THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S SIXTH PLENUM: DENG FIRMS HIS GRIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03T02547R000100100001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
The Chinese Communist
Party's Sixth Plenum:
Deng Firms His Grip
Secret
EA 81-10014
November 1981
Copy 19 0
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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Party's Sixth Plenum:
The Chinese Communist
Deng Firms His Grip
Information available as of 15 August 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared b
of the China Internal Division of the
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief China
Internal Division, OEA,
This paper was coordinated with the former Offices of
Strategic Research and Economic Research, and with
the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia.
25
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Secret
EA 81-10014
November 1981
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The Chinese Communist
Party's Sixth Plenum:
Deng Firms His Gri
Key Judgments Deng Xiaoping's attempt to ensure political stability and the continuation
of his reformist policies after he dies made a major advance in June at the
Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's 11th Central Committee,
when Deng and his followers strengthened their grip on party power. As a
central element in this effort, Hua Guofeng was replaced as party
Chairman by Deng's longtime protege, Hu Yaobang.
The plenum produced a "Resolution" on party history that criticizes Mao
Zedong and ideologically supports the pragmatic approach Deng and his
allies have taken in revamping the party line. To obtain the party's
endorsement of the Resolution, Deng steered a middle course between the
demands of uncritical Mao loyalists and the extreme condemnations urged
by some in Deng's wing of the party. The result amounts to a document
that will remain open to interpretation.
The victory of Deng and his reform group was delayed six months by
economic and social problems that emerged late last year. These troubles
provoked a strong political reaction that emboldened critics of Deng's
plans. Through a delicate combination of compromise, careful timing, and
political craftiness, however, Deng succeeded in placating his formidable
opponents with comparatively minor gestures while scoring lasting gains.
The most visible price of Deng's success was acceptance of the arguments
of those, particularly in the military, who were alarmed over the unforeseen
consequences of the party's drift toward pragmatism. Deng yielded to
hardline sentiment on questions of social order and the need for "spiritual"
exhortation as well as "material" incentives to motivate the populace.
In order to deal with disgruntled elements in the military, Deng was also
forced to take over chairmanship of the party's Military Commission only a
year after voluntarily giving up his position as chief of staff. Before the ple-
num, Deng successfully pressed the Army to accept his choice for Minister
of Defense and the second budget cut in less than a year, but he could not
arrange for Hu Yaobang to succeed Hua Guofeng as Chairman of the
Military Commission.
Moreover, the difficulties encountered in building a consensus for the
plenum led to delays and confusion in implementing the reforms Deng's
supporters had launched with great fanfare last fall. Mixed signals
adversely affected economic performance as lower level officials waited for
the leadership to sort out its priorities.
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November 198/
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In foreign affairs, the plenum reaffirmed China's anti-Soviet foreign
policy. It also approved a new, more nationalistic line that demonstrated
particular sensitivity over the Taiwan issue.
Deng and his allies are in a race against time to demonstrate the success of
their reforms. They still face resistance in the party and Army from
numerous officeholders who gained their positions during Mao's Cultural
Revolution. Hu, moreover, is personally unpopular among segments of the
Army and populace. Despite the gains made at the plenum, this opposition
could still provoke a confrontation that might frustrate achievement of
Deng's goals.
Before the 12th Party Congress next year, Deng and his allies will seek to
consolidate their gains further, although with a caution nurtured in the six
months of delicate politicking that led to the Sixth Plenum.
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The Chinese Communist
Party's Sixth Plenum:
Deng Firms His Gri
Introduction
The Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's
1 1 th Central Committee, held 27-29 June, has further
strengthened Deng Xiaoping and his reformist allies
in their continuing struggle with well-entrenched left-
ist and orthodox elements in the party and military.
Deng's approach to the plenum was marked by a
combination of compromise, careful timing, and po-
litical craftiness-tactics that enabled him to score
important gains in key appointments and ideology
while placating his formidable opponents with com-
paratively less significant concessions.
After an enlarged Politburo meeting in May and an
expanded work conference of the Central Committee
in mid-June, the Sixth Plenum "unanimously"
endorsed:
? Promotion of Deng's longtime protege Hu Yaobang
to the party chairmanship.
? Demotion in disgrace of former Chairman Hua
Guofeng to the most junior vice chairmanship.
? Appointment of Deng Xiaoping as Chairman of the
party's Military Commission.
? Promotion of Premier Zhao Ziyang to fourth-rank-
ing position on the Politburo Standing Committee.
? "The Resolution on Certain Questions in the Histo-
ry of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's
Republic of China," a document that both praised
and criticized Mao Zedong.
? Appointment of Deng-loyalist Xi Zhon xun to part
secretary in charge of legal affairs.
The Campaign Against Hua
The changes in personnel announced at the Sixth
Plenum cap the five-year effort by Deng and his
supporters to remold the party's top leadership. Oust-
ing Hua Guofeng from the three important posts he
obtained just before and after Mao Zedong's death
remained Deng's key objective all along; by removing
Hua as Premier, Chairman of the party Central
Committee, and Chairman of the party Military
Commission, Deng has positioned his followers to
prepare an eventual succession to Deng's authority in
order to ensure the continuity of his policies.
Deng has used "salami tactics" to achieve his ends
against tremendous odds. At the watershed Third
Plenum in December 1978, he arranged to have the
party declare an end to the period of large-scale "class
struggle," thus effectively rewriting the ideology un-
derpinning the position of Hua Guofeng and other
beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. At the same
time, Deng succeeded in adding four members to the
Politburo, including the independent-minded veteran
leader and Vice Chairman Chen Yun, who has proved
a major Deng ally at crucial moments, and Hu
Yaobang, who assumed the powerful positions of 25
party secretary general and director of the Propagan-
da Department
Deng again advanced the positions of his followers at
the Fourth and Fifth Plenums in 1979 and 1980. In
1980, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang moved onto the
Politburo Standing Committee, the most powerful
body in the party. The reformers weakened Hua's
position by removing from the Politburo four left-
leaning beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. The
party's reestablishment of the party Secretariat, de-
stroyed during the Cultural Revolution, and the selec-
tion of General Secretary Hu Yaobang as its head
also sharpl limited Hua's role in the party's day-to-
day work.
Hua's slide accelerated in September 1980 when the
Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress
approved Zhao Ziyang as Premier in place of Hua.
Three months later the Politburo-after meeting for
nine sessions-decided to remove Hua from the chair-
manships of the party and its Military Commission.
In his stead, Hu Yaobang was chosen to be party
chairman.
By late December 1980, it appeared that Deng had
effectively cut Hua out of the leadership
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Deng Xiaoping, China's domi-
nant political figure, and his
heir apparent, new party Chair-
man Hu Yaobang at the Sixth
Plenu
A central work conference was
set for late December, and its agenda was widely
expected to deal with Hua, as well as to approve a
critical assessment of Mao Zedong intended to shed
the party of his radical ideological legacy.
The December Work Conference-A Very Cold Wind
By the standard that Deng prizes most-the place-
ment of his people in key jobs-the December work
conference of the Central Committee was a qualified
success, but his moves provoked a strong reaction that
was reinforced by broader problems in the economy
and society. Deng's game plan for the work confer-
ence went awry when the meeting unexpectedly fo-
cused on the economy. Essentially, Deng's opponents
sensed his weakness on economic and social issues.
Deng's earlier moves against Hua had already made
the political climate surrounding the conference tense.
The stakes were high; Cultural Revolution holdovers
believed that Deng's seizure of the levers of control
would ultimately lead to their political eclipse. Just as
important, orthodox party leaders who were alarmed
by the disarray in Poland because of the experiment
with reform were inclined to slow the pace of change
to avoid similar disorders. Finally, the trial of the
Gang of Four-then under way-had sharpened dif-
ferences within the party over the legacy of Mao,
whose name was dragged into the courtroom defense
by his widow Jiang Qing despite the regime's elabo-
rate measures to prevent that occurrence.
On the face of it, the decision to stress economic
readjustment in December was a setback for Deng,
who had launched his ambitious reform program only
a few months earlier. Even so, Deng and the reform-
ers, who won the support of Chen Yun on economic
questions, were able to cushion their acceptance of
some responsibility for exacerbating the economy's
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difficulties by blaming China's longtime economic
planners for the fundamental problems of the econo-
my. Indeed, Deng and his group took the offensive
against their critics by charging them with "left
deviationism." Party Vice Chairman Li Xiannian and
the "petroleum faction," so called because of its grip
larly vulnerable on this score-a weakness evident
albeit not eliminate, their power.
In spite of the strong political shudder sent through
China by the work conference, Deng came out ahead.
Hua had been relieved of all but
the ceremoma responsibilities of the party chairman-
ship. Hu Yaobang was to assume his duties until the
Sixth Plenum formalized the change; Deng Xiaoping
took over the Military Commission's work.
The price of Deng's success was acceptance of some of
the arguments of those, particularly in the military,
who were alarmed over unforeseen cgriseauences of
the party's drift toward pragmatism
The results of the conference, moreover, affected
Deng's policy goals directly by endorsing the stringent
cutbacks in investment and delays in implementing
economic reforms that had been mandated earlier by
the Politburo
China's economic circumstances clearly added weight
to the political pressures on Deng and the reformers to
go along with the orthodox policies of the central work
inflation on the previous Chinese regime, news that
inflation rates ran 10-15 percent late last year
since they included the newly established bonuses that
were an integral though frequently mishandled part of
the policy of "material incentives." The effect of
shocked the party leadership into endorsing drastic
cuts in state expenditures. The cuts carried political
consequences for Deng's economic reform program,
reducing spending on capital construction and closing
inefficient factories also promised to add to the
regime's already serious unemployment problem-a
prospect that entailed the need to consider new meas-
ures to maintain social order.
The turnabouts in reform policy and in the top party
leadership evoked strong reactions. Liberal elements
in the Chinese political spectrum felt sold out because
of the reduced emphasis on reform of party, state, and
economic structures and the inroads into material
incentives by hoary appeals for self-sacrifice. Left-
leaning and orthodox opinion objected to the bum's
rush treatment of Hua Guofeng, particularly in the
face of the credit accorded him in helping to oust the
Gang of Four in 1976. These groups also sensed that 25
they could exploit an apparently fragile leadership
consensus to roll back even more of Deng's pragmatic
initiatives since the Third Plenum, including criticism
of Mao, cadre rectification, and the dismantling of the 25
commune system. 25
Trouble With Hua Guofeng
The Sixth Plenum eventually confirmed Hua Guo-
feng's fall from grace, but only after more than six
months of wrangling. Crosscurrents in the Chinese 2
media about Hua's removal as the party Chairman
during the December work conference suggest that
Deng was compelled to push hard against resistance
from Hua's supporters. The specific circumstances
behind Deng's trouble with Hua remain unclear, but 25
it appears that Hua changed his mind in December
and decided not to cooperate in his own ouster.
According to the Hong Kong leftist press, Hua openly
displayed his unhappiness through his refusal to at-
tend public ceremonies intended to demonstrate lead-
ership "unity." In the Chinese political culture a
withdrawal of this sort amounts to a call for political
support. The specific rationale behind Hua's move is
unknown, although it seems likely that he wanted to
use his remaining leverage to bargain for power and
status in his reduced role as a vice chairman
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China's jive most active top
leaders chatting informally
during the plenum.
Pictured are Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Li Xiannian,
and Zhao Ziyang. This picture seems intended to convey a
collegial atmosphere in the Politburo's standing committee. Miss-
ranking leader Ye Jianying, elements in the People's
Liberation Army (PLA), and lower level cadres who
profited from the Cultural Revolution. As Mao's
ostensible heir, Hua was the rallying point for those
threatened by Deng and his policies. Public appear-
ances by Hua in his capacity as chairman on two
occasions during 1981 seemed to signal an under-
standing with his enemies over his fate, and there
were anomalies in the media that suggested he would
be demoted. Some stories recounted wrangling over
plenum asserted that notwithstanding his contribution
to the arrest of the Gang of Four-a principal point
offered by Hua's supporters-Hua had:
? Promoted the erroneous "two whatevers," a code-
phrase for uncritically upholding whatever Mao said
or did.
Tried to suppress discussion of the "criterion of
truth," Deng's main ideological theme.
Obstructed the rehabilitation of veteran cadres and
the reversal of previous political errors, including
treatment of the Tiananmen incident in 1976 that
toppled Deng.
Shared responsibility for an overambitious economic
the ranking Hua would receive as vice chairman even
as late as the preplenum work conference in June=
While some in Deng's group may have tried to force
Hua all the way out of the party's senior ranks, at no
point did Deng appear to seek Hua's complete ouster
from the top leadership. Whatever Hua hoped to
obtain from his maneuvering, in the end he lost big.
The original agreement to reduce him to vice chair-
man held, and he reportedly retains no real power as
number seven-the last-on the Politburo Standing
Committee. Moreover, the Sixth Plenum's Resolu-
tion, which was used by Deng's forces to place Hua's
past errors on record with those of Mao himself, has
left Hua with only a veneer of respectability. The
policy in 1976-78.
The Resolution concluded: "Obviously under his lead-
ership it is impossible to correct left errors within the
party, and all the more impossible to restore the
party's fine traditions." Permitted to decide for him-
self whether to make a self-criticism, Hua reluctantly
made a brief statement that fell short of a full self-
criticism during the preplenum work conference.
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Ye Jianying, who was unable to
attend the entire plenum ses-
sion, is pictured seated, receiv-
ing Politburo members Deng
Yingchao, the widow o Zhou
Enlai, and Peng Zhen.
Hua's Fate and Ye Jianying:
The Old Marshal's Last Stand
The views and actions of senior party Vice Chairman
Ye Jianying, de facto head of state as Chairman of
the National People's Congress Standing Committee
and an "old marshal" held in perhaps the highest
esteem by the military, complicated the infighting
over Hua's fate and helped drag out the process of
demoting him. After participating in the November-
December 1980 Politburo meetings that originally
decided on Hua's removal, Ye returned to his native
southern China, ostensibly to escape the cold northern
winter as he has for years. The timing of Ye's
departure and his subsequent public behavior, how-
ever, suggested that the old man was unhappy about
both the treatment of Hua and Den 's rogressive de-
Maoization
Ye has repeatedly absented himself from Politburo
activity to protest and signal his disagreement with
party decisions-an action even taken to demonstrate
support for Deng Xiaoping in 1976. Given Ye's great
prestige and network of supporters particularly in the
Army, he is not a man Deng can afford to defy
directly. Deng and his allies have, therefore, learned
to work around Ye during his absences, albeit at least
seeking his acquiescence in key decisions. In 1980, for
example, Ye's unhappiness over the rehabilitation of
former President Liu Shaoqi led to a delay of several
months in the formal ceremonies, which Ye ultimate-
ly did not attend.
The removal of Hua from the chairmanship seems to
have similarly rankled Ye. Although the party has
circulated documents including Ye's lukewarm en-
dorsement of decisions reached at the plenum, the fact
that the vice chairman missed public appearances
with the entire leadership denied Deng and his allies
the claim that the party was united behind their
Moreover, it is likely that Hua will benefit from Ye's
protection as long as the "old marshal" lives. Ye gave 2
Hua's own personality cult its first boost in 1976, and
he supported Hua's contention that Mao had selected
him to run the country's affairs. The relationship
between Ye and Hua and their clear linkage to the
cult of Mao make the two men the most important,
though visibly declining, obstacles in the top leader-
ship to Deng and the reformers 2
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Politburo standing committee, arranged in no particular order,
Hua Guofen is in the nominally lowest ranking position at the
extreme lelft.
The Military Speaks Up
Ever since the All Army Political Work Conference in
April 1980, elements within the Army leadership have
Since taking over the Military Commission from Hua
in January, Deng has tried to tackle the military's
complaints while pressing his campaign to modernize
expressed grave reservations-born of the military's and depoliticize the armed forces. Deng's main em-
loyalty to Mao and its leftist indoctrination-about phasis has, however, remained on his own policy goals.
the direction in which Deng was leading the party. He succeeded in forcing his choice for Defense Minis-
At the conference, both Hua and Army General
Political Department Director Wei Guoqing ex-
pressed misgivings about the use of material incen-
tives, since soldiers, who do not ordinarily produce
saleable goods and services, were unlikely to share in
such benefits. Numerous press reports have subse-
quently described the party's efforts to reassure sol-
diers that the dismantling of the commune system
would not cause disproportionate hardships for mili-
tary families. The subject remains sensitive, however,
and directions have been issued to ensure that local
pendents, who were previously looked after by the
communes. Years of political indoctrination centered
on Mao have made the military a bastion of Maoism.
In addition, many soldiers are concerned that Deng's
reduction in force and push for upgrading of skills
within the People's Liberation Army will mean de-
mobilization and a return to the hard life of the
countryside
ter, Geng Biao, on reluctant senior officers. The PLA
was required to accept a major budget cut in Febru-
ary, only six months after unhappily agreeing to a
13-percent reduction in its budget. He has also over-
seen a new large troop demobilization and the estab-
lishment of new, higher recruitment standards. Pres-
sure, meanwhile, is growing on disgruntled senior
officers to retire.
Deng's tactics in implementing his policies highlight
the importance and difficulty of the tasks. As a case
in point, he has taken on the job of Military Commis-
sion chairman himself despite his oft-stated intention
tional provision according the job to the party chair-
man. There are also signs that Deng is attempting to
impose an intermediate level of governmental control
between the PLA's top ranks and the party leaders
in effect, a buffer that would depoliticize and stabilize
the Army's links to the party. Prior to the Sixth
 Plenum, for example, the National People's Congress
Standing Committee issued instructions on military
discipline, a function long reserved to the military's
political commissars.
For his part, Deng has enlisted Hu Yaobang in the
effort to find some modus vivendi with the military.
Because Hu's reformist zeal has made him personally
unpopular in Army ranks-a factor that may well
have prevented his selection as the Military Commis-
sion chairman-he has in recent months made several
overtures to the military.
Deng's push to remove Hua was designed in part to
give Hu Yaobang time in the job to build a personal
following within the military under Deng's protection.
Hu's success with the Army will be a key indicator of
his staying power. 1 -1
Despite Deng's hard-won victories in dealing with
military opponents, his problems are still not over.
Army General Political Department Director and
Politburo member Wei Guoqing, for example, has
assumed a spokesman's role for left-leaning officials
who are concerned with the activities of dissident
intellectuals. Wei, who apparently supported both
Hua and a kinder verdict on Mao, will likely become a
rallying point for some of Deng's opponents. Indeed,
media articles suggest that some members of the
military are unwilling to accept the Resolution's
judgment on Hua despite an intense propaganda
effort to build support for the document's conclusions.
The Resolution on Party History
"The Resolution on Certain Historical Questions"
stands alongside Hu Yaobang's promotion as one of
the major products of the Sixth Plenum. After 15
months of argument and compromise, the plenum
endorsed a document that ideologically supports
Deng's pragmatic approach through a revamped party
line. The Resolution also provides a new political
baseline for the reformers' use in making future
changes in policy and personnel
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Mao's own leftist mistakes constitute the heart of the
Resolution's critique. The document handles the sen-
sitive issue of Mao's role by weighing his achieve-
ments through the mid-1950s against his later fail-
ures-a format in accord with Deng Xiaoping's public
statements that Mao's contributions are greater than
Wei Guoqing, Politburo member and director of
the Army's General Political Department, at the
Sixth Plenum.
The Resolution sharply repudiates the legacy of Mao
Zedong's later years, the Cultural Revolution, and
other aspects of party history that form the basis of
leftist critiques of current policies. It does, however,
carefully preserve enough of Mao's reputation to
prevent a sweeping condemnation that could under-
mine the regime's legitimacy. The Resolution ad-
dresses sensitive-and heretofore avoided-periods in
the party's past and makes definitive judgment on
them. It also presents a credible but highly critical
evaluation of the party's history long sought by
moderates within the party and intellectuals outside
it.
Leftists are the clear losers in the document. The
Resolution scores "leftism" as a deviation from Marx-
ism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and details
leftist errors in economics and politics during the
Great Leap Forward, the 1960-62 "period of natural
disasters," and the Cultural Revolution. The assess-
ment declares that leftism undermined the morale of
the party and led to the eclipse of party traditions like
democratic centralism. Finally, the Resolution repudi-
ates the leftist line of the Ninth, 10th, and 1 1 th
Congresses
his errors.
The Resolution nonetheless is firm in its condemna-
tion of Mao's later years. The document asserts that
Mao began to stray from the mainstream of the party
and his own principles after the benchmark Eighth
Party Congress in 1956, which established policies
that closely resemble those of today's leaders. In the
process, it criticized Mao for failing to heed the
Congress' decision to concentrate on economic devel-
opment. The document acknowledges, for the first
time, that Mao initiated the disastrous Cultural Revo-
lution. In attacking Mao's personal leadership style-
something orthodox leaders had lobbied against-the
Resolution echoes the sentiments earlier expressed by
Deng and asserts that in his later years Mao was
unable to correct his errors.
The Resolution presents a positive, upbeat view of the
party's future, praising Deng Xiaoping by name. It
heartily approves of post-Third Plenum policies and
argues that the party has put the Cultural Revolution
behind it and is a healthy and vital institution capable
of modernizing the country. In this respect, the
document emphasizes political unity, collective lead-
ership, and limited democracy.
Deng's political skill was vital in steering the docu-
ment through the plenum debate. Argument was
apparently prolonged by considerable disagreement
over the 1958-65 period, when many who are in power
today, including Deng himself, acquiesced in Mao's
early leftist policies. Deng engineered a face-saving
compromise that shared blame for the errors of that
period and thereby overcame obstacles to a final
draft. Deng probably had to restrain his own support-
ers who pushed for removal of all references to Mao
or his thought in books and public places, threatening
to unhorse the hard-won compromise
Controversy lingers despite the air of finality that
surrounds the Resolution. Both the document's ideo-
logical findings and its treatment of Mao will remain
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On the early Mao: Our party and people would have
had to grope in the dark much longer had it not been
for Comrade Mao Zedong, who more than once
rescued the Chinese Revolution from grave
danger....
On the later Mao: While making serious mistakes, he
repeatedly urged the whole party to study the works
of Marx, Engels, and Lenin conscientiously and
imagined that his theory and practice were Marxist
and that they were essential for the consolidation of
the dictatorship of the proletariat. Herein lies his
tragedy.
On the Cultural Revolution: History has shown that
the Cultural Revolution, initiated by a leader labor-
ing under a misapprehension and capitalized on by
counterrevolutionary cliques, led by domestic turmoil
and brought catastrophe to the party, the state, and
the whole people.
-Chief responsibility for the grave "left" error of the
Cultural Revolution, an error comprehensive in mag-
nitude and protracted in duration, does indeed lie
with Comrade Mao Zedong.
Theses of the Cultural Revolution: They were incor-
porated into a general theory-the "theory of contin-
ued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat" -which then took on a specific meaning. These
erroneous "left" theses, upon which Comrade Mao
Zedong based himself in initiating the "Cultural
Revolution," were obviously inconsistent with the
system of Mao Zedong Thought, which is the integra-
tion of the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism
with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.
These theses must be thoroughly distinguished from
Mao Zedong Thought.
On the removal of Hua as party Chairman: Obvious-
ly, under his leadership it is impossible to correct
"left" errors within the party, and all the more
impossible to restore the party's fine traditions.
On Deng and the Tiananmen Incident: In April of the
same year (1976), a powerful movement of protest
signaled by the Tiananmen Incident swept the whole
country, a movement to mourn for the late Premier
Zhou Enlai and oppose the Gang of Four. In essence,
the movement was a demonstration of supportfor the
party's correct leadership as represented by Deng
Xiaoping.
controversial. On the one hand, conservatives and
elements in the PLA are unhappy with the negative
assessment of much of the party's recent history. On
the other, intellectuals, one of the major audiences for
the Resolution, may not accept its distinctions be-
tween Mao and the Gang of Four or between Mao
and the party. For many, Mao was the party, and the
party still remains deeply suspect.
Because of its complexity, length, and calculated
ambiguity on specific issues, the Resolution remains
open to interpretation. Each faction withi
and the Army will twist it to its own ends
There are indica-
tions already that the military is focusing primarily on
the document's praise of Mao Zedong. The party has
urged the people to restrain their impulse to use the
document to settle old scores, but such appeals ma
not be effective. 25
United States
Foreign Policy Implications: 25,
China Stiffens Its Posture
Both the Resolution and Hu Yaobang's speech on
1 July commemorating the party's 60th anniversary
contain a conventional reiteration of Beijing's anti-
Soviet foreign policy. They also display a new, more 25X
assertively nationalistic line, particularly a sensitivity 25X
to the Taiwan issue, with obvious implications for the
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The Resolution declared that "we must maintain our Party Rectification. Remolding the party member-
own national dignity and confidence and there must ship to reflect the regime's new pragmatic policies is
be no slavishness or submissiveness in any form in high on the reformers' agenda. Rectification has so
dealing with big, powerful, or rich countries." In Hu's far been discussed in moderate terms, emphasizing to
speech, similar language was juxtaposed to a call for wayward cadre that their acceptance of and support
"reunification" with Taiwan. Since the plenum, Bei- for the new policies will protect them from a purge. In
jing has published a series of critical articles dealing this regard, Hua Guofeng's retention in the leadership
with the Taiwan Relations Act. These reject what the is designed to encourage cooperation. Hu Yaobang's
Chinese see as attempts by some in the United States party anniversary speech and a People's Daily article
to use the Act to introduce "officiality" into relations by the director of the party's organization depart-
with Taiwan. Moreover, new and prominent articles ment, however, hint that the reformers will keep the
have extolled various historical figures for their "prin- pressure on by steadily adding new members, loyal to
cipled" stand in dealing with foreign countries] them, as a first step in reshaping the party
Prospects
Since the 11th Party Congress in 1977, Deng Xiao-
ping has steadily consolidated his position despite a
Politburo and Central Committee that were initially
stacked against him. Deng's need to court those
bodies frequently has forced modifications in his
policies and slowed his effort to place his followers in
secure positions to succeed him; it has not, however,
stalled his political momentum. By tailoring policies
to accommodate the sensitivities about signs of social
disorder,and acting to remedy shortcomings in eco-
nomic policy, Deng has kept the political initiative in
his hands.
Like Deng's tactics after the Third Plenum, the
tentatively scheduled for early next year-are likely
to bring a revived political offensive by the reformers.
opposition in the Politburo, push for reforms, and
prepare a campaign to neutralize left-leaning cadres
reformers are likely to continue the more cautious
approach that has been evident in their attempt to
rebuild the leadership consensus since the reverses of
and bolster the gains already made may slow efforts
in government, party, and economic institutions.
Still, the reformers appear to have an agenda-
largely hidden-for eventual changes that they be-
lieve are required to prevent a return to political and
economic disruption
The Economy. As in the last six months, troubles over
economic policy will continue to cloud the political
future. The leadership needs concrete economic plans
that will mesh with the plenum's endorsement of the
break with past economic policy and buoy its sagging
image among the Chinese people. Debate nevertheless
persists over the relative weight to assign to readjust-
ment and reform; powerful figures who favor central
planning and heavy industry remain in key positions
where they have repeatedly obstructed the reformers'
attempts to redirect the economy. Given the political-
ly costly false starts and mixed signals that have
plagued the economy so far, Deng's coalition will try
to use its success at the plenum to forge a working
consensus on economic policy.l
"Institutional Reform. " Deng and his allies see the
party's efforts to reform itself and the government as
the keys to long-term stability. The reformers' public
line repeatedly emphasizes that China's institutions
must change to prevent backsliding toward the pat-
terns of personal rule, which led to Mao's errors.
Premier Zhao Ziyang is likely to take the lead in this
area. By promoting him ahead of more senior leaders,
the plenum removed the cloud that had hung over
Zhao and his reform program since last winter, when
readjustment was stressed over reform
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The Politburo, the State Chairman, and the General
Secretary. Deng and the reformers want to continue
reshaping the Politburo and Secretariat with more
youthful and knowledgeable leaders like Hu and
Zhao. To that end, the reformers have so far unsuc-
cessfully attempted to form a senior Advisory Council
of the Politburo, where superannuated members could
be retired. While the reformers' have nudged several
elderly members, who in principle have surrendered
some of their government jobs, into accepting advisory
status, the effort has foundered on Ye Jianying's
unwillingness to yield his position. Ye realizes that he
is frequently the only serious obstacle to many of
Deng's ambitions, including the demotion of Hua. At
83 years and in failing health, Ye is probably viewed
by Deng and others as a problem that time, rather
than action, will solve
The reformers' intention to recreate an official head-
of-state position is less clear. The issue prompts
concern among those who stand to lose in any redis-
tribution of power within the leadership. Articles in
legal journals have argued the pros and cons in recent
months; Soong Ching-ling was made honorary head of
state on her deathbed in May. Here again Ye Jian-
ying's refusal to step into retirement appears to be the
principal impediment, since he still is de facto head of
state.
Finally, the Sixth Plenum's failure to appoint a party
general secretary to succeed Hu Yaobang leaves
another ambiguity. Hu has not been publicly identi-
fied as general secretary, although he reportedly
retains the title since his promotion to chairman.
Immediately before the Sixth Plenum, Xi Zhongxun
appeared to be the candidate of Deng and Hu for the
general secretary position. According to the Hong
Kong leftist press, however, other leaders objected
because Xi lacked experience on the Secretariat. He
may well be nominated for the post again at a later
plenum. Meanwhile, he is in charge of legal affairs
and is maintaining a high level of appearances,
consistent with candidacy for the higher post
As a new and untested chairman, Hu is confronted
with a more complex task than before, a fact that is
likely to make him move more cautiously. He must
extract results from a recalcitrant economy that will
justify his pragmatic approach to the younger genera-
tions of Chinese steeped in Maoism. He needs to
continue the reforms he has started but not at the
expense of alarming his critics into a unified opposi- 25
tion. Changing roles, moreover, has made him more a
spokesman for the regime than its critic. Recognizing
the widespread skepticism about his promotion, Hu
now stresses reliance on the guidance of the older
generation of leaders, especially Deng
Despite these inhibitions, however, Hu realizes that he
must use the next few years under Deng's protection
to build the political influence that will prevent him
from becoming, like Hua, another transitional figure
in the next Chinese succession struggle. Although the 25
party repeatedly appeals for new democratic methods,
the time-tested method for dealing with the o osition
is a ruthless and persistent purge.
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