.
Long Live "May 1" Labor Day!
Long Live the Soviet New China!
(Signed) Mao Tse-tung, chairman, Central Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China
? "Red China," Vol 179, 24 April 1934.
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April 1934
[Text] On 17 April, the Foreign Ministry of Imperialist
Japan published its note to the big powers regarding their
China policy. Since then, the imperialist countries,
from the viewpoint of their interests in their spheres
of influence in China, have made known opinions express-
ing dissatisfaction. Immediately, the Kuomintang Nanking
government also published treasonous comments of the most
shameless nature.
In order to secure the views of the Central Government of
the Chinese Soviet Republic on this matter, the reporter
of this paper made a special visit to interview Comrade
Mao Tse-tung. The following is the conversation that
ensued.
The recent note of the Japanese Foreign Ministry is the clearest indication
of Japanese imperialism's plan to gain sole control of China. In this note,
Japanese imperialism has openly defined China as a Japanese protectorate.
It has directly set forth its policy of protecting, with the force of arms,
Japan's monopoly of all military, political and economic matters in China.
This plan of Japanese imperialism is to directly suppress the Chinese
Revolution with its own powers in the course of gaining sole control, and
completely colonize China, as well as to create an even more consolidated
rear defense area so as to launch a war against the Soviet Union.
Although this plan of Japanese imperialism met with the opposition of other
imperialist countries, the true intent of this opposition is limited to their
unwillingness to see Japan gain sole control of China and their desire to
have China divided up by international imperialism and become the "open door"
common colony of all. With regard to the direct suppression of China's
revolution and the strengthening of the rear area defense for the war against
the Soviet Union, the various imperialist countries are naturally in complete
accord with Japan.
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The traitorous Kuomintang Government of China behaves in the most shameless
and pitiful manner. On the 19th, the spokesman of the Kuomintang Nanking
government published a vile and base statement in which it held that it is
the "natural obligation" of the Kuomintang Government to "propose international
cooperation in order to achieve international peace and security." That is to
say, to propose the joint partition of China by international imperialism
and to guarantee the security of international imperialism's interests in
China.
Of course, the Kuomintang truly "never had the desire to harm any nation,"
and it is even more true that it entertains no idea of disturbing the peace
of Asia." The Kuomintang explains carefully to Japan: "The procurement of
military supplies (such as military aircraft) and the employment of foreign
military training officers and experts are only for national defense needs,
and they are mostly for maintaining domestic peace and order."
Nevertheless, the fact is such that not a single penny of the loans obtained
from the various countries of Britain, France, America and Italy, nor a
single bullet from the equipment bought from these countries, has been used
by the Kuomintang to oppose Japanese imperialism's aggression in Manchuria
and North China and British and French violent and forceful occupation of
Tibet. The Kuomintang has always adopted an attitude of compromise and
capitulation toward imperialist aggression that does not even come near to
anything like national defense.
What is actually meant by the Kuomintang's so-called "maintaining domestic
order and peace" is the suppression of the worker-peasant revolutionary
movement in China and, especially, the offensive against the Soviet areas
and the Worker-Peasant Red Army.
Chiang Kai-shek, the arch criminal of national betrayal, deployed 70 percent
of his regular troops in Kiangsi Province to carry out its fifth "encirclement
and suppression." This is exactly an expression of the Kuomintang's loyalty
to imperialism, playing the role of street sweeper for imperialism in dividing
up China.
The Kuomintang has specifically underscored this point in its explanation
to Japan. The Kuomintang went a step further to announce that "If existing
unequal matters can be rectified, improvements may be made in Sino-Japanese
relations, thereby preserving the common interests of the two countries."
This is ample expression of the slavish nature of the Kuomintang running
dog. The Kuomintang made such a shameless, tail-wagging announcement to
the Japanese to gain their sympathy because it was fearful of not being able
to efficiently discharge its duties as a dog and being unable to please
every one of its owners.
The Soviet Central Government, representing the hard-working worker-peasant
masses of China and the Worker-Peasant Red Army, resolutely opposes
Japanese imperialism's plan to gain sole control of China and points out the
Kuomintang's plot to guide imperialism toward a common partitioning of China.
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In order tQ achieve freedom and liberation for the nation and society, the
masses of Chinese workers and peasants must rise as one and, under the
leadership of the Soviet regime, smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression"
of the Soviet Red Army by the imperialist Kuomintang. This is the only way
to obstruct the path to complete colonization of China, and wrest victory
for the Soviet new China.
? "Red China, Vol 181, 28 April 1934.
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DECLARATION OF THE CHINESE WORKER-PEASANT RED ARMY ON ITS INTENTION TO
MARCH NORTH TO COMBAT JAPANESE AGGRESSION
15 July 1934
[Text] Workers, peasants, soldiers and all revolutionary people in the
country!
The devilish Japanese imperialists have swallowed up our three eastern pro-
vinces (Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning), invaded and occupied Jehol and
Inner Mongolia. Now they have again seized our entire North China. In
South China, Japanese imperialism is planning the direct occupation of
Fukien Province with the use of big naval guns and their army, navy and
air forces. It intends to transform all China into a colony and turn the
people of China into colonial slaves, to forever suffer the butchery of
Japanese bandits and to be raped, exploited and ravaged by them!
The warlords of the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang and
others, have always adopted an attitude of surrender and betrayal in dealing
with Japanese imperialist aggression. They sold'out the three eastern
provinces, Jehol and Inner Mongolia. Now they are directly trafficking
with "Manchukuo," recognizing that entity and selling out all of North China
and Fukien Province. They are helping Japanese imperialism to suppress the
Chinese anti-Japanese movement, the boycott of Japanese goods and the
guerrilla warfare waged by the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army. Under the
pretext of "no strength to oppose Japan," they amassed over a million
soldiers from all over China, expended 100 million silver yuan and used all
the planes and artillery they have to launch endless "encirclements" against
the only anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist Soviet government of the workers
and peasants and the Worker-Peasant Red Army. All these testify that the
Kuomintang warlords are the loyalist of the running dogs of Japanese
imperialism. The Kuomintang warlords are the biggest traitors and national
betrayers in the history of China.
In dealing with the non-stop aggression of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese
Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army have repeatedly called on
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the people of China to arm and oppose Japanese imperialist aggression with
national revolutionary warfare. They openly declared war and issued emergency
mobilization orders for war against Japan to mobilize the people in the en-
tire Soviet area and prepare them to directly fight against Japanese
imperialism. The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army have
repeatedly proclaimed to the people of China that under the three conditions
of:
1) Cease all attacks against Soviet areas and the Red Army;
2) Cede to the people the initial powers toward democratic rights--the
freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association and the freedom to
strike and demonstrate; and
3) Immediately arm the people and create a people's anti-Japanese volunteer
army to defend China," they are willing to conclude a fighting agreement with
any armed unit. The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army
have repeatedly opposed the Tangku agreement, direct negotiations between
China and Japan, recognition of the Japanese puppet government of "Manchukuo"
and the Kuomintang betrayal of North China.
They have repreatedly called for open aid to the anti-Japanese volunteer army
in North China and all revolutionary movements in China opposing Japan and
imperialism and opposition against all suppressions and slaughter perpetrated
by imperialism and the Kuomintang against the anti-Japanese, anti-imperialism
movement.
The broad masses of workers, peasants, soldiers and revolutionary people
throughout China are against the Kuomintang's betrayal of Jehol, the three
eastern provinces (Heilungkiang, Liaoning and Kirin), Inner Mongolia, North
China, Fukien Province and all of China, and support the proposal of the
Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army to oppose Japan and their
anti-Japan activities. This has compelled the Kuomintang to blockade us
even more frantically and attack us, thereby preventing our Soviet Government
and the Worker-Peasant Red Army from uniting directly with the people of
China, from carrying out unified action with the anti-Japanese Volunteer
Army in North China to launch a national revolution against the Japanese
imperialists and drive the bandits of Japanese imperialism from China. Not
only have the Kuomintang warlords completely ignored the proposal to unite
with the Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army and together
oppose Japan, but they have even more shamelessly betrayed China and
stepped up the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the Soviet Government
and the Worker-Peasant Red Army to help Japanese imperialism swallow up
China.
In order to mobilize all their forces to fight directly against Japanese
imperialism, the Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army have
been forced to first engage in bloody combat with the over 2-million-man
bandit army of the Kuomintang which have been attacking us so as to preserve
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the free, Soviet territories, which have already shaken off the fetters of
imperialism and prevent them from ever again being trampled upon and betrayed
by the Kuomintang, the running dogs of imperialism.
We absolutely will not abandon the anti-imperialist revolutionary base of
China formed through countless bloody battles with the bandit army of the
Kuomintang. The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army absolutely
cannot idly watch the enslavement of the Chinese nation by Japanese
imperialism, absolutely will not permit the traitors and national betrayers
in the Kuomintang to completely auction off all of China.
They absolutely will not allow Japanese imperialism to ravage and perpetrate
mass butchery of the broad masses of the hard-working people of China, nor
can it allow the solitary struggle of the Northwest Volunteer Army to go on
(without support). The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army,
at the crucial moment of the merciless, decisive battle against the superior
force of the Kuomintang bandit army, have, with the greatest of determination
and disregarding all difficulties, dispatched an anti-Japanese vanguard force
to march north to fight the Japanese.
If only the armed units that are attacking us can accept the three conditions
we have set forth, the main strength of our Worker-Peasant Red Army can then
march north in full force, following the vanguard unit to unite with all
armed forces in China and fight the Japanese together.
People of all China! The vanguard unit of the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red
Army marching north to fight the Japanese is willing to unite with the
people of China and all armed forces to fight together against the Japanese,
launch a people's national revolutionary war and overthrow Japanese
imperialism. All the people opposing Japan should help the vanguard unit
of our Worker-Peasant Red Army now marching north to fight against Japan,
unite and rally around this vanguard force, join its column, arm and fight
directly against the bandits of Japanese imperialism attacking China. All
people opposing Japan are our compatriots and all armed units fighting
against Japan are fellow travellers. We should all unite. All individuals,
groups or armed units who prohibit or oppress our opposition against Japan
are traitors and betrayers of the nation. We should all arise and wipe
them out!
We hold that only a national revolution waged by the armed units of the
people of all China can overthrow Japan and all imperialism and secure the
independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and preserve the
? territorial integrity of China.
For attaining victory in the national revolution the Soviet Government and
the Worker-Peasant Red Army make these concrete proposals.
1. Resolutely oppose the selling out of the three eastern provinces,
Jehol, Inner Mongolia, North China, Fukien Province and all China by the
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Kuomintang Government, oppose direct negotiations between China and Japan to
sell out and take over the nation, oppose the recognition of the puppet
"Manchukuo," and discard the dream of getting help from the League of Nations,
the bandit clique of imperialism and from U.S. imperialism.
2. Immediately proclaim the severing of relations with Japan and the
abrogation of the Tangku agreement and all secret Sino-Japanese treaties.
Mobilize the entire Chinese Army, Navy and Air Force to fight against Japan.
Immediately cease the attacks on the Soviet areas and stop blockading them
so that the Worker-Peasant Red Army can be fully utilized in direct battle
with Japanese imperialism.
3. Call on the people throughout the country to arm themselves with all of
the weapons in the Kuomintang arsenals and in the Central Ordnance Factory,
and the armaments being imported, organize anti-Japanese people's voluntary
armies and guerrilla warfare and war against Japan and give active support
to the Northeast Volunteer Army and the vanguard force of the Chinese Worker-
Peasant Red Army marching north to fight the Japanese.
4. Confiscate all business enterprises and assets of Japanese imperialists
traitors and national betrayers, stop all payments of principal and interest
on all debts owed by China to Japan, establish a progressive tax system and
seize the entire military budget of the Kuomintang to use as combat funds
against the Japanese (to finance the war against Japan).
5. Organize anti-Japanese people's groups on a general scale (such as anti-
Japanese associations, committees for boycotting Japanese goods, committees
for the solicitation of funds in support of the volunteer army and the Red
Army, as well as all kinds of anti-Japanese control units, sabotage units,
communication units, propaganda units and transportation units. Absorb the
broad masses into the anti-Japanese groups without regard to age, sex, creed
or political faction and use strikes, boycott of classes, absenteeism and
closing of shops to oppose the aggression of Japanese imperialism and the
national betrayal and capitulation of the Kuomintang Government.
The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army will struggle for this
program without regard to any and all sacrifices. The Soviet Government
and, the Worker-Peasant Red Army ask the people of all China to support this
program and, together with us, struggle to the end for the implementation
of this program.
Let the Kuomintang, the running dog of imperialism and the traitors and
national betrayers in the Kuomintang clamor that "China has no strength
to oppose Japan!"
The anti-Japanese general mobilization of the people of China, the anti-
Japanese armed forces countrywide, the anti-Japanese people's group through-
out the nation have all the power to overthrow Japan and all imperialism
and to overthrow the Kuomintang, this clique of traitors and national
betrayers!
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Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic
Hsiang Ying, vice chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, vice chairman
Chou En-lai, vice chairman
Wang Chia-ch'iang [3769 4471 5638]
Chu Teh, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee of the
Worker-Peasant Red Army.
15 July 1934
? "Red China," Vol 221, 1 August 1934.
* Soldiers Daily Curriculum, Vol 1, July 1934.
* Reference Materials on the History of the Chinese Revolution, Vol 3,
People's University of China, 1956.
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COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG TALKS ON CURRENT SITUATION AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE
VANGUARD UNIT OF THE RED ARMY
July 1934
[Text] The correspondent of this paper called on
Chairman Mao of the Central Government yesterday
to inquire on the question of the current situa-
tion and the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Unit of the
Red Army. The talk follows.
After seizing Manchuria and Jehol by force and gaining control of P'ing-chin
[1627 3160] to achieve open traffic and communication and following its
publication of the announcement of its intention to solely take over China
and its presentation to the Kuomintang of a list of over 1,000 "unresolved
issues"--and a demand for their resolution--Japanese imperialism has begun
stepping up its new offensive to swallow up China. The Japanese Government
recently presented to the United States of America its suggestion to divide
the Pacific Ocean equally between the two countries. It is frenziedly
preparing for an anti-Soviet Union war in northern Manchuria and held the
Dailen Conference with Kuomintang representatives, clearly indicating that
Japanese imperialism is striving to mitigate the struggles between the
imperialists in an attempt to achieve a temporary understanding among them
and, together, divide up China, attack the Chinese revolution and oppose
the Soviet Union. The Kuomintang Nanking Government, the running dog of
Japanese imperialism, is presently spreading a smoke screen of "abrogate
the Tangku Agreement" and "recover the war areas" to cover up the Dailen
Conference, which is very rapidly selling out all of China and, on another
side, the veteran pro-Japanese Pei Yang [0554 3152] warlord, An Fu-hsi [1344
4395 4762] is fully cooperating with the Kuomintang. Such important people
as Wang Ke-min [3769 0344 2404] are streaming south and holding secret
talks in Shanghai and at Mo-ch'ien-shan [5359 0578 1472] with Huang Fu [7806
6744], Tang You-jen [0781 2589 1103] and others. Tuan Ch'i-jui [3003 4388
3843],.a chieftain of An Fu-hsi, went to Lu Shan [1687 1472] and conferred
in secret with Chiang Kai-shek. This kind of massive cooperation between
new and old traitors wholly shows that there is a high urgency in the new
offensive of Japanese imperialism. The Chinese nation has come to an
extremely dangerous juncture. The fate of slavery and doom is threatening
the hard-working masses of the entire country.
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The new offensive of Japanese imperialism and the massive attacks of the
Kuomintang on our Soviet areas are completely coordinated as one. Several
hundred thousand Kuomintang troops are advancing from the doorway areas of
the Soviet region--Kuang-ch'ang [1684 2490], Lien-ch'eng [6647 1004],
Lung-kang [7873 1481] and T'ai-ho [3141 0735]--into the central areas to
carry out the last stage of the fifth encirclement, planning to bathe the
Soivet area in blood, wipe out the Soviet Red Army and be the most dutiful
running dog of imperialism in carving up China. These are the special
characteristics of the current situation. To protect their own territory
and take punitive action against the traitors--the Kuomintang--the Soviet
Government and the Red Army are leading the broad masses and the heroic and
courageous Red Army to unleash the most intensive and blood battles on
various fronts against the enemy. They are putting all their forces
and applying all means to the task of smashing this brutal "encirclement
and suppression." The Soviet and the Red Army have long ago made up their
minds to smash this ferocious encirclement, no matter what happens. Now
it is even more necessary for us to utilize all resoluteness, tenacity and
perseverance to smash this encirclement. By so doing we will also be sure
of smashing it in the end.
In the most recent period we have created 70,000 new Red Army soldiers in
the Soviet area and mobilized several hundred thousand tan of grain to solve
the problem of supply between seasons, and, presently, we are carrying out the
great mobilization for the autumn harvest. Our guerrilla forces have been
greatly expanded and they are still being expanded. Guerrilla warfare is
spreading on a wide scale. A mass movement of boiling salt and weaving
cloth is underway to provide material support. Military industry, such as
the manufacturing of ammunition, has increased by several tens of times.
The Kuomintang does not even dream that we have such strength. The Kuomintang
has early claimed that we were in a "very poor position" and they had won
big victories. But the facts proved, and will prove in the end, that it is
the rotten-to-the-core Kuomintang that is in a "very poor position."
Chiang Kai-shek, very pleased with himself, began to build blockhouses for
several thousand li and several tens of layers deep in the Soviet areas
and boasted how their "easy-pickings-fishing in packed waters" policy was
soon to "succeed." True, Chiang Kai-shek has built many blockhouses and
he has occupied some of our areas--Ningtu and Hsing Kuo. Many of the
Kuomintang units, however, were routed and annihilated under the iron fists
of the Red Army. These are things Chiang Kai-shek does not mention and
prohibits from being mentioned. Such a stupid pig as Chiang Kai-shek does
not understand that in the end it is Chiang Kai-shek and the entire landlord
capitalist Kuomintang and not the Soviet Red Army, who will be in a "very
poor position." They also do not understand that it is the imperialists
who are directing the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang who will, in the end, be in
a very "difficult position."
Let me again point out two things. First, what kind of influence is imparted
to the over 1 million soldiers of theirs sent to attack our Soviet areas
(Kiangsi, Szechwan, Hunan, Fukien and Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei) when confronted
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with the Soviet Red Army? We would like to say that such a broad mass of
soldiers were, on the one hand, forced to attack us, and, on the other hand,
they were receiving our revolutionary education. It can be said that the
various Soviet areas are universities where the soldiers o[the White armies
are educated in revolution. It is not only the Red Army, but also his own
soldiers, who are helping to dig the grave of Chiang Kai-shek. May I ask,
does this stupid pig, Chiang Kai-shek, understand this? Second, the
Kuomintang is frantically selling out the country, daily groveling on its
hands and knees before imperialism, the arch enemy of the people throughout
China, and presenting China to Japanese imperialism. Not a shot was fired
against the several hundred-thousand Japanese bandit troops. But all the
troops it has from the three eastern provinces, Jehol, Peking, Tientsin,
Shanghai, Hangchow, Hankow and Honan, Hopeh, Kiangsu and Chekiang were
deployed to attack the Red Army while these areas were presented to
imperialism to be ravaged and oppressed. Similarly, Ch'en Chi-t'ang [7115
3444 2768] did not guard against Hong Kong (British imperialism's base for
aggression against China) but handed the Canton-Kowloon railway to the
British and deployed 80 percent of his troops to Kiangsi and Fukien to
attack the Red Army.
Will the broad masses of these areas allow Chiang Kai-shek and Ch'en Chi-t'ang
to go on selling out the country like this to the very end? No. They
absolutely will not. As for Chiang Kai-shek and Ch'en Chi-t'ang, (as well
as Chang Hsueh-liang [1728 1331 5328], Ho Chien [0149 6943] and others),
tens of thousands of bombs are buried right underneath their legs. These
bombs have exploded or are exploding in some areas (the anti-Japanese
Volunteer Army of the three eastern provinces of Kirin, Heilungkiang and
Liaoning, the People's Revolutionary Army, the Shanghai campaign, guerrilla
attacks in various areas, and people's uprisings). In some areas, bombs
will explode on a massive scale. Please tell me, who among the hard-working
masses of the country and the soldiers of the White armies does not support
the Chinese Communist Party's five big programs of opposition to the
Japanese? Who does not support the order of the Soviet Central Government
declaring war on Japan? Who does not accept the call made by the Soviet
Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee to
"desist from attacking the Red Army, unite with the Red Army to fight
together against Japanese imperialism?" There is no doubt that if they only
read or hear about our programs, order, and call, they will jump up and be
willing to carry them out. There is no doubt that the storm of nationwide
opposition against Japan and imperialism will break and gather force under
the call of the bright, Red banner.
At a time when the Kuomintang has sold out half of China and the people
throughout the country, as though anticipating rain in a time of severe
drought, look forward to the Red Army's march north to fight the Japanese,
the Soviet Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee,
on 1 August of this year when the working people of the world were staging
massive demonstrations against the imperialist war of aggression, dispatched
an anti-Japanese vanguard unit. It has been approaching Fuchow for the
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last 2 days and will pass through the various provinces in the east as it
marches north to fight the Japanese. The purpose of this is to make the people
throughout China realize that in all of China the Red Army is the only army
that is truly in opposition to the Japanese. Although the main force of the
Red Army has been prevented from marching north by the Kuomintang's fifth
encirclement, it is now proceeding to smash it and only after thoroughly
smashing the Kuomintang's encirclement can the Red Army march north in
strength. Meanwhile, it has dispatched a vanguard unit of its own forces.
Although this force has only one vanguard unit it is fully combat effective
and has ample fire power. The fighters and commanders are all of high
calibre and they have already shown the greatest courage in battles against
the Kuomintang troops. Although this unit is not heavily equipped, we
believe that it will receive the support of the people along the way. All
those elements in the Kuomintang forces who are determined to fight Japan
will join the ranks of this unit in an endless stream and it will very
rapidly grow into a huge force for fighting the Japanese.
Chiang Kai-shek and his Nanking Government, this faithful running dog of
Japanese imperialism, in order to discharge its duty, will surely send troops
to block the path as the unit marches north. If this should be so, then the
vanguard unit will have to fight the blocking troops of Chiang Kai-shek as
it advances. This will necessitate directing massive propaganda toward the
soldiers of this blocking force to win their sympathy and collapse their
ranks so that the march up north will be fast. The sooner we fight the
Japanese the better it will be because the new offensive of Japanese
imperialism is imminent. Fangs are bared and claws unsheathed as all the
imperialists prepare to divide up China and the disaster looming over the
heads of the people all over the country is growing greater and greater.
We are, therefore, calling for the country to rise as one and help the Soviet
Red Army so that we will be able to quickly smash the fifth encirclement
and concentrate our forces to fight against Japan and oppose imperialism.
Give assistance to our anti-Japanese vanguard unit so as to enable the anti-
Japanese Red Army to march forward rapidly. The anti-Japanese vanguard unit
of the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army is now on the move! Our courageous
and heroic Worker-Peasant Red Army has taken concrete action to oppose the
aggression of Japanese imperialism and to save China from disaster.
Simultaneously, the Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Affairs
Committee have issued orders for the Red Army throughout the country to be'
ready to move out at any time after the vanguard unit. But, the Kuomintang
is blocking the Red Army with a huge force of several hundred thousand,
deploying its entire northern army southward into Kiangsi Province. People
of China, is it still unclear to you? The Kuomintang is the street sweeper
for Japanese imperialism. People of the country and brothers of the White
Army, oppose the Kuomintang policy of national betrayal and surrender!
We demand the general mobilization of the army, navy and air force to fight
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the Japanese! Oppose the attacks against the Red Army! The guns of all the
troops in China should be pointed and fired at Japanese imperialism and at
the traitors who are betraying the nation! Only thus can we, and will we,
be victorious over Japanese imperialism!
? "Red China," Vol 221, 1 August 1934.
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ORDER OF CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC
15 August 1934
[Text] Kung Ho-ch'ung [1313 5440 1404] was a member of the Central Executive
Committee and former commander of the Red 16th Army. While working in the
Hunan-Kwangtung-Kiangsi Soviet area he disobeyed orders of the Central Revolu-
tionary Military Committee several times, He was panicky and vacillating in
attacks against the enemy and he led the Red Army in retreat and flight. In
consideration of the fact that elements of the counterrevolutionary liquida-
tion faction infiltrated the unit and caused heavy losses to the Red 16th
Army and the people of the Hunan-Kwangtung-Kiangsi Soviet area, he was several
times educated through criticism, but to no avail. Last October, he was
relieved of his command of the Red 16th Army, but hoping that he would still
be amenable to education, he was ordered to report to the Central Government
for admission to the Red Army University to be educated. Not only did he show
no improvement whatsoever, but also took to opposing the revolution. When he
was assigned to the Replacement Division in July of this year he seized this
opportunity to escape and surrender to the enemy. A member of the Central
Executive Committee, Kung Ho-ch'ung, who has a relatively long history of
struggle, could not see the victorious future of the revolution and resorted
to the most despicable action of rebellion at a time when our courageous
and heroic Red Army and the broad masses were engaged in the final and
decisive battle against the enemy's fifth encirclement. Besides expelling
him from the Central Committee, a special order has been issued to all the
Red armies in China, various local units and the various levels of the Soviet
Government and the revolutionary groups in various areas and the worker-
peasant masses of the Soviet and White areas are called upon, that if
Kung Ho-ch'ung is encountered, he should be executed on the spot as a
warning to the vacillating and the rebellious.
By order,
Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet
Republic of China
Hsiang Ying, vice chairman
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Chang Kuo-t'ao, vice chairman
15 August 1934
0 "Red China," Vol 228, 30 August 1934.
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SIX-POINT PROGRAM PROPOSED BY CHU TEH AND MAO TSE-TUNG
To Soldiers of White Army to Combat Japanese Aggression
1934
[Text] 1. [We] demand the immediate cessation of attacks against the Soviet
areas and the march north to oppose Japan, the implementation of the policy
of Chinese not fighting against Chinese, not fighting against the Red Army
and turning the guns on Japanese imperialism and Chinese traitors.
2. [We] demand the freedom of assembly, association, speech and action for
soldiers fighting against Japan, the organization of an anti-Japanese
Soldiers' Union and the resolution of the major task of opposing Japan and
matters of intimate concern to the soldiers.
3. [We] demand the improvement of living conditions and treatment of soldiers,
payment in full in arrears, opposition to the use of abusive language and
physical punishment and opposition against the fascist emperor's suppression
and slaughter.
4. Arrive at an understanding with the Red Army and dispatch representa-
tives from both sides so as to set up an alliance for the cessation of
warfare and opposition to Japan.
5. Kill the officers who forbid soldiers to fight against Japan and rise
in mutiny and join the Red Army, which is truly opposing Japan.
6. Refrain from burning and killing the workers and peasants in the Soviet
areas, oppose the Kuomintang's oppression of the anti-Japanese mass movement
and unite with compatriots all over China in unified opposition against
Japan!
Brother soldiers of the White army!
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Unite immediately and carry out this six-point program of opposition to Japan
if you want to save China and do not wish to become colonial slaves. The
Red Army is constantly prepared to welcome you to send representatives
and jointly set up an alliance to cease fighting [among ourselves] and
oppose Japan. Let us all unite and march north to fight the Japanese!
Soldiers of the White army and the Red Army unite!
Down with Japanese imperialism!
Down with the national traitor, the Kuomintang!
? Soldiers Daily Curriculum, Vol 1, July 1934.
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FINAL DECISION OF CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE AGAINST ENEMY'S FIFTH ENCIRCLEMENT
Adopted at Tsun-i Conference of Political Bureau on 8 January 1935
8 January 1935
[Text] After listening to the summation report made by Comrade x x on the
fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and the supplementary report
by Comrade x x x the enlarged session of the Political Bureau held that the
report made by Comrade x x is basically incorrect.
1. In its decision on the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression"
the CCP Central Committee has clearly pointed out that the fifth "encircle-
ment and suppression" is an ever more vicious offensive launched against
the soviet revolutionary movement by imperialism and Kuomintang reaction.
It also pointed out at the same time that in this ferocious and decisive
battle of the classes, the inner weaknesses of imperialism and the Kuomintang,
and the new intensification of the revolutionary, situation, has caused a
new change in the relative strength of the classes in the country which is
favorable to us, and it has arrived at the correct conclusion that "In the
midst of the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' we possess all the condi-
tions for winning a decisive victory, which are even more adequate than
before" (CCP Central Committee decision 20 July 1933). But, in his report,
Comrade x x over-estimated objective difficulties. He placed the reason for
the inability to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" in the central
Soviet area on the strong and powerful forces of imperialism and the
Kuomintang. But, at the same time, he did not adequately appraise the
current revolutionary situation. This will certainly lead to an opportunis-
tic conclusion that, on the objective level, it will definitely be impossible
to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression."
2. The CCP Central Committee, in accordance with its own correct decision,
has set forth concrete tasks for opposing the enemy's fifth "encirclement
and suppression." One-and-a-half year's difficult struggle against
"encirclement and suppression" has proved beyond the shadow of a doubt
that the CCP Central Committee's political line is correct. Especially,
the party committee in the central Soviet area, under the direct leadership
of the CCP Central Committee, has achieved unprecedented results in mobiliz-
ing the broad masses of workers and peasants to participate in the revolu-
tionary war. The movement to expand the Red Army has become an upsurge
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of the masses. The mobilization of worker and peasant activists, arming and
sending them to the front, has reached over 100,000, thereby greatly expand-
ing the Red Army. The model Red Youth Units are beginning to turn into rear
support troops for the Red Army, and the people's armed organizations of the
Red Youth Units have achieved great growth. Under the slogan of "all for
victory on the front" the party committee has resolved financial, food and
all other material needs of the Red Army. The intensification of the class
struggle inside the Soviet area, the economic construction of the soviet
and the thorough improvement of relations between the soviet government and
the masses have even more vigorously developed the masses' enthusiasm and
activism for participation in the revolutionary campaigns. All these have
created favorable conditions for the thorough smashing of the fifth
"encirclement and suppression." However, in his report, Comrade xx was
clearly inadequate in his appraisal of these favorable conditions. Coming
from this kind of inadequate appraisal it will be inevitable to reach the
conclusion that on the subjective level we will have no ability to smash
the "encirclement and suppression."
3. It should be pointed out that there are still many serious shortcomings
in our work. With regard to the party's leadership of the broad masses
of workers and peasants in opposing imperialism and the Kuomintang in the
White area, and the leadership of the daily struggles, it still has not
shown any marked progress. The development of guerrilla warfare and the
work of collapsing the soldiers of the White army are still weak. The mutual
help and coordination between the Red armies in the various Soviet areas
given under a unified strategic purpose are still insufficient. All these
weaknesses will undoubtedly affect the action taken to oppose the fifth
"encirclement and suppression" and it will become an important cause for
our inability to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression." The
existence of these weaknesses absolutely must not be construed as the chief
reason for the inability to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression."
But, in his report and conclusion Comrade x x exaggerated on these weak-
nesses in the work. And yet he did not understand, nor did he acknowledge,
the basically erroneous estimates made on the strategic and tactical levels
of the military leadership. This has prevented us from understanding where
the main reason for the inability of the main force of our Red Army to leave
the central Soviet area and our inability to smash the fifth "encirclement
and suppression" in this area was. It covered up the evil fruits of the
erroneous line in the strategic and tactical area of our military leader-
ship. With the courage and skill of the Red Army in combat, model rear
area work and the support of the broad masses notwithstanding, it will be
impossible to achieve a decisive victory in the war if we cannot apply
correct strategy and tactics in our military leadership. Herein lies the
principal reason for our inability to smash the fifth "encirclement and
suppression" in the central Soviet area.
4. After suffering defeats in four "encirclement and suppressions," the
Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek and his imperialist military advisers have
learned that it was extremely unfavorable to use the strategy and tactic
of "penetrating deeply" to give us battle inside the Soviet areas. There-
fore, in the fifth "encirclement and suppression," they adopted the strategy
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and tactic of protracted warfare and blockhouse warfare in an attempt to
gradually whittle away our effective strength and our material and financial
resources, constrict our Soviet area, and, finally, to search out our main
force and engage it in decisive battle so as to achieve the objective of
wiping us out.
Under these circumstances our strategic line should be defense through
decisive engagements (offensive defense). Concentrate superior forces,
select the enemy's weak spots, and, by using mobile warfare, confidently
go about wiping out a part, or a major part, of the enemy, destroying
them one at a time and thoroughly smashing the enemy's "encirclement and
suppression" thoroughly. In the campaign against the fifth "encirclement
and suppression," defense through decisive engagements was substituted with
the line of pure defense (defensive defense), mobile warfare was substituted
with positional warfare and blockhouse warfare and the tactical principle
of "short, swift thrusts" was applied to support this kind of strategic
battle lines of pure defense. This enabled the enemy's strategy and tactic
of protracted war and blockhouse warfare to achieve their objective and
caused the main force of our Red Army to suffer partial losses and to with-
draw from the central Soviet base area. It should be pointed out that this
line is diametrically opposite to the basic principle of the strategy and
tactics that would achieve victory for our Red Army.
5. At this present stage of the Civil War in China when we do not yet have
the coordination of worker uprisings in big cities and towns and the mutiny
of White soldiers, when our Red Army is still very inadequate in numbers,
when our Soviet areas still constitute only a small part of China, when we
still lack special weaponry such as planes and artillery, and when we are
still in a situation of having to fight from interior lines, our strategic
line, naturally, will be defense through decisive engagements when the enemy
launches his "encirclement and suppression" and attacks us. That is, our
defense will not be pure defense, but a defense seeking for a decisive en-
gagement and then switching over to the counteroffensive. Pure defense can
drain the enemy to a considerable degree and it can preserve territory for
a certain period of time. But it will be impossible to protect the Soviet
area by smashing the "encirclement and suppression" in the end, and there is
no hope of achieving final victory. It is only by going from the defense
to the counteroffensive (on a campaign and strategic level) and then to the
offensive, winning victory in decisive engagements and wiping out enemy
effective strength on a massive scale can we smash the enemy, protect the
Soviet area and develop the Soviet revolutionary movement.
With this strategic line we should not immediately engage the attacking
enemy in decisive battle we are not confident of winning before we have
discovered and exploited the weaknesses of the enemy. What we should do is
to continue to confuse and lure the enemy on various fronts by using our
secondary forces (such as guerrilla units, people's armed force, independent
battalions and regiments, and part of the Red Army's main force). In this
regard, the main thing is to contain the enemy with mobile warfare while
the main forces withdraw to a suitable distance or move out on the enemy's
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flanks or his rear areas, conceal and concentrate and seek favorable oppor-
tunity and launch surprise attacks on the enemy. Under the situation of
fighting along interior lines, the withdrawal and concealment of the Red
Army in the face of enemy's attacks with superior forces will be fully
adequate to tire out the enemy and cause him to become arrogant and care-
less and to commit errors and expose their weaknesses. This creates the
condition for switching over to the counteroffensive and winning victory
in decisive battles.
We must most carefully analyze and appraise the enemy situation so that
the engagement will be properly planned and launched at a favorable time.
Do not permit enemy's feints and provocations to make us unnecessarily
deploy our forces and engage the enemy and become fatigued, thereby causing
us to lose the opportunity for victory in decisive engagements toward a
certain direction. In order to achieve victory, we do not have to block
the path the attack is taking when the enemy begins his advance in accordance
to (his) plan. We should wait until he has penetrated to a suitable distance
and then encircle and wipe him out (that is, luring the enemy to penetrate
deeply). For the purpose of achieving victory we will do whatever is
necessary, temporarily abandoning part of the territory of the Soviet area,
even to the extent of having the main force withdraw temporarily from the
Soviet base area, because we know that we will not only be able to recover
abandoned territory, but also expand the territory of the Soviet area if
we only can annihilate the enemy and smash his "encirclement and suppression."
All these are for the purpose of enabling the Red Army to always assume the
active role and fight successfully against the enemy's attacks and "encircle-
ment and suppression," and to always avoid a passive role and its ensuing
unfavorable results.
All these principles, however, were flouted in the fifth battle. In
February of last year a cable from the Communist International correctly
expounded this: "We feel as if nearly all the plans and measures adopted
by the military command during this period were frequently produced by
the pressures brought to bear by the enemy. The enemy's provocations have
caused us to engage in unnecessary reorganization of our forces. Therefore,
our forces were unable to participate vigorously in engagements with the
enemy because of continuous changes. We feel that we should defeat the
enemy in those areas where we have already won certain victories, and
refrain from attempting to defeat the enemy on all fronts at the same time."
The leaders of the pure defense line were unable to understand this kind of
instruction from the Comintern, therefore, the pure defense line, which
was wholeheartedly willing to place itself in a passive role, did not, and
was also unable to, plan to defeat the enemy on all fronts at the same
time, but attempted to stop the enemy on all fronts at the same time.
This was so not only prior to February of last year but also after the
main force of the Red Army had to withdraw from the Soviet area. The slogan
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"attack on all fronts" set forth in the past by Comrade x x x became resistance
on all fronts during the fifth "encirclement and suppression." Strategically
speaking, both of them are wrong. Politically, the slogan "do not abandon
an inch of soviet territory" is correct, but it becomes wholly erroneous
when mechanically applied to strategy. It can easily become a camouflage
for the line of pure defense.
6. In order to win victory in a decisive engagement it is absolutely neces-
sary to concentrate superior forces. Currently, in a contrast between enemy
forces and ours, the enemy has absolute superiority in troops. They often
attack us with troops several times, or even several tens of times, stronger
than ours. But this is not something we have to fear because the enemy is
situated on the exterior line and has adopted a strategic policy of encircle-
ment, advancing along different routes and converging to attack. This
creates the opportunity for us to defeat the enemy one at a time, and enables
us to benefit from fighting along exterior lines in the campaign (localized
exterior lines) while engaged in strategic interior line combat. That is,
contain the enemy's one line or several lines of advance with part of our
forces and concentrate the greatest force to encircle and wipe out one line
of the enemy's advance, using this kind of method to defeat the enemy
individually and smash his "encirclement and suppression." Under the
situation of fighting along strategic interior lines, it is only by concen-
trating superior forces to seek victory in exterior line engagements in the
campaign can it enable the Red Army to constantly grasp the initiative and
force the enemy into a passive position, and finally to smash his entire plan.
In the past, however, the leaders of the pure defense line almost always
scatter their forces (primarily the dispersement of the 1st and 3d Army Corps)
in their resistance along all fronts against the enemy's advance. The re-
sult of this dispersement has frequently put us in a passive position,
weakening our forces everywhere and proving advantageous to the enemy for
defeating us one at a time. In the war of the fifth "encirclement and
suppression" we were unable to achieve victories in many of the campaigns
(such as the campaigns at Hsun-k'ou [3169 0656], T'uan-tsun [0957 2625],
Chien-ning [1696 1337], and Wen-fang [3306 0972] because our forces were
not concentrated. The central task given the Red Army by the leaders of
the pure defense line was to block the advance of the enemy in an attempt
to wipe out part of the enemy with "short, swift thrusts," and it was not
to seize the initiative, not to win victory in decisive engagements. The
result was that the number of enemy (troops) wiped out by the Red Army
was very small, and, in the end, the Soviet area was also ravaged by the
enemy.
7. Wiping out the enemy in mobile warfare is the specialty of our Worker-
Peasant Red Army. When the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression"
began, the Comintern pointed out for us (in a cable sent in October of the
year before): "In our actions we should not adopt the method of positional
warfare, but adopt the method of mobile warfare on both flanks of the
enemy." In last February's cable it was repeated: "Based on past experience,
it is plain that our troops have won many great victories in mobile warfare,
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but they were unable to win victory in battles fought by storming the block-
house areas." These instructions from the Cominterm were completely correct.
Although we did not have the opportunity under the blockhouse warefare of
the enemy's fifth encirclement to adopt mobile warfare on a massive scale
as was the case with the enemy's "deep penetration" in the first, second,
third and fourth "encirclement and suppressions," the feasibility of mobile
warfare still exists. This, in practice, has been proved many times (in
the various campaigns of Hsun-k'ou, T'uan-tsun, Chiang-chun-tien [1412
6511 3013], Chien-ning, Wen-fang, Hu-fang [3275 0972], and, especially at
the time of the 19th Route Army uprising. Nevertheless, the pure defense
line which grew out of the fear of blockhouse warfare and Comrade Hua Fu's
[5478 1133] theory of "short, quick, thrusts" caused us to switch from mobile
warfare to positional warfare during the fifth campaign. But this mode
of positional warfare, at that time, was only beneficial to the enemy, and
it was extremely disadvantageous to the Worker-Peasant Red Army.
Under current technical conditions, storming the enemy's blockhouses should
be rejected. It is only in a situation where the blockhouses are weak, or
isolated, or it is either for the purpose of striking at enemy reinforce-
ments or to force the enemy to deploy his troops that attacks on enemy
blockhouses are permitted. Frequently, assaults on enemy blockhouses have
been undertaken lightly with hardly any affect. This is not surprising,
because war has been taken as a child's game.
Due to underestimating the feasibility of mobile warfare in the fifth war,
there was absolute separation of the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppres-
sion" from his first, second, third and fourth encirclements. This, in
turn, led to the absolute negation of past experiences in mobile warfare
and to the absolute denial of the combat methods of luring the enemy in to
wipe him out. This, in practice, led to the reluctant rejection of the
correct instructions of the Comintern and these were natural rationale
for the leaders of pure defense and short, quick thrusts.
8. Because of the overestimation of the enemy's blockhouse warfare and the
underestimation of the feasibility of mobile warfare, the theory that
victory can only be realized through tactics was born. It held that only
tactical victory can be turned Into a campaign victory, and, then, victory
in the campaign will bring about changes favorable to us strategically
(Comrade Hua Fu's article and comrades x x and x x letters to Lin Piao and
P'eng Te-huai). It held that "under blockhouse warfare there can only be
many small victories but no clear-cut victory" (see Comrade x x's speech
in the Political Bureau and Comrade x x's "Red Star" article, and it also
held that blockhouse warfare can be handled only by dividing the troops to
resist and by short, quick thrusts. The theory and practice of all these
strategies and tactics of opportunism in the revolutionary war became
bankrupt during the fifth campaign.
We cannot deny that blockhouse warfare has created new difficulties for
smashing the fifth "encirclement and suppression" (whereas they first
reviled blockhouse warfare with the empty talk of the left--see Comrade x x's
article in "Red Star"). We do not deny, but should prepare for, the
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technical conditions of the Red Army (planes and artillery), especially the
uprising of worker-peasant soldiers inside the blockhouse areas so as to
overcome even more powerful enemy blockhouses in the future. However,
blockhouse warfare can also be smashed, even at present. Blockhouse warfare
has fatigued the enemy's troops and dispersed his forces. It has fostered
the enemy's dependency on the blockhouses, causing them to lose confidence
of victory when they leave them.
At the same time the enemy cannot advance on us without leaving his block-
houses. Nor can he build enough blockhouses all over the country to restrict
the movement of the Red Army. All these taken together create favorable
conditions for us to overcome blockhouse warfare. The method to be applied
by the Red Army toward smashing blockhouse warfare is still dependent upon
mobile warfare, dependent upon unfolding guerrilla warfare all around the
blockhouse lines in a coordinated move with the Red Army and dependent upon
the intensification of the movement among the White soldiers. We wait
inside the lines of the blockhouses for the enemy to advance and then destroy
his troops on a massive scale outside the lines of the blockhouses, when the
Red Army has moved to an area free of blockhouses to carry out its activities,
to force the enemy to leave his blockhouses and engage us in mobile warfare.
If we only apply the strategic and tactical principles of mobile warfare
flexibly, skillfully and with strategem, we will then certainly be able to
smash the enemy's blockhouse warfare. Only a correct strategic guideline
can correctly lead a campaign and correctly apply tactics to smash block-
house warfare and to smash the "encirclement and suppression." In pure
defense and in "short, quick thrusts" victory is not mainly dependent upon
correct leadership of the strategic campaign, but merely on tactics. This,
in practice, is to surrender to blockhouse warfare, not to smash it.
9. The understanding of the leaders of the pure defense line is also incor-
rect with regard to the question of protracted war and waging war with
quick, decisive engagements. The Chinese civil war is not a short-term
war. It is a prolonged, protracted war. The Soviet Revolution was developed
and consolidated in the midst of the continuous smashing of the enemy's
encirclements. When favorable conditions occur, we should switch over
completely from the defensive to the counteroffensive, and then to the
offensive, wipe out the enemy and smash the "encirclement and suppression"
(for example, the first, second, third and fourth wars, and prior to the
Kuang-ch'ang [1684 24901 campaign). When unfavorable conditions arise we
can temporarily withdraw to conserve our effective strength and then go
over to the counteroffensive and offensive when other favorable conditions
came into being (for example, after the Kuang-ch'ang campaign of the fifth
war). This is the first basic principle. Simultaneously, however, another
principle must also be understood. In order to wage a protracted and
prolonged war, all efforts must be made to achieve a quick and decisive
battle situation in each of the "encirclement and suppressions" and in every
one of the campaigns, because under the present balance of forces between
ourselves and the enemy, it will be extremely disadvantageous for us to
adopt the policy of protracted warfare toward each and every one of the
"encirclement and suppressions" and toward each and every one of the
campaigns.
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We must apply a correct strategic policy and smash the enemy's plans when he
uses protracted warfare against us (as in the fifth "encirclement and suppres-
s:ion") and win a decisive victory in a period of time we can sustain to
smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression." Using figures of our
manpower, material resources and munition supply to compare to what the
Kuomintang has (the so-called competition with the enemy at attrition, see
Comrade x x's article in "Red Star")--such understanding of protracted
warfare is basically wrong. In such things we are at present situated in
an absolutely "inferior position" and such comparison of figures can only
give proof of contrary conclusions.
Precisely because we must wage protracted warfare in the long-range Civil
War, and, at the same time, wage a campaign of quick decisions in every
campaign, we must be especially careful in deciding upon our strategic
campaign plans. The strategy of pure defense pursued during the fifth war
was basically wrong, and the many battles of desperate recklessness fought
under this erroneous strategy (such as the campaigns of Kuang-ch'ang,
Mao-ting-san [3029 0002 0005], San-chi-fang [0005 3305 0972], P'ing-liao
[1627 4070] and others) were similarly erroneous. The Red Army must avoid
those battles which have no prospects of victory. Even though the battle
decision was correct at that point of time we should immediately refuse to
engage in such battles when the situation changes unfavorably against us.
It is a heinous crime to play with uprisings, and it is also criminal to
play with battles.
Exactly because we must wage protracted warfare and wage quick and decisive
engagements in the campaign, we must provide the Red Army with the necessary
time for resting its forces and for educating and training them. These are
prerequisite conditions for victory in the war. It is wrong to say that
it was not possible to rest and train during the fifth war. That is the
inevitable conclusion of proponents of pure defense and short, quick
thrusts. It is also incorrect to hold that in order to inject vigor into
the Red Army activities we must have it fighting battles frequently, and
without stop, and there is no need to give attention to rest and training.
Without the necessary rest and training we cannot then fight battles well
and victoriously. The organization of the Red Army must be suitable to
the environment of the current Civil War. It is wrong to establish many
new regimental and divisional units before the main force has been brought
up to strength. Only after the main force is up to strength should new
units be established. It is not right to throw into battle all by itself
a division of new troops who have no education or training and who have no
combat experience. There should be a core of veteran soldiers in the
division of new troops, and, in the initial stage, place them by all pos-
sible means under the command of a veteran army corps in order to have
some combat experience drilled into them. The kind of unnecessary,
unweildy, top-heavy organizations and those impropetly equipped, should
all be converted to light equipment, and the company and the leadership
of units below divisional level must be strengthened.
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Precisely because we must wage protracted warfare and fight short, decisive
engagements in the campaign, we must oppose that kind of theory which places
the need to conserve effective strength in opposition to the need to protect
the Soviet area. The heroic sacrifice of the Red Army is entirely necessary
for the purpose of fighting a victorious battle. This is the essence of
the class armed forces, the foundation of victory for the revolutionary war.
This kind of sacrifice is made in exchange for victory, and this kind of
victory is worthwhile. This cannot be suitably applied to conduct a battle
of desperation because we must understand that only by conserving our
effective strength can we truly defend the Soviet area. Without a powerful
Red Army the Soviet area cannot be protected, while with one we can, after
all, recover, even if the Soviet area sustained partial loss temporarily.
Furthermore, only by relying upon the Red Army can new Soviet areas be
formed.
Under the principle of waging protracted warfare we must oppose the two
kinds of erroneous tendencies which may arise after we have smashed the
enemy's "encirclement and suppression" with counteroffensive engagements.
One type is conservatism rising from fatigue and overestimation of the
enemy's strength. This type of conservatism causes us to become dis-
appointed and discouraged, causes us to stop and become immobile. It
causes us to become unable to go over from the counteroffensive to the
offensive to wipe out even more enemies, develop even bigger Soviet areas
and expand the forces of the Red Army. It prevents us from being able
to obtain adequate conditions to smash the new "encirclement and suppression"
before its onset. The other is adventurism rising from overestimation of
one's own victory and inadequate appraisal of enemy strength. This kind
of adventurism prevents us from achieving victory from our offensives (such
as offensives undertaken without prospects of victory, and unnecessary
offensives against key cities), and even causes the victory already won
to be wasted or go up in smoke. It causes excessive losses to the Red
Army effective strength, causes neglect in the mission to expand the Red
Army, expand the Soviet territory and achieve the development and consolida-
tion of strategic areas. This similarly prevents us from obtaining favor-
able conditions to continue smashing the enemy before the coming of his
"encirclement and suppression." Opposing these two erroneous tendencies
is a serious problem for the party with regard to the question of strategic
offensive. That is, in the period between the enemy's two encirclements.
Under the principle of waging quick, decisive engagements in the campaign
we must oppose the opportunist tendency of hastily accepting battle, which
has its roots in fear and panic, or of being imprudent in the initial
battle. We must oppose opportunist trend toward feeling that nothing could
be done about it after failing to win victory in a battle against the enemy
which was launched in the hope of knocking him out first, or not making
adequate preparations on the pretext of launching a quick, decisive engage-
ment, or not making all necessary preparations in a period of time that
can possibly be sustained, against the enemy's encirclement. For a quick,
decisive engagement ther are many necessary conditions (such as strategic
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superiority, correctness of campaign leadership, mobile warfare, grasping
the opportune moment and concentration of forces) to wipe out the enemy
troops. Only by wiping out enemy troops can a battle situation be quickly
resolved and cause the enemy's offensive and "encirclement and suppression"
to be smashed.
10. One of our important strategies for smashing the enemy's "encirclement
and suppression" is to take advantage of every friction within the
counterrevolution and vigorously widen the rift within their ranks so as to
benefit our switching over to the counteroffensive and offensive. The
incident of the 19th Route Army in Fukien Province was the crux to smashing
the enemy's fifth encirclement. At that time, the CCP Central Committee
adopted the correct political line of utilizing this contradiction within
the Kuomintang. It concluded a cease-fire agreement with the 19th Route
Army so as to impel it to oppose Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek.
At that time, Comrade x x and others, under the empty talk of the left,
adopted an opposing policy on the strategic plane. They did not understand
at all that utilizing the 19th Route Army incident politically and militarily
was an important key to smashing the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppres-
sion." On the contrary, they felt that the Red Army's continuation of its
activities on the eastern front and striking at the rear and flanks of
Chiang Kai-shek's troops attacking the 19th Route Army was equivalent to
helping the 19th Route Army. They deployed the main force of the Red Army
to the west to engage in the useless effort of attacking the blockhouses
in the Yung-feng [3657 0023] area and lost this precious opportunity. They
basically did not comprehend that the existence of the 19th Route Army's
People's Government at that time was advantageous to us. Striking at
Chiang Kai-shek's flanks and rear in direct coordination with the 19th
Route Army was precisely for our own benefit. This was not because the
19th Route Army was a revolutionary army. On the contrary, it was merely
a faction within the counterrevolution. This faction planned to use even
more swindles and arbitrary propaganda, and even such terms as socialism,
to preserve in entirety the rule of the landlord bourgeoisie. Only by
demonstrating to the worker-peasant soldiers of the 19th Route Army with
concrete action that we give aid to the anti-Japanese, anti-Chiang Kai-shek
struggles of any faction can we even more easily expose the swindles of the
warlords of the 19th Route Army and win the soldiers over to our side in the
common war against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek.
Only by adopting on a military plane a policy of direct coordination with
the 19th Route Army can we retain the opportunity, at that crucial point
in time, to wipe out Chiang Kai-shek's main force. This kind of condition
has no precedent in the many past battles. We did not utilize this
militarily. For the leaders of pure defense this would not be out of the
ordinary, because their objective, origir.ally, was merely to resist the
enemy's advance. As for using the frictions and contradictions within the
enemy ranks to bring about our going over to the counteroffensive and the
offensive was a rash move in their eyes.
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11. Similarly, error in principle was also committed on the question of
changing strategy and carrying out the breakthrough of the encirclement.
The first thing we should discuss is that when we saw that the possibility
of achieving decisive victory by continuing to fight along interior lines
in the central Soviet area had become remote, and, finally, had become im-
possible (period between May and July 1934, that is, after the Kuang-ch'ang
campaign). We should have altered our strategic policy without any hesita-
tion and carried out a strategic withdrawal in order to conserve the effective
strength of the Red Army's main force, and sought favorable opportunities in
the vast blockhouseless area for an opportune moment to go over to the
counteroffensive, smash the encirclement and create new Soviet areas to
protect the old. In its 25 June cable, the Comintern pointed out in this
manner: "(the resources for) the mobilization of new armed forces in the
central area have not dried up yet. The Red Army's strength to resist and
the situation in its rear area are not enough to make us.panic.
Even speaking on the matter of the Red Army's main force in the Soviet area
withdrawing, its only reason is to conserve its effective strength and avoid
the possibility of being attacked by the enemy. On discussing the resolu-
tions of the 5th Plenary Session of the Central Committee and the 13th
Plenary Session of the Communist International the future prospects of the
struggle and the current international situation as well as the flexible
policy of the Red Army, it was, first of all, inclined toward the conserva-
tion of effective strength, to consolidate and expand under new conditions
and to wait for the opportunity to launch a massive offensive against
imperialism and the Kuomintang." On this crucial point it was clear that
our strategic policy was also incorrect. This question was not mentioned
at all in the "strategic plan for the 3 months of May, June and July."
Although this problem was brought up in the "Strategic plan for the 3 months
of August, September and October"' and preparations were also begun for
withdrawing from the Soviet area, nevertheless, the basic principle of the
new plan was still contrary to the strategic policy which should have been
adopted at that time. "Use all available strength to continue with the
defense of the Soviet area and win a massive victory in the campaign by
doing so" and "launch guerrilla warfare and strengthen activities in the
secondary direction to achieve a strategic change in the situation"--all
these still remain as the second article of the first part of the basic
principle of the new plan, and the question of conserving effective strength
was completely ignored. Whereas this question was the foundation of the
strategic policy on which the decision to withdraw from the Soviet area rests.
The error in timing, plus the emergence of positional warfare in this cam-
paign, caused heavy losses to the Red Army. This kind of contradictory
attitude of preparing for a breakthrough on the one hand, and, on the other,
"Use all available strength to continue with the defense of the central
area" is precisely the manifestation of the inevitable panic of leaders
of the pure defense line when they arrived at the crucial moment of change.
Of even greater importance are our activities for breaking through. In the
mind's eye of Comrade Hua Fu they were basically irresolute and not combat
orientated. It was a kind of panicky running away, home moving type of
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activity. Precisely for this reason, not only was this massive changeover
not conducted in accordance with the Comintern's instruction to carry out
work directed at explaining the situation to the cadres and Red commanders,
it was not even brought up for discussion at the Political Bureau conference.
The political objective of the mass movement of several million people was
not considered to be a significant problem. The necessary time for rest,
reorganization and training was not given to the main force of the Red Army
for moving from the Soviet area to the White area and for changing from
positional warfare to mobile warfare, and a hasty departure was made. They
were silent from beginning to end with regard to the basic questions of what
the present mission was, where they were going and why they were withdrawing
from the Soviet areas. Therefore, they were unable to heighten the enthusiasm
and activism of the Red Army fighters on the military level, and, especially,
on the political level. This cannot be but a grave error. The huge column
of the military committee and other rear echelon departmental organizations
of the Army Corps caused great difficulties to the Red Army fighting on the
move, turning all combat troops into a covering force, slowing down movement
and losing the opportunity for reaching the pre-designated area.
It'was completely forgotten that the strategic switch-over carried out by
the Red Army would encounter serious opposition from the enemy, that in the
course of the long move it would have to fight many difficult and decisive
battles with all of the pursuing and blocking enemy forces before being
able to arrive at its objective. All these military, political and organiza-
tional errors, especially the fact that the strategic policy was not based
upon the principle of obtaining the necessary and opportune moment to engage
the enemy in decisive battle brought about a situation in which we find
ourselves almost always being placed in a passive position and frequently
subjected to enemy attacks and being unable to strike at the enemy with
strength. It therefore turned the 3-month breakthrough campaign into a
covering engagement everywhere, and there were no free rein offensives taken
on our own initiative. Although "preparing for combat" was frequently on
the lips, in practice, we were frequently "avoiding combat" besides conduct-
ing covering engagements. The morale of the Red Army could not be uplifted,
there was over-fatigue from being unable to get a moment's rest. And it
resulted in a decrease in personnel to an unprecedented degree. It also
caused the correct slogan of "counteroffensive" to become, in practice, a
camouflage for the policy of avoiding combat advocated by Comrade x x and
others. There was no preparation for actually seizing victory in the
counteroffensive when it became necessary. We failed to compel the enemy
to change his entire plan to attack the central Soviet area with the Red
Army's change of strategy so as to protect the central area, smash the fifth
"encirclement and suppression," establish the Hunan base and even to con-
serve the effective strength of the Red Army at a high level. All these
were the unavoidable result of basically adopting avoidance of combat in
the strategic policy. This strategic avoidance of combat stems from our
erroneous viewpoints. That is to say the Red Army must first arrive at
its designated area (western Hunan Province), unload its baggage and then
launch a counteroffensive to wipe out the enemy. Otherwise, it would not
be possible.
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In the pursuit of the enemy (for instance, the columns of Chou [0719] and
Hsueh [5641], they were afraid to give battle even when the enemy became
separated and they were fatigued. The source of this kind of erroneous
viewpoint lies in not understanding the fact that the current situation
does not allow us to go about our task in such a simple, nonchalant and
straightforward manner, as well as in overestimating the strength of the
pursuing enemy. This way of doing things might be possible in a brief
situation involving inconsequential movements of small units. But, in a
situation covering several thousand li of the fifth "encirclement and
suppression" and involving the massive strategic relocation of the Red
Army's main force it was impossible. Avoid battles with the enemy which
are unnecessary and where no weaknesses can be exploited. Engagements with
the enemy should not be avoided when the contrary arises. Herein lies the
main reason for the failure to accomplish their own mission in the break-
through activities. This error in principle kept on developing right up
to the final stage of the breakthrough campaign. When the Red Army reached
the borders of Hunan and Kweichow it still acted in a mechanical manner and
wanted to advance into the area of the 26th Army Corps. They did not know
how to change action guidelines with the situation that had already changed.
When the Red Army arrived in the area of Wu-chiang [3527 3068], they again
did not know how to delineate the task of switching over in the counter-
offensive in accordance with the changes in the new situation to wipe out
the pursuing troops of Chiang Kai-shek, but only recognize the task of wiping
out a handful of the enemy in Kweichow and some so-called bandits. Although
the last two errors were corrected due to the resolute opposition of the
majority of the comrades in the Political Bureau, they were enough to display
the habitual opportunist tendencies of Comrade Hua Fu and others with regard
to strategy.
The prospects in the development of the pure defense line are: Either it
would be desperate recklessness or flightism. There could be nothing else.
12. The enlarged session of the Political Bureau believes that all the
facts have substantiated that our line of pure defense in military matters
is the principal reason for our inability to smash the enemy's fifth
"encirclement and suppression." All attempts to defend the erroneous line
with regard to military leadership with the party's correct line will be
futile. The enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that this kind
of pure defense line in military affairs is a kind of concrete manifestation
of right opportunism. It rises from inadequate appraisal of enemy strength,
overestimating objective difficulties, especially the difficulties of pro-
tracted campaigns and blockhouse warfare, underestimating one's own subjec-
tive strength, especially the strength of the Soviet area and of the Red
Army and from not understanding the characteristics of the Chinese revolu-
tionary war.
The enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that the struggle against
the pure defense line in military matters is the concrete struggle in the
party against right opportunism. This kind of struggle should be launched
and intensified in the entire party. All attempts to turn this struggle
into an unprincipled individual squabble will be severely dealt with.
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13. Furthermore, the enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that
Comrade x x, especially Comrade Hua Fu's, method of leadership was very
poor. All the functions of the military committee were single-handedly
monopolized by Comrade Hua Fu, the collective leadership of the military
committee was abolished, there was a great increase of punitivism, and
self-criticism was nonexistent. Not only all differing opinions on the
military plane were completely ignored but repressive measures were adopted
against them, and the ingenuity, expertise and creativity of lower level
commanders were stifled. Many valuable experiences and lessons of past
revolutionary battles were thrown away under the pretext of switching
strategy and tactics and labeled "guerrillaism." Although the majority of
the comrades in the military committee have made correct suggestions many
times, and many intense debates have broken out over it, it did not affect
Comrade Hua Fu and Comrade x x. All these contributed to the abnormal
phenomenon within the military committee.
At the same time, the Political Bureau believes even more so that, in the
past, the Secretariat and the Political Bureau's leadership of the military
committee was extremely inadequate. The greatest part of the Secretariat's
and Political Bureau's attention was focused on the huge Red Army and on
matters concerning the assurance of material supply to the Red Army.
Unprecedented great results were achieved in this respect (in these fields).
Very little attention was given to strategy and tactics, placing this
responsibility on the shoulders of a very few comrades, mainly Comrade x x
and Comrade Hua Fu. We did not clearly understand that the question of
conducting a war affects the overall situation of victory or defeat, and
mistakes could turn achievements gained from the best rear area work into
smoke. The mistake the Political Bureau made on this question should be
admitted. All the comrades of the Secretariat should bear an even greater
part of the responsibility because some of the important decisions or
strategic plans were approved by them.
But the enlarged session of the Political Bureau especially set forth the
grave errors of Comrade x x in this respect. Representing the CCP Central
Committee, he directed the work of the military committee. With regard to
the error in line committed by Comrade Hua Fu in directing battles and
the abnormal phenomenon within the military committee, he not only did not
correct it in a timely manner but vigorously supported and nurtured the
development of this kind of error. The enlarged session of the Political
Bureau considers that Comrade x x should bear the main responsibility in
this respect, but Comrade x x, in his conclusion, did not admit his own
errors, nor did he accept the criticism of the greatest majority of the
comrades. It must be pointed out that with regard to Comrade x x, this
kind of error was not an error of the entire political line, but a partial
and serious political error.
The enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that the error committed
in the past on military leadership must be thoroughly rectified in order to
smash the enemy's encirclement campaign, create new Soviet areas and improve
the method of leadership of the military committee.
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14. The enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that although our
past erroneous leadership in military matters has caused us to be unable to
smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" within the central Soviet
area and brought about the forced withdrawal, with partial losses, of our
main force Red Army from the Soviet area. Nevertheless, the Red Army's
main force still exists. We have the superior conditions based on the masses,
the correct leadership of the party, a relatively good area with regard to
materials and terrain and the support of the broad masses throughout the
country. In coordination with the victories of the Fourth Front Army and of
the 26th Army Corps, plus the correct conduct of warfare, we believe all
these difficulties can be overcome through the industrious efforts of the
entire body of our comrades and the red commanders. At the same time the
difficulties of the enemy have increased greatly and the area of our activities
has become very distant from.the counterrevolutionary base of the Nanking
government. The blockhouse area, which was run by Chiang Kai-shek for many
years and on which he placed his reliance, is now no more. The contradictions
and disunity within the ranks of the warlords have further multiplied and the
main force of our chief enemy, Chiang Kai-shek, has been weakened in the fifth
"encirclement and suppression." The division of China by imperialism, the
Kuomintang's policy of national betrayal and the unprecedented collapse of the
national economy throughout the country have made it even more clear to the
people of the nation that only the Soviet can save China. They, thereby,
become even more sympathetic to the Soviet Revolution and give it support,
and even directly participating in struggles on behalf of the Soviet
political power. All these are favorable conditions for smashing the enemy's
new encirclement campaign, creating new Soviet bases and developing a'nation-
wide soviet movement. It must be pointed out, however, that the current
situation has set critical tasks before the party and the Red Army. This
is because at no time will imperialism and the counterrevolutionary warlords
of the Kuomintang relax their drive against us. In the face of the new
encirclement campaign we must recreate Soviet areas as there are no existing
ones, and the central Red Army is not in the Yunnan-Kweichow area. Our
victory must be won through arduous struggles of our own. The creation of
new Soviet areas cannot be successful without going through bloody struggle.
The current central problem is how to be victorious over the troops of
Szechwan, Yunna, Kweichow and Chiang Kai-shek. The movements of the Red
Army must have a high degree of flexibility in order to fight successfully
against these enemies.
The basic principles of revolutionary warfare have been decided and to accom-
plish battle tasks it will be necessary to apply these principles in a
flexible way. The special capacity of the Red Army for mobile warfare has
been considerably weakened by protracted positional warfare in the battles
of the fifth encirclement, and, right now, the various levels of Red Army
commanders are required to have a high level of tactical skill in mobile
warfare. The resolute and rapid change over from the tactics of positional
warfare (short, quick thrusts) to the tactics of mobile warfare is a very
serious task. Necessary training in skills must be given to the fighters,
especially the new ones. In political work everything must meet with the
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current need of the movement in order to guarantee the accomplishment of
every combat task. The Red Army needs even more to rest up and reorganize
during battles and also to expand itself in a big way. The Red Army should
tighten up its own discipline. It must maintain even closer relations
with the broad masses of hard working worker-peasant masses and become as
one with them and strengthen in a big way the work of the local people.
The current situation demands that the leadership of the party and the
Red Army should exert all efforts to resolve these basic questions con-
cretely and positively.
The work of the party in the White area must be established and strengthened.
There must be a thorough change in the leadership method of the mass struggle
in the White area. The work of collapsing the White army must be launched
in a positive manner. The propagation of large-scale guerrilla warfare
is one of the party's most central tasks. The party must hold fast to the
leadership of guerrilla warfare in the central Soviet area and the Soviet
areas of Hunan,Kiangsi and Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi provinces, change past
methods of work to conform with the new situation. Finally, even more
closer relationship must be established with the 26th Army Corps and the
Fourth Front Army and also strengthen the leadership over them in order to
achieve unified action of all the Red armies in the country and their
coordination with each other.
The enlarged session of the Political Bureau believes that we can accomplish
these serious tasks that have been placed before us, and their accomplishment
ensures subsequent new victories in the revolution. New victories in the
revolution will make our central Red Army create a new Soviet base area in
the vast expanse of the three provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan,
bring about the recovery of our old Soviet area, and the creation of a unified
liaison between the Red armies in various areas with the Soviet areas. It
will also bring about a change of the struggle of the worker-peasant masses
throughout the country into a victorious revolution.
The enlarged session of the Political Bureau believes that the Chinese
Soviet Revolution, having its rich historic source, cannot be wiped out and
cannot be conquered by the enemy. The transformation of the central Soviet
area, the Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet area and the Chekiang-Kiangsi Soviet area
into guerrilla areas is but a partial setback in the overall Soviet revolu-
tion. Such a setback is not enough to make us display alarm and panic about
the progress of the Chinese Soviet Revolution. In practice, it will not be
possible even for the Kuomintang and imperialism to contemplate temporarily
stopping the advance of the Soviet revolution. The victories of the
Fourth Front Army and the 26th Army Corps, the brisk activities of the
Central Red Army in the three provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan,
and the revolutionary struggle of the worker-peasant masses throughout the
country testify that the entire Chinese Soviet Revolution is advancing.
The enlarged session of the Political Bureau pointed out that the past errors
of the party in its military leadership are but partial errors when viewed
from the standpoint of the party's entire line. This kind of error is not
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The People's University of China, 1956.
enough to make us become dejected and discouraged. The party has courageously
exposed this kind of error and educated itself to it. It has learned how
to even better lead the revolution and battle to complete victory. The
party has not been weakened, but strengthened, after exposing such errors.
The enlarged session of the Political Bureau calls on all comrades to oppose
with the determination of a Bolshevik, all right-leaning opportunism of
alarm and panic, dejection and discouragement, and, foremost, to oppose the
line of pure defense. The enlarged session of the Political Bureau even
more urgently calls on all comrades to unite to a man around the CCP Central
Committee and struggle to the end for the CCP Central Committee's general
line. Victory will inevitably be ours.
A "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," Vol 1
Printed by the CCP Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Central Bureau, 1948.
8439
CSO: 4005 END
neierence riateriais on the History of the Chinese Revolution, Vol 3,
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