SOUTH KOREA: POLITICS UNDER CHUN DOO HWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03T02547R000100110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
South Korea:
Politics Under
Chun Doo Hwan
Secret
D
Secret
PA 81-10371
September 198/
?py 2 iJ 4
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
South Korea:
Politics Under
Chun Doo Hwan
lrtTormation available as of l5 August 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Office of Political Ana ysis. omments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, East Asia-Pacific Division Office of
Political Analysis,
This paper was coordinated with the Offices of
Economic Research and Strategic Research and
with the National Intelli ence Officer for East Asia-
Pacific.
This assessment was prepared b
25
25
Secret
PA 81-1037/
September /98/
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South Korea:
Politics Under
Chun Doo Hwan
Key Judgments South Korea has entered a period of relative political stability after a year
and a half of uncertainty following the assassination of President Park
Chung Hee. The next year or two will be marked with sporadic antigovern-
ment incidents by disgruntled elements, but-barring any government
misstep-this should pose no serious challenge to Chun Doo Hwan's
regime.
Chun has consolidated his support within the military and recognizes that
his support rests on his successful handling of the nation's problems and re-
maining responsive to the needs of national security and of the military.
His Democratic Justice Party has gained a solid majority in the National
Assembly and will provide a strong base for his political programs. The
National Assembly probably will not be the rubberstamp that Chun would
like it to be, but at least it will not soon become the forum for
antigovernment confrontation that it was in the past. The docile, controlled
mass media and a strong popular yearning for stability-even at the
expense of a liberal democratic system-will help Chun maintain a tight
control over the political process. The political system is likely to remain
substantially the same over the next several years. Politics will be basically
authoritarian, with numerous restrictions on the opposition. Chun will ease
his stringent controls only gradually. He will do so only if he gains
politically and if the opposition does not perceive relaxation as a sign of
weakness.
The rest of 1981 and the first half of 1982 promise to be relatively calm.
Student demonstrations can be expected both this fall and next spring, but
they will be dealt with quickly and forcefully. Succeeding years will be
characterized by a resurgence in demands for democracy and a gradual
revival of partisan wrangling in parliament.
Chun's success in office will hinge mainly on his ability to reduce inflation
and unemployment and revive business confidence in his government.
Recent economic indicators have been encouraging. The resurgence of
exports has paved the way for 6-percent real growth in GNP this year, and
slightly higher rates are attainable in subsequent years. Continued im-
provement in the economy will boost Chun's stock; a deterioration of the
economy would almost certainly lead to a weakening of his popular
support.
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Chun's attitude toward human rights is likely to influence tics with the
United States, in view of the close links between Korean religious and
human rights groups and sympathetic constituencies in the United States.
In managing this and other issues, Chun will use "parliamentary diploma-
cy"-but will avoid the excesses of the Tongsun Park era and will woo
the large Korean emigre population in the United States to lobby for
Korean interests and to enhance his regime's image.
Chun will seek Washington's continued assistance in strengthening Seoul's
diplomatic hand against Pyongyang and in starting a dialogue with China
and the Soviet Union. He also is likely to ask the United States to press Ja-
pan to recognize South Korea's importance for Japanese defense and to
increase economic assistance to South Korea as a quid pro quo for its role
in regional defense.
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South Korea:
Politics Under
Chun Doo Hwan
D
What Chun Doo Hwan calls the "New Era" prob-
ably, in the end, will differ little in either substance or
technique from the old "yusin" (revitalizing) system of
President Park. Chun's rule is highly authoritarian
and restrictive. Chun-like Park-has suppressed po-
litical liberties, tightly controlling criticism of himself
and his government. Although Chun's regime is more
repressive than that of Park, he is likely to ease
present restrictions somewhat as he expands his base
of support and as the economy improves.
Politics in the New Era will reFlect Chun's personal
and flamboyant style of leadership. Chun has im-
pressed many Korean and American observers with
his leadership qualities: ambition and drive, boldness
in action. and the ability to learn quickly.
Chun, moreover, does not tolerate criticism, especially
from political opponents, and he demands absolute President Chun Doo Hwan
loyalty and obedience from his subordinates; these
attributes could detract from his effectiveness.
Governing Bodies
Policy formulation and decisionmaking are highly
centralized in the Blue House st~fJ: Although outsid-
ers are solicited for opinions, the initiative for most
major policies comes from Chun and his young,
retired military advisers, particularly Ho Hwa-pyong,
Ho Sam-su, and Yi Hak-pong, men to whom Chun
has delegated great authority.
The performance of the Blue House staff has been
mixed so far. A number of poorly-thought-out meas-
ures have cost the regime good will. For example, in
hope of diverting student attention on the first anni-
versary of the Kwangju insurrection, the government
held a youth festival in Seoul, which only aroused
student hostility and led to new demonstrations.
Chun's able but inexperienced advisers have been
criticized by both military and civilian officials for
meddling in economic matters where they lack exper-
tise. Moreover, some personal frictions among the
Blue House staff and between them and the Army's
leaders appear to be developing. Because Chun trusts
and is dependent on his ex-military advisers, he will
be reluctant to replace even the less able ones unless
they become serious political liabilities.
One of Chun's concerns will be to avoid becoming
isolated and manipulated by his advisers, as were
Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee. Chun is well
aware of the problem and has taken special pains to
prevent it; he meets large numbers of visitors each day
Nonetheless, the danger exists, and the problem
may become more difficult to manage over time. 25X1
The National Assembly probably will not be the
rubberstamp that Chun would like, but neither will it
soon become the forum for the kind of rough-and-
tumble antigovernment confrontation that it was in
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the past. By promoting a multiparty system, Chun has
succeeded in fragmenting the opposition and in mak-
ing it difficult to challenge the government effective-
ly. Some of the minor parties will attempt to merge to
improve their bargaining position in the parliament,
and many independents are likely to join a party or to
align themselves with one. Strong factional rivalries,
however, will remain, and because the most popular
opposition politicians were either banned from politi-
cal activity or prevented from running for office, the
opposition parties are unlikely to produce a popular
figure with enough charisma to become an effective
spokesman for the antigovernment forces.
given more leeway to his Cabinet than Park, govern-
ment officials appear reluctant to be innovative and
wait for the Blue House to guide them.
The purges and some lingering doubts about Chun's
political durability encourage corruption that could
lead to a loss of public confidence in the government.
Many officials, including Chun's political appointees,
expect to lose their jobs one way or another, and the
temptation to use their positions to accumulate per-
sonal wealth is strong. Chun must stabilize and
reassure the bureaucracy if it is to administer his
programs effectively.
Even though Chun has formally
Chun would prefer to have the National Assembly
project an image of harmony, but he probably will Strengthening the
countenance a feisty opposition as long as it does not Underpinnings of Power
become strident. Chun will attempt to control the Chun's prospects for getting through the next few
lawmakers through a combinati years without serious trouble are good and are en-
and political ressure hanced by a gradually widening base of supporter
So far, e has attempted to win over at least tolerance.
opposition awmakers by consulting with them and
making them feel more a part of the political sys-
tem-something Park failed to do. For their part, the
opposition leaders have done much posturing but have
not attacked the government with the vehemence that
characterized earlier National Assemblies.
The dissatisfaction of many younger opposition politi-
cians with the cozy relationship between their leaders
and the government is almost certain to increase. The
spirit of independence among these younger leaders is
likely to show itself within the next year in attempts to
revise some of the laws passed during the transition
period by the junta-like special legislative committee.
Chun would oppose such efforts, which he views as
undoing his reforms and likely to stimulate opposition
from other social groups.
Chun's widespread purges and the forced retirements
of Park-era officials in the name of generational
change, which have helped consolidate his grip on
power, also demoralized some parts of the bureaucra-
cy, making it less efficient. There is at present a
reluctance to make decisions-ter even to exchange
views freely-for fear of criticism. This is tru v
the Cabinet level
J
First, Chun has gained the reluctant acceptance of the
general public. Many working-class Koreans attri-
bute the long economic recession to the loss of strong
leadership after the assassination of Park and seem
willing to give Chun a chance. So far, the public has
not been willing to support attempts by students and
other dissident groups to foment unrest. Chun, more-
over, continues to make skillful use of the media to
portray an image of himself as an internationally
respected leader, a patriot, and the only person capa-
ble of coping with the country's political and econom-
ic problems. Chun will continue to stress his efforts to
deal with the North Korean threat, in part by pursu-
ing adialogue with Pyongyang.
Chun is also reaping political benefits from his pledge
to clean up corruption in government. He has already
removed ahigh-ranking military officer and had one
of his own relatives investigated for influence ped-
dling. In addition to enhancing his own image, this
kind of purge also is an effective tool for controlling
the political opposition and for removing potential
rivals. The anticorruption campaign is likely to con-
tinue to be one of the main themes of Chun's adminis-
tration, although, as noted earlier, it could prove
counterproductive to the goal of stabilizing the
bureaucracy.
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Second, Chun already has consolidated his power base
in the military, with his friends and supporters occu-
pying key commands. A substantial body of military
opinion is opposed to further Army involvement in
civilian politics, and most senior officers realize that
any attempt to unseat Chun would damage the econo-
my and weaken national security. In the absence of a
serious loss of confidence in Chun, the military is
unlikely to oust him.
By arranging the retirement in July of General No
Tae Woo, Chun's Korean Military Academy class-
mate and a key member of the "core group" that
helped him seize control of the armed forces in
December 1979, Chun removed from the military the
man most able to move against him. Chun probably
will retain his military support as long as he is
successful in handling the broader national prob-
lems-the economy, national security, and political
stability-as well as narrower military concerns, such
as a just system of promotions and assignments,
attractive pay levels, and the maintenance of the
military's social prestige.
Third, Chun also is building a civilian power base; his
newly created Democratic Justice Party (DJP) gained
a solid victory in the National Assembly elections in
March. By winning 90 of 92 constituencies and 61
proportional representation seats-well over half of
the total of 276 seats-the DJP has secured a com-
fortable majority in the legislature. Chun claims that
he wants to make the DJP into a disciplined, ideologi-
cally dedicated, and effective party that will survive
his presidency and act as a counterforce to the Korean
Workers (Communist) Party in North Korea. Despite
the DJP's assertions that it will become an independ-
ent political force, it is more likely to assume the same
role as Park's Democratic Republican Party an
extension of the President and an instrument for
carrying out his policies.
Outlook for
Chun's Opposition
To maintain stability, Chun must contend with a
number of hostile elements-especially student radi-
cals and Christian dissidents who have been further
alienated by his consolidation of power. These groups
deny Chun's legitimacy, viewing him as a usurper
who has derailed progress toward a truly democratic
political system. They are particularly embittered by
the bloody suppression of the Kwangju insurrection
last year. Adding to the frustration of these groups is
their perception that the United States abetted
Chun's takeover and that it is unlikely to intervene to
force Chun to liberalize the system. Although they
realize that there is nothing they can do to remove
him, some nonetheless feel compelled to demonstrate
their opposition.
A small number of radical college students continue
to call for Chun's ouster. They attempted to foment
demonstrations during the spring semester, but effec-
tive government tactics and general student apathy
militated against serious incidents. The new promi-
nence of leftist slogans and issues in student propa-
ganda-including the use of some anti-US themes-
concerns the authorities, as does the perception that
youth in general is growing less hostile toward North
Korea.
Improved planning and the formation of a reported
undergound movement will allow radical student lead-
ers to coordinate better their antigovernment activi-
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5uuth Korea: Voting Statistics for the 11th National
Asscrul~;e l~ lection b~~ Provinct~
UJP -Democratic Justice Party
DKP -Democratic korea Party
'~ 6N('P-Korean 'National Citizens Party
CRP -Civil RiKhts Party
ti~~,~tn
Chungchong
South
Chungchong
North ('holly
South Cholla
v ~>~th
Kyongsang
South
Kyongsang
Cheju
NPP -New Political Party
_J DSP -Democratic Socialist Party
Others
Elegible
Voters
Voting
Rate (%)
5,048,348
63.0
1,803,273
65.3
2,795,272
77.0
947,977
88.2
788,748
87.0
1,613,38]
79.4
1,237,238
80.8
1,996,274
79.7
2,772,236
82.6
1,857,765
84.7
238,956
85.3
ties this fall and next spring. They will seize on issues
of opportunity to foment antigovernment activities,
but they are still unlikely to attract significant student
support. Although the government may remove police
from the campuses in the fall, the security services
will continue to act quickly and decisively to quell any
campus turmoil.
Christian dissident groups, now dormant, will almost
certainly become more strident in their political de-
mands within the next few years. While Chun has
undercut some of the most sensitive issues-by com-
muting Kim Dae Jung's death sentence, granting
clemency for many Kwangju offenders, and releasing
numerous political offenders-some human rights ac-
tivists are pressuring Christian leaders to take a more
aggressive stance.
To lessen this kind of pressure, Chun will periodically
release more political prisoners, perhaps including
Kim Dae Jung himself, who probably would be
permitted to go into exile. Nonetheless, Christian
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groups probably will gradually take up politically
sensitive issues, press for an easing of the restrictions
on prayer meetings and other political gatherings, and
protest against alleged police brutality and torture of
political prisoners. Chun will attempt to control reli-
gious dissidence without infringing on religious liber-
ties, but will do so if necessary to curb dissent.
Reverend Sung Myung Moon's controversial Unifica-
tion Church has the potential for becoming a political
issue, because it is attempting to enlarge its control
over nondenominational Christian churches. This has
aroused the anger of moderate Protestant clergymen,
who see the Unification Church as a tool of the
government. Although Chun probably would like to
take advantage of what many perceive as the church's
anti-Communist orientation and its influence in
Washington, he is aware of the political risks and will
keep his distance.
In addition, several other interest groups will require
careful management by the government:
? The traditionally antigovernment South Korean
press has been effectively neutralized by the restric-
tive Basic Press Law, but it will carefully test the
limits of permissible dissent. The authorities will
move quickly to punish those who exceed these
limits, and there is little prospect of independent
printed and broadcast journalism in the foreseeable
future.
? The victims of Chun's political and bureaucratic
purges clearly harbor resentment toward the re-
gime. Although few in number, they are politically
astute. They are unlikely by themselves to spark the
kind of activity that could lead to serious problems
for the regime, but they could be troublesome in
combination with other groups.
? The deepest, most bitter opposition to Chun is
among the residents of South Cholla Province;
dealing with their hostility will be a continuous
headache for Chun. The government is attempting
to heal the wounds of last year's insurrection pri-
marily through increased economic assistance. An-
other Kwangju incident is unlikely, but students
from Cholla will continue to agitate against Chun
on campuses throughout the country. The people of
Kwangju will remain hostile to Chun, as well as the
United States for its perceived complicity in the
Chun takeover and the Kwangju incident.
Paradoxically, to the extent that Chun is able to
create stability and prosperity, he will obviate the
need for a highly centralized, authoritarian regime,
thus providing a more fertile climate for liberalization
demands. The more successful Chun is, therefore, the
more likely there will be increasing demands for
democracy, a gradual revival of partisan wrangling in
the parliament, and, barring a change in P'yongyang's
present policy, a diminution of the perception of the
North Korean threat especially among the younger
generation which has served as a check on dissent.
Chun probably will run a tighter ship than did Park;
he will "liberalize" in response to popular demands
only gradually, only if there is political gain in it for
him, and only if the process can be handled in such a
way that the opposition would not regard it as a sign
of weakness.
The Economic Dimension
The public expects Chun to solve the country's eco-
nomic woes. The fate of the economy will thus be a
key factor in Chun's ability to maintain popular
confidence in his leadership. He must drastically
reduce last year's 30-percent inflation rate, cut unem-
ployment, and-perhaps most important -convince
the populace there has been improvement.'
The economy itself is sound but highly vulnerable to
and dependent on world economic conditions. Al-
though Seoul's economic planning officials are highly
capable civilian experts, they arc sometimes subjected
to policy pressures from the ex-military advisers in the
Blue House. Military interference in economic mat-
ters last year contributed to a loss of business initia-
tive and to inertia among both businessmen and the
government bureaucracy. Many Korean businessmen
still are suspicious of the Chun government, uncertain
about its future policies, and fearful of more anticor-
ruption purges. So far, the government has refrained
from prosecuting businessmen for fear of further
depressing their entrepreneurial impulses.
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Foreign loans to South Korean substantially im-
proved terms-have increased with the restoration of
political and economic stability. Many foreign com-
panies, however, are backing away from equity ven-
tures, in part because of high labor costs and the
failure of the South Korean bureaucracy actively to
promote foreign investment. Nonetheless, barring se-
rious external shocks such as sharp oil hikes, down-
turns in import demands among Western industrial-
ized states, or serious government missteps on
economic policy, the economy should register 6-per-
cent growth this year and 7 to 8 percent annually for
the next five years.
Although the economy has begun to recover, inflation
is still high and low income groups are finding it
increasingly hard to cope. Until the average Korean
feels improvement in the economic situation, the
Chun regime will face a potential threat of labor
unrest. Unions are weak and disorganized, seemingly
acquiescing to government measures that have re-
duced their influence. Many workers are unhappy
over government guidelines limiting wage increases
and over the inability of some employers to meet
payrolls. To help control inflation and to make South
Korean industry competitive internationally, workers
have generally agreed to smaller wage increases in
expectation of larger hikes when the economy im-
proves. Meanwhile, the government has averted seri-
ous labor disputes through the use of labor-manage-
ment councils and government arbitration.
Workers may be less willing to make sacrifices next
year when the economy is moving forward, and they
may become more politically active if the government
is not more sympathetic to their needs. An unexpected
downturn in the economy would pose even greater
problems. In particular, the authorities worry that
disgruntled workers might ally themselves with radi-
cal students. In Pusan and Masan in October 1979,
large numbers of disaffected workers joined student
demonstrations against the government, turning them
into riots that led to the imposition of martial law in
those areas.
Succession Questions
The question of succession will remain an important
latent issue throughout Chun's presidential term.
Chun repeatedly has promised to step down after his
seven-year term and to turn over power peacefully. [n
South Korea, where political power has never yet
changed hands in this way, such a move would make
Chun a great patriot-a prospect that would have
strong appeal for him.
Many Koreans, however, doubt that Chun will step
down voluntarily. They see him as following the path
of Syngman Rhee in 1954 and Park Chung Hee in
1972, when they swept aside constitutionally mandat-
ed procedures and stayed in office. Students and
intellectuals especially distrust Chun's intentions, but
the general public-and some in the military-also
would bitterly oppose any move by Chun to prolong
his rule. While Chun may be sincere in his promise to
step down in seven years, he will be under great
pressure from many of his supporters to remain in
power.
The American Connection
Chun's domestic policy will focus on social reforms,
anticorruption drives, the management of dissent,
economic growth, and personal image building. Chun
will be watching to see how his policies are assessed in
Washington, since careful handling of internal politi-
cal and economic issues will smooth his relations with
the United States, and warm relations with Washing-
ton in turn will strengthen further his political posi-
tion at home.
In particular, Chun's handling of the problem of
human rights over the next few years is likely to have
a great impact on ties with the United States, given
the close ties between Korean religious and human
rights groups and sympathetic constituencies in the
United States. In managing this and other issues,
Chun will use "parliamentary diplomacy"-but will
avoid the excesses of the Tongsun Park era-and will
woo the large Korean emigre population in the United
States to lobby for Korean interests and to enhance
his regime's image.
Some minor problems in the area of US military
support levels, sales of US-licensed arms to third
countries, and trade quotas for South Korean prod-
ucts are almost certain to crop up in the next several
years, but they should not disturb the alliance or
create major domestic political problems for Chun.
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Chun believes that the United States places a high
value on its alliance with South Korea and the role of
South Korea in Northeast Asian regional defense. He
will, therefore, seek Washington's continued assist-
ance in strengthening South Korea's diplomatic hand
against North Korea, in blunting P'yongyang's diplo-
matic offensives, and in undercutting Kim Il-song's
unification proposals. He will ask Washington not to
expand its economic or political contacts with Pyong-
yang and will continue to seek US support and
assistance for South Korean efforts to start a dialogue
with China and the Soviet Union-P'yongyang's prin-
cipal backers. Finally, Chun is likely to ask the United
States to use its influence to press Tokyo to recognize
South Korea's contribution to Japan's defenses and to
increase economic assistance as a quid pro quo for
Seoul's role in regional defense.
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Secret
Secret