THE QUAINTNESS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: ITS ORIGIN, THEORY, AND PROBLEMS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Release Date: April 19, 2012
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THOMAS F. TROY
The Quaintness of the U.S.
Intelligence Community: Its
Origin, Theory, and Problems
Once upon a time there was no "Intelligence Community" in the United
States. Suddenly there appeared an "Intelligence Community." Today we
have the "U.S. Intelligence Community."
When first heard by insiders familiar with the secret, secretive, and frac-
tious members of this so-called community, the name caused them to
snicker. Later. American historian Henry Steele Commager thought the
community "quaintly" named.1 British scholar Zara Steiner, discussing the
British community - the term having become internationalized - said the
name suggests "harmonious interplay between agencies and government
control." She called it "a velvety term" that might be "quite misleading."2
Ms. Steiner and many others have probably also wondered when, how,
and why such a name ever came into use. Perhaps they even wondered
whether it referred to anything more than a polite fiction or a pious hope.
Possibly the continued unexamined use of the term actually masked the
Achilles heel of American intelligence.
Perhaps these questions have never been asked before because the so-
called community's best known member, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), has been the cynosure of all eyes, both friendly and hostile, and has
by force of events shaped and monopolized the writing of contemporary
American intelligence history. Perhaps we would find revealing approaching
this history from a different perspective; that of the Intelligence Community
(IC).
Thomas F. Troy, a CM veteran, is the author of Donovan and the CIA: A
History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES THAT GREW AND GREW
Again, once upon a time there was no "Intelligence Community" in the
United States. Of course, intelligence existed - whenever men or peoples are
in conflict, there is intelligence, however unrefined it may be. But the intelli-
gence services that existed were ephemeral - wartime utilities such as
General George Washington's clandestine New York "Culper" spy ring in the
American Revolution. General Winfield Scott's "Spy Company" in the Mexi-
can War and Lafayette Baker's self-described, inflated U.S. 'Secret Service
Bureau in the Civil War. But for half of U.S. history since its founding, no
permanently established intelligence organization existed. But in time they
came, one by one, like so many Topsys.?
They first appeared in the military services. These, in tandem with their
European counterparts in the nineteenth century, gave the word "intelli-
gence" its modern meaning and organizational growth. The first to do so in
the U.S. was the Navy, which established the Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) in the Bureau of Navigation in 1882. ONI, always fated to fight for
function, money, and status, moved ahead in 1915 when it was made sub-
ordinate to the new Chief of Naval Operations.
By 1885 the U.S. Army, not to be outdone by the Navy, set up its intelli-
gence service, the Division of Military Information, which was established in
the Military Reservations Division of the Miscellaneous Branch of the
Adjutant General's Office. From this lowly beginning it became by the end
of. the Great War the Military Intelligence Division (MID), also known as
G-2, one of four divisions in the War Department General Staff. By 1939,
G-2 and ONI thought they had firm control of intelligence as a military and
naval preserve.
By this time, they had also formed a pragmatic alliance with another
"Topsy," the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Originally named the
Bureau of Investigation, the FBI had been established in the Department of
Justice in 1908 because of the department's need to have its own investi-
gators. During World War I, its responsibilities were greatly broadened when,
at the request of the Department of State, it took on overseas investigations
of actual and suspected cases involving spies, subversives, radicals, enemy
aliens, etc. Such activities brought the bureau into the counterintelligence
field. This necessitated its chief, J. Edgar Hoover, to carry on liaison with the
G-2 and ONI chiefs, who also had counterintelligence responsibilities dealing
with the security of information personnel, bases, and equipment. By the
? "Grew Eke Topsy" IS a poputu Americanism meaning to grow baphuardb,, unryrtematkafly, or Ina
dborpnised manna. Topsy was a Yount black slave JM in Harriet Seeehr stove's (*de To..
CGbbr. Who, when a*ed about bet orWnk replied that aM ha Taal jrowW
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outbreak of World War 11, G-2, ONI, and the FBI were the Big Three of
American intelligence and counterintelligence.
But always looking over their shoulders was the State Department.
Logically, this probably should have been the first department to set up an
intelligence service, but it wound up being the last to do so. Like the Moliere
character who was surprised to discover that he had been speaking prose for
40 years, State did not discover until 1945 when it picked up the research
and analysis function of the former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that
its diplomatic and consular corps and its numerous secret agents - and here
one should add many presidential or executive agents - had been gathering
political intelligence since 1789. Even so, State was always protective enough
of its primacy in foreign affairs to keep an ever watchful, often superintend-
ing, eye on others' dealings in foreign matters.
Like State, the equally old Treasury Department had been in the intelli-
gence business long before it knew it. Its responsibilities for collecting,
accounting for and disbursing public monies very early on involved it in
investigating and uncovering violations of the relevant laws. In the process of
doing so it picked up much important foreign information, developed a
corps of special agents who were often envied, and even borrowed or hired,
by other departments. By 1939 a half dozen outfits were established - the
Coast Guard, Secret Service, Bureau of Narcotics, Customs Service, Alcohol
Tax Unit, and the Internal Revenue Service - whose operations produced
many intelligence byproducts.
To catalogue the fifty or so government agencies, such as the Agriculture,
Commerce and Interior departments, the Postmaster General, and the Signal
Corps, which by 1939 had been or still were involved in collecting and pro-
ducing small amounts of intelligence, would indeed be tedious. By this
time the national intelligence stage was dominated by the Big Three with
State in its superintending and Treasury in its supporting role. My focus
is the relationship among themselves and with the president.
About that only three points need be made. First; each intelligence unit,
with its own requirements, operations, methods, traditions, ambitions and
especially secrets, was a sealed world of its own. Second; each unit, organi-
zationally, was but a part, usually a small part, of a much larger organization
whose chief was a cabinet officer and from whom it sought recognition and
support. Third; each unit had a chain of command, which led through its
secretary to the president, the ultimate customer and patron. Thus they
stood - behind their secretaries, independently, side by side, eyes on the
president. They stood in a line, in a linear lineup.
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248 THOMAS F. TROY
THE CIA: A REAL MOUSETRAP
Was there never a suggestion for making a better mousetrap, a better way of
organizing American intelligence? Yes, whenever there was big trouble, espe-
cially a war, but even then it usually ran into the stiffest opposition.
Both world wars revealed the weakness of the linear lineup of the intelli-
gence services. The eruption of war between modern armies and navies on a
large geographical plane inevitably produced an information explosion that
far exceeded the handling capacities of the small, peacetime services, each
doing its own thing. When information - reports and requirements - began
cascading at electric speed, there followed backlogs, duplication, confusion,
complaining, and other evils abhorrent to tidy minds.
In that situation the problem was quickly diagnosed as a lack of coordina-
tion among the services, and the proposed mousetrap was a clearinghouse
to sort out the information. Thus, in 1915, Secretary of State Robert
Lansing, much exercised about the "great amount of information" flooding
government agencies on German and other subversive agents, had President
Woodrow Wilson designate State, because of the diplomatic questions in-
volved, the central office to which all such information should be sent.
Lansing's estimate of the extra work thus taken on by State was so slight
that he thought he might need only "a thoroughly trustworthy stenog-
rapher" and "if the work is unusually heavy, a filing clerk."3
Lansing's office apparently threatened no one. In fact, two years later,
with the United States in the war, Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo
thought Lansing's clearinghouse inadequate. He pointed out that the Secret
Service, the Bureau of Investigation, the Post Office Inspection Service, as
well as Treasury's revenue and customs agents, were all reporting on crimes
against the U.S. He said they were often "crossing wires." Hence he urged
the president to establish a Bureau of Intelligence, in State or Treasury, to
handle the old, as well as the new, problems brought on by American
belligerency. But the Post Office and the attorney general were so opposed
to what struck them as so much poaching that McAdoo, swearing "I don't
care three straws about organizing" the new bureau, withdrew his sugges-
tion.4
At war's end another critic accused the federal agencies of inefficiency,
incompetence. lack of centralization, and mutual jealousy. This was William
A. Pinkerton, head of his late father's well-known detective agency, which
had been employed by the government in the Civil War but not in the Great
War. Pinkerton told the International Association of Police Chiefs In 1919
that what was needed in the war and then was "a central government agency
force (sic) of Federal detectives" to centralize and weave together all the
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THE QUAINTNESS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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information coming in, and thereby cope with such German agents as
Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff and Franz von Papen.f
Not for another decade would someone propose a better mousetrap, and
surprisingly enough that would occur in the untroubled spring of 1929. That
was the year Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson made intelligence history
by banning the reading of other gentlemen's mail In that year, John A.
Gade, a former naval attache turned banker, gave his advice to military
officials in New York. Gade had been impressed by what he wrongly saw as a
very efficient "wheel of British intelligence" whose "central hub" and far-
reaching "spokes" gathered and produced vital intelligence for Britain's
leadership. Gade, with his vivid imagery in mind, said the British wheel
should be duplicated in Washington, but Washington judged the idea
''nothing to be gained and many difficulties to be overcome." Gade's advice
would not have received even as much consideration as it did had it not been
expected he would communicate it directly to President Herbert C. Hoover,
for whom he had worked in Belgium during the war.6
But another decade passed before the problem reached the presidential
level. This happened in 1938 when the country's sensational Guenther
Gustave Rumrich trial hit the fan. So much squabbling occurred among the
many services involved in the apprehension of Rumrich's confederates in a
German spy ring in America that leading defendants found safety in flight.
The presiding judge. publicly castigated the government's "protective
agencies" for their "carelessness" and "ineptitude."?
The press, watching this fiasco, repeatedly asked Roosevelt when these
agencies would be coordinated. Finally, having waved his wand, FDR
announced on 9 December: "That has been done; [coordination) is work-
ing."$ What he meant was that he had been told by his attorney general that
the Big Three had "a well defined system which is functioning as well as
present funds permit." That system involved the heads of the three agencies
being "in frequent contact" and "operating in harmony."O How premature
that reassurance was is manifested, as we shall see, by the fragmentation of
today's counterintelligence services. Even so, the Rumrich fiasco had signifi-
cance for the country, the services, and the president. It marked the fast
time that coordination of the counterintelligence services had become a
matter of public presidential concern and action. For the services it crystal-
lized the interdepartmental committee as the cherished mode of coordina-
tion, a mode that left everything in their hands. It was FDR's introduction
to the problem of managing, first, his counterintelligence and, then, his
information and intelligence services.
But before Roosevelt turned to his intelligence services, they toyed with
two proposals reminiscent of those of Lansing, McAdoo, Pinkerton, and
Gade. These came early In 1941 when the U.S. government was feeling the
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impact of the information explosion of World War 11, and when rumors had
begun to circulate about the ambitious plans of Col. William J. Donovan for
coordinating the government's intelligence. The first proposal. appearing in
March. was an Army idea for a joint military and civilian intelligence com-
mittee modeled after the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which
was only then beginning to be effective. An American JIC. however, was
initially rejected and then endorsed only after Donovan was made Coor-
dinator of Information (COI) in July and not activated until after Pearl
Harbor - when it finally received promised office space!
The second proposal, another for getting a grip on the flood of informa-
tion reaching Washington, arrived in April. also from the Army. This in-
volved eight agencies, many papers and charts, and several meetings. The
conferees almost summarily rejected the old idea of a clearinghouse. Smell-
ing a fishing expedition, State was happy with the status quo. Treasury and
Navy saw no need to change the existent relationship. So what did they all
do? They agreed each would maintain its own office for the exchange of
information, and they accepted a common definition of "Secret," "Confi-
dential," and "Restricted"! 10
Never had the mountain's laboring more truly produced a mouse. No
wonder that FDR, ignoring the eight agencies, struck out in a new direction
in July. Then he established not a new committee but a new organization,
indeed the country's first central intelligence agency. This he did when he
established COI, later restructured as OSS, under Colonel Donovan. But
Roosevelt never did give Donovan the real power to do the COI job, and
hence the coordination job was not done.
Even so, the job and Donovan were so unwanted by the Big Three and
others that they bitterly opposed him and COI/OSS throughout the war and
connived in OSS's abolition at war's end. That left them where they had
always wanted to be: untrammeled by any outside coordinator, especially
by the likes of Bill Donovan, now a major general.
While they had also driven Donovan back to his Manhattan law practice,
they had not fully reckoned with the plan he had left behind. This had
called for a permanent peacetime central intelligence service; something
they had never, never, wanted. Still, they had been driven by the Pearl Harbor
syndrome, the force of Donovan's argument, the prospect of the Cold War,
and by a new war-born appreciation of intelligence to come up with two
counterproposals.
The first came from the State Department, which was now eager to take
on the intelligence job and was egged on in this regard by the Bureau of the
Budget, which wanted no new agencies established. State put forth a Rube
Goldberg contraption consisting of three cabinet secretaries at the top, the
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inevitable secretariat, two advisory groups. three coordinating committees.
eleven intelligence committees, and eight counterintelligence committees.
The second counterproposal came from the Army and Navy - actually
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) - which had found the Donovan plan
too strong for the national system to digest but found the State plan dis-
mayingly weak. Hence, with nothing on their drawing boards but a modifica-
tion of the Donovan plan, they picked it up. changed it again, and made it
their own JCS plan. What they thought they had done was subject the pro-
posed CIA to the control and direction of the three secretaries and the chiefs
of the intelligence services so that intelligence was left securely in their
hands. However, they had accepted the unacceptable, a new agency.
When confronted with these two choices. President Harry S Truman, nine
months in office, had little difficulty picking the second. He did so offi-
cially on 22 January 1946, when he established what he thought was the
new permanent American intelligence system. It had three components: a
National Intelligence Authority (NIA) consisting of the secretaries of State,
War, and the Navy and a representative of the president; a Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI); and a Central Intelligence Group (CIG). But this
CIG consisted of people, money, and facilities provided by the agencies the
DCI was charged with coordinating! The new system lasted a year and a half.
No fret, however; the groundwork had been laid. Truman's original choice
was reworked, incorporated in the National Security Act of 1947. worked
on by Congress, and turned into something significantly different. When the
act became law in July it still had three components, but with changes: the
NIA became the National Security Council (NSC) with expanded functions
and with the president in charge; the DCI was now made a civilian post -
though still open to a military man - and the CIG became the Central
Intelligence Agency, which now had its own law, boss, personnel and money.
Here at last was a real mousetrap - or so it seemed.
Never in the considerable government discussion and newspaper coverage
of the creation of this new intelligence mousetrap had anyone ever spoken
or written of an Intelligence Community. Likewise, the reader who has come
this far in this narrative will have noted that never in the years between 1882
and 1946 had anyone ever used that "quaint" or "velvety" term. Whence did
it come?
THE COMMUNITY: AN AFTERTHOUGHT
The answer lies in the arrival of the CIA, an event that revolutionized the
American intelligence establishment.
CIA was no longer an idea, a proposal, not even a bad dream. It was not
even a mere exchange office, a clearinghouse, a post office. Least of all was
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THOMAS F. TROY
it a committee. Instead, it was a hard fact; a legal. Political, bureaucratic
fact: a substantial reality of people, functions, and powers subject to presi-
dential direction. It was different from everything else, as its name clearly
shows.
CIA was, and is, not a staff element, a section, a division, or office within
a major governmental department - as were and are all the other services -
but an "agency" as independent as any other cabinet-level department. It
was established not by a low-level bureau chief, not even by a cabinet
officer, not by a presidential directive but by an act of Congress and the
president - after a constitutional provision the most substantial of founda-
tions. Second, as an "intelligence" agency, CIA gave unprecedented signify
cance and visibility to the concept, activity, and profession of intelligence.
Never in American history had intelligence, including espionage and ulti-
mately covert action, been made the primary stuff of an independent govern-
ment agency. Never had an intelligence agency been so publicly established
- and located at the presidential level. Never had any intelligence service -
ONI, G-2, State intelligence, the FBI's intelligence division. etc. - won such
quick public recognition as did CIA. Intelligence had come of age.
Finally, it was not merely another service, another addition to the linear
lineup. Quite the contrary; it was the "central" agency, and its director
headed "central" intelligence. As such it could not be visualized as standing
on a straight line. In fact, its establishment destroyed that line. There had to
be a different lineup, a different image.
What comes more quickly to mind than the circle. the symbol, amusingly
enough, of perfection and eternity? Since CIA was clearly a center, it had to
be central to the other services, which necessarily occupied the periphery.
Shades of John A. Gade! It dawns upon us that CIA and the DCI are "the
central hub" and the other intelligence services so many "spokes" in this
new "wheel" of U.S. intelligence. That Gade unknowingly anticipated the
future is evident in CIA's regular use of the circle (a pie chart) as a way of
representing today's Intelligence Community. While Gade foresaw it. he
never received his footnote in history.
Gade never received it, because no one knew of him, and because no one
had cared about these questions, which, admittedly, are rather historical and
speculative and even, perhaps, fanciful. More to the point. everyone
intimately affected by the appearance of CIA on the intelligence scene had
more important subjects to think about than naming the thing of which
history would show they were becoming members. Those subjects were two:
turf and conflict, and out of them would come the name that now captures
us.
While CIA's name readily suggests a circle, it was a long time before CIA
and the other intelligence agencies could think of themselves as an agreeably
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cozy little sewing circle. During the CIA's first year of existence, conflict over
turf threatened its sense of oneness. CIA had battles with the FBI over South
America. with G-2 over clandestine operations, with State over its authority
over CIA personnel abroad, and with all agencies over the preparation of
national estimates. Charges of intelligence failures touched Rumania,
Bulgaria. Finland and Colombia. Allegations of friction, jealousy, lack of
cooperation, duplication, distrust, resentment. etc. characterized CIA's
relations with the other intelligence services. All in the first year! No wonder
that in that year CIA had its first outside investigation.
Because of CIA's position and high visibility there was then and in
succeeding years steady discussion in government circles and in the press of
relations between CIA and the other services - in those years G-2, ONI,
the new Air Force's A-2, the FBI, and intelligence units in State, Treasury,
and the Atomic Energy Commission. The talk was of CIA and the other
services - the various intelligence units, the old-line agencies, the FBI and
military and naval intelligence, etc. In retrospect, there must have been some
yearning for a briefer way of referring to these outfits. As it was, the talk
went on for years: eight to be precise. Then, in 1955, with conflict still per-
sisting and people still talking about CIA and the others, the second Hoover
Commission on the organization of the executive branch of the government
almost unthinkingly tossed off a brief parenthetical phrase that at one and
the same time created the community and coined its name. Here, with
emphasis added, is the history-making phrase:
The machinery for accomplishing our Intelligence objectives, hereafter called
the Intelligence Community when referred to as a whole, includes the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Intelligence xetions of
the Department of State, of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and of
the Atomic Energy Commission.
Voila! There it is! The name - curiously enough, only partially capitalized
- and the definition. All tossed off parenthetically, without explanation,
elaboration, fanfare or pride of accomplishment. Unlike the CIA, whose
birth was planned, programmed, officially proclaimed and publicized, the
Intelligence Community was unobtrusively slipped into history, like an
afterthought.
Why was the afterthought - whatever it was and is - called a "community"?
There were, after all, any number of possibilities. Why not "circle," why not
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THOMAS F. TROY
"wheel." why not "system," why not even "machinery," the word used by
the Hoover Commission? A score or more of possibilities lay at hand in
Roget's Thesaurus, and all of them were as accurate as community.
The word, cheapened today through indiscriminate use, has had a long
and respected meaning. Since the time of Aristotle. Cicero. and St.
Augustine, it has always identified a human group bound together by affec.
tion and love. In the nineteenth century Frederick Tbnnies introduced the
distinction between getneinschaft (community) and gesellschaft (associa-
tion). The gemeinschaft was epitomized by the family, the primary com-
munity whose members served one another with love and loyalty to the
death. The gesellschaft was a coldly calculated collaboration actuated by
self-interest. In simple terms, a person stuck to his community - family,
tribe, ethnic group - through thick and thin, but he cut and ran when his
corporation's stock went down or he did not make CEO. Surely the intelli-
gence agencies - jealous of their turf, distrustful of one another, loath to
share information close-chested in their operations - hardly had the stuff of
community. Why then so "quaintly" named?
The answer, admittedly speculative, lies in the times. In the postwar West,
particularly in the United States, the air was full of community talk. The
wreckage of the war had moved people to try to rebuild, or try once again to
build, an international community: and the rivalries and antagonisms that
had wracked Europe in two world wars had also moved them to try to build
a new European community. To that end the Western community estab-
lished the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. debated the
establishment of the European Defense Community and the European
Political Community in 1952-1954: signed the European Economic Com-
munity treaty in 1957; established the European Atomic Energy Community
in 1958; and in July 1959 many African states proposed the establishment
of the Community of Independent African States. Community talk was so
much in the air in the late forties and fifties that sociologist Robert Nisbet
in 1953 could write a book titled The -Quest for Community (New York,
Oxford University Press).
Quest it was. What was sought was a healing of wounds, an end to ani-
mosities, the establishment of friendly, productive relations. What was
sought was making friends out of enemies. What was sought was community;
oneness. wholeness, togetherness. Additionally, what was needed was a name
to capture the ideal. What more appropriate than community? Was it not
such thinking, however vague, that moved some unknown scribe on the
Hoover Commission to think that naming the warring services a community
might help make them one?
Be that as it may, the name stuck like glue. It soon replaced all references
to CIA and the "intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the
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Government." as the 1947 act referred to them. Next it was Capitalized: then
the Intelligence Community became the U.S. Intelligence Community. Last
June the country observed "National Intelligence Community Week."'=
Next it was borrowed at home and abroad. The U.S. military, with their
many intelligence services, now have their "milit
ity."ra The British also now have their own intell1en a community, com.
hicch.
we are told, was actually established in 1936 - before the term wseven in
use!" Nor is that the only case of reading history backward: another writer
has characterized Sir William S. Stephenson, better known as Intrepid, as
one of the most effective members of the intelligence community in the Hitler war."" Finally, former Attorney General Griffin Bell really inter-
nationalized the term recently when he deplored the bad effects of American
leaks on "the international intelligence community.""
The definition, if that is what it is, has also stuck. In 1976, in the first of
three executive orders on intelligence, President Gerald Ford stated very
simply that the term "Intelligence Community refers to the following organi-
zations." which he then identified by name.t'' Subsequent orders, by Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter in 1978 and Ronald Reagan in 1981, took Ford's defini-
tion for granted. The only differences lay in the naming and describing of
the various members. The definition, unlike many definitions, has had no
challengers.
However much the name and definition were glued in place, the thing
itself never attained what might be considered proper government recogni-
tion. It never managed to get into the government's own blue book, the U.S.
Government Manual. This is the 940-page compendium of basic information
about every separate government entity. It abounds in agencies, boa
commissions, committees, departments, services, etc., but it knows o hing
of communities. Yes, there is the Intelligence Community Staff, to which we
are coming, but there is no community: no intelligence community in
particular.
The reason is very simple. It is not there for the same reason that the
American military intelligence community, the British community, Beirs
community and many other newly-sprung communities are not listed in any
manual comparable to our blue book. They are not legal and bureaucratic
realities in which rights and duties inhere. They are not subjects and objects
of action. They are only names applied loosely to other entities that are the
real movers and shakers.
WHAT IS IT?
In this country, what is called the Intelligence Community does not exhaust
the intelligence scene. Indeed, it is but one of three parts of what, for want
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THOMAS F. TROY
ota name, might be called the American intelligence structure. The president
is at the top, followed by the NSC and several NSC intelligence committees
of which the Director of Central Intelligence is a member. Second is a
quartet of overseers. These are the two select intelligence committees of the
Senate and House, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB), which is an outside monitoring group, and the Intelligence Over-
sight Board (JOB), who are outsiders looking for illegalities and improprieties
within the community. Then comes what is properly (or improperly) called
the community.
What, then, is the community? Assuming it may be called an "it," let it be
described initially as standing between nothing and something. It is the
collection of those entities loosely knitted together by a number of commit-
tees chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence or his appointee. The
objective of the knitting is the effective and efficient conduct of the intelli-
gence and counterintelligence functions of the United States government.
As Jeffrey Richelson says in The U.S. Intelligence Community, the exact
number of those entities, the first element of our definition, is "somewhat
ambiguous or misleading."" Thus, CIA's pie chart shows twelve in number:
CIA, State, Department of Energy, Treasury, FBI, DIA, NSA, Army intelli-
gence, Navy intelligence, Air Force intelligence, Marine Corps intelligence,
and "offices fin Defense] for collection of specialized national foreign
intelligence";" but President Reagan's executive order lists thirteen, all on
the CIA list plus "other offices" for missions and responsibilities assigned the
Secretary of Defense." The vagueness of "offices" on both lists is discon-
certing, probably intentionally so. In any case, no wonder Richelson winds
up with a total of twenty-seven, including the Federal Research Division in
the Library of Congress121
However uncertain their number, more uncertain are figures for em-
ployees and budgets. Guesses put the former well over 100,000 and the
latter at S 10,000,000,000. What is most important about these totals is that
80 to 85 percent of them are under the control of the Department of
Defense and have been so, in one way or other, since 1947. These Defense
elements, constituting an intelligence community within an intelligence
community and fronted by the Secretary of Defense, do not readily lend
themselves to outside direction.
Now come those committees, the least well-known element in the com-
munity. Historically, they are an immediate outgrowth of the efflorescence
of intelligence activity in World War 11. The blooming saw an expansion of
old activities, the establishment of new intelligence units in old-line agencies,
and the proliferation of committees to handle the voluminous new inter-
agency business. The committee system, like intelligence itself, had taken
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such hold during the war that at war's end it was merely revamped to meet
the needs of the Cold War leadership.
Today it is more than revamped: it is elaborate. Thus, there is an Intelli-
gence Community Staff (ICS), popularly known as the IC Staff. under the
control of the DCI. It has four staffs of its own - a secretariat, counter.
intelligence, planning and policy, and program and budget; eight committees
- information handling, critical intelligence problems, foreign intelligence
priorities, imagery, security, signals intelligence, human intelligence, foreign
languages: and a legislative liaison. Then then is the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Board (NFIB) chaired by the DCI. It has thirteen committees parallel-
ing some of the above and also including technology transfer, economic
intelligence, scientific and technical intelligence, atomic energy, and weapons
and space systems. The DCI also chairs the National Intelligence Council
(NIC), which has several analytical groups producing intelligence estimates,
and the Intelligence Producers Council (IPC). Still other committees involve
the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.
What must be said about this network of committees is that little is
known about them either inside or outside the community. True, the IC
Staff budget is publicly appropriated. Still, unless insiders are directly
involved with any committee, they know and care less about it. Outsiders
know less of these committees - of their membership, agenda, products,
arguments, obstacles, defects, successes and failures. Indeed, the public
generally is ignorant of them. Yet they are the mechanisms by which the
DCI rationalizes the work of the baker's dozen of independent intelligence
services in the community.
That brings us to the DCI, who runs these committees. He has command
authority over the CIA, the ICS, and the NIC - the last two of these
amounting to a few hundred people. He has no command authority over, for
instance, the 80 to 85 percent of the community's personnel and resources
controlled by various units of the Department of Defense. What pull he has
with them rests upon presidential exhortations, which are words in the wind,
and upon executive orders, which are as changeable as the executive's mind.
The Church committee concluded in 1976 that the DCI "lacked real
authority" to do his job .21 In short, the DCI has much less authority to run
the Intelligence Community than any other intelligence chief has to run his
own agency.
A curious thing about the community is the short shrift that is given to
the committees, in particular in the charts and figures of the Intelligence
Community. Mention has been made of the community's three parts, but in
the writer's opinion there is none that does justice to all elements thereof,
least of all to the committees. Thus, the top echelon - president, NSC,etc. -
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get full treatment. The second group - PFIAB, IOB, but not the House and
Senate committees - are included with the first. The third - the Intelligence
Community - commonly appears as it does in CIA's pie chart: namely, the
member agencies, the DCI, and the IC Staff - but not its subordinate staffs
and committees. These only appear, as they do in books by Richelson,
Ray S. Cline, and Scott D. Breckinridge, in isolation." Never do the three
parts - with or without the ICS committees - appear as a unit. Perhaps their
unity is not evident!
Were people to pay more attention to these committees, which are after
all the links between the DCI and the services, he or she might see the
remarkable, and ironical, resemblance between today's Intelligence Com-
munity and that 1945 State plan, which was labeled a Rube Goldberg
contraption.24 That plan called for a score of committees run by an execu-
tive secretary answerable to the cabinet secretaries and their intelligence
chiefs. What we have had since 1947 is a score of committees run by a DCI
who had had to bargain endlessly with cabinet secretaries and their intelli-
gence chiefs! True, the intervening years have seen some increases, as we
shall see, in the DCI's power in the community, but at root the situation has
not been much better than what State envisioned in 1945. The only differ-
ence is that the fellow running the committees has, since 1947, been spend-
ing most of his time on a different job: namely, running a powerful new
agency!
What, then, is the Intelligence Community? Originally, the Hoover Com-
mission in 1955 precisely, and perhaps presciently, defined it as "the
machinery for accomplishing our intelligence objectives" and equated that
machinery with the individual intelligence services. Since then the machinery
has been supplemented by new committees, staffs, and councils. The services
are, of course, those "'spokes," and the committees, with the DCI, are the
central hub" of the "American wheel of intelligence" as recommended by
John Gade in 1929. The whole has been another Topsy.
Topsy, however, is considerably less than an independent entity, a self-
standing organization, a force to be reckoned with. On the other hand, it is
considerably more than nothing; it is more than a pious hope and a polite
fiction. Somewhere between nothing and something, it is a working arrange-
ment, a modus vivendi, a way of doing business, which the country's intelli-
gence services have tolerated, generally begrudgingly, sometimes agreeably,
as a bureaucratic inevitability.
Still, it is not a community. Though its parts are well cemented together
by the cult of secrecy shrouding intelligence, it lacks that sense of oneness,
of wholeness, and togetherness that constitutes a community. If there is
any sense of community in the intelligence structure, it is in the individual
agency where people have their careers and place their loyalties. Were the
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so-called community to be dissolved or greatly rebuilt, no tears would be
shed - except by those few who lost jobs or prestige. On the Other hand.
were CIA, the FBI or NSA abolished, the grief would be genuine and wide.
spread. No. the "machinery" is not a community. not even an association.
only an arrangement. Misnaming it only misleads the public and perhaps
masks its basic problem - that of the DCI - to which we must now return.
WHAT TO DO WITH THE DCI?
When CIA was established in 1947, its position as the "central" agency was
immediately challenged. The other departments and agencies argued that
because CIA had both operating and producing functions it was a depart.
mental agency like themselves, but because it also was the central coordinat.
ing agency it was coordinating itself as well as others and was therefore a
judge in its own case. According to arguments, since the CIA was both a
central and departmental agency, it was (in the language of John Gade)
both hub and spoke and hence had a conflict of interest.
Of course CIA came up with a rejoinder. It was an old one, the two-hat
defense. It said that the DCI wore two hats, one as head of CIA and the
other as head of the Intelligence Community. That answer scored no points
with the generals, admirals, and diplomats who pressed the charge. They
rebutted that no matter how many hats there were there was only one head,
and that was CIA's head. In contests like this there is no dearth of counter-
arguments. so CIA refined its two-hat theory.
The agency found help in congressional action and in the Hoover Com-
mission report. In 1953 Congress authorized the appointment of a Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence (D/DCI), and in 1954 the Clark Task Force
of the commission recommended that the new D/DCI run the agency and that
the DCI, then Allen Dulles, run the community. Even though it did not work
out that way - Dulles, reversing the recommendation, chose to run the
agency and leave the community to his deputy - CIA could defend its
objectivity on the ground that two persons ran the two entities. That, how.
ever, was transparent sophistry since the deputy was merely the alter ego of
his chief, and thus the two hats were still worn by the one head.
The challenge to CIA had a very important twofold effect. First, it
brought to light a hitherto unappreciated distinction between the DCI and
CIA. This had been inherent in the old Central Intelligence Group where the
group was but borrowed people assigned to the DCI. The distinction was
carried over in the 1947 act where the DCI, already in existence, was merely
described as "the head" of the new CIA. However, so much emphasis was
placed on the new agency - indeed, it was even given the powers formerly
assigned the DCI - that the latter seemed relegated to a subordinate posi-
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tion. This subordination was now ended by the development of the two hat
argument. The DCI was seen as somewhat separate, or separable, from CIA -
a view that, as will be seen, will not go away.
The second effect of the challenge was to knock out CIA as the "central"
agency. Whatever its name and whatever its centralized functions. CIA today
is not the center of even CIA's pie chart. It is on the periphery, one of a
dozen spokes. It has had to yield the center to the DCI and his community
staff, which are thus the hub of the wheel.
Nevertheless, neither chart nor theory has altered reality or disposed of
the argument and the continuing problem of managing the community. The
CIA, however sidelined, has been the indispensable institutional base without
which the DCI, as presently empowered, is impotent. Because of this rela-
tionship, with its advantages and disadvantages, the DC1, however com-
munity-oriented he might be, has had to spend the bulk of his time and
energy on agency affairs, and with little power to run the community he
had little incentive to do so.
No wonder, then, that the DCl has been periodically exhorted to get on
with it. The Clark task force, the first to push him, recommended the estab.
lishment of a chief of staff to run the agency. Then in 1956 and 1958 the
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (now
PF1AB) echoed the recommendation, and in 1960 it raised for the first time
the possibility of separating the DCI and the CIA. Then in 1962 a president
got into the act. John F. Kennedy sent the new director. Dulles's successor
John A. McCone, a letter exhorting him to run the community and let his
deputy take care of the agency. A similar presidential exhortation was sent
in 1965 by President Lyndon B. Johnson to McCone's successor, Vice Adm.
William F. Raborn, Jr. Then in 1971 President Richard M. Nixon made an
abortive effort to supplement the now familiar exhortation to the DCI with
some presidential authority over the intelligence community's budget, but
that would not come until 1976.
Meanwhile, the community continued to be neglected. No one ran it from
1947 to 1955. Under Dulles the relationship between agency and com-
munity was that of liaison, and that pattern persisted in the McCone and
Helms years. There were stirrings in the early seventies, in the directorships
of James R. Schlesinger and William E. Colby, when the Nixon directive was
producing changes in the Intelligence Community Staff and the production
of finished intelligence, and when considerably more time and effort were
being devoted to the IC problem. Nevertheless, from 1947 to 1976 the DCI
had no more real authority to manage the community than he did in 1947.
The later seventies were something else. In December 1974, a sensational
article in The New York Times on alleged CIA misdeeds subjected the
agency to an unprecedented period of public investigation, abuse, and
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reform. One result - an effort to defend, regulate, and improve the agency -
was a 1976 executive order in which President Ford made the DCI chairman
of a three-man committee charged with the preparation of the administra.
tion's intelligence community budget. While still not statutory authority.
it was a significant presidential codification of recent budgetary develop.
ments. The money power proved to be an opening to such other community
areas as collection and analysis.
Nevertheless, another result of the public scrutiny was a re-examination of
the DCI's job. Thus, later in 1976 the Church committee, which said the DCI
"lacked real authority" to do his job, further observed that the job was
"burdensome in the extreme," that his two roles were "competing, not com-
plementary roles," and that they "differ considerably." It concluded that a
separation of them "may prove a plausible alternative.":s
Still later that year, a former top CIA official came forward with a specific
plan for reorganizing both CIA and the community. In his book Secrets
Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA, and despite its reference
to CIA in its subtitle. Ray Cline proposed among other ideas abolishing the
agency and replacing it at its Langley headquarters by a new central an-
alytical center. He further proposed that the DCI be elevated by legislation
to cabinet status and be given "broad supervisory control over all intelli-
gence activities." His proposals, repeated in his 1981 edition, would leave a
small, diffused clandestine service reporting to a White House staff under the
DCI.2'
If President Ford's executive order was a significant boost to the DCI's
community role, it paled in comparison with what was tried by Admiral
Stansfield Turner when he succeeded George Bush as DCI in 1977. From the
outset, Turner, who had his mandate from Carter and Vice President Walter
Mondale, sought to discipline the agency as well as enhance the community.
The latter objective was demonstrated on his f" day in office when his
installation was made not an agency but a community affair. As community
representatives gathered in CIA's auditorium, it looked to agency personnel
like occupied territory. Almost the next day Turner initiated and publicized
his regular hurrying from his Langley office to his community office in
downtown Washington.
As quickly, he began his reorganization of CIA and the community. He
renamed the old ICS the Budget and Evaluation Staff. Under Helms, this had
been staffed entirely by CIA people, but Schlesinger made it a genuine inter-
agency group. This provided the DCI with a community perspective. It gave
him community data and points of view - community thoughts. In a sense
it gave him a new head; the two-hatted DCI had become two-headed. Turner
now added two more heads; one in charge of a new National Intelligence
Tasking Center and the other in charge of the new National Foreign Assess-
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THOMAS F. TROY
ment Center. As DCl he thus had these three community organizations and
CIA reporting to him. A later wiring diagram, showing slight changes.
showed Turner commanding three teams - one "pink," one "blue." and one
mixed. The first was his community team, the second his agency team, and
the third a mixed agency-community team to which CIA ostensibly lost
partial control of two of its four directorates. Never in the history of the
agency had it been so denigrated and the community so exalted.
Even so, the community and the DCI's role therein were not substantially
or permanently affected by Turner's largely cosmetic changes. In his Secrecy
and Democracy: The CIA In Transition, written after he was replaced in
1981 by William J. Casey, Turner not only recounted his successes and
failures but also prescribed some changes. Echoing the Church committee,
he said the DCI's two roles "conflict" and should be separated. There should
be. he wrote, a new Director of National Intelligence to whom the CIA
director would report. 2
Turner's successor, representing a new Republican president, was some-
thing else. Casey was an OSS veteran with respect and affection for the CIA.
He sought to restore agency morale, had no use for Turner's teams, simpli-
fied his own chain of command without relinquishing his control of the com-
munity budget, and won community-wide respect. So far, Casey's successor,
William H. Webster, the former FBI director, has undertaken no new com-
munity management initiatives.
Meanwhile, the last word publicly spoken on the question of what to do
with the DCI shows that the question will not go away. It came last 27
October when Sen. Arlen Specter (R., Penn.) said on the Senate floor that
the job facing the intelligence agencies was so "demanding, complex and
interdependent that their management and leadership can no longer be
accomplished by a Director of Central Intelligence who also must manage
a large agency such as the CIA." Hence he was introducing legislation calling
for the separation of the DCI's agency and community jobs.2' His action
shows we are back in 1954 when the Clark task force first addressed the
problem. Will the jobs be split apart?
THE FUTURE
First, let us briefly balance the books on the community. When President
Reagan last June observed "National Intelligence Community Week," he
saluted both the men and women "serving with our intelligence services"
and everyone involved 'In paying tribute to the Intelligence community."
The Senate resolution, also recognizing "the seffliess "
Nation's intelligence personnel," emphasized the importance 'oftintelligence
as the country's "first line of defense." The House, for the second year in a
row, refused to act on the resolution."
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More substantial. but less public, words of praise for the community are
heard from speakers addressing, for instance, meetings of the Association of
Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO). a strong pro-intelligence organization.
Thus. in 1985 a former CIA official now with Hughes Aircraft and a member
of PFIAB. Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, spoke of the "enormous progress" made
in the community since he left it in 1966. The former deputy director for
science and technology credited the community with "a stability and a
collaboration unknown in his time."30
Another speaker, the director of NSA, Lt. Gen. William E. Odom. assured
an AFIO audience in 1987 that the "community is healthy,... is healthy and
robust." But he had to admit that "serious problems'do exist." Mentioning
one, he declared that
The intelligence community is institutionally fragmented. It is spread out
through several executive departments. Its biggest customer is the military.
For that reason, It is intertwined with the military services. Getting this frag.
mented community to operate effectively with the military is not easy.
Elaborating on the need for cooperation, he concluded that "The trend in
this regard is good, but there is a long way to go."31
Other recent criticism of the community has come from the House intelli-
gence committee, which did a study of counterintelligence and security as a
result of the espionage explosion of 1985. Last year it criticized the com-
munity for being insensitive to "the importance of counterintelligence con-
cerns, an attitude often reflected in internal agency budgetary and policy
prioritization." It too focused on fragmentation:
Moreover, despite some recent improvement, the fragmented components of
the counterintelligence community remain uncoordinated, divided and turf.
conscious in virtually every substantive area, ranging from simple inforsna.
tion-sharing... to policy formulation and counterintelligence operations.
With no reference to FDR's 1938 coordination of these same fragmented
services, the committee urged the DCI and others "to undertake all possible
measures" to protect the country against espionage.32
Also, there are many complaints and recommended changes, some stem-
ming from last year's Iran-Contra hearings and some of older pedigree. Thus,
in addition to Senator Specter's proposal there has been new or renewed talk
about establishing a joint congressional intelligence committee, having CIA's
inspector general and general counsel confirmed by the Senate, and giving
the General Accounting Office authority to audit the agency's spending -
something it gave up decades ago!
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THOMAS F. TROY
Pluses and minuses exist. On the one hand,
there the passage of time, the change of people, the sharing of common expe6
ences, successes and failures, and the consequent development of new
attitudes, as well as to the basic good sense and patriotism of personnel -
that the community is a more fraternal organization than ever before. On the
other hand, the fact that an NSA director and the House committee can both
deplore the persisting fragmentation of the community, the result of the
inherent dominance of centrifugal forces in the community, surely points to
a fundamental structural weakness that spawns vulnerabilities, lessens
community effectiveness and invites enemy exploitation. That situation may
well invite another Pearl Harbor.
Will a separation of the DCl's two roles remedy the situation? That is
quite arguable, but it is not an argument that can be settled here. There is a
more immediate question: Will anything be done to make our Topsy worthy
of its "quaint" name? The answer here is a "probably not." The record of
the thoughtless emergence and inadequate strengthening of the community
- four decades of inadequate management by an overburdened and weak
director - suggests that only a grossly shocking event or a national emer-
gency, rather than rational deliberation, will produce significant structural
changes.
Pessimistic as that forecast may be, it rests also upon forgotten nineteenth century Frenchman that the truth expressed
moral
progress in the world is an abuse of the patience of God.
REFERENCES
'Commager, Henry Steele, 1976, "Intelligence: The Constitution Betrayed.- in New
York Review of Books, 30 September, pp. 32-34,
'Steiner, Zara, 1984, "The Spying Business," in Timer Liter, Supplement, (London)
12 October, p. 1162e.
'U.S. Department of State, 1939, Papers RektbV to the ForejYn Rebtrons of the United
States: The Lansin: Papers 1914-1920 (2 vols.), GPO, W
pp.218-221. uhington. D.C., Vol. 1.
4Wifiam C. McAdoo to President Wilson, "Bureau of Intelligence" 16 April 1917, and
letter to Wilson. 16 May 1917; Container No. 522, McAdoo Papers, Manuscript Div.,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
s Horan, James D., 1968, The Pbtkerwnr The Detective Dynasty That Made Xutory.
Bonanza Books, New York, p. 495.
'0. H. Saunders to Cot Stanley H. Ford, 27 April 1929. with encL by John A. Gade;
File No. 9944-u.612, Military Intelligence Div., War Wash, National Records Center, Suitland ar Department General Staff, RG
No. 9944-ud/3, Ibid. That Cade "tivro? Md.; also, "C" to CoL Ford, a.d., File
ugly" saw a British "wheel" Is supported by Sir
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Kenneth Strong's assertion in his Men of Inte1Z once (p. 46) that prc.World War
London had no "central independent Intelligence organization" for producing broadly.
based estimates. See Also Christopher Andrew, n. 18, lrfra.
'Judge John C. Knox, quoted in The New York 7Tmes, 3 December 1938, p. 1:4,
'Press Conferences, 9 December 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Library.
Hyde Park, N.Y.
'Homer Cummings to Roosevelt, 20 October 1938, in File "Justice Department," PSF
Conferences, [bid.
"Troy, Thomas F., 1981, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the
Centrallntelligence Agency, University Publications, Frederick, Md., p. 46.
rr U.S. [Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the U.S.
Government (1953-55), "Intelligence Activities: A Report to the Congress," 84th
Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 201, p. 13.
r""House Stalls, Intelligence Week Ceremonies Go On Without It," in Periscope (Journal
of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers), Summer 1987, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 2.
t' Hopple, Gerald W., and Bruce W. Watson. 1986, The Militmy Intelligence Community,
Westview, Boulder and London.
"Andrew, Christopher, 1986, He, Majesty's Secret Serv[ce: The Makes of the British
Intelligence Community, Viking, N.Y., pp. 421-422, 483-486.
Is Ogilvy, David, 1978, Blood Brains it Beer: The Autobiography of David Ogilvy, An-
theneum, N.Y., p. 173.
"Bell, Griffin B., "Secrecy After the Snepp Case," in The Washington Post, 9 April
1980, p. A-21.
"Ford, President Gerald R., "United States InteDigence Activities," E. 0. No. 11905.
19 February 1976, sec. 2(b). Carter's order was No. 12036, 26 January 1978, and
Reagan issued No. 12333,4 December 1981.
"Richelson, Jeffrey T., 1985, The U.S Intelligence Community, Ballinger, Cambridge,
Mass., p. 11.
"Central Intelligence Agency, 1987, "Fact Book On Intelligence," CIA, Washington,
D.C., p. 20.
"Reagan, Ronald, "United States Intelligence Activities," E. 0. No. 12333,4 December
1981, sea. 1.7-1.14.
Richelson, op. cit. p. 104.
"U.S. Congress, Senate, Select (Church) Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with respect to Intelligence Activities, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on
Foreign and Military Intelligence, Bk. IV, Final Report, 94th Conj., 2d. sess, Rept.
No. 94-755, p. 92.
"Richelson, op. cit.; Ray S. Cline, 1981, The QA Under Reagan, Bush d Casey: The
Evolution of the Agency from Roosrrelt to Reup an, Acropolis, Washington, D.C.,
pp. 305-308; Scott D. Breckinridge, 1986, The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System,
Westview, Boulder and London,
"For two charts of State's plan see Troy, op. cit. pp. 327, 332.
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