GUATEMALA: THE CLIMATE FOR INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03T02547R000100210001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Guatemala:
The Climate for Insurgency
An Intelligence Assessment
USAID review completed
Secret
PA 81-10073
February 1981
Copy 018
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Guatemala:
The Climate for Insurgency
Information available as of January 1981 has been used
in the preparation of this report.
Office of Political Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be directed to the Chief, Latin
This assessment was prepared by
America Division, OPA
Officer for Latin America
This paper was coordinated with the Office of Economic
Research, the Office of Central Reference, the
Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence
Secret
PA 81-10073
February 1981
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Secret
Guatemala:
The Climate for Insurgency
Key Judgments The 20-year-old Marxist insurgency in Guatemala is again intensifying.
Encouraged by the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the growing vio-
lence in neighboring El Salvador, the revolutionaries have more than
doubled their strength over the past two years, to some 2,000 armed
guerrillas. They are stepping up operations, particularly in rural areas where
the impoverished Indian masses have been left behind by the country's
rapid, but badly skewed, economic growth.
Havana, encouraged by the prospects for revolution in Central America, has
increased its financial aid, advice, and training for Guatemalan insurgents.
Cuban leaders are pressing the radicals to set aside their rivalries and
establish an effective political and military coalition.
We believe the insurgents will be unable to improve their military position
substantially over the next several months. Even with increased supplies of
arms, they will face many obstacles that are likely to make the revolutionary
struggle in Guatemala a long-term process. These include repression by the
Army, police, and unofficial death squads; dissension within guerrilla ranks;
and lack of widespread popular support
Guerrilla prospects would be enhanced considerably should the bid for
power by fellow revolutionaries in El Salvador succeed, thereby giving
Guatemalan leftists training and staging areas across the border and a
convenient source of arms and munitions.
In the north, Mexican territory is used for small-scale arms smuggling, and
isolated border areas probably serve as guerrilla sanctuaries. Although
Mexico City is keeping the Guatemalan Government at arm's length, it does
not actively support the insurgents and will prevent them from carrying out
blatant aggression from Mexican territory.
Lacking the resources and support base necessary to launch a broad,
nationwide offensive, the insurgents are pursuing a long-term strategy that
they and their Cuban mentors hope will complement the growth of
revolutionary activity throughout Central America. Focusing operations on
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four regions-the capital, the Pacific Coast plantations, the Western High-
lands, and the Northern Transversal-the extremists are trying to demor-
alize the Army, erode business confidence, and promote a degree of general
insecurity that eventually will undermine the government.
Radical leaders recognize that their success ultimately depends on recruit-
ing and mobilizing the Indians and, in some areas, Indian guerrillas already
appear to be playing an important role in the fighting. The susceptibility of
the Indians to guerrilla appeals depends to a large extent on cultural and
economic factors that are eroding traditional indigenous lifestyles. This
process is producing a generation of young Indians who are increasingly
unwilling to submit to the injustices of the past. The failure of Guatemala's
socioeconomic structure to accommodate these changing aspirations could
result in a gradually growing indigenous support for radical change. For the
time being, however, most Indians apparently prefer to remain neutral in the
violent struggle between leftist and rightist forces.
Guatemalan Government and business leaders, though concerned by the
insurgent challenge and the country's growing social and economic prob-
lems, are confident that they can maintain the upper hand. The govern-
ment's response ranges from genuine efforts to improve living conditions for
the poor to a continued heavy reliance on repression. President Lucas's
regime has initiated social expenditures that, in the Guatemalan context, are
unprecedented. A nationwide propaganda campaign to boost the positive
image of the government and the armed forces is under way, with the
military increasing its role in social welfare programs. At the same time,
"death squads" operate with near impunity, decimating the ranks of labor
leaders, members of the legitimate political left, and students and faculty of
universities.
Improved government performance faces substantial obstacles, many of the
adminstration's own making. The military and the business community do
not constitute a unified oligarchy. Latent frictions between the entrenched
ultraconservative groups and reform-minded government leaders, who are
pushing increased public sector spending, a wider tax base, and reasonable
changes, are likely to increase. The government also does not appear to have
enough technically and administratively skilled people to implement its
social action programs. Despite the new social welfare commitment, the
ratio of government expenditures to national income is one of the smallest in
Latin America. Moreover, the impact of benevolent programs is reduced by
the regime's use of intimidation and increasingly indiscriminate violence.
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Nonetheless, Guatemala overall has the best organized, trained, and
equipped armed forces in Central America; significant human, natural, and
financial resources; and probably sufficient time to sort out and begin
solving the problems it faces. To the extent that the socioeconomic and
political elites refuse to provide wider benefits, however, they spread the
seeds of their own destruction.
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Secret
Guatemala:
The Climate for Insurgency
The Guatemalan radical left-including both terrorist
groups and sympathetic front organizations represent-
ing labor, peasants, and students-is the most tena-
cious in the hemisphere. It has survived constant brutal
repression and vitiating internal dissension. Drawing
on their years of experience in subversion and feeding
on the deep social, political, and economic inequities in
Guatemalan society, the radicals are again challenging
the government in a campaign reminiscent of the vio-
lence that wracked the country during the mid- and
late 1960s.
Guerrilla Groups
The modern guerrilla movement can be traced to 1962
and the formation of the Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR)-an alliance of the Guatemalan Community
Party (PGT), dissident military officers, and leftist
students. The FAR spawned the first significant ter-
rorist campaigns, which peaked between 1965 and
1969. A brutal government counterinsurgency pro-
gram killed several top leaders, decimated cadres, and
broke up support networks. The FAR repudiated the
PGT in 1968 for not helping enough in the fighting,
and out of a series of factional splits and mergers grew
the now predominant insurgent group, the Guerrilla
Army of the Poor (EGP). A second major group, the
Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), began
operations during the past year.
The EGP remains the largest and most potent guerrilla
organization, but if ORPA continues to increase its
operations at the present rate it may soon eclipse the
older organization. Havana-the major adviser and
arms supplier to Guatemalan guerrillas-appears to
favor ORPA and this may be a significant factor in
ORPA's rapid rise to prominence. Although much
smaller in numbers, both the FAR and a group of
dissident Communist Party members continue to en-
gage in propaganda or terrorist activities
Given the still-limited scope of guerrilla operations
we believe there
are no more than 2,000 armed insurgents. Even so, this
would be more than double the force of two years ago.
Moreover, guerrilla warfare training in Cuba for
Guatemalan insurgents has increased significantly and
this probably will further strengthen the revolutionary
forces.
Affiliated Organizations
Several labor, student, and peasant groups sym-
pathetic with the radical left probably constituted
sources of recruitment for insurgent cadres during the
past year. Most of them were not classic front groups,
however, since the guerrillas did not control the leaders
or policies of the organizations, even though some
members were guerrillas. By the close of the year,
however, relentless attacks by rightist death squads
forced the majority of these groups to cease operating
publicly. Some groups, like the Robin Garcia Student
Front (FERG) and the Peasant Unity Committee
(CUC) apparently have gone underground and joined
the guerrilla movement
The Democratic Front Against Repression (FDCR),
established in 1979, represented a fledgling bid to
duplicate the broad front tactics of Nicaraguan and
Salvadoran revolutionaries. During 1980, it focused on
publicizing human rights violations in Guatemala and
in promoting a negative international view of the gov-
ernment of President Lucas. In their travels through
Europe, Latin America, and the United States, FDCR
representatives tried to project an image of nonparti-
san and nonviolent opposition to repression; their pub-
lic statements, however, echoed the propaganda of the
insurgents. The death squads also forced the FDCR to
cease overt operations in Guatemala, but a few FDCR
spokesmen in exile continue to make statements that
are disseminated by domestic and international media.
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Figure 1
Legend Key
FAR: Rebel Armed Forces
Schism Communist Party)
EGP: Guerilla Army of the Poor
PGT( (November 13 Movement
April 12 Movement
? ? ?
FAR/
November 13 Movement
PGT
PGT Dissidents
i 978
FAR
ORPA
? ?
PGT National Revolutionary Union
Cuban Support and the Search for Unity
Havana's friendship, counsel, and material assistance
have long been a key factor in the survivability of the
radical left in Guatemala. Most guerrilla leaders have
spent time in Havana, where Fidel Castro has patiently
but persistently pressed them to set aside their dif-
ferences and cooperate; their reward would be stepped-
up Cuban assistance. Castro's goal is to build and
sustain a guerrilla coalition responsive to Havana and
ready to confront directly the Guatemalan Govern-
ment at the appropriate time
Although Castro's task seems formidable, both he and
Guatemalan extremist leaders are encouraged by what
they believe is the potential for revolutionary upheaval
in Central America. The Sandinista success in Nica-
ragua-and Cuba's role in convincing the factions
there to work together-is held up as a model.
In early 1980, Havana succeeded in prodding the four
main Guatemalan insurgent groups to agree to co-
ordinate operations, but rivalries between insurgent
leaders and disagreements over strategy still seemed to
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Secret
Propaganda flier exhorting the
Guatemalan people to join the
four guerrilla groups in the
struggle against the "criminal
Lucas government" and the
"assassin Army." Guatemalans
are also urged to support ac-
tively the insurgents in El
Salvador.
CONMEMOREMOS EL 20 DE OCTUBRE
IMPULSANDO LA LUCHA PARA DERROCAR
AL GOBIERNO CRIMINAL DE LUCAS
Llamamos unitariamente al Pueblo do Guatemala:ruERZAS ARMADAS RE9ELDes
F A R
Las cuatro Organizaclones Revolucionarias
EGP, FAR, ORPA y PGT
A enfrentar combativamentc la represion del gobierno y los patrones con la Autodefensa
inteligente y organizada, usando todos los medios a nuestro alcance.
A incorporarse masivamente a la Guerra Revolucionaria Popular impulsada y dirigida por
nuestras cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias, Para dar nuevos y mayores golpes al
ejercito asesino.
A apoyar activamente la lucha victoriosa del heroico Pueblo hermano de Ell Salvador y
seguir su ejemplo combativo.
For the present, the revolutionary effort in El Salvador
still appears to be Havana's top priority. If that is
successful, El Salvador could serve as a staging area
for attacks into Guatemala as well as a convenient
source of arms and munitions. In the meantime,
Cuba's strategy in Guatemala will concentrate on
keeping the radical forces unified while gradually
building up the guerrillas' numbers, organization, and
public support
Other Foreign Support-Mexico and El Salvador
Mexican leaders are pursuing a dual-track policy to-
ward Guatemala. Official relations between the two
countries are cool because of the international notori-
ety and repression employed by the Lucas regime.
President Lopez Portillo has underscored his displeas-
ure with the situation in Guatemala by postponing
indefinitely a scheduled state visit. Mexico City is
convinced that only socioeconomic reform and more
moderate government policies can save Guatemala
from an eventual revolutionary upheaval.F
LA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, POPULAR
Y DEMOCRATICA ACERCA EL DIA DEL
TRIUNFO PARA NUESTRO PUEBLO
At the same time, Mexico City sees drawbacks in
isolating the Lucas government completely, since that
would aggravate the siege mentality of the Guate-
malan right wing and close off Mexico's own options.
Thus, while Mexican leaders will continue to keep
Lucas at arm's length, they will also proceed with trade
programs and joint development projects.
the
long Mexican border-isolated, sparsely populated,
and lightly patrolled by the armies of both countries-
is an area of insurgent activities. We believe that
Guatemalan guerrillas are smuggling arms-albeit on
a small scale-from the Mexican side and are probably
using certain areas of Mexican territory as sanctuaries.
Indeed, pitched guerrilla warfare is currently under
way in Guatemalan departments of the Western High-
lands bordering Mexico.
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Revolutionary groups in El Salvador have cooperated
with their Guatemalan counterparts for several years,
primarily in the Guatemala City area.
The consensus of the radical left is that the
revolutionary struggle in Guatemala will be a long-
term process. Thus, their aim is to develop the "infra-
structure of the revolution" through propaganda and
recruitment, reinforced by a limited campaign of ter-
rorism and guerrilla warfare. Within this framework,
four major factors figure prominently in the left's
overall tactics:
? The lack of sufficient popular support to escalate
hostilities into open warfare.
? The formidable obstacle represented by rightwing
counterinsurgency, which has resulted in the deaths
of hundreds of overt and covert supporters of the
radicals.
? The guerrillas' belief that their "final offensive" will
not be possible until the insurgent left comes to power
in El Salvador.
? The difficulty of maintaining a unified guerrilla
front in the face of strategic disagreements and per-
sonal rivalries among the insurgents.
Active Insurgency
Unable to carry out operations in all parts of the
country, the guerrillas generally have focused on what
they regard as the four most suitable or vulnerable
regions: the Guatemala City metropolitan area, the
Western Highlands, the Pacific Coast Plantation
Suchitepequez to the Mexican border.
Rural guerrilla warfare is most intense in the Indian
areas of the Western Highlands. Throughout most of
1980, the EGP insurgents in the Quiche department
waged the most effective military campaign, but to-
ward the close of the year and the beginning of 1981,
the area of severest fighting shifted to the ORPA zone
of operations stretching west from Chimaltenango and
pathy.
Although some regional variation exists, current guer-
rilla tactics generally are designed to minimize rebel
casualties, discredit and embarrass the government,
garner a maximum of publicity and gain public sym-
In the Western Highlands and the Northern Transver-
sal Zone, the numerical superiority of the Army has
compelled the guerrillas to rely on hit-and-run
ambushes intended to increase Army casualties and
In the Western Highlands, the insurgents have sought
publicity by temporarily occupying towns and villages.
Wearing uniforms to dramatize the power and legiti-
macy of the underground army, the guerrillas quickly
assemble the local populace and subject it to anti-
government, anticapitalist harangues. ORPA has been
particularly active in this practice in recent months,
gaining a reputation for audacity and effectiveness.
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Guerrilla communique in which
the "EGP reveals the truth
regarding the victorious attack
on the Cotzal garrison and re-
futes the lies of the Army." Con-
tradicting Army spokesmen, the
guerrillas claim to have killed 35
to 40 soldiers. In reprisal, "the
Army of the rich and its North
American, Israeli and
Somocista advisers" massacred
60 men, women, and children in
that Indian town. "But with this
genocidal attitude, the only
thing they accomplish is height-
ening of the awareness of the
people that POPULAR
REVOLUTIONARY WAR IS
THE ONLY PATH LEFT TO
FOLLOW...."
EJERCITO GUERRILLERO DE LOS POBRES
EL EGP INFORMA LA VERDAD SOBRE EL VICTORIOSO
ATAQUE AL CUARTEL DE COTZAL Y REFUTA LAS
MENTIRAS DEL EJERCITO.
El EJERCITO GUERRILLERO DE LOS POBRES -EGP- in
forma a la Prensa nacional e international y al Pue
blo guatemalteco, sobre el ataque que victoriosamen
Edgar Ibarra, el lunes 28 de julio.
Ese dia, a las 5:20 horas, nuestras fuerzas iniciaron un ata ue de
hosti;miento en gran escala contra el Cuartel Militar de San Juan otza ,
Depart:amento d e E uic , en el cual habian entre 80 y 100 kaibiles fuer
temente armados, bajo el mando de dos oficiales guatemaltecos y dos ex-o-
ficial.es de la odiada guardia somocista.
Despu6s de 20 minutes de intenso enfrentamiento (reconocido publica-
mente como el mayor habido entre el ej6rcito y Las fuerzas guerrilleras),
el fuego de fusileria de nuestros her6icos combatientes guerrilleros le
caus6 al enemigo las sigiientes bajas comprobadas:
- Murieron uno de los oficiales guatemaltecos (que si fu6 reconocido por
el gobierno de Lucas ante la imposibilidad de ocultarlo) y los dos ofi-
ciales somocistas, que aparecian como miembros de Is Guardia de Hacien-
da, torturadores de oficio.
- Entre 35 y 40 kaibiles muertos.
- Entre 25 y 30 kaibiles heridos que han sido distribuidos en diferentes
hospitales militares del pais (Huehuetenango y Guatemala).
- Ajusticiamos a dos elementos del poder local: Juan Ramos Chamay y Do-
mingo Rodriguez Chamay, guias y orejas del ej6rcito.
Nuestras fuezas no sufrieron ni una sola baja. Por eso el enemigo -
no ha podido presentar ni una sola arma capturada.
Fasta las 07:55, cuando ya nuestras fuerzas guerrilleras se habian -
retirado, llegaron refuerzos enemigos transportados en helicopteros desde
el Cuartel de Chajul. Poco despu6s la aviaci6n comenz6 a bombardear el-
centre y los alrededores del Pueblo y del cuartel, provocando tanta confu
si6n cue una bomba cay6 en pleno cuartel, y los kaibiles dispararon contra
la aviaci6n. El cuartel qued6 pr'acticamente destruido y actualmente ha -
sido cesocupado. Posteriormente el ej6rcito desat6 una feroz y salvajema
sacre contra la poblaci6n civil, ante su incapacidad de golpear a las fuer
zas guerrilleras.
La masacre a continuado, cont6ndose hasta el 31 de julio 60 muertos y
desaparecidos, entre ninos, mujeres, hombres adultos y ancianos. Con esa
cobarce represi6n, el ej6rcito de los ricos y sus asesores norteamericanos,
israelies y somocistas, creep que podran enganar al Pueblo y aislar a1 EGP
de las grandes masas populares. Pero con esa actitud genocida lo unico -
que hacen es acelerar la toma de conciencia de todo el Pueblo de que LA
GUERRP. POPULAR REVOLUCIONARIA ES EL UNICO CAMINO QUE LE QUEDA y aumentar -
su integraci6n a las filas guerrilleras.
EJERCITO GUERRILLERO DE LOS POBRES
-EGP-
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Selected Socio-Economic Regions
8oondary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Western Highlands: Predominantly Indian: minifundia; subsistence agriculture
Pacific Coast Plantation Zone: Ladino and Indian; latifundia; export crops
Northern Transversal Zone: Settlers predominantly Indian; latifundia and minifundia;
subsistence and export crops
Principal Coffee Area: Latifundia and minifundia
Mexico
100
Kilometers
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Secret
Guatemalan Guerrilla Activity: 1979-1980
GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES
Military (Combat against government forces)
Terrorism (Assassination, kidnapping and sabotage)
Propaganda (Temporary town or plantation occupation)
GUERRILLA GROUPS/AREAS OF OPERATION
= EGP- Guerrilla Army of the Poor
0 FAR- Rebel Armed Forces
[I Mixed guerrilla groups
~Jln
Mexico
BELMOPAN
Belize
(U.K.)
Boundary reproaentalion is
nol necenear,Iy aul hor'IIal,oe
^
Dolor'
Santa Eulalia
.A..
--/Huahueango
fitme enan,o
aA A'
~. i ?AAtltide A-
Suchiteeeque
^
Chisec
? Alta Verapa.
Quic he
!L
Chajal
? ; U4an Jua otzal
No I? ?, , Son I Uspanten
Gnu--a-t e m a
Santa Ci
z Bala verapaz
Adel Quiche
A t E!
!.. Quezaltenan o
at~paa
yo
A all
an A
sn Marco
AirCOS
a Qu9zalt flan
~fl*GUATEII XLA Jalapa
1ma#tlln
Panzos
t~ Z
Honduras
Ell Salvadori
*
SAN SALVADOR
Kilometers
NOTE: Towards the end of 1980, the area of most intense rural guerrilla activity shifted southward from the EGP
to the ORPA zone of operations. Due to the isolation of many rural communities, it is probable that reporting of
guerrilla activity is incomplete.
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In Guatemala City and other areas, terrorist acts
include assassinations, kidnapings, and bombings.
Uniformed personnel are attacked indiscriminately;
particular individuals may be targeted for revenge
because of specific acts of repression. A few busi-
nessmen have also been killed at random. The radicals
hope these tactics will accelerate polarization and
undermine the confidence of domestic and foreign
companies and investors.
Indian Recruitment
Believing that the success or failure of their movement
depends ultimately on mobilizing the Indian masses-
constituting nearly half of the population-guerrilla
leaders have made recruitment of the indigenous popu-
lation a major aspect of their long-term strategv.
Despite these beginnings, the percentage of the indig-
enous population supporting the guerrilla movement
apparently remains small and geographically limited.
Most Indians still distrust the revolutionaries and
would prefer to sit out the struggle-they sympathize
with neither the insurgents nor the government
Whether the guerrilla organizations can widen their
appeal to the Indian masses depends to a significant
degree on a variety of socioeconomic factors that are
ending the isolation of the Indian communities and
eroding their traditional lifestyles.' This process is
producing a less submissive generation of Indians. But
the changes affecting the indigenous population do not
necessarily produce revolutionaries. In fact, the decline
of the old culture has been accompanied by a strong
desire among young Indians to participate in the
national mainstream. Economic opportunity could pro-
vide an outlet for that desire, while the lack of opportu-
nity could become a major factor in the radicalization
of Indian youths.
Government Response to the Radical Challenge
Relying primarily on native interpreters to propagan-
dize in the local dialects, the EGP astutely seeks to
incorporate entire households into guerrilla operati
Guatemala possesses the resources to offer more social
mobility to its poor. Concern over the potential for
insurgent successes has caused the government to be-
gin significant social and economic reform aimed at
improving the living conditions of the lower classes.
propaganda, moreover, carefully couches its appeals in
terms of local concerns. For example, Ixil Indian
resentments over official regulations against cutting
firewood are exploited by charging that the govern-
ment is only preserving the forests for the rich.
Thus, a core of Indian militants and sympathizers is
being formed-the first of the fruits of the guerrillas'
long-term campaign to promote popular insurrection
the countryside. In addition,
An economic downturn in 1979 and early 1980-
brought on by rising prices of imports, a squeeze on
credit, and the disruption of Central American trade-
is likely to cause a cutback in the government's reform
program. Nevertheless, the economy is basically
strong, and continuing high prices for most agricul-
tural exports and the expected significant increases in
oil production promise to ease the situation over the
long term.
So far, the country's rapidly growing middle class-
between 15 and 18 percent of the urban population-
sees little attraction in revolutionary activity. The
main interests of working class youth also appear to be
economic changes affecting the Indian population.
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employment, education, and social mobility. If eco-
nomic conditions decline significantly, however, the
radical left would probably gain many new adherents,
particularly among urban and rural youth.
Current economic problems, therefore, threaten not
only the stability of the urban sector but-by reducing
tax and other revenues-the continuation of govern-
ment-financed social welfare programs for rural areas.
The Lucas government, aware of the potential difficul-
ties and particularly concerned over agitation by leftist
labor unions, raised minimum wages significantly in
1980, doubled the traditional Christmas bonus, and
implemented other measures benefiting both urban
and rural workers. Nevertheless, the antagonism of the
authorities toward politically active unions, coupled
with the murders of labor leaders and others by rightist
death squads, undercut government efforts to gain
good will.
Repression and Reform
This mix of repression and reform reflects the variety
of views within the Army, the government bureauc-
racy, and the private sector over how to confront the
subversive challenge. The issue is complicated further
by regional divisions within the national power struc-
ture. Leftist terrorism in the Pacific Coast Plantation
Zone and in Guatemala City directly involves the
economic base of the national elite; the current guer-
rilla warfare in isolated areas of the Western High-
lands is not an immediate threat. Local elites in the
Western Highlands, however, have a much different
perspective. Threatened by insurgent agitation among
the Indians, they will continue to favor extreme meas-
ures to eliminate it-regardless of the course of na-
tional politics.
On one point there is considerable unanimity among all
elements of the ruling elite: the country's unprece-
dented expenditures in the social sector will not bear
fruit if leftists are allowed to engage in subversive
activities.
The ruling classes traditionally have viewed the na-
tional government primarily as an instrument for
maintaining the peace, providing minimal services, and
allowing laissez faire capitalism to run its course. Even
today, despite the new emphasis on social programs,
the ratio of government expenditures to national in-
come remains one of the smallest in Latin America.
The Lucas regime, however, has initiated a significant
break with the past. Although continuing to believe
that prosperity in the private sector will ultimately
benefit the poor, the government is investing in the
public sector and making the other expenditures-at
least partially because of the current business decline.
Budgeted public spending has risen from $282 million
in 1978 to $418 million in 1980, while estimated actual
expenditures went up by $91 million from 1978 to
1979-a major increase compared to the record of
previous regimes.
The government's programs and activities are high-
lighted by:
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? The Social Action Plan, emphasizing employment 25X1
and basic services in rural areas.
? A variety of reform measures including land dis-
tribution, wage hikes, and improved public relations.
? Armed forces' involvement in civic action and social
welfare programs.
The Social Action Plan
The government's main effort in the area of socio-
economic reform is embodied in its ambitious Social
Action Plan. Aimed primarily at the rural poor, the
plan intends to generate jobs and provide basic services
to the large segment of the population that has failed to
benefit from the economic progress of the past two
decades. On paper, the plan looks good, but about one-
third of the proposed projects are still under study and
many of those already approved are bogged down in
the planning stages. The overall results may not be 25X1
apparent for several years and it is questionable
whether the government has the intention or the capac-
ity to fully implement this far-reaching program.
Government technocrats have warned that should cur- 25X1
rent trends continue, conditions will have deteriorated 25X1
further by the time President Lucas's term ends in
1982:
? More people will be suffering from malnutrition,
which now affects 80 percent of children under five
years of age.
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? Illiteracy, now reaching 80 percent in some rural
areas, will have increased.
? Unemployment, now at 30 percent, will have in-
creased
The plan's goals, therefore, are to "quickly reorient
state activity," emphasizing programs "to increase
employment and income, provide basic services to
impoverished communities, and improve administra-
tive efficiency." Over the next two years, the plan
budgets $566.7 million for health, housing, education,
and child nutrition
The Social Action Plan seems to be a pragmatic effort
to gear new programs to local realities. For example, it
deemphasizes hospitals and doctors, which provide
services only to a small segment of the rural popula-
tion, and stresses public health clinics staffed primarily
by paramedics. Reversing previous policy, the govern-
ment is also promoting birth control information and
the distribution of contraceptives through these clinics.
Other Government Measures
A number of other government programs dovetail with
the Social Action Plan and are a key to its success or
failure. These include incentives to industries moving
to the provinces, resettlement of Indians, higher mini-
mum wages, and a stepped-up public relations cam-
paign. Like the broader Social Action Plan, these
programs are aimed primarily at improving the lot of
the rural poor.
A new decentralization law offers substantial tax
breaks and other financial incentives to businesses that
relocate plants outside Guatemala City. Government
planners hope that as firms relocate in the provinces,
employment opportunities will increase significantly
and help ameliorate the sharp disparity between rural
and urban income)
The government has undertaken little land reform-in
the traditional sense of breaking up large land hold-
ings. Instead, the Lucas regime has focused on coloniz-
ing jungles in the Northern Transversal Zone with
cooperative units that will receive technical/
agricultural assistance as well as access to roads, mar-
kets, schools, and health clinics.
Figure 4
Government of Guatemala Total Actual Public
Sector Expenditures, 1974-80
(Investment and Operating Costs)
Million $
1 .200
Total government of
Guatemala expenditures
expenditures
of
institutions
working
in rural area
Total rural
expenditures
of
institutions
working in
rural areas
1978-Lucas takes office
A top priority is resettlement of Indians from the
Western Highlands, where overpopulation and soil
exhaustion are major problems. The administration
claims that 22,000 titles have been granted during the
past two years, but many obstacles remain. Un-
controlled deforestation may ruin the agricultural
potential of the new lands, for example, while critics
charge that the whole program is merely perpetuating
the traditional dependence of small farmers on tem-
porary work on larger holdings nearby. Moreover,
since the government cannot adequately control the
movement of people in the area, land conflicts among
Indian settlers have occurred and there are also allega-
tions that big landowners and developers have evicted
some Indians from land they settled independently of
the program.
Low wages, traditional for agricultural workers, led to
unprecedented work stoppages in Pacific coast planta-
tions in February 1980. The authorities reacted with
uncharacteristic restraint, and eventually decreed a
minimum wage nearly three times higher than the
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General Lucas personally
distributing land titles to
Indians resettled in the
Northern Transversal Zone.
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previous rate for workers in cotton, sugarcane, coffee,
and livestock-the main exports of agrobusiness.
Wages for urban workers also were raised substan-
tially.
Some large landowners laid off workers, however, and
others refused to meet the minimum wage, despite a
public threat by the Labor Minister to prosecute those
who refused to comply. Even if a nationwide minimum
wage were instituted, workers' purchasing power
would still continue to erode because of inflation-
currently 13 percent and likely to increase
Concerned over signs of widespread antipathy toward
its policies both domestically and internationally, the
government has initiated a nationwide public relations
campaign emphasizing the benefits of its social welfare
program and depicting soldiers as compassionate and
nationalistic citizens. The government stresses the high
percentage of Indian soldiers to discount allegations of
atrocities against the Indians, and exalts as a patriotic
rallying point the Maya Indian heritage. This tactic
could be particularly effective because of the massive
numbers of Guatemalans who retain an Indian iden-
tity, and because some officials do maintain close
relations with the indigenous population. President
Lucas, for example, is intimately familiar with the
Indians of his native Alta Verapaz, and speaks the
Kekchi language.
The Guatemalan armed forces overall probably are the
best organized, trained, and equipped in Central
America despite certain inadequacies, such as its
counterinsurgency capability. To remedy some of these
deficiencies, the Army is expanding guerrilla warfare
courses and emphasizing civic action and psychological
warfare
Military Objectives
A major task of the Army is finding and engaging
elusive insurgent units, but a shortage of helicopters,
inadequate intelligence, and a frequently uncoop-
erative local populace narrow the government's edge.
In addition, contrary to the insurgent strategy of inte-
grating guerrillas into the community, the Army usu-
ally rotates units every four to six months and has
made no effort to develop local militias
In areas where guerrilla warfare is most intense, the
Army seeks to control the population by roadblocks,
searches of homes and individuals, rigid enforcement
of identity card regulations, and other measures that
antagonize the local communities. Some officers use
torture and other harsh methods to elicit information
about guerrillas and to discourage support for insur-
gency. Military commissioners, operating independ-
ently of local Army units, sometimes persecute the
same peasants that civic action teams are trying to win
Over the short term, harsh treatment by the military
can intimidate most of the rural populace but it also
radicalizes some individuals and builds anti-
government resentment that benefits the revolutionar
Civic Action and Social Reform
The armed forces are already playing an integral role
in the colonization projects in the Northern Transver-
sal Zone, as well as in other social welfare programs.
Army civic action teams provide medicine and other
vital services to isolated areas, and Air Force planes
transport people and supplies to the jungle colonies.
Emulating the methods of the Sandinista literacy cam-
paign in Nicaragua, the military is reported to be
promoting a similar effort that will be fully operational
early this year. Moreover, Army officers have been
ordered to stop abuses of civilians and to give a high
priority to public relations efforts;
often not familiar with local dialects.
the
armed forces face considerable cultural and linguistic
obstacles in the effort to gain widespread popular
support. Some young Indian men enlist voluntarily, but
the dominant indigenous attitude is negative and most
native recruits have to be conscripted forcibly. Even
with these Indian conscripts, however, Army troops are
i
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Guatemalan Army public rela-
tions advertisement: "Let us
maintain peace in Guatemala.
Soldiers are men of the people.
People like yourself. Who love
and cherish Guatemala as you
do. I am your brother. You are
my brother. We are a single
Guatemalan race."
A GUATEMALA COMO TU.
PUEBLO COMO TU. QUE SIENTEN Y AMAN
LOS SOLDADOS SOMOS PUEBLO.
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Reacting to international and domestic criticism of
forced conscription, the Ministry of Defense issued
new recruiting and pay regulations in July. Material
benefits were raised, and now even include a monthly
allotment to compensate families for the loss of
working member.
Rightwing Terrorism
Death squad activity-much of it the work of govern-
ment security forces-has mixed effects. While assas-
sinations debilitate guerrilla organizations and deci-
mate student and labor groups, the atmosphere of
repression also alienates segments of the general popu-
lation, furthering the polarization sought by the radi-
cal left.
No centralized control over the clandestine rightwing
organizations appears to exist, and their activities are
growing increasingly indiscriminate. To avenge the
recent death of a police chief, rightwing extremists
fired randomly on a group of students at San Carlos
University, killing seven. Leaders of moderate opposi-
tion parties that do not support the revolutionary
movement have also been murdered. Radicals on both
sides attempt to dramatize their assassinations by
machinegunning victims on public streets. Moreover,
while most death squad activity condoned by the
authorities is aimed at known or suspected leftists,
many murders result from purely personal motives.
The Guatemalan populace is more likely to blame the
government for burgeoning insecurity than the guerril-
las. As long as the insurgents remain discriminating in
their selection of targets and persuade the public that
the government has ties with rightist death squads, the
radical cause will gain increasing domestic and inter-
national sympathy.
Over the short term, we believe Guatemalan leaders
will try to hold the line by continuing the current mix
of repression and reform. They are buoyed by the new
administration in Washington, expecting that the
United States will now be more aggressively anti-
Communist and thus supportive of the Lucas regime.
Abroad, Guatemala is increasing contacts, attempting
to obtain military and security assistance from like-
minded governments-particularly Southern Cone
states such as Argentina
New variables, however, are coming into play, and
these will require unprecedented adaptiveness on the
part of the power structure:
? The government may not possess the leadership nor
the necessary administrative capabilities to attain its
social action goals. Low salaries, inadequate train-
ing, and corruption among many public employees,
coupled with inefficient and time-consuming regula-
tions, may vitiate ambitious projects. As of March
1980, for instance, $48.5 million out of a total of
$54.6 million of loan projects approved by the United
States had not been disbursed; some of the projects
date back to 1977.
? The drive to expand the role of the state and to
increase government spending may be hampered by
the current economic decline, which affects the ma-
jor sources of tax revenues. Tourism, another large
income producer, has declined markedly because of
terrorism. Recent murders and kidnapings have
undermined private business confidence, severely
curtailing investment and credit. The government
may try to enforce the previously neglected personal
income tax more strictly, but this and other re-
forms-even if adopted-will be politically difficult
to implement. In effect, Guatemala's ruling sectors
would have to submit to unprecedented levels of
taxation for the benefit of the impoverished majority.
The recent tax debates in the Guatemalan legislature
indicate that the private sector will avoid the major
restructuring sought by some reformers.
? Latent friction between the predominately white
upper class businessmen and plantation owners, and
the largely mestizo middle and lower class military
officers could be brought to a head by the issue of
socioeconomic reform. The military and the business
community are not a unified oligarchy, and consider-
able distrust-based on social distinctions and differ-
ing perspectives on the insurgent threat-exists be-
tween the two groups. Although some prominent
businessmen publicly espouse the need for reform,
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Rightwing death squads often
seek to make a psychological im-
pact on the local populace by
dumping the bodies of their vic-
tims along public roads.
?TRIPLE CR1MEN. -
Habitantes de la finca
Torolita, de Escuintla,
ven con estupor comb
quedaron los cuerpos
sin vida de Salvador
Del Cid Herrarte, Feli-
ciano Cardona Contre-
ras e Inds Barillas Po-
casangre, muertos a ti-
ros ayes por hombres
desconocidos. Los eje-
eutores del triple cri-
men, previamente ata-
ron a sus vlctimas con
las mans hacia atras,
dandoles muerte con
rafagas de metralleta.
(SITS)
the armed forces seem to be more committed than
the economic elites.
? Some conservative military officers, on the other
hand, give only lipservice to social reform programs
and may work to undermine them. These officers
share the views of reactionary civilians that the sta-
tus quo must be preserved at all costs, and that
massive government spending will only result in
greater inflation and foreign debts.
? Political violence will pose significant impediments
to the social welfare programs. Some rightists, for
instance, view the Social Action Plan and similar
projects as excessively influenced by members or
sympathizers of the radical left. Rightist extremists
probably were responsible for the murder in 1980 of
Julio Segura, a key advocate of the plan.
? The leftist victory in Nicaragua and the civil war in
El Salvador assume particularly ominous signifi-
cance for Guatemala, whose officials until recently
have felt abandoned by the United States. The strat-
egy of the Carter administration, according to these
critics, was to destabilize the Lucas regime while
currying favor with the revolutionary left. They sus-
pect that the United States willfully lowered coffee
prices, banned the import of Guatemalan beef, and
advised United States business leaders to withhold
credit or move their firms out of the country.
In spite of these potential problems, we believe that the
Guatemalan Government over the short term will not
be seriously threatened as long as the radical left is
stymied in its bid for power in El Salvador. In the
meantime, the Guatemalans have at least some of the
human and financial resources to begin sorting out the
difficulties they face. If the entrenched ultraconserv-
atives block meaningful reform, however, growing vio-
lence over the longer term, with its attendant social
polarization and economic dislocation, will undermine
the present power structure.
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Appendix
Cultural Change Among
Guatemalan Indians and Its
Impact on Guerrilla Recruitment
New Aspirations
Guerrilla success in rural Guatemala ultimately may
depend on the ability of the insurgents to galvanize and
channel substantial Indian support against the govern-
ment. The authorities formerly could take for granted
that the fatalistic, introspective nature of the Indians
would be an effective barrier to radical left subversion
among them.
This complacency is no longer warranted. Indigenous
culture is experiencing a profound transformation as
long-established attitudes and patterns of behavior are
being altered by diverse factors:
? Traditional minifundia (small plot) agriculture is
unable to provide adequate livelihoods, thus inten-
sifying dependence on the national money economy.
? Missionaries and catechists have raised the concept
of social justice as well as undermined fatalistic
religious beliefs and rituals.
? The Indians have increasing communication with the
outside world.
These changes-guerrilla leaders reason-could pro-
duce a generation of Indian youth who will seek a
better life by overthrowing the capitalist system.F
But these changes could go either way; an expanding
horizon does not necessarily produce revolutionaries,
and, in fact, the decline of traditional culture has been
accompanied by a strong desire among young Indians
to enjoy the benefits of participation in national life.
Whether Guatemala's socioeconomic system can
accommodate changing Indian aspirations is an issue
that will be resolved over time. If Guatemalan leaders
can provide the Indians with an opportunity for social
and economic betterment, we believe the government
will benefit from the long process of cultural change.
Cultural Challenges and Guerrilla Problems
Radical left propaganda, an integral facet of the strat-
egy to legitimize the insurgency and gain foreign sup-
port, depicts Guatemala's Indians as a homogeneous
mass being collectively oppressed. This stereotype ig-
nores the linguistic and cultural diversity among In-
dians, as well as the economic progress enjoyed by a
growing number of Indian merchants. Guerrilla propa-
gandists also give the inaccurate impression that all
peasants are Indians. Although most of the rural popu-
lation in the Western Highlands is indigenous, most of
the peasants in the eastern zones are not. Furthermore,
not all Indians are peasants; many are active and
successful in commerce. Anthropological studies in-
creasingly refer to an emerging indigenous elite in
various locales.
Indians generally consider themselves racially distinct
from the dominant, Spanish-speaking Ladino popula-
tion of Guatemala, but the distinction is primarily
cultural rather than racial. The most obvious cleavage
is that of language; however, this also separates In-
dians from each other, since many Indian languages
and dialects are spoken. In the same manner that each
dialect is limited to a specific area or locality, the
traditional cultural orientation of the Indian centers on
his native community. This localism, with its particu-
lar code of behavior and set of beliefs, distinguishes the
traditional Indian from the Ladino, who views himself
as part of a wider Spanish-American culture with
centers in Guatemala City and abroad.
Ladino domination of the economic and governmental
structures in the Western Highlands has been facili-
tated, in part, by the rural Indians' general lack of
knowledge about the outside world. During recent
decades, however, the Indians' isolation has been re-
duced by a host of factors including new roads, literacy
campaigns, foreign missionaries, an increase in mi-
grant labor, and the availability of transistor radios.
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Guatemalan guerrillas; many of
them apparently are Indians.
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These have brought a growing sophistication that,
while making some Indians more accessible to insur-
gent appeals, has made others strive for personal eco-
nomic advancement within the national mainstream.
The insurgents are attempting to take advantage of
changing Indian aspirations by promising that a
revolutionary government would bring about social
and economic improvements that could never be at-
tained under the present capitalistic system. Guerrilla
efforts to gain sympathy in indigenous communities
probably are enhanced by the antigovernment
resentments provoked by the Army's chronic abuses of
civilians. Nevertheless, before a substantial number of
Indians takes the risk of joining the armed rebellion,
the radical left must prove that it is capable of success-
fully challenging the armed forces militarily.
The left's task is compounded by a growing fragmenta-
tion within many indigenous communities, a result of
culture changes that pit old values and practices
against new social and economic aspirations. Although
the attendant polarization has made some Indians
increasingly susceptible to insurgent appeals, it also
has reinforced the desire of others toward material
benefits within the present political order.
Over the last few decades, a major factor contributing
to polarization among the Indians has involved tra-
ditional Indian religious organizations known as
cofradias, whose power and influence have declined as
indigenous participation in modern commercial activ-
ity has increased. In the past, the most prosperous
Indians bore many of the heavy financial costs of the
cofradias-including fiestas and rituals in honor of
patron saints-thus enabling these organizations to
level wealth, promote group solidarity, and reaffirm
traditional customs. Now, however, individual Indians
are more likely to use their money for personal
advancement, a reflection of the inroads made by
modern Western culture. Moreover, class divisions are
emerging in some communities as wealthier Indians
marry among themselves, thereby establishing an eco-
nomic elite more likely to favor the status quo-and,
ironically, also disposed to revolt if economic progress
is blocked unfairly by Ladinos.
The reduction of the socioeconomic and religious
significance of the cofradias has been accelerated by
Protestant and Roman Catholic religious modernizers,
who have attacked the system as idolatrous and waste-
ful. Primarily concerned with social justice rather than
traditional religious practices these innovators work
through native converts or lay catechists-usually
assertive, literate youths-to focus the attention of the
Indians on human rights and other issue
To a limited degree, this has favored the insurgent
cause. Some catechists-repudiated by cofradia tra-
ditionalists and persecuted by rightist Ladinos-have
turned to the radical left, particularly to the EGP
guerrillas in the Quiche department. Moreover,
rightwing groups have been killing catechists and have
begun to assassinate liberal priests, a course that prob-
ably will prompt some clerics to lend the same kind of
active support to the insurgency that they did in the
1960s.2
Nonetheless, the polarization within Indian commu-
nities does not always work to the advantage of the
guerrillas. Seeing their traditional way of life threat-
ened by modernization, some Indians have turned on
those who have abandoned long-established customs
and practices. And, in some localities, the resentment
of cofradia traditionalists is so intense that they have
sided with reactionary Ladinos-who view the activ-
ities of the native catechists and foreign missionaries as
a threat to their continued socioeconomic and political
dominance.
The Erosion of the Indian Economic Base
Insurgent attempts to recruit Indians ultimately may
benefit less from concerted guerrilla strategy than
from the lack of economic opportunities, which frus-
trates the desires of Indians for change and advance-
ment. In this context, the marketing system and the
z An EGP manifesto states: "Christians play an important role in the
consciousness raising and organization of our people and have made
of their faith a generous force for the liberation of Guatemala....
Aware Christians should understand and believe that when peaceful
means to achieve justice have been exhausted, revolutionary violence
is legitimate and just. In our country, one cannot be a Christian
without being a revolutionary." Fidel Castro himself made overtures
to Christian militants in his 1971 proposals in Chile for "strategic
alliances between Christians and Marxists" and on other occasions.
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IN ANCIENT TIMES Moses
gathered together the leaders
of the people to lead them out
of Egypt.
Our mission is to deliver the
people from slavery.
TODAY the poor must unite
and work together to attain the
kingdom.
They are taking Jacinto. WE
MUST HELP HIM!
Translated excerpts from Com-
rade Christ (Cristo Compahero)
a series of Christian
revolutionary pamphlets using
Biblical references to raise the
consciousness of the people,
particularly Protestant converts,
and foster agitation for social
justice.
ANTES Moises reunid a los dirigentes del pueblo
para sacorlo de Egipto
ctto b(blica EX000 3, 16.
AHORA los pobres ',enemos que unirnos y trobaJar
para alcanzar el reino
M' f
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declining productivity of subsistence farming are
converging to intensify the economic plight of the
Indians, further alienating them and making some
increasingly susceptible to appeals by the radical left.
Despite the advances of Indian merchants, the market-
ing system keeps most Indians in an inferior position by
vesting control of native commerce largely in Ladino
hands. For example, the bulk of the agricultural lands
in the Western Highlands-the area where indigenous
involvement in guerrilla groups has been most pro-
nounced-are owned and farmed in small parcels by
Indians. The produce, however, is bought and distrib-
uted in the Ladino-dominated market towns, thus ren-
dering the Indians largely dependent on that segment
of the population generally opposed to any form of
change
For the Indians, the problem of the marketing system
is exacerbated by the minifundia, or small parcels of
land, which traditionally have supported the indig-
enous population. Now, however, increasing over-
population, further subdivisions through inheritance,
and the poor quality and meager productivity of the
land have rendered the minifundia inadequate
Faced with the erosion of their traditional economic
base and unable to secure employment near home, an
estimated half-million Indians from the Western
Highlands migrate each year to the Plantation Zone
for seasonal work. This movement could have far-
reaching political consequences, since it helps break
down the traditional distrust between disparate Indian
communities. This, in turn, could open the way for the
emergence of pan-Indian solidarity-an eventuality
that has not been missed by the radical left, which is
exploring ways to capitalize on the disaffection of
migrant workers.
Guatemala's export economy-primarily sugar, cot-
ton, and coffee-largely hinges on indigenous migrant
workers, but high inflation is eroding the earnings from
plantation labor. The extent of Indian dissatisfaction is
illustrated by the massive work stoppages that swept
across plantations in the Escuintla and Suchitepequez
departments in February and March of 1980, resulting
in government decrees nearly tripling the minimum
Indian labor
wages. Although the Peasant Unity Committee was
involved in agitation, the strikes apparently were not
organized by the radical left; instead, young Indian
men were at the forefront of the protests, suggesting
some erosion of the passivity that has characterized
Recognizing the potential for widespread unrest im-
plicit in the economic plight of the Indians, the Guate-
malan Government is conducting a large-scale pro-
gram to resettle Indians in the jungles of the Northern
Transversal Zone. Plans to expand the work begun by
Maryknoll missionaries at Ixcan by creating coopera-
tive units with access to schools, health clinics, tech-
nical assistance, and outside markets may founder,
however, on the administrative inadequancies of the
bureaucracy.
Another serious problem is the dramatic rise in value
of formerly worthless jungle land because of the
discovery of oil in the zone and the building of the
Transversal Road connecting newly opened lands with
the Caribbean coast and the national road network.
Ladino speculators and developers-including military
officers-have acquired large tracts of land in the
area. According to various allegations, some of these
lands had already been settled independently by In-
dians who were evicted-either legally or by use of
violence. Although Guatemala City claims that the
Northern Transversal Zone is to be reserved primarily
for the small landholdings allotted by the government,
private latifundia are also emerging, arousing criti-
cism that Indian dependence on plantation labor will
be perpetuated.
Exploitation of Indians has characterized Guatemala's
history. Indications are increasing, however, that the
indigenous peoples-particularly the young-are now
less likely to submit to repression. The notorious 1978
Panzos massacre-in which the military killed at least
32 Indians and possibly as many as 100-was
precipitated by Indian settlers protesting evictions,
suggesting an increasing resolve to oppose that which
previously was met with stoicism and submission.
Moreover, in some of the jungle areas, well-organized
guerrilla groups now exist to capitalize on Indian
frustrations. The Guerrilla Army of the Poor began its
revolutionary activity in 1975 at Ixcan, a major col-
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Comrade Christ compares the
suffering of the people of Israel
under Egyptian bondage with
the exploitation of Guatemalan
peasants by referring to the
Panzos massacre:
IN ANCIENT TIMES God
wanted, through Moses, to free
His people from slavery.
We cannot bear this hard work
any longer.
United we shall change this
situation.
TODAY God does not want
slavery and death for our
brothers.
They killed more than 100
peasants in Panzos.
In the face of this, what must
we do as Christians?
Now therefore, behold, the cry
of the children of Israel is come
unto me: and I have also seen
the oppression wherewith the
Egyptians oppress them.
Come now therefore, and I will
send thee unto Pharaoh, that
thou mayest bring forth my
people the children of Israel out
of Egypt.
AHORA Dios no quiere to esclovitud y
Ia muerte de nuestros hermanos.
)1111
El clamor de Jos hIJoa de Israel ha Ilegodo
hosts mi y he vlato to oprea+on a que los
egipclos loo someten.
Ve, puss, yo to envio a Foraon para que saques
de Eglpto a mi pueblo, los h1jos de Israel
0
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Secret
onization center, and since then has made several
successful attacks on Army units in the Northern
Transversal, ultimately hoping to establish a major
front in this lowland area.
Although conditions conducive to a popular insurrec-
tion are emerging in the rural sector, indigenous sup-
port for the radical left probably will be gradual. At
this point, most Indian villages still greet both armed
guerrilla units and government troops with equal sus-
picion and apprehension, an indication of the continu-
ing sense of separation that traditionally has been
central to indigenous perceptions.
Ultimately the success of the radical left in Indian
recruitment appears to be as much in government as in
guerrilla hands. The Lucas regime publicly proclaims
the intention of providing new social and economic
opportunities to assuage mounting indigenous frustra-
tions, but it remains to be seen whether these words
will be translated into actions.
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Approved For Release 2008/01/17: CIA-RDP03TO2547R000100210001-8
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/01/17: CIA-RDP03TO2547R000100210001-8