GRENADA: TWO YEARS AFTER THE COUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03T02547R000100170001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Grenada:
Two Years After the Coup
State Dept. review completed
Secret
PA 81-10185
May 1981
Copy 2 3 7
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Grenada:
Two Years After the Coup
Information available as of 28 April 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
The author of this paper is John Gannon, Office of
Current Operations. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be addressed to the Chief,
Latin America Division, Office of Political Analysis,
Operations.
This paper has been coordinated with the Office of
Economic Research, the National Intelligence
Officer for Latin America, and the Directorate of
Secret
PA 81-10185
May 1981
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Secret ii
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Grenada:
Two Years After the Coup
Key Judgments Since seizing power in Grenada two years ago, Prime Minister Maurice
Bishop has entrenched his leftist-oriented regime and made Cuba his closest
ally, but domestic and foreign criticism has tempered his government's
radical tendencies.
The People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) now seems sufficiently
entrenched to weather a difficult year ahead, but economic and political
trends are increasingly unfavorable. If Bishop refuses to restore constitu-
tional freedoms, there is at least an outside chance that his growing domestic
opposition-perhaps with private support from other eastern Caribbean
islands-will coalesce and overthrow him. 25X1
Cuba has provided Bishop's government with about $50 million worth of
technical and military assistance; the USSR has offered only token aid
valued at slightly over $1 million.
Bishop is openly promoting reconciliation with the new US administration,
which he fears is moving beyond earlier diplomatic coolness to a more
aggressive strategy that would cut off Western economic aid to Grenada.
Nonetheless, the Prime Minister apparently is not prepared to ease his anti-
US rhetoric or modify his friendship with Cuba for the sake of better 25X1
relations with the United States.
Most Caribbean leaders advocate continued US participation in a regional
effort to press the PRG to hold elections and to ease what they see as its
fanatical devotion to the Castro regime. They would be less enthusiastic
about a US-led effort to cut off Western aid to the island and probably
would strongly oppose direct intervention by any foreign government to oust
Bishop by force.
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Grenada:
Two Years After the Coup
The Route to Revolution
Long before Grenada became independent from the
United Kingdom in 1974, trends pointed to increasing
political and economic instability in this tiny ministate
characterized by endemic poverty, chronic population
pressures, and severely limited resources for develop-
ment. The island-containing only 110,000 people in a
land area twice the size of the District of Columbia-is
among the poorest countries of the eastern Caribbean;
annual per capita income is about $600.
Politically, Grenada has stood apart from its demo-
cratic neighbors since the early 1970s, when then
Prime Minister Gairy began to crack down on middle
class opposition to his corrupt government. Educated
only through elementary school, Gairy launched his
political career in the early 1950s as a black labor hero
whose powerful rural following guaranteed his domi-
nance of the island's formerly white-controlled legisla-
ture for most of the period following World War II. In
office, however, he gradually lost touch with his politi-
cal roots and with the country's growing economic
problems. He increasingly used force and intimidation
against his opponents and maintained tight though
inefficient control of government affairs. His
unenlightened rule and unsavory reputation con-
ditioned the local middle class as well as political
moderates elsewhere in the region to condone the first
unconstitutional overthrow of a leader in the English-
speaking Caribbean.
The New Jewel Movement. Maurice Bishop, 36, a
London-trained lawyer and member of Grenada's
lighter skinned elite, entered politics a decade ago as a
rebellious black nationalist. He formed the New Jewel
Movement (Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education,
and Liberation) in March 1973 by merging several
youth-based leftist groups that had been organized
during black power protests three years earlier. Its top
leaders were young, middle class, well-educated
Grenadians-strongly nationalist exceptions to the
heavy emigration of professional and technically
skilled youth. The Movement's principal power base
was the island's increasingly disaffected young people,
who had been particularly hard hit by rising unemploy-
ment that has exceeded 30 percent of the labor force in
recent years. 25X1
Economic as well as political discontent played into
Bishop's hands. In the 1960s, GDP had grown steadily
at about 4 percent annually, led by the buoyant tour-
ism sector and increasing agricultural exports (princi-
pally nutmeg and its byproduct mace, cocoa, and ba-
nanas). In the 1970s, however, growth slowed because
of political turmoil, because sharply rising oil and other
import costs absorbed a growing share of export earn-
ings, and because budgetary support from the UK
dried up.
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Although its own orientation was leftist, the New
Jewel Movement (NJM) tried hard to consolidate op-
position to Gairy among groups across the political
spectrum. Bishop and his colleagues, by skillfully
exploiting the country's serious political and economic
problems, gradually emerged as the most dynamic
political force on the island. In 1976, the Movement
joined with two conservative groups in an alliance that
won 48.3 percent of the vote in a hard-fought elec-
tion-which the NJM alleges Gairy stole by fraud-
and Bishop was elevated to leader of the opposition.F
By early 1979, however, the United People's Party and
the Grenada National Party, the conservative mem-
bers of Bishop's three-party coalition, had all but de-
serted their alliance with the New Jewel Movement
because of its increasing militancy. This shift appar-
ently came easily to Bishop, who had a long record of
violent confrontation with Gairy. He was beaten by
police during a demonstration in November 1973 and
was arrested three times in 1974 on politically related
charges, including conspiracy to assassinate Gairy. In
January 1974, the police killed Bishop's father, a
prominent middle class businessman, apparently with-
out provocation during another demonstration. Early
in 1978, police forcibly broke up several opposition
activities, and that September two of the Movement's
supporters were arrested in the United States on
gunrunning charges that eventually led US Treasury
investigators on a trail to Bishop himself.
That investigation appears to have been the immediate
catalyst for the coup in March 1979, which occurred
hours after the arrival in Grenada of two investigators
from the US Customs and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms. Although Bishop's partisans
have since alleged that they acted to prevent the police
from killing NJM officials on Gairy's orders, they
probably were impelled by fear that the gunrunning
investigation was about to sideline the Movement's
leadership. With arrests imminent and Gairy off the
island, Bishop's "revolutionary army"-54 mostly
adolescent youths armed with rifles and submachine-
guns-stormed the barracks of the 320-man defense
force on 13 March. Gairy's demoralized and poorly
equipped army surrendered within an hour. Far from a
popular revolution, the takeover ended in a carnival-
like atmosphere that demonstrated the weakness of
Gairy's government.
The People's Revolutionary Government
The People's Revolutionary Government (PRG), a
nominal coalition strongly dominated by Bishop's left-
ist entourage, has done little to alter the structure of
the island's mixed economy. It has retained some
prominent moderates, preserved channels of commu-
nication with the private sector, and received high
marks at least for its early fiscal administration and
economic planning. On the other hand, it has been 25X1
widely denounced by Caribbean leaders for its suspen-
sion of democratic freedoms and for its alliance with
Communist states policies that are seriously under-
mining the PRG's development objectives.
The PRG, installed three days after Gairy's ouster, 25X1
includes nine members of the New Jewel Movement,
two representatives of the conservative Grenada
National Party, and three respected moderates from
the business and professional communities. The
moderates, who are much older than their leftist col-
leagues, have had a strong hand in both the Ministry of
Health and the Ministry of Tourism, but only marginal
influence elsewhere. The most powerful member of the
PRG after Bishop is 36-year-old Bernard Coard, a
graduate of Brandeis University, whose Marxist ideo-
logical sympathies so far have not interfered with his
exceptional performance as Finance Minister. Despite 25X1
his inexperience and his devotion to Cuba, Coard has
demonstrated a sophisticated grasp of international
economics as well as a penchant for hard work.
Economic Goals. The PRG's principal economic objec-
tives have been to impose tight fiscal management and
to promote development, with a focus on agriculture
and tourism. Bishop has succeeded on the first count.
Under Coard's stewardship, expenditures have been
centralized and controlled, tax collection has im-
proved, government corruption has been virtually
eliminated, and longstanding debts to regional institu-
tions have been substantially reduced.
Coard, who secured modest International Monetary
Fund standby loans for Grenada in 1979 and again in
1980, used the Fund's expertise to establish a budget
division in the Ministry of Finance that helped
Grenada achieve a small budgetary surplus in 1979 for
the first time in five years. The World Bank has
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Prominent Leaders of the
People's Revolutionary Government
of Grenada
Maurice Bishop, 36, Bernard Coard, 36,
Prime Minister_______ Deputy Prime Min-
ister and Minister of
Finance, Trade and
Industry
Selwyn Strachan, 34, Kendrick Radix, 39,
Minister of Commu- Minister of Legal A/-
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commended the PRG's basic management of public
investment. The Caribbean Development Bank-
which has allotted to the PRG some funds contributed
by the United States-also has credited Grenada with
efficient use of loans earmarked for development
projects.
The government, moreover, has made an ambitious
start on a long-term development program. It has built
new feeder roads to open up arable lands, created new
food and cash-crop farms, expanded the processing of
fish and citrus products, and inaugurated training
programs to boost the efficiency of agricultural work-
ers and fishermen. The Cuban-assisted construction of
the airport at Point Salines is the most visible mani-
festation of the PRG's commitment to the expansion of
tourism. Grenada's present airport, too small to
accommodate large passenger jets and lacking night-
landing facilities, now forces most tourists to arrive via
Barbados. The airport accounts for over a third of the
1981-82 capital budget-an excessive commitment
according to Western lending institutions-with the
balance funding 189 other projects.
The PRG also has established Community Education
Councils to supervise both the maintenance and
administration of local schools and has beefed up
teacher-training programs across the island. A school-
repair program launched in 1980 attracted several
thousand young volunteers, who apparently have im-
proved physical conditions at many rural schools. In
addition, Bishop has inaugurated a national literacy
program to reduce Grenada's functional illiteracy rate
of 40 percent and to improve the academic skills of the
majority of the population, who would not qualify for
graduation from elementary school.
Problems Ahead. Despite its real administrative gains
and its rational development objectives, the PRG is
headed for trouble. Encouraged by the improved budg-
etary position and increased availability of external
resources, the government has more than doubled the
amount of public sector investment for 1981-84 in the
expectation that revenues will be increased substan-
tially because of a resurgence of domestic and foreign
investment and by a boom in tourism after the comple-
tion of the new airport. The PRG expects a growth rate
of up to 6 percent annually by the end of the period-
Events over the past year, however, indicate that the
PRG's venturous economic course was charted with
little regard for the disruptive impact of its political
actions, which have been denounced by democrats
inside and outside Grenada. Soon after the coup
Bishop promised an election and an early "return to
constitutionality," but instead he began to entrench
the New Jewel Movement and to isolate traditional
opposition groups. He suspended the constitution only
12 days after the coup, but never called a proposed
constituent assembly to prepare a new constitution.
Assisted by Cuba, he quickly built up a 1,500-member
People's Revolutionary Army to consolidate his power.
By the end of 1979, he had shut down Grenada's
independent newspaper The Torchlight; imposed "peo-
ple's laws" in place of the constitution; jailed 70 to 115
political prisoners; and dropped all pretense about
holding an election. As a result, confidence in the
government among organized groups-such as unions,
civil servants, the private sector, and the island's small
farmers-is low, and the potential for costly political
upheaval is high.
The masses of young Grenadians who strongly backed
Bishop's takeover early in 1979 have seen their unre-
alistic expectations for economic betterment dashed.
In April 1980, for example, the PRG foiled an attempt
by several formerly loyal members of the New Jewel
Movement to take over and "colonize" a large estate.
The Prime Minister's crackdown on these and other
young extremists led to isolated terrorist activities that
culminated in June 1980 in a bomb blast that nearly
cost Bishop his life. That incident was one of a half
dozen antigovernment "conspiracies" dramatically ex-
posed by the PRG in the year preceding the introduc-
tion of a stiff antiterrorist law last October.
Bishop's undemocratic behavior at home and his
grandstanding for Cuba have also rankled private sec-
tor leaders, whose cooperation he has needed more
than ever after heavy rains in 1979 and a hurricane in
1980 damaged roads, bridges, and crops. The com-
bination of weather-induced setbacks to agriculture,
stagnant private investment, and sluggish performance
in the tourism sector slowed economic growth to about
2 percent for Bishop's first year in office-a marked
drop from 5.3 percent growth under Gairy in 1978.
an optimistic projection even for better times.
25X1
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Army are not long-term solutions. The Army, more-
over, has experienced significant defections in the past
year, presumably because of low pay and even lower
is picking up only slowly this year.
The PRG's political stock has been further weakened
by its strident attacks on Western democracy. The
New Jewel Movement has long argued that political
experimentation is essential because the Westminster
model is irrelevant to the character and needs of Car-
ibbean societies. Local moderates as well as leaders of
other nearby English-speaking countries have come to
accept an increasing manipulation of democratic prac-
tices in the region, but none would subscribe to this
wholesale denunciation of the parliamentary system.
Perceived as arrogance on Bishop's part, this has
contributed heavily to the PRG's alienation from the
traditional political elite of the eastern Caribbean.F_
Domestic Balance Sheet
Bishop's government, despite its inexperience, is the
most development-oriented Grenadian administration
in memory. Yet, after two years, the "revolution" is
souring in the face of both traditional and PRG-
inspired obstacles to economic development
The government continues to be troubled by an in-
creasingly younger population, half of which is under
the age of 16. It still is waging an uphill battle to
expand tourism to ease the island's historical
dependence on a few export crops that cannot provide a
decent livelihood for the people. It has had only mar-
ginal success in dealing with high unemployment-the
creation of 1,000 new jobs in 1979 made little impact
in a country that in the same year produced 1,400 new
entrants to the labor force. Like Gairy before him,
moreover, Bishop is losing the battle against inflation,
which has exceeded 20 percent annually since 1978,
and against Grenada's costly dependence on imported
oil and manufactures
Bishop's plight is deepening because of his reliance on
radical politics among a traditionally conservative
West Indian people. The Marxist rhetoric that rallied
disaffected youth in the early days after the coup has
had the opposite effect among the productive sectors of
Grenadian society that must be mobilized to sustain
economic recovery. Government-sponsored work
projects and an oversized People's Revolutionary
morale in its youthful ranks.
The PRG's attempt to introduce Marxist ideology into
Grenada's mostly denominational schools-only 15 of
61 elementary schools and three of 14 secondary
schools are government-controlled-has encountered
public protests and has driven off at least 400 qualified
teachers in a country that has produced only about 25
new certified teachers in three years. The Catholic
Church, the dominant influence in education and an
early ally of the PRG, has since become a critic of the
government. The Chamber of Commerce, spokesman
for Grenada's 200 businesses and also one of the orinn-
nal defenders of the PRG, has recently blamed the25X1
government's political posturing for the country's eco-
nomic slowdown. The three unions representing
Grenada's civil servants, who were often a thorn in (25X1
Gairy's side, in early March launched a strike that
closed the island's airport, disrupted government of-
fices, and forced many schools to close
Nevertheless, Bishop is still in control, and Grenada's
opposition parties are virtually dormant after rough
treatment in the streets by PRG partisans in the first
year after the coup. The ragtag Army, moreover, ap-
pears basically loyal and is probably equal to any local
challenge to Bishop's rule-at least for the near term.
Opposition sentiment is crystallizing, however, and
organized pressure groups are poised to try extracting
concessions from the government.
Foreign Policy
The PRG has broken dramatically with Grenada's
strongly pro-Western tradition in the formulation and
implementation of a "nonaligned" foreign policy. In a
broad sense, the nationalistic policy conforms with a
regional trend toward nonalignment-the establish-
ment of relations with governments of wide-ranging
ideological orientation and a decrease in the historical
dependence on the West for trade and aid. In
Grenada's case, however, the policy gives dispropor-
tionate influence to Communist nations and opens the
way for exploitation by both Cuba and the Soviet
Union]
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The PRG's virtual blitz to broaden its diplomatic links
has produced some modest economic benefits but no
patrons for a socialist revolution. Since the coup, the
PRG has established formal relations with over 40
nations, including many Western states, the Soviet
Union, most of Eastern Europe, and a majority of the
radical Arab states. Bishop's government has been
especially active in Cuban-backed forums promoting
international socialism
In search of aid, Grenadian leaders have traveled to
the Soviet Union and the Middle East, where they have
signed several agreements for economic and technical
cooperation. From the Arab countries, Grenada has
received grants and loans worth about $14 million,
large enough to cement good relations but not to
stabilize the island's slackening economy. From the
Soviet bloc, the PRG has extracted pledges of project-
related assistance but no hard currency. In sum, no
foreign assistance is on the horizon that would fill the
widening gap between what the Grenadians have been
led to expect from Bishop's regime and what Grenada's
economy can deliver
The Cuban Connection
The Cubans quickly recognized that the Gairy regime
was unpopular with other West Indian governments
and judged that its overthrow would not be strongly
denounced. Havana had cultivated close relations with
Grenada's current leadership since the early 1970s.
After the coup, the Cubans waited a month before
formally recognizing the PRG on 14 April 1979-21
days after the United States and the United Kingdom,
and 19 days after Jamaica and Guyana. Once govern-
ment-to-government relations were established, Ha-
vana poured in arms and materiel to entrench Bishop's
regime. Cuba reportedly helped train and equip
Grenada's Army with small arms, including rifles,
revolvers, light machineguns, some heavy
machineguns, and four antiaircraft guns. By 1980
about 300 cubans were resident in Grenada: at least six
military advisers, 15 medical personnel, 12 economic
advisers, roughly 20 other technical personnel, and an
estimated 250 construction workers on the airport
project at Point Salines. The number of Cubans on the
island since then has been fairly constant.
Grenada now is the principal foreign base for the
expansion of Cuban influence in the Caribbean, an
alliance that will endure as long as the New Jewel
Movement remains the dominant force in the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, both countries have become con-
cerned that their special relationship is increasing their
isolation in the region
Cuba has not dictated Grenadian Government policy,
but it has been more influential than any other nation.
Although the PRG enthusiastically invited Havana to
participate in its internal affairs, it probably would
have adopted the same stridently nationalist policies
25X1
even if the Cubans had not responded. Cuban Ambas-
sador Julian Torres Rizo, the only foreign emissary
resident on the island besides the Venezuelan Ambas-
sador is a powerful influence on Bishop and his en- 25X1
tourage. He carries decisive weight in the implementa-
tion of Cuban-assisted development projects and is a
principal adviser in matters of foreign policy
The appointment of Torres Rizo demonstrates Ha-
vana's determination to play its Grenada card for
maximum advantage in a chronically unstable area of
the Caribbean
Torres Rizo came to
Grenada after a long stint at United Nations head-
quarters, where he served as liaison with pro-Castro
groups in North America. In 1969 he helped organize
the Venceremos Brigade that transported US youths
on cane-cutting expeditions to Cuba over the next 25X1
decade
Torres Rizo's aggressive cultivation of Grenadian in-
terest groups spanning the political spectrum, as well 25X1
as his private remarks, indicate that Cuba wants to
exploit the island as a fully accepted member of the
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Caribbean community, not as a fortress separate from
its neighbors. Havana is sensitive to the potential for
rapid political shifts on other eastern Caribbean is-
lands that could prove favorable to the Castro regime;
Dominica and Saint Lucia are prime candidates. The
Cuban strategy under Torres Rizo, therefore, has been
to encourage Grenada to find a course that would
preserve its credentials among West Indian states;
retain and even broaden the PRG's access to Western
sources of aid; and keep the island open to Cuban and
addition, Bishop has approached the European Eco-
nomic Community for aid to complete the project. He
also has asked a private Canadian firm for technical
and some material aid, but the Canadians have been
cool toward what they see as a highly risky investment.
25X1
The target date for completing the first 5,500-foot
segment of runway this fall appears to be slipping. The
Cuban Ambassador to Grenada now estimates that it
may not open for limited service until January 1982.
Although workers are engaged in construction activity
around the clock, problems have been encountered in
obtaining new funding for the terminal building and
auxiliary electronic equipment and in locating dredg-
ing machinery and sufficient asphalt to surface the 25X1
initial portion of the airstrip
The airport project has been criticized by Bishop's
detractors as a sinister scheme intended primarily to
provide Cuba with an intermediary facility for flights
supporting its military activities in Africa. Havana will
certainly use the new airport in preference to less
hospitable fields in Barbados and Guyana. In January,
moreover, Cubana Airlines began a weekly direct
flight to Grenada. The airport project, however, origi-
nated with Gairy's government as the keystone in the
expansion of Grenadian tourism and, even without
Cuban help, Bishop could have vigorously pursued the
ambitious project to end Grenada's dependence on
Barbados as a tourist gateway
25X1
The most persuasive criticism of the airport project is
that it is expending vast resources on the questionable
assumption that tourist arrivals will increase substan-
tially after its completion. This view apparently is held
by the Western lending institutions that are otherwise
helping the PRG. PRG hopes are riding high on an
expected bonanza in tourism, and the Cubans have
joined the gamble, but Bishop's growing reputation
Soviet influence
Controversial Aid and Activities
Although Cuban aid to Grenada-now estimated by
the PRG to have surpassed $50 million-has covered a
wide spectrum, it is increasingly identified with two
controversial projects: the installation of new radio and
television facilities, and the construction of the airport
at Point Salines.
In late February, excavation was begun at a new site
for Radio Free Grenada, now the only transmitting
facility on the island. Thanks to Cuban assistance, a
new 75-kilowatt transmitter and a medium-wave tower
eventually will allow transmission of radio and televi-
sion programs to neighboring islands. The project,
which also has engaged two Soviet technicians on loan
from Cuba, is worrisome to moderates in the region
because it is potentially an instrument of Cuban and
Soviet propaganda. The Cubans and Soviets probably
boosted the project to counter the recent installation of
Voice of America broadcasting facilities to the north in
Antigua
The airport, however, is at the center of the controversy
over Cuba because it is consuming resources and
assuming a scale disproportionate to Grenada's needs.
Havana is providing about $10 million worth of man-
power and material-about 22 percent of the es-
timated $45 million cost of the three-year project-to
level and pave what eventually will be a 9,000-foot
runway and to assist in the construction of buildings
for the combined terminal-resort complex. Venezuela
is providing at least $500,000 for labor costs and has
offered further assistance for the regular supply of
diesel fuel, asphalt, and gasoline. The recent Arab
loans also are likely to help finance the venture. In
under his government
The most serious threat posed by Cuba's presence in
Grenada concerns the potential use of the island as a
secret Communist military base against the United
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States or as a staging area for insurgency against other
In July 1979, for example, the Deputy Prime Minister
of Saint Lucia sent a dozen youths to Grenada for
"bodyguard training," but this has been acknowledged
openly. Guyanese radi-
cals and a ew Surinamese Army personnel have re-
ceived military training in Grenada. Yet the extent of
Havana's commitment to Grenada-based training is
uncertain
Moreover, many of
the various training programs for Grenadians are be-
ing administered in Cuba, where over 130 youths have
traveled in the past two years for instruction in secu-
rity, medical, and technical subjectsl
The Soviet Union
Moscow trails far behind Havana's influence on the
PRG; it apparently is content to let the Cubans take
the lead in a region considered a US sphere of influ-
ence. Bishop moved quickly to establish diplomatic
relations in September 1979, hoping in vain that the
USSR would establish a resident mission as it had in
Cuba, Jamaica, and Guyana. The Soviets applauded
Grenada's leftward drift and welcomed Bishop's es-
pousal of Soviet causes in international forums, but
they have done little to satisfy the expectations of
Grenadan leaders. In addition to $1.1 million in ag-
ricultural and construction equipment and the modest
technical assistance for the new radio and television
transmitter, the Soviets so far have offered Grenada
only a dozen scholarships to military schools in the
USSR.
Bishop has done his utmost to cultivate Soviet favor,
especially by supporting the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan at the United Nations. In so doing, the
PRG has incurred the displeasure of regional powers
and of major Western nations that could substantially
influence Grenada's development-all for trifling eco-
nomic benefits so far.
Nevertheless, the PRG will not make a sharp depar-
ture from its current pro-Soviet policy, although some
moderation is possible if economic relations with the
USSR do not soon bring significant gains for Grenada.
West Indian leftists generally have not shrunk from
criticizing the USSR, either as an "imperialist" or a
"racist" world power. The strong ideological orienta-
tion of Bishop's government, moreover, centers on loy-
alty to Cuba rather than to the Soviet Union. Both
Jamaica and Guyana have demonstrated that close ties
with Cuba need not depend on blind allegiance to
Moscow.
Grenada-US Relations
The PRG's policy toward the United States has ranged
from open hostility to limited cooperation. Initial
friendly overtures toward Washington were made at a
time when the government was also planning to accept
large-scale Cuban assistance. When the US Ambas-
sador in April 1979 expressed displeasure over the
prospect of increased Cuban influence on the island,
Bishop bitterly attacked the United States-the first
of many charges of US interference in Grenada's
internal affairs. Since then Bishop's actions have dem-
onstrated a strong conflict between his ideological
impulse to attack Washington and his practical fear of
US retaliation. For the past year, however, the PRG
has been groping for a formula that would allow rec-
onciliation with the United States while still holding
the line on its relationship with Cuba
25X1
25X1
The political thinking of Bishop and his colleagues has
been influenced as much by the "black power" and
antiwar sentiments cultivated during their years at
North American and British universities as by their
more recent contact with Cuba. They have widespread
family and political contacts with West Indian
communities in North America, where the New Jewel
Movement drew its primary financial support. They 25X1
understand and admire many aspects of US society
and culture. They have been friendly toward US citi-
zens owning property in Grenada and have cooperated
with administrators of the Saint George's University
Medical School, an offshore facility run by and for US
citizens, about 700 of whom are now enrolled.
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The PRG's hostility toward the US Government,
which it professes to distinguish from the American
people, is based on a perception of "US imperialism"-
embodied in powerful multinationals and the CIA-as
historically and inherently opposed to revolutionary
change. Moreover, Bishop appears honestly to believe
that the CIA has attempted to oust him by supporting
his political rivals or by promoting violent opposition to
his government. The Prime Minister has exaggerated
and exploited anti-PRG terrorism to his political
advantage, but the strain of a growing paranoia may
have forced his hospitalization in the past few months.
Grenada and Its Neighbors
The most serious setback to Grenada's "revolution"
has been alienation from its traditionally friendly
Caribbean neighbors. Of the 18 English-speaking
Caribbean countries, only three Jamaica, Guyana,
and Saint Lucia-demonstrated strong enthusiasm for
the PRG at the beginning, and their support has
slackened greatly since. Most of the six small English-
speaking islands, which for 1 1 years had cooperated
with Grenada in the West Indies Associated States,
saw the unconstitutional takeover by the PRG as a
dangerous precedent. Last year, the newly independent
states-Saint Lucia, Dominica, and Saint Vincent-
formed a new regional organization called the Orga-
nization of Eastern Caribbean States, in which
Grenada has membership but little influence.
The PRG apparently overestimated the appeal of what
looked like a rising tide of leftist sentiment in the
region. By July 1979 constitutional changes of power
in Saint Lucia, Dominica, Saint Kitts-Nevis, and the
Netherlands Antilles seemed to favor the left. Three of
the governments-Grenada, Saint Lucia, and Domi-
nica-that month signed the "Saint George's Declara-
tion," a unity pact widely touted but soon forgotten
The leftist tide quickly receded, however, as conser-
vative West Indian traditions reasserted themselves
dramatically in successive elections. By November
1980 moderate leaders had won 13 victories in as many
contests. The defeat of Michael Manley in Jamaica
the greatest blow to the Caribbean left in a decade-
deepened the PRG's isolation, leaving it with only
Cuba and Nicaragua as strong allies
As early as the end of 1979, the regionally influential
leaders of Trinidad and Barbados had begun openly to
criticize the PRG. The late Prime Minister Eric Wil-
liams demonstrated strong Trinidadian disapproval of
Bishop's political behavior by refusing to open personal
letters from the Grenadian leader. Barbadian Prime
Minister Tom Adams openly accused Bishop of
subverting democracy and abusing human rights.
At this juncture, Grenada probably is more threatened
by the hostility of its neighbors than it threatens any
one of them. Strong cultural traditions and familial
contacts still bind the islands. An estimated 40,000
Grenadians reside in Trinidad, for example, and many
prominent Grenadians are closely linked with the
political elites of other West Indian islands. The
deteriorating relations with his neighbors, therefore,
are aggravating Bishop's domestic political problems
since the widespread animosity toward him may
encourage efforts to replace him with a moderate
successor. 25X1
Prospects 25X1
Events in Grenada over the next year will evolve out of
the tension between the pro-Cuban orientation of the
PRG and the conservative traditions of the eastern
Caribbean societies. In the face of growing political
and economic problems, both Bishop and his Cuban
advisers probably will hold to a damage-limiting strat-
egy aimed at retaining Western financial assistance 25X1
and avoiding further isolation of Grenada in the re-
gioni
25X1
Politically, the PRG would prefer to continue to limit
constitutional freedoms at home, but the status quo
will become increasingly unacceptable to influential
interest groups in Grenada and to leaders of the
Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM). Some
members of CARICOM already are discussing the
possibility of expelling Grenada from the 12-member
regional organization later this year
The possibility exists that Bishop may attempt some
accommodation on the constitutional question to pre-
vent further isolation of his government. Since late
1979 he has suggested that the PRG would appoint a
commission of prestigious West Indian jurists to draf25X1
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a new constitution, and more recently he has hinted
that the government is considering an election. Yet no
assurance exists that the PRG would observe the spirit
of a new constitution, permit the full reactivation of
opposition parties, or otherwise allow conditions for a
fair election)
Although we do not expect major economic disloca-
tions in the next year-growth of 2 or 3 percent is
possible barring bad weather-we anticipate contin-
ued political fallout from a sluggish economic perfor-
mance. Disenchantment will spread among organized
labor, the business community, small farmers, and
especially among the restless youth majority that first
flocked to the PRG's banner. If Bishop continues to
ignore legitimate opposition as well as regional con-
cerns about constitutional freedoms, at least an outside
chance exists that his more action-prone enemies-
perhaps assisted privately from neighboring islands-
will coalesce to oust the PRG over the next year or two.
Washington is in a good position to influence regional
policy toward the PRG but probably cannot assume
the leadership role. Even among the more conservative
countries such as Trinidad and the Dominican Repub-
lic, a strong opposition to Communism is paralleled by
an equally outspoken commitment to nonintervention
in foreign affairs. Despite their uneasiness about
Grenadian radicals and their Cuban allies, most mod-
erate leaders believe that Bishop is on the defensive
and that a cooperative, gradualist effort among pro-
Western governments offers the best hope for return-
ing democracy to Grenada.
US Policy
For the United States, Grenada under the PRG will
continue to be a problem. We have no convincing
evidence that the island is being used to establish
Communist military bases against the United States or
to export insurgency to other islands-although this
situation could change. Yet Grenada continues to back
Cuba and to attack the United States in international
forums, as was demonstrated most recently by the
PRG's attack on US policy toward El Salvador. This
pro-Cuban perspective will remain a constant in PRG
policy no matter what other concessions Bishop might
make in the direction of political moderation
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Secret
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