NICARAGUA'S NEW MILITARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03T02547R000100160001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Nicaragua's New Military
Secret
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National
p9 ~f Secret
Center
Nicaragua's New Military
Information available as of 15 October 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
The author of this assessment isi Regional and Special Projects ranc Latin America
Division, Office of Political Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Middle America-Caribbean Division, Office of
African and Latin American Analysi
This paper was coordinated with the Office of Strategic
Research, the Office of Economic Research, the
Directorate of Operations, the Office of Imagery
Analysis, and the National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America
Secret
PA R1-10797r
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Nicaragua's New Military
Key Judgments Nicaragua already outstrips its Central American neighbors in military
manpower, armor, and certain artillery. It is in the process of building an
armed force, closely patterned on the Cuban model, that will surpass the
combined strength of its neighbors. By 1983 Nicaragua's Sandinistas
probably will be in a position to dominate Central America militarily.
Since Nicaragua expects Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, with US
backing, to initiate a regional war, its conventional military growth has so
far been defensive. This buildup intimidates governments in the region,
however, and encourages the Sandinistas to export their revolution.
Through aid to regional insurgents, Managua seeks to tie down neighbor-
ing forces while developing a potential fifth column.
The Sandinistas' active-duty force of some 19,000 to 24,000 regulars
probably will reach 35,000 to 40,000 men in the next year or two. By then
they will also have a ready reserve of approximately 40,000 men. The
remainder of the 200,000 people the Sandinistas want for militia training
will be incorporated into irregular territorial forces.
Nicaragua probably will overcome Honduras' present air advantage, in the
next year or so, and also deploy radar-assisted antiaircraft artillery and
surface-to-air missiles. In addition, the Sandinistas have received some 25
Soviet-made T-54/55 tanks and in the next year will probably receive a to-
tal of 40 to 50 tanks, enabling them to deploy two armor battalions. Even
now, the Sandinistas could probably beat back an attack by any one
potential adversary in the region.
Havana apparently has been Managua's chief small-arms supplier and
transshipper of larger weapons. The defense pact signed between the
countries in late 1979 makes Cuba the guarantor of Sandinista rule. With
about 2,200 military and security advisers in the country, Cuba's training
programs are extremely broad; at least several hundred Nicaraguans are
also training or studying in Cuba at any one time and the total could be
substantially higher.
Moscow's role in planning and facilitating the military buildup is impor-
tant, although its direct involvement is limited. Part of the increased Soviet
arms shipments to Cuba this year are intended for transshipment to
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Nicaragua and to replace Cuban arms previously delivered to the Sandinis-
tas. The Cubans and East Europeans work in concert with the Soviets, and
both the PLO and possibly the Algerians are being encouraged by Moscow
to play larger roles in boosting Nicaragua's military. Most of the Soviet ef-
fort will continue to be directed through intermediaries; direct involvement
will grow in measured increments in the hope of muting United States and
regional reactions.
Significant Sandinista vulnerabilities-such as a deficient air arm and lack
of weapons proficiency-will reinforce the preference for a broad defensive
strategy for at least the next year or so. The Sandinistas will face a lack of
skilled support personnel and the drawdown of a relatively slim officer
corps for foreign training. In addition, the construction of repair and
maintenance facilities will probably lag as new equipment is received, and
the logistics system is not fully developed.
Managua's increasing military capability will nevertheless translate into
growing tactical aggressiveness. As the Sandinistas have less to fear from a
Honduran attack, they will increasingly risk strikes across the border to
eliminate the camps of counterrevolutionaries, whose raids they see as a
forerunner to eventual foreign invasion. This will widen the possibility of
border incidents that could spark open warfare.
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Key Judgments
Strategic Thinking
Armed Forces: Size and Structure
Militia and Reserve Programs
Politicization
The Materiel Buildup
Supply Lines
Foreign Influence
Cuba
Soviet Union
East Germany
Other Foreign Influence
Outlook
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Nicaragua's New Military
Strategic Thinking
The Sandinistas are preparing for regional warfare-
which they expect their neighbors to initiate--and
military preparedness is therefore an overriding objec-
tive. The Sandinistas have designated this year as one
of "Defense and Production," but defense is clearly
the first priority.
The Sandinistas' attitude is central to this military
buildup and explains why their armed forces' capabil-
ity will continue to grow. Even relatively moderate
Sandinistas see regional conflict as a significant possi-
bility, and for many in the leadership it is probably
close to an inevitability. The United States, in the
Nicaraguan view, is actively encouraging and covertly
supporting collaboration by the regimes in Guate-
mala, Honduras, and El Salvador against Managua's
leftist administration.'
This thinking permeates the command structure.
Field-grade officers view the border clashes with
Honduras as a prelude to a broader conflict, and thus
contingency planning for open war is under way. With
the government stressing what it regards as Teguci-
galpa's aggressive actions, the public increasingly
regards Honduras as a serious threat. Armed forces
commander Humberto Ortega has publicly voiced
what is a strongly held private view: that the US
decision in May to halt wheat shipments to Nicaragua
was not an economic move but "an aggressive political
measure to set a better, more suitable stage for ...
military intervention."
These perceptions are reinforced by Cuba, whose
estimated 2,200 military and security advisers help
shape Sandinista strategic thinking. Havana's exper-
ience with the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt and its
view of Reagan administration policies prompt it to
encourage Managua to build a professional military
with sufficient prowess to offset the combined
strengths of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guate-
mala-all of which are viewed as US pawns.
The Sandinistas are therefore determined to build
such a force. The recent receipt of Soviet field
artillery pieces and some two dozen ranks are only the
first steps in building a powerful military machine. At
the same time, this buildup is fostering an alliance
among the northern tier military regimes and making
open warfare more likely. The Sandinistas probably
recognize this, but with their own view of the inevita-
bility of conflict, it only accelerates their efforts.
Much of the Sandinistas' strategic thinking is neces-
sarily defensive at this relatively early stage of the
buildup, paralleling the thinking that initially shaped
the Cuban military. Fear of attack by the United
States reinforces their present strategy, which is to
fall back, resist, and survive invasion by a superior
mi!itary force. Primary effort has been expended on
recruiting and training large numbers of personnel to
deter an invading force and on setting up an air
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defense system. Defensive trenching extends along
some of the border with Honduras. Like the Cubans
in the early years of the Castro regime, the Sandinis-
tas reportedly are attempting to make regional com-
mands self-sufficient by dispersing weapons stocks
and maintenance facilities. In addition, in the event
Managua should fall, substantial stores of weapons
have been cached for use in irregular warfare. Given
their guerrilla origins, the Sandinistas believe such
irregular warfare could be conducted by them and
their supporters throughout Central America.
These views on the likelihood of conflict and fallback
strategy underscore why Managua's cooperation with
Cuba and the Soviets in supplying aid to Central
America's leftists will not only persist but probably
increase. Such support both furthers the Sandinistas'
political objectives and is an integral part of their
military strategy
The effort extends far beyond the Sandinistas' well-
known involvement in El Salvador. For example,
Managua has become a major training center for
Central American radicals. A ranking Sandinista
officer has noted that Nicaragua hopes to benefit
from the acceleration of insurgent activities in Guate-
mala
From the Sandinistas' perspective, it is Nicaraguan
self-interest-quite apart from Cuban urging that
dictates continued aid to regional insurgents. If Nica-
ragua is to avoid encirclement, revolutionary move-
ments in the region must prosper. Thus, the Sandinis-
tas cooperate not only with Havana, but with others
such as the PLO-and through them, the Soviets-in
promoting revolution
their northern neighbors. In the event of open war-
fare, the Sandinistas will have a fifth column appara-
tus in neighboring territories that would be a critical
support element for their fallback uerrilla strategy.
F
As the Sandinistas' military capabilities widen and
their fear of possible attack by Honduras or others
diminishes, it is inevitable that Nicaragua will be in a
better position to advise, train, and arm revolutionar-
ies.
US-backed invasion from northern tier forces.
The internal Nicaraguan political situation is unlikely
to slow either conventional military expansion or the
growth of the Managua-based insurgent support net-
work. Instead, pressures from the Nicaraguan demo-
cratic opposition and from armed revolutionary bands
are accelerating the Sandinistas' military schedule
and stiffening their commitment to Central American
leftists. The Sandinistas' control is already extensive
enough to make its sub rosa operations immune to
local investigation or pressure. Further, believing their
domestic opponents are linked to the United States
and neighboring conservative regimes, the Sandinistas
are strengthening their commitment to the left in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala as a means of
ensuring the security of their own regime. Moreover,
Nicaragua's rapid expansion of troop strength and
acquisition of relatively modern weapons are intended
to quell dissent at home as well as meet the expected
Armed Forces: Size and Structure
In less than two years the Sandinistas have trans-
formed an undisciplined guerrilla force (the core of
which was 4,000 to 5,000 men) into a standing army
of some 19,000 to 24,000 men, of which about 20
percent are apparently reserves or militia on active
duty. Perhaps another 20,000 or more militia serve as
an additional reserve with sufficient training to be
incorporated easily into the military. These totals do
not include the 8,000-man police force.1
Of the four Central American states that maintain
standing armies, Nicaragua has a population only
about half the average of its neighbors and is working
from a more limited resource base as well. Only El
In the near term the Sandinistas hope the training and
arming of revolutionary groups will add to domestic
turmoil and tie down the potentially hostile forces of
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Salvador's military approaches Nicaragua's in total
personnel, but the Salvadorans have boosted their
armed forces and national guard strength to 18,000
men because of their major counterinsurgency effort
against some 4,000 to 4,500 guerrillas. In contrast to
Nicaragua's plans to boost recruitment and widen the
present personnel gap further, none of its neighbors
has embarked on a major force expansion (see
table If
At most, 1 10 to 125 Nicaraguan units may have been
formed (the majority of which are reserves or militia)
with an apparent authorized strength of about 700
personnel each approximately 77,000 to 88,000 men
in all. Many of the militia have been given only
limited training, however, and a number of regular
and reserve units are under strength. Many units are
in the initial stages of formation, with the Sandinistas
apparently assigning unit numbers sequentially as
soon as a group begins organizing. This is partly
because of the Sandinistas' vested interest in exagger-
ating both the size of their militia and the extent of
reserve recruitment. Some units are organized only on
paper, and there are some inconsistencies in the
numbering system.
The overall growth of the Sandinista People's Army
(EPS), however, is evident. Beginning late last year,
and especially this year, reserve groups have been
integrated into active-duty forces. Moreover, large
groups have been sent abroad for training, and a
major effort has been made to form new militia units.
The original Sandinista target of 16,000 active-duty
troops probably was exceeded late last year.I
Comparison of Central
American Military Forces
Population GNP 1980 Area
(million) (billion $) (km
Armed
Forces
Nicaragua
2.5
1.8
14;,900
19,000-
24,000
Guatemala
7.2
7.6
108,880
15,000
Honduras
3.8
2.2
11:1,150
13,500
El Salvador
4.9
3.2
21,400
18,000
a In contrast, Nicaraguan forces in 1979 under President Somoza
totaled 10,500, including police.
ent structures, and that some personnel are training
abroad. More precise totals are hampered not only by
limited Western access, but by the EPS integration of
regular, reserve, and militia forces. (See appendix D.)
Roughly, the major line elements of the ground forces
include:
? Ten regular motorized infantry battalions with an
authorized strength of 857 men each.
? Six Frontier Guard battalions (commanded by and
integrated into the regular EPS, but which may
include militia forces as a major component) prob-
ably with an authorized strength of 600 to 700 men
each.
? One tank battalion (possibly expanding to two)
estimated at 250 men total.
Our 19,000 to 24,000 estimate of active-duty person-
nel reflects several considerations. An estimated
breakdown of the force structure
figure.
I many
units are still under strength, even taking into consid-
eration that the EPS is being forced to use temporary
facilities, that there is probably overcrowding in pres-
? One artillery battalion totaling 350 men.
? Two antiaircraft battalions with 350 men each.
. One engineering battalion with 350 men.
? One special forces battalion with 350 to 500 men.
? Five battalions of reserves or militia on active dut
totaling 3,500 men.I
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This line strength adds up to approximately 18,000
men. Other support troops may total 5,000 men,
based on known Nicaraguan inventories and their
practice of relying heavily on large numbers of per-
sonnel in the absence of skilled technicians.
This provides an active duty complement of 24,000
men at full strength. Subtracting the reserve battalion
strength and assuming that half of the Frontier Guard
forces are militia on active dut about 19,000 of this
total would be regular EPS.
the Sandinistas are embarked on a major expansion.
In terms of structure and personnel, the Sandinistas in
many respects are patterned after the Cuban model,
which may provide some insight into future develop-
ments. During the last several years, for instance, the
composition of the Cuban armed forces has been
altered to reduce the number of regular troops and to
increase reliance on reserves and a territorial militia.2
The economic drain of a large standing army was one
of the motivations for the reductionf
population.
If the Cuban peacetime army formula of I to 2
percent of the population is applied to Nicaragua with
a population of 2.5 million, it would mean a standing
force of some 25,000 to 50,000 men. Coincidentally,
the combined standing force of Managua's three
northern neighbors is 48,000 men, which may be one
element in Sandinista planning. Moreover, the EPS
has a reported target of 30 reserve motorized infantry
battalions-a total of 24,000 men-which accords
with the Cuban model. It also would bring Nicara-
gua's total ready force close to 2 percent of the
production
This suggests a possible topping out of regular forces
in the not too distant future and fairly heavy reliance
on reserves to boost active-duty forces to the 35,000-
to 40,000-man level or slightly beyond. This is partly
borne out by the accelerated patterns of militia
recruitment this year and plans for reserve to regular
ratios of 3 to 1 and 4 to I in some areas. As in Cuba,
economic considerations also will play a role, since
reserves are a cheaper way to maintain a large
standing army and are not as disruptive to civilian
Militia and Reserve Programs
As noted, reserve or militia forces (about 5,000 of the
19,000 to 24,000 active-duty strength) already boost
the EPS, although the militia's capability falls short
approximating 2 percent of total population.
2 The Cuban Deputy Chief of Staff forecast the shift in emphasis in
1970 when he suggested that a Cuban peacetime army should be I
to 2 percent of the population, with a heavy dependence on ready
reserves. At that time Cuba had some 130,000 regular personnel in
its standing army. At present, with a population of almost 10
million, the Cubans have approximately 120,000 men (1.2 percent
of the population) on active duty; a major percentage of the 26,000
to 32,000 Cubans serving overseas are activated reservists. Some
100,000 to 130,000 ready reserves (available on 4-hour callup) back
this force, with the total of active-duty forces and ready reserves
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of the extravagant claims of Sandinista spokesmen.
EPS leaders have boasted of a 120,000-man militia
alread in bein but much of this force is unor a-
nizcd.
Nevertheless, this year witnessed a major surge in
militia recruitment and mobilization. Perhaps 25,000
to 30,000 personnel have passed through some stage 10
of training. Additional personnel probably participate
in weekly drills, but are not yet organized into reserve
battalions. In some instances the EPS apparently
provides the better militia recruits with additional
training to reach reserve battalion status, after which
they may serve on active duty. In turn the reserve
forces are the primary source of recruits for the
regular Army.1
Much of the militia is still being defined. Those units
that will constitute the formal reserve were initially
not markedly differentiated from others, but they now
appear to have separate status and longer tours of
duty in tandem with regular units. Border Guard
Forces originally were under the Ministry of Interior,
but now are integrated into the EPS and work with
Q
regular units at activities ran in from land and naval of 35,000 to 40,000 troops. The FPS would thus easily
patrols to customs duties.
The Sandinista goal of a 200,000-man militia (some
spokesmen have even suggested 300,000) is probably
unrealistic in a strict military sense. Already Sandi-
nista leaders are privately talking about winnowing
the militia to make it a more respectable force. Some
youth and women's battalions have more propaganda
than military value.
Politicization
Sandinista objectives are political as well as military.
Focusing on numbers alone neglects the other primary
aim for regular and reserve alike- - which is indoc-
trination and politicization.
Nevertheless, the Sandinistas have a good chance to
achieve their goals. Based on recruitment to date, they
seem likely to provide at least rudimentary training to
some 150,000 people by mid-1982. Even if only one-
fourth of them have adequate skills to reinforce
active-duty troops, this would probably be sufficient
for Sandinista needs. In a crisis in late 1982, there-
fore, the Sandinistas would be able to add quickly
40,000 or so personnel to a projected active-duty force
Among regular forces this is reflected at several
levels. The Office of Political and Cultural Affairs,
part of the General Staff, also has components at the
regional command levels. National Directorate mem-
ber Luis Carrion recently contended that regional
political chiefs cannot give orders to the local military
commander, but admitted that there is at least equal-
ity between the two. Perhaps more pertinent, a former
EPS officer indicated that the political chief was the
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Figure 5. Vice Minister of Defense Luis Carrion
"... the people must be trained around the army
so they can be mobilized to defend the national
sovereignty.'
equal or superior of the regional military commander,
since the former reported through the political net-
work to the controlling National Directorate, rather
than through the EPS command structure.
The EPS devotes perhaps a fourth or more of basic
training time to political instruction. Officers are
being screened to determine those most willing to
defend the FSLN from foreign invasion, whatever the
source. The investigations are also designed to root
out by 1985 those who might prefer social democracy
to rule by the proletariat. Probably not coincidentally,
1985 is the year the FSLN has promised elections
Militia training reflects the same political emphasis.
The EPS combat chief recently stated that the most
important instruction for backup troops is political-
ranking above tactical and physical training. Having
reserve and militia forces manning the front lines in
the battle against counterrevolutionary elements
draws the civilian population further into the political
struggle. Similarly, the Sandinistas have blurred the
distinction between regulars and reserves in a number
of areas, upgrading salaries and instituting death
benefits to families of militia. This tends to unify the
EPS and local populations, as does the practice of
blending the anti-insurgent units with regular, re-
serve, militia, and police personnel.
Over time these varied efforts, in conjunction with a
large corps of foreign-trained personnel, should pro-
vide the FSLN with a politically reliable fighting
force.
The Materiel Buildup
In addition to its manpower buildup and its expansion
of physical plant and training facilities, the EPS is
also acquiring additional materiel. The most glaring
weakness-lack of a significant air capability-will
probably persist into next year, but this will be offset
by improved air defenses, longer range artillery, and
more armor and firepower
It is this expansion as much as the current arsenal
that has so unsettled other Central American govern-
ments. The EPS achieved a firepower advantage in
field artillery in May when it received at least 12
Soviet_152-mm-howitzers. This field piece, with a
range of 16 kilometers, easily outdistances the 105-
mm howitzers in most Central American inventories.
With 12 to 16 guns sufficient for one battalion, it is
likely that another unit eventually will be formed in
order to match or outclass Honduras, which has three
artillery battalions on paper though only one is com-
bat ready
Nicaragua's antiaircraft defenses are already exten-
sive by Central American standards, and given the
emphasis on air defense, it is likely the inventory will
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be expanded. Some 88 ZPU-4 or ZU-23-2 uns have by late this year or early next. It is also likely that
been observed at sites around the county ,
I hey also have an undetermined number of SA-7
surface-to-air missiles
in a military parade last July
MIG aircraft or similar planes from Vietnam will be
in Nicaragua in 1982
Deliveries of Soviet-built T-54/55 tanks were origi-
nally expected last spring, but the Nicaraguans may
have delayed receipt because of heavy attention in the
US press to their prospective arrival and possible
concern over upsetting some of their international
Nevertheless, vulnerability to air attack remains Nic-
aragua's principal weakness, and even speeded-up
equipment deliveries or training programs are unlike-
ly to solve it in the near term. The main air defense
weapons are vintage ZPU-4s or ZU-23-2s, which are
relatively small caliber (14.5 mm and 23 mm, respec-
tively). Although they may give a psychological boost
to the Nicaraguans, they would not be a match for the
Hondurans, whose claim to military superiority rests
principally on a squadron of 15 Super MysteresF777
The gap is most likely to be filled by a relatively
sophisticated, radar-assisted antiaircraft missile sys-
tem like the SA-2 or SA-6.
Zits appearance
next year would not be surprising. Actual delivery
depends on political considerations as well as the year-
long training schedule. Factors that could speed up
delivery include a delay in Nicaraguan receipt of
fighter aircraft, or a Honduran move to improve its
capabilities or readiness posture. SA-2 or SA-6 train-
ing would take about a year; if training was initiated
in late 1980, the Nicaraguans would be capable of
operating such systems by early next year at the
latest. This assumes, however, that Nicaragua has
enough qualified personnel to complete the courses
successfully. Even after such training, Nicaraguan
personnel would probably continue to have problems
maintaining and operating such sophisticated equip-
ment without foreign assistance, and their level of
proficiency is likely tp be low until considerable
experience is gained.
Armor and aircraft are two other areas of major
regional concern. Despite some deference to interna-
tional and domestic political sensitivities regarding
both types of hardware, Nicaragua is in the process of
fielding one tank battalion and will probably have two
supporters. Both Mexico and members of the Socialist
International, who have strongly supported the
Sandinistas, have ex ressed disquiet over any major
buildup of armor. 25
additional T-54/55s are
due later this year, but at this point we expect
international pressure and the Nicaraguan Army's
own limitations to restrict the tank inventory to no
more than two battalions overall. The Cubans rely
heavily on armor and may have argued that adequate
defense demands-even initially-40 to 50 tanks.
Much more than this, however, would probably over-
whelm the army's repair and maintenance facilities.
Even so, the T-55, a medium tank with three to four
inches of armor and a 100-mm gun, easily outstrips
any tank now in Central America. The principal
competition comes from Honduras' 16 Scorpion light
tanks, but this vehicle is thin skinned with a 76-mm
gun, not even a close match.
Nicaraguan strategy for defending against invasion
from Honduras probably calls for some armor deploy-
ment to the northern border region, where tanks
would serve as both a real and psychological deter-
rent. Much of this area, however, is unsuited for
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tanks, being heavily forested and ravined, with poor
roadways. Given Sandinista and Cuban concern about
potential counterrevolution, it must be assumed that a
substantial number of the tanks are intended to quell
possible domestic unrest.
One Sandinista leader has suggested that Nicaragua
would purchase either F-4 Phantoms from Iran or
T-37s from Vietnam, but such purchases would prob-
ably be a stopgap. The Nicaraguans have discussed
acquiring high-performance aircraft from Vietnam-
probably captured US F-5s or perhaps T-37s-and
are in the process of acquiring helicopters from
Hanoi. Spare parts and maintenance problems associ-
ated with the F-5s could argue against their acquisi-
tion as a long-term solution to the Nicaraguan air-
craft problem, although they could serve as a
temporary political expedient. Vietnam has been un-
able to sell the F-5s, and they could be available under
extremely attractive terms. The Sandinistas might
reason that F-5s would not be
as MIGs
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In the interim the Air Force has made do with about
40 outdated and battle worn aircraft, the most effec-
tive of which are four T-33 jet trainers and four T-28
prop trainers, both modified for a combat role.
The Sandinistas' principal near-term improvement
effort appears devoted to increased troop mobility and
quick reaction capabilities by the acquisition of heli-
copters and short-ranee transport aircraft.
In more mundane areas of materiel acquisition, the
Sandinistas are also forging ahead. Our knowledge of
the total holdings of ground force light weapons is
imprecise, but sufficient to record major increases in
almost all categories over the last year.
In contrast to midyear 1980, units throughout Nicara-
gua last fall reflected very rapid increases in their
holdings of machineguns, mortars, and light cannons.
Undetermined quantities of rocket-propelled grenade
launchers, Czech M-23 and M-25 submachineguns,
and machine pistols have been delivered.
Where AK-47s were observed in the
military parade last year but were not in general use,
they are now much more common. Soviet Bloc weap-
ons clearly predominate, with older Western rifles
having pretty much disappeared from the EPS inven-
tory.
This outfittine of troops extends to the militia
By August reserve units were ob-
This kind of depth in the resupply effort, the caching
of weapons as a contingency for use in possible 25.
fallback guerrilla warfare 25
I isuggest the
Nicaraguans probably have abundant stocks of small
arms and ammunition, at least for active-duty forces.
The Sandinistas also appear to have made up what
had been an early shortage of transport vehicles. Last
year the government contracted for the purchase of
800 W-50 trucks from East Germany, and almost all
of them were probably delivered by this spring most
of them to the EPS. Recent sea shipments have
included Soviet cross-country and other types of
trucks with as many as 60 in a single delivery and an
estimated 150 overall. The Sandinista practice of
attempting to disperse maintenance facilities-as op-
posed to a central facility as is the case in Honduras-
coupled with the fact that most EPS vehicles are new
provides Nicaragua with a comparative advantage.
Supply Lines
The Cubans and Soviets play principal roles in the
resupply and upgrading of materiel. Havana appears
to be a major supplier, relying on the Cuban airbridge
and Nicaraguan ships regularly traveling between
Cuba and Nicaraguan Caribbean ports. Inventorying,
and in some cases confirming, all of these shipments
has been impossible due to EPS concealment practices
and limited Western access. The overall frequency of
the deliveries and our knowledge of some of the
contents, however, provides a gross index of the
military buildup.
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
3
25
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25X
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Most of the large equipment is coming in by ship, and
some of the smaller weaponry now arrives at east
coast ports and is trucked from there. The Nicara-
guans, however, follow the Cuban practice of offload-
ing and moving their equipment at night and closing
the ports and roads to civilian traffic. In addition,
deliveries are made principally on the remote Carib-
bean coast, an area whose sparse population, poor
access, and easily secured approaches make it ideal
for clandestine deliveries
The apparently increased frequency of sea shipments
and particular information regarding individual car-
goes reflects the broadening effort by Nicaraguan
allies to puma un EPS military canabilities.
2
2
2;
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Secret
25X
Figure S. Algerian freighter delivering military equipment to
Nicaragua. February 1981.
several respects modeled on the Cuban armed forces. 25
The roles of the Soviets, other Bloc countries, and the
important PLO contingent are also expanding, but
even collectively these countries do not come close to
the influence wielded by Havana. 25
Foreign Influence
In contrast to the Bloc presence, Western nations have
Nicaragua has been almost wholly dependent on
Cuba, Soviet Bloc countries, and the Palestine Liber- been almost completely cut off from the militar . 25X
ation Organization (PLO) for military training and 25;
supply, these foreign ties are likely to grow stronger.
The interchange between Nicaragua and these coun-
tries in terms of materiel deliveries, planned pur-
chases, and training commitments all show an upward
climb over the past several months. As the Sandinista
army begins to receive more sophisticated equipment, Most of the 25.
its training and spare parts needs will deepen the Latin American military has cold shouldered the
ua
relationships. The Sandinistas' political perspective Nicara ns, viewing them as a potential enemy
and their expectation of conflict with their US-backed 25X1 25X1
northern neighbors are further prods in the direction
of wider military relations with current suppliers.=The United States is occasionally treated to surface 25:
cordiality, but Nicaraguan officers rarely attend even 25US social functions, and the military relationship has
Havana's pervasive influence is growing--some 2,200 generally come to a dead end. 25'
Cuban military and security advisers are in the
country and the Nicaraguan military system is in
25
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Cuba
Havana has supplied the bulk of training and prob-
ably much of the materiel to the Sandinista army and
has become the guarantor of continued Sandinista
rule by virtue of the defense pact signed between the
two countries in late 1979. One measure of Havana's
preeminent position is the Sandinistas' steadfast re-
fusal to countenance internal criticism of the exten-
sive Cuban military role, despite some backlash. This
is in contrast to the FSLN's tactical flexibility in
The Cuban role is the logical result of the historical
relationship between the FSLN and Fidel Castro, who
supported the Nicaraguan guerrillas from their begin-
nings in the early 1960s. The Cubans fashioned and
cemented the Sandinista guerrilla coalition in 1978
and 1979, helped formulate and coordinate political
and military strategy, and trained "internationalist
brigade" personnel who fought with the Sandinistas.
Castro played a pivotal role in the closing months of
the campaign against Somoza by supplying some 500
tons of arms. Havana also sent about 50 Cuban
advisers to assist Sandinista units during the final
offensive against the Nicaraguan National Guard.
Havana moved swiftly to extend its influence as the
Somoza regime fell on 19 July 1979:
? Julian Lopez Diaz, who had been the key Cuban
adviser to the Sandinistas in Costa Rica, flew into
Managua on 18 July in time for the takeover and
became the new Cuban Ambassador.
? Cuban military personnel accompanied Sandinista
leaders into the bunker headquarters formerly occu-
pied by Somoza and set up an immediate advisory
presence.
? Before the first week of Sandinista rule was over,
Havana had in place its first 65-man medical team,
about 100 military and security advisers, a function-
ing Prensa Latina office,
? By the end of October the Cuban presence num-
bered 650 personnel, increasing to about 2,200 the
following February and continuing a steep upward
climb to an estimated 5,850 to 6,300 by October of
this year; about 2,200 of these are military or
security advisers. The large complements of teach-
ers, medical personnel, and construction workers
and Cuban attention to humanitarian and technical
aid put the best face possible on the large Cuban
contingent
The Cubans shouldered an enormous training and
support burden for the Nicaraguan military from the
outset. By September 1979 some 60 Cuban instruc-
tors were detailed to the Basic Infantry Training
School to help train the first class of platoon leaders.
Cuban advisers were reportedly present down to the
company and sometimes the platoon level. All high-
level Sandinista leaders also have Cuban advisers
personally assigned to them.
The present scope of Cuban training and schooling is
a clear indicator of the extremely close military tics
and of the likelihood of a continuing close relation-
ship. The most intensive trainine takes place in Cuba.
F some 700 ranking Army and party mem-
bers had been sent to Cuba by early 1980. One initial
group of 60 officers took an accelerated six-month
course, returning to replace Army staff officers who
were then to proceed to Cuba for a two-year course
F777 j
At least several hundred Nicaraguan personnel are
probably receiving military or security training in
Cuba at any one time. Commissioned and noncom-
missioned officer training is provided at Cuban mili-
tary academies, and the Cubans also receive fairly
significant numbers of troops for specialized training.
About 300 of the quick reaction battalion troops
traveled to Cuba last year for special instruction.
Several groups totaling perhaps 100 to 200 men have
also received tank training, including repair and
maintenance.
roups o
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Qnrrat
25
10 to 50 personnel travel periodically for instruction
in subjects ranging from antiaircraft defense to infan-
try training. Small groups of pilots have also been sent
to Cuba, and unknown onths'
basic training.
Although militia and border
guar troops have received far less attention than
regular troops, a hundred or so militia have attended
courses in Cuba. Smaller numbers of border guard
unit personnel have also received instruction
I I
The impact of the Cuban presence and training is
reflected across the board in the military sphere. The
EPS structure, philosophy, reflect
the Cuban model. The EPS, like the Cuban mi itary,
is a multiservice force, with air and naval elements
integrated into the army command. The early empha-
sis on air defense and the inclusion of air defense and
the antiaircraft brigade under the air force command
follow the Cuban example. So does the integration of
a political office and political functions into the armed
I
25
25
25
25
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forces. EPS reliance on a backup militia and the
integration of reserve and regular forces on active
duty similarly reflect Cuban tutelage
compromise on the Cuban question. Sandinista lead-
ers have also reportedly refused to countenance inter-
nal discussion concerning the numbers and roles of
Cuban personnel. In June the government announced
an apparent decision to reduce substantially the con-
tingent of 2,000 Cuban teachers in the country, but
quickly reversed itself following a statement from
Washington calling attention to the planned depar-
tures. Now the 1,200 teachers that returned to Cuba
last summer are being replaced.
the defense pact concluded between Havana and
Managua, apparently in late 1979. A logical out-
coincided with high Sandinista concern over border
counterrevolutionary efforts against the FSLN lead-
ership. Details of the agreement are unclear,1
The extensive Cuban role has sparked a backlash.
East coast rioting and demonstrations last fall were
directed at the Cubans. There is also evidence of
periodic military disgruntlement at the sometimes
overbearing presence of the Cubans.
The response of the Sandinista hierarchy, which has
demonstrated significant tactical flexibility in several
areas, underscores the symbolic and material impor-
tance FSLN leaders attach to the Cuban role. The
east coast protests were put down, and there was no
In addition to the FSLN's needs over the next several
years for continued arms supplies and training from
Cuba, the emergence of Minister of Defense Hum-
berto Ortega-now the single most powerful individ-
ual in the government-and his brother Daniel, head
of the government junta as the dominant Sandinista
clique, is another indicator of the likelihood of closer
ties between Cuba and Nicaragua. Even before the
takeover in 1979 the Ortegas privately made clear
their intention to establish a Cuban-style government.
During the insurgency against Somoza the Ortegas
operated out of San Jose, Costa Rica
Of
These ties do not rule out public relations moves
reducing the number of Cuban personnel working in
such secondary areas as construction or the possibility
of shifting more training activities to Havana and
even lowering the Cuban profile in some more sensi-
tive security areas. But the broad dimensions of the
Havana-Managua relationship are set. That relation-
ship has a firm historical base and will probably be
deepened by support programs and strong personal
ties.
Soviet Union
The Soviets are playing an important role in planning
and facilitating the military buildup, although their
direct involvement is relatively limited. Soviet arms
shipments to Cuba make possible Havana's deliveries
to Managua,
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25
Figure 10. This photo appeared in a Nicaraguan newspaper with
the following caption: "The Soviet Ml-8 helicopter, loaned by
Aeroflot to the Nicaraguan Government, with its Soviet pilots,
when it landed in Rancho Grande Yesterday. The comrade in front
Havana is also a convenient trans- the embassy presence appears not to have been boost- 25X
shipment poin . Apparently growing East German, ed significantly. Although a small number of military
Bulgarian, and Polish military cooperation with Nica- advisers was probably included in the original total,
ragua is done at Soviet behest. The PLO views its role the first indication of Soviet military personnel Bur-
in Nicaragua at least partly as a tradeoff for in- ve in Nicaragua's needs was in the summer of 1980.
creased Soviet aid. The Soviets also appear to be 25,
encouraging countries such as Algeria to contribute to
the military buildup. Although the Soviets contribute The pace of Soviet-Nicaraguan military relations has 25~
primarily through middlemen, they are slowly in- picked up this year.
creasing their local role-and probably the numbers 25X1
of Nicaraguans going to the Sovi Union-as 5X1
gauge both local and US reaction Soviet technicians and pilots arrived in late 25
May o t is year to train Nicaraguan crews on two
In contrast to the Cubans, the Soviets moved at a Soviet-delivered MI-8 helicopters. 25
relatively measured pace, and the Soviet presence still E_ 1 25
is of moderate size-some 50 to 70 personnel. An u sequent y in July, the icara- 25
initial Soviet diplomatic mission visited Nicaragua in uans also received six Soviet AN-2 trans ort.
August 1979, relations were formalized in October,
and about 30 embassy personnel arrived the following
January. Despite initial press reports that the diplo- 25X1
matic mission would quickly expand to 100 or more,
17 1 Secret 25
 Approved For Release 2007/05/22 : CIA-RDP03TO2547R000100160001-4
Defense Minister Ortega visited Moscow in March
1980 and again this March
Soviet weapons deliveries to Cuba
in the past year have also included outdated antitank
and antiaircraft artillery. The appearance of such
weaponry in Nicaragua over the past year confirms
that the Soviets are employing Havana as a conve-
nient
security and other specialized fields
Like the Cubans, the Soviets hope to build Sandinista
military capabilities quickly enough to deter either
foreign invasion or counterrevolution and to help
blunt US pressures on the FSLN
East Germany
East Germany has worked actively to boost ties with
the Nicaraguan regime, both as part of its effort to
gain greater political influence in Latin America and
holding area to avoid many to advance Soviet foreign policy objectives. Although
the military relationship is generally not treated pub-
licly, East German advisers are believed active in
The East Germans, having provided immediate medi-
cal aid and supplies after the Sandinista takeover,
sent one of their most talented and aggressive diplo-
mats to head their mission in the fall of 1979. East
Germany quickly provided an $11 million line of
credit, and its Ambassador worked energetically to
facilitate the Soviet ties and programs that followed.
Both the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense and the
Minister of Interior visited East Germany in early
1980-with security matters certainly dominating
discussion
In other areas the Soviet role is similarly important, if
further removed. For example, the timing of the
provision to Nicaragua of MIG aircraft-perhaps
from Cuban or East European stocks-will almost
certainly be determined in consultation with the Sovi-
ets.
The Soviets also reportedly provide military and
police training programs in the Soviet Union, al-
though we lack detailed information. We estimate
that a few hundred personnel may be involved in such
instruction, with courses probably running for six
months or longer.
When Nicaraguan Foreign
Minister D'Escoto met with East German Council of
State Chairman Honecker in June of this year, they
both noted the "dynamic development and high level
of cooperation between the two countries."I
The direct military relationship has nonetheless been
kept quiet. Press coverage of visits in East Germany
has sometimes been uninformative, even by East
German standards. In Nicaragua, this is mirrored in
the publicity accorded East German trade, cultural,
and humanitarian activities while military acti
have been shrouded
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Other East German activities cover a fairly broad
spectrum. East German technicians help maintain the
800 trucks purchased by Nicaragua and work in
several military fields. East German advisers assisted
in preparing the anniversary celebrations of the revo-
lution last year
revolutionary organizations in Central America
may still be in that range. Although the PLO has
diverse objectives in seeking to lend support and
expand ties in Nicaragua, it reportedly is acting at
Soviet urging in the broad outlines of its policy
including using Nicaragua as a base to aid other
PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat attended the first anni-
versary celebration of the Nicaraguan revolution in
mid-1980, and a military cooperation agreement was
concluded the following month. The PLO agreed to
provide flight and paramilitary training and to supply
coastal radar units. In September some 30 personnel
in these specialties arrived in Managua. In the last
year PLO personnel have provided instruction in
flying and airplane maintenance, flown operational
missions, and aided Nicaragua in its effort to improve
its radar defense capabilities.
25
PLO
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) origin-
ally stationed about 30 to 35 personnel in Nicaragua
following the Sandinista takeover. Subsequently, the
number appears to have fluctuated significantly but
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Other Foreign Influence
There are in Nicaragua perhaps an additional 50 or so
Communist Bloc representatives from six countries-
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Viet-
nam, and North Korea. Some, like the North Kore-
ans, teach specialities such as personal defense to
security personnel, and the Koreans may also have
supplied some limited weaponry, like 57-mm antitank
guns. The Bulgarians run a flight training program
and provide other forms of specialized training in
their home country, and assign military doctors to
Nicaragua. Many of the others are active in
supply of small weapons
In addition to this Communist presence, there are
scattered Latin American radicals in the military and
security services. These personnel are remnants of the
international brigades that fought with the FSLN in
the struggle against Somoza.
met
Outlook
An active duty force of 35,000 to 40,000 men in late
1982 is attainable, particularly if tensions with Hon-
duras continue. An active duty force approaching
50,000 would place considerable strain on the logistics
and command systems and would probably be the
maximum FSLN capability in this time frame. The
buildup is already running ahead of the EPS's ability
to provide skilled commissioned and noncommissioned
officer cadre. While foreign training programs are
expanding, it will be some time before this need is
Cuban system
As the EPS sorts itself out, it is likely to make a more
meaningful distinction among regular, reserve, and
militia forces. The militia will become more purely a
territorial backup, while the caliber and training of
reserve forces are boosted, more in line with the
Because of certain significant deficiencies, Nicaragua
is likely to follow, at least for the next year, a broadly
defensive strategy. Even if Soviet-built jet combat
aircraft are provided promptly, Nicaragua's air arm
in 1982 would still be untested. Proficiency on artil-
lery and armor also will take time to acquire. Logis-
tics are still rudimentary, and the all-volunteer ap-
proach can provide more chaff than wheat.
Nicaragua still appears to have a very low officer-to-
enlisted ratio. Even assuming that ranking personnel
soon begin to return from medium-term Cuban and
other foreign training programs, the continuing armed
forces expansion ensures a bottom-heavy force that
will complicate command and control for some time.
Even beyond this, focusing on numbers and inven-
tories obscures the difficulties the Sandinistas face in
transforming themselves from a guerrilla band to a
modern military force. In a crisis, lack of skilled
personnel in support categories could make logistics a
nightmare. The Nicaraguans have not had adequate
time to acquire professional expertise, and the contin-
ued introduction of new weaponry will extend reliance
on foreign technicians and advisers.
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Secret
Havana heavily influences the Sandinista military
and will probably caution against an aggressor role,
since the Cuban-Nicaraguan defense pact and the
large number of Cuban military and security advisers
would probably draw Havana into any regional con-
flict. Managua would not be inclined to a preemptive
strike, unless it was convinced that an attack by its
EPS will be further inclined toward cross-border
pursuit and retaliation against counterrevolutionary
activity based in Honduras. As Managua's growing
military strength blunts the potential damage of a
direct Honduran attack, Nicaragua will increasingly
risk employing airstrikes and assaults across the
Honduran border to eliminate the counterrevolution-
aries. Training and arming regional radicals to help
cope with this counterrevolutionary threat and tie up
the resources of the Sandinistas' potential adversaries
will remain an integral part of military strategy
The Sandinistas' greater tactical aggressiveness will
increase the risk of wider hostilities. Even now, de-
spite Tegucigalpa's air superiority, we doubt that
Honduras could win a war against Nicaragua in the
sense of occupying and holding a major portion of
Nicaraguan territory. Any direct comparison between
Nicaragua and Honduras-or any of the Central
American nations ignores the likelihood that Cuba,
under the terms of its defense pact, would probably
come to Nicaragua's aid.
In addition, even though there is significant internal
political dissent in Nicaragua, any armed confronta-
tion with Honduras would be a compelling unifying
event. Even a superior conventional force fighting the
Sandinistas would probably face major civil resistance
in addition to its purely military adversary.
Nicaragua is already a potent military force by
regional standards, and its expanding military and
training programs and planned weapons acquisitions
will widen the gap between it and its neighbors The
Sandinistas are shaping their military institutions and
designing strategies for regional war. In contrast,
neigTiormg militaries have devoted their energies in
arge measure to the internal threat and domestic
politicking. By early 1983 such disparities and the
Sandinistas' improved arsenal will probably enable
the Nicaraguans to dominate Central America mili-
tarily
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Appendix D
Organization of the
Sandinista National Liberation Front
Comandante de la Revolucion Humberto Ortega
concurrently Commander in Chief, Minister of De-
fense, and member of the Sandinista National Direc-
torate-dominates the Army structure. He is the most
powerful single individual in Nicaragua, and his
power is further enhanced by his brother Daniel's
position as head of the governing junta.
The EPS is headquartered in the capital, Managua,
with the General Staff immediately subordinate to
Commander in Chief Ortega. In addition to standard
military functions and departments, the staff includes
a political and cultural office and a political repre-
sentative to the government sector. Both the armor
and special forces battalions are headquartered out-
side Managua with the antiaircraft brigade divided
among the various regions.
The EPS is multiservice, including not only ground
forces but the Air Force and small naval elements as
well.
Regional commands are broken down into seven
broadly similar military districts covering the entire
country; regional brigade headquarters mirror general
staff functions. Troops are broken down into perma-
nent or Regular Army battalions, reserve or mobilized
militia forces, and border guard troops. The number
of battalions in each category is somewhat flexible;
outlying areas have a higher proportion of reserve
troops, while Managua and northern border regions
may have two regular battalions.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/22 : CIA-RDP03TO2547R000100160001-4
Appendix D
Organization of the
Sandinista National Liberation Front
Comandante de la Revolucion Humberto Ortega
concurrently Commander in Chief, Minister of De-
fense, and member of the Sandinista National Direc-
torate-dominates the Army structure. He is the most
powerful single individual in Nicaragua, and his
power is further enhanced by his brother Daniel's
position as head of the governing junta.
The EPS is headquartered in the capital, Managua,
with the General Staff immediately subordinate to
Commander in Chief Ortega. In addition to standard
military functions and departments, the staff includes
a political and cultural office and a political repre-
sentative to the government sector. Both the armor
and special forces battalions are headquartered out-
side Managua with the antiaircraft brigade divided
among the various regions.
The EPS is multiservice, including not only ground
forces but the Air Force and small naval elements as
well.
Regional commands are broken down into seven
broadly similar military districts covering the entire
country; regional brigade headquarters mirror general
staff functions. Troops are broken down into perma-
nent or Regular Army battalions, reserve or mobilized
militia forces, and border guard troops. The number
of battalions in each category is somewhat flexible;
outlying areas have a higher proportion of reserve
troops, while Managua and northern border regions
may have two regular battalions.