HOW KISSINGER, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE CIA OBSTRUCTED THE INVESTIGATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 23, 1976
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

`'Classified information."; pre
.sents a classic paradox:,
without it,. government: some
times cannot" function; with
it, _ government.sometimes ;
cannot-function?.
Page; 66 ;
`On September .124, 1975
the Deputy Secretary.. o-f =State,
raised for the first time an'.
innuendo that the
Committee's :action
resembled. .McCarthyism.'
Page'63
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Z
.We were given heavily
`.'sanitized". pieces of paper.
"Sanitized---.was merely a
euphemism for blank "sheets
Page 61 .
DllO~GaOQC~I D~IOC
` .. The cut-offfrom. inform-
tionstruck' at the'heart of '
Committee, operations: One
onth. out- of our _five month
investigative `period was' lost,
while the -issue -was ,::
:negotiated
Page 6
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...`Overuse of classification is
inevitable when .. some
1,75 persons can
.classify :information.'
The- authority; invoked.by.
the Secretary of-State-was
neither "classification,"' nor
"executive privilege,"?but.a
new. doctrine -,that- can best be
=-
?characterized as `-`secretarial.
privilege".. '
Page 62;
Page:.;68
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If this Committee's recent experience any test, in.
.
telligence agencies that are to be: controlled by, Con-
gressional, lawmaking are
,to`day?be
ond the l
w=
,
y
a
maker's scrutiny.
These secret agencies-.have interests that inherently, conflict with the open accountability of a- political
body, and . there are many tools and tactics to block
and. deceive.'. conventional- Congressional-;checks.
Added to.this:are the unique attributes,i f,-intelligence
notably;."national security,"' in its cloak of secrecy
and mystery-to intimidate Congress and erode fragile
support for-sensitive inquiries.
Wise -and:effective, legislation cannot proceed. in the.
.'absence oUinformation? respecting conditions to be.af-
fected,'o I changed.; Nevertheless,: under, ppreseht cir--
cumstances; inquiry into intelligence activities. faces
serious,and fundamental shortcomings.
Even. limited ,success in : exercising. future oversight
requires: a rethinking of the,powers, procedures, and
duties ofd the overseers.' This Committee's path 'and
policies, its pluses 'and,minuses,,may at'least'indicate
[nfo~n. atI4ji
The keyto?exercising.oversight is knowledge.:In the
case of intelligence agencies, this translates into a need
for,access to information often held ,'by'Ithe`agencies
themselves, about. events. in distant. places.
It is an uncertain approach to gathermg'facts , given'
the best bf circumstances.- The? best of circumstances
thereby l ecome-a minimum, condition.:
..-The Select Committee's.most . important work may,
well have been, its test of those. circumstances; testing
perhaps for the ; first' time what happens ' when Con-
gress unilaterally decides what, it wants fo know and
how it wants to know,, it.
.
There, were numerous public expressions by.intelli
intelli-gence' agencies;?and the Executive that-.full coopera-
tion would be accorded 3 The' credibilityi: of. s'uch' as:
suran~es was ,important,_since almost all the necessary
material's.,were.classifed and controlled liy, the. execu-
tive 'branch. Despite- these. public representations,'-in
practice most document. access was preceded by
lengthy negotiations: Almost without exception, these
negotiations yielded something less than complete or
timely'aceess 4 ?
In'short, the words were always words of coopera-
iion;-the ,'reality was delay, refusal missing inform a-
tion,' asserted privileges, and on and on .s
The .Committee.' began by ;assertmg..that Congress
.alone.must decide..who, acting in its belhalf.has. a
right fo. know secret information. This led-to a rejec-
,tion of:.Executive "clearances"6 or the " coinpartmenta-
tion" 7 of our staff..The. Commfttee.refused,,. as a mat-
ter of policy, to sign agreements. It refused -toallow
'intelligence?officials to;read:and review our ihvestiga-
tors'notes;,and,ayoided: canned briefings' _in? favor, of
,primary :,source material..-The Committee maintained .
that Congress has a, right?to all infor-nation-short of
:direct communications with the President
Our ability to abide by" these,;policies has been a
mixed record
Qn the plus side, an aggressive pursuit, of facts and
a willirign~ess.to back, up. this pursuit with'subpoenas?
produced some unprecedented- results..As an example,
never before .had .either the. Executive or dongress, puts
together a ten-year, review, of. covert action projects.
By subpoena-which, unfortunately, had to be 'taken-'
the: brink of contempt enforcement-the staff: of the `
Committee analyzed 'all, official-covert action .approv-
als since 1x965, and reported its ,results to he- Commit-..
tee in a closed. hearing.?, That presentation, was one. of,'
;the. morel interesting and. ' accurate pictures ,of?. U.S.':
covert..policies ,yet' assembled and 'was of no. small
valueao our findings. Other, examples appear, through
out:.the-remamder.of this.repo`rt
. ,
Nonetheless `if that is the ,positive side, it was off-
set by the extraordinary efforts that were required,
eyen~m a (climate.: favorable to reviewing past;Execu
I..
tive.conduct, fo, identify and. obtain documents:.
It~is a commentary in itself .that subpoenaswere
Ii 7 3717 i unary G . (. Y7 iL'd ~7 I~ f"^3t k 7u P E' rt F a t'i 7id
EDITOR'S NOTE
Last week The: Village'. Voice printed almost
in 'full the text of,the.second of three sections of
the`repoit on U;S."secret'agencies,-dated January..
19" 1976, 'prepared by.. the House Select. Com--
mittee.on' Intelligence,, chaired -by Congressman
Otis Pike of 1.N6w York. That .second: section
contains t'ne investigative record of the Com-
mittee As noted in our introduction; we could
not publish the third section of the report-a
section on 'recommendations - because" the,-Co
m
mittee had' not. written it.. And, we did., choose
..,to publish' the'first section becau'se .-dealt.'not
with the* Coinmittee's findings but rather with' its .
frustrations' as an `investigative unit.
Herewith we 'are'- 'publishing' the text, of that
first'section because of the perspective. it .provides
for; understanding the reaction of Secretary. of
State Henry Kissinger the ' White :House -the
secret agencies, and the :Pike Committee itself:
to publication of the report and, to the .'fact that
it appeared; exclusively in , the Voice By::far the;.'
greatest outrage} has been expressed not;,toward"'.''
those whose mismanagement cynicism and ;;
downright ,lawlessness` have made 'scandal : and'.=
toward those m. the Congress and the media who:
uncovered '. and reported: the. "facts.. The first sec
tion;'of the ,, Pike,;Papers :helps explain, this in
vetted .response = It tells `of repeated efforts by
above all }Mr Kissinger and by the White House'_
theCIA Senator Henry :.Jackson; and others tor;
-contain" 'obstruct;wdelay rand , if. possible derail.
the Select Committee s'investigation It also tells=
some of~ the effects ,?of these efforts
u In the end the obstructionists;did not succeed
But the turmoil itself` and piecemeal leaks tend
? a x.
to: focus attention on the clash of interests rather
than the substance; of the "Committee s findings
arid-kill threaten to dilute its cumulative ;impact
In;the-following text space lim tations:require,
us to delete some. non substantive references from
:
the footnotes.. Therefore;-.footnotes-are not'num
bered'consecutively;'. but- the- numbering :follows
subpoenas:. were, not enough and only a , determined
threat of .contempt; proceedings: brought _ grudging-
'It- is interesting fo note" that,' d'espite,volumes 'of,
literature,' public. utterance, and court cases oh.the
subject, there are no, clear definitions of" what `national
security is: E.q Note .87'Horv:'L 'Rev: "976`'(1'974);
Becker, .`Tlie ' Supreme . Court's Recent""National Se-
curity" Decisions: Which'. Interests' Are Being Pro-
tected?:40 -Tenn. 1. Rev ,t (1972)
2Justice Van Devanter `speaking for a , unanimous
Supreme Court wrote that the Congressional power
of inquiry=with process 'to enforce. it-is ; essential
and appropriate as an auxiliary to y the legislative funs-
Lion "'McGrain v ,Daugherty (1972)
Early in the history of our republic the power was
accompanied: by "instructions to inquire into the, con
dition of the! various: ex_ecutive.,'departments; and the
ability and_iniegritywith which they have been?con-
ducted:' 13' Cong:?.Deb '1057-4067;
(1836)
31n a. letter to the Chairman dated October '14,
1975, Secretary of State Kissinger stated: I have'no
desire- to keep anything, from the' Select' Committee
with-regard to the Cyprus 'crisis or'any-other' subject.'.'
Letter to' ChairmanPike, from' Dr... Kissinger, State
Dept., Oct'. .14, 1975.:
In ?a second 'letter to the.Chairman, dated.'.Novem
ber'3, `1975, Dr Kissinger.'again .pledged=his coopera-
tion! ."Let. me reiterate that-- my -intention is not to
withhold'any information of:?,use to-the- Committee ....
1. remain-. as determined as:ever;.'to.do everythingpossi-.
.1.bleto assist. the Committee in its difficult. and impor-
tant task. ' :Letter to ,Chairman,:Pike,, from- ?Dr .- Kis
I
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At a news conference o un 10 1975, PreSid nt f o r i T J m a i o n even among officials witty security lear-"
: n$1J'r f- z?e A7'.'7~~:;TPJ! 'v~J > laf f. )t; .Lti:, r~10Ie~- to tlr rn
Ford stated:."I will.make'available'to the Senate, and
'House` Select .Committees these [Rockefeller Commis-
sion] - materials; together with other related`," aterials
in .the executive branch." He went ' on to say: "`So
?there's'not going to be any possibility of any cover-up
because we're, giving them the material that the Rock-
efeller Commission developed in' their hearings,' plus
any other material that is, available 'in 'the executive
branch.", (Emphasis added.) President's News Con
ference, Wash. D.C.; June 10,1975.''
4The following statement by the Chairman, on No-
vember "14, .-1'975, with reference ?to ? a subpoena of
State Department documents; -is typical:
`"Chairman' PIKE. That troubles ' me, Mr: McClory.
The fact. is that three days' after' the subpoena :was
? due, we have nothing. You,have had' phone calls.- Mr.
Donner and Mr. Field have . had. phone: calls. The
President has not asserted executive` privilege, but- he..
hasn't done it.'.' .
The Committee also discovered'. .what Chairman
Pike described as the "dribble treatment,'!- where one'
or two documents .were' delivered `each day over. the.
course of several weeks. -This: was a particularly subtle
impediment," as ` it gave the' executive branch an op-
..portunity,to,deny that it was withholding, information,
.while at 'the'.. same time delaying,' the Committee's
work.
In the domestic intelligence investigation,-Drug En- :
forcement Administration documents, which had been
requested for over three months, were opened ,for
Committee "inspection 48 hours before a hearing on
DEA intelligence. - Even then; a subpoena had ' been
'necessary to obtain .information. -The staff:was not
given access to the'17 so-called Kissinger?wiretap-ma
aerials" until 24 hours before Dr. Kissinger appeared
before the Committee; and that took place only after
lengthy negotiations: (Justice Dep'artment memoranda
arelating to the 17 wiretaps: are printed as 'pp.-IX of
the Comm. Hearings, Part 3.) ? ? '
5The Chairman's comments on September 29, 1975,
in a ? discussion ' of proposed , agreements with the Ex-
ecutive; illustrate the 'point::. ? .
"Chairman PIKE. You thought we had -an
agreement with the President two weeks' ago-or .,a
week and a, half ago-and we adopted your proposals
in order 'to get,that agreement.
"Having adopted your proposals; they said, 'Well,
that is the first bite, now. we: will come back for some
more.' They have ,now come back for some more:
"You want us to adopt these proposals: You keep,
seeing huge cooperation' just around'the. corner and it
is not there, and it has not been there.
At a Committee meeting early in September, the
,.Chairman described the Committee s'experience thus
far with executive branch cooperation"'
Here is what;.we run into.... Nothing is ever re
fused-things.just are.notdelivered.:They,.very'care
fully do'notrefuse but.the. language'isalways,the,lan
duction. " .
A' month later, the degree. of, cooperation - liad not
noticeably improved. As ,the Chairman , stated:
'I think we .all know- :what is-going on here. You
asked-that we wait another;-week-and; we can. wait
for another week. You say. that we" ought';to :be coh
cerned with-the official: statements and,, as I,have .in-,
dicated from the day,I got on. the Committee, the ofli-
cial.statements. always'promise cooperation. There has
never been an official statement which says, `In.,,no.
-way are you .going;,to get, this information.',:But the
fact of `the matter is that we don t.,-; the informs
tion
.6The Committee did accept -the assistance of the
FBI in conducting background :investigations of its'
staff prior .to hiring. All decisions,, however,-
concern-ing the,members of the Committee's staff and' their.
work'w ere 'made by the Committee
The Director of Central Intelligence requested that'
the Committee require its staff to sign. secrecy. oaths'.
comparable to''those. which the CIA requires of its
own employees`; The Committee refused.However,
each member of the staff.was obliged' liy the Commit-'
tee to sign- an "Employe'e'Agreement
' Compartmentation" is`a system employed by the
L
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ances 1 The justification for compartmentation. is de-;
scribed in the following. excerpts. .,from.-a letter to;the
Chairman from CIA Director. Colby on July. 28 1975:
"National Security Council?,Intellgence: Directive
No. 1 -(17. Feb. 1972) instructs the Director of, Central.
Intelligence to `. develop- and review security, sstand-
ards and practices as they relate -to- t' protection of
intelligence and;-of intelligence as . '.,and methods
from unauthorized. disclosure.' Sine the National Se-
curity Act did Snot' provide. for an .authority corre
sponding with the.'DCI's responsibility in this area,.
the Directive ' provi des that h:Members`of the U:S.
Intelligence. Board' are'
responsible.'.for The su
per-
visionl of the dissemination of securitylintelligence ma-
terial. 'The Director of . Central Intelligence, acting
with- the advice :of',the U.S. -Intelligence Board, has
'.promulgated. a number of, directives, regulations, -and
security. manuals _. related to the protection of- foreign
intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and meth-
ods." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby,, CIA,
-July 28, 1975.
9Tlis report resulted from a subpoen a of documents
in possession of, the: "Forty Committee," which, is 'a:
.National Security, Council; subcommittee that 'approves.
covert. action.
On .November 14,. by a vote of ?1to .2,. the Com-
,mittee;.approved? ',..resolution citing Dr. Kissinger in
contempt.-of. Congress for his. failure to comply- with
the Forty. Committee subpoena.. The . report accom-
panying the resolution (94-693) wash filed December
8. On December. 10,`, after, negotiations with White
House ;officials,officials,. the, Chairman , informed the House
that' substantial. com ,pliance had bee n` obtained,.` and
the Committee's rep.'ortwas,:rec'oinmitted...
The record of subpoenas. is worth reviewing.
It 'began on `August 5, -1975,,. when an Assistant'
Secretary of Defense,,wasasked to Iapplear;as a witness
.and bring .with. him the document bye which the Na-.
tional 1.Security 'Agency (NSA) 'was. set up. , It was .a
simple and ? logical request;-.The Defense -Department .
controls NSA; ? the ? Comittee was holding , hearings
,on intelligence ,,budgets; NSA, has :the biggest budget;
-and te ;Committee wanted to see -the authority. by
which; NSA .operates. fl
The official did not bring the document., He did 'not
have "clearance" to.10
For this elementary piece of information, the Select
Committee was forced to resort to 'l the first, of its,
many subpoenas. It is worth noting that 'the sub-
poena -was. promptly honored, which Jraises the .ques-
tion why the document : was =not deliv' red in the `first ?
place.
By, ate :August the Committee was preparing, for
hearings to review what kind of intelligence?our',mon- ?
ey buys. Four events were chosen for hearings: the
1973 MW-East- war, the.1974 Cyprus) coup, the 1974
Portuguese coup and- the 1968 Tet, offensive in: Viet-
nam. During August and early September. there were
repeated' requests for documents and interviews 13
In some cases we were ;given heavily "ysanitized"
pieces of paper; Sanitized" was merely a euphemism
for, blank sheets of paper with"a few ascattered words
`=left ini>oftenillegible,"sometimes:misleading,-and usu-
ally mconelusive.14-In'some:cases "notably"as to'the
1974 -coup-in Portugal,'therewas an absolute refusal
to provide. anything, until' early October. '
As -a last' ditch effort, with hearings"approaching; the
Committee'-turned'once again to its subpoena power.
'On September. 10 .1975; it subpoenaed materials from
the three major intelligence agencies and the' National -
Security:-Council 15
What `were ;the materials :that forced the -Committee
to resort. to'the'forc'e o'f law?Were"they the names of
agents?' No 'Were they descriptions- of secret intelli-
' gence techniques? 'No. They were,- simply, copies of
intelligence publications' that 'had been circulated: in
the exiecutive branch "during' the'weep' preceeding "the
events -that .we were examining,16'documents-. circu-
lated literally to hundreds, if notthousa-ds, of people.
?Were'they turned,?over by the date specified in'the
subpo'na? Not 'completely.
The three . intelligence agencies supplied :some of
'.their publications.17 Dr. Kissinger, as'Assistant?to the
President 'for' National' Security:Affairs', refused to
'turn over: a. single. piece of. paper from 'reports pro-
vided to the National Security Council during the,
weeks 1:in question 1s ..:;.
By the. time. hearings on intelligence results began
in mid-September only two. agencies head substantially.
`complied with% our.. subpoenas . 19' More` than`-a month
would pass before a good faith' effort -at compliance
~~t*va. ca r r ? I ^ ~l' `hft: 3 . ~Yt) i11'1' 1
M58, f( 'rthcoming- from the:National ST-curlty:Cound i.e
140n August `:5 '1975, ,the ;Committee received.
testimony. from Dr Albert C ' Hall Assistant Secre-,
Lary-ofDefense`(Intelligence) r ,?
"Chairman PIKE)Well Dr. Hall, we' did make a
formal request 'that you'=:bring `.this -piece 4of paper;
-creating ;the National Security Agencyjwith you:and'
,you tell us .that you ? want :.us. to have everything we
need but. you,,didn t? bring it.' Why?
"Dr Hall. Wehave'to get' clearance. for releasing.'
this ' material ' to' you,. sir.
"Chairman PIKE:', Here `we,' are. representing the,
"'.legislative,branch of Government, asked to appropri-
ate,hundreds of'millions of dollars to a'certain agency.,
.,.and we 'are ` having difficulty: finding the statutory au-
thority for-that agency -even to exist. 'Now, isn't, that
ridiculous?'
13Letters 'were sent 'to CIA on .Aug'..18; -1975;
'Aug'-`I,9, -1975; Aug. 27, 1975; and, Sept. 5, 1975
State Department requests were,, sent on Aug.' 19;.
1975; Sept. 8, 1975;. and -again 'on Sept. 8, :1975. Re-.
quests were forwarded to.the Defense Department on
>Aug. 45, 1975 Aug. 19,,1975;,.Sept. 8 1975 ; ;again. on
Sept ,'8, 1975; and Sept. 91`1975%
The last two pages ?of one set of documents were
typical deletions. :The first page was. apparently a
:cable. It was blank; except for the following: across'
'the', top: ; 3tND/,DOLL-VNM/T-;0144-6SG TRANS-.
-..House Select'Committee Chairman Otis Pike:'He'got
the "dribble treatment"-one or two -documents a day.
LATED DECRYPT _VNJAC/VN NR 1' Y 301300G,
FM"IJB -TO CO ..INFO BBM STOP CNMB 30.119
5610M 4ol: 30JA68,/ 1012Z` 300"
The, second ,page. of the cable " was even less info-r,,
mative.' It was completely blank, except, for .a;,'Top
Secret" Stamp. '
15The ' subpoenas were directed to the National
,Security Agency, the,. Defense,'Intell iigence , Agency,
the Director'ofCentral?Intelligence;'andtle National"
Securi ty ,Council.; . ,'
.16The-,subpoena ,to the :Defense .Intelligence A'gen-,
cy on, the subject. of.the Mid-East,war illustrates the'.
types of -documents: called for: ,
"l-For the period of September 25,.1973, through.
October 6,;19,73, on' a daily basis, .or as frequently as?
same were, issued,,the. original, documents as follows:
-all '. Defense Intelligence. Agency, estimates., Current
Defense: Intelligence `Summaries, situation' Reports,
'and any and 'all cables emanating 'from the'-Defense -
-Attache Office In TO Aviv ,National Military ? lntelli-
gence'Center daily briefings
17A staff summary, prepared on September 12,
1975. indicated the following non-compliance:
"DIA .Items Not'Furnished-Cyprus and Mid East ,
War
a DIA Intelligence Summaries for July, 14.
b DIA'. Intelligence Bulletin for. July 13, July 114'.
and ? Q
0
c DIA Daily'Current Intelligence Briefings', for
July :13, July l'4; and July 20.
d. ""DIA. Daily Intelligence Bull'etins for September '
,29;.. September 3Q, October, 6 ,
'e 'DIA Intelligence- Summary for.September 30..
`NSA,Items-Not Furnished Cyprus,
,a SIGSUM's for .July,13; July 14;.July 19,July 20.
b Wrap up'messages' for July 13, July'14; July
?
"15;?
July 16; July.'.'17.
if or. r.CS: ,' s 'la.;,:j O? .'.~V"'n is "t>~: /.+
or. NSC reads as folibws:E
Warr.;
a: Nothing wasp-furnished, unless NSC maintains
` HSC "via`?NSC, are. `reports provided NSC by
b; Nothing furnished:" ' .
19These were 'the National Security- Agency and
:This problem was soon' dwarfed by a new tactic 1 .1
the - cut-off. - . , ; .- .
On September 12; 1975, the President,, or someone
using his name, cutoff the Committee from all'classi-
feed information. As? if that were not enough, his?.ac-
tion was accompanied by a-demand that we.'immedi-
ately turn over .all classified -'materials :-from our own
2 internal files21
'.The. reason?The Congress, -through-this'Commitfee,
''had passed judgment, 'after lengthy' deliberation of
'the merits, on whether ' fou'r, words "classified" by 'the
Executive branch could be told' to the American peo-
ple.22
The Executive, by its legally questionable. reaction,23
had now set aside any immediate, subpoena problems;
and the public hearing problems 'as' well. .
As background; a hearing, oilvSeptember11'1975,
had reviewed intelligence performance,. with ? respect
to the,Mid-East'war in 1973: The result was shocking:
In the-words of a CIA document, 'the principle con- ,
elusions concerning: the imminence of hostilities
reached and reiterated by' those: esponsible for in
telligence`.'analysis were-quite?simply;obviously, and .
starkly-wrong:1,124 . ,
That ,same document had.verbatiin quotes;frogi two
intelligence -bulletins that weremoderately,;?favorable
and "from five bulletins demonstrating that, intelligence
estimates were embarrassingly,wrong. The twb'fayor-
able quotes were declassified-:and?'read.. into 'the:rec-
ord 25"-The 'five embarrassing' quotes, containing the
same' type..of-information,; were ;not declassified ',by
-CIA. :.
:The,Committee objected 26
The ;CIA returned that afternoon 'to report % %that
after'all=the five quotes could- be declassified 27"-How-
ever; in an apparent need not to appear "arbifrary. in
their earlier decision, they insisted-that sonic 13 words`
still remain classified.
The Committee debated those 13 words . for over'
four': hours 'in 'a closed session. Thee CIA 'Special
Counsel was present and in- telephone ,contact :with
CIA.'Director Colby; the: head of the State Depart-
ment's ? Intelligence and-Res earch was there',-* the head '
?of ,the- Defense?'Intelligence -Agency was there ' and a
high: official of,'.-,the National Security Agency 'was
there. No' agency was .without-representation, and all
had a chance .to,'speak. -Nine' words were mutually
'agreed.to remain classified', 28 but four,.-words W&ren6t.
The four remaining words could: not reveal any
secret "sources 'and methods," `which is. the basis of
official classifications;29:because the information they
contained could have come' from. `any number of
-sources in addition; the- intelligence was so old by
the- time it; was reported that it could not- reveal" how.
rapidly our intelligence techniques - operated 30" The
Comaliittee satisfied- itself 'on these'and?'other'points
'before` taking some half dozen rollcall votes on `the
matter: {
It is possible that never. before had ? so 'much' `ex
pertise' and thought gone.?irifo "a declassificaton''de-
cision."For- this; the -Committee was accused of being
'irresponsible.' . To protect=-national security, -the
"President" invoked a cut=off "perhaps before 'the
President-ever heard'of what.was going on. '
The Committee later learned that in a biography-0f
Dr. Kissinger a year 'earlier,' the subject- to'which the
four words referred' had been spelled out in great de- -
tail: So' much for- the validity, o'of' the' classification
argument.. No. "high State- Department official" had
been cut off from information- or forced to turn over
his, '-files as-,-a result 'of- that earlier publicati'o" . 'So
much for protecting against irresponsibility.'`
Police ;guarding Committee offices were, instructed.:
?to prevent any'takeover Of' files'kythe Executive, and ?
nothing more was -heard of that.
Nevertheless, the cut-off from informatiori'rstruck
at' the heart of Committee operations. One month' out '
'of'our five-month: investigative period-was lost-'while
the issue was negotiated ''With little choice, ; the-Com-
mittee` agreed that for pu'rposes` of getting. the investi
gation"under'way?ag-ain, future disputes;wouldabe re
ferred to the 'President 34' Thls''was`agreed to on the
assurance?of'the President that the"Committee would'
have:no further problem with access, f& information 35,
It is perhaps significant that 'the day the.40,,b t ril"t ell
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was cut off was also the day hearings were scheduled
on the 1974 Cyprus coup. Hearings were to be focused
on the State Department's handling of intelligence,
and of Dr. Kissinger's role therein 36 Those hear-
ings had to be cancelled. However, the Committee
located a State Department witness who was to testi-
fy about Cyprus, even in the absence of classified evi-
dence from the Executive-his name was Thomas
Boyatt.
Thomas Boyatt was the State Department officer in
charge of the Cyprus desk during the period in ques-
tion. The Committee was interested in what kind of
intelligence had been supplied to Boyatt regarding the
1974 coup against Archbishop Makarios and the con-
sequent Turkish invasion.
More important, the Committee wanted to examine
how that intelligence, as well as Mr. Boyatt's analysis
of it, was handled by the decisionmakers at State. Mr.
Boyatt had, in fact, advised one of our staff members
that he vigorously criticized the handling of intelli-
gence at the time of the Cyprus crisis. This criticism
was embodied in a written report which was sent
through the State Department's "dissent channels."37
[Page 25 of the Draft Final Report not available-
editor's note.]
Footnotes:
21Rex E. Loe, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, delivered the order:
". . . [T]he President's responsibities for the na-
tional security and foreign relations of the United
States leave him no alternative but to request the
immediate return of all classified materials heretofore
provided by any department or agency of the execu-
tive Branch and direct all departments to decline to
provide the Select Committee with classified materi-
als, including testimony and interviews which disclose
such materials, until the Committee satisfactorily al-
ters its position."
22When Mr. ex Lee appeared before the Commit-
tee to announce the President's cut-off of information
it became evident that the executive branch had not
given the matter equally careful consideration.
`Chairman PIKE. Mr. Lee, you say it revealed
certain foreign communications activities of the
United States. Is that your language?
`Mr. Lee. That is what I am advised, Mr. Chairman.
`Chairman PIKE. Did you look at the language of
what the Committee released?
"Mr. LEE. I did not.
"Chairman PIKE. You are sitting here making a
statement, saying that we have released language, re-
lating to the communications activities of the U.S.
Government, and you did not even look at the lan-
guage we released."
231n his appearance before the Committee, the
Assistant Attorney General asserted that the dispo-
sition of security information is solely within the pre-
rogative of the executive branch:
"Chairman. PIKE. You say the legislative branch
of Government had no right whatsoever to make any-
thing public that the executive branch of Government
does not want public. Is that your position?
"Mr. LEE. That is our position as far as classified
information is concerned.
"Chairman PIKE. So what you say is that in this
great democracy, one branch of Government, and one
branch ... alone may decide what is secret, and one
branch of Government . . . alone may decide what
is not secret."
In support of his position, Mr. Lee did not assert
that the Congress or the Committee was bound, as a
matter of law, by Executive Order 11652, which
established the current classification system, nor did
he offer any contrary interpretation of Section 6(a) of
H. Res. 591, which explicitly authorized the Com-
mittee to release such information as it deemed advis-
able.
24This quotation is taken from the summary con-
clusion of a post-mortem prepared by the intelligence
community itself. The principle conclusions of the
post-mortem began as follows:
"1. There was an intelligence failure in the weeks
preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on
October 6. Those elements of the intelligence com-
munity responsible for the production of finished in-
telligence did not perceive the growing possibility
of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its im-
minence.
"The information provided by those parts of the
community responsible for intelligence collection was
sufficient to prompt such a warning." The Perform-
ance of the Intelligence Community Before the Arab-
Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-
Mortem Report, Director of Central Intelligence
December 1973).
25The two verbatim quotes which were voluntarily
declassified by the CIA were:
"We continue to believe that an outbreak of major
Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the im-
mediate future.although the risk of localized fighting
has increased slightly.... 4 October 1973 (emphasis
in original).
"There are reports that Syria is preparing for an
attack on Israel but conclusive evidence is lacking.
In our view, the political climate in the Arab states
argues against a major Syrian military move against
Israel at this time. The possibility of a more limited
Syrian strike-perhaps one designed to retaliate for
the pounding the Syrian Air Force took from the Is-
raelis on September 13-cannot, of course, be ex=
cluded." INR Memorandum to the Secretary, 30 Sep-
tember 1973 (emphasis in original).
26The first of five quotes, which was later released,
is as follows:
"Syria-Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and
Egyptian military readiness are considered to be coin-
cidental and not designed to lead to major 'hostilities."
DIA Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1973.
The text was the subject of an extensive discussion
among the Chairman and representatives of the CIA:
"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Parmenter, before we go into
questioning, would you tell me why you have omitted
from your sanitized statement here the actual pre-
dictions, as contained in the report from which you
read, i. e., the DIA Intelligence Summary Statement
of 3 October 1973? '1 want you to look at what the
original report says and tell me why we should not,
here in open session, hear what the DIA actually said
on October 3, 1973.
"Mr. PARMENTER. There are sources and meth-
ods here that we will be happy to discuss in execu-
tive session.
"Chairman PIKE. Sources and methods in that
statement?
"Mr. PARMENTER. Yes, sir.
"Chairman PIKE. I find that incredible. How does
that differ from the one you read on the preceding
page (INR Memorandum to the Secretary) as far as
sources and methods are concerned? . . . All I am
asking you is, could you tell us why the reading of
this plain, blank conclusion by the DIA as to the like-
lihood of the outbreak of war, would reveal a source
or a method?
Mr. ROGOVIN. I will assume that the reason for
the deletion was the manner in which the informa-
tion was secured-
"Chairman PIKE. It doesn't say how the informa-
tion is secured. This is a conclusion.
"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find, as I look at
what has been deleted and what has been omitted
and what has been retained and read, differs not as
to sources and methods, not as to the necessity of
protecting the sensitivity of stuff, but whether it is
in fact rather self-serving...." Sept. 11, 1975.
27A11 five quotes are reprinted in the Mid-East War
Post-Mortem in an appendix to this report. The first
two quotes are typical:
"Syria-Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and
Egyptian military readiness are considered to be co-
incidental and not designed to lead to major hostili-
ties." DIA Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1973.
"Egypt-The exercise and alert activities in Egypt
may be on a somewhat larger scale and more realistic
than previous exercises, but they do not appear to be
preparing for a military offensive against Israel. Cen-
tral Intelligence Bulletin, 5 October 1973." Post-
Mortem, DCI, 6 (December 1975).
28Of the nine words which the Committee agreed
not to release, few of them would have revealed,
directly, any sensitive intelligence sources or methods.
Instead, in most cases, they constituted personal
characterizations, the publication of which might
have been embarrassing to the United States or to
individual foreign officials.
. 29"Sec. 7. In the interests of the security of the,
foreign intelligence activities of the United States and
in order further to implement the proviso of section
102(d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947
(Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first session)
that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be re-
sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and meth-
ods from unauthorized disclosure . . ." 50 U.S.C.
? 403 (1973).
301n the closed session, Mr. Rogovin, Special Coun-
sel to the CIA, stated: ". . . [T]he experts feel very
confident this is the bottom line that can be made
public. These are references to real time reporting.
..." Comm. Execs. Sess., Sept. 11, 1975....
31Mr. Lee referred to what he characterized as the
traditional procedures by which the Congress has re-
ceived and treated classified information, a characteri-
zation which elicited the following colloquy:
"Chairman PIKE. If it is your position that we
may never disclose information, how can we carry out
our responsibilities?
"Mr. LEE. The same way, .` Chaitman, that for
decades other committees in congress... .
"Chairman PIKE. That is exactly what is wrong,
Mr. Lee. For decades other' committees of Congress
have not done their job, and you have loved it in
the executive branch. You tell us that Congress has.
been. advised of this. What does that mean? It means
the executive branch comes up and whispers in one
friendly Congressman's ear or another friendly Con-
gressman's ear, and that is exactly what you want to
continue, and that is exactly what I think has led us
into the mess we are in."
34Text of letter from Mr. William Colby, Director
of Central Intelligence, to the Chairman, dated Sep-
tember 30, 1975:
"With the approval of the President, I am forward-
ing herewith the classified material, additional to the
unclassified material forwarded with my letter of 29
September 1975, which is responsive to your subpoena
of September 12, 1975. This is forwarded on loan with
the understanding that there will be no public dis-
closure.of this classified material (nor of testimony,
depositions or interviews concerning it) without a
reasonable opportunity for us to consult with respect
to it. In the event of disagreement, the matter will be
referred to the President. If. the President then certi-
fies in writing that the disclosure of the material would
be detrimental to the national security of the United
States, the matter will not be disclosed by the Com-
mittee, except that the Committe would reserve its
right to submit the matter to judicial determination."
350n September 26, 1975, Mr. McClory described
the President's position as follows:
"We have assurance, in my opinion, of getting
everything we need, and I would hope we would find
we were getting everything we need."
36Mr.William Hyland, Director of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State, was scheduled to be
the key witness on September 11, 1975. It was unfor-
tunate that the cut-off and later restrictions on testi-
mony from Foreign Service officers, prevented the
Committee from a full investigation of the Cyprus
crisis. There is a closely held State Department report
identifying the people who killed the American Am-
bassador, Rodger Davies, during that crisis, and a
public protest has perhaps not been raised because
these same murderers are now officials in the Cyprus
government. Questions related to that intelligence re-
port should, and must, be cleared up.
37"The `Dissent Channel,' through which this mem-
orandum was submitted, provides those officers, of the
Department of State who disagree with established
policy, or who have new policies to recommend, a
means for communicating their views to the highest
levels of the Department." Letter to Chairman Pike
from Dr. Kissinger, Dept. of State, Oct. 14, 1975.
3. Silenced Witnesses
In response, a new tactic was fashioned-the
silenced witness.
On September 22, 1975, Mr. Boyatt was ordered
not to tell the Committee "information which would
disclose options considered by or recommended to
more senior officers in the Department."38 The order
was added on to the existing ban on classified infor-
mation.
That was not the end. Anything Mr. Boyatt did say
would have to be in the presence of State Department
monitors, by order of the Secretary.
It is worth pointing out that this prohibition ex-
tended to more than Mr. Boyatt's options or advice.
Any information that would disclose those options
was also banned. An attempted interview by the staff,
with monitors, demonstrated that this- covered almost
everything the man ever did or said 40
The State Department's order was issued in spite of
two United States laws which' protect and guarantee
the right of a federal employee to provide informa-
tion to Congress.
One statute says that the right of a federal employee
"to furnish information to either House of Congress,
or to a Committee or Member thereof, may not be
interfered with or denied."41 The second law, which
directly bears on the Boyatt situation, was specifically
designed to encourage candid testimony. of employees
from federal agencies, including the Department of
State.42
The authority invoked by the Secretary of State
was neither "classification," nor "executive privilege,"
but a new doctrine that can best be characterized as
"secretarial privilege."43
The Secretary of State was demanding special
treatment. If this Committee could not have received
testimony from CIA officers or FBI agents about ad-
vice or options they presented to senior officials, it
would have had no choice but to shut down44 Over-
sight would be dead.
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Fortunately,-the~CIA the~FBI,-and the other intel-
ligence agencies lla either not heard of "secretarial
privilege," or did not believe it existed.
On October 2, 1975, the Committee voted to
issue a subpoena for Mr. Boyatt's Cyprus critique.
Dr. Kissinger responded on October 14; 1975, refer-
ring to the subpoena as a "request." It was denied,
even though it was not a request, but a legal order
to produce a document 46.
Time and control are, as we noted at the outset, in-
the hands of those who have possession of documents.
Therefore, the Committee, more than one month
after issuing its subpoena, accepted from Mr. Boyatt
no testimony and no document, but something less.
We were given Mr. Boyatt's memo after it had been
mixed into a number of other paragraphs drafted else-
where in the State Department-ostensibly to protect
Mr. Boyatt. It ended up very much like the proverbial
"riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."47
This time the euphemism was "an amalgam."48
Footnotes:
38This order was embodied in a September 22,
1975, memorandum from Lawrence S. Eagleburger,
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Management, to
William G. Hyland, the Department's Director of
Intelligence and Research. This directive stated that
"the following conditions will pertain. to sworn inter-
views by the Pike Committee staff:
"The Department of State insists that a State De-
partment representative be present during the inter-
views. Should the interviewees wish to be represented
by their own legal counsel, the State Department
representative will be in addition to that private legal
counsel.
"The interviewees are to decline, by order of the
President, to discuss classified material.
"The interviewees are to decline, by order of the
Secretary of State, to give information which would
disclose options considered by or recommended to
more senior officers in the Department of State."
When Mr. Eagleburger appeared before the Com-
mittee on September 25, he stated that the orders
contained in his memorandum of September 22 were
issued at the verbal direction of the- Secretary of
State.
40This was clearly indicated by the following ex-
change among Mr. Field, on behalf of the Committee,
Mr. Boyatt, and Mr. Hitchcock, the Department's
monitor:
"MR. FIELD. Mr. Boyatt, would you please de-
scribe for us in detail what was done in the State
Department not with respect to classified intelligence
reports or information, but ... knowledge of any of
these events, who was involved, and what they were
doing? Would you please describe that for us in
some detail?
"MR. BOYATT. I would like to ask Mr. Hitch-
cock's advice.
"MR. HITCHCOCK. I regret but it appears to me
that this comes to the problem of the description of
the decision-making process which my instructions
seem to indicate is proscribed.
"MR. FIELD. In other words, it is your position
that who was doing what in the State Department
has something to do with decision-making?
"Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes.
"MR. FIELD. We can't discuss this activity? We
can't discuss where he went to, what he did, who
he told, what that person told him in response? We
can't discuss as I understand it, whether or not he
is aware of any moves made by the Secretary of State
towards Turkey, towards Cyprus, either-preceding or
during this period."
41"The right of employees, individually or collec-
tively to petition Congress or a Member of Congress,
or to furnish information to either House of Congress,
or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be in-
terfered with or denied." 5 U.S.C. ? 7102 (1973).
42"Upon the request of a committee of either
House of Congress, a joint committee of Congress, or
a member of such committee, any officer or employee
of the Department of State, the United States informa-
tion Agency, the Agency for International Develop-
ment, the United States Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, or any other department, agency, or
independent establishment of the United States Gov-
ernment primarily concerned with matters relating
to foreign countries or multilateral organizations, may
express his views and opinions, and make recom-
mendations he considers appropriate, if the request
of the committee or member of the committee relates
to a subject which is within the jurisdiction of that
committee." 2 U.S.C. ? 194a (1973).
43Chairman Pike, questioning Dr. Kissinger in an
open hearing on Oct. 31, 1975, stated, "I feel that you
are alleging a privilege which has heretofore been
reserved only to Presidents." Dr. Kissinger responded,
"I have deliberately not asked the President to exercise
executive privilege, nor am I asserting a secretarial-
privilege."
440ne example comes from reports on the Cyprus
crisis: "On the basis of a single CIA report from
Athens, the analysts,, notwithstanding their earlier
concern, conveyed the impression to the policyrnakers
that the world had been granted a reprieve." CIA
Post Mortem on Cyprus, p. iii (January 1975).
Not only were we told about the report, we were
also told about its impact on policymakers. .
46The Committee Counsel, on Nov. 6, 1975, noted
that, "MR. DONNER . . . A subpoena is not an in-
vitation to negotiate. A subpoena is a command by a
duly autho*ized body of government to deliver infor-
mation." ' .. '11., W:t
47WinstotS. Churchill, radio br ddc r
480n November 4, the Commlttee, ' ' ? a' vote of 8
to 5, agreed to the following resolution:
"Resolved by the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives that an amalgama-
tion of Department of State documents to include in
its entirety the papers described as the Dissent Mem-
orandum prepared by Thomas Boyatt while Director
of Cypriot Affairs. in the Department, fulfills the're-
Innuendo of McCarthyism: The late Wisconsin
Senator at a hearing with helpmeet Roy Cohn.
-the Committee for pursuing the plain truth. With that
opinion;. the fiction of an amalgam became feasible.
Some day the full story of Cyprus may be told,
but not by this Committee.
a. An Attack Averted
If no "flank" attack was launched by the FBI
to discredit the Committee, it may have been because
one was averted by the Committee.
On October 9, 1975, Mr. Martin Kaiser, a manu-
facturer of wiretap equipment, testified before the
Committee. He indicated that the FBI bought his
equipment through a middleman, U.S. Recording,
who added a 10 percent markup. There was no justi-
fication for the markup, and it later developed that
the president of U.S. Recording and a top FBI official
were close friends.
The Committee began an investigation of U.S. Re-
cording and its FBI friends. The Justice Department
and FBI later began their own probe of the same
matter.
On December 23, 1975, two and one-half months
after Mr. Kaiser testified, he was, subjected to a six-
hour interview by two FBI agents. The agents were
allegedly carrying out an internal FBI investigation
regarding the agency's contractual dealings with U.S.
Recording Company.
Mr. Kaiser called the Committee to relay his con-
cern, and offered to give a statement under oath as to
the conduct of the FBI agents.
In a Committee deposition of December 30, 1975,
Kaiser claimed that the FBI agents were more con-
cerned with discrediting the Committee's inquiry
and personnel than conducting their investigation of
U.S. Recording: Ultimately, the agents had elicited
from him a statement, written by an FBI agent, which
in some insignificant details recanted portions of his
testimony. Mr. Kaiser then repudiated that written
statement, which he had signed while agents stood
over him and thrust it in front of him.
Taking the initiative, the Committee, on December
31, 1975, released a copy of the written statement, a
full copy of Mr. Kaiser's December 30, 1975, depo-
sition, and the text of a letter to the Attorney Gen-
eral demanding a full explanation of the entire inci-
dent.56 This was done to head off any FBI "leak" of
the statement its agents had taken while Kaiser was
under some duress.
Footnotes:
49Mr. Eagleburger's statement, delivered to the
Committee offices on September 24, 1975, read:
"Mr. Chairman, this is far from a hypothetical
issue. To cite but a single example, the Foreign
Service and the Department of State were torn apart
in the late 1940's and early 1950's over an issue that
raised some of the same concerns that are before us
today-the ability of Foreign Service Officers to give
to the Secretary and their other superiors their can-
did advice, secure in the knowledge that this advice
will remain confidential. The events of those years
not only injured individuals, but also did significant
damage to the process by which foreign policy is
made. Who can be certain how many recommenda-
tions during the years that followed were colored by
memories of those experiences?"
50"I must say again, as I said in the statement
today, the issue for me right now is an issue of prin-
ciple. It is the question of our duty to protect junior
and middle-grade officers of the Department in the
conduct of their duties within the Department . . .
51"While I know that the Select Committee has
no intention of embarrassing or exploiting junior and
middle-grade officers of the Department, there have
been other times and other committees-and there
may be again-where positions taken by Foreign
Service Officers were exposed to ex post facto public
examination and recrimination." Letter to Chairman
Pike from Dr. Kissinger, Oct. 14, 1975.
52The plain facts are that Senator McCarthy de-
stroyed the careers of State Department employees
on the basis of their beliefs and politics. This Com-
mittee never sought the political views of any federal
employee. Senator McCarthy operated without evi-
dence. This Committee sought only evidence. Senator
McCarthy forced people to testify. Mr. Boyatt wanted
to testify. McCarthyism grew out of a lack of char-
acter and integrity, and from a climate of hysteria.
Restrictive rules are no answer to such problems.
53"MR. HAYES. [O]ne of the things that has
deeply offended me ... has been the implication, the
very clear implication, that your position of protect-
ing middle and lower level Foreign Service officers
is a position of protecting them from McCarthyism...
"SECRETARY KISSINGER. With respect to the
charge of McCarthyism, I want to make clear that I
do not accuse this committee of engaging in McCarthy-
ism and I know indeed that the Chairman has a
quirement of the subpoena issued by the Committee
on the 2nd day of October, 1975.
"Provided the amalgamation is accompanied by
an affidavit signed by a person mutually acceptable
to the Department of State and the Committee as
represented by the Chairman and the ranking min-
ority member, attesting that the aforementioned Boy-
att memorandum is contained unabridged in the am-
algamation:
"The. adoption of this resolution shall in no way
be considered as a precedent affecting the right of
this Committee with respect to access to Executive
Branch testimony or documents."
4. Flank Attack
On September 24, 1975, two days after written
instructions to Mr. Boyatt were issued, the Deputy
Secretary of State raised for the first time an innuendo
that the Committee's action resembled McCarthy-
ism 49 The Committee's initial reaction was to dismiss
any such inference as a temporary lapse into poor
taste.
Unfortunately, it was not a temporary lapse.
The next day, on September 25, 1975, Deputy
Secretary Eagleburger appeared before the Committee
to explain the Boyatt order. His statement again re-
ferred to State Department employees' problems with
Congress in past times-a clear reference to the
McCarthy period of the 1950's, as his subsequent
testimony made clear 50 On October 14, 1957, Dr.
Kissinger's written response to the subpoena of
Boyatt's intelligence critique again raised a reference
to McCarthyism 51
The implication was baseless, S2 as both Mr. Eagle-
burger and Dr. Kissinger admitted under questioning.53
Facts seemed to make no difference. Within days
of the innuendo being raised by Dr. Kissinger and his
reply, newspaper columns and editorials were re-
porting their charges of McCarthyism.54
To the extent that such media activity may have
been inspired, directly or indirectly, by the State De-
partment, it helped erode support. within and outside
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record in this regard, and from the convictions of
many of the members that I am familiar with, I know
that this is not the intention of this committee."
"MR. HAYES . . . I don't think there has been
one instance that you can cite or that Mr. Leigh can
cite, where this Committee has ever taken it upon
itself in the tradition of the McCarthys . . . to, in
essence, run a purge operation.
"MR. EAGLEBURGER. Mr. Hayes, there is no
implication in my statement that this Committee is
performing in the way I described the Department
went through in the late '40's and early '50's. That
is not, sir, my point." Sept. 25, 1975.
54The New York Times editorial of October 19,
1975, was entitled, "Neo-McCarthyism?"
"In view of the facts, the Intelligence Committee's
insistence that it has the right to reach into the
interior of the State Department to subpoena the
dissenting memoranda of junior and middle-rank of-
ficials-and to summon them to testify on policy
issues-is clearly contrary to the national interest...."
The Washington Post editorial of October 6, 1975,
entitled "Mr. Pike's Committee" had this to say:
"The analogy with McCarthyism evoked by the
State Department is a relevant one, even though it
appears that in this case the committee of Congress
wishing to question Mr. Boyatt apparently is inclined
to praise him for his views, not persecute him-and
to use his testimony to fault Secretary Kissinger.
Certainly Mr. Kissinger should be faulted for his
Cyprus policy...."
560ne of the most disturbing aspects of the inci-
dent-quite aside from the propriety of interrogating
a Committee witness about the Committee-was that
the, interview was replete with FBI suggestions of pre-
judice on the part of the Committee Counsel. Vigor
was apparently seen as prejudice, and by two agents
who had never met the Committee personnel they
were denigrating.
5. Deletions
In early November, about the same time the Boyatt
problems were being resolved, the Committee moved
on from the subjects of money and what our money
buys. The third topic of our hearings was risks, and
how well those risks are controlled.
Seven new subpoenas were issued. Four were for
materials pertaining to subjects of prior hearings.
They were honored.57 The remaining three were di-
rected to Dr. Kissinger, for materials pertaining to
upcoming hearings. Not surprisingly, those subpoenas
went unanswered.58
Once again, some background is helpful.
Two of the three subpoenas were for covert
action recommendations made by non-CIA officials,
since the CIA had already opened up the covert ac-
tion files to us. The third subpoena was for intelli-
gence records on Soviet compliance with strategic
arms limitation agreement (SALT).
When considering risks, covert actions rank as per-
haps the highest risk operations in the government,
short of war. The law allows CIA "to perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence af-
fecting the National Security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct."60 This is the
legal authority for covert action. A subcommittee of
the National Security Council, presently called the
Party Committee, has been assigned the task of di-
recting these actions.
By tracing money, the Committee came across mil-
lions of rounds of ammunition and weapons being
purchased in the early 1970's. The purchases were
destined for a questionable military venture in a far-
off war that most Americans had probably never
heard of, much less felt they had any national inter-
est in.
The CIA's military escapade was bad enough, but,
on examining documents, the Committee discovered
that the Forty Committee appeared not to have met or
voted on the operation. In fact, internal documents
showed that CIA and the State Department had
turned the project down three times in the previous
two years.
It turned out that during a trip overseas, Presi-
dent Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had met alone with the
head of a foreign government [the Shah of Iran-
editor's note]. At that man's request, the Administra-
tion had involved CIA in an internal war in the head
of state's neighboring country [the Kurdish rebellion
in Iraq-editor's note]. John Connally, on the verge
of heading Democrats for Nixon," was sent back to
the foreign leader, apparently to bring him the good
news of final approval.
A month later, after training for the project had
already begun, Forty Committee members were sent
a memo by Dr. Kissinger informing them, for the first
time, of President Nixon's decision.
In a separate matter, this Committee was told by
former CIA Director Richard Helms of a decision to
undertake a covert action project in Chile. Mr. Helms
had been called into the Oval office and told by Presi-
dent Nixon, with Dr. Kissinger and Mr. John Mitchell
present, that he was to undertake the project in spite
of CIA reservations. He was also told "not to inform
the other members of the Forty Committee."64
A pattern was emerging.
Not all covert actions were generated by the CIA.
In particular, paramilitary operations of the worst
type seemed to come from outside the CIA. Some
projects came from the President. Some projects came
from his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and
some had their beginning in the Department of
State.
Forty Committee records were subpoenaed to see
if the pattern was valid 66 The subpoena was limited
to the official document by which a covert action was
approved. These records were often no more than
one paragraph long.
What arrived in response to our subpoenas showed
nothing-because it was mostly deletions.
The deletions came in all shapes and forms: Typ-
ically, there would be one line left on a page, say-
Secretary Kissinger: He was "alleging a privilege
heretofore reserved only to presidents."
ing, "A CIA project was telephonically approved,"
or, "The Committee voted to approve a CIA paper
entitled [title deleted]." Ofen, if there had been
numerous items considered at a meeting, the deletions
themselves had been cut and pasted together. For ex-
ample, item eight might follow item one, giving the
impression that only two items had been considered
that day.67 Sometimes there would be only one word
left on a page-"Chile"-nothing else, anywhere; but
it was still classified top secret. The information,
needless to say, was worthless68
Wholesale deletions, were encountered in the Com-
mittee's investigation of domestic covert activities as
well.
COINTELPRO, the FBI'S program for disruption
of the "New Left," like nearly all FBI actions, was
extremely well documented. The Committee requested
the appropriate documents in July69 What it re-
ceived were summaries so heavily excised as to be
unusable.
One memorandum, for example, referring only
generically to the "New Left," contained the sub-
heading, "Recommended Procedure," on one page,
and "Results" on the next. The pages were otherwise
blank. Another document with the same type generic
reference, "Black Extremist Organization," was like-
wise excised in its entirety.
The Committee protested. Negotiations followed 70
Finally, in mid-October, an agreement was reached
whereby less excised memos were made available to
Committee staff, at FBI headquarters. The Committee
persisted, selecting a representative number of mem-
oranda to be delivered to its own offices. After some
delay, they were delivered, still excised.
Requests for the documents pertaining to FBI na-
tional security wiretaps led to a similar experience.
One set of documents was delivered, excised beyond
use. Negotiations took place for almost a month.
Finally, a second set of documents was provided, but,
again, without identifying targets of electronic sur-
veillance.
Footnotes:
The following subpoenas were honored:
1) To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, for-all minutes of the National Se-
curity Council Intelligence Committee, its Working
Group and its Economic Intelligence Subcommittee;
2) To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, for the minutes of all meetings of
the Washington Special Action Group concerning the
Mideast War, the Cyprus crisis, and the Portugal
coup;
3) To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, for all intelligence reports furnished
to the National Security Council between October 5
and October 28, 1973, relating to the Mideast war;
4) To the Director of -Central Intelligence, for all
written requests and memoranda of requests from
the CIA to the Internal Revenue. Service since July 1,
1961, for tax information or official action by IRS.
58These subpoenas were not complied with:
1) To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs for all Forty Committee records of
decisions taken since January 20, 1965, reflecting
approval of covert action projects;
2 To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs for documents relating to the Soviet
Union's adherence to the provisions of the.Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972 and the Vladivostok
agreement of 1974; and
3) To the Secretary of State for all State Depart-
ment documents recommending covert actions to the
National Security Council since January 20, 1961.
60The National Security Act of 1947 states:
"(d) Powers and Duties.
"For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and
agencies in the interest of national security, it shall
be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the
National Security Council-
."5) to perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the National Security Council may from time to
time direct." 50 U.S.S. 403(d) (1973).
64"MR. FIELD. In the case of the Chile operation,
could you describe very briefly how that was directed?
"MR. HELMS. Well, there was a part-
"MR. FIELD. How you came to be told-
"MR. HELMS. There was some activity undertaken
at the President's direction in Chile by his saying to
me that he wanted this effort made and that I was
not to inform the other members of the Forty Com-
mittee.
"MR: FIELD. In other words, in the case of the
Chilean operation, were you called to the Oval Office?
"Mr. HELMS. I was in the Oval Office.
"Mr. FIELD. You were called into the Oval Office
and who was present?
"MR. HELMS. The Attorney General and Dr.
Kissinger." Exec. Sess., Oct. 23, 1975.
66"CHAIRMAN PIKE. The question then becomes
-and Mr. Field stated this yesterday-are those op-
erations which are generally within the CIA, and in
the normal course of business, normally more respon-
sible? Do they normally get our nation into less diffi-
culties than those which somebody outside of the
intelligence operation department tells them to do?"
"CHAIRMAN PIKE. Well, here we are seeking to
look at the genesis of all oversight and the degree of
control and the degree of responsibility by which
these operations get launched.
"You and I, and Mr. Dellums, and Mr. Treen, as
members of the Armed Services Committee, for years
heard the magic word, "The Forty Committee." It
has seemed to us as we get deeper and deeper into
this that the Forty Committee really has not been all
that relevant in the decision-making process in the
oversight process. The Forty. Committee is always
held forth as being that body which exercises judicial
restraint, perhaps, in-authorizing these various oper-
ations. It has seemed to me and I think most of the
members of this committee that the activities of the
Forty Committee have been relatively negligible in
authorizing these operations.
"We are trying to get the information to see
whether anybody ever really argues about these
things, to see whether anybody votes no on these
things, to see whether the Forty Committee is a
reality or a rubber stamp."
67"MR. FIELD. I think this is the best example of
the kind of deletions. The items skip from Item 1 to
Item 4. Items 2 and 3 are clearly cut and pasted out
of the document. It then skips from 4 to 7. In other
words, here is a document that could conceivably be
two or three or four pages long. It gives you the feel-
ing that you have gotten a reasonable amount of in-
formation, but in fact all somebody has done is snip
out little sections and paste them together and com-
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pact them and make it look like it is a complete docu-
ment."
68"MR PIKE. I think that as any of us look at what
they have given us, we will simply make a pretty easy
judgment that what tliey have given us is so heavily
censored and deleted as to be meaningless for our pur-
poses."
691t was part of a general request on July 22, 1975,
for all documents previously provided the Senate Se-
70The Senate, which received the same excised ma-
terial, also objected, with more or less the same re-
sults. All of this happened before July 22, 1975. Much
time could have been saved had that information been
volunteered to the House.
6. Privileges
The second Kissinger subpoena brought even less
than the first one.
For the first time in the history of the Ford Ad-
ministration, executive privilege was invoked. The
subpoena which caused this historic assertion was
directed to Dr. Kissinger as Secretary of State. It was
intended for the purpose of examining the type of
covert actions recommended by the State Department
since 1965.
The State Department reported that it had recom-
mended only eight projects-this was later changed
to 16, and still later to 20-but that none of the
documents could be provided to the Committee.
Although only a few of the recommendations were
from a Secretary of State to a President, all docu-
ments were being withheld because they were deemed
privileged communications with Presidents. They in-
cluded recommendations from lesser State officials to
the staff of the National Security Council, with no
apparent intention that the document be for the eyes
or the use of the President.
The communication did not take place in this
President's administration. All privileges recognized
by law are controlled specifically and personally by
the person whose communication is being protected,
and this President was not in that position as to all
the documents 74 It must be noted, again, that no
other intelligence agency or department withheld
recommendations for covert action-or anything else
-sent to the National Security Council. If they had,
the Committee's work would have come to a halt.
In any- event, nothing came forth from the State
Department.
At no time was there a legitimate question as to
which documents the Committee was seeking, under
either this subpoena or the subpoena for Forty Com-
mittee documents. At no time was the physical
amount of paper a problem, since only a few hundred
sheets of paper were at issue. At all times, this Com-
mittee, as well as the Congress, had a right-and, in
fact, an obligation under law75-to review the in-
formation at issue.
With no other recourse, the Committee cited Dr.
Kissinger for contempt on November 14, 1975.76
On November 20, 1975, the Committee approved a
report to the House of Representatives, asking that
the Committee's contempt citation be supported by
the House itself and referred to the U.S. Attorney
for prosecution. Contempt proceedings began to pro-
duce results with respect to the Forty Committee
records. Revised editions, with fewer deletions, were
soon provided.
Nothing came forth from the State Department.
The Committee then entered its last two weeks of
hearings, having endured more than three months of
uninterrupted delays, cut-offs, silenced witnesses,
amalgams, attacks, deletions, and privileges.
Finally, the evening before the Committee was to
take a contempt citation of Dr. Kissinger to the floor
of the House for a vote, the Committee was given
access to State Department recommendations for co-
vert action.78
Footnotes:
74"MR. JOHNSON.... I don't think we ought to
even acknowledge that this is a possibility that a
President 'can control' everything that has happened
in the government files and government documents;
that the President has absolute control over this since
the time of the inception of the Republic."
75"Sec. 2. The select committee is authorized and
directed to conduct an inquiry into-
"(5) the necessity, nature, and extent of overt and
covert intelligence activities by United States intelli-
gence instrumentalities in the United States and
abroad;" H. Res. 591, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
76"Resolved, That the Speaker of the House of
Representatives certify the report of the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
as to the contumacious conduct of Henry A. Kissinger,
as Secretary of State, in failing and refusing to pro-
duce certain pertinent materials in compliance with
a subpoena duces tecum of said Select Committee
served upon Henry A. Kissinger, as Secretary of
State; and as ordered by the Select Committee, to-
gether with all the facts in connection therewith,
under the seal of the House of Representatives to the
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,
4o the end that Henry A. Kissinger, as Secretary of
State, may be proceeded against in the manner and
form provided' by law."
78"MR. FIELD.... Mr. Hyland . . . had both the
State Department recommendations and the Forty
Committee minutes before him. He read verbatim
from the Forty Committee minutes, and he used the
State Department recommendations to verify the date,
the country, and the type of program that was recom-
mended by the State Department, and in response to
our questions, he was very forthcoming."
7. More Delay
40 documents sent to the NSC from CIA that should
have been included in the subpoenaed material.
83The lack of access to documents was the primary
reason no administration witness was called to testify
at the Committee's first SALT hearing. Without docu-
ments to identify issues, we called a SALT critic,
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, to testify.
Ironically, the same officials who withheld primary
source materials from us criticized the Committee for
not presenting administration witnesses. However,
we had no evidence to question them about.
After documents were sent to the Committee, a
hearing was held to receive testimony from two
senior administration officials with reference to cer-
tain documents that appeared to show withholding of
intelligence. The point is that until the Executive
opened access to documents we could not select ap-
propriate witnesses or be prepared with issues; nev-
ertheless, that same Executive made it seem that res-
ponsibility for not calling their witnesses rested with
the Committee.
84For example, SALT intelligence was put on
"hold"- which means it was not only classified, but
not even generally distributed in the executive branch.
Mr. Hyland testified as to one of these "hold" items:
"MR FIELD. But the Russians were told it twice
while it was on hold.
"MR. HYLAND. That is the purpose of the system.
If you decide not'to do it, that is one decision.
"MR. FIELD. Who was it kept from?
"MR. HYLAND. As far as I am concerned, officials
who had an operational policy decision were in-
formed.
"MR. FIELD. That is not the question. Whom are
we keeping it a secret from?
"MR. HYLAND. We are keeping a hold item
secret from people who might read the Central In-
telligence Bulletin that is disseminated in several hun-
dred copies.
"MR. FIELD. We tell the Russians.
"MR. HYLAND. Of course."
The third so-called Kissinger subpoena was inten-
ded for the review of strategic arms limitation agree-
ment (SALT) intelligence handling, but brought in-
stead a return to the delay.
What is SALT, and why was the Committee so in-
terested in the intelligence aspects of it? Briefly,
SALT covers the strategic arms limitation agree-
ments signed with the Russians in 1972, to limit the
arms race. The agreements specifically limit such
things as missile production, deployment, and testing
by the United States and the Soviet Union. The ability
of our intelligence services to detect whether the Rus-
sians are violating this agreement is of vital strategic
interest. More important, SALT intelligence must be
able to move through channels, uninfluenced by bias
or ulterior motives, to appropriate decisionmakers.
The Committee had earlier received testimony that,
during the Vietnam War, a desire to please highlevel
officials may have caused some intelligence to reflect
what the upper levels wanted to hear. Vietnam is
history, but SALT is not.
To check how intelligence was being handled at
the highest levels, and whether it was'ever withheld
from top Executive officials or Congress, the Com-
mittee subpoenaed all reports on, Soviet compliance
that had been sent to the National Security Council.
At first, Committee staff went to the White House
and was given a few SALT monitoring reports.
These, it was said, were absolutely all that the Na-
tional Security Council had in its files on the subject
of SALT compliance. It did not seem possible.
For one reason, the Verification Panel, which exists
primarily to review SALT matters, is part of the Na-
tional Security Council and has been quite active.
For another, the Committee had already identified
dozens of pertinent documents from the intelligence.
community which had been sent to the National Se-
curity Council.82
The skepticism proved accurate. After Committee
proceedings to cite Dr. Kissinger for contempt of the
SALT subpoena, on November 14, 1975, volumes of
SALT intelligence materials began to come forth.
A week had passed since the return date of the
subpoena before the documents we needed were even
identified, making preparations for hearings most dif-
ficult 83 This was the last of the subpoenas, however.
In reviewing the oversight experience, access to in-
formation, even when it was backed up by subpoena,
was not satisfactory. As an example, at the State De-
partment we found that lower level officials had
eventually been ordered not to testify before the Com-
mittee; their documents were likewise refused to Con-
gress. Upper level officials at State had become in-
accessible because of executive privilege; and diplo-
matic exchanges, an important element of intelligence,
were similarly off limits to the Committee.
To place the. importance of this in perspective, in-
telligence has two primary consumers: military and
diplomatic. Diplomacy is preferable to war; yet it is
nearly impossible, today, to evaluate how well-intel-
ligence serves diplomatic ends. If. it does not serve
well, it is-hard to imagine how anything could be
known or done about it by Congress.
The passion for confidentiality and secrecy at State
is curious, because in many cases the Russians and
other adversaries were either directly informed of
the name secrets the Committee sought, or the Rus-
sians know of them by other means.84 It is hard to
imagine a justification for allowing the unelected to
keep elected officials in the dark, in a democracy.
Footnotes:
82We had not received any documents from the
Verification Panel or its subcommittee, the Restricted
Working Group. In addition, we had identified some
8. Routine Problems
When legal proceedings were not in the offing, the
access experience was frequently one of foot-dragging,
stonewalling, and careful deception.
A few examples should suffice.
The President went on television June 10, 1975, and
reassured the nation that the uncompleted work of
the Rockefeller Commission would be carried for-
ward by the two intelligence committees of the Con-
gress. The files of the Commission, President Ford an-
nounced, would be turned over to both committees
immediately.85
The Committee began requesting those files within
the week. We requested and requested.86 We nego-
tiated.
Finally, by threatening to announce publicly that
the President's word had not been kept, the files were
turned over-in mid-October, some four months late.
In another case, likewise involving basic research
information, the Committee in early August, re-
quested a complete set.of what has become known
as the "Family Jewels." This 693-page document was
the very foundation of the current investigations. It
had come into existence as the result of an order by
former CIA Director James Schlesinger, on May 9,
1973, in the wake of Watergate revelations. Dr.
Schlesinger had ordered CIA employees to report any
possible past wrongdoing, and those reports were
compiled into the "Jewels" on May 2-1, 1973.87
By the end of August, the Committee had been pro-
vided only a sanitized version of the document. Let-
ters were sent and negotiations proceeded throughout
September. On October 7, 1975, the staff was told
that they would not be allowed to see the complete
record of wrongdoing as assembled in May 1973.88
A second sanitized version was sent in mid-October,
but it was hardly less sanitized than the first. As an
interesting sidelight, the second version did have one
page that was not in the first. It was a photocopy of
a Jack Anderson newspaper article, nothing more. In
the first version, that page had been blanked out,
with the message, "This information deleted because
it reveals sensitive operational techniques and meth-
ods." The second version was not deleted, but it was
classified.
The Chairman demanded a complete copy of the
report, and was told that one would be forthcoming.
None was. As a result, he scheduled a press confer-
ence for 12:00 noon on October 11, 1975.
At 11:45 a.m. on October 11, 1975, the report was
finally delivered,89 after the life of the Committee's
investigation was more than half over.
These two examples represent some of the most
basic research materials available to the Committee.
Their contents were crimes, abuses, and questionable
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conduct, not sophistical d r , ti a e, i telli ence
secrets.
Other important information was withheld, such
as a Committee request for certain records of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. On
August 25, 1975, a letter was sent asking for a copy
of the Board's agendas since 1961. No written re-
sponse to that letter has even been received.
The Board interested the Committee from the stand-
point of command and control. There have been nu-
merous recommendations, for example, that a pending
executive reorganization make this group the key
command and control unit for foreign intelligence91
The Committee is still waiting for the Board's doc-
uments to be delivered, despite the fact that the rank-
ing minority member of the Committee took a per-
sonal interest in the matter. A month of his efforts
produced only a limited right to see certain informa-
tion, not the documents themselves.
Another important piece of information the Com-
mittee requested was the names and relationships of
newsmen who worked for both the CIA and the
American news media at the same time. Congress-
man Dellums asked for this in executive session on
August 6, 1975.92 The information was re-requested
by letter on October 14, 1975, and on October 21,
1975, and on October 31, 1975, and on September 2,
1975.93
The Committee is still waiting for answers about
the newsmen. The only information it did receive
was in response to inquiries about specific news-
men, after we had determined from other sources that
there was a CIA connection. In fact, in one case, the
CIA denied the relationship until confronted with
irrefutable proof.
As a final example, there is a category of intelli-
gence that is sent to the Secretary of State, who then
controls its further dissemination. It is called "NODIS
CHEROKEE ."94
The Committee specifically requested NODIS
CHEROKEE information with reference to the Cy-
prus crisis in 1974. It was told none existed. Two
months later other officials revealed that the mate-
rials do exist. When the Committee went back to
State with this new information, it was simply told
NODIS CHEROKEE was not going to be given to
us96 By then, there was no time left to issue a
subpoena.
a. The Right Question
Perhaps the most difficult problem in developing
information about intelligence activities is knowing
the right question to ask 97
As an illustration, Committee staff obtained the
names of CIA proprietaries, after lengthy negotiations.
Some time later, staff members noticed that certain
names were not on the list. The explanation was that
those were "fronts," and we had not asked for fronts.
Nor was this sort of semantic contest confined to
staff inquiries. In one . public hearing, Congress-
man Stanton and the FBI's Raymond Wannall con-
sumed more than five minutes drawing distinctions
among "surreptitious entry," "burglary," and "illegal
break-in."
Another example grew out of a Committee investi-
gation of a covert action project that had taken place
some years ago. This particular project was the sub-
ject. of unusual interest by the Committee, both be-
cause-of the country involved and because it entailed
tampering in the free election of an allied nation. The
Committee's objections to the project were strong
enough that it voted to recommend to the President
that the project no longer be kept secret.
Astonishingly, while the Committee was in the
midst of objecting to this past project, CIA was ob-
taining approval for re-instituting.the same type of
project in the same country. The CIA never told the
Committee about this renewal. When newspapers re-
vealed the new project, Committee staff asked the
CIA why it had not been told. The response was,
"You didn't ask the right question." '
Time and again, a question had to be repeated and
variously repeated. Only then would the sought-
after facts emerge, even though the intent of the
questions had been readily apparent. The operable
ground rules were, as one official put it, "After all,
we're not a Coke machine; you don't just put in a
quarter and expect something to come out."
Examples of the difficulty in asking the right ques-
tion are a bit like trying to prove a negative; the full
impact may not be possible to illustrate. It was,
however, the most nagging factor in attempting to
exhaust the items that deserved Congressional insight.
The significance is that it reflects an attitute which
cannot be expected to change; and, as long as that
is the case, ready access to documentary evidence and
primary source material is all the more imperative.
Footnotes:
85"Because the investigation of the political assas-
sination allegations is incomplete . . . I will make
available to the Senate and House Select Committees
these [Rockefeller Commission] materials together
with other related materials in the executive branch.
... I should add, that the Senate and House Commit-
tees are also in the process of making further investi-
gations as they have been charged with the responsi-
bility by the Congress; so there's not going to be any
possibility of any cover-up because we're giving them
the material that the Rockefeller Commission devel-
oped in their hearings...." President's News Confer-
ence, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1975.
86More than two dozen phone calls were made, by
three separate members of the staff, over a three-
month period.
87"MR. JOHNSON. On May 9th 'of '73, Mr. Schles-
inger issued a directive calling on all CIA employees
to report any and all abuses by the CIA. That is a
matter of public records, there isn't any question
about that, is there?
"MR. COLBY. No, sir.
"MR. JOHNSON. And is it also ' a fact that by
May 21, just 11 days later, there were several hun-
dred separate reports of abuses which had been re-
ported to him?
"MR. COLBY. There-were a number of abuses. I
couldn't give you a quantitative statement.
"MR. JOHNSON. That is the report that has been
called by a variety of names, it has been called poten-
tial flap activities, or jewels, or the family jewels;
isn't that the report we are talking about?
"MR. COLBY. Yes."
88"On 4 September I formally requested to see the
original copy of the unsanitized `family jewels' from
the Review Staff at CIA. I was put off. Then Seymour
Bolten, Chief of Review Staff, countered with an of-
fer to have someone sit with Mr. Pike and let him
read a version. This was unacceptable, so they further
'compromised' and offered to let Jack Boos and A.
Searle Field sit at CIA with the sanitized 'family
jewels' and ask for each sanitization as it came up.
This was also unacceptable and the access flap
started.
"Now, I have been told by Donald Gregg and Sey-
mour Bolten that 'no one will see the original, unsani-
tized family jewels.' " Memorandum to Mr. A. Searle
Field, from Emily Sheketoff, Oct. 7, 1975.
89"Pike told reporters the documents had been
turned over to him, for Committee use, 'a few minutes
before noon.
"'We have been trying to get documents with hard
evidence and a particular document including the re-
port generated by Mr. Schlesinger about alleged im-
proprieties within the CIA,' [Pike] said.
"Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger served
as CIA director for a few months in 1973 and held an
in-house investigation of the agency before he left
that post." "Pike Gets a New Report," The Washing-
ton Star, p. A-10, Oct. 11, 1975.
91From time to time, the Board has examined the
scope and effectiveness of covert action and the tech-
nical means ol; gathering intelligence. Staff was in-
formed of current discussions to enhance the responsi-
bilities and resources of the Board. Another concern
was the role and interrelationships of members of the
Board with the business community. Many of these
members are affiliated with major intelligence com-
munity contractors.
92"MR. DELLUMS. Describe the existence and na-
ture of the CIA secret propaganda operations in the
U.S. I would appreciate detail. How`many U.S. jour-
nalists overseas are in contact with the CIA? How
many outlets for media operations does the CIA have
in the U.S.?"
93This set of requests was for "a complete list of
all people now in the news media who have ever had
a relationship, contractual or otherwise, with the
Agency." Letter to Donald Gregg, Assistant to the
Director, CIA, from Emily Sheketoff, Oct. 21, 1975.
94"MR. HITCHCOCK. NODIS CHEROKEE is a
particularly sensitive category of NODIS messages
limited in use to relatively few embassies, covering
intelligence materials of extraordinary sensitivity,
handled virtually only by the Secretary, the President,
if he is involved, and the Chief of Mission. And virtu-
ally one-man dissemination in Washington and the
field."
96"All of them (NODIS CHEROKEE) . . . contain
diplomatic correspondence between the capitals and
Washington. . . . Thus, these messages do not deal
with the intelligence matters of concern to the com-
mittee and do not relate to your request of 16 Octo-
ber." Letter to Gregory Rushford from J. J. Hitch-
cock, Department of State, Jan. 5, 1976.
97"MR. PIKE. It has been my experience and judg-
ment that if you [Mr. Colby] are asked precisely the
right,question,.you, will give,an honest answer. You
do rioi-lead us info those areas which would help us
knbwrrhat`tfl'e(r ght question was to ask. You do not
make it easy for us to ask the right question. Anyone
who thinks you have been running back and forth
to Capitol Hill with briefcases bulging with secrets
which you are eager to bestow upon us hasn't sat on
my side of the desk."
Congress and
the Secrecy
Dilemma
Classified information presents a classic paradox:
without it, government sometimes cannot function;
with it, government sometimes cannot function.
Spy agencies cannot publish details about- their
operations. At the same time, Congress cannot fail
to report to its constituents about abuses of their
government. What it all means is that there must be
a responsible system of classification, accompanied
by an equally responsible and effective system of
declassification.
We have neither.
It has been easy to create secrets, but this govern-
ment has yet to construct an adequate way to handle
the problems too many secrets create. We have no
Official Secrets Act-which would make it a crime
to publish secrets-because such a law would be un-
constitutional.100 Therefore, the only real enforce-
ment of classification is sanctioning those who depend
on access to secrets,101 such as Congress. Congress
can be, and has been, either cut off from classified
information or convinced to receive secrets selec-
tively.
That is only the beginning of classification problems.
The law says that there are to be only three cate-
gories of classifications: top secret, secret, and con-
fidential.102 In spite of this, intelligence agencies
spawn all sorts of "higher" classification, such as
"code word" or compartment" categories. Just as
often, information is simply withheld from Congress
under ad hoc arrangements. This Committee was
frequently told that, whereas its mandate was legal
authority to receive classified information, that was
not enough.
Footnotes:
'?0Mr. Colby stated: "I do believe that the question
of an Official Secrets Act has to be looked at in the
context of our Constitution . . . I would not apply it
to the press, for example, because I think that would
run into real conflict with our Constitution."
Chairman Pike summarized the witnesses' testi-
mony as follows: "I gather that you are all agreed
there should be no Official Secrets Act or the equiva-
lent thereof, and that our Constitution simply doesn't
allow it, for openers."
'?'In the course of the investigation, one official
reminded Committee staff of an anecdote involving
President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. Dur-
ing one of their visits, President Kennedy apparently
asked the Russian leader about a Soviet citizen who
had been sentenced to 23 years for running naked
through Red Square shouting, "The Party Leader is a
moron." Chairman Khrushchev allegedly replied, "He
got one year for indecent exposure, two years for
insulting the Chairman, and twenty years for reveal-
ing a state secret."
102The classification categories and criteria used by
the executive branch are defined in Section 1 of
Executive Order 11652, as follows:
"SECTION 1. Security Classification Categories.
Official information or material which requires pro-
tection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest
of the national defense of foreign relations of the
United States (hereinafter collectively termed "na-
tional security") shall be classified in one of three
categories, namely "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Con-
fidential," depending upon the degree of its signifi-
cance to national security. No other categories shall
be -used to identify official information or material
as requiring protection in the interest of national
security, except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute."
1. Oaths and Agreements
The first matter of business between the CIA and
the Committee was a request by the Agency that all
of the staff be required to sign six pages of CIA
oaths.
These elaborate oaths stipulated, in effect, accept-
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able conduct for Congressional employees.,with , re-
spect to things CIA had determined were secret.
Without oaths, secrets would not be forthcoming.
The staff represents, of course, Committee members,
but the members were not asked to sign oaths. Per-
' haps this was because members would not do any-
thing untoward with secrets. More likely, it was be-
cause they would protest loudly.
The Committee reminded CIA that subjecting our
employees to Executive oaths would violate the con-
cept that Congress is an independent and co-equal
branch of government.
It is the Constitutional responsibility of Congress
to control its own staff, and this is the course the
Committee followed. It required every employee to
sign a statement, drafted by the Committee, reflect-
ing the needs and considerations of Congress, and en-
forced by Congress107
This may seem like so much posturing; but it is
important not to underestimate the significance of
firmly establishing the premise that a target of an in-
vestigation does not lay down ground rules.' As the
Agency noted, this has not been the case in the past;
and it may be one of the reasons this investigation
had become necessarylos
The,next move was to require the Committee to
enter into agreements.
The, proposed agreements outlined certain cate-
gories of information so sensitive that the Committee
was to agree in advance not to see them. When this
was rejected, a modified version of those agreements
set forth proposed rules and regulations the Com-
mittee would abide by if certain classified information
were to be made available.109 These agreements also
included a proposal to "compartment" our staff 110
Compartmenting would mean dividing them up and
restricting their access to each other's work.
The,Committee refused to sign. It refused even to
agree, as a matter of "understanding," that Execu-
tive rules would be binding. Such proposed under-
standings included allowing intelligence officials to
review the notes of investigators before notes could
be brought back to Committee offices. Other com-
mittees have consistently been subjected to that ar-
rangement.111
The FBI then came forward with a six-page agree-
ment that they requested be signed before classified
information could be handled by the Committee.
The FBI proposal was even more restrictive than
CIA's. Secret documents would be made available in
special rooms at the FBI, with FBI monitors present.
Notes would be reviewed by FBI agents. After notes
had been appropriately sanitized, they would be sent
to, our offices.112
Once again, the Committee refused to sign. It did
agree orally to put all future requests for documents
in writing. The repercussions of this oral agreement
illustrate quite nicely the problem with agreements.
A few days later the Committee received a letter from
the Justice Department stating that requests for ma-
terials that had been made a month earlier by Com-
mittee members in public hearings had not been ful-
filled, Even though FBI officials had publicly agreed
to furnish the documents promptly, the requests had
not been "in writing."113 ,
While the Committee was negotiating an end to the
cut-off from classified information, another agreement
for handling secrets was proposed by the Executive.
The Committee was asked to agree that certain cate-
gories of information be inaccessible.114 Other cate-
gories would be available only to senior members, by
means of selective briefings. Again, it was not
agreed to.
lOSAs the Chairman expressed it to Mr.' Rex Lee of
the Justice Department: "It means the Executive
Branch comes up' and whispers in one friendly Con-
gressman's ear or another friendly Congressman's- ear,
and that is exactly what you want to continue, and
that is exactly what I think has led us into the mess
we are in."
109"c. The compartmentation procedures of the In-
telligence Community have been established pursuant
to statute and National Security Council Intelligence
Directives.-The simplest way for the staff to obtain
access to this compartmented material would be to
accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modified
in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties
in access to such compartmented material' throughout
the Intelligence Community." Letter to Chairman
Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA, July 28, 197.
110The specific suggestion came in a letter to the
Chairman: "The security principle of 'compartmen-
tation' involving special access and information dis-
semination controls is designed to ensure that only
those individuals whose 'need to knows have been
specifically approved by some higher authority, who
have been specially indoctrinated, and who undertake
special commitments to protect it are provided access
to a particularly sensitive category of foreign intelli-
Senator Henry Jackson: He was "extremely helpful" to
the CIA in its "problems" with Senate investigators.
screened `~n4ate'r hJs` bhl(y 'if such rotes are reviewed
and cleared by- the Bureau under the provisions. of
(6) (a) thru (c) above." Proced res, submitted by
the Department of Justice, to the House Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, Aug. 19, 19"3.
113"You will recall that the C amittee agreed to
put all requests for materials, d cuments, informa-
tion, and briefings in writing....
"To date the Department has not received written
requests which encompass all of the oral requests
which were made by the different Committee mem-
bers during the testimony of Me srs. Pommerening
and Walsh before the Committee an August 7, 1975.
Letter to Mr. Field, from Mr. Steven Blackhurst,
Department of Justice, Aug. 21, 1 75.
114111. Identities of secret agent,,, sources and per-
sons and organizations involved i operations which,
if disclosed, would be subject to personal physical
danger, or to extreme harassment, or to economic or
other reprisals, as well as material provided confiden-
tially by cooperating foreign in elligence services;
diplomatic exchanges or other material the disclosure
of which would be embarrassing to foreign govern-
ments and damaging to the forei n relations of the
jJnited States; and
"2. Specific details of sensitive i telligence methods
and techniques of collection... .
"Verification procedures will continue to be avail-
able in case of Committee questi s concerning mat-
ters deleted by the Executive agency.
"Other matters, the complete confidentiality of
which the President personally certifies is essential
to the effective discharge of Presi ential powers, may
be `withheld." Draft Agreement, submitted to the
Committee, Sept. 28, 1975.
2. Selective B iefings
Soon after the opening heari: gs, staff began in-
vestigating a high-risk, secret program. A request was
made to interview the official in -charge of the pro-
gram. The interview was grant d, but the official
refused to talk about the program He sat with a thick
book of documents, but he refus d to let any docu-
ments be reviewed. They were t o secret,
Intelligence officials made a proposal the Com-
mittee would hear again and a afn. The Chairman'
and perhaps the ranking minorit Member could be
briefed on the program.1 17 In ligh of the fact that the
Committee had been told that c earances would not
be used to block the staff's work it protested. When
the Chairman refused to be brief d alone, intelligence
officials relented and allowed sty f. to have access to
the information, so long as the Chairman was briefed
first.
A second example illustrates the problem with
selective briefings. The Committee inquired into a-
project that included foreign military assistance via
the CIA. It was "too sensitive" to discuss with staff.
Once again, intelligence official asked to brief the
Chairman and senior Members.
The full Committee and staff ere briefed, and the
consensus was that the project ad turned out to be
one of the more outrageous ventures by CIA. Some
months later, this same project was the subject of
a Committee action to ask the P esident that the full
story be made public.
A recent CIA operation in Afr a followed the same
awkward course of senior Me ber and senior staff
briefings first, then full and pros pt disclosure to the
Committee. This Committee consistently maintained
this policy that everything told to senior members
was promptly told to the full ommittee119 If Con-
gress wanted a one- or two-ma Committee, it had
every opportunity to set one u It has not done so
to date. Preventing this from ha pening de facto was,
and is, a serious challenge.119a
gence sources and methods. Corn partme tation assists
in.. the application of the 'need-to-know', principle by
ensuring that individuals are provided access to only
that information clearly essential to the performance
of their duties....
"For your information, in addition to the Senate
Select Committee's use of the modified secrecy oath
dealing with compartmented access, the following
House and Senate committees have obtained com-
partmented access for their staffs, which was granted
after the normal briefings and signing of the secrecy
oath:
"Armed Services Committee
"Appropriations Committee
"Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee"-
Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA, July
28, 1975.
1i'The CIA has also informed this Committee that
all other Congressional committees leave their per-
sonal notes at Agency headquarters.
112" (3) The Department will furnislj access at the
Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those materials re-
quested:
"(a) only to the members of the Committee, where
it' is determined by the Attorney General that the
materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelli-
gence sources of peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign
intelligence operations. -
"(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is, made
for the identities of so-called "live" informants or
potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual
of Instructions as to which no access will be fur-
nished unless the identity of the individual as an in-
formant or potential informant has already been made
known to the Committee...
"(a) Before the copies of . . . materials are taken
to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24
hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and
paraphrases of information which might, if inadver-
tently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources or
sensitive ongoing operations.
"The ? Committee' staff may, remove "notes' on' dn-
Footnotes:
107The following excerpts are from the agreement
signed and honored by the members of the Commit-
tee's staff:
"EMPLOYEE 'AGREEMENT
"1. I have read House resolution 591, 94th Con-
gress, establishing the House Select Committee on In-
telligence, and the Committee's Rules and Security
Regulations.
"2. I understand that as a condition of employ-
ment with the Committee I am required to, and here-
by agree to, abide by House Resolution 591, 94th
Congress, and by the Committee's Rules and Security
Regulations.
"4. 1 further agree that I will not divulge to any
unauthorized person in any way, form, shape or
manner the contents of classified information received
or obtained pursuant to House Resolution 591, 94th
Congress. I .understand that it is my responsibility to
ascertain whether information so received or obtained
is classified. I further understand and agree that the
obligations hereby placed on me by this paragraph
continue after my employment with the Committee
tia-s terminated."
Footnotes:
117This request was a consta t problem, as illus-
trated by the Chairman's rema ks with reference to
subpoenaed Forty Committee m terials-.
"Chairman PIKE. It has been indicated to me that
I would be permitted to go do n and look at these
documents. That is not satisfa ory to me. We sub-
poenaed these documents for tl e Committee. One of
the difficulties which my pred cessor had was that
he was in possession of infor: ation which the rest
of the Committee did not hav . This Chairman has
made it clear from the outset tI at when we subpoena
documents for the Committe and when there is
information which the Commit ce feels it is essential
that the Committee have, I an not going to look at
the information and deprive tl rest of the Commit-
tee of it."
119"Chairman PIKE. I have t o problems with that
tierification situation.
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"We have had this situation time and time again
in the House of Representatives where the members
of a committee, and the members of the House are
asked to trust the discretion of the Chairman, or of
the Chairman and the ranking Member.
"I have a great deal of problem with the concept
that I should be privy to information which is with-
held from the rest of the Committee. That is No. 1."
119alntelligence agencies are constantly maneuvering
to keep information from Congress:
"MEMORANDUM FOR
THE RECORD 23. February 1973
FROM: [deleted], CHIEF, WESTERN HEMIS-
PHERE DIVISION
RE: MEETING WITH SENATOR JACKSON
TO DISCUSS HOW CIA SHOULD
HANDLE INQUIRIES FROM SENATOR
CHURCH'S SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUL-
TINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, IN RE-
GARD TO CIA 'INVOLVEMENT WITH
ITT IN CHILE IN 1970.
"TOPICS DISCUSSED. Senator Jackson's advice
to us was as follows:
"1. Senator Jackson felt strongly that the first
order of business for CIA in terms of handling the
basic issues that were involved in the Senate, Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corpora-
tions asking the Agency about its activities in Chile
in 1970, was to discuss the problem with the White
House. (Jackson) was quite explicit that this con-
versation should be carried out by Schlesinger and
that he should talk with no one other than President
Nixon and Mr. Halderman (sic). The Senator stressed
repeatedly that the Church Subcommittee on Multi-
national Corporations had focused on ITT only in
the sense that this was the top of the iceberg. . .
"2. Senator Jackson felt that the ultimate solution
to the problem facing the Agency . , . could be found
in getting Senator McClellan, acting on behalf of
Senator Stennis, to call a session of the CIA Over-
sight Committee. This Committee would then look
into the nature and scope of CIA's activities in Chile
in 1970. Once that was accomplished, the Oversight
Committee would handle the Foreign Relations Com=
mittee. Senator Jackson repeatedly made the comment
that in his view the CIA Oversight Committee had
the responsibility of protecting the . Agency in the
type of situation that was inherent in the Church
Subcommittee. As a result of this conviction, Senator
Jackson would work with the Agency to see that we
got this protection . .
"4. Once the Oversight Committee had heard the
details provided on the CIA's involvement, `the
Agency could send a brief statement to the Church
Subcommittee staff members in response to the ques-
tions which they had previously posed to CIA. Senator
Jackson agreed that the following statement would
be perfectly adequate for this purpose:
"'The testimony of Mr. Helms on 5 and 7 Febru-
ary before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
clearly established that CIA neither gave to nor re-
ceived from ITT funds for use in Chile in 1970 for
support of political parties. In addition, Mr. Helms'
testimony brought out the fact that there were no
joint action programs established in the context of the
1970 political developments in Chile, CIA regards
Mr. Helms' testimony on this topic to be accurate
thus, no further elaboration is planned.'.
"9. Comment. Senator Jackson was extremely help-
ful throughout 23 February on the issue of the
Agency's problems with the Church Subcommittee.
Senator Jackson is convinced that it is essential that
the procedure not be established whereby CIA can
be called upon to testify before a wide range of
Congressional committees,"
3. Special Restrictions
Committee Members are not the only object of se-
crecy arrangements proposed by intelligence officials.
Other Members of Congress apparently cannot be
trusted with secret information about the government
they govern.--
Time and again, staff was told that it would be
difficult to turn over documents because of Rule 11.
Rule 11 is a House rule that allows members of the
House of Representatives to have access to all "com-
mittee hearings, records, data, charts, and files ..."120
'The Committee was asked to sign letters affirming
that it would not turn over any documents to another
Member of the House. The Committee was eventu-
ally asked to pass a Resolution to, that effect. Some-
times this acted to delay the forwarding of documents.
The primary result was that most materials the Com-
mittee received in the closing months of its investi-
gations were "on loan."121
The concept of loaning materials to the Committee
had other advantages for the intelligence community.
The first advantage is the right to possession and
control of final disposition of our files, Without a
loan arrangement, staff was told that certain papers
could not be provided.
The other advantage in, loaning documents per-
tained to a possible court contest over release of clas-
sified information. If release of a document were
going to be legally, disputed, the Executive clearly
wanted to be in the position, of having legal possession
of that document. Unfortunately, release or publica-
tion of Committee information raised far more imme-
diate, and practical, problems.
Footnotes:
120Specifically, House Rule XI (2) (e) (2) provides
that:
"All committee hearings, records, data, charts, and
files shall be kept separate and distinct from the con-
gressional office.'records of the Member serving as
chairman of the committee; and such records shall be*
the property of the House and all Members of the
House shall have access thereto."
I2tThe standard caveat, which accompanied all ma-
terials turned over to the Committee, was adopted
from a letter of Sept. 30, 1975:.
"This is'forwarded on loan with the understanding
that there will be no public disclosure of this classi-
fied material (nor of testimony, depositions or inter-
views concerning it) without a reasonable oppor-
tunity for us to consult with respect to it." Letter to
Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA.
4. The Release Qf Information
One of the most troubling problems the Committee
faced was what information to release and what proc-
ess to follow in making its decision. A corollary
problem was what to do about unauthorized release
of information.
Existing standards for. classifications are vague,
arbitrary, and overused. Almost anything can be a
"source" or "method" of intelligence-which are the
primary . criteria for foreign intelligence classifica-
tions. As a result, the sources or methods by-line is
used to classify items that have practically no bearing
at all on intelligence, but was extremely embarrass-
ing.123
Overuse of classifications is inevitable when, by the
Executive's most recent estimate, some 15,466 persons
can classify information.124
The difficulty is that no one in Congress can de-
classify. The Executive Branch claims exclusive and
sole jurisdiction. This gives an administration the
power to use the classification system in a manner
that can result in manipulation of news by declassify-
ing information that can be used to justify policy,
while maintaining classification of information that
may lead to contrary conclusions. Another aspect to
be recognized is that classification can hide conduct
from the American people that is well-known to the
foreign country involved. Castro knew of the assas-
sination attempts, the Cambodians knew they were
being bombed, but the American people, whose gov-
ernment was engaging in these practices, were not
aware of the activities because of the classification
system.
The dilemma arises when a Congressman or Com-
mittee receives information which one or the other
decides should be brought before the people they
represent. This Committee faced that problem and
did not reach a satisfactor solution.
The procedure followed by the Committee was
that when it decided to consider making public cer-
tain information taken directly from classified docu-
ments or testimony, it would give appropriate execu-
tive branch officials 48 hours' notice. It would then
allow those officials to appear before the Committee,
in closed session, and present arguments against re-
lease of-all or part of the information. If no agree-
ment could be reached, the materials at issue would
be forwarded to the President. They would be re-
leased unless the President asserted, personally and
in writing, that release would be "detrimental to the
national security."126
The Committee used this process with three sep-
arate pieces of information. All three were covert
CIA projects. Their release was proposed in sep-
arate motions placed before the Committee by Con-
gressman Johnson.
The initial Johnson motions were introduced in
November 1975, and voted down by the Committee,
with five Members not present. Some weeks later, the
motions were made again,' with all but one Member
present, and approved by the majority. 128 This began
the release of information 'process..
The next step was' to draft a shorf statement out-
lining the, signiflcan aspeCtS Of nch ntlt Opera,
tion.129 The statemem is were forwarded to the Special
Counsel to the Dire tor of Central Intelligence, with
an accompanying le ter notifying him of an oppor-
tunity to present the Intelligence Community's views
in'a hearing three ays later.
The, Director of entral Intelligence, Mr. Colby,
appeared, accompal led by appropriate officials, to
present any specific objections he' might have. His
response was specifi ; but sweeping. He objected to
everything, no matt r how it was worded; nd no
matter how imposs ble it would be to identify a
country, a source, o an operational method.131 I "I
Mr. Colby's respo se seemed to end any good faith
effort to work out utually acceptable release of in-
formation, but the Committee made one more effort.
The three statemen were rewritten, making them
even more general an before. Names of countries
were taken out; only gross dollar totals were used;
and innumerable ge eric descriptions were inserted.
In one case, far less remained than had appeared in
newspaper articles a ributed to high executive branch
officials.
In a hearing the next day, Mr. Colby still objected
to the release of any hing.132
This meant that all the materials had to ~e for-
warded to the Pres' ent for a decision on 'vhether
release would be de imental to the national security.
The President, of course, turned to CIA forkuance.
More than three weeks later, the Chairman was
informed in writing by the President that t r& Com-
mittee could not ii plement its decision t release
the two statements.
Incredibly, the resident's letter was classified
"secret." The secret stamp was unnecessary, because
there were no facts at all about the covert- projects
in his letter. The ty es of projects at issue'were not
even mentioned. Th letter was simply a rhetorical
pronouncement of h,* important confidentlity is,
and how telling the merican people what their gov-
ernrkent is doing i these matters would harm our
best interests.
It should be note that one of the items that al-
legedly would harp this nation's security if made
public had alread been made public-by Dr.
Kissinger.134
Footnotes:
123A typical example was the CIA refusal, at
first, to declassify art of the 1973 Mid-East War
Post-Mortem. That osition produced the following
exchange with the IA Special Counsel:
"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find, as I look gat
what has been dele ed and what has beet) omitted
and what has been retained and read, differs 1i.t as to
sources or methods, of as to the necessity of'pr'teit-
ing the sensitivity o stuff, but whether it is in fact
rather self-serving, o whether. it is in fact rather daii-
aging,"
124This estimate was provided to the Committee LX
the Interagency Classification Review Committee,
which was established by President Nixon in Execu-
tive Order 11652, w ich also established the security
classification system now in force....
126In the event of disagreement, the matter will be
referred to the prey ent. If the President then certi-
fies in writing that the disclosure of the material
would be detrimental to the national security of the
United States, the m tter will not be disclosed by the
Committee, except t at the Committee would reserve
its right to submit he matter to judicial determina-
tion." Letter to Chai man Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIS,
Sept. 30, 1975.
128The votes were 10-2, 10-2, and 10-2.
129The shortest st tement was two pages; the long-
est was 14 pages.
131Mr. COLBY. , Chairman, we have several dif-
ficulties with this r port. We looked through' it. We
tried to identify what things might be released and
what things might n t. There are a few odd sentences
that might be releas d."
132"Mr. NELSO . . . I consulted with the Di-
rector. It is his position that he would obje4,t to the
declassification of ither of these papers s' I de-
scribed them to bin over the phone."
134"Tokyo U.S. as istance prevented a to C over by
Soviet-backed elem nts in Angola in July' ' senior
official aboard U.S Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger's plane sa d en route to Tokyo yesterday."
Washington Post. A-17, Dec. 8, 1975.
This was the first administration acknowledgement
of U.S. involvement in Angola.
"Secretary of Stat Henry A. Kissinger's admission
that the United Stat s is frying to be helpful to some
neighbors of strife- orn . Angola is a surprise only
because Kissinger has openly acknowledged it."
Jeremiah O'Leary, "U.S. Admits Indirect Aid to
Angola," Washingto Star, A-4, Dec. 10, 1975. []
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9th St E 623-3 Rms $90/Mo.No Fee
11 St E 642-2 Rms $75/Mo. No Fee
See Supt at 628 E 9 St or Call
674-8913 or 516-678-1634
9th Ave40s NO FEE
3 ROOMS $125
Well maint walk ups.Ownr-mgt221-5710
10th St-W(130) Apt to rent
Murray Space shoes to see Wed, Sat
12-5. Call
242-7754.
10 ST-374 E-No Fee
Large beautiful apts. 3 Rooms $65
4 Rooms $90. Near shopping.
Supt Apt 14 or CA 8-1201
10 ST.,216 EAST(off 2nd Ave)
4 ROOM APTS $195
QUIET,LOCKED BUILDING
10TH ST-323 East.2 cluplexes,both
w/private garden.3 ft.livrm;$290
&$305.Big airy fir-thru;5 rm over-
looking Thompkins Sq."$275.NO FEE
Call Bill 675-1384
10 ST., 35 EAST
EXCITING DUPLEX $500
Spiral staircase,terr.,huge windws
LARGE I BEDRM $400
Lrg terr.,dishwshr,hi ceils-No Fee
RODAL REALTY 755-3555
10 ST & TOMPK I ISIS SQ-Sunny
6 rm 2nd fl r facing park. 1125 sq ft
fir-thru.Fplc,A/C,intercom. Owner
occup brnstn.$420. 533-9346
11 St,67 E.-Large studio w/sep
kitchen in newly renov cast iron
landmark.Sublet Apr.1 to Sept 30
at $296 or new lease $302.
473-8674 or supt
11 STREET,610 EAST
Livingrm,Kitchen,tile bath
$10O.No Fee. Office 608 E.11 St
11th St W(off Greenwich) Ideal share
5rm fl thru,xint cond,2dfir,waikup
$335,
Univ PI-Prewar Doorman bidg,studio
w/eat in kitch & foyer $285
12th St,145 W(6/7Av)Tree lin blk
Well mnt eIv b1d;3 r/eatin kit $312.50'
Chariton St-Elev bidg,Bright
large 1 Bedroom
17 St,200 E(3d Av)mod elev bldg.
STUDIO,seprt kitchen $245
ALSO Very lite cnr 1 Bedroom $365
23 St,312 W-Mod elev bIdg.Mod STUDIO
kitchen, tile bath $185
All Fee. Supt premises or call
BUCHBINDER & WARREN 243-6766
11 ST,227 EAST(nr 3rd AVe)
CHARMING 11/2 RM STUDIO
Newly renov. bldg. Sep kitch &
eating area-full tile bath-
wdfplc-$225, NO FEE. CALL
254-1808 or see supt. on premises
11 St. E. IN r 1 st Ave) 21/2 rm a pt
Free gas, FpIc, quiet block
$150.
260-3084 After 12pm
11th St. West-21/2 rms
wbfpIc, hi cells, porch, sep kitch,
brick wall, $200.
Call 691-8242 after 6PM
12 ST.,527 EAST (Off Ave A)
4 ROOM APTS $125
TWO MONTHS FREE RENT
12th St.E. Garden apt verylarge
one bdrm,lovely yard.
Nice building
Very reasonable rent.
Call 473-1779
12 St E,Nr 3rd Av-Freghly painted
11/2 rms,well kept brnstn,
full kitch equip,mod bth $195
G.G. REALTY 41 W.96 ST 866-7700
12 St(321 East)-3 Rms-ALL BRAND
NEW!
Well-Kept Bldg w/Good Tenants!Con-
ven.To Trans & Shopping!Outstanding
Buy at $185.Bkr.255-5089/279-7660
13th St E-226, Bet 2 & 3 Aves
Beaut 3 & 4 rm apts.Large,lite,clean
secure $165 month. For working couple
or students.See Supt on premises
13TH ST. 15 EAST,STUDIO
Second Floor. (Top Floor)
Suitable artist, sculpture,
designer, etc. Private
Entrance, sky-light.
MORRIS GOLDMAN R.E. CORP.
WA 5-3939
13TH ST-212 East.Elev bldg
spacious I bdrm apt. No fee.
See Super or call
254-7146.
13 ST, 243 EAST
4 RMS, $155; 5 RMS, $185
NO FEE! Good security system
Apply Supt or call 524-1236
13th ST. 440 E. bet 1st & A 3 rms
sep BR, complete mod kitch & bath,
Renov building $140.
NO FEE. Supt on premises
14St.,313 EAST-NO FEE
STUDIOS & 1BRs $200-250
Newly rnvtd Brownstone. Garden duplex
Some w/terraces.Hi ceils.Grt for loft
Agent on prem 12-4pm Sat,Sun.12-5pm
daily.LPI RENTALS 7"-6005
14 St, 234 E-Mod Lux elv-NO FEE
Brite Studio $188. Bay windows
hi ceils,nr trans/shop.
Supt 260-1380
14 St. E. Nr 1st Av. Very lov Ig stu-
diommod kit,tile bth,brk walls,locked,
intercom,good value $175. NO FEE
377-2046/7"-9142
UNFURN APTS
MANHATTAN (300)
14TH ST EAST,205
2 Bedrms,$235. Renovated bldg.
A/C,NO FEE.See Howard 677-6033
14 St 234 E-NO FEE,Mod brite
1BR,WBF $269.Brk walls;hi cells
nr trans/shops.Supt or 260-1380
14 ST. 24 Hr Lux Orman Bldg
PARKER GRAMERCY
7 WEST 14TH ST
NO FEE -
MAGNIF STUDIO,sep kitch $290:
1 BEDROOM APARTMENT $335
HUGE 1 BEDROOM APT $375
FULL 2 BEDRMS,2 BATHS $475
CENTRAL A/C & GAS INCLUDED
PARMAN CO, 929-3613 or 741-4700
14 St(338 W.)-A Garden In The City I
Lvrm w/W/BFplc!Brick Wall!Bedrm,
Kitch AND Lg Spacious Grdn!
Quiet,Well-Kept Bldg With Old NY
Charm!Good Trans & Shopping.$295.
Broker 255-5089/279-7660
14 ST.W(204) Lge Studios$220
TV security.A/C,elev,free gas
675-8368 or 243-9195
15TH ST NEAR 7TH AVE
Charming St.3 nice rms.Clean bldg.
No fee. $175/month 736-3587
15 St.220 WEST NO FE-E
VICTORIAN HOTEL
Converted by architect/builder
into handsome 10 sty apt bldg.
1 BR;sep kitch,A/C,walnut stained
oak kitch cabinets & firs. $300
Everything new thruout bidg.Tenant
roof garden;laundry room.See 5-7
wkdays;12-3 wknds.924-6661.Ownr/Mgt
P & J REALTY CO 929-4210
BEAUTIFUL
LOFT BLDG
Converted by arch/bldr into handsome
MODERN APT HOUSE
All apts have spacious rms,hi ceils,
A/C,free gas,light oak kit cabinets
o*k fir/.Full sz refrigs;lots of
kit work space,huge winclows,use
of tenant roof deck,some apts are
bi-level;have terraces,views of
Empire State Bidg,arched windows,
D/Ws,bIdg has lanudromat,bsmt
storage space,live in supt and is
wired for cable TV. Rents $285-$390
OPEN HOUSE
3:30-7 wkdays; 11-4 wknd.Clos Friday
Renting office prem 989-0918
P&J Rity Co Own/Mgt 929-4210
16 St 160 W (cor 7th Av)NO FEE
THE KNITTING MILLS
PENTHSE DUPLEX
Knockout 2BR;spiral staircase
private terrace,LR 18X30,arched
winclows,hi ceils,light oak firs,
dishwasher $625. To Inspect:
OPEN HOUSE
3:30-7 wkdys; 11-4 wknds (Clos Fri)
Call Prem 989-0918 or our home ofc
at 929-4210 for further details
P & J REALTY CO-Owner-Mgmt
16 St(23O W.)-3 Mod,Spacious Rooms!
Brite & Sunny!Select Prvt House!Nr
Trans &Shopping! Refs.Unusual Buy!
$275.Bkr 255-5089/279-7660
16th St, E. Gram Pk. Area
IS THIS YOUR SPACE?
Style and space for flexible
living architect designed top floor
loft apt. huge windows skyline
view Ir 36x16 Bdrm 12x15
Skylight studio bdrm 15xl5 all
new kitchen w/dwshr bath & laundry
pass. & Frt elevat. $750 incl
util Call OR7-3834 Days 935-0975Eves
17th St 134 E.Beautiful residential
block,charming older brnstn,partial
renov.11/2&21/2 rm apts w/sep kit-
chens&mod appliancs.No Fee Immed
occup. fr. $150-$180 See Super prem.
W. 18 St.
18 St. W. (8-9) Newly renov spacious
sunny 1 BR brnstn fir thru. 2 WBFP
Hi ceils, mod kitench & bath, cable
TV $350. 1 Or 2 yr Ise 989-7164
19TH ST EAST GRAMERCY PARK
On Block Beautiful, Penthouse
sky lighted, dble gardens, duplex
2 becirms, balcony,working fireplac
air cond, $1200 and/or on
contiguous floors, 2 bedrm,2 bath
Breuer designed ranch style
compl. new gourmet kitchen,work-
ing fireplace air cond. $1000
Mr. Forrester 777-3017
20th St.W.207 (off 7th) 2 rboms,
beautiful floors,open fireplace.
$26O.No agency. Call Georgina at
924-6750 between 10am and 12pm
20's WEST NEW
Chelsea Mews
A NEW TOWNE HOME
IN RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD
BETWEEN 7th & 8th AVENUES
DOORMAN SECURITY SYSTEM
ALL THE LUXURY AMENITIES
HANDSOME A/C APARTMENTS
SOME WITH TERRACES &
WOODBURNING FIREPLACES
STUDIOS fr $250
I BEDRMS fr $330
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY
924-4787
Renting Agt on prem Daily & Sunday
J.1. Sopher & Co, Inc.
UNFURN APTS
MANHATTAN (3W)
MANHATTAN (3W)
20 W. Chelsea
2 BDRM-$345-NO FEE
Renov twnhse w/elev,carpeted halls
intercom,free gas.Come to 326 W.23
St. lOam-5pm or call 691-5900
20s W-LANDMARK AREA
Mod renov 2BR fir-thru.Fplc,3 sky-
lites,lots closets a/c $340 no fee.
E.W. REAISTY 242-5020
20s W/GOOD BLOCKS BRNSTNS
CHOICE 1BR APTS $225
$280-Mod kit/bth,brk walls,a/c
work fpIc NO FEE E/W RLTY 242-5050
22 ST 340 EAST NO FEE
Con TOWNHS 1 BR/WBF
verted by architect/builder
Windowed kitch/bath,hardwd firs
A/C,$32O. Laundry rm.See 6-8 wkdys
11-2 wkends. 677-6032 or own r-mgt
P & J REALTY CO. 929-4210
-
23rd St-West.Brite 1BR;duplex
in renov twnhse.W/garden.A/C.No Fee
Rent $338. Come to 326W.23rd St 10AM
-5PM or call 929-4944
23 St.W.Bright 2BR apt in renov
townhse w/elev,a/c,free gas intrcom
No Fee. Rent $389.Come to 326 W.23 St
10am-5pm or call 924-2190
23 St.W.Bright 1 BR duplex in
renov t,.vnhse w/grdn,a/c,marvelous
shape Rent $328.Come to 326 W.23 St.
iOam-5pm or call 929-4944
23ST.,208W(NR7THAVE)
Beaut bedrm apt,livrm,sep kitch,
bth,elev,drmn $275-$325. NO F E E ,
CALL MANAGER 929-7060
25 ST.,231 WEST-Luxury Elev Bldg
11/2 Rms $229.2 Rms $235
ONE MONTH VREE RENT
255T. Chelsea,Attic Studio,Owner
Occup Brnstn,French Windows,WBfpIc,
Brk Walls,Small Kitch Alcove,Sunny,
Suitable 1 person. $185. 741-0215
25th St 209 East (off 3rd Av) No Fee
1 BEDRM, SEP KITCHEN
WOODBURNING FIREPLACE
New Air Cond Elev Building $325 Mo
25th St 209 E (3dAv)No fee
Large modern stjidio apt $235 mo
New Air Cond Elev Building- .
30TH ST-308 W. Moderate priced.
2 bdrm apts, incl electric,from.
$280.Attractive,well maintained apt
bldg in Madison.Sq. Garden area,
walking distance to R. R.947-2341.
30s/Mid,9th Ave WALK-Up
Lge 3 & 4 Rms $110-125
Recent paint/tub kit, 947-3270/1-5pm
31 East 1 St Nr 2d Av
Livi.ngrm,kitchen,pvt bathroom,
Free gas. Locked bldg. No Fee
$125-$135. 477-1492
or see Supt on premises.
31 St (166 Lexington Ave) Unusual
fir thru; expos joist ceils; re-
cessed & track lighting; several
skylights; large living & bedrm,
$385 mo. Owner-mgmt 371-6512
31st Street-Park &.Lex. Large
studio,dining area.Tile bath,elev
$250/mo. Call Agent
242-3700.
35TH ST-221"E NO FEE
Charm'g Ig 1 Bdrm,hi ceils,ground fir
front $280, Hardwd fir, share garden
Supt or owner-mgmt 371-6512
35th Street-Nr all transp,Charming
townhouse,hi ceils,brk walls,31/2 rms
Very reasonable. Call 247-3651
or 247-3664
36 St,East-Murray Hill
Garden apt,31/2 rms,conv loc,suit
business couple.
MU9-5951 by appt.
42nd St(Betw 8th/9th)
- 2 ROOMS $125
Well maintained walk up bldg.
OWNER-MGMT 221-5710
50's OFF AVENUE OF AMERICAS
No Fee-Lge studio attended lobby.
Elev bldg $225 mo. 757-3404 kitte.
50th ST454 W LRG 1 BDRM
$260.Walk to work area. Brick wall.
fplc,renov Twnhse.No Fee. 734-3668
56TH ST WEST-THEATER DISTRICT
Extra Ig sunny studio w/foyer in
lux bidg.24 hr drmn.$275. Call
246-7314
57 St.W-Walk to Work-No Fee
Beaut 1 bdrms,skylite or fpIc $345
WESTPARK Rity 155 W.72 St.595-0900
70's THRU 90's EAST
Specializing in apt rentals.
Brnstns,renovations,semi lux,pre war
lux,lux drmn bldg.
A/C Studios in renov bidgs $175-200
Semi lux L studios $200-$250
Renov brnstn 1 Bdrms $200-$240
Semi lux 1 bdrm apts $265-$300
NEVER A REGISTRATION FEE
MURGE Realty 236 E.77,879-1710
70s-90s-W.Side NO FEE
Lg studio,full kitch,only $200
Lg.brite,lBdrm,bnstn,nu kit $255
WESTPARK Rity 155 W.72 St.595-0900
70s W.-New huge bnstn
2Ox2O LR, 13 ft ceils, $390
WESTPARK RIty 155 W.72 St.595-
0900
70 ST, 333-335 EAST
2 RMS + KITCHETTE $175
LWOLLMAN, Bkr, 3?4-9400
70's West.Vic.Lincoin Center
+W.80's+CPW Vic-3 selected bidgs:
for performing arts-fine arts-writing
Well built,thick wall prewar elev bidgs
(24 hour security service)
Studios $140-$190
11/2 Rooms $195-$235
2 Rooms $235-$285
3 Rooms(eat in kit,when avail) $295-325
4 Rooms(2 SRs,when avail $375-450
Rehearsal, practice & wkshop spaces
being planned;music (pianos when avail)
dance,theatre,photo dkrms and al I
arts and crafts shops.
GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR MUSIC
AND ALL ART TEACHERS
Huge clsts,hi ceils,good light,
hardwood firs or carpeting.
Some apts have oak mantle
fireplaces & room moldings.
FREE UTILS NO BROKERS FEE
Well furn apts avail if requested.
Special consideration to all teachers
and students.
Call: 873-7717 If no ans., 866-2412
71 ST OFF C.P.WEST
Brownstone-Bedrm $275
MR.BLAZER 563-7440
71 St. W. Owner's own charming
south gdn apt in renov brnstn, brick
walls,Gourmet kitch, W/W carpet in
LR & BR.Free cable TV. avail immed.
$395. Call 877-3663
72StW(off WEA)newly rnvtd bidg,ige
2BR,LR2Ox25,brand new kitch;So expos
$350 LPI Rentals 799-6005
73(on WEAP/2 fee paid-Lovely 1 BR,
bay wind,sep mod kit,A/C $230
THETAN REALTY, CO.
20OW72nd St 7"-9510
73 ST-201 EAST (Corner 3rd Ave)
STUDIO w/Kitchenette -
Walk-Up Apt. Available Immed.No Fee
Ms Lamas 889-8555 Mon-Fri/See Supt
74th St West-No Fee-lovely 21/2
rooms $265/Month. 31/2 rms $325/Mo
Some have river view. 24 Hr svce.
Free elec. Agent 787-1100.
74 St W-501id prewar 24hr attend 1
BR,kitte,Ig clos,free utils$230
THETAN REALTY, CO.
20OW72nd St 799-9510
75 ST. W. (CPW area) NO FEE
New 6 story elev bldg. Studios & 1 BRs
A/C, lots of closets, lite, $210 up
LPI RENTALS 799-6005.
77 St. 201 W. Beautiful 41/2 rms
$415. Also 31/2 rms $325.. No Fee.
See Doorman anytime
682-8475
77th St, West Attr neighborhood
Two one bedroom apts available
$225 month each. Heat paid
Chris Murphy 580-8207
77TH ST 1471 2ND AVE
LARGE 2 ROOM APT $225
Shown betwn 4-6pm NO FEE.Own-Mgmt
-
77th St. 315 W. bet WEA & R F D
2 studios avail, $150 & $190.
Avail immed,brnstn. No fee.
Mr. See Super Mr. Matiko
78th St.,306 W. bet WEA & RFD,
small,cute basement studio,avail
immed,$150 incl G&E.See Super
Mr. Zaitz or call 564-4945
78th St CPW vic-Sunny small
studio,older brnstn.Kitch't,mod
bath; I mmed $150.
G.G. REALTY 41 W.96 ST 866-7700
79th St East.Charming 3 rm apt,
exposed brick & fireplace. $165/mo
including utilities. Call Jodie
751-6617 10-5 days
80's E. 1 BR, recently renovated
2 A/Cs, clean bldg. simulated fire-
place. $285. Call Susan, days
374-7882 2E.~i2hts 49-3845
80's E (NR 2ND AVE)
4 rms $225/$250,studios $190/$225
others.OPEN 7 DAYS WK.
BERGMAN REALTY, 249-9941
83rd St-West.CPW. 1 garden apt
Newly modelled.1mmed avail. 1 or 2
persons. Call
787-0735. 7AM-4 PM
84 St,just off RSD-Charm 3 rms
secure brnstn,sep bedrm
mod kitch & bath; immed $249
G. G. REALTY 41 W.96 ST 866-7700
84St.W(off CPW)beaut tree lined street
Newly rnvtd Brwnstn,l BR,so exposure
LR exposed brick $235
LPI RENTALS 799-6005
W 85 ST-NO FEE
Charming,clean,newly renovated apts
in secure elev buildings.Ultra modern
colorful kitchens & bathrms with all
new appliances incl laundry facils.
NO FEE OWNER MANAGEMENT
STUDIO $175
ONE BEDROOM APT $235
- Ca 11877-7871
86 St(WEA)535,No Fee-Brownstn-hand
carved wood panel I ng,fpI c, loft bed&
airy I Bdrm overlooking tree lined
sq $384.Agen on premises Sat.
0OAM-3PM) or Call 929-3254
86 ST. W. (CPW area) Ig I BR, lots
1 litiRr stri IY, kitch, $250.
NoNO 9 Is 799-6005
87-88 St & Amsterdam Ave-
4 rm front apt $235 mo.4 rm rear apt
$210 mo.Walk-up,nr trans
873-9402
87 St West,343.Lge studio with
pvt.bath & kitchen.Freshly painted.
3rd Floor in brownstone. Call
anytime GE 5-2582, 873-3590
UNIFURN APTS
MANHATTAN (3W)
87 St.nr.Central Pk.West,rtew
renov,bristne lbdrm,hi-ceil,full kit
very light,sunny.$255.Also 81 St.
Ig.studio 20'x22'fplc$230.787-3487
87 St. W. betw RSD & WEA. 19x28-
hi ceils, walk in closets, 4 wndws
mod kit & bath, parquet firs. $235.
2 mos sec. 874-6428 Keep trying
88 St,CPW-Brite 21/2,top fir,older-
brnstn,sep bdrm,hi ceils,W/B fpIC
shutters,needs painting. $220.
G.G. REALTY 41 W.96 ST.866-7700
90's East4 Large rooms
2 bedrms,eat-in kitchen. Elevator.
No Fee. $295 mo.Call-348-8675.
91 St, 252 W.
Newly Renovated Bldg
4 rooms $300-$
Studio $190-$!
No Fee See Supt or Cal 1777-8820
94TH ON SCENIC RIVER DRIVE
New lux elev bldg at 214 Riverside Di
Studio,1&2 bedrms-duplex.Huge room
A/C.See Agent 11-6pm or call
865-0334 or 876-1700. NO F E E.
95 St,CPW vic-Fabulo s fir thru
2 bedrms,huge liv rm,ufplc,expos
brick,A/C;immed.A Knockout! $400
G.G.REALTY 41 W.% ST 866-7700
95 St,CPW vic,secure older brnstn
freshly painted small studio,kitch't
prvt bath; incl G&E $160
G.G.REALTY 41 W.96 ST 866-7700
95t,220 E. (bet 2nd&3rd Aves) -
YORKVILLE
NEW LUXURY BUILDING
3BR APT $390-$440
Unique Layouts, Dishwasher,A/C,
Laundry, R Esident Supts.FREE GA!
ONE MONTH FREE RENT
Call 831-80" for appt.
95 St 134 W. off CPW.Gdn apt
Sep entr. Massive Livrm, sep big BF
pvt kitch, mirrored walls, 8Ox2O
gdn. $375 mo.Call betw 2 & 6 for appi
243-9834. Plenty of extras.
98th St,104 E.4 brite rms,
Unfurn,$190,Also one furnished
$21O.Quiet bIdg.Good Loc.1 Or 2
adults pref.No pets.725-0399
101 Street Broadway
Modern studios from $210.Other lay-
Othe
outs also avail. Elev.bldg, excl.
security. 850-1691
102 ST & WEST END AVE
3 rooms,free gas & elec. No fees.
$240/month.Call 866-M3 10am-12noon
102 St,just off CPW-Freshly painted
4 rms(tenement style)2 becirms,
mod kitch. NO FEE $150
G.G. REALTY 41 W.96 ST 866-7700
103 St,just off CPW-Icleal 21/2 rms
older tenement type bldg,
sep bedrm,kitch't.NO FEE $130
G.G.REALTY 41 W.96 ST 866-7700
105th Street West-Beautiful block
nice studio.Lots of sun. $185
Also studio with sleeping loft.$200
H. Gibbons Realty 873-4
106 StOD9 West)-4 Lg Rms-Newly
Renov,Elev!Brite & Sunny! Good Trai
& Shopping 1$260.Bkr. 255-5089
or 279-7660
106 STREET,56 WEST
31/2 Rm Apt, $205
Must be Seen-Newly Decorated!
749-7314 or LU 8-8000
107 St, on Bway-ldeal 4 rms,
elev bldg, 2 becirms
mod kitch &.bath; immed $260
G.G.REALTY 41 W.96 ST 866-7700
A new renovated building from $135
to $175.Tile bath,separate kitchen,
brick walls,parquet ffrs,all copper-
tone uti. Free gas.533-4120 (8-12am)
THIS AD WORTH $5
WHEN RENTING ANY AOT BELO"
ELEV REMOD BLDGS NO FEE
Studio 516 E 5 nr Ave A $
2 rms 277 E 10 $
3 rms 361 E 1 0 $
4 rms 361 E 10 $
3 rms 728 E 9 $
Supt on Prem or cal 1201-755-5241
Manhattan-No Fee Apts
NESOR ASSOC.
New Buildings 865-0334 or 982-3
UNFURN APTS REF SVCIE (301
Audubon Ave,STUDIO $145
31/2 rms,$175-SECURE ELEV BLDC~
For fast friendly Direct Svce,call
Vivian-19-7PM,889-6566, Fee $35
Ave of Americas-Near WEst 4th Stre
3 Room Apt(l Bedroom)in nice bldc
Right at subway $270 mo.Call Gleni
687-06M Two For The Money-$35_Fei
ankSt E F LS 799-~
P
W.VILL-4'ROOMS $2,
Barrow St nr 6 Av in heart of West
Village, 31/2 rms,brownstone, avail
immed, $286. Call Vivian at
DIRECT SVCE, 889-6566, Fee $35
Barrow St at 6th Ave-Large 31/2 Rm!
in well kept brnstn.Good ARea.
3.273 mo.Nr subway.Avail Imm.Davi
687-0600 Two For The Money-$35 Fei
Bleecker. EFLS 799-9
W.VILL-2&3 RMS $165-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/30: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420002-0