THE REPORT ON THE CI THAT PRESIDENT FORD DOESN'T WANT YOU TO READ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 16, 1976
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420001-1
Harness racing: Antiabortionists What makes Is kitsch deadly?
Crooks, cronies, are stronger Pat Moynihan Kid-rock plays
pols ride high. than you think, run on and on? violence as fun.
BY JACK NEWFIELD (P. 14) BY ANN PINCUS (P. 10) BY PETE HAMILL (P. 20) BY FRANK ROSE (P. 105)
'IV IC
p?:01=Inc. VOL. XXI No. 7 THE WEEKLY NEWSPAPER OF NEW YORK MON. FEB. 16, 1976
24-Page Supplement
50c
TEXT HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE SUPPRESSED HOUSE
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT (P 691
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420001-1
L d11,111
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420001-1
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420001-1 ? h (_
- - V ridrY
A 24-PAGE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT
THE CIA REPORT
THE PRESIDENT
DOESN'T
TO READ.
The Pike Papers: An Introduction by Aaron Latham
SPENDING
". . Inadequate controls, even
less auditing, and an over-
abundance?of secrecy . . ."
Page 72
PERFORMANCE
46
. . . [The Tet offensive]'
flatly challenged the reassuring
picture intelligence in Saigon
and Washington had helped
present to the American
people. . ." Page 76
YOM KIPPUR WAR
46
. . . The entire system had
malfunctioned. Massive
amounts of data had proven
indigestible by analysts . . ."
Page 78
CC
PORTUGAL
. . . [T]he U.S. intelligence ?.
community had not even been
tasked to probe deeply into
Portugal in the waning
months of the Caetano
dictatorship. . ." Page 79
CYPRUS
. . . Intelligence clearly failed
to provide adequate warning
of the coup, and it performed
indifferently once the crisis
begun. . ." Page 80
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
". . . The three individual
branches of the military resist
any organization which might
curb their authority . . ."
?
Page 82
46
COVERT ACTION
. . . The Committee. . . has
considerable evidence that
[covert action operations]
are iregularly approved,
sloppily implemented, and at
times have been forced on a
reluctant CIA by the President
and his National Security
Advisor. ." Page 83
ANGOLA
". . . Apparently at the direc-
tion of National Security
Council aides, the task force
recommendation [against
military intervention] was
removed from the report and
presented to NSC members as
merely one policy option. . ."
Page 85
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420001-1 ----_---
70
the village VOICE February 16, 1976
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420001-1
Introduction to the Pike Papers
BY AARON LATHAM
These are not the Pentagon Papers,
but there are points of similarity. For,
once again, an American president has
set himself against the publication of a
government study of dangerous govern-
mental adventures. Once again the
White ,House is seeking to protect the
American people from a reading of a
part of their own history.
The history in this case was written
by the House Select Committee on In-
telligence, which is chaired by New
York Congressman Otis Pike. The com-
mittee's report was finished on January
19, 1976, but ten days later the House of
Representatives voted not to release it
until it is censored by the executive
branch. Since the report details at great
length all the obstacles which the execu-
tive branch put in the way of the Pike
committee from ' the beginning of its
work to the end, the White House would
not seem the ideal, unbiased expurgator.
If the executive ?branch "sanitized"
the report.the way it sanitized many of
the documents it turned over to the com-
mittee, little would remain. For, accord-
ing to the report, "sanitized" quite often
turned out to be "merely a euphemism
for blank sheets of paper ,with a few
scattered words left in, often illegible,
sometimes misleading, and usually in-
conclusive. One page was blank except
for the following: "3/ND/DOLL-VNM/
T-0144-6SG TRANSLATED DECRYPT
UNJAC/VN NR 1 Y 30/300G FM IJB
TO CQ INFO BBM STOP CNMB
30119 5610M Tol: 30JA68/10/22 300."
Another page was blank except for the
"TOP SECRET" stamp.
At the moment, the White House and
The House are stalemated. Perhaps this
unofficial publication of the Pike Papers
will moot that stalemate. The reports are
now in the custody of Carl Albert, the
Speaker of the House, who must decide
what the House's next move will be.
One Congressional source says that Al-
bert plans simply to sit on the report
until the press prints it. Then he will be
able to mOve to make it public .officially.
The Pike committee report is divided
into three sections: (I) "The Select
Committee's Oversight Experience" . . .
(II) "The Select Committee's Investiga-
tive Record" . . . and (III) "Recom-
mendations." In the text which follows
this introduction, we are printing only
the second section and even here some
of the footnotes have had to be trimmed
for space reasons. (As a result, the foot-
notes are not numbered consecutively;
we have followed the committee report's
numbering throughout.) We chose to omit
the first section because it is primarily a
record of the committee's frustrations
rather than its findings. We had no
choice but to leave out the third section,
the recommendations section, since, as
we went to press, these had not yet been
written.
The first section of the report, missing
here`, begins with this sentence: "If the
Committee's recent experience is any
test, intelligence agencies that are to be
controlled by Congressional lawmaking
are; today, beyond lawmaker's scrutiny."
The document then goes on to present
an 81-page catalog of obstruction which
begins but does not end with the "sani-
tizing" of papers.
For example, one Pike committee wit-
ness was harassed. A man named Martin
Kaiser, who manufactures wiretap equip-
ment, testified that the FBI bought eaves-
dropping devices from him through a
middleman, the U.S. Recording Corn-
Chairman Otis Pike had promises of cooperation, but met delay and refusal.
pany. This middleman's sole function
was to camouflage the Bureau's pur-
chases, and yet the company tacked on a
30 percent markup to the price. The
committee eventually learned that the
president of U.S. Recording was a poker
buddy of a top FBI official.
After Kaiser testified, two FBI agents
subjected him to a six-hour interroga-
tion. They then wrote out a statement
recanting several trivial aspects of his
testimony and stood over him while he
signed it. Undaunted, Kaiser went back
before the committee, complained about
the harassment, and repudiated the state-
ment written for him by the G-men.
But 'the biggest single obstacle, ac-
cording to the report, was Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger. The Pike com-
mittee report accuses Kissinger of put-
ting forth "a new doctrine that can best
be characterized as 'secretarial priv-
ilege.'" He defied Congressional sub-
poenas, prevented State Department
witnesses from testifying, and leaked
stories to embarrass the committee.
The committee began the second sec-
tion of its report, the section we do print,
with an attempt to make visible the long
invisible intelligence budget.. The Pike
Papers conclude that Congress is told
that the intelligence budget is about $3-
billion, but that it is really closer to $10-
billion.
The report also Concludes that even
.within the intelligence agencies, where
they presumably know what the real
budgets are, "spending controls [are]
inadequate." The study supports this
allegation with such examples as the
CIA station iti a small country which
turned in a one-year liquor bill of
$41,000 . . . the taxpayers' money "spent
to provide heads of state with female
companions" . . . and more tax dollars
invested in the making of pornographic
movies, one of which was entitled
Happy Days with former Hughes Tool
executive Robert Maheu acting "as cast-
ing director, make-up man, cameraman,
and director."
. What happened to that station chief
who managed to spend $41,000 on alco-
hol? He was transferred to Angola.
Having answered the -question, how
much, does it cost?, the Pike committee
then turned to another question: Is it
worth it? In attempting to answer this
question, the committee undertook case
studies of six intelligence failures: the
Tet Offensive, the Russian invasion of
Czechoslovakia, the 1973 Mid-East War,
the coup in Portugal, India's first atomic
test, and the coup in Cyprus.
They began with Tet. As background
to this predictive failure, the committee
chronicled the pressure on the CIA to
provide "confirmation of the contention
that there was light at the end of the tun-
nel." For example, the committee re-
ported that Walt Rostow, the then as-
sistant " to the president for national
security affairs, asked the CIA for a
report on pacification-program successes.
When an intelligence officer replied that
there had not been many, Rostow re-
portedly replied, "I am amazed at your
unwillingness to support the president
in his time of need." The agency eventu-
ally did supply an optimistic pacification
report, but with a caveat letter attached.
.Rostow removed the letter and then gave
the report to the president, remarking:
"At last an objective appraisal from
CIA."
Moving from Asia to Europe, the
committee found that we could be caught
just as much by surprise in Czechoslo-
vakia as in Vietnam. The committee dis-
covered that one reason we did not
anticipate the 1968 Russian invasion
was simply this: "We 'lost' the Russian
army, for two weeks."
How did we finally learn that the
USSR was in fact invading Czechoslo-
vakia? Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
called at the White House and told
President Johnson that that was what
Russia was doing. At least we had found
the Russian army.
? Moving to the Holy Land, the com-
mittee reported: "The Mid-East war
gave the intelligence community a real
test of how it can perform when all its
best technology and human skills are
focused on a known world 'hot spot.' It
failed."
'---The failure of our intelligence before
the Arab assault has been generally rec-
ognized for some time, but the -Pike
Papers maintain that there may have
been an even more serious intelligence
failure after the attack. Since we had
not anticipated trouble in the Middle
East, our spy satellites were caught out
of position. We were therefore unable
to monitor adequately the progress of
the fighting and wound up relying "al-
most unquestioningly" on Israeli battle-
field reports. We therefore believed the
Israelis when they said they had not vio-
lated the cease-fire.
The Pike committee concluded: "Thus
misled, the U.S. clashed with the better-
informed Soviets on the latter's strong
reaction to Israeli cease-fire violations.
Soviet threats to intervene militarily
were met with? a worldwide U.S. troop
alert. Poor intelligence had brought
America to the brink of war."
Moving on to Portugal, the committee
asked: "Do our intelligence services
know what is going on beneath the sun
face in allied nations that are not making
headlines?" The answer on April 25,
1974, turned out to be no.
We failed equally to predict the first
nuclear test in the Third World. It hap-
pened in India on May 18, 1974. A De-
fense Intelligence Analysis report issued
shortly before the test carried this title:
"India: A nuclear weapons program will
not likely be pursued in the near term."
A CIA post-mortem report said of our
intelligence blindspot: "This failure de-
nied the U.S. Government the option of
considering diplomatic or other initia-
tive to try to prevent this significant step
in nuclear proliferation." .
In Cyprus, our apparent failure to
predict the overthrow of Archbishop
Makarios helped set the stage for a spec-
tacular diplomatic failure: we somehow
managed to offend all sides and to under-
mine NATO's southern flank. However,
in this case, it is not altogether clear
how much of the blame belongs to the
CIA and how much to the State Depart-
ment. For some evidence suggests that
we may not have been totally surprised
by the Cyprus coup.
The man behind the overthrow of
Archbishop Makarios was Greek strong-
man General Dimitrios Ioannides, who
- happened to be on close personal terms
with the CIA station chief in Athens.
Evidently the station chief had exclusive
access to the dictator, which meant that
the U.S. ambassador to Greece was
walled out. This special relationship be-
tween our spook and their chief of state
made many believe that we were either
stupid in missing signs of a developing
crisis?or else we encouraged it.
An internal State Department memo-
randum, written by a critic of Kissinger's
handling of the Cyprus crisis, concluded:
I believe that strong U.S. representations
to Ioannides would have prevented the
crisis."
The coup which the United States
might have been able- to prevent led
not only to thousands of casualties, a
near war between NATO allies, and a
deterioration of our relations with
Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. It also got
an American ambassador killed. Roger
Davies, our ambassador to Cyprus, was
fatally shot during an anti-American dem-
onstration at the embassy in Nicosia.
The Pike committee report says:
"Contemporary accounts concluded that
Davies was simply struck by a stray bul-
let. Information made available to the
Committee suggests that Davies may
have been the victim of an assassination.
Our intelligence and/or diplomatic
failure may have led to the assassination
of our ambassador.
Having concluded that the U.S. tax-
payer does not receive his money's worth
in foreign intelligence, the Pike com-
mittee turned to domestic intelligence?
and came to the same conclusion.
The Pike Papers report, that the FBI
investigated the Institute for Policy
Study, a left-wing Washington think
tank, for five years without ever observ-
ing criminal violations. Yet the FBI
manual states that investigations should
be terminated within 90 days if criminal
violations are not observed.
The FBI investigation of the Socialist
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Workers Party went on for 34 years.
pack in 1941, the Bureau did prosecute
several members under the Smith Act,
gut the portions of the law used to bring
those cases have since been declared
unconstitutional. Since 1941, the FBI
hs brought no charges at all against
SWP members.
i; The net result of the IPS and SWP
Operations would seem to be 39 years of
NVasted funds.
One of-the most important conclusions
reached by the Pike committee's report
that the CIA is not a "rogue elephant"
-11;
-as Senator Church, the chairman of
the Senate select committee on intelli-
gence, once called it. The Pike report
srays: "All evidence in hand suggests that
the CIA, far from being out of control,
has been utterly responsive to the in-
structions of the President and the Assis-
'i
tant to the President for National Secur-
ity' Affairs."
The committee came to this conclu-
son after an unprecedented study of all
covert operations approved by the Forty
Committee over the past ten years. The
Forty Committee, which is chaired by
the president's foreign policy adviser, is
supposed to pass on all sensitive covert
activities undertaken by the CIA. The
Pike committee categorized different
types of covert operations and looked for
petterns.
It may surprise some to discover that
the largest single category of covert ac-
tivity concerned tampering with free
elections around the world. These elec-
tion operations make up a full 32 per-
cent of the covert action projects ap-
proved by the Forty Committee since
1965. The report says the operations
usually mean "providing some form of
financial election support to foreign par-
ties and individuals. Such support could
he negative as well as positive." Most of
the money has gone to developing coun-
tries and generally "to incumbent mod-
etate party leaders and heads of state."
One "Third World leader" received
T$60,000 over a 14-year period.
The second largest covert action cate-
gory is "media and propaganda." The
committee found that 29 percent of the
covert projects approved by the Forty
Committee fell under this heading. The
report says: "Activities have included
support of friendly media, major propa-
ganda efforts, insertion of articles into
the local press, and distribution of books
and leaflets. By far the largest single
recipient has been a European publish-
ing house funded since 1951. . . . About
25 percent of the program has been di-
rected at the Soviet Bloc, in the publica-
tion and clandestine import and export
of Western and Soviet dissident litera-
ture."
The third largest category is "Para-
military/Arms Transfers." These make
up 23 percent of the total Forty Com-
mittee-approved covert action projects.
Although these rank third in total num-
bers, they rank first in expense. The
committee report states: "By far the
most interesting, and important, fact to
emerge was the recognition that the
great majority of these covert action
projects were proposed by parties out-
side CIA. Many of these programs were
summarily ordered, over CIA objections.
CIA misgivings, however, were at times
weakly expressed, as the CIA is afflicted
with a 'can do' attitude."
As a part of its investigation of covert
action, the Pike committee examined
three recent operations: our funding of
pro-U.S. elements during the 1972 Ital-
ian election, our funding of the Kurdish
rebellion in Iraq, and our assistance to
one of the contending factions in Angola.
The committee report says that we
spent $10 million in the 1972 Italian
general election "perhaps needlessly."
The election produced not only a bitter
struggle between Italy's Christian Demo-
cratic party and its Communist party?
it also produced. an even more bitter
struggle between our CIA station chief
in Rome and our ambassador in Rome.
The ambassador, Graham Martin,
wanted to pour money into the election,
but the CIA station chief cabled head-
quarters that "money is not the prob-
lem." While this tug-of-war continued,
President Nixon, according to the re-
port, "was indirectly approached by
prominent ' international businessmen,
who were former nationals" of Italy.
Ultimately the CIA was ordered to draw
up a covert election-funding operation.
The ambassador had won.
Then Ambassador Martin wanted to
run the operation himself as if he were
the station chief. The actual station chief
sent a memorandum to Washington,
which protested: "I do not feel that any
ambassador has the requisite back;
ground in clandestine activities to suc-
cessfully manage a covert political ac-
tion program." But again the ambassa-
dor, backed by Kissinger, won.
In charge now,/ Ambassador Martin
decided ht.; Want. l *a give $800,000 to
General Vito Miceli, the head of the
Italian military intelligence agency, de-
scribed by the Pike committee as a man
"clearly linked to anti-democratic ele-
ments of the right." General Miceli cur-
rently faces charges in Italy for his
alleged involvement in a 1970 plot to
overthrow the Italian government. The
failed plot was led by Prince Junio Va-
lero Borghese, known as the "Black
Prince," who hoped to rule Italy.
Challenging the ambassador, the CIA
station chief opposed giving money to
Miceli. At one point the CIA man asked
the ambassador if he really cared if Mi-
celi's proposed propaganda operation
turned out to be successful. Martin re-
plied, according to a CIA cable, "Yes, I
do, but not a helluva lot, Important
thing is to demonstrate solidarity for the
long pull." The ambassador later re-
Relations between the ambassador and
the station chief became so strained that
the ambassador once told the CIA man
he would "instruct the Marine guards
not to let you in this building and put
you on the airplane [home]."
In the end, the ambassador and the
station chief not only hated one another
but the Christian Democrats did not do
very well in the election. They narrowly
won the general election?continuing an
unbroken string since 1948?but they
suffered severe reverses in the subse-
quent local elections held last year.
But by then Ambassador Martin was
no longer in Italy. He was our ambas-
sador in Saigon presiding over an even
greater foreign policy debacle, the fall of
South Vietnam.
In 1972, Dr. Henry Kissinger met with
the Shah of Iran, who asked the U.S. to
aid the Kurds in their rebellion against
Iraq, an enemy of the Shah. Kissinger
later presented the proposal to President
Nixon who approved what would be-
come a $16-million program. Then John
B. Connally, the former Nixon Treasury
secretary, was dispatched to Iran to
inform the Shah, one oil man to an-
other.
The committee report charges that:
"The President, Dr. Kissinger and the
foreign head of state [the Shah] hoped
our- clients would not prevail. They pre-
ferred instead that the insurgents simply
continue a level of hostilities sufficient
to sap the resources of our ally's neigh-
boring country [Iraq]. This policy was
not imparted to our clients, who were
encouraged to continue fighting. Even in
the context of covert action, ours was a
cynical enterprise."
During the Arab-Isradi war, when the
Kurds might have been able to strike at
a distracted Iraqi government, Kissinger,
according to the report, "personally re-
strained the insurgents from an all-out
offensive on the one occasion when such
an attack might have been successful."
Then, when Iran resolved its border
dispute with Iraq, the U.S. summarily
dropped the Kurds. And Iraq, knowing
aid would be cut off, launched a search-
and-destroy campaign the day after the
border agreement was signed.
A high U.S. official later explained to
the Pike committee staff: "Covert action
should not be confused with missionary
work."
In its section on Angola, the Pike
committee report says: "Information sup-
plied to the committee suggests that the
military intervention of the Soviet Union
and Cuba is in part a reaction to U.S.
efforts to break a political stalemate in
favor of ?its clients."
The committee also learned that a
task force composed of U.S. experts on
Africa "strongly opposed military inter-
vention" in Angola; but National Secur-
ity Council aides removed this recom-
mendation from the task force report.
At one point, the Forty Committee ap-
proved $300,000 for non-military activi-
ties in Angola. Part of this money went
to pay for 50,000 campaign-style FNLA
buttons. But these buttons did not seem
to be winning any more battles than the
WIN buttons here at home.
The Pike report also deplores seventeen
wiretaps which the FBI "installed for
Dr. Kissinger," pointing out that these
"posed a risk that the FBI could become
the tool by which an administration in
power obtains political information."
- And finally the study censures Henry
Kissinger for his "passion for secrecy,"
especially regarding possible violations
of the Strategic Arms Limitation treaties.
The committee says: "Nowhere is the
risk of corrupting intelligence greater
than in recent efforts to restrict and
shape important data on Soviet compli-
ance with strategic arms agreements."
In many ways, the moral of the Pike
Papers seems to be: controlling the in-
telligence community must begin with
controlling Henry Kissinger. 0
-
Contents
The Select Committee's Investigation Record
?
A. Costs
72
8. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
82
1. Deceptive Budgets
72
9. National Security Council Intelligence Committee
82
2. An Absence of Accountability
73
10. The Management and Production of
3. Spending Abuses
73
Defense Intelligence
82
a. Covert Procurement
C. Risks
83
b. Local Procurement
c. Accommodation Procurements
d. Research and Development
e. Colleges and Universities
f. U.S. Recording Co.
1. Covert Action
a. Ten Year Survey
b. Election Support
c. Media and Propaganda
d. Paramilitary/Arms Transfers
83
4. Budget Secrecy
76
e. Organizational Support
B. Performance
76
f. Trends
1. TET: Failure to Adapt to a New Kind of War
76
g. Three Projects
a. The Order of Battle Controversy
b. The Consequences
c. The Aftermath
2. Intelligence Collection
a. Submarines
b. Interception of International
88
2. Czechoslovakia: Failure of Tactical Warning
77
Communications
3. The Mid-East War: The System Breaks Down
78
c. Manipulation of the Media
4. Portugal: The U.S. Caught Napping
79
d. CIA Presence in the Executive Branch
5. India: Priorities Lost
79
e. CIA Relationships with U.S. and
6. Cyprus: Failure of Intelligence Policy
80
Foreign Police
7. Domestic Internal Security and
3. Domestic Intelligence Investigations
90
Counterintelligence
a. Institute for Policy Studies
81
a. Programs as Abuses
b. Law Enforcement Turned Law-Breaking
b. Socialist Workers Party
4. SALT: Political Control of Intelligence
92
r I ".
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?Select Committee's
Record;,.Investigative
"- .1)1
cc; 5,3'
Costs
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
law; and a reuglar Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money. .
shall be published from time to time.. Art. 1, Sec.
9, cl. vii, U.S. Const.
Money and spending were the first topics of Com-
mittee hearings. This choice of a beginning was
founded on Constitutional responsibilities, and it
implemented a straightforward investigative tech-
nique?by following the dollars, the Committee
would 12cate activities and priorities of our intelli-
gence services.
' The inquiry, was fruitful and interesting. By the
time it was over, GAO accountants on loan to the
Committee had concluded that the foreign intelligence
budget is three to four times more costly than Con-
gress has been told. 135 An OMB review of the domes-
tic intelligence budget, conducted at the Commit-
tee's request, concluded that it may be five times
the estimate given to Congress by federal officials.
Totals do not, tell the whole story. Congressional
and Executive scrutiny of these 'budgets was found
to range somewhere between cursory and nonexistent.
Spending controls by the agencies themselves were,
likewise, often inadequate, as a few preliminary ex-
amples indicate.
? A CIA Station in a small country spent $41,000
on liquor, in one ykar.
? Taxpayer monies were spent to provide heads of
state with female companions, and to pay people with
questionable reputations to make pornographic
moviesir for blackmail.
? The "accommodation procurement" mechanism
was used to buy limousines for foreign dignitaries,
with cash payments that were difficult to verify.
? ? A huge arsenal of weapons and access to ammu-
nition have been developed by CIA, giving it a capa-
bility that exceeds most armies of the world.
? A middleman who is a close friend of top
FBI officials tacked thousands, if not millions, of
dollars of ?unwarranted markups on to covert pur-
chases.
These examples reflect the wide range of problems
with secret financing of secret activities. A more de-
tailed review of these and other examples, along
with the basic processes or mechanisms that accom-
pany them, is a good base for suggested reforms.
1. Deceptive Budgets
Much attention is paid to numbers 'when the foreign
and- domestic intelligence budgets are prepared. Not
much attention is paid to sulistance.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and other of-
ficials go through an elaborate process in arriving
at budget numbers. As described to Congress, it is
an impressive procedure.
What is not described is the close, almost inbred
relationship between OMB officials and intelligence
budgetmakers. OMB also does not point out that it
completely lacks the expertise to evaluate huge tech-
nological expenditures by the National Security
Agency.
Executive officials do not stress the lack of a cen-
tralized budget authority in the intelligence services,
which causes enormous waste, duplication and hid-
den costs in military intelligence. There is little con-
sideration 'given to the extraordinary spending
latitude granted to CIA, or to the CIA's heavy use
of "unvouchered" funds. There is -no explanation
from FBI of the reasons for millions of dollars of
"confidential" purchases.
When appearing before Congress, executive of-
ficials do not review the inadequacies of internal
Agency auditors. No mention is made of items trans-
ferred elsewhere in the federal budget to keep the
intelligence budget' small.
These officials do not --remind Congress that our
government's auditors, the General Accounting Of-
fice, have been denied access to secret intelligence
budgets for more than a decade. They do not explain
abuses of covert purchasing mechanisms, domestic
as. well as foreign.
-
These same officials do, however: stress that anY-
thing they can or will say must be kept a secret.
All this adds up to more than $10 billion being
spent by a handful of people, with little independent
supervision, with inadequate controls, even less audit-
ing, and an overabundance of secrecy.
It begins with OMB officials and their counterparts
in the various agencies. Testimony before this Com-
mittee revealed that only six OMB employees work
full-time on the foreign intelligence budget. Of those
six,, three are former CIA employees. In turn, the
CIA official in charge of the Agency's budget has re-
cently arrived from OMB, where he had primary
responsibility for CIA's budget.
This, in itself, does not bode well for a vigorous
review of the merits of intelligence programs. It is
set back further by the fact that OMB is not told of
sensitive projects as they are being planned. Even
after it is told, OMB's officials are not free to evalu-
ate all details of sensitive projects. . -
The absence of real involvement by outsiders in'
'intelligence spending continues.
For example, CIA's budget appears as only a single
line item in the published Federal budget. This is
done in the name of secrecy, but it gives CIA an un-
usual advantage. Congress requires any agency wish-
ing to transfer funds from one line item .to another
to come back to Congress for approval. ,
This is called reprogramming. Most agencies have
many line items; giving Congress some check on their
spending. CIA has had no reprogramming problems
in the past. It could tell Congress it was spending a
certain' amount on covert action, then proceed to
transfer large amounts to covert programs without
Congress' approvalJ48
This is not however, the most significant lack of
knowledge about intelligence spending. Billions of
dollars spent every year for intelligence are not in-
cluded in the "offifial" intelligence-budgets. -
One way this has been accomplished has. been by
shifting items that have traditionally appeared in the
intelligence budget into other budget categories. For
example, the Department of Defense has switched
the following items, by reclassifying them as "com-
munications": Counterintelligence and. Investigative
Activities; Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy; and the
Advance Location Strike Program. A sizeable secret
reconnaissance activity t Defense was switched to
"research and development." All of these activities
and many more were, until recently, in Defense's in-
telligence budget.149 Defense is not alone in using
this tactic.
The costs given Congress for military intelligence
do not include expenditures for tactical military in-
telligence, which would approximately double intelli-
gence budgets for the three armed services.150 Rough-
ly 20 percent of the National Security Agency's
budget is not added into the intelligence budget.
It should be noted that NSA does nothing else except
gather and analyze technical intelligence, and it has
one of the largest budgets in the intelligence com-
munity. ?
Sometimes entire agencies, such as the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, are completely
omitted from estimates of intelligence-related costs
as well as the intelligence budget.
The budget for the National Security Council is
omitted completely, although a sizeable portion of
their staff and subcommittees work exclusively on
intelligence matters.153
Still another technique is,-undervaluation of the
real cost of certain operations. The Committee. ana-
lyzed one covert operation and found that the dollar
amounts given by CIA for weapons supplied were
about half of 'the Defense Department's contract
prices. .
At the Committee's request, OMB did add up the
total cost for all federal domestic intelligence, for the
first time ever. The total they came up with was
more than five times the amount that had been given
to the Committee in testimony by domestic intelli-
gence officials.155 The FBI, for example, had neg-
lected to include such clear intelligence functions as
the National Bomb Data Center, or Counterintel-
ligence. More significantly, there had never been an.
attempt to add up all the divergent intelligence op-
erations in the federal government.156
By using the new .0MB figures for domestic in-
telligence, and by adding such items as transferred
expenditures, the full NSA budget, and revalued cost
figure, the Committee estimated that the cost of
intelligence today is at least three to four times the
amount reported to Congress.
An obvious question is how can there be such a
difference in total cost estimates? One answer is the
lack of coordination in approaching the budget.
Another is that there are no adequate standards for
what is, and is not, intelligence spending. A final
answer may be that there is a conscious desire to
keep the totals small, by dividing and confusing the
estimates.
It should be obvious that if nobody has ever added
up the costs'of the many domestic intelligence units,
then certainly nobody is coordinating their budgets,
as intelligence per se. In foreign intelligence, the
problem is, to a large degree, a lack of centralized
authority. For example, -the DCI presents the entire
foreign intelligence budget to Congress and the Presi-
dent, but he only has authority for CIA's budget.
Defense officials testified that a substantial part of
their intelligence budget is considered the responsi-
bility of the Secretary of Defense. The DCI, they say,
merely reviews their work.
Fragmented authority leads to overall coordination
'problems. A good illustration is the existence of sep-
arate counterintelligence budgets in FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force.159 Some are in-
cluded in the intelligence budget; some are not. Some
coordinate with other counterintelligence programs;
some do not. The FBI testified, for example, that it
does not know if CIA has a counterintelligence group,
that it does not know how much CIA's operations
cost, and that it does not know if CIA duplicates
FBI's work.16?
Fragmented authority and coordination leave the
budget wide open to distortions. Each agency applies
its own budget standards. . . .
There is, for example, no standard for allocating
the -cost of a military base whose primary purpose is
to support intelligence operations. The repair of a
submarine damaged on intelligence duty may or may
not be included in spy costs. The Committee asked
OMB, GAO, and all the intelligence agencies for
their standards for allocating support ,costs. No agency
had any to offer. No agency had even a basic defi-
nition of intelligence.
In a statement prepared for the Committee, the
DCI made it clear that there are no good definitions
in use today. As he said, ". . . [I]n essence, it boils
down to a judgment call."
The Committee has compiled it own set of sug-
gested guidelines.164 In addition, a good first step
would be to include the same items in the intelligence
budget from one year to the next. This alone would
have prevented the official intelligence budgets from
remaining at constant levels over the past few years,
which is fundamentally deceptive.
Footnotes:
135A special study done in 1971 by Dr. Schlesinger,
as had of OMB, concluded that the foreign intelli-
gence budget was nearly double the amount being told
to Congress at that time. See, A Review of the Intel-
ligence Community, OMB (March 10, 1971).
1370ne of these was titled "Happy Days," with
Mr. Robert Maheu as casting director, make-up man,
cameraman and director.
148"MR. ASPIN. For the record again, tell us who
has to approve reprogramming, who is informed, and
who approves reprogramming?
"MR. COLBY. I do.
"MR. ASPIN. And that is all?
-"MR. COLBY. Yes. . . ."
. . . Comm. Hearings . . . Aug. 4, 1975.
149In total, the transfer of these programs from the
"intelligence" portion of DoD's budget to "Communi-
cations" and "Research & Development" by them-
selves involved hundreds of millions of dollars and
thousands of personnel. -
150Some costs for military/tactical activities are dis-
closed to Congressional Committees in chart form,
entitled "Intelligence Related." However, after exam-
ination, the staff believes that the charts vastly under-
state the costs of military/tactical intelligence activi-
153Examples of, this would be the Forty Committee
whose sole task is to approve covert action projects,
or the Verification Panel and its Restricted Working
Group who verify intelligence indicating alleged
Soviet violations of SALT.
155Letter to Staff Director, from Mr. Ogilvie, OMB,
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I IL I
Nov. 12, 1975:
"Department of Justice
FY76 except as noted
$ in K Personnel
Deputy Attorney General's
Office
125
5
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
87,119
3385
Drug Enforcement
Administration
11,913
463 .
Immigration & Naturalization
Service
814
'38
Criminal Division
1,262
51
101,233
3942
Civil Service Commission
National Agency Check &
Inquiry
3,366
265
Full Field Investigations
15,386
722
Other Investigations
3,082
95
21,834
1082
Department of Treasury
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms
62,929
2269
Customs Service
183,441
7748
Internal Revenue Service
Intelligence Division
101,942
3813
Internal Security
(Inspection)
12,141
553
Secret Service
94,466
2934
INTERPOL dues
140*
INTERPOL other
388*
455,447
11,317
Energy Research & Development
295
15
Administration
TOTALS
578,809?
22,356"
*1975 costs
156Testimony on Aug. 7, 1975 by Eugene W. Walsh,
Assistant Director, Administrative Division, Federal
Bureau of Investigation:
!`MR. FIELD,. It sounds like that is all they are over
there for and that it is a way of shifting the real cost
of intelligence out of that budget. How about the
National Bomb Data Center?
"MR. WALSH. Yes, sir.
"MR. FIELD. That is intelligence?
"MR. WALSH. It may be in the dictionary's defini-
tion, sir, but it is not in ours." Comm. Hearings . . .
Aug 7, 1975.
159When Mr. Walsh appeared before the Com-
mittee on Aug. 7, 1975, he was asked if FBI was
aware of the multitude of counterintelligence pro-
grams: ?
"Are you aware that the CIA, the DIA, the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force and NSA, all have their
counterintelligence programs?
"MR. WALSH. I haven't acquainted myself with
their programs, sir." Comm. Hearings . . . Aug. 7,
1975.
160Mr. Walsh was also asked: "Do you know if
the CIA spends more than you do?
"MR. WALSH. I would certainly think so.
"MR. FIELD. Has anybody in the administration
ever told all of these people, who spend multi-multi
millions of dollars, over and over again?really, on
the same program?has anybody in the vernacular
of my generation, told them to `get their act together'? ?
"MR. WALSH. I have no knowledge on that, no
sir." Comm. Hearings . . . Aug. 7, 1975.
164The Committee used three major classifications:
1. Foreign/National?This intelligence relates to'
"national" programs (i.e., overhead reconnaissance
with various detection and sensing devices) targeted
against foreign countries. Intelligence of this nature
is "national" in the sense that it is a concerted effort
of the CIA, DoD components and State Department.
a. National intelligence is intelligence bearing
on the broad aspects. of U.S. national policy and
national security transcending the competence of a
single agency to produce. ?
2. Domestic Intelligence?This intelligence includes
activities of civil departments and agencies such as
DEA, IRS, FBI. It is, conducted within the United
States and directed at U.S. citizenry.
3. Military/Tactical?Intelligence of this nature
includes a variety of DoD activities to support mili-
tary commanders ranging from detailed weapons per-
formance assessments of our adversaries, to R & D
projects for upgrading present radar early warning
and ocean surveillance and patrol systems.
a. Tactical intelligence is intelligence in support
of military plans and operations at the military unit
level.
b. Strategic, intelligence is intelligence -in support
of military plans and operations at national and inter-
national levels. _ I
2. An Absence of
Accountability
The General Accounting Office (GAO) is the audit-
ing arm of Congresg. When it comes to intelligence
agencies, that arm is no arm at all.
In the early years, GAO was generally limited to
an auditing-function. With the passage of time, Con-
gress has turned to GAO for more than balancing
books. Today, under authority of law, GAO is em-
powered to analyze the economy and efficiency with
which government funds are spent.
The Comp&oller General, who heads GAO, testi-
fied that he cannot even balance CIA's books, let
alone analyze its efficiency. Specifically, he said that
from 1962, GAO has made no attempt to audit the
CIA, because it was allowed scant access to classified
spending.
Last year GAO was directed to compile basic
budgetary information on federal investigative and
intelligence functions. It was refused information by
CIA, NSA, and intelligence agencies of the Defense
Former CIA Director Colby:
Under considerable pressure to "generate" numbers.
Department. In another recent instance, the FBI
refused to permit GAO to examine -case files. The
Bureau offered special summaries, but refused to al-
low any verification of those summaries.
The Executive agencies' treatment of GAO is curi-
ous. In January 1966, the CIA enter into a sole-source
contract with the management consulting firm of Peat,
Marwick, Livingston & Co., for a total contract price
of $55,725.00. CIA could have saved taxpayers some
money, if it had given GAO access.
CIA officials conceded that these independent con-
sultants were given complete and free access to all
classified procurement documents, as well as all per-
sonnel concerned with Agency procurement activi-
ties. In June 1966, the firm completed its work and
issued a full report of findings and recommendations.
A cover memorandum addressed to the Inspector
General expressed appreciation for the Agency's full
cooperation..
By contrast, this Committee's staff encountered
lengthy delays in gaining limited access to similar
documents and personnel, including the report of
Peat, Marwick, Livingston & Co.
The issue is not really whether Congress?with
Constitutional responsibility for federal spending?
should have equal access with a private company. The
issue is whether an objective look at secret expendi-
tures ever takes place.
It does not take place at OMB. GAO cannot look.
Even this Congressional investigating committee has
now tested access and come up wanting.
Do intelligence agencies themselves adequately
audit their own operations? No.
The CIA is a good example. Their audit staff is un-
dermanned for a comprehensive review of complex
and extensive agency spending that takes place world-
wide. They are allowed to balance books, but they
are not always allowed to know the exact purpose of
expenditures. Only five percent of all vouchered
transactions are checked, even though these add up
to 20 percent of CIA's entiie but-get. Substantive
corroborating records are not kept. Their audits de-
. ? . ,?? .
viate from the standards of professional Certified
Public Accountants, and CIA has not compiled alist
of these exceptions to control the deviances.
These and other shortcomings in audit and control,
for both foreign and domestic intelligence agencies,
lead to an inevitable result?spending abuses.
3. Spending Abuses
The easiest way to illustrate problems encountered in
secret spending is to examine a number of mechan-
isms currently in use, and a number of situations that
have grown out of those mechanisms.
a. Covert Procurement
Many CIA covert actions and clandestine opera-
tions must be supported in a "non-attributable" man-
ner, which led CIA to establish a covert procurement
branch. -Unfortunately, covert procurement has be-
come an overused, expensive, and often uncontrollable
technique for questionable purchasing.
The branch's activities include support of overseas
stations and the procurement of weapons and para-
military materials. To facilitate these requirements,
covert procurement has under its control a number of
operational proprietaries and "notional" companies.
Notional companies are merely paper firms, with
appropriate stationery and checking accounts. These
companies make requests to the proprietaries so the
proprietary can bill an apparently legitimate com-
pany for covert requirements. Needless to say, it is
an expensive way to buy a refrigerator, and should
not be used unnecessarily.
When an overseas station requires an item that can-
not be traced to the United States government, it sends
a requisition with a special code. One code is for items
that should not be traceable 'to CIA. Another code
means it should not be traceable to the U.S. govern-
ment.
Theoretically, once these codes, called "sterility
codes,"18? are attached, there is no more traceable in-
volvement with the government. However, the Com-
mittee reviewed documents which showed that items
purchased in a non-traceable Planner are sometimes
transported by U.S. military air-pouch, rather than
sent by private carrier as a truly non-government pur-
chase would be.
Another procedure which the Committee staff ques-
tioned was the routing of requests for small quantity,
low-cost, and even non-traceable items through the ex-
pensive covert process. The logical alternative would
be to have the item purchased either overseas or here
with petty cash, avoiding the expense of covert pro-
curement. These included such items as quantities of
ball point pens, ping-pong paddles, or hams.
The staff was also unable to determine the reason
for certain high-cost items being purchased through
this mechanism. Hundreds of refrigerators, televisions,
cameras, and watches are purchased each year, along
with a variety of home furnishings.
The question is why- an American television would
be purchased here and sent to Europe if someone was
trying to conceal his involvement with the United
States. This is especially true because the power re-
quirements abroad are different, and a transformer has
to be installed on an appliance bought in the U.S. be-
fore it will work. In fact, a large percentage of elec-
trical appliances did not have transformers added,
which raises the possibility that these items are being
covertly purchased for use in the United States.
The same'. question arises with the purchges of
home furnishings. A review of overseas station pur-
chases showed, for example, that one station bought
more than one hundred thousand dollars of furnish-
ings in the past few years. In that context, additional
covert purchases here at home seem excessive. Finally,
why not buy a Smithfield ham through normal pur-
chasing channels? There is no way that ham could,
be traced to the CIA or the U.S. government, no mat-
ter how it was bought.
As in every other component of the Agency, the ef-
fort to maintain secrecy, even within the branch itself,
is highly emphasized.
The Committee was told that because proprietary
employees do not have a "need to know," they are not
put in a position to question any request the Agency
might make. Three high procurement officials have
conceded that the sterility code is not questioned by
the' covert procurement staff. The 1966 study by
Peat, Marwick, Livingston & Co., stated that there
was excessive use of these codes, without justifica-
tion. 188 The Committee's investigation indicates that
this situation has not been remedied.
b. Local Procurement
The Committee's investigation of the covert pro-
curement mechanism led to a review of records from
local, or in-field, procurement. The staff reviewed rec-
ords for the past five fiscal years from three typical
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. -
Overseas stations varying in size and number of ern=
ployees. Over-spending and under-auditing seemed td
be prevalent.
An example is a medium-sized station that pur-
chased over $86,000 in liquor and cigarettes during the
past five years. 189 The majority of these purchases
were designated "operational gifts"?gifts to friendly
agents or officials in feturn for information or as-
sistance.
It would appear that spending practices have an
uncanny way of changing with new station chiefs. A
station that purchased $41,000 in liquor in 1971, had
a new chief in 1972. Liquor purchases dropped to
$25,000, which is still a lot of liquor. 190
One station had purchased over $175,00 in furnish-
ings for leased quarters and safehouses.191
In an effort to determine whether this kind of
spending is questioned! by CIA auditors; the staff in-
terviewed the CIA audit official who audited these
stations. He recalled,the liquor, and that when he in-
quired as to the quantity, he was told by the Station
Chief that they would "try to hold it down in the
future."192 The Same auditor had audited the station
that purchased over $175,000 in furnishings. When
questioned, he. was not even aware of the total
figure.
This experience led the Committe staff to interview
several members of the Internal Audit Division, as
well as eight overseas case officers and chiefs of sta-
tion. From these interviews, several things became
apparent.
Auditors do not perform thorough reviews of case
officers' "advance accounts." At all overseas sta-
tions, each case officer is allotted an advance, which is
nothing more than a petty cash fund. From this fund,
the officer pays operating expenses and the salaries of
his agents. He is required by Agency regulations to
obtain a receipt for every expenditure, but, due to
manpower considerations, these are only spot-checked
when audited?which is not often. 195 Such funds run
into millions of dollars each year.
Every case officer and Internal -Audit officer con-
ceded that the Agency must "rely solely on the integ-
rity of its case officer." When a case officer's agents
refuse to sign receipts, the case officer "certifies" that
he expended the funds. A case officer might have as
many as ten agents working for him, each of whom
may receive between $50 and $3,000 per month, all
in cash.
Finally, audits of all overseas stations are not per-
formed on a regular basis. It may be two or three
years, or more, before a station is audited. Even
then, the Committee discovered that recommendations
made by auditors are usually not disclosed in the
auditor's report to headquarters.
c. Accommodation Procurements
In addition to procuring goods and services for its
own use, CIA makes "accommodation procurements"
for foreign governments, officials, agents, and others.
The Agency serves more or less as a purchasing
agent for an undisclosed principal. Although the indi-
vidual for whom the accommodation procurement
was made advances the necessary funds or repays
the Agency after delivery, the indirect administrative
costs are borne by American taxpayers. These costs
include the salary of the agency purchaser, certain
transportation charges, accounting costs, and in some
cases the salaries of training and technical personnel.
In investigating one series of accommodation pro-
curements, the Committee learned that a foreign gov-
ernment received a 20 percent discount by having
CIA buy equipment in the name of the U.S. govern-
ment.
If the foreign government had contracted for the
same items in its own name, this discount would not
have been available. In just two of these actions CIA
saved the foreign government over $200,000, at the
expense of American suppliers.
The Agency will usually refuse to make such pro-
curements only if the requested item might appear to
be beyond the requester's financial means, and might
therefore give rise to questions about the requester's
sources of income. Agency security officers feel that
such questions might lead to disclosure of the re-
quester's relationship with the agency.
Accommodation procurements involving less than
$3,000 require only the approval of a CIA chief of
station. When larger sums are involved, approval
must be obtained from the Deputy Director for Oper-
ations. When the amount is more than $500,000; it
must also be approved by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
The Committee examined a number of accommo-
dation procurement records. The following two ex-
amples illustrate that the facilities and resources of
the United States government are sometimes used to
sati?flyflittle pore than th him -fqiiga offigials.
?trront-intrance-,-a-foreign official described his son's
erfthiltiasm Mr model airplanes to the chief of station.
The foreign official wanted three model airplane kits,
and even advised the CIA officer precisely .where the
kits could be purchased in the United States. A cable
was sent to Agency headquarters asking for the pur-
chase of three kits from the store in Baltimore sug-
gested by the foreign official. Further, the cable
instructed that the items were to be designated by
a "sterility code," to indicate that the purchase of
the kits could not be attributable to the United States
government. Documents provided to the Committee
in this case by the Agency were sanitized.296
In another instance, the President of an allied
nation was preparing to play golf on a hot afternoon.
Anticipating his thirst after several hours in the sun,
he made a "priority" request to the local chief of
station for six bottles of Gatorade. An Agency em-
ployee was immediately relieved of his ordinary
duties and assigned to make the accommodation
procurement 207
Nor was this the chief of state's only experience
with the Agency's merchandising talents. In the past,
the Agency has purchased for him several automo-
biles, including at least two custom-built armored
limousines,298 and, among other' things, an entire
electronic security system for his official residence.
It is worth noting that these security devices are being
supplied to a man who runs a police-state.
Accommodation procurements have also involved
more expensive and politically sensitive items. For
example, another head of a one-party state had long
been fascinated by certain highly sophisticated elec-
tronic intelligence gathering equipment. He wished
to develop his own independent collection capability.
As an accommodation, and to "share the take," the
Agency procured an entire electronic intelligence
network for him in two phases. Phase I involved con-
tract costs in excess of $85,000, and Phase II cost
more than $500,000.
In investigating one series of accommodation pro-
curements for an oil exporting country, the Committee
asked CIA officials about the coordination and effect
of the Agency's purchasing favors on the foreign
country's oil pricing policy. The country's oil policy,
incidentally, has not been among the most favorable
to the United States. Agency officials were uncertain
as to the effect, but they indicated that the two poli-
cies are largely considered separate issues.
In return for making accommodation procurements,
the Agency is usually reimbursed by the requesting
party. Although reimbursement may be in U.S. dol-
lars, it is usually made in local foreign currency.210
The Committee was unable to learn whether the
Agency has any firm policy on what rate of currency
exchange is to be used in making reimbursement. In
many countries, U.S. dollars exchanged for local cur-
rency at the official rate bring fewer units of local
currency than if exchanged at an unofficial, but more
commonly used, rate.
d. Research and Development
CIA has long prided itself on technological capa-
bility, and many of its projects operate at far reaches
of the "state of the art." Such accomplishments are
made by, the Agency with assistance and advice from
the private sector.
Each year, CIA's Deputy Director for Science and
Technology enters. into hundreds of contracts with
industry, usually in the name of other government
agencies.211 These contracts total millions of dollars
for Agency contracts alone. Not only does the Agency
contract for its own research and development pro-
grams, but also for national intelligence programs.
Total contracts for both programs amount to hun-
dreds of millions of dollars, annually.
Committee Staff interviewed numerous members
of the Science and Technology Staff. A major target
of this investigation was "contractor selection" prac-
tices. Although Mr. Colby testified before the Com-
mittee that CIA has established management controls
to insure that contracting is carried out according
to the intent of Congress, the investigation revealed
that 84 percent of these contracts are "sole source
contracts."
Staff also examined "cost overrun" aspects of
research and development contracting. CIA claimed
two and one-half percent of all research and develop-
ment contracts involved cost overruns of 15 percent
or more. There is no reason to doubt the figures;
however, certain caveats must be considered. Con-
tractors' cost estimates in sole-source contracts can
easily be inflated to cover anticipated cost increases.
Overruns can also be labeled "changes in scope."
In several interviews with contracting officers, "by
the book" answers were given to questions regarding
which officer is authorized, and does, accept contract
epanges: However, on fortner, Agen0., dontratting.
I% 0 J. 1; '0 ?
j 5 2
officer indicated that, to a considerable degree, the
technical representative actually makes the contrac-
tual decisions, and the contracting officer then hat
to "catch up" by preparing contract amendments to
legitimize changes already made.
Another ,target of the investigation was the disposal
of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) . Reg-
ulations regarding GFE appear to be precise in de-
termining when to "abandon" 'this ? equipment.
However, the Office of Communications, for example,
contracted in 1965 with an electronics company to
do research work. The contract required the purchase
of a large piece of industrial equipment, as well as
related testing equipment. CIA provided funds for
the equipment as well as the research.221 The testing
equipment cost $74,000 and the industrial equipment
over $243,000. At the termination of the contract in
1975, the testing equipment was sold to the contractor
for $18,500, the lape piece of industrial [equipment]
was abandoned, in place.
Calls to the manufacturer of this piece of ma-
chinery, as well as two "experts" in the field of this
particular type of testing, revealed that the machinery
which was abandoned, while perhaps "_useless" to the
Agency, was not a "worthless" piece of equipment
which should have been "abandoned." - According
to documents provided to the Committee, CIA made
no attempt to contact other government agencies, to
see if the chamber could have been used by another
agency.
c. Colleges and Universities
In 1967 Ramparts Magazine disclosed CIA support
to the National Students Association. As a result,
President Johnson issued a flat prohibition against
covert assistance to educational institutions; but the
Agency unilaterally reserved the right to, and does,
depart from the Presidential order when it has the
need to do so.224
There is no evidence that a President authorized
this departure from the Johnson directive.
As background, President Johnson had appointed
a committee to investigate the matter and make policy
recommendations.
Under Secretary of State, Nicholas deB. Katzen-
bach, and CIA Director, Richard H. Helms, served
on the Committee. It recommended that "no federal
agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or
support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's edu-
cational or private voluntary organizations."
On March 29, 1967, President Johnson issued a
statement accepting the recommendation and direct-
ing "all agencies of the government to implement it
fully."
.The Agency then issued internal policy statements
to implement the President's orders, stating that,
whenever possible, the Agency's identity and sponsor-
ship are to be made known. But the Agency was to
clearly retain the option of entering into a covert
contract with colleges and universities, after obtaining
approval from the Deputy Director for Administra-
tion.
Mr. Carl Duckett, Deputy Director for Science and
Technology, testified before the Committee on Novem-
ber 4, 1975, that the Agency still has on-going con-
tracts with "a small number of universities." Mr.
Duckett also revealed that some of the contracts in-
volved "classified work," and some are covert.
f. U.S. Recording
On October 9, 1975, the Committee held hearings
on electronic surveillance in the United States. One
of the witnesses, Mr. Martin Kaiser, was a manufac-
turer of electronic surveillance and counter-measure
equipment. In the course of his testimony, he revealed
that all sales of his equipment were routed?pursuant
to FBI instructions?through a cut-out or middle-man,
U.S. Recording Company, of Washington, D.C.232
The equipment was neither modified nor serviced
by U.S. Recording. Kaiser testified that ,he delivered
80 percent of his equipment directly to the FBI. On
one such occasion Kaiser noticed an invoice from
U,S. Recording for equipment he had supplied, and
it showed that U.S. Recording had tacked on 30 per-
cent more than it had paid for the devices.235
The mark-up interested Committee investigators
because, according to Kaiser, the middle-man had
handled only paperwork and deliveries. The staff
therefore acquired records of all sales between U.S.
Recording and the FBI involving Kaiser's equipment.
A Committee staff accountant did a detailed study and
determined that the 30 percent mark-up on the in-
voice seen by Mr. Kaiser was representative of all
such sales.
As a result of numerous interviews, it became ap-
parent that Mr. Joseph Tait?the President of U.S.
Recordif)g-t?was a 19-nglimp friend: and poker-pl,aying
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cOmpanion of Mr. John P. Mohr, the Associate Direc-
tor of the FBI in charge of Administration until
1972.236
During the course of investigation, the staff learned
the poker games had been held at the Blue Ridge
Club near Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, on several
weekends each year for the past decade.237 Guest
lists included FBI officials connected with the Ad-
ministrative Division, OMB officials, and a procure-
ment officer from CIA. The only non-governmental
officials at the poker games were Tait, and Mr. Gus.
Oberdick?the President of Fargo International?a
supplier of police equipment to the FBI and CIA.235
Mr. Mohr had invited all the guests, although Mr.
Tait was the only person in the poker games who
possessed membership in the Blue Ridge Club.
Interestingly, the Blue Ridge Club burned to the
ground the evening before two staff-attorneys traveled
to Harpers Ferry to examine its records.
Most purchasing procedures of the FBI are governed
by General Services Administration (GSO) regula-
tions. However, confidential contracts are not subject
to GSA regulations or supervision. The U.S. Recording
Company was the sole company serving as an FBI
cutout.239 Interviews revealed that there was virtually
no control exercised over the confidential contracts
between U.S. Recording Company [and] the FBI.
Neither the Laboratory Division, which initiated
the equipment requisitions, nor the Administrative
Division, which authorized the requisitions, had any
? knowledge of the percentage markup being charged.
The General Services Administration was consulted
and gave an opinion that an appropriate mark-up for
similar services would have been in the 5 percent
range.
? FBI's use of U.S. Recording was apparently moti-
vated by the need for secrecy in purchases of sensitive
electronic equipment. That justification appears ques-
tionable. In most instances, FBI Laboratory Division
personnel negotiated for equipment directly with the
I manufacturers. When manufacturers later received
purchase orders from U.S. Recording, for equipment
with corresponding model number, quantities, and
prices, it was apparent that the equipment was indeed
going to FBI. In fact, the FBI told Kaiser that they
were using U.S. Recording Company and not to worry
about it.
FBI's use of U.S: Recording represents a grossly in-
efficient expenditure for intelligence equipment. Simi-
larly, the fact that the persons within the FBI respon-
sible for requisitioning and purchasing the equipment
had no clear knowledge of the chain of authority re-
garding the arrangement, is at best, nonfeasance. Fur-
ther ramifications are presently being investigated by
the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, and
i by the IRS.. The Committee has made its information
on this matter available to both authorities.
Footnotes:
160"Sterility Codes," as they are termed within the
Agency, designate the "degree of traceability" which
can accompany an item procured or shipped. These
codes range from "unclassified," which may be attri-
buted to CIA, to a code which designates that a pur-
chase is so sensitive that it is an "off-shore purchase
of a foreign item."
188 This was one of many deficiencies and recom-
mendations highlighted by the study. Some of the rec-
ommendations were adopted; most were not, accord-
ing to the Committee's investigation.
I 189This figure was computed by Committee staff
during several reviews of Local Procurement expendi-
tures for one of the three typical overseas situations.
190Those two figures were likewise computed by
Committee staff during reviews of Local Procurement
records. The same Agency employee who was chief
of the station in 1971, is now responsible for CIA
operations in Angola.
191Figures computed by staff during review of local
procurement expenditures. "Leased Quarters" are
housing units supplied by CIA for staff or contract
employees at field stations. "Safehouses" are housing
units where the Agency's primary interest is that of
a secure location to conduct clandestine meetings;
its housing function, per se, is only incidental. The
Agency also provides furnishings for these quarters,
such as refrigentors; ranges, and living room furni-
ture, and at times provides luxury items, such as
china or crystal ware.
192Interview with Agency auditor, by S. A. Zeune,
Oct. 29, 1975. The- auditor concurred, with another
high level Agency official, that in the country in ques-
tion, it was "traditional" to give liquor and cigarettes
as gifts. He also stated, "the controls on the issuances
[of liquor] are not so stiff."
195/bid. Agency regulations permit expenditures of
less than $15.00 without receipts.
,19,,7,W1,-i4t,eryip,w?-?*jth F.a_seOken ?and, ,..fcipyer
Chief of Station revealed this fact. Interviews, by
S. A. Zeune, Oct. 17 & 24, 1975, copies on file with
Sel. Comm. on Intel]. Further, it *as revealed-during
these interviews that polygraph examinations of staff
employees, at one time carried out on a regular basis,
are no longer performed except during pre-employ-
ment investigations. The agency continues, however,
to polygraph indigenous agents on a regular basis.
206This information first came to the attention of the
Committee from staff review of requisition documents
in Sept., 1975. Further inquiry about the model plane
purchases led CIA to give staff access to the cables.
207This was related to Staff, in response to ques-
tions concerning "accommodation procurements"
made for the President of the allied country. The re-
sponse was supplied by the former Chief of Station in
the country. IntervieW with Chief of Station, by S.A.
Zeune, Oct. 31, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm.
on Intell.
205CIA documents made available to the Committee
revealed that the Agency made three such accommo-
dation procurements for the Chief of State. In all
three instances?three times in the last ten years?
the Chief of State requested that CIA procure the
limousines. A Staff interview with the former Chief
of Station disclosed that in the instances concerning
the limousines, the Agency was reimbursed by way of
American currency, hand delivered in bags or brief-
cases to the Station. In one instance, the transaction
ontracting arrangements with academic institutions
and this can be carefully monitored and accomplished
within the policies and principles expressed in the
Katzenbach report . . ." Memorandum for Director of
Central Intelligence, June 21, 1967.
232'1 began my relationship with the FBI around
1967 or 1968. All my correspondence was sent direct-
ly to the FBI.- However, I think it was on only one
occasion that the Bureau ever contacted me person-
ally. All other addresses were made personally or ver-
bally. Once they began purchasing equipment I was
directed not to send this equipment to the FBI, but
rather sell it to a company known as United States
Recording, a private company operating on South
Capitol Street in Washington, D.C. I informed the
Bureau, as if they needed that piece of information,
that Federal law would not allow me to sell equip-
ment to anyone except bona fide governmental agen-
cies. The FBI agents assured me my actions were
proper and subsequently supplied a stamp to United
States Recording which purported to certify on the
purchase order that the transaction was in accordance
with Federal law." Comm. Hearings . . . Oct. 9, 1975.
235"I might point out at this time, by the way,
that nearly all the equipment deliveries I made to
the Equipment Bureau involving orders to United
States Recording were handled by me and billed to
American troops under fire in the Tet offensive January, 1968: "Pearl Harbor all over again."
involved the equivalent of (U.S.) $50,000. Further,
the 'documents appeared to reveal that the Agency
was not disturbed by the fact that the President, in
two instances, did not reimburse the full balance to
the Agency until some months after the transaction
had taken place. Interview with Chief of Station, by
S.A. Zeune, Oct. 31, 1975, copy. on file with Sel.
Comm. on Intell.
210A Staff interview with the member of CIA Re-
view Staff (and former Chief of Station) revealed
that this is considered a further accommodation to the
requesting party, inasmuch as the local currency is
certain to be more readily available than U.S. dollars.
211For security reasons, CIA usually contracts in the
name of other government agencies, such as Depart-
ment of Defense, Air Force, or Army. Contractor em-
ployees are usually unwitting of CIA's association, al-
though in most casts a high company officer will be
briefed by the Agency on a "need to know" basis.
221In this instance, CIA-did not advance the funds
to ,the contractor for the purchase of the test equip-
ment or the industrial equipment. The cost of both
was added to the contractor's fee to the Agency.
Interview with Office of Communications staff mem-
bers, by S.A. Zeune and J.C. Mingee, Oct. 28, 1975,
copy on file with Sel. Com. on Intell. .
224"3. It is proposed that upon your approval:
"a. The attached guidelines be applied immediately
to all future contractual arrangements with U.S. edu-
cational institutions.
,"b. Contracts and grants now in existence be con-
formed to these guidelines as rapidly as feasible and
wherever possible, no later than 30 December 67 for
relationships that will extend beyond that date . . .
The thrust of the review of existing contracts and the
placement of future contracts will be that our con-
tractor relationships with academic institutions will
be strongly on the premise that CIA will be identified
as the contractor . . . Any special contract arrange-
ment will be considered only when there is extremely
?tropL.jtut,ification. w,arraNing.ca from the
rinciples of trA, identification as' the' Cciiitrgdf-OrL. fi
is felt that the Agency must retain some flexibility for
United States Recording. So the paperwork went
through that route. I discovered at one time that
United States Recording was adding a 30 percent
markup on the bills for the equipment. During my
dealings with the Federal Bureau of Investigation I
sold them approximately $100,000 worth of electronic
equipment." Comm. Hearings, . . . Oct 9, 1975.
236"MR. VERMEIRE. Mr. Tait, I believe at- the
last deposition, November 21, you mentioned that you
had played poker on a number of occasions with Mr.
John Mohr, former Assistant Director of the FBI.
"MR. TAIT. Yes." Interview with Mr. Tait, by
J. B. F. Oliphant and R. Vermeire, Dec. 1, 1975,
copy on file with Sel. Comm. on Intell.
237"MR. VERMEIRE. And I think you testified that
you had played poker with him not only privately at
each other's homes or homes in the area but also at a
club up in Harpers Ferry. I think at the time that is
all that was said; it was up in Harpers Ferry.
"MR. TAIT. That's right.
"MR. VERMEIRE. What was the name of that
club?
"MR. TAIT. Blue Ridge.
"MR. VERMEIRE. How did you become a mem-
ber of the club?
"MR TAIT. I used to play cards up there . . . with
another man by the name of Parsons, Donald Par-
sons, (former Chief of the FBI Laboratory Division) .
"MR. VERMEIRE. And was Mr. Parsons alive
when you became a member?
"MR. TAIT. No.
"MR. VERMEIRE. How long had you been play-
ing at the club prior to becoming a member?
"MR. TAIT. I don't know. I'd say probably four
or five years.
"MR. VERMEIRE. Who is the one business person
who was connected with private enterprise that was
there?
"MR. TAIT. A man by the name of Oberdick.
"MR. VERMEIRE. Mr. Oberdick?
T "MR. TAIT. Yes.
waft! VEVMEIRE:.M;a* ififirtiarnerk
"MR. TAIT. Godfrey.
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"MR. VERMEIRE. What business was he in? '
"MR. TAIT. He is?I don't know exactly what
you would say. He is a representative to various com-
panies that supply equipment. What companies, I'm
not sure.
"MR. VERMEIRE. What kind of equipment?
"MR. TAIT. Firearms, tear gas." Mid.
239This fact was established through numerous
staff interviews with knowledgeable FBI personnel in
the Laboratory and Administrative Divisions.
"MR. VERMIERE. Were there other companies
that you dealt with in that way?
"MR. HARWARD. I don't know of any company.
"MR. VERMEIRE. U.S. Recording is the only com-
pany that you know of that 'you had this confidential
relationship with?
"MR. HARWARD. Yes." Interview With Mr. Har-
ward.
4. &mut Seexecy
During Senate hearings in 1973, to confirm James
Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, Mr. Schlesinger
indicated it might be possible to make public the total
budget cost of foreign intelligence. When William
Colby was confirmed as head of CIA in 1973, he, like-
wise, testified that publication of budget totals might
not be harmful.244
In a television interview some years later, Dr.
Schlesinger inadvertently revealed the size of the for-
eign intelligence budget. No great harm apparently
came from that disclosure.
In 1973, a recommendation to publish the annual
costs of intelligence was made by a Senate Special
Committee to Study Questions Related to Secret and
Confidential Documents.
On June 4, 1974, Senator J. William Proxmire of
Wisconsin offered a floor amendment to a defense
procurement authorization bill. His amendment would
have required the Director of Central Intelligence to
provide Congress with an annual, unclassified report
describing the total amount requested for the "nation-
al intelligence program" in the budget submitted by
the President.
In June 1975, the report of the Rockefeller Com-
mission recommended that Congress carefully consider
whether all or part of the CIA budget should be made
public.
On October 1, 1975, Representative Robert N.
Giaimo of Connecticut offered a floor amendment to
a defense appropriations bill, prohibiting any of the
funds provided for "Other Procurement, Air Force"
from being expended by the CIA. Had the amend-
ment been adopted, a subsequent amendment would
have been offered to restore funds for the CIA, and a
specific total for the agency would have been disclosed
Today, however, taxpayers and most Congressmen
do not know, and cannot find -out, how much they
spend on spy activities.
, This is in direct conflict with the Constitution,
which requires a regular and public accounting for all
funds spent by the federal government.
Those who argue for secrecy do not mention the
Constitution. They do not mention taxpayers. Instead,
they talk of rather obscure. understandings the Rus-
sians might derive about some specific operation,251
even if all the Russians knew was a single total which
would be in the billions of dollars and would cover
dozens of diverse agencies.
How the Russians would do this is not clear. The
Committee asked, but there was no real answer. What
is clear is that the Russians probably already have a
detailed account of our intelligence spending, far more
than just the budget tota1.252 In all likelihood, the only
people who care to know and do not know these costs
today are American taxpayers.
Footnotes:
244"When the same question was put to William E.
Colby during his confirmation hearings to be Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, he replied: I would pro-
pose to leave that question, Mr. Chairman, in the
hands of the Congress to decide . . . We are not going
to run the kind of intelligence service that other
countries run. We are going to run one in the Ameri-
can society and the American constitutional structure,
and I can see there may be a requirement to expose
to the American people a great deal more than might
be convenient from the narrow intelligence point of
view." Cong. Rec. S. 9603, June 4, 1974.
251"CHAIRMAN PIKE. . . . Do you think the
Soviets know what our intelligence effort is?
"MR. COLBY. They know a good deal about it,
from the various books that have been published by
'X' members of the intelligence community." Comm.
Hearings. . . Aug. 6, 1975.
clitNigMAN PAq.,.- 9.0P;tYPP.tbNc
that the' Soviets have a fai. better estimate of what
we are spending for intelligence than the average tax-
"e ii fist?-
"MR. COLBY. I think they have put a great deal
of time and attention trying to identify that, and they
Undoubtedly have a better perception of it than the
average taxpayer who just takes the general state-
ments he gets'in the press. But?and that comes from
the careful analysis of the material that is released.
This does help you get a more accurate estimate of
what it is." Ibid.
eTfiernmace
It is one thing to conclude that tens of billions of
intelligence dollars have been rather independently
spent, and sometimes misspent, over the past few
years.
The important issues are whether this spending suf-
ficiently meets our needs, whether Americans have
received their money's worth, and whether non-mone-
tary costs sometimes outweigh the benefits.
The latter question is a matter of risks. . . . To test
the first two questions, the Committee investigated a
representative spectrum of recent events. Some in-
volved war; some involved law enforcement. Some
involved American lives overseas; some involved-per-
I .( 'c 9 t
vented measurement of changes in enemy strength
over time. Second, .pressure from policy-making offi-
cials to produce positive intelligence indicators rein-
forced erroneous assessments of allied progress and
enemy capabilities.
a. 'rho Oe t of
111
ogle Countroversy
According to Mr. Colby, the CIA had been 'sus-
picious of MACV's numerical estimate of the Viet-
namese enemy since at least mid-1966. At an order
of Battle conference held in Saigon in September,
1967, the differences between Washington and the
field, and between CIA and MACV, were thrashed
out; but according to Mr. Colby, to neither's satis-
faction.
A resulting compromise represented the best reso-
lution of MACV's preoccupation with viewing the
order of battle in the classic military sense and CIA's
assessment of enemy capabilities as a much broader
people's war. The Special National Intelligence esti-
mate that emerged from this conference quantified
the order -of battle in MACV terms, and merely de-
scribed other potential enemy forces. Categories now
proposed from previous estimates of order of battle
detailed as much as 200,000 irregular personnel, self-
[one word illegible] and secret self-defense forces,
Soviet troops in Prague, August 1968: For two weeks the U.S. had "lost" the Red Army.
sonal freedoms at home. All involved important in-
terests.
How did intelligence perform? Let the events speak
for themselves.
11.0
7afillutire t? AT.lapt t? a,
New,Klirad. off W ET
War in Vietnam meant that intelligence had to
adapt to an unconventional war, and true perceptions
could spell life or death for Americansnn Tet, per-
ceptions were shattered.
Taking advantage of the Vietnamese lunar holiday,
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched
an all-out offensive on January 30, 1968, against virtu-
ally every urban center and base in South Vietnam.
The scale of attacks was unprecedented in the his-
tory of American involvement in the Vietnam War
and flatly challenged the reassuring picture intelligence
officials in Saigon and Washington had helped present
to the American people.
With nearly all provincial capitals under siege, the
American embassy compound was penetrated by the
Viet Cong, and the pacification program set back in
all areas; predictions of successes, announced scant
months before, had turned into one of the greatest
misjudgments of the war.
The Committee's investigation of Tet focused on
the questions of warning in a combat situation and
communicating the realities of a guerrilla war to ex-
ecutive branch policy-makers. Both are interrelated.
Mr. William Colby and the post-mortems certify,
"warning of the Tet offensive had not fully antici-
pated the intensity, coordination and timing of the
enemy attack." A chief cause was our degraded image
of the enemy.
There were at` least two primary causes for such
degradation. First, the dispute between CIA and MACV
(lylitarcy,Assisytance Vietnam) over. erienly
strength-=cAlted'OMeircif BaillVfiges.?tire'gted 'false 4
perceptions of the enemy U.S. forces faced, and pre-
and assault [one word illegible] and political cadre.
As foot soldiers realized at the time, and as differ-
ent studies. by the Army Surgeon General confirm,
the destructiveness of mines and booby traps, which
irregular forces set out, was increasingly responsible
for American' losses. This was primarily because
American forces were engaging the enemy with in-
creased frequency in his defensive positions. Docu-
ments indicate that, even during the Order of Battle
Conference, there was a large increase in sabotage
for which irregulars and civilians were responsible.
It appears clear in retrospect that, given the nature of
protracted guerrilla war, irregular forces were basic
determinants of the nature- and scope of combat.
The numbers game not only diverted a direct con-
frontation with the realities of war in Vietnam, but
also prevented the intelligence community, perhaps
the President, and certainly Members of Congress,
from judging the real changes in Vietnam over time.
The Saigon Order .of Battle Conference dropped
numbers that had been used since 1962, and used
those that were left in what appears to have been an
arbitrary attempt to maintain some ceiling. It
prompted Secretary of State Dean Rusk to cable the
American Embassy in Saigon, on October 21, 1967:
"Need your recommendation how to resolve problem
of unknown percentage of enemy KIA (Killed in
Action) and W IA (Wounded in Action) which comes
from ranks of self-defense, assault youth and VC
civilian supporters. Since these others not carried as
part of VC strength, indicators of attrition could be
misleading."
When the Systems Analysis office in the Depart-
ment of Defense examined the results of the confer-
ence and reinterpreted them in terms consistent with
prior quantification, it remarked that the new estimate
should have been 395,000-480,000 if computed on the
same basis as before. "The computations do not show
that 6nemy strength has increased, but that previous
estimates of enemy strength were too low."
In ,the context of the late 1960's, numbers .were
'not at all ihabadernic.fekiefcfs'e. lids'. tes
fled that "(T)he effort to develop a number with
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?r-aprect. -to the enemy strength was a part of the ad-
our government as to the amount of effort
we would have to 'spend to counter that kind of
(guerrilla) effort by the Viet Cong. They were
also used to inform Members of Congress and the
American public on the progress in Vietnam.
The validity of most of the numbers was signifi-
cantly dubious. Unfortunately, they were relied on
for optimistic presentations. For example, while men-
tioning in parenthetical and classified comments that
the numbers supporting its indicators of progress in
Vietnam were suspect, the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research provided Assistant Secretary of State Wil-
liam Bundy with quantified measures of success.263
General Westmoreland used such figures to support
his contentions in the fall of 1967, that the enemy's
"guerrilla force is declining at a steady rate."
In testimony before this Committee, Mr. Colby has
stated that the "infatuation with numbers" was "one
of the more trying experiences the Intelligence Corn-
mu,nity has had to endure." In the context of the'
period it appears that considerable pressure was
placed on the Intelligence Community to generate
numbers, less out of tactical necessity than for political
purposes.
The Administration's need was for confirmation of
the contention that there was light at the end of the
tunnel, that the pacification program was working
and generally that American involvement in Vietnam
was not only correct, but effective.266 In this sense,
the Intelligence Community could not help but find
its powers to effect objective analysis substantially un-
dermined. Whether this was by conspiracy or not is
somewhat irrelevant.
b. The Consequences
Four months after the Saigon Order of Battle Con-
ference, the Tet offensive began. On February 1, hours
after the initial mass assaults, General Westmoreland
explained to a press conference, "I'm frank to admit
I didn't know he (.the enemy) would do it on the.
occasion of Tet itself. I thought he would do it before
or after." The U.S. naval officer in command of
the river forces in the Mekong Delta and his ,army
counterpart were similarly caught off guard. Appalled
at how poorly positioned they were to provide quick
and efficient response, the naval officer, now a retired
Vice Admiral, has told the Committee that he "well
remember(s) the words of the Army General who
brought us the orders to extricate ourselves from the
mudflats as fast as possible. They were, 'It's Pearl
Harbor all over again.'"
The April, 1968, post-mortem done by a collection
of intelligence officers discussed the general question
of warning. It concluded that while units in one corps
area were on alert, allied forces throughout the coun-
try generally were caught unprepared for what was
unfolding. Certain forces even while "on a higher
than normal state of alert" were postured to meet
"ineyitable cease-fire violations rather than attacks
on the cities." In other areas "the nature and extent
of the enemy's attacks were almost totally unexpect-
ed." One-half of the South Vietnamese army was
on leave at the time of the attacks, observing a
36-hour standdown.
In testimony before this Committee, both General
Graham and William Colby confirmed, the fact of
some amount of surprise. General Graham preferred
to label it surprise at the enemy's "rashness." Mr.
Colby spoke of a misjudgment of their potential
"intensity, coordination and timing."
Even though quick corrective action was taken to
salvage American equipment and protect U.S. per-
sonnel, the ultimate ramifications on political and
military fronts were considerable. General Westmore-
land requested a dramatic increase of 206,000 in U.S.
troop strength, and additional equipment supplies.
Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford began rethinking
the substance of intelligence. A collection of intelli-
gence officers finally briefed the President of the
United States on the realities of the Vietnam VV III
mid-March, and a few days later he announced he
would not seek re-election.271
c. The Aftermath
The Committee received testimony that problems
with intelligence in Vietnam were not confined to
Tet. Up to the last days of South Vietnam's existence,
certain blinders prevented objective reporting from
the field and an accurate assessment of the field situ-
ation by Washington. Tet raised the issue of whether
American intelligence could effectively account for
enemy strength. Later events, among them the col-
lapse of the Saigon government, pointed to a failure
to properly acknowledge weaknesses of allies.
A real attempt to address the shortcomings of
factors. During the time of -massive?American_pres,
ence, there was a? failure to attrhute;.at,leag: partial
South Vietnamese. "success" to American air, power
and logistics support. Consequently, projected ARVN
performance in 1975, after. the U.S. pullout, was
measured against the yardstick of the Easter Offensive
of 1972, when American support was crucial.
Mission restrictions curtailed necessary collection
activity by professional intelligence officers, and forced
reliance on officials charged with military aid re-
sponsibilities. This promoted biased interpretations.274
The sum total of restrictions, manipulations, and
censorship no doubt led to the conclusion Secretary
of Defense, James R. Schlesinger reached at an April,
1975, news conference. He pointed out that "the
strength, resiliency and steadfastness of those forces
(South Vietnamese) were more highly valued than
they should have been, so that the misestimate, I
think, applied largely to Saigon's capabilities rather
than Hanoi's intentions."
Ultimately, the Vietnam intelligence experience is
a sobering reminder of the limitations and pitfalls
the United States can expect to encounter if it chooses
to align itself in unconventional battle with uncon-
ventional allies. It illustrates how very different guer-
rilla war is from World War II, and how much more
problematic an alliance with emerging and unstable
Third World governments will be.
Reviewing the American experience in Indochina,
an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
wrote a note of .caution to the Secretary of Defense
emphasizing the following view:
"The problems that oescurred in Vietnam or
Cambodia can now be occurring in our efforts to
assess [an allied and an adversary Third World
country's] forces, forces in the Persian Gulf or
forces in the Middle East. These problems must
be addressed before the U.S. becomes involved
in any future crisis in .the Third World that
requires objective and timely intelligence analy-
sis."
Given the substantial American involvement in
these areas, strong remedies and honest restrospect
appear necessary, to overcome and prevent intelli-
gence output that fails, for whatever reason, to pre-
sent comprehensive and undisguised perceptions of
war.
Footnotes:
263The memorandum to William Bundy is from
Fred Greene of the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research and is dated Sept. 22, 1967.
It notes that claims of enemy captured, enemy re-
cruited, weapons lost, desertions, incidents of bat-
talion size attacks, killed in action, vital roads opened,
and the percentage of population under South Viet-
namese control are not supported by the statistics.
The memorandum also advises that Mr. Bundy not
bring to light other figures that present a negative
picture.
After alleging that the VC was having difficulties
in its recruitment, Mr. Greene goes on to point out,
in a confidential comment, that "Recruitment sta-
tistics should be avoided since they are based on a
relatively small number of reports of dubious reli-
ability. Moreover, any use of recruitment figures
might well be used by our critics to question the
reliability of our estimates on Communist order of
battle, a subject which almost certainly will soon
cause us considerable public relations problems."
264,, it is significant that the enemy has not won a
major battle in more than a year. In general, he can
fight his large forces only at the edges of his sanctu-
aries . . . His Viet Cong military units can no longer
fill their ranks from the South but must depend in-
creasingly on replacements from North Viet Nam.
His guerrilla force is declining at a steady rate. Mo-
rale problems are developing within his ranks." He
concluded by saying, "The enemy has many prob-
lems: He is losing control of the scattered popula-
tion under his influence. He is losing credibility with
the population he still controls. He is alienating the
people by his increased demands and taxes, where he
can impose them. He sees the strength of his forces
steadily declining. He can no longer recruit in the
South to any meaningful extent; he must plug the
gap with North Vietnamese. His monsoon offensives
have been failures. He was dealt a mortal blow by the
installation of a freely elected representative govern-
ment. And he failed in his desperate effort to take the
world's headlines from the inauguration by a military
victory." General Westmoreland, "Progress Report
on the War in Viet Nam," before the National Press
Club, Washington, D. C., Nov. 21, 1967.
266According to George Allen, pressure was put on
CIA by Walt RoStow, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, to prepare positive indica-
tors of progress in the pacification program. When
Mr. Allen suggested that there were few, he received
_port your President in his time of need." Rostow
then requested that the Office of Current Intelligence
-
produce a compilation of extracts showing progress,
which OCI did, while attaching a cover letter caveat.
Rostow removed the cover letter and reported to the
President "at last an objective appraisal from CIA."
Staff interview with George Allen, Dec. 1, 1975.
271Immediately after the Tet offensive, President
Johnson began to seek independent assessments of the
US role in Vietnam. Turning first to Dean Acheson,
the former Secretary of State, he solicited opinions
from an informal study group, known as the "Wise
Men." Startled by the pessimism of these advisors
from outside of the government, the President de-
manded an individual presentation of three' briefings
provided to the group, in order to discover "who
poisoned the well." George Carver from CIA opined
that the President had a two-audience problem and
could not very well continue to tell the Americans
one thing and the Vietnamese another.
Staff ihterview with George Carver, Jan. 9, 1973.
274Defense attaches in Vietnam held the dual re-
sponsibilities of monitoring military aid and coordi-
nating intelligence reporting on friendly forces. The
former tended to affect the latter, and attaches would
use supply figures to interpret South Vietnamese capa-
bilities toward the end of the war.
The Ambassador in Vietnam in 1975 "personally
and through his Political Section monitored very
closely the intelligence reporting from Vietnam." Re-
ports on the political, and economic conditions (in-
cluding reports on corruption) were either censored
or retained within the Embassy. (See Henry A.
Shockley, "Intelligence Collection in Vietnam, March
1974-March 1975" in Appendix.)
2. Czechoslovakia: Failure
Of Tactical Warning
The, Czechoslovakia crisis challenged our ability
to monitor an attack by the Soviet Union?our prime
military adversary. We "lost" the Russian army, for
two weeks.
Forces of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia
on August 20, 1968, to overthrow the Dubcek regime
which, since spring, had been moving toward liberal,
independent policies the Soviets could not tolerate.
U.S. intelligence had understood and reported the
basic issues in the developing Soviet-Czech confron-
tation, and concluded that the Soviets were capable
of launching an invasion at any time.
Intelligence failed, however, to provide a warning
that the Soviets had "decided to intervene with
force." Consequently, President Johnson first learned
of the invasion when Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
visited the White House and told him.
A review of U.S. intelligence performance during
the Czech crisis indicates the agencies were not up
to the difficult task of divining Soviet intentions.
We knew Soviet capabilities, and that the tactical
decision to invade might leave only hours of advance
warning. The CIA, DIA, and NSA should have been
prepared for lightning-quick reaction to Soviet mili-
tary moves.
Czech radio broadcasted news of the invasion at
8:50 p.m., Washington time. CIA translated and trans-
mitted its reports of invasion to Washington at 9:15
p.m. By that time, President Johnson had already
met his appointment with the Soviet Ambassador.
U.S. technical intelligence learned of the Soviet
invasion several hours before?but the information
did not reach Washington until after the Czech radio
message. The CIA later concluded that the informa-
tion "might have made a difference" in our ability
to provide the tactical warning.
One alarming failure of intelligence prior to the
invasion occurred during the first two weeks in
August, when U.S. intelligence could not locate a
Soviet, combat formation, which had moved into
northern Poland. Director Helms later admitted he
was not "happy about those two weeks" when he
could not locate the Soviet troops.
Information from technical intelligence, which
would have been helpful, was not available until days
later: Clandestine reporting in the previous weeks had
been so slow to. arrive it proved of little value to
current intelligence publications.
Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms
reported to the President's Foreign intelligence Ad-
visory Board in October, 1968, that the intelligence
record of failing to detect the actual attack "distresses
me." The Director provided reassurances that the
record would have been better "if West Germany had
been the target rather than Czechoslovakia."
In 1971, a Presidential Commission reported to
President Nixon that its review of U.S. ability to
respond to sudden attack had found serious weak-
nesses. The Pentagon was directed to improve its
rtezidl Iferseln Nap) lAmpered by ,mprly.) chNT.R14`.:la Tpt,a.p14.z,q,at your litrillingnesS to sup- waTing. system. Improvement to the.very ,best pos-
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the village VOICE February 16, 1976
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sible degree is, of course, the minimum acceptable
standard. There will be no more important area for
Congressional oversight committees to explore thor-
oughly.
3. The Mid-East War: The
System Breaks Down
The Mid-East war gave the intelligence community a
real test of how it can perform when all its best tech-
nology and human skills are focused on a known
world "hot spot." It failed.
On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a
major assault across the Suez Canal and Golan
Heights against a stunned Israel. Although Israel
eventually repelled the attack, at a cost of thousands
of lives, the war's consequences cannot be measured
in purely military terms.
For Americans, the subsequent U.S.-Soviet con-
frontation of October 24-25, 1973, when the Soviets
threatened to unilaterally interyene in the conflict,
and the Arab oil embargo are reminders that war in
the Middle East has a direct impact on our own
national interests.
The Committee's analysis of the U.S. intelligence
performance in this crisis confirms the judgment of
an intelligence community post-mortem that "the prin-
cipal conclusions concerning the imminence of hostili-
ties .. . were?quite simply, obviously, and starkly?
wrong." Even after the conflict had begun, we did not
accurately monitor the course of events.
The important question is what went wrong?
The last relevant National Intelligence Estimate be-
fore the October War was published five months
earlier, in May, 1973, during a particularly bad period
in Arab-Israeli relations. That estimate addressed
the likelihood of war "in the next few weeks." No
long-range view was presented, and the crisis soon
passed.
The only intelligence report concerned with future
political-military issues was a May 31, 1973, Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR) memorandum to
Secretary of State Rogers. The authors reasoned
correctly that Egypt's President Sadat, for political
reasons, would be strongly tempted to resort to arms
if diplomacy proved fruitless. Accordingly, the report
concluded, the "resumption of hostilities by autumn
will become a better than even het" should the diplo-
matic impasse continue.
By September 30, 1975?less than a week before the
attack?INR had lost "the wisdom of the Spring."
By then, all U.S. intelligence agencies argued that the
political climate in the Arab nations was not con-
ducive to a major war. Intelligence consumers were
reassured that hostilities were not likely.292
The next question is why this happened.
Analytical bias was part of the problem.293 In the
summer of 1973, the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA),- CIA, and INR all flatly asserted that Egypt
was not capable of a major assault across the Suez
Canal. Syria, they said, was not much of a threat
either, despite recent acquisitions of sophisticated So-
viet . . . missile systems and other material.
One reason for the analysts' optimism can be found
in a 1971 CIA handbook, in a passage reiterated and
reinforced in discussions in early October, 1973. The
Arab fighting man, it reported, "lacks the necessary
physical and cultural qualities for performing effec-
tive military services." The Arabs were thought to
be so clearly inferior that another attack would be
irrational and, thus, out of the question.
No doubt this attitude was not far in the back-
ground when CIA advised Dr. Kissinger on September
30, 1975, that "the whole thrust of President Sadat's
activities since last spring has been in the direction
of bringing moral, political, and economic force to
bear on Israel in tacit acknowledgment of Arab un-
readiness to make war."
That analysis is quite surprising, in light of infor-
mation acquired during that period, which indicated
that imminent war was a distinct possibility. By late
September, for example, CIA had acquired vital evi-
dence of the timing and warlike intentions of the
Arabs. The source was disbelieved, for reasons still
unclear.
There were other positive indications. In late Sep-
tember, the National Security Agency began picking
up clear signs that Egypt and Syria were preparing
for a major offensive. NSA information indicated
that [a major foreign nation] had become extremely
sensitive to the prospect of war and concerned about
their citizens and dependents in Egypt. NSA's warn-
ing escaped the serious attention of most intelligence
analysts responsible for the Middle East.299
The fault may well lie in the system itself. NSA in-
tercepts of Egyptian-Syrian war preparations in this
period were so voluminous?an average of hundreds
of reports each week?that few analysts had time to
digest more than a small portion of them. Even fewer
analysts were qualified by technical training to read
raw NSA traffic. Costly intercepts had scant impact
on estimates.
These reports lacked visibility and prestige to such
a degree that when, two days before the war, an NSA
briefer insisted to General Daniel Graham of CIA
that unusual Arab movements suggested imminent
hostilities, Graham retorted that his staff had reported
a "ho-hum" day in the Middle East. Later, a key
military analyst claimed that if he had only seen cer-
tain NSA reports, which were so "sensitive" they had
not been disseminated until after the war began, he
would have forecast hostilities.302
There was testimony that Dr. Kissinger's secrecy
may also have thwarted effective intelligence analysis.
Kissinger had been in close contact with both the So-
viets and the Arabs throughout the pre-war period.
He, presumably, was in a unique position to pick up
indications of Arab dissatisfaction with diplomatic
talks, and signs of an ever-increasing Soviet belief
that war would soon break out. When the Committee
was denied its request for high-level reports, it was
unable to learn whether Kissinger elicited this infor-
mation in any usable form. It is clear, however, that
the Secretary passed no such warning to the intelli-
gence community.303
The Committee was told by high U.S. intelligence
officials and policy-makers that information from high-
level diplomatic contacts is of great intelligence value
as an often-reliable indicator of both capabilities and
intentions. Despite the obvious usefulness of this
information, Dr. Kissinger has continued to deny in-
telligence officials access to notes of his talks with
foreign leaders.
The morning of the Arab attack, the Watch Com-
mittee?which is responsible for crisis alerts?met to
assess the likehood of major hostilities. It concluded
that no major, coordinated offensive was in the off-
irig.305 Perhaps one of the reasons for this was that
some participants were not "cleared" for all intelli-
gence data, so the subject and its implications could
not be fully discussed.
The entire system had malfunctioned. Massive
amounts of data had proven indigestible by analysts.
Analysts, reluctant to raise false alarms and lulled by
anti-Arab biases, ignored clear warnings. Top-level
policy-makers declined to share perceptions gained
from talks with key Arab and Soviet diplomats dur-
ing the critical period. The fact that Israeli intelli-
gence, to which the U.S. often deferred in this period,
had been wrong was small consolation.
Performance did not measurably improve after the
war's outbreak, when the full resources of the U.S.
intelligence community were focused [there].
The Defense Intelligence Agency, having no mili-
tary contingency plan for the area, proved unable to
deal with a deluge of reports from the war zone, and
quickly found itself in chaos. CIA and INR also
engulfed Washington and each other with situation
reports, notable for their redundancy.
Technical intelligence-gathering was untimely, as
well as indiscriminate. U.S. national technical means
of overhead coverage of the Middle East, according
to the post-mortem, was "of no practical value" be-
cause of time problems. Two overflight reconnaissance
missions, on October 13 and 25, "straddled the most
critical phase of the war and were, therefore, of
little use."310
The U.S. failure to accurately track war develop-
ments may have contributed to a U.S.-Soviet con-
frontation and troop alert called by President Nixon
on October 24, 1973.311
A second intelligence community post-mortem, the
existence of which was not disclosed to the Com-
mittee until after its hearing,312 reported that CIA and
DIA almost unquestionably relied on overly-optimistic
Israeli battle reports. Thus misled, the U.S. clashed
with the better-informed Soviets on the latter's strong
reaction to Israeli cease-fire violations. Soviet threats
to intervene militarily were met with a worldwide
U.S. troop alert. Poor intelligence had brought Amer-
ica to the brink of war. _
Administration witnesses assured the Committee
that analysts who had performed poorly during the
crisis had been replaced.313 The broader record sug-
gests, however, that the intelligence system faults
have survived largely intact. New analysts will con-
tinue to find themselves harassed and deluged with
largely equivocal, unreadable, or unusable data from
CIA, DIA, INR, and the collection-conscious NSA.
At the same time, they can expect to be cut off, by
top-level policy-makers, from some of the best indi-
cators of hostile intentions.
Footnotes:
292"If analysts did not provide forewarning, what
did they offer in its stead? Instead of warnings, the
Community's analytical effort in effect produced re-
assurances. That is to say, the analysts, in reacting to
indicators which could be interpreted in themselves
as portents of hostile Arab actions against Israel,
sought in effect to reassure their audience that the
Arabs would not resort to war, at least not deliber-
ately." (Emphasis in original.) CIA's Post-Mortem,
page 3.
293CIA-DIA4NR Arab-Israeli Handbook, July 1973.
The CIA's Post-Mortem at 13 characterizes this Hand-
book and analytic preconceptions: "No preconcep-
tions seem to have had a greater impact on analytical
attitudes than those concerning relative Arab and Is-
raeli military prowess. The June War was frequently
invoked by analysts as proof of fundamental and per-
haps permanent weaknesses in the Arab forces and,
inferentially, of Israeli invincibility. The Arabs, de-
spite the continuing acquisition of modern weapons
from the Russians, remained about as far behind the
Israelis as ever." At page 14 the Post-Mortem con-
cludes: "There was, in addition, a fairly widespread
notion based largely (though perhaps not entirely)
on past performances that many Arabs, as Arabs, sim-
ply weren't up to the demands of modern warfare and
that they lacked understanding, motivation, and prob-
ably in some cases courage as well. These judgments
were often alluded to in conversations between ana-
lysts. . ? ."
299The draft CIA Post-Mortem states that NSA
SIGINT Summaries probably did not convey the full
significance of these technical indicators to the reader.
The conclusion of all intelligence officials interviewed
by the Committee staff was unanimous: the National
Security Agency products?particularly raw products
?are difficult to understand. The CIA's Post-Mortem,
page 9, states the problem with NSA products as seen
by Middle East intelligence analysts: "Two particular
problems associated with SIGINT should be men-
tioned here: (1) Certain highly classified and spe-
cially handled categories of COMINT reached their
consumers only several days after intercept, a circum-
stance which perhaps had unfortunate effects; (2)
SIGINT reporting is very voluminous; in a typical
non-crisis week, hundreds of SIGINT reports on the
Middle East cross the desk of the area specialist in a
production office. Moreover, partly because of the
requirements levied on it by a wide variety of con-
sumers, NSA issues most SIGINT reports (not mere-
ly ELINT) in very technical language. SIGINT can
thus challenge the ingenuity of even the most experi-
enced, all-source analyot searching for meaning- and
patterns in a mountain of material.". . . .
302From the Draft CIA Post-Mortem: "If the infor-
mation contained in the NSA messages had been avail-
able prior to the time of the outbreak of hostilities,
we could have clearly predicted that [a foreign na-
tion] knew in advance that renewed hostilities were
imminent in the Middle East." This particular type
of NSA-acquired intelligence was delayed "a mini-
mum of ten days."
303Among such reports on Soviet and Arab attitudes
were "The Secretary Afternoon Summary," 27 Sept.,
1973 which reported an intelligence finding that a high
Arab official "has said that Kissinger's statement
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that
U.S. policy in the Middle East remains the same,
destroyed the recent Egyptian hope aroused by
President Nixon's comment that the U.S. is partial
neither to the Arabs or to Israel." . . .
305"The Watch Committee met in special session at
0900 on 6 October 1973 to consider the outbreak of
Israeli-Arab hostilities and Soviet actions with respect
to the situation.
"We can find no hard evidence of a major, coordi-
nated Egyptian/Syrian offensive across the Canal and
in the Golan Heights area. Rather, the weight of evi-
dence indicates an action-reaction situation where
a series of responses by each side to preconceived
threats created an increasingly dangerous potential
for confrontation. The current hostilities are ap-
parently a result of that situation, although we are
in a position to clarify the sequence of events. It is
possible that the Egyptians or Syrians, particularly the
latter, may have been preparing a raid or other small-
scale action." Special Meeting of the Watch Commit-
tee, Oct. 7, 1973.
311"We do not know whether, in fact, these differ-
ing appreciations contributed to the development of a
confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during
the final three days of the crisis (24-26 October).
But this seems to be a real possibility. And it is clear
in any event that in certain crises and under certain
circumstances an accurate view of the tactical mili-
tary situation can be of critical importance to decision-
makers." Also: "If U.S. decision-makers had had a
more accurate view of the tactical situation around
Suez between 21 and 25 October, they might have
had better insight into why the Soviets reacted as they
did to the Israeli violations." Ibid. . . .
312The second post-mortem . . . was not given to
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any Congressional Committee, even those who were
- told of the first post-mortem.
3-13Three DIA officials were removed from their
fibsitions; there were no changes at the CIA, INR, or
NSA. Community analysts interviewed by Committee
staff all agreed the reassignments involved internal
DIA controversies more than any effort to revamp the
agency after the Middle East War.
4. Portugal: The U.S.
Caught Napping
Do our intelligence services know what is going
on beneath ,the surface in allied nations that are not
making headlines? Quiet Portugal exploded in 1974,
leaving serious questions in its aftermath.
When a group of left-leaning Portuguese junior
military officers ousted the Caetano regime on April
25, 1974, State Department officials represented to
the New York. Times that Washington knew those
who were behind the coup well. State indicated that
we were not surprised by the coup, and that no
significant changes in Portugal's NATO membership
were expected. Nothing could have been further
from the truth.
On October 26, 1973, the Defense A ttare in Lis-
bon reported to DIA headquarters in the Pentagon
rumors of a "coup plot," and- -serious --discontent-
among Portuguese military offiCers. ?
On November 8, 1973, the attache reported that
860 Portuguese Army Captains had signed a petition
protesting conditions.320 The attache quickly con-
cluded these dissidents had no intentions of revolu-
tion. Nevertheless, the fact that over 800 military
officers felt deeply enough to risk retribution was a
good indication of the profound social revolution
which Portugal faced.
The record does not suggest that the attache at-
tempted to get to know these junior officers, under-
stand their views, or even record their names. Nor
had anyone in Washington assigned him the task of
searching for signs of social and political unrest in
the Portuguese military. One reason for this was that
the Director of Attache Affairs was not allowed to
-assign duties to attaches. Assignments were done
elsewhere, in an unbelievable demonstration of con-
fusing and inefficient administration.321
Also in November 1973, the attache attended a
social gathering at the home of a retired American
officer where he heard discussion of right-wing Span-
ish and Portuguese countercoup plans, should "ex-
tremists" overthrow the Caetano government. Neither
UPI
Egyptian tanks cross the Nile, October, 1973: American intelligence said it couldn't be done.
The Committee has reviewed documents which
show that the U.S. intelligence community had not
even been asked to probe deeply into Portugal in the
waning months of the Caetano dictatorship.315 As a
result, policy makers were given no rea warning of
the timing and probable ideological con equencs of
the coup, despite clear and public indic tions that a
political upheaval was at hand.316
The State Department's Bureau of Int lligence and
Research had not analyzed events in Po tugal in the
month before the April coup. In retrospec ,four warn-
ing signals, beginning in late February an continuing
through mid-March, 1974, should have sp rked "spec-
ulation at that time that a crisis of major proportions
was brewing," according to the Direct .r of Intelli-
gence and Research, William Hyland. All four events
were reported in the American press:
1. The publication in February 1974, of General
Antonio de Spinola's controversial boo criticizing
Portugal's African colonial wars, which I leashed an
unprecedented public storm.
2. The refusal of General Spinola and the Armed
Forces Chief of Staff, Francisco Costa Gomes, to
participate in a demonstration of milita unity and
support for the Caetano dictatorship.
3. An abortive coup, in mid-March, hen an in-
fantry regiment attempted to march u on Lisbon.
This was followed by the subsequent ? ismissal ?of
Spinola and Costa Gomes from their corn ands.
4.-A period of rising tensions, the arrest of leftists,
and a purge of military officers followi g the first
three developments.
The intelligence community, however,
occupied to closely examine the Portugue
Those responsible for writing current
publications had deadlines to meet,
attend, and relatively little time to specu
velopments in the previously sleepy Caeta
ship.318
The Committee's investigation indicates
other, earlier warning signs which might h
some intelligence interest. Again, these in
deeper unrest were not subjected to close
. 1
1.! 1 (I.;.1 .
? ? (...? "; C T ) ? 1.. ;
1 ? ?-.,1 ? 3 ), t =
as too pre-
e situation.
'ntelligence
eetings to
ate on de-
o dictator-
there were
ye sparked
ications of
analysis.
the identities of the counter-plotters nor of the "ex-
tremists" were reported by the attache. No further
reference to this report was found in a review of
subsequent attache activities prior to the April coup.
In February 1974, the attache forwarded informa-
tion from December 1973, on the Portuguese govern-
ment response to a petition of complaints signed by
over 1,500 junior military officers.323 There was no
effort to identify the leaders of the petition campaign
or to contact any of the signers. After the coup, high
CIA officials would complain of the lack of in-depth
biographic reporting from the attache office.
A review of all Defense Attache reports in the
-months prior to the coup indicated substantial delays
in forwarding reports to Washington. It even took a
month for the attache to send Washington the Spinola
book which unleashed the public storm when it was
published in February.
Twice, Defense Intelligence Agency headquarters
in Washington wrote the attache office in Lisbon
urging the six officers there to be more aggressive, to
travel more, and frequent the diplomatic party circuit
less. Only the most junior attache, a Navy lieu-
tenant, made an attempt to probe beyond the obvious.
The Committee was also told that a serious prob-
lem in DIA is a tendency to reward senior officers,
nearing the ends of their careers, by assigning them
to attache posts. Not only were these officers often
untrained and unmotivated for intelligence duties, but
the Director of Attache Affairs testified that he was
powerless to assign substantive duties to the attaches
in any case.
The Committee did not have the opportunity to
review raw CIA reports during the six months prior
to the coup. CIA officials who relied on these reports
told this Committee that the CIA Station in Lisbon
was so small, and so dependent upon the official
Portuguese security service for information, that very
little was picked up. In fact, attaches were in a
better position than CIA to get to know the Portu-
guese military. There is no indication that attaches
and the Chief of Station attempted to pool their re-
sources and combine CIA's knowledge of the Portu-
t
's1-).1'
guese Community movement with attaches' supposed
military contacts.
- The National Intelligence Officer (N10) for West-
ern Europe did attempt an analysis. A draft memoran-
dum on trends in Portugal, titled, "Cracks in the
Facade," had been in preparation for nearly a month,
and was almost complete when the April coup
erupted. It had to be re-titled. The document itself,
despite its titles, was not attuned to the real causes
of intense discontent which produced a leftist-
military revolt.
That same National Intelligence Officer testified
that he had some twenty-five European countries to
monitor, with the help of only one staff assistant.
NIO's do not have command authority over CIA's
intelligence or operations directorates. They cannot
order that papers be written, that staffers be detached
from the current intelligence office to work on an
in-depth estimate. They cannot instruct clandestine
operations to collect certain types of information.
Nor will the NIO ahvays be informed of covert ac-
tions that may be underway in one of his countries.
The most disturbing testimony before this Com-
mittee was official satisfaction with intelligence prior
to the Portuguese coup. The Director of Attache
Affairs told the Committee that intelligence perform-
ance had been "generally satisfactory and responsive
to requirements." The National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe said intelligence reports had de-
scribed "a situation clearly in process of change, an
old order coming apart at the seams."331
However, both officials quickly admitted under
questioning that the attaches had not, in fact, been
very aggressive. Nor had any intelligence document
warned when and how the old order was "coming
apart at the seams." Without access to intelligence
reports, this Committee might have believed official
claims that the system was functioning well.
Footnotes:
315Interview with Dennis Clift, Senior Staff Mem-
ber, National Security Council, by G. Rushfort, Oct.
3, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm. on Intell.
Mr. Clift stated there was no National Security Coun-
cil effort to levy requirements on the intelligence
community, nor was there any National Security
Council study memorandum addressed to Portugal.
316Testimony of William Hyland before the Com-
mittee: "Even a cursory review of the intelligence
record indicates there was lio specific warning of the
coup of April 25, 1974 in Portugal. As far as the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research was concerned,
our last analytical reporting was in late March and
we drew no conclusions that pointed to more than a
continuing struggle for power but short of a military
revolt." Comm. Hearings . . . October 7, 1975.
320Defense Attache report from Lisbon to the De-
fense Intelligence Agency: "These younger officers
are not disloyal and desire to serve Portugal as mili-
tary officers and have no intention of revolution.
They are patriots who want to make changes for the
improvement of the P.A. [Portuguese Army?editor's
note] and Portugal."
323Defense Attache report also commented on the
Spinola appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces: "Although there are some political reasons
in back of this appointment, it is reported that he
will concern himself mainly with personnel and logis-
tics in the Metropole." Defense Attache report, Feb.
6, 1974
331Testimony of Keith Clark and Samuel V. Wilson.
Only William Hyland, Director of INR, testified
without prodding that the system had not functioned
well in the Portugal crisis.
5. India: Priorities Lost
How well does U.S. intelligence keep track of non-
military events that affect our foreign policy interests?
Not very well, if the first nuclear test in the Third
World is any indication.
The intelligence community estimated, in 1965, that
India was capable of conducting a nuclear test, and
probably would produce a nuclear device within the
next few years. In 1972, a special estimate said
the "chances are roughly even that India will conduct
a [nuclear] test at some time in the next several years
and label it a peaceful explosion."
DIA, in reports distributed only within the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, had stated since 1971 that India might
already have a nuclear device. However, when India
did explode a nuclear device on May 18, 1974,
U.S. intelligence was caught off-guard. As the CIA's
post-mortem says of the community's surprise: "This
failure denied the U.S. Government the option of con-
sidering diplomatic or other initiatives to try to pre-
vent this significant step in nuclear proliferation."
Only one current intelligence article was published
in the six months before the May explosion. That
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article, by DIA, stated for the first time that India
might already possess such a device. Perhaps one
reason the article did not provoke more deliate and
initiative was the title: "India: A nuclear weapons
program will not likely be pursued in the near term."
In 1972, U.S. intelligence had picked up 26 reports
that India would soon test a device, or that she was
capable of doing so if the government made the deci-
sion to proceed. There were only two reports on the
subject from August 1972, to May 1974, when the
device was exploded. Neither was pursued with what
the CIA can claim was a "real follow-up."
An April 17, 1974 report indicated that India might
have already conducted an unsuccessful nuclear test
jn the Rajasthan Desert. The CIA did not disseminate
this report to other agencies, nor did CIA officials
pursue the subject.
The Director of Central Intelligence had estab-
lished the bureacratic device of "Key Intelligence
Questions" in 1974. Although nuclear proliferation
was on the list, few officials outside the upper reaches
of the bureaucracy expressed much interest. The CIA's
general nuclear developments priority list did not-
address India. and the military attaches received no
clear instructions on nuclear matters. Nevertheless,
previous estimates on India had identified "gaps" in
our information.
After India exploded the nuclear device in May
1974, Director Colby wrote Dr. Kissinger to say he
intended to mount a more aggressive effort on the
nuclear proliferation problem.
One of several justifications for national technical
means of overhead coverage over India in the two
years prior to May 1974, was the nuclear test issue.
However, the Intelligence Community technical ana-
lysts were never asked to interpret the data. The
CIA's post-mortem stated, in effect, the system had
been tasked to obtain data, but the analysts had not
been asjced to examine such data. After the explosion,
the analysts were able to identify the test location,
from pre-test data.
Following the failure to anticipate India's test, the
United Slates Intelligence Board agreed to hold one
committee meeting a year on nuclear proliferation.
Interagency "coordinating" mechanisms were estab-
lished. Teams of experts traveled to various countries
to impress on American embassy personnel the im-
portance of the proliferation threat. Analysts once
again were encouraged to talk to each other more.
The missing element, as the bureaucracy reshuffled
its priorities after the Indian failure, is quite simple:
the system itself must be reformed to promote antici-
pation of, rather than reaction to, important world
events.
6. Cyprus: Failure of
Intelligence Policy
Cyprus presented a complex mix of politics, per-
sonalities, and NATO allies: Unfortunately, a crisis
turned to war, while intelligence tried to unravel
events?and America offended all participants.
On the morning of July 15, 1974, Greek strong-
man General Dimitrios Ioannides and his military
forces on Cyprus overthrew the elected government
of Archbishop Makarios. Five days later, Turkey in-
vaded the island, ostensibly to protect the Turkish
minority there and to prevent the Greek annexation
long promoted by the new Cyprus leadership. Un-
satisfied with its initial military success, Turkey re-
newed its offensive on August 14, 1974.
The failure of U.S. intelligence to forcast the coup,
despite strong strategic and tactical signs, may be
attributed to several factors: poor reporting from the
U.S. Embassy in Athens, in part due to CIA's exclu-
sive access to Ioannides; the general analytical as-
sumption of rational behavior; and analysts' re-
luctance to raise false claims of an impending crisis.346
The failure to predict the coup is puzzling in view
of the abundance of strategic warnings. When loan-
nides wrested power from George Papadopoulos in
November, 1974, analysts concluded that relations
between Greece and Makarios were destined to
worsen. Ioannides' hatred of Makarios, whom he
considered pro-Communist or worse, has been de-
scribed as having "bordered on the pathological."
Moreover, Makarios was seen as a stumbling block
to Ioannides' hopes for onosis. Observers agreed that
a serious confrontation was only a matter of time.
By spring of 1974, that confrontation would at
times appear imminent, with intervening lulls. Each
trip to the brink elicited dire warnings to policy of-
ficials from Near East desks in the State Department.
However, the nuances of these events, indicating a
gathering of storm clouds, were largely lost on
analysts as their attention remained focused on the
Greek-Turkish clash over mineral rights in the Aegean.
Cyprus remained a side issue despite growing evi-
dence that the Ioannides-Makarios relationship was
reaching a critical stage.
There would soon be several tactical indications
that a coup was in the works. On June 7, 1974, the
National Intelligence Daily warned that loannides
was actively considering the ouster of Makarios if
the Archbishop made an "extremely provocative
move."350 On June 29, intelligence officials reported
that Ioannides had again told his CIA contact nine
days before, that if Makarios continued his provoca-
tion, the Greek would have only two options: to
write-off Cyprus, with its sizeable Greek majority, or
eliminate the Archbishop as a factor.
On July 3, 1974, Makarios made that "extremely
provocative move," by demanding the immediate
withdrawal of a Greek National Guard contingent
on Cyprus. The ultimatum was delivered in an ex-
traordinary open-letter to the Greek government, ac:
cusing Ioannides' associates of attempting his physical
as well as political liquidation.352
On June 29, 1974, Secretary Kisinger, responding
to alarms sounded by State Department desk officers,
approved a cable to U.S. Ambassador Henry J. Tasca
in Athens, instructing that he personally tell loannides
of U.S. opposition to any adventure on Cyprus.353
The instruction was only partially heeded.
Tasca, assured by the CIA station chief that loan-
nides would continue to deal only with CIA, and
not sharing the State Department desk officer's alarm,
was content to pass a message to the Greek leader
indirectly.
Tasca's colleagues subsequently persuaded secre-
tary Kissinger's top aide, Joseph Sisco, that a general
message passed through regular government chan-
nels would have sufficient impact. The Ambassador
told Committee staff that Sisco agreed it was un-
necessary for Tasco himself to approach Ioannides,
who had no official government position. That in-
terpretation has been vigorously disputed. It is clear,
however, that the Embassy took no steps to under-
score for loannides the depth of U.S. concern over a
possible Cyprus coup attempt.
This episode, the exclusive CIA access to Ioannides,
Tasca's indications that he may not have seen all
important messages to and from the CIA Station,
Ioannides' suggestions of U.S. acquiescence, and
Washington's well-known coolness to Makarios, have
led to public speculation that either U.S. officials
were inattentive to the reports of the developing crisis
or simply allowed it to happen, by not strongly, di-
rectly, and unequivocally warning Ioannides against
it.358
Due to State Department access policies. the Com-
mittee was unSuccessful in obtaining closely-held
cables to and from the Secretary of State during this
period including a message the Secretary sent to
Ioannides through the CIA the day after the coup.
Accordingly, it is impossible to reach a definitive con-
clusion.
On July 3, 1974, a CIA report stated that an indi-
vidual, later described as "an untested source," had
passed the word that despite new aggressiveness on
Makarios' part, loannides had changed his mind:
there would be no coup after all. For reasons still
unclear, this CIA report was embraced and heeded
until July 15, the day of the coup. The Intelligence
Community post-mortem, appears to have concluded
that the "tip" was probably a ruse.
Ioannides' dubious change of heart went virtually
unquestioned despite Makarios' open-letter, despite
further ultimatums from the Archbishop to remove the
Greek officers, and despite the en masse resignations
of three high-level Greek Foreign Ministry officials
known to be soft-liners on Cyprus. In this setting,
the grotesquely erroneous National Intelligence Bul-
letin of July 15, 1974, is not surprising, nor are Am-
bassador Tasca's protestations that he saw no coup
on the horizon.
Almost at the moment Ioannides unleashed his
forces, a National Intelligence Bulletin was reassur-
ing intelligence consumers with the headline: "loan-
nides is taking a moderate line while he plays for
time in his dispute with Archbishop Makarios."
Results of the events triggered by the coup in-
cluded: thousands of Cypriot casualties and refugees,
a narrowly-averted war between NATO allies Greece
and Turkey, a tragic worsening of U.S. relations with
all three nations, and the death of an American Am-
bassador. U.S. intelligence must be accorded a share
of the responsibility.
The intelligence community somewhat generously
termed its performance during the Cyprus crisis as "a
mixture of strengths and weaknesses." The Com-
mittee's conclusion, after an analysis of the record, is
less sanguine. Intelligence clearly failed to provide
adequate warning of the coup, and it performed indif-
ferently once the crisis had begun.
The analytical failure in the Cyprus crisis brings to
mind several parallels with the 1973 Middle East
debacle. In both cases, analysts and policymakers
were afflicted both with a past history of false alarms,
,and with the rigid notion, unsupported in fact, that
foreign leaders invariably act "rationally." In the
Cyprus crisis, as in the Mid-East, analysts were de-
luged with unreadable and redundant data subsequent
to the initial intelligence failure.363 Still, given the
ample indications that Makarios had sufficiently
aroused Ioannides' ire, these analytical quirks should
not have prevented a correct interpretation of events.
There appear to have been collection failures in
this period, although additional evidence could prob-
ably not have overcome the analytical deficiencies
that caused erroneous conclusions. For example, CIA
personnel had been instructed by the U.S. Ambas-
sador not to establish contacts within the Turkish
minority, and to obviate any allegations of collusion
with the anti-Makarios EOKA-B movement. They were
told to seek intelligence on EOKA-B by indirect
means, rather than through direct contact with mem-
bers of that organization. Finally, signals intellig-
ence in the area was focused elsewhere and even after
the coup was not a significant factor.366
Since the coup inevitably led to the two Turkish
invasions and the Greek-Turkish confrontation, the
performance of intelligence in predicting military
hostilities after the coup is both less important and
unremarkable in its successes.
Along with most newspaper articles of the time,
U.S. intelligence concluded that Ioannides' installa-
tion of Nicos Sampson, notoriously anti-Turk, as
Cypriot President insured a Turkish invasion of the
island. Despite prominent stories in Turkish news-
papers and undisguised troop movements at the coast,
DIA did not predict the invasion until literally hours
before Turkish forces hit the beaches on July 20,
1974. A National Intelligence Officer's report had
picked July 20 as a likely invasion date, but was never
disseminated to the intelligence community.368
Perhaps flushed by its "success" in calling the first
Turkish invasion just after the Turkish press did, U.S.
intelligence appeared to lose interest, in the belief
that the crisis was over. Thus, there was no real
forewarning that the Turkish forces would launch an
even more ambitious invasion on August 14, result-
ing in the capture of fully one-third of the island.
In terms of both its immediate 370 and long-range
consequences, the sum total of U.S. intelligence failure
during the Cyprus crisis may have been the most
damaging intelligence performance in recent years.
Footnotes:
346Former intelligence officials have described to
this Committee the difficulties encountered by those
who must report from an area which has frequent
and intense crises. "After a while, Washington of-
ficials get tired of hearing about impending crises
from your area and it actually gets embarrassing to
report them." That obsevation gained credence when
witnesses from the Department of State jokingly re-
ferred to the number of times Cypriot Desk officers
had predicted coups. Interview with intelligence of-
ficial, by F. Kirschstein, Sept. 29, 1975, copy on file
with Sel. Comm. on Intell.
350ne June 7 National Intelligence Daily was based
on a June 3 Field Intelligence Report which stated
that "Ioannides claimed that Greece is capable of
removing Makarios and his key supporters from
power in twenty-four hours with little if any blood
being shed and without EOKA assistance. The Turks
would quietly acquiesce to the removal of Makarios,
a key enemy . . . Ioannides prayed for some un-
expected favorable gift from heaven. Ioannides stated
that if Makarios decides on some type of extreme
provocation against Greece to obtain a tactical ad-
vantage, he (Ioannides) is not sure whether he should
merely pull the Greek troops out of Cyprus and let
Makarios fend for himself, or remove Makarios once
and for all and have Greece deal directly with Turkey
over Cyprus' future." That report has been confirmed
by former CIA Athens officials interviewed by staff.
Interview with CIA operations officials, by J. Boos
and G. Rushford . . . copy on file with Sel. Comm.
on Intell.
352The letter reads in part; "I have many times
asked myself why an unlawful and nationally harmful
organization . . . is supported by Greek officers . . .
The Greek officers' support for EOKA-B consti-
tutes an undeniable reality . . . I am sorry to say,
Mr. President, that the root of evil is very deep,
reaching as far as Athens. It is from there that
the tree of evil, the bitter fruits of which the
Greek Cypriot people are tasting today, is being fed
and maintained and helped to grow and spread. In
order to be absolutely clear, I say that cadres of the
military regime of Greece support and direct the
activity of the EOKA-B terrorist organization. This
also explains the involvement of Greek officers of
the National Guard in illegal activities, conspiracy
and other inadmissable situations . . . You realize,
Mr. President, the sad thoughts which have been
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Ipreoccupying and tormenting me following t e ascer-
tainment that men of the Government of Gr ece are
, incessantly preparing conspiracies against e and,
;what is worse, are dividing the Greek Cyprio people
and pushing them to catastrophe through civ 1 strife.
I have more than once so far felt, and some cases I
have almost touched, a hand invisibly extendi g from
Athens and seeking to liquidate my huma exist-
ence . . ." Makarios went on to ask for th imme-
diate withdrawal of all Greek officers in the Cypriot
National Guard.
3531he State cable, drafted by John Day, of the
Greek desk, was dispatched to the Embassy in Athens
under Undersecretary Joseph Sisco's signa ure. It
stated in part: "We share concerns of Ath ns and
Nicosia regarding gravity of relationship etween
Government of Greece and Government of yprus.
From various reports, it is evident that loan ides is
seriously considering? way to topple Makari s from
power. . . . In our view effort to remove Mak rios by
force contains unacceptable risks of generatin chaos
eventually causing Greco-Turk confrontati n; in-
volving Soviets in Cyprus situation; and corn ? icating
developing U.S.-Soviet detente.
"We know that loannides has long been ebsessed
with issue of communism both in Greece and in
Cyprus and that his dislike for Makarios as bor-
dered on the pathological. Until recently, ur im-
pression has been that he preferred to play fir time ?
on Cyprus problem until he had consolida ed his
position in the internal Greek context. No , how-
ever, he apparently feels that Makarios is se ing to
take advantage of Greek-Turkish tensions nd the
Greek regime's domestic difficulties to reduc Greek
influence on the island and that this effort i a per-
sonal challenge which he cannot ignore." T cable
went on to instruct Ambassador Tasca to pe sOnally
tell loannides that the U.S. opposed any ad enture
on Cyprus. Department of State cable to Athens
Embassy, June 29, 1974.
358"It is reasonable to ask whether this U.S action
was perceived in Athens as a reflection of the ? epth of
.Washington's concern about loannides' sch me to
oust Makarios. Clearly General General Io nnides
had much ground to believe that in light of th direct
orttact he enjoyed with the CIA station, he would
have received a stronger, more categoric waning if
he U.S. were _genuinely exercised about pr tecting
Makarios, whom he regarded as a communi t sym-
pathizer.
"All this leads to one basic conclusion: I believe
that strong U.S. representations to loannides would
have prevented the crisis. This judgment is shared
by the rest of the Greek language/area speci4lists in
.SE." "Criticisms of United States Policy in the Cyprus
ndum.
NSA
rstood
in past
lained
equent
analy-
ficance
Crisis." Internal Department of State memor
I 363As in the previous Mid-East crisis, man
SIGINT reports were too technical to be und
by lay analysts. The Post-Mortem added: "As
Crises, most of the Customers interviewed corn
6f the volume of . . . reporting, as well as its f
i?edundancy. Many also complained of too littl
s.is of the facts, too few assessments of the sign
,of reported developments."
366Intelligence officials have told our staff t at U.S.
SIGINT resources were not focused on targets which
would have the most relevance to an Athens- icosia
16' risis, i.e., Greek National Guard cornmuni ations.
Emergency reaction SIGINT teams were rush d into
he area after the coup and later contributed ti some
successful intelligence. Interview with Intel igence
officials, by F. Kirschstein, Dec. 2, 1975, copy on file
with Sel. Comm. on Intell.
368The NIO responsible for the report whi h pre-
dicted July 20 as the invasion date was preo cupied
7vith the production of a National Intelligen e Esti-
mate on Italy which was to be presented at USIB
meeting on the 18th of July. It should also b noted
!hat Cypriot experts within State and CIA wer in the
.1
process of being shuffled around in a burea cratic
tleorganization of area responsibilities. In a dition,
State Department Washington experts on al three
.1
countries concerned, as well as the U.S. Amb ssador
t6 Greece, were removed from their posts t one
1.
time or another during the crisis. -
378Some days later, Roger Davies, the U.S. mbas-
sador to Cyprus, was fatally wounded during a anti-
*merican demonstration at the Embassy in icosia.
Contemporary accounts concluded that Davi s was
imply struck by a stray bullet. Information made
tivailable to the Committee suggests that Davi s may
have been the victim of an assassin.
Ambassador Tasca disclosed to staff a repo t that
EOKA-B had decided to kill either Davies or h mself.
ILS. intelligence officers have asserted not only that
Davies may have been intentionally shot, b t also
that the identities of individuals firing at the EMbassy
are also known. The intelligence sources hive al-
11-zed that the individuals may be officials of thel
Nico-
sa police. Despite repeated private U.S. protests, the
.1
'1
Cypriot government is said to have declined to remove
these individuals from their jobs.
Interview with Henry J. Tasca, by J. Boos, Sept.
26-27, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm. on Intell.
Interview with CIA officials by G. Rushford and F.
Kirschstein, Oct. 22, 1975, copy on file with Sel.
Comm. on Intell.
7. Domestic Internal
Security and
Counterintelligence
The Intelligence Division of the FBI is divided into
two section's: Internal Security and Counterintelli-
gence. The Internal Security Division investigates
domestic subversive or extremist groups with the
goal of ascertaining whether individuals are violating
federal laws.
These investigations are costly, in monetary terms
and in terms of personal privacy. Are they effectively
and dispassionately controlled, in keeping with crimi-
nal priorities? Are they efficiently terminated when
clearly unproductive? Thirty-four years of investigat-
UPI
A G.I. on Nimin alert October, 1973:
Poor intelligence led "to the brink of war."
ing the Socialist Workers Party and over five years
spying on the Institute for Policy Studies provide
some examples of disturbing answers.
a. Institute for Policy Studies
The FBI Manual of Instructions allows preliminary
investigations to be opened on groups espousing ex-
tremist philosophies. If these investigations do not
demonstrate reasonable likelihood of uncovering
criminal violations, the Manual states that they should
be terminated within 90 days.
In 1968, the FBI saw sufficient connection between
the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and the Students
for a Democratic Society (SDS) to open a preliminary
investigation of IPS.
The investigation was not terminated after an
initial 90-day period, even though it had turned up
no evidence that IPS members or their associates
were violating federal laws. Six months later, at the
end of a vigorous nine-month investigation of IPS,
the Washington field office reported the results as
"negative."
The IPS investigation was destined to continue for
five more years.
The investigation had been based on an SDS con-'
nection. During the investigation, however, FBI had
received information from a source, advising "that,
in general, the IPS is not well thought of by the hard-
core SDS leaders because members of the IPS are not
activists," except for one IPS leader considered sym-
pathetic with SDS objectives. The FBI was not dis-
couraged by the loss of its investigative base, and
went ahead reporting unrelated matters. One report,
for example, described IPS as "a non-profit, non-tax-
able institute which studies programs to present
policies." The same Keport noted the fact that "IPS
edutational curriculum centers on topics which are
critical of the present U.S. system . . ."
In January, 1971, the Bureau continued reporting
non-criminal matters, such as the fact that the Insti-
tute "though small . . . exerts considerable influence
through contacts with educators, Congress and la-
bor." It is important to remember that the whole
probe began with an investigation of alleged contacts
between one IPS staffer and an SDS leader. The FBI
had effectively reversed the traditional concept of
"guilt by association." Instead of a suspect group
tainting an individual, the individual had tainted the
group.377
An October 1971 Bureau report said of the Insti-
tute:
The popular impression of IPS as the "think
tank" of radical United'States politics is justified.
It has taken and continues to take a major role
in the antiwar movement and calls for disarma-
ment. While IPS people see themselves as leaders
of radical thought, they would appear to be
leaders without a popular constituency.
The same report concentrated on IPS suspicions
of FBI surveillance. It stated that "they suspect that
they are being watched from the building across the
street and from adjacent buildings." The same report
went on to say that two members of the Institute had
been "observed by a representative of the FBI . . .
walking slowly around the block of IPS, sometimes
several times, conversing with each other . . . they
appear to be conversing in low tones and in a guarded
manner."
In August 1972, an ,alert Bureau agent collected
some IPS garbage.388
The trash revealed no evidence of criminal conduct.
However, eight used typewriter ribbons were found.
Even though there were no signs of crimes, and de-
spite the fact that IPS itself was not suspected of
crimes, FBI devoted time and money to the expen-
sive process of reconstructing the documents that had
been typed by the ribbon.
Part of the yield was intimate sexual gossip.
FBI officials told Committee staff, under oath, that
personal information, such as sexual activities, is
discarded if it does not bear on a crime. That was
not true. Information from the trash retrieval, includ-
ing the sexual gossip, was incorporated into a number
of reports. In each report, the information was at-
tributed to "a source who has supplied reliable infor-
mation in the past."
In 1973, the Washington Field Office reported that
"the organization [IPS] is fragmented into a wide
variety of studies and interests, the vast majority of
which appear to be within legal limits." In May
1974, the Washington Field Office concluded that a
"paucity of information exists that would support the
likelihood of IPS or its leaders to be functioning in
violation of federal law." Only then, after five
years and no evidence of law-breaking, did the in-
vestigation become inactive.
b. Socialist Workers Party
The second example involved the Socialist Workers
Party (SWP) . The SWP adopted a Declaration of
Principles and a Constitution at their founding con-
vention in January 1938. The Declaration of Principles
was replete with revolutionary rhetoric of the Marxist
Left. The fledgling Socialist Workers Party also swore
allegiance to the world-wide organization of Trotsky
?the Fourth International.
Nevertheless, the SWP dissolyed their allegiance
with the Fourth International and retracted this Dec-
laration of Principles on December 21, 1940, in order
to comply with the Voorhis Act. The FBI main-
tained that this disassociation with the Fourth Inter-
national was merely cosmetic. However, the FBI has
been unable to prove any illegal relationship be-
tween the SWP and the Fourth International.
FBI's failure to uncover illegal activity by this
political party is not from lack of effort. SWP has
been subjected to 34 years of intensive investiga-
tion.
On November 5, 1975, FBI officials testified that
the Fourth International itself was a body made up
of Marxist elements around the world and enjoyed
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the village VOICE February 16, 1976
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the village VOICE February 16, 1976
t.
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no structural power base in the Soviet Union. Sig-
nificantly, these officials demonstrated no detailed-
knowledge about the Fourth International. FBI offi-
cials did not mention the fact that the Socialist
Workers are a legitimate American political party,
that even runs a candidate for President. Equally as
important, the FBI has found no evidence to support
a federal prosecution of an SWP member, with the
exception of several Smith Act violations in 1941.
Since that time, not only have there been no further
prosecutions against the SWP for any Federal of-
fense, but the portions of the Smith Act under which
these earlier convictions had been obtained have been
declared unconstitutional.
The investigation, which FBI officials tacitly admit
has been conducted partially under the aegis of an
unprosecutable statue, has revealed that the SWP
is a highly law-abiding group. The SWP has even
avoided illegal and potentially violent confrontations
with the authorities during any sort of civil protest.
Nevertheless, this had no apparent impact on 34 years
of unproductive spying.
According to the Presidential candidate of the SWP,
Peter Camejo, party members are even forbidden by
the SWP to smoke marijuana. The Bureau apparently
formulated a philosophy, in this case, to justify their
investigation.
Considerable resources have been allocated to
compound the error of a continuing unproductive
investigation and to back-stop the preconceptions of
FBI personnel.
For example, FBI Internal Security investigators
committed a massive manpower allocation to inter-
viewing landlords, employers, fellow employees, and
family relations of SWP members. The FBI also
maintained intensive surveillance of most, if not all,
of the SWP's 2500 members.
Americans are often concerned about privacy inva-
sions of domestic security investigations. One-fifth
of all investigations initiated by the FBI during the
last decade dealt with security matters. The im-
portant issue is whether citizens receive a valuable
product in the form of anticipatory intelligence which
would serve as a deterrent to, and a prevention of,
crime. While it is impossible to accurately gauge the
deterrent effect of FBI efforts, it is obvious that the
FBI failed to anticipate groups dedicated to the over-
throw of the existing government and fully committed
to violence:400
The FBI has likewise had a dismal record in the
prompt apprehension of fugitives from the New Left
underground:40i Domestic intelligence appears to be
suffering from a misallocation of resources and effort.
Footnotes:
3770ne group may taint another group. The FBI
initiated investigation of the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War because the VVAW had the misfor-
tune of being mentioned favorably by the Communist
Party. . . .
380"Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) is DASH,
RA. On August two three last, [a Special Agent] ob-
served a private trash truck picking up trash from
IPS. The truck proceeded to a burning dump, where
the trash was abandoned. [The Special Agent] ob-
tained the IPS trash, and information obtained from
this source is being assigned symbol number [de-
leted]." NITEL Cable to Acting Director, FBI from
SAC, WFO, Aug. 8, 1972.
400The S.L.A. is an example. The FBI provided
staff attorneys with a detailed after-the-fact history
of the S.L.A. However, the FBI was apparently unable
to anticipate the formation of' the group or *thwart
its initial criminal activities. FBI briefing on Intelli-
gence by [W. Raymond] Wannall, 'et al., attended by
J. B. F. Oliphant and R. Vermeire.
401Mark Rudd, Abbie Hoffman, et al.
8. President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
In addition to day-to-day bureaucratic efforts to
monitor and to improve intelligence, the executive
branch oversees performance through mechanisms
like the quasi-public President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB). The issue is whether such
a mechanism is viable and effective.
Staff investigation suggests that reliance on PFIAB
for oversight responsibility is totally without merit.
The Board, admittedly part-time, meets for one- or
two-day sessions about six times a year. The Chair-
man spends about half his time on PFIAB affairs.
Only two professional staff members support the
Board, and both are detailees from the very intelli-
gence agencies they are supposed to oversee.
The meeting and staffing arrangements do not lend
themselves to a responsible analysis and review of
massive and complex Intelligence programs. .It said
-
't !)
that, from time to time, PFIAB submits to the Presi-
-dent useful documents on covert action and technical
eglleetion.. programs. However, the Committee? :de-
nied access to these and other periodic *PFIAB reports
is unable to determine whether the Board has been
functioning meaningfully.405
Two important and limiting factors shed light on
the role and performance of the Board. The Board
cannot establish or even oversee policy, but is limited
to advising the President with respect to objectives
and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related
activities. The Board's effectiveness also is limited by
the interest and confidence of the President, and this
has varied considerably throughout the five Adminis-
trations of the Board's existence.
. The joblems do not end there. Board members are
chosen for distinguished careers in government, aca-
demia, and the business world. Not surprisingly, mem-
bers of PFIAB, whose principal functions include ad-
vice on research and development goals, are typically
affiliated with firms holding lucrative intelligence and
defense contracts.408
There are no indications that a PFIAB member has
ever improperly profited from his Board service. How-
ever, after searching Board records at the request of
,
Portugal's General Antonio de Spinola:
How long should it take for a book to cross the ocean?
Committee staff, a PFIAB spokesman stipulated that
there are no conflict-of-interest regulations applicable
to its members. Likewise, there were no regulations
covering the expense and confidential contracts they
assess and review. Instead, members are provided,
on their appointment, with the "Standards of Con-
duct for the White House Staff."
There are obviously difficult policy problems in
gathering a group of distinguished and knowledgeable
citizens and, at the same time, insuring that the
Board's activities and judgments are entirely beyond
reproach.
The part-time nature of PFIAB, if its work is recog-
nized as being cursory, is not necessarily undesirable.
Members an bring a fresh perspective from their
other pursuits, and they are less compromised by the
secrecy and insular views of intelligence agencies. On
the other hand, heavy reliance on this Board for over-
sight, without more outside professional staff and
greater Presidential commitment, is an illusion.
Footnotes:
405The Committee felt that access to materials re-
lied on and prepared by the Board was the only equit-
able method pf assessing ,the Board's past .perfor-
i t 1
mance and role within the structure of the intelligence
community. The Committee, without reliance on sub-
poena, attempted in vain to gain access to materials
Used by and prepared by the Board. After several
months of negotiation, the Committee was granted
access to a classified Board history, which outlined,
but did not specifically enunciate, the kinds of recom-
mendations the Board has made since its inception,
and the agendas of the Board's meetings from January
1961 to the present.
408For example, present members of the Board
whose corporations hold such contracts include Wil-
liam 0. Baker, President, Bell Telephone Laboratories;
John S. Foster, Jr., Vice-President for Energy Re-
search and Development, TRW; Robert W. Galvin,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Motorola,
Inc.; Edwin H. Land, Board Chairman, Polaroid Cor-
poration; and Edward Teller, Associate Director of
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. In addition, three
of the remaining four members have formidable mili-
tary credentials and affiliations: George W. Anderson,
Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations; Leo Cherne,
member of the Board of AdvisOrs of the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces; and Gordon Gray,
former Secretary of the Army and Director of the
Office of Defense Mobilization.
9. National Security Council
Intelligence Committee
. . . The National Security Intelligence Committee
has met only twice in four years. [Membership con-
sists of the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs as Chairman, DCI, Deputy Secretary
of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Under Secretary of the
Treasury for Monetary Affairs?editor's note.] It
met once in December 1971, to organize, and once
in August, 1974, to re-organize. It has no permanent
staff, other than the NSC Director for Intelligence
Coordination, Richard Ober, a CIA detailee and archi-
tect of the controversial CHAOS program. There is no
indication that the Committee has been effective.
A Working Group is composed of the next lower-
level of consumers. Although in existence from 1971
to 1974, it apparently did not perform any useful
function. This group was revived following the 1974
Intelligence Committee meeting and met seven times
thereafter. While Working Group principals assert
a need for intelligence consumers to somehow insti-
tutionally convey their problems to collectors, there
appears to be a general low level of interest on the
part of several members and misgivings as to the
effectiveness of the panel as presently constituted.
The Economic Intelligence Subcommittee's perforin-
ance to date can be easily evaluated. While its pur-
pose?to provide consumers of economic intelligence
a forum to convey their needs?appears worthwhile
on paper, it has produced no results. One meeting
was held in May 1975, at the behest of the DCI.
The Chairman, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for International Affairs, told Committee staff that
as a consumer he was generally satisfied with intelli-
gence input, that the group was a waste of time,
and that he intended to hold as few meetings as pos-
sible. Displaying an attitude rare among government
officials, the Chairman disdained formal high-level
committees and called for informal communication
at the working level. He has since left his post and
may well be replaced by a proponent of bureaucratic
committees. Nonetheless, the record strongly calls for
an abolition of the Subcommittee, as presently
operated and tasked.
10. The Management and
Production of
Defense Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently ex-
pressed frustration at the apparent inability of a mul-
ti-billion dollar U.S. intelligence establishment to pro-
duce timely and useful information. He reportedly
complained that "In a mechanical sense the system
produces the information, but it's so damn big and
cumbersome and uncoordinated, that you can't get
the information properly assessed and to the right
people."417
Mismanaged and uncoordinated intelligence opera-
tions result in more than resource wastage.
During the Mideast war and Cyprus crisis, for
example, uncoordinated and duplicative reports com-
pounded the problem of interpreting events.418
There is a clear need to challenge organizational
proliferation, duplication of activity and product,
and overlapping of management layers that have
plagued defense intelligence for years. The signifi-
cance of these problems is contained in the fa,ct that
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the Department of Defense controls nearl 80 percent
of the intelligence community's resourc s and em-
ploys nearly 90 percent of its personnel.
Particular attention must be directed toward the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) , an irganization
established in the early 1960's to integra e and align
defense intelligence activities, and a majo production
unit in its own right.
As chartered, DIA was to function as b th a super-
visor and coordinator, and as centraliz d producer
of intelligence.
Over the years, however, it became increasingly
apparent that DIA could not accomplish the ambi-
tious management and production goals ehvisioned at
the time of its formation. A string of o erviews, in-
cluding the 1969 Froehlke report, the 1940 Blue Rib-
bon Defense Panel, the 1971 Schlesing r study for
the Office of Management and Budget, th 1974 Man-
agement Review, and the 1975 Defense Panel on In-
telligence all found that organizational impediments
and product imperfection have continued to persist
after years of DIA operation. Each in urn recom-
mended reorganization and substantive im rovements.
None solved the problems.
DIA lacks comprehensive authority t direct and
control resources throughout the Defense l7epartment,
as initially envisioned. For example, the Ivast crypto-
logic resources in the armed services and he National
Security Agency are not responsible to IA. DIA's
resources management functions were ta en over in
1972 by an Assistant Secretary of Defens for Intelli-
gence with a broader mandate to coordi ate budget-
ing.
The .central problem is bureaucratic olitics. The
three individual branches of the militar resist any
organization which might curb their uthority to
direct programs and allocate resources. hey under-
mine the concept on which DIA was ounded, by
avoiding its authority and preventing it from obtain-
ing qualified manpower.
President Nixon recognized that DI k had not
achieved its purpose and issued a direct ye on Nov.
5, 1971, charging the DCI with responsi ility for in-
telligence budget preparation, including the budget
for tactical military intelligence. This too ailed, since
the DCI lacked authority for over 80 pe cent of the
community's budget, which remained in the Depart-
ment of Defense.421
The only noticeable effect of these refor s has been
an added layer of bureaucracy and a conf sed sharing
of responsibilities.
The output side of DIA's operation ha been criti-
cized from a number of directions. Ove the years,
neither the Secretary of Defense nor the rmed serv-
ices have been completely satisfied with D A product.
Secretary of Defense McNamara reported y preferred
CIA's product; the services prefer their own anal-
ysis.423 Their criticisms focus on DIA's current clin-
telligence and its estimates. They raise uestions as
to DIA's capability to produce uniquend quality
intelligence to meet tactical and national demands.
An internal Defense Department mem randum to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense in Ja uary 1974,
indicated the scope of DIA inadequacy in light of the ?
Mid-East war failures. The memorandum concluded:
"What has been stated briefly are only th symptoms
of the disease. The causes lie deeper .. ."
While noting the failure of DIA analys s to predict
the war, the memo stated, "the blame i not theirs
alone. It is a corporate failure, a chronic unsound-
ness of the entire DIA mechanism. Unle s we make
the required changes in organization, proc dures, and
personnel, we are going to reap another intelligence
failure?and the next one could be a dister involv-
ings U.S. Forces."
While several of the root causes of po r perform-
ance provide an argument for piecemeal reform, in
general the problems are too permanent allow for
anything less than across-the-board chang s.
A major obstacle to strong analytic capability
within DIA results from the civilian-military nature
of DIA, in a setting of independent mil.tary estab-
lishments. As long as the service bran hes retain
viable intelligence units, DIA remains an nattractive
assignment and will not attract qualifi d officers.
In addition, manpower reductions have s read avail-
able, personnel too thin for effective repo ting.
Civilians in DIA are confronted with to disincen-
tives. DIA cannot compete with CIA a d NSA in
appointments and promotions, and persist nt military
control of higher grade management posi ions limits
mobility .428
Officials within DIA are ready to admit hey cannot
match CIA. They justify their contributio as that of
"devil's advocates," or "honest brokers. ' Even in
military intelligence, the Committee was told, "they
(CIA) are at least our equals, meaning that DIA
was no real improvement over CIA intel4gence.
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In- stirhmary; finished intelligence generated by
PIA has repeatedly failed to meet consumer needs.
The evidence suggests that DIA does not fulfill the
ambitious expectations of the early 1960's. It is
duplicative, expensive, unattractive, and its produc-
tion capabilities are handicapped by the consistent
weaknesses of its own organization.
Footnotes:
417Quoted by William Beecher, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, in Report of
the Defense Panel on Intelligence, January, 1975,
p. 7 of his statement.
418See, fOr example, the IC Staff Preliminary Post-
Mortem report on the October War which concludes,
"The coordination procedures which are followed
by the Community during normal times are fre-
quently abandoned during times of crisis?because
the press of time may simply not allow regular proc-
esses to continue. It thus has been said that the Com-
munity is pretty good about coordinating, except
when the intelligence becomes important. And, in a
way, this did indeed happen immediately before and
during the October War in the Middle East. Coordi-
nation of the Central Intelligence Bulletin, for exam-
ple, was suspended for a time, and the wartime Situ-
ation Reports and Spot Reports prepared by CIA,
DIA and INR were unilateral and often duplicative
issuances. This, if not a major problem for the ana-
lysts themselves, was certainly one for the consum-
ers. . . ." (IC Stall., The Performance of the Intelli-
gence Community Before the Arab-Israeli War of
October 1973: A preliminary Post-Mortem Report,
December, 1973, p. 19, emphasis added.) . . . .
? 421The President on November 5, 1971, citing the
"need for improved intelligence product and for
greater efficiency in the use of resources allocated to
intelligence" charged the DCI with greater respon-
sibility for coordinating the community intelligence
effort. His Memorandum stated that the President
would "look to him (DCI) to improve the perform-
ance of the community, to provide his judgments on
the efficiency and effectiveness of all intelligence pro-
, grams and activities (including tactical intelligence),
and to recommend the appropriate allocation of re-
sources to be devoted to intelligence," (emphasis
added). More specifically, he directed "the Director
of Central Intelligence to prepare and submit each
year, through OMB, a consolidated intelligence pro-
gram budget, including tactical intelligence," (em-
phasis added). These sentiments are reiterated in an
October 9, 1974, Presidential Memorandum. . . .
423General Graham has written the committee: "I
believe that much of this criticism stems from the
early growing pains of the DIA, when its consumers,
particularly those on Mr. McNamara's staff, turned
elsewhere for intelligence analysis when the DIA
product did not satisfy them." The 1975 Defense
Panel on intelligence indicated dissatisfaction with
DIA by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Se-
curity Affairs, both important consumers. Vice Ad-
miral David Richardson, in the same report, offered
his experience as a commander of deployed forces
to point out "the institutional inability of the Agency
to provide other than intelligence for background
and data base purposes."
428The most recent density ratios (supergrades com-
pared to total force) show that possibility of ad-
vancement for civilians is vastly better in CIA than
in DIA. The Civil Service Commission has refused
DIA exemption from the General Schedule that CIA
maintains. A deputy director of DIA informed Com-
mittee staff that civilians are still "second class citi-
zens" there. Staff interview with James Agersborg,
DDI/DIA, Nov. 10, 1975. Statistics provided by
ASDI.
Risks
The American taxpayer clearly does not receive
full value for his intelligence dollar. The costs of in-
telligence should not, however, be measured in dol-
lars alone. Many day-to-day activities inevitably pose
real risks.
The Committe has found that when results are mea-
sured against hazards alone, certain intelligence pro-
grams may be wholly unacceptable; other projects
may too easily stray from wise and worthwhile
courses, without detection.
It is disturbing that the consequences of intelli-
gence activities are sometimes apparently given scant
'consideration by policy makers. Even more troubling
are indications that this insensitivity continues when
dangers reveal themselves.
1. Covert Action
The Committee has examined CIA covert action
operations and has considerable evidence that they
are irregularly approved, sloppily implemented, and
at times have been forced on a reluctant CIA by the
President and his National Security Advisor.
"Covert action" may be defined as clandestine ac-
tivity other than purely information-gathering, which
is directed at producing a particular political, eco-
nomic, or military result.
Successive administrations have cited Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 as the legal justi-
fication for covert action.431 During the course of this
investigation, the Special Counsel to the Director of
Central Intelligence has argued that the President, in
his conduct of foreign relations, has an inherent Con-
stitutional mandate to authorize these activities.432
On the other hand, in recent years, commentators
have maintained that in establishing the CIA, Con-
gress had no specific intention that covert operations
apart from intelligence-gathering missions be con-
ducted. Witnesses before the Committee likewise dis-
puted any inherent Constitutional power to conduct
covert actions. In any event, Congress has implicitly
acquiesced in covert action through the oversight
process.
It may be argued that there has been explicit ap-
proval as well. Just as the War Powers Act acknow-
ledges the authority of the President to conduct overt
military hostilities, albeit for a limited period, without
a Congressional declaration of war, the Ryan-Hughes
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974434
formally acknowledges the exiitence and legality of
covert action.
The Committee has surveyed all Forty Committee
approvals since 1965, and has delved deeply into
three recent covert action projects. It is believed that
the Committee's review of ten years of covert action
is without precedent in the Congress or the executive
branch.
a. Ten Year Survey
Our primary purpose was to determine whether
the Forty Committee and its predecessors had been
exercising their oversight and control responsibilities
from 1965 to date.435 To do this, it was necessary to
trace the process from proposal to final approval.
Like other aspects of covert action, fixing respon-
sibility for the initiation of various covert action
projects was a difficult task. As recorded in Forty
Committee records, the vast majority of projects was
submitted by the CIA, 88 percent of the total projects
since 1965. The high number of covert action pro-
posals represents a general activism within the for-
eign affairs bureaucracy, especially within CIA.
The overall picture, however, does not support the
contention that covert action has been used in fur-
therance of any particular principle, form of govern-
ment, or identifiable national interest. Instead, the
record indicates a general lack of a long-term direc-
tion in U.S. foreign policy. Covert actions, as the
means for implementing a policy, reflected this band-
aid approach, substituting short-term remedies for
problems which required long-term cures.
Covert action proposals came from a variety of
interest areas: a foreign head of state, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of State, an Ambas-
sador, CIA, the Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs, a cabinet member, or the
President himself.
_Proposals involving a large expenditure of funds
or classified as "politically sensitive," required re-
view and approval of the Forty Committee. Unfortu-
nately, the executive branch does not have a clear
definition of what constitutes a large or politically
sensitive operation. Projects of less sensitivity are ap-
proved within the CIA, usually at the level of the
Deputy Director for Operations, with the determina-
tion of "political sensitivity" being left to the Director
of Central Intelligence.
The Forty Committee is chaired by the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs and in-
cludes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under-
secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. Theoretically, a detailed proposal
is presented to this group. The members are then
afforded an opportunity for a full discussion of the
merits and a reporting of their views to the President.
In practice, the Forty Committee has often been little
more than a rubber stamp.
The procedures for approval of covert action have
changed with administrations, political conditions and
personalities. At various times, the approval process
has been relatively informal, extraordinarily secretive,
and pro-forma.
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While on occasion some projects have been.,cor-
sidered in depth, at Committee meetings which in-
cluded the approval or disapproval by formal votes,
several informal procedures have frequently been
used. These informal procedures, such as telephonic
votes, do not allow each member to benefit from the
views of his colleagues. At times, members have been
given only the barest of details, and instead of formal
votes have simply been allowed the opportunity to
acknowledge the project's existence.
The Forty Committee has only one full-time pro-
fessional staff member. Because of the high degree
of compartmentation attending these projects, com-
mittee members?who are among the busiest officials
in government?are frequently in the position of
evaluating a complex proposal without adequate staff
support. The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, having the incentive and the resources to cope
with Forty Committee business, clearly dominate the
process.
The origin of many covert action projects is murky
at best.
The CIA, as the prospective implementation arm,
is often directed to produce proposals for covert ac-
tion and is, therefore, incorrectly seen as a plan's
original proponent. It is clear that on several occa-
sions involving highly sensitive projects, CIA was
) 32 0 qi ) el Media and Propagaudan ?,
Some 29 percent of Forty Committee-approved co-
vert actions were for media and propaganda projects.
This number is probably not representative. Staff has
determined the existence of a large number of CIA
internally-approved operations of this type, apparent-
ly deemed not politically sensitive. It is believed that
if the correct number of all media and propaganda
projects could be determined, it would exceed Elec-
tion Support as the largest single category of covert
action projects undertaken by the C/A.
Activities have included support of friendly media,
major propaganda efforts, insertion of articles into the
local press, and distribution of books and leaflets. By
far the largest single recipient has been a European
publishing house funded since 1951. There are a num-
ber of similar operations in the region. About 25 per-
cent of the program has been directed at the Soviet
Bloc, in the publication and clandestine import and
export of? Western and Soviet dissident literature.
d. Paramilitary/Arms Transfers
The 23 percent approvals in this category from 1965
to 1975 have taken one of esentially four forms: secret
armies, financial support to groups engaged in hostili-
AP
A.A
India explodes a nuclear device, May 1974: After the explosion, intelligence analysts knew.
summarily ordered by the President or his National
Security advisor to carry out a covert action program.
It is further clear that CIA has been ordered to engage
in covert action over the Agency's strong prior
objections.
All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far
from being out of control, has been utterly respon-
sive to the instructions of the President and the As-
sistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
It must be remembered, however, that the CIA Di-
rector determines which CIA-initiated covert action
projects are sufficiently "politically sensitive" to re-
quire Presidential attention.
From 1965 to 1972, a majority of approvals oc-
curred subsequent to a formal committee meeting; al-
though many telephonic approvals also took place dur-
ing this period. In 1972, the process became quite infor-
mal, often involving mere notification to members
that an operation had already been set in motion by
the President. The Forty Committee, as the review
and approval mechanism for covert action, fell into
virtual disuse, with telephonic approvals being the
rule and formal meetings the exception. One formal
meeting was held in 1972, none in 1973 and 1974.
This process did not begin to reverse itself until 1975.
b. Election Support
From 1965 to date, 32 percent of Forty Committee
approved covert action projects were for providing
some form of financial election support to foreign
parties and individuals. Such support could be nega-
tive as well as positive. This is the largest covert ac-
tion category, and its funding has occurred in large
part in the developing countries. With few exceptions,
financial support has been given to incumbent moder-
ate party leaders and heads of State.
Certain projects have had a long life. One Third
World leader received some $960,000 over a 14-year
period. Others were financially supported for over a
ties; paramilitary training and advisers; and shipment
of arms, ammunition and other military equipment.
Military ordnance is typically supplied by CIA out of
its large inventory of U.S. weaponry and captured
foreign weapons.
The Committee scrutinized these projects careful-
ly, since this category is the most expensive and rep-
resents the greatest potential for escalating hostilities
and deepening American involvement. By far the most
interesting, and important, fact to emerge was the
recognition that the great majority of these covert ac-
tion projects were proposed by parties outside CIA.
Many of these programs were summarily ordered, over
CIA objections. CIA misgivings, however, were at
times weakly expressed, as CIA is afflicted with a "can
do" attitude.
At times, CIA has been used as a conduit for arms
transfers in order to bypass Congressional scrutiny.
A State Department-proposed project which could
have been accomplished under the Military Assistance
Program was tasked on CIA because the Department
of Defense did not desire to return to Congress for
additional funds and approval.
e. Organizational Support
A plethora of foreign, civic, religious, professional,
and labor organizations have received CIA funding.
There has been no real geographical concentration,
although the Third World was again well represented.
For example, one labor confederation in a developing
country received an annual subsidy of $30,000 in
three successive years.
f. Trends
Since 1965, there has been a general decline in the
number of covert action projects approved by the
Forty Committee. There are indications that the low
figure represents the Director of Central Intelligence's
determination that- riot 'as -many 'projects. -shontd ho
r: < I r < ?: '
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considered "politically sensitive" and taken to the
1Kr4lty' -dommittee for approval. This, in turn, may
reflect his recognition that the forty Committee had
fallen into disuse and their approvals pro-forma.
- There is no indication that the passage of the Ryan-
Hughes Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1974, requiring Presidential certification and brief-
ings of Congressional oversight committees, has had
a significant impact on the national covert action
program. As the events of 1975 have shown, those
who had warned that the Amendment and the Con-
gressional probes into the U.S. intelligence commun-
ity would make covert action impossible, have not
seen their fears realized.
g. Three Projects
The three projects examined in depth were selected
from major recent operations, apart from the Ameri-
can experience in Indochina, and involved different
types of covert activity. One was election funding of
pro-U.S. elements in an allied country. The second
was Presidentially-direcled arms support of an in-
surgency movement at the behest of the foreign head
of a third country. The last involved a mix of politi-
cal action, military training, and assistance to pro-
Western forces in Angola. The last project was also
initiated in part at the request of a third party.
The Committee became aware of each of these
operations through other parts of its investigation
and through information provided to staff by sources
outside the intelligence community. For example, a
study of CIA arms inventories and shipments led to
the major Agency para-military support operations.
The case studies are not representative of all covert
action since 1965. The Committee does believe that
they are not atypical of most major programs of this
type. CIA has indicated its agreement with the com-
pleteness and factual accuracy of the staff's analysis,
though not necessarily with the conclusions.
Case 1: Election Support
The U.S., perhaps needlessly, expended some $10-
million in contributions to political parties, affiliated
organizations, and 21 individual candidates in a recent
parlimentary election [1972?editor's note] held in
an allied country447 [Italy?editor's note].
The program was initiated by our Ambassador
[Graham Martin?editor's note], who later persuaded
the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs [Henry Kissinger?editor's note] to authorize
him, rather than CIA, to select funding recipients
and otherwise control the program's implementdtion.
The results of the aid were mixed, and short-lived.
With national assembly elections less than two
years away, the U. S. country team concluded from
a CIA-contracted survey that the pro-U.S. elements,
which had governed the country since the post-war
period, were being seriously challenged by the Com-
munists. The opposition, apparently heavily financed
by Moscow, had scored gains in regional elections
and trailed the incumbents by only a few points in
the opinion polls.
Pro-West parties and affiliates had received sub-
stantial funding in the past. CIA reports total U.S.
election financing over a previous 20-year period at
some $65 million.448 Despite this massive aid, the
beneficiaries had suffered repeated electoral setbacks.
American observers apparently concluded that an-
other "quick fix" was necessary to see our clients
through the next vote.
Anxious to gain control of the covert program, and
fearing that inter-agency consideration would be in-
hibiting, the Ambassador has originally sought the
President's personal approval of this proposed politi-
cal action.449
This course would avoid the Forty Committee and,
with it, the inevitable role of CIA in implementing
the program. The Ambassador was rebuffed. Ironi-
cally, the Assistant to the President then requested
that CIA draft a proposal without the knowledge of
the Ambassador or the Department of State.450
It is known that during this period the President
was indirectly approached by prominent international
businessmen, who were former nationals of the allied
country. Their communications to the President were
not available to the Committee.45t
The Forty Committee subsequently approved the
CIA proposal, but with unusual implementation. De-
spite the usual near-automatic control of covert action
by CIA, the Ambassador, by all accounts a man of
unusual force, successfully extracted from the As-
sistant to the President the commitment that he would
have total control of the "mix and implementation"
of the project.452 Thus, the Ambassador, who had
been in the country less than two years and did not
speak the language, would determine which individ-
uals ancicorfinizationa wouthat reetliv&-3/434S:Itintb.-ThF
1R000200420001-1
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_ ? )
CIA station would be reduced to couriers. The Age44
expressed concern that a high profile by the Ambas-
sador would needlessly compromise the program;
their complaints fell on deaf ears, despite the agree-
ment of all that exposure would bring down the pro-
West government.
A major political party received $3.4 million; a
political organization created and supported by CIA,
$3.4 million; other organizations and parties, a total
of $1.3 million. Substantial funds were provided to
several incumbents whose seats did not appear in
jeopardy. Of a total of $11.8 million approved by
the Forty Committee, only $9.9 million was actually
spent. The reserve was held toThe spent in the fol-
lowing year.
CIA concurred in most of the recipients chosen
by the Ambassador, although differences were ex-
pressed on precise amounts. There were serious dis-
agreements over some recipients. One of these was a
high local intelligence official to whom the Ambassador
wanted to give over $800,000, to conduct a propa-
ganda effort. The Ambasaftdor was unmoved by CIA
warnings that the man was clearly linked to anti-
democratic elements of the right, and went ahead with
the funding.456
Embassy control of the funds was poor. Participants
in the program testified before the Committee that
little effort was made to earmark grants or, failing
that, at least seek assurances that the money was
spent as intended by the Forty Committee. The
Ambassador resisted most CIA control suggestions,
insisting that such monitoring would insult the re-
cipients. Thus, there was almost no accounting or
control of the expenditures.457 There is no indication
that the Ambassador began to encounter interference
from Washington at this point.
The fruits of this U.S. investment are difficult to
assess. The pro-U.S. elements retained control of the
government by a small plurality, and most of the
incumbents supported were returned to office. On the
other hand, the ruling coalition quickly lost public
support and suffered severe reverses in subsequent
local elections.
Case 2: Arms Support
fAt.this point in the committeeTeport o
page was missing. It is clear from the c
missing material opened a discussion of
involving the Shah of Iran, to channel
the Kurds in their rebellion against th
of Iraq.1459
The program, ultimately to involv
million, was apparently endorsed by
after a private meeting with the foreign
and Dr. Kissinger.
There was no Forty Committee mee
a formal proposal paper containing b
cons could be discussed and voted
members were simply directed to ackno
of a sparse, one-paragraph description of
In a setting of almost unprecedented s
the U.S. government, John B. Connall
Treasury Secretary, about to assume a
the President's re-election campaign,
vised the head of state that the U.S.
ate.461
The recipients of U.S. arms and cas
surgent ethnic group fighting for au
country bordering our ally. The borderin
our ally had long been bitter enemies.
substantially in ideological orientation
relations with the U.S.
Evidence collected by the Committee
the project was initiated primarily as a
ally, who had cooperated with U.S. inte
cies, and who had come to feel me
neighbor.
As our ally's aid dwarfed the U.S. aid
assistance can be seen as largely symboli
made available to the Committee indi
U.S. acted in effect as a guarantor that
group would not be summarily dropped
head of state.462 Notwithstanding thes
surances, the insurgents were abruptly c
ally, three years, thousands of deaths, a
U.S. dollars later.463
It appears that, had the U.S. not re
ally's prodding, the insurgents may hay
accommodation with the central gove
gaining at least a measure of autonomy w
further bloodshed. Instead, our clients fo
taming thousands of casualties and 200,
There is little doubt that the highly un
precautions and the circumvention of th
mittee were the product of fears by the
Dr. Kissinger that details of the project
wise leak?a result which by all account
mightily ttlispleased aLso_c ear that ;he;
secrecy was motivated by a desire that the Depart-
e manuscript
ntext that the
U.S. scheme,
secret aid to
? government
some $16--
he President
head of state
ing at which
th pros and
on. Instead,
ledge receipt
he operation.
crecy within
, the former
ajor role in
ersonally ad-
ould cooper.
were an in-
onomy in a
country and
hey differed
and in their
suggests that
favor to our
ligence agen-
aced by his
package, our
. Documents
ate that the
he insurgent
y the foreign
implicit as-
t off by our
d 16 million
nforced our
reached an
nment, thus
lie avoiding
ght on, sus-
00 refugees.
sual security
Forty Com-
resident and
ould other-
would have
'1
ment of State, which had consistently' opposed such-
ventures in the 'region, be kept in the dark 464
Perhaps more than the President's disregard of the
Forty Committee, the apparent "no win" policy of
the U.S. and its ally deeply disturbed this Committee.
Documents in the Committee's possession clearly show
that the President, Dr. Kissinger and the foreign head
of state hoped that our clients would not prevail.465.
They preferred instead that the insurgents simply con-
tinue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap the re-
sources of our ally's neighboring country .466 This
policy was not imparted to our clients, who were
encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context
of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise.
It is particularly ironic that, despite President
Nixon's and Dr.,Kissinger's encouragement of hostili-
ties to keep the target country off-balance, the United
States personally restrained the insurgents from an
all-out offensive on one occasion when such an attack
might have been successful because other events were
occupying the neighboring country.467
All U.S. aid was channeled through our colla-
borator, without whose logistical help direct assist-
ance would have been impossible. Our national
interest had thus become effectively meshed with his.
Accordingly, when our ally reached an agreement with
the target country and abruptly ended his own aid to
the insurgents, the U.S. had no choice but to acqui-
esce. The extent of our ally's leverage over U.S. policy
was such that he apparently made no effort to notify
his junior American partners that the program's end
was near.
The insurgents were clearly taken by surprise as
well. Their adversaries, knowing of the impending
aid cut-off, launched an all-out search-and-destroy
campaign the day after the agreement was signed.469
The autonomy movement was over and our former
clients scattered before the central government's su-
perior forces.470
The cynicism of the U.S. and its ally had not yet
completely run its course, however. Despite direct
pleas from the insurgent leader and the CIA station
chief in the area to the President and Dr. Kissinger, ,
the U.S. refused to extend humanitarian asistance to
the thousands of refugees created by the. abrupt ter-
mination of military aid. As the Committee staff was
reminded by a high U.S..official, "covert action should
not be confused with missionary work."471
Case 3: Angola
For reasons not altogether clear, and despite the
opposition of senior government officials, the U.S. has
been heavily involved in the current civil war in
Angola.
The CIA has informed the Committee that since
January 1975, it had expended over $31 million in
military hardware, transportation costs, and cash pay-
ments by the end of 1975. The Committee has reason
to believe that the actual U.S. investment is much
higher. Information supplied to the Committee also
suggests that the military intervention of the Soviet
Union and Cuba is in large part a reaction to U.S.
efforts to break a political stalemate, in favor of its
clients.
The beneficiaries of U.S. aid are two of the three
contesting factions: the National Front for the Inde-
pendence of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The
third faction contesting for control of the government,
following independence on November 11, 1975, is the
Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA). CIA estimates that the fighting
had claimed several thousand casualties by the end
of 1975.
The main U.S. client is the National Front, headed
by Holden Roberto, a longtime associate and relative
of President Mobutu Sese Seko of neighboring Zaire.
Subsequent to President Mobutu's request last winter
to Dr. Kissinger, as independence for Angola became
a certainty and liberation groups began to jockey for
position, the Forty Committee approved furnishing
Roberto $300,000 for various political action activi-
ties,474 restricted to non-military objectives.
Later events have suggested that this infusion of
U.S. aid, unprecedented475 and massive in the under-
developed colony, may have panicked the Soviets into
arming their MPLA clients, whom they had backed
for over a decade and who were now in danger of
being eclipsed by the National Front. Events in Angola
took a bellicose turn as the U.S. was requested by
President Mobutu to make a serious military invest-,
ment.
In early June, 1975, CIA prepared a proposal paper
for military aid to pro-U.S. elements in Angola, the
cost of which was set at $6 million. A revised pro?
-
gram, costing $14 million, was approved by the Forty
Committee and by President Ford in July. This was
i o,c,regsed, t$25'rn,illi on i n umst, awl_ to, about, $32
million in November. By mid-summer, it was decided
cthat U.S. aid should not be given solely to Roberto,
but instead, divided between him and UNITA 's Jonas
Savimbi.
The Committee has learned that a task force com-
posed of high U.S. experts on Africa477 strongly op-
posed military intervention; instead, last April they
called for diplomatic efforts to encourage a political
settlement among the three factions to avert blood-
shed. Apparently at the direction of National Security
Council aides, the task force recommendation was
removed from the report and presented to NSC mem-
bers as merely one policy option?The other two
alternatives were a hands-off policy or substantial
military intervention.
? Of CIA's $31 million figure, said to represent ex-
penditures to the end of 1975, about half is attributed
to supply of light arms, mortars, ammunition, vehicles,
boats, and communication equipment. The balance
includes shipping expenses and cash payments. The
Committee has reason to question the accuracy of
CIA's valuation of military equipment sent to Angola.
A staff accountant on loan from the General Ac-
counting Office has determined that CIA "costing"
procedures and the use of surplus equipment have
resulted in a substantial understatement of the value
of U.S. aid. Examples include .45 caliber automatic
weapons "valued" by CIA at $5.00 each and .30
caliber? semi-automatic carbines at $7.55. Based on a
sampling of ordnance cost figures and a comparison
with Department of Defense procedures, staff advises
that the CIA's ordnance figure should' at least be
doubled.
Dr. Kissinger has indicated that U.S. military in-
tervention in Angola is based on three factors: Soviet
support of the MPLA and the USSR's increased
presence in Africa, U.S. policy to encourage moderate
independence groups in southern Africa, and the U.S.
interest in promoting the stability of Mobutu and
other leadership figures in ,the area. Past support to
Mobutu, along with his responsiveness to some of the
United States recent diplomatic needs for Third
World support, make it equally likely that the para-
mount factor in the U.S. involvement is Dr. Kissin-
ger's desire to reward and protect African leaders in
the area. The U.S.'s expressed opposition to the
MPLA is puzzling in view of Director's Colby's state-
ment to the Committee that there are scant ideological
differences among the three factions, all of whom are
nationalists above all else.481
Control of resources may be a factor. Angola has
significant oil deposits and two American multina-
tionals, Gulf and Texaco, operate in the off-shore
area. Gulf had deposited some $100 million in con-
cession fees in a national bank now 'under MPLA
control. At the suggestion of the U.S. government, the
company suspended further payments.
Until recently, the U.S.-backed National Front was
supported by the People's Republic of China, which
had provided about 100 military advisors. Moboutu
has provided a staging area for U.S. arms shipments
and has periodically sent Zairois troops, trained by
the Republic of North Korea, into Angola to support
Roberto's operations. Small numbers of South African
forces have been in the country and are known to
have been in contact with Savimbi's UNITA troops.
Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1974, the President has found that the Angola
action program is "important to the national secur-
ity." As directed by the Act, CIA has briefed the
Congressional oversight committees as to the Forty
Committee approvals of increased amounts of military
aid.
CIA officials have testified to the Committee that
there appears to be little hope of an outright MPLA
military defeat. Instead, U.S. efforts are now aimed at
promoting a stalemate, and in turn, the ceasefire and
the coalition government urged by the long-forgotten
NSC task force.
Footnotes:
431Section 102 (d) (5) calls on CIA, under Na-
tional Security Council direction, "to perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence af-
fecting the national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct."
432Mitchell Rogovin, Counsel to the DCI, argued
that "before there was a 1947 Act there was a United
States and a United States with a President with the
authority to conduct foreign affairs and he conducted
such affairs over the history of the nation which in-
volved activity which we now know as covert activ-
ity. Now the 1947 Act did not give the President a
power he did not have before. The 1947 Act merely
came upon the scene as it was and it set up the Na-
tional Security Council. The Council itself subse-
quently took its authority and devised a 40 Committee
as an implementing system for getting information
with respect to covert activity. So that the activity in
1972 grew from two seperate legal authorittes fgr, the
President to pursue."
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9/.61 '91 fimm.sqad 30I0A arnMa ati7
86
the village VOICE February 16, 1976
I"
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;id xtEn;ia ;: . C
?-,1k I;,
434Section 32 of Public Law 93-559 (The Foreign
Assistance Act Amendments of 1974) states in part:
"No funds appropriated under the authority of this
or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of
the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in
foreign countries, other than activities intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until
the President of the United States finds that each
such operation is important to the national security
of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion,
a description and scope of such operation to the ap-
propriate committees of the Congress, including the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
United States House of Representatives." The remain-
ing four committees are the Armed Services and Ap-
propriations Committees of the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate.
435Subsequent to a subpoena issued by the Committee
on Nov. 6, 1975, two staff members reviewed all
records of the Forty Committee reflecting approvals
for Covert Action from 1965 to 1975. All information
and statistics used in the section entitled "Ten Year
Survey" are drawn from the staff review of those
documents. The staff presented their findings to the
full Committee in Executive Session testimony on
Dec. 9, 1975. During that session, Mr. Colby had an
opportunity to express his .views on the staff report
and while he had reservations about the conclusions,
he raised no substantial disagreement? with the facts.
447It appears clear that this expenditure was made
despite the fact that money was "not the problem."
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters in Washington 3 March
"Ambassador continues to cpgitate on nature, amount
and channel for financial assistance an dtelling Sta-
tion very little. He is aware of Station view that
money is not the problem, [deleted] has plenty and
any amount we contribue to [deleted] will have in-
significant effect on edectoral showing. If we could
reduce the pernicious effect of interparty squabbling
and get party to pull in unison this would be worth
financial support. We do not exclude possibility Am-
basador [deleted] will want to give some. money
strictly as a demonstration of 'solidarity,' and a case
might be made for this, but not two million dollars
worth." (Emphasis supplied)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA:
SUBJECT:
"Costs
This program will cost $1,050,000 the first year and
$2,465,000 the second . . ."
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelli-
gence
Ambassador [deleted]
Proposed [deleted] Elec-
tion Program 7 March
Director of Central Intelli-
Deputy Director of Plans
Forty Committee Approval
For Political Action Pro-
gram 18 February
SUBJECT:
"Costs
Of the $10,000,000, the $1,790,000 for the [deleted]
is to come from the budget approved on March 10 by
the 40 Committee . . .$8,300,000 in new funds will
be required."
448MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
The Forty Commitee
Political Action Pro-
gram for [deleted] to
Arrest the Growing
Power of the Commu-
nists 10 March
"1. History of CIA Supported Political Action in [de-
leted]. The United States government was concerned
in 1948 that the Communists would emerge from the
national elections sufficiently strong to enter the gov-
ernment as a major if not dominant force. As a coun-
ter, it was decided that CIA should give $1,000,000
to the center parties for this election with the bulk
going to [deleted].
"Between 1948 and 1964 funds provided to [de-
leted] totaled approximately $5,450, 000. Between
1948 and 1963 additional support to [deleted] in
eight national and regional elections amounted to
$11,800,000. Between 1958 and 1968, the [deleted]
received about $26,000,000 to support its opposition
to the Communist dominated labor confederation.
[deleted] received some $11,350,000 during this pe-
riod.
"Between 1948 and 1968 other organizations re-
ceived about $10,550,000 of CIA assistance. This sup-
port was given to the following political parties as-
sociated with center or center-left governments . . .
"In sum, excluding the initial $1,000,000 spent in
the 1948 campaign, CIA gave [deleted] and its re-
lated organizations $54,600,000 as well as $10,550,000
to the other non-Communist parties and affiliates for
a grand total of $65,150,000 over approximately
twenty years, starting in 1948 . . ."
449The Ambassador had decided during the first
r 7 ?
months of ;the project that he would go directly to
the President for his approval, and that he would
exclude the CIA from whatever plans he would pro-
pose.
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 13 March
"Ambassador [deleted] case (which he hopes present
to President [deleted] and [National Security Ad-
visor]) , and not to State Department or 40 Commit-
tee . . . Imperative keep these observations as priv-
ileged within CIA owing Ambassador [deleted]
explicit admonitions to Chief of Station to effect he
does not repeat not wish inform anyone in Washing-
ton his views until he personally sees President
[deleted]."
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 14 October
"Concur that Ambassador [deleted] will raise the
need for political action in [deleted] in the future
. . . A key to his thinking is his strong conviction
that any political action program in [deleted] which
requires 'interagency approval' is not likely to get
off the ground."
Cable from Headquarters
To Chief of Station 15 October
. . . Keep in mind that 'Ambassador [deleted]
previous proposal re support of [projects in other
countries] . . . floundered in large measure because it
was not submitted through proper channels and thus
was not injected into interagency mechanism until too
late."
Nonetheless, the Ambassador stated to the Commit-
tee that he had not really attempted to bypass the
Forty Committee.
Comm. Hearings
"CHAIRMAN PIKE. But was not an effort made to
have your plan approved by the President without
going through the Forty Committee route?
AMBASSADOR [deleted]. No sir, it would never
have occurred to me that this was even possible."
450The initial Forty Committee approval paper
which was drafted by the CIA stated,
"4. Coordination.
"At the request of [National Security Advisor],
this program has not yet been coordinated with Am-
bassador or with the Bureau of [deleted] of the
Department of State."
The CIA, while waiting for the President to re-
spond to the Ambassador's proposal, did not believe
that the CIA could wait indefinitely for that answer.
Cable from Headquarters
To CIA Chief of Station 7 January
"At this juncture, Ambassador [deleted] should not
repeat not be apprised of this draft paper's prepara-
tion. CIA is preparing this draft paper ... for internal
purposes and it will not repeat not be discussed with
State at this time."
451The CIA alluded to other approaches to the
President by private individuals.
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 10 February
"2. An important factor in Ambassador [deleted]
desire to present an action program is his problem
of how to cope with the many American and [de-
leted] channels to President [deleted] office which
now exist. Ambassador. [deleted] has become aware
of this special character of [deleted]-U.S. relations
and is trying to get a handle on this problem rather
than having to react to the advice and influence of-
fered by others."
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 11 February
"B. Ambassador [deleted] insists that unless he pro-
ceeds quickly 'certain people' will push the White
House into a 'disastrous program.' The name of [an
international businessman who contacted the White
House] finally emerged. 'If you think the [right-wing
foreign intelligence officer's] program is bad, you
should see the kind of stuff [international business-
man] is trying to sell.' In the Ambassador's view
'[international businessman] is further to the right
than [right-wing politician]: "
StatdDepartmant offitialstih talks with. the-AgeOcy
also expressed reservations in dealing with these
channels to the White House.
MtiVIGRANDUM
FOR THE RECORD 14 JULY
"2. [State Department official] said that one of the
problems that he had in dealing with [deleted] af-
fairs is that people like [international businessman]
had excellent access to higher echelons of our gov-
ernment, and there was no way of knowing their
information input. He said that [international busi-
nessman] had very good relations with [deleted] of
the White House. (The international businessman
conducted foreign fund-raising activities for a U.S.
political party)"
452Testimony given to the Committee by the CIA
Deputy Director for Operations states that ". . .
The Forty Committee approval stated that Ambassa-
dor [deleted] would 'control the mix and implemen-
tation . . .' of the program and would be expected to
'forward recommendations' for additional overt ac-
tivities which might be undertaken in support of U.S.
objectives in [deleted]." Comm. Hearings . . .
The Agency was uncomfortable with this unaccus-
tomed turn of events. In cables from the Station, it
was reiterated that the Ambassador was to be the one
calling the shots.
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters June
"1. Morning 4 June I delivered to Ambassador, a
sterile copy of your message. After reading it he com-
mented that 'They still do not understand that the
program as approved by 40 Committee and the Presi-
dent is only an illustrative one leaving to Ambassador
[deleted] the authority to decide what should be
done.'
"4. Headquarters is in error if it really believes fric-
tion with Ambassador [deleted] can be avoided if
Ambassador understands CIA views better. He under-
stands them only too well. It is this 'understanding'
that causes the friction and it will continue. . ."
The Agency and the Ambassador had frequent dis-
agreements over the "mix and implementation" of the
project and its developments.
Comm. Hearings at
"AMBASSADOR. One ?of the people who was here
this morning, the Acting Chief of Station, couldn't
get away from the fact that the Agency had tradition-
ally run all this and [thought that] the Agency knew
better what needed to be done and [couldn't accept]
what the 40 Committee had said and the President
had approved, that the authority and the mix and im-
plementation would be mine. He felt that if he di--
agreed with something, that therefore they could veto
it and send it back, you see, for whatever. Yes, I did
object to this."
The Ambassador felt so strongly about his differ-
ences of opinion with the Acting Chief of Station that
he mentioned their disagreements nine times during
his testimony before the Committee.
The Ambassador reacted vigorously even when his
authority was questioned by [the National Security
adviser] and reviewed by the Forty Committee. When
[the National Security adviser] decided that the CIA
should submit a separate progress report of the proj-
ect to the Forty Committee, the Ambassador was
aroused.
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 28 February
"1. You should be aware that Ambassador [deleted]
reaction to (memo) was negative in the extreme. He
considers it offensive to him personally that the CIA
would submit annual report. Says it is not true that
[National Security adviser] 'ruled' that CIA submit
report. It was CIA that suggested that idea to him..
At the annual 40 Committee review of the project,
reservations were expressed by the members on por-
tions of the operation, particularly the funding of a
moribund [political action group]. The Ambassador
was annoyed at this interference from Washington
and he apparently resorted to subterfuge.
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 16 March
"1. Ambassador intensely annoyed by outcome of 40
Committee meeting.
"2. You will note that Ambassador's message states
he has committed additional [amount of money] to
[affiliated political action group] effort. This is not
repeat repeat not true. He was urged not to make this
statement because it: (A) not accurate and (B) still
not determined that [affiliated political action group]
could-effectiVely ase-or. absorb this additiolaahamount.
Ambassador said he insisted on reporting that funds
'committed for tactical reasons'. .."
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'
?
4.56The Ambassador and the _CIA 'harsh p dgree4
ments about the funding of, this [rightv1'ing senior
Zintelligenceofficer] and his propaganda program In
itially, the thief' of StatiOn expressed his teserv0ns
about :the project, to the, AmbasSadat. ?
I. Cable from Chief -of Station.
'1ToHeadquarters ? 10 Februarj
51. In response .to, Chief of StatiOn'i--q4eSii9ti;.`,DO
.1
you really care if, [roreign-,:intelligence'offider] FOP&
i ganda effort-a" are successful not AmbassadorJetted] rePlied, `Yes, I do but not a helluv lot,i-Iiiipot'T. ?
thing is ' t6:'derricinStrate :SOlidarityf
pull.' " - ? ...,
. When the Chief. of !Station ?.continued' to 'resist fur:
t?the'r. on, the .funding; .Ambatad?r,-beeam, . very.
,
- ? . - ?
." ? ?!- ;
acinoyed
Cable, from. Chief of Station
ITo Headquarters- . ,11? February
.j-"`3.',''''AriibaisadOr',Jdeleted].,s-,said Headquarters abso
lutely wrong Said he had discussed in. Washington,
(did,not':-say with'Whorn).-,and'all, agreed this'',was leit
irnate:,:, .; Chief,lof-StatiOn. expreSsed, the ?view" that ,?
ArnbassadOr-[deleted]"'Shopld first thii-Point in
personal' exchange :with CIA: . He. [Ambassador]:
I thereupon accused Chief of Station' of .dragging his.
[feet in .contacting 4foreign:Antelligence. officer] ,::?and
t. said if thii 'eontinued beyond today Instrtict..
Marine guards not fo let you in this ,bliildifig and:
you on the airplane Chief of .Station. Said, he. thought ?
this a ? bit .'extreme and expressed view that.,'ArnhaSsa-:...
ddi? [deleted] .- cOuld. hardlY-.objeet :to ''What, appeared.'
?
legitimate Headquariers:_question.--/He,fdid..object . and ?
_ , . , ?
-vigor:- ?
.p.t.The;CIA headquarters shared-the same Concerns as.
the Station Chief. and .Warned the 'Ambassador, 'in con,
diliatory terms against:: funding; especially :
;iri-gs attached .? 7: ?
1
Control over fundingWaslao- loo e Ahat there
IVAS noway Of checking,to See:if funds 'Were,being; ex:. ?
_
pended' foil' the purposes for .which :they Slid. the were
: to. be used: The Ambassadorsaid befo-- ?re.. he Commit-
tee,".:.- ? ,
. think aS it turned- out that we 'did rrget our
full money's Worth; .' ? 7,- -? ,
"Now On thequestion of, the possibili,ol-a. rin-
,off; thatis quitetrue: The possibility?eiciais':.',.: ??;,:.
-149[The begirthing.of thiS footnote WaS'Aotavailable
We chi' mit- Wish to become in- ?
Volved; eyen indirectlY, in operations 'Which, would
have the effeet "cif . prolonging -the insurgency_thereby.
'encoulaging. separatist- aspiratiOns, possiblY.!prO- ?
Yiding to,ithe .Soviet an' opportunity "to -e,reae
difficulties for..[tWo other.' US. allieS]:" , cable
Heim the COS ? in ;the area to 7the.bCI ?centainS?14he
AnibassadoeSiyieWs: on*. the ,Proposal.:., re.
,action is against giving financial support : tch.this',Op-
eration unless ? there:. are :important policy conaidera-
tions to, the ',.contrary ?of :which I? am iititZaWare-...7.
FurtherniOre, the roaci?ls?Topen-ended..and7ifme begin
and then 'decide to Withdra* there Might -bePtifor-
, tnnate 'misinterpretation& pf? our:. reaScins.? which', could
adversely- affect ..our?74-elatiOnswith'..[out .A
seeon'd .PropOsal...,*asqiirned in August Of4974.
againtin March'of l972.Oii the.latter ?oceasion; ;
"'?KiisingPr conferred-, with. i.?.:high State Depart ?
Ment Official indepthon',:the propOsal, and agreed that
it should be disipp4oved.
461The 'Secretary ,of the 40 Committee -hand-carried
a brier one paragraph synopsis. of4he,prOject, to,:the.
members for them to initia1.7"Theeciliehisi6iYthatf.the.
procedure -Was Simply .proforma. indieated b the
fast,that John cOnnally.tiad already ?,inforined out,
. thai the U.S. would proVide,SiiPpOrt to theinsurgents:
In addition, even-v.:The, ma, and cons contained in "the
proposal :piper; prepared for Dr Kissinger were ?
fINegorie, eariClUsioni. ? Responding f-6? a -,question - '
:staff concerning why CIA 'S. negative. yieWS. -of The
priijeet Were riot put tnoreforcefullY, -a' CIA Official'.
'responded that the Committee must -realize that CIAwas "told to prepare ii" paper on how the project
:,
prOjece ShOtild-be
1620n numerous occasions the leader of the &fit*
liFOUP'.e5cpresied:his':diStrUit.'.Of Our. allies intentions
He did,.hOweVer; trust the United States 'aS'Indieated
by his frequent statementathat-"he trusted ,no. Other
? major power" and aSserted-that if big :canSe, were' itie-cessful he Waa"ready to- become ?the.51st;itater, (See
COS cable to,DCI 'of 'January 16,:1975, for one ek-
aiiiiile)'Inadditiori;? his -admiration fort? DrKissinger
was expressed on, two occasions whenheSent dgift of
Three rugs. and later;-orr, the.'oceasiOn. ef?Dr-:, KisSinger'S'
inatriagei
Memorandum to tO',?.?Brent4Scowertift Texplains :the7;rieCei-
::,sity "of'.-keepirig1-the?gifta:zseeret:7.Avyou :are: aware',.'
ithe relationship between theAlriited-StateS,GoVerh?
Merit and the .:(Pilinie grcniP)'";?rernairis-7extreiiielik Seri- .:
_Sitive.41KnOwledge. OfilitS=texisiericeabai.theenikeidiely
.41-rt ;i1314)1iWigi`A
ktit
*70
_restricted; therefore; the: fact that -Drricissinger "has
_-
.
received this gift should
49The;
cut of aid to? the,ethrile-group came as ,a ?
severe shock to its--Ipadership:W'cIA"Cable'-frorn the ?
: COS'167the DCF--oniMa-iCh"?'151:19i5;.'deSeribeSi'the--
'method. used by.bur/allY to inform the ethnic groiip'S
'leadership. On March 5; a representative 4onr ally's
, intelligence: service., visited the headquarters of the
? ethnic group and "told [them]. in blpritpst?imagiriable
terms that a);, the border Was -being clased to. all!re-
, peat ,all movementl b) . could .,expect .no more
assistance from [oar ,ally], c)''. Should; Settle, with
Our [ally's enemy]' on whatever 'terms' he could get,
and: d) his military units 'would be allowed to, take
:refuge infour, , ally's can-A-try.] :only lin small grofiPs
`f?arid.. Only if they -inirenderedi,-, their ,arms [our
ariny:"- ? 4.. 1-
: '4.64Elaborate nieastires ..were .takeh to' inSure.7,that
, the ;Department of State- did not 'gain knowledge of
- the projeet:?DOeuMents'siiggest that it may have ?orig?
? inally been 'planned to keep the project:, so severely
:restricted, that -not even the Ainbaisidor tO the coun-
tryinvalyed Was ;to. be told. . . ;
In: addition evidence in the Committee files is con
-
Meting ,:on.?Whether Secretary of State'William y..
-:-Rogers was:. ever informed ;Of ?-?the prOjeet. :Officials :
;.of Kiiiinger's:;Staff and ti'A 'Officials' asiiiined that he'
?
?
"a uniquely. , useful. tool for weakening [our ally's
eneiny's] potential for' international adVenturiam,"
?,4,67-.A -White .1-foaSe'ineMordndiim".?:of'?.Qctober 16;
1973 froirt,Dr. Kissinger .to the DCI states ,. Tjte
President 'concurs in your judgment ;In'-,paragragh
of ' your ? rnemorandUnf, of October- ,-'15:' on the....above
subject.Nou-shdOld therefore sendthe followjng reply
immediately to [the ethnic group] =-We?sko .not repeat
., not consider: it advisable :for you: t94indertake: the
Offeniive, Military action that ..[another, government]"
haS;suggested?to yoii.7-7For:your,infOrrnation, we have
consulted ;with ?[onr, ally] (?tr61.igl,the :Ambassador
and they have both made,the,samerecomineridation."
I 49The attack launched'the day after,the agreement
,Was signed caught ethnic group by surprise.?:, A
Message from, their headquartera.to,CIA on 10 March,
''.1975 read as follows : "There is confusion and dismay
_-4rriong.qtg,peopje and, forces: Our people's fate in un-
precedented danger: Complete 'destruction? hanging'
over out head. No explanation-for, all,this.: We appeal
, you and Lisp: intervene according your promises
and not letting down ally;, to Save ['ethnic leader's]
life and dignity of our families, to,find,horiorable solu
tion. to [Our] ,problem.",,On.:tharsanie' day the Chief
- Of. Station sent the , following 'cable to the DCI Is
headquarters in touch With Kissinger 's office on thisif ;
. _ .
ys6 does not handle this situation deftly/in a?way
?
V
,
Greek Cypriots attack in AineriCan Library, January 1975: Did the US. "allow" it to ?happen?,
liadbeenibriefed since,th AleXisjohnSori was a Mem:,
bei of the Forty Committee:And;.in.an interview with
: staff Mr Rogers stated that he felt 'certain that he: had
been informed, Nevertheless, a.eable from 'Secretary
: -Rogers almoSt'a: year .,after the- project began, suggests
? ?, _
that he did no
11-k5L'c,:-.15powlpOg0;,as of Jine 22 1973
The ''''e.able.;S:i4P-S' that, E.'4(?*Lit4i4d'i:Yk.
,
policy not repeatl1not give ?entonragentent,-;:to.,,q*
[ethnic hOPea. for '0:8177'aSSIS'tanee:Or re:166'01i;
; lion,' we' watild intend keep .contaeta-at .dOnntry
rectorate 1061." :Interview. with William P Rogers;
?by Aaron Donner Oct 20 1975 copy on fife with Sel
Comm..
4,-5The:progresSively deteriorating. position of the
ethnic ? groUP, reflected- the f ae(that 'ridne of thenations
7wi'io were aidink "-them' seriously deiired4tiat'4,hey 're-
: ? alize -their .objective Of an'autOnornous:statc::-A:?CIA
;
memo of March -722,'-1974 states our 'ally's ? ancl,7'the
:. Millie& States!:pdailibri?elearly,i "-"We Wouldithink-thit
[our illy] 'Would not look with faVOr-On7?-the'establish::
nient.cif alorinallied: au-tailor-nails -gOVerninent. {O?e.
vlike'OnfielVes; baa,"Seeri4benetit iiv.*a:.7Stalernate
? situation,:
eallyt weakened by [the.eihnid;;group's]'4efusal to7
relinduiSh!=its,.'SeiniaatencliiY;Neither i[oiff.;ally]..1'nor
"ourselves Wish .te ?see . the': matter:--resolVed' One 'w'a
or the other.", , ? ????
46,6The ?CIA . had early inforrhation:,..WhichuggeSC
that our ally 1would abandon the ethnic group the
Ininiitehe,7cametoan agreerneritwith -his enemy oyer
border . disputes ..:T.Wo inonth? after:Initiating...the. proj-
-eet:.'d-CIA, Memo of-O.-et:47, '1972, states [Our
has appareritly,;.Usal danother,g6yernitient's], !Foreign
Minister:4e .ipass-3vvord, to:, [hiveneiny]
be willing7:to,i allow peace_to?;prevail . in the areal: if
eriernY],- Would-puhlicly?agree,to,abrogate;:la pre, ,
vlotis4reity,1eoncerning their respective 1:,,orders17,!_i, In
additionclAr-,mPinOs. and ''':cables characterize =?.04r
ally s views of the ethnic-.group as a"ca,,rd to play
in this dispute with his neighbor: And -a.'CIA',,iperrio'
'9,LAt.4011L-g4A11)97.AictI4r:acterj.K4 the1C_E711111;cC'gr..01.1R as
?EN O_Iiiits11, 417,1 bViayiVe
which will avoid giving the [ethnic group] the. ithpres7
sion that Yve'iare Abandoning them they are-flikelY
.go;fpublic.,' [OM- ally!s],'aciion has not only shattered :
'hope's; 'it-endangers lives of thousands.":
the COS proceeded to Make suggestions for, what 'the
,USG;-.couledo,to 'help. and ended, WithAliet:enthrk,-."it
woilldbeithe
MarahA g,-::1975': the.following 'letter ai
rived from the leader of-the ethnic' groupi fo.secietary
of .5tate, , Henry Icissinger:YoupExcellency;;HaVing
always' believed; in the peaceful solutio6?of::'disputes
iticlu,dingi,thosez between [yckir ally and his enemy]
are pleased to.? see:that- their two countries have
cotne.:to some agreement' . . However, our, hears
bleed 4see that an:Immediate by product of their
agreementi-s "the?--4.estruCtion PC our, defenseless:pdOple
in,priunprec_edented,manner.ps....[your411fl!Close&itS
border and itopp,pd.belp.. to 0?,:Conipletely-, and .while
enemy].lz.egan:?,,the biggesr;offensive jhey,- have
ever, launched. and:which -iS,noW being; contimied.:Our
movement and people are being: destroyed:. in . an: un;
betievahle:way..with..::?iienee, from' everyone.:,,We ?feel
your ExcelleneY7that.' the . United Stateshas a. moral
and politieal:responsibility?towards',oUr people who
have:corinnitted:.theinselves.49 ?your fcountry!s?policy
In -consideration of this situation We beg your EXcel-
leney.to take action as immediately a? possible-On tlie
folloWing isSuga: :1) -Stopping the . ,::offensiVe:and
op-ening4he, way, for talks betweentisl" to arrive: at
a :solution.J.tor our.' people: which. Will .at.-least be:face
' saving: 2), 'Using-whatever; influence yott,',hanye;.,with
[your' ally], to help our people^ in this historically
tragic and:sad moment. and at leak in, stich;a :?Way,,,that
our _people- and [army] could ',Maintain some liveli
hood ?and, Perform; :at Aleast, partisan, activitY.--,in [our:
area] pniklour.liroblerri--yis_, also solVe_d,.i within:?the
rarneworIoof [oVerall]agreement. ?M r:. Secretary,
we are anxiously awaiting your 'quick:: response and
action and; we .'are certain tthat',4hp,'Lunited -States; will
not .remain .- indifferent: during these ;critical , and -,trying
',SVC 4:300.0e13 lo bairtg
ir14\1
04-6b6 th,O. 'ibki%ii?cifiA *04
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A CIA cable from the COS to the Dirator on 22 _
March 1975 states: "No reply has been received from
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the message
from [the ethnic leader] . . . The two additional mes-
sages received by radio from [his] headquarters are
forwarded this morning . . . and underscore the seri-
ousness of [their] situation, the acute anxiety of their
leaders and their emotional appeal that the USG use
its influer,ce with [our ally] to get an extension of the
cease fire. This would permit the peaceful passage of
. .. refugees to asylum . . . Hence, if the USG intends
to take steps to Aert a massacre it must intercede with
[our ally] promptly." Interview with CIA official, by
J. Boos, Oct. 18, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm.
on Intell.
4710ver 200,000 refugees managed to escape into our
ally's country. Once there, however, neither the United
States nor our ally extended adequate humanitarian
assistance. In fact, our ally was later to forcibly return
over 40,000 of the refugees and The United States gov-
ernment refused to admit even one refugee into the
United States by way of political asylum even though
they qualified for such admittance. .. .
4741he political action program included the dis-
tribution of 50,000 campaign-type buttons identifying
the wearer as a supporter of Roberto's FNLA.
475The United States has found itself in similar situ-
ations on other occasions. Having supported colonial
power policies in previous years, they are constrained
from developing a rapport with indigenous indepen-
dence movements. The Soviets, however, are not simi-
larly inhibited. Once the colonial power relinquishes
control, the well-organized, well-financed, Soviet
backed group is ready to step into the breach. The
United States is forced at that point to scurry around
looking for a rival faction or leader to support. The
U.S. has often chosen leaders who had a prior rela-
tionship with the colonial power and whose national-
ist credentials are thus somewhat suspect, or leaders
who have spent most of their time outside the coun-
try waiting for _the colonial power to depart. The
point is that many of the U.S.-backed groups begin
with a variety of factors working to their disad-
vantage.
477The task force was composed of African experts
within the Department of State, DoD officials, CIA
officials, and others. Officials from the Department of
State have told this Committee that the majority of
that task force recommended diplomatic efforts to
encourage a political settlement rather than interven-
tion. After they had prepared their report for the Sec-
retary of State containing this recommendation, they
were informed by National Security Council aides
that it was improper for them to make a recommenda-
tion on policy. Instead, they were instructed to sim-
ply list diplomatic effiarts as one option among many
in their final report. Thus, the African experts who
made up the task force were not allowed to place
their recommendations on paper to be reviewed by
the Forty Committee.
"'The Committee attempted to determine the differ-
ence between the three contesting factions in Angola.
Mr. Colby responded to questions of that nature:
"They are all independents. They are all for black
Africa. They are all for some fuzzy kind of social sys-
tem, you know, without really much articulation, but
some sort of let's not be exploited by the capitalist
nations." The Committee also attempted to discern
why certain nations were supporting different groups
if they were all similar in outlook:
"MR. ASPIN. And why are the Chinese backing
the moderate group?
"MR. COLBY. Because the Soviets are backing
the MPLA is the simplest answer.
"MR. ASPIN. It sounds like that is why we are
doing it.
"MR. COLBY. It is."
2. Intelligence Collection
Human and diplomatic risks are not confined to
covert action. Certain methods of intelligence-gathering
invite the same danger of war and infringement of
the Constitutional rights of Americans.
The Committee has examine.d both technical and
non-technical intelligence-gathering programs and has
concluded that the risks accompanying them are often
unacceptably great; that information obtained often
does not justify the risk; the policy-makers have been
insensitive to dangers, especially of the violation of
U.S. citizens' rights; and, that there are inadequate
.policy-level mechanisms for the regular review of risk
assessment.
a. Submarines
A highly technical U.S. Navy submarine reconnais-
sance program, often operating within unfriendly
waters, has experienced at least 9 collisions with
hoktile yessels in the last ten years, over 110 possible
detections, and at least three press exposure. Mogt
of the submarines carry nuclear weapons.
The program clearly produces useful information
on our adversaries' training exercises, weapons test- -
ing, and general naval capabilities. It is also clear,
however, that the program is inherently risky. Com-
mittee staff's review of the program suggests if both
Congress and the Department of the Navy were suffi-
ciently motivated to provide the funds, technical
capabilities could be developed which would make
possible the acquisition of the same data through less
hazardous means.
The Navy's own justification of the program as a
"low risk" venture is inaccurate, and has, therefore,
not met or resolved the Committee's misgivings.487
Documents provided the Committee by the Defense
Department indicate that, while risk assessments are
made prior to operations, they ate ritualistic and pro
forma. In fact, their mission risk assessments do not
vary despite constant -changes in political conditions,
information sought, distance from enemy shores and
hostile forces, and our adversaries' ability to detect the
presence of U.S. submarines. During the hundreds of
missions these submarines have conducted, the Navy
has never assessed military risk as anything but "low."
The Committee is, therefore, troubled by the com-
pletely pro forma nature of the mission risk assess-
ment as it is presently accomplished.
Just as the Navy's assurances that the program is
secure are inconsistent with the collisions, apparent
detections, and press stories, their claims that the
sensitive missions are closely monitored are belied by
the scant tactical guidance given commanders and
regular communications gaps. Once a U.S. submarine
enters the 12-mile limit of another nation, communi-
cations security and the lack of certain technical
capabilities make it impossible to independently verify
the location of a submarine at any given moment.
Many of these difficulties result from factors which
are inherent in the nature of this covert operation.
Naval inquiries into collisions and other "untoward
incidents," if held at all, are almost always conducted
at a low level, effectively keeping policy-makers in
the dark on changing operational conditions. Thus, it
took a field-initiated, low-level investigation, conduc-
ted after three collisions in 1970, to determine that
pre-mission training and operational guidelines for
U.S. submarines on this type of sensitive mission
needed revision and up-grading. If Washington-based
review had been adequate, it would not have taken
this field investigation to determine that U.S. sub-
marines were following other submarines too closely.
In addition, staff found no evidence which would
indicate that commanders of submarines colliding
with hostile vessels have ever received disciplinary
action of any kind. At times, commanders have es-
caped censure despite recommendations to that effect
by a review panel.
Despite these faults, the Committee noted the pro-
cedures implemented by the Navy to insure the safety
of the mission and the crew in situations which are
inherently risky. Washington-based control, review,
and coordination of this program has been an evolu-
tionary matter over the years. At present it appears
to be extremely well managed, with the exception of
the risk assessment area and the failure to forward
the results of low-level investigations for Washington-
based revieW.
In reviewing past investigations and formal reviews,
the Committee noted the Navy's implementation of
previous suggestibns for change. There is, however,
one unfortunate exception. A previous review of this
program suggested that the Department of the Navy
make a firm commitment to the necessity of main-
taining an intelligence capability with U.S. submarines
by allocating funds to research and development ef-
forts designed to increase both the capabilities and the
security of their missions. The Navy has paid only lip
service to this commitment.
Given these factors, the Committee urges a thor-
ough review of the program's product and hazards,
to avert another Pueblo, or worse, and to insure that
important intelligence collection continues with sig-
nificantly less risk than presently exists.
b. Interception of
International Communications
The National Security Agency (NSA) systematically
intercepts international communications, both voice
and cable. NSA officials and the Director of Central
Intelligence concede that messages to and from Amer-
ican citizens and businesses have been picked up'
in the course of gathering foreign communications
intelligence. They maintain, however, that these mes-
sages are small in number and usually discarded in
any case.493
Earlier NSA programs of questionable legality
focused on international narcotics traffic and radi-
Valiiin, and even targeted Americans. The Commit-
rtee's preliminary investigation reveals at least one new
area of non-political and non-military emphasis in
international intercept?economic intelligence. Com-
munications interception in this area has rapidly de-
veloped since 1972, partly in reaction to the Arab
oil embargo and the failure to obtain good information
on Russian grain production and negotiations for the
purchase with American corporations.
The Committee is not convinced that the current
-commercial intercept program has yielded sufficiently
valuable data to justify its high cost and intrusion,
however inadvertent, into the privacy of international
communications of U.S. citizens and organizations.
Inasmuch as the technical complexity of the program
defies easy or quick evaluation, the Committee is
hopeful that a permanent oversight mechanism will
closely and comprehensively scrutinize the operation
to determine whether the risks are necessary and
acceptable.
c. Manipulation of the Media
The free flow of information, vital to a responsible
and credible press, has been threatened as a result of
CIA's use of the world media for cover and for
clandestine information-gathering.
There are disturbing indications that the accuracy
of many news stories has been undermined as well.
Information supplied to the Committee suggests that
some planted, falsified articles have reached readers
in the U.S.'
Intelligence agencies have long prized journalists
as informants and identity-covers. Newsmen generally
enjoy great mobility, and are often admitted .to areas
denied to ordinary businessmen or to suspected in-
telligence types. Not expected to work in one fixed
location, both bona fide journalists and masquerading
intelligence officers can move about without arousing
suspicions. They also have extraordinary, access to
important foreign leaders and diplomats.
CIA, as no doubt every other major intelligence
agency in the world, has manipulated the media. Full-
time foreign corrspondents for major U.S. publica-
tions have worked concurrently for CIA, passing
along information received in the normal course of
their regular jobs and even, on occasion, travelling
to otherwise non-newsworthy areas to acquire data.
Far more prevalent is the Agency's practice of re-
taining free-lancers and "stringers" as informants.
A stringer working in a less-newsworthy country
could supply stories to a newspaper, radio, and a
weekly magazine, none of whom can justify a full-
time correspondent. This may make the use of string-
ers even more insidious than exploitation of full-time
journalists.
The Committee has learned that the employment
of newsmen by CIA is usually without the knowledge
or agreement of the employers back in the U.S. Pub-
lishers have been unable, despite strenuous effort, to
learn from the Agency which, if any, of their em-
ployees have had a clandestine intelligence func-
tion.498 Newsmen-informants apparently do not often .
disclose this relationship to their editors. The Com-
mittee has learned of cases in which informants
moved from one bona fide press position to another,
without ever making employers aware of their past
or present CIA status.
CIA acknowledges that "stringers" and others with
whom the Agency has a relationship are often direc-
ted to insert Agency-composed "news" articles into
foreign publications and wire services. U.S. intelli-
gence officials do not rule out the possibility that these
planted stories may find their way into American
newspapers from time to time, but insist that CIA
does not intentionally propagandize in this country.
CIA insensitivity to the possibility of its adultering
news digested by Americans is indicated by its fre-
quent manipulation of Reuters wire service dis-
patches?which regularly appear in U.S. media. Be-
cause Reuters is British, it is considered fair game.499
A number of CIA officers employed by U.S. and
foreign publications write nothing at all. Their jour-
nalistic affiliation is a "cover"?a sham arrangement
making possible full-time clandestine work for the
Agency. With these arrangements, the employer's co-
operation has been obtained.500
After the Washington Star-News discovered a CIA-
media relationship in 1973, Director Colby ordered a
review of these practices. Subsequently, the Agency
terminated the informant relationships of five full-
time employees of American periodicals. Stringers
and free-lancers are still on the payroll, despite their
periodic reporting for a U.S. media usually unaware
of the writer's CIA connection.501
The use of American press enterprises as a cover
has been tightened somewhat. No longer, for example,
can a CIA officer in the field arrange for cover with-
out headquarters approval.
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i ), 1.30 : t
Director Colby, citing the Agency's continu iire .
for reliable information and the increasing ie uctanc
of, private firms, and the goveimment to provide cover,
has maintained that the recent reforms have reduced
risks to an acceptable: level..
d: CIA Presence in the Executive Branch
CIA personnel may be found in a host of U.S.
departments and agencies, in the National Security
Council, and in the White House itself.
. Typically, t,heir Agency affiliations are unknown 'to
colleagues and to all others, except one or two leader-
ship figures.503 They sit on interagency panels whose
members are unwitting.504 In some cases these panels
already include another, official, CIA representative,
giving CIA undue representation.505 Some of them
. work in positions involving evaluation of CIA's work
product and proposals.506 '-
These individuals are "detailees"?CIA employees
on loan to the Executive, usually at the latter's re-
quest. They include all types, from gardeners and typ-
ists, to intelligence analysts and practitioners of covert
action.507
Detailees are requested for a variety of reasons?
because the White House wants to circumvent Con-
gressional budget ceilings, because there are no other
available secretaries with security clearances, because
CIA professiOnal expertise is highly regarded, or be-
cause the position had always been staffed by an
Agency officer.508
The Committee has found no indications that CIA
detailees are instructed to make clandestine reports
to headquarters on the inner workings of the host-
employer. Nor is there credible evidence that they are
asked by CIA to perform in any manner which is incon-
sistent with the best interests of the host. Nonetheless,
the Committee believes that detailing as presently
practiced reflects an unwise policy.
At bet, intelligence personnel such as electrical help
are diverted from CIA duties thus frustrating the
budget allocating intent of Congress. A far worse
spectre is that of CIA officers assigned to such posts
as the National Security Council where they are sus-
ceptible, despite all good intentions, to substantial
conflicts of interest on the most sensitive issues. The
latter problem is compounded by the fact that the de-
tailee's background often is unknown to NSC col-
leagues who are also charged with CIA-related re-
sponsibilities. 509
The Committee discovered detailees, whose Agency
ties were closely held secrets, making recommenda-
tions on CIA covert action proposals to unwitting
,senior NSC officials. Such individuals also help con-
duct the NSC's evaluation of the intelligence product,
?and in that capacity regularly compare CIA's per-
formance with that of rival agencies.
- These individuals have impressed staff as highly
motivated professionals, acutely aware of the prob-
lems resulting from divided loyalties. Their integrity
is not at issue. But neither the White House nor the
CIA is well served by an unnecessary policy which
invites cynicism and compromises the quality of Ex-
ecutive Branch oversight of the intelligence community.
e. CIA Relationship with U.S. and
Foreign Police
In creating the CIA, Congress clearly intended to
deny it any domestic police functions. Their fear that
a super-secret, bureaucratically powerful spy agency
might evolve into a domestic secret police, has not
been realized, respite shortcomings in control and
oversight.
Evidence in Committee files, however, indicates that
during the late 1960's and early 1970's, CIA allowed
itself to become involved in domestic police activity.
In addition, the Agency undertook other police assis-
tance activities which jeopardized the integrity of an
otherwise legitimate and useful U.S. foreign aid pro-
gram.
? Association and Collaboration with U.S. Police
Notwithstanding its charter's clear prohibition
against internal security functions, CIA has main-
tained relationships?many entirely appropriate?
with various Federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies. Questionable activities prior to the Holtz-
man Amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Acts of 1968, included the training by
CIA of domestic police and loans of Agency equip-
ment for domestic use. In return, local police depart-
ments cooperate with CIA on matters of concern to
the Agency's Office of Security. Both activities appear
to have been improper. The first violated the charter's
ban on domestic police functions, and the. latter tended
.e c IC. . . )11. ef Cr' 93iart-
ment o Justice.
Of those activities, CIA's role as a source ot ordi-
nary as well as exotic equipnientiis .perhaps the most
troubling and publicized. The Agency has loaned such
traditional gear as body protectors, billy clubs, mace,
and similar civil disturbance paraphernalia. Most of
the equipment was provided during the height of the
Vietnam War movement and may have been used by
local police during the May 1971 demonstrations in
Washington.
More exotic loans consisted of decoders, clandestine
transmitters, analyzers, and other wiretrapping devices.
A staff examination of these practices reveals that
CIA officials usually provided equipment on a no-
questions-asked basis, did not require the production
of court orders for eavesdropping gear, and exercised
virtually no control over the loaned items.
The record suggests that on one occasion, CIA-
loaned equipment was used in an illegal wiretap. In
June, 1971, Mr. Kenyon Ballew was severely
wounded during a raid on his apartment by agents of
the Division of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, sup-
ported by police from Montgomery and Prince
Georges Counties in Maryland.
The raid was conducted pursuant to a Federal search
warrant for possession of suspected firearms and hand
grenades. Plainclothes agents and police officers broke
down the door to the apartment when Mr. Ballew
failed to -answer their knock. Mr. Ballew, a gun col-
lector, picked up a pistol, was shot, and is now perma-
nently disabled. He is partially paralyzed, walks only
with the aid of a brace and cane, speaks with diffi-
culty, and still has the police bullet lodged in his
brain.
Mr. Ballew was never prosecuted for any gun con-
trol violations. The case received a large amount of
publicity and was the subject of a number of investi-
gations of alleged police misconduct. Mr. Ballew
brought suit pursuant to the Federal Torts Claim Act
and received an adverse judgment from the courts in
February, 1975.
A CIA Office of Security employee assigned to liai-
son with the Montgomery County Police Department
told staff that, in a conversation with a police inspector
on the Ballew case, the possible use of CIA-loaned
bugging equipment was revealed. He was advised that
police intercepted a telephone conversation in which
plans were outlined to "kill a cop." However, neither
the affidavit in support of the search warrant, the
subsequent investigations, nor the transcript of the
civil suit reflected the existence of any wiretap. Mr.
Ballew's case is now on appeal, and if there had been
an illegal wiretap, he may be entitled to a new trial.
While the Department of Justice's CIA Task Force
has been made aware of this possible wiretap for
months, it has apparently refused, both to act upon
it,517 and to notify the attorneys in the case.
CIA Involvement with Foreign Police
From the early 1950's until late 1973, CIA operated
a proprietary, International Police Services (IPS) , in
the Washington, D.C. area. It had the dual purpose
of improving allies' internal security, and evaluating
foreign cadets for pro-U.S. orientation, which might
later enable CIA to recruit them as intelligence
assets.
In the early 1960's the Agency for International
Development's Office of Public Safety (AID-OPS)
became actively involved in foreign police training.
OPS' 14 week course was augmented by an additional
four weeks of training at IPS, pursuant to a contrac-
tual arrangement with AID. Students were not made
aware that they were being trained at a CIA facility,
and only a handful of AID officials, including the
Director of OPS, knew of IPS' CIA status.
Instructors were asked to record names of students
who demonstrated a pro-American attitude. It does
not appear, however, that the CIA attempted to re-
cruit students while in the United States, although
CIA documents indicate that with the cooperation of
OPS, lists of OPS and IPS students were made avail-
able, along with biographical information, to CIA
components for operational use.
As many as 5,000 foreign police officers from over
100 countries, many of whom have become high
officials, unwittingly received training from the
CIA. The position of these foreign police officers
may have been damaged when, in 1973) IPS was
revealed as a CIA front.
In addition to damaging the credibility of these
foreign police officers, CIA's apparently unnecessary
involvement with a legitimate foreign aid program
could have seriously undermined that program from
a propaganda standpoint.523 Despite these realities,
AID-OPS continued its relationship with IPS until
late 1973. Department of State and AID officials
should review these practices and develop alternative
methods of administering foreign aid programs with-
.out CIA involvement and support.,
1 ai(i( 'tic. .? , ?,1 , 2)9
to C1V vent jurisdiction of the ana tne
Footnotes:
t "Mach monthly mission schedule forwarded to tie
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Forty Committee fo- r p-
proval has an alpha-numeric designator attached for
mission risk assessment. By far the most frequently
assigned is "4 A 4"; the first digit, "4", stands for
"low military risk"; the second alpha character,
"A", stands for "high intelligence value" and the
third digit, "4", stands for "low political risk." No
mission has ever been assessed a military risk factor
other than "low." This evaluation is belied not only
by the nine collisions, 110 possible detections, con-
stantly fluctuating factors which should impact on the
calculations of military risk such as presence of
enemy forces in the area, distance from enemy shores,
political conditions, etc., but also by a variety of
statements by Navy personnel who have conducted
studies on this program. . . .
493Comm. Hearings. . . .
"MR. ASPIN. . . . Does the National Security
Agency monitor telephone calls between American
citizens and foreigners abroad?
"MR. COLBY. The Agency does monitor foreign
communications.
"MR. ASPIN. Does it involve a U.S. citizen at one
end?
"MR. COLBY. On some occasions, that cannot be
separated from the traffic that is being monitored. It
is technologically impossible to separate them.
"MR. GIAIMO. Obviously, we know that in other
countries you undoubtedly perform all kinds of inter-
cepts.
"MR. COLBY. Incidentally we pick up material
about Americans abroad; yes.
"MR. GIAIMO. That is the point I am trying to
get at. Did you say that incidentally you are also
intercepting American citizens?
"MR. COLBY. I did not want to say that we
never, never covered any American citizens abroad.
If I have made a mistake in what I said, that we were
not?that we incidentally cover Americans in our
foreign intelligence activities.
"MR. GIAIMO. You incidentally cover Americans
where?
"MR. COLBY. I say we do incidentally cover Amer-
icans. I would like to get into a further description
of this in executive session."
Ibid. . . .
"Chairman PIKE. Does your system intercept the
telephone calls of American citizens?
"Gen. ALLEN. I believe that I can give a satis-
factory answer to that question which will relieve
the Committee's concern on that matter in closed
session."
Although the Committee "met for some four hours in
Executive Session to take testimony from NSA Di-
rector Allen and Deputy Director Benson K. Buff-
ham, primarily concerning the interception of inter-
national commercial communications, Gen. Allen
apparently felt it necessary to clarify and elucidate
that testimony in a follow-up letter to Chairman
Pike on August 25, 1975:
"Dear Mr. Chairman:
"I am writing to provide additional clarification
to the testimony I gave before your Committee on
8 August.
"At the present time, the telephone calls of U.S.
citizens in the United States to a foreign location
are not being monitored. The monitoring of tele-
phone conversations of United States citizens in the
United States to a location in the United States has
never, been authorized by NSA. Currently, we are
not now monitoring any telephone circuits termi-
nating in the United States.
"For several years prior to mid-1973, a few inter-
national radio-telephone circuits were monitored be-
tween the United States and foreign countries. This
monitoring did include the calls of U.S. citizens as
well as foreign nationals, and calls were sometimes
selected for monitoring based on the name (or phone
number) of a U.S. citizen provided us by another
government agency. In the summer of 1973, the use
of the naRes of U.S. citizens to select telephone calls
was terminated and remains so.
"From mid 1973 until recently a search of our
records reveals there were occasions where radio-
telephone circuits between a foreign terminal and a
U.S. terminal were monitored. On some occasions the
monitoring was for the purpose of developing patterns
of foreign communications use and, on yet other
occasions, the monitoring was based on the foreign
subscriber and the substance of the conversation was
obtained. Our records indicate that in all of 1974,
reports were made involving the substance of only
eight telephone conversations, wherein a U.S. citizen
might be presumed to have been conversing, and in
these instances, only the foreign intelligence aspects
of the conversation were reported, and the names of
citizens , were never used, in these NSA reports.
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This number may be compared with reports involving
[a vast number of] other foreign communications
carried on international circuits.
"The executive directives applying to these efforts
state: a. The purpose of the signals intelligence activi-
ties of the National Security Agency is to obtain for-
eign intelligmce from foreign communications or for-
eign electronic signals. b. Foreign communications
exclude communications between or among American
citizens or entities. ?
"I hope this letter will help clarify the matter."
/s/ Lew Allen, Jr., Lieutenant General, USAF, Di
rector, NSA/Chief, CSS.
495William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelli-
gence, told members of the Committee staff at an
October 25, 1975 meeting, that the Agency plants
propaganda in the foreign press, including English-
language newspapers, and can not be inhibited by the
possibility that these planted stories may be picked
up by American news services, etc.
498The Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA
explained that the Agency wants as. few people as
possible to know the Agency's sources. Therefore,
the CIA considers "stringers" and free-lancers to be
free agents, working for many employers and so there
is no necessity for the CIA to inform a "stringer's" or
free-lancer's publisher of his other employer (CIA) .
Committee staff meeting on October 25, 1975. . . .
499A11 ex-CIA Chief of Station explained that ". . .
our American media assets ... are given neither Agency
guidance nor information which might influence a
piece written for an American audience. These peo-
ple are used entirely for intelligence gathering pur-
pos2s, and are left free to write what they would have
written had there been no connection with the Agency
. . . This method is quite different from our handling
of foreign media assets, writing for foreign audiences,
where Agency influence over the content of certain
articles is selectively applied." He further states,
"CIA will undertake no activity in which there is a
risk of influencing domestic public opinion either di-
rectly or indirectly." But he turns around in the next
sentence to say: "The Agency does have a responsi-
bility for undertaking certain propaganda activities in
foreign countries." Director Colby emphatically stated
on October 25, 1975 to members of the Committee
staff and Congressman Johnson that he "differentiates
between AP and Reuters. I consider AP to be an
American wire service and therefore off limits . . .
but Reuters is a foreign wire service." It was pointed
out to Director Colby that Reuters, a British wire
service, was frequently used by American media, but
this fact did not change his mind. In an effort to
assure that official Washington is not deceived by
planted articles in the foreign press, CIA maintains
high-level liaison with the Department of State and
the U.S. Information Agency to identify spurious
stories.
500The CIA's Cover and Commercial staff files
show that in 1975 11 CIA employees used media
cover with 15 news field companies ? TV, radio,
newspapers, and magazines. Five of these are of
major general news impact, nine of no major general
news influence, and one a proprietary.
501When the CIA had fiduciary relations with five
full-time correspondents of major American news
organizations, three of their employers were unwit-
ting, according to William E. Colby. . . .
503At the National Security Council, there are four
CIA employees working as professional staff. Three
of them are overt employees of the CIA, open em-
ployees. The fourth is an undercover employee, one
who does not acknowledge the CIA as his true em-
ployer. Ironically, through committee staff interviews,
the undercover employee was the only CIA detailee
readily identified by his colleagues or subordinates.
504 [Name deleted] sits on the Interagency Classifi-
cation Review Committee (ICRC) , representing the
National Security Council staff, although he is actual-
ly detailed to the NSC staff from the CIA. The CIA
also has a representative on the ICRC. [Name .de-
leted] told the Committee staff that he does not tell
other ICRC members of his true affiliation. The man
who preceded [Name deleted] at the NSC was
[Name deleted]. He also sat on the ICRC represent-
ing the NSC. And he was also a CIA detailee. Fur-
ther, he was a key NSC staffer, but the only people
at the NSC who knew that he was from the CIA were
Dr. Kissinger and Alexander Haig.
505This Interagency Classification Review ?Commit-
tee rules on questions of declassification from the Ex-
ecutive branch agencies. These questions come up as
a result of Freedom of Information Act (FOI) requests.
If an FOI request is initially denied, the requester
may appeal to the head of the Agency; and if that
appeal is denied, he may appeal to the ICRC. Many
of these declassification cases involve the CIA.
506The man who directed Operations CHAOS at
the CIA is now detailed to the NSC staff as Director
for Intelligence Coordination of the NSC ,staff. His
task is to evaluate the quality of intelligence sent to
the NSC, including intelligence from his regular em-
ployer, the CIA. He maintains close contact with the
CIA as part of his job.
507There are, or have been, CIA detailees working
at the White House (including the Federal Executive
Institute, Cabinet Committee on Price Stability, White
House Joint Committee on Science, Office of Emer-
gency Preparedness, Council on International Eco-
nomic Policy and President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board), the Department of Justice and the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the State
Department and the Agency for International Devel-
opment, the Treasury Department, the Defense De-
partment and the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Energy
Administration, the Vice President's Office, the Na-
tional Security Council and the Commerce Depart-
ment.
The CIA details cover: communications techni-
cians, biographic analysts, general illustrators, secre-
taries, clerks, couriers, laborers, telephone operators,
graphic analysts, personal assistants, physical scien-
tist, intelligence officers, operations officers, econo-
mists, administrators assistants, program analysts,
chauffeurs, sky marshals, and stenographers.
508The White House used CIA detailees to keep the
total number of staff down, in contravention of Con-
gressional appropriation staff ceilings. The NSC staff
Secretary Kissinger before the Pike Committee:
His comments were "at variance" with the facts.
"borrows" secretaries initially from the CIA, until
their secretaries get clearances, but in many cases, the
CIA secretaries stay at the NSC for years. Many exec-
utive branches, such as the Department of the Trea-
sury, use CIA professionals as advisors to Secretaries,
etc. And finally, the NSC staffer responsible for covert
action proposals and approvals is almost always from
the CIA's Directorate of Operations, which requests
the covert actions. He has sole custody of all the Forty
Committee's records.
5095ee previous note on a key staffer at the NSC
?1:77tho made recommendations on poliey options. He,
therefore, was called upon to make these recommen-
dations on CIA policies to people who did not know
of his current CIA affiliation.
517The ?Agency's position in this case is that the
Agency was not involved beyond the loan of audio
equipment, which may have been used against Mr.
Ballew . . . .
523For example, the AID-OPS program was dam-
aged considerably by allegations linking foreign po-
lice training to the CIA. In 1970, Dan Mitrione, a law
enforcement officer of impeccable credentials and rep-
utation, employed by AID as a Public Safety Advisor
in Uruguay, was kidnapped and murdered by Tupa-
maro guerrillas. The Tupamaros alleged that Mitrione
was a CIA "agent" and that Public Safety Advisors
including Mitrione taught torture tactics to police.
CIA documents indicate that although Mitrione may
have had some contact withCIA officers stationed
in Uruguay, he was not a CIA employee or informant.
. . . Allegations of AID-OPS sponsored torture train-
ing, depicted in various press reports and the film
"State of Siege," appear factually unsupportable.
However, this type of allegation had a tremendous
propaganda impact which contributed substantially
to the termination of AID-OPS in 1975.
3. Domestic Intelligence
Investigations
Domestic intelligence carries with it two distinct
types of risks. There are programs that by their very
nature and method offend individual liberties and
statutory rights. Then there are legitimate intelli-
gence methods that are improperly applied, turning
the law-enforcers into law-breakers.
a. Programs as Abuses
COINTELPRO was a series of covert counterintel-
ligence programs aimed at identifying, penetrating,
and neutralizing subversive elements in the United
States. The program itself consisted of myriad clandes-
tine dirty tricks carried out by FBI agents against per-
sons and organizations considered subversive by the
FBI.525 Careers were ruined, friendships severed, rep-
utations sullied, businesses bankrupted and, in some
cases, lives endangered.526
The FBI justified this aberration from traditional
law enforcement programs by stating that it was dic-
tated by the mood of the times. The FBI, as implemen-
tors of the program, thereby became the barometer
of the country's mood, instead of fulfilling their statu-
tory function of enforcing Federal laws.527 Evidence
received by the Committee of FBI racism,527a bias, and
strong conservative ideology hardly qualifies it to re-
view people's politics. Moreover, the Constitution pro-
hibits such a role and protects the very things FBI
was attempting to punish.
COINTELPRO is only one example. Another would
be programs grouped under "anticipatory" intelligence.
FBI states: "Because the FBI's investigative respon-
sibilities follow the contours of those entrusted to the
Attorney General, the Bureau's domestic intelligence
investigations are, of necessity, broader than investi-
gations strictly designed to collect evidence for crim-
inal proceedings. The FBI's domestic intelligence re-
sponsibilities have a distinct anticipatory, or preven-
tive, purpose, requiring continuing investigative activ-
ity in cases wherein criminal conduct remains a future
possibility. Whereas the evidence required to initiate
an investigation under such a standard would obvious-
ly be something less than probable cause of a crime,529
it would nevertheless be more than mere suspicion.
The FBI itself states that advocacy of an ideology
alone is not sufficient grounds for classifying a group
as subversive.
Anticipatory domestic intelligence projects, how-
ever, do create serious problems on occasion. A. few
examples illustrate the point.
Lori Paton testified before the Committee on No-
vember 18, 1975. In 1974, Miss Paton, then a high
school student, inadvertently wrote the Socialist
Workers Party as an academic assignment. She in-
tended to write to the Socialist Labor Party.
The FBI was conducting a "mail cover"532 on the
SWP and intercepted Miss Paton's misdirected letter.
They immediately began an investigation of her, and
the attendant publicity in Miss Paton's small town
caused her great mental anguish.
The Bureau's response was that the "FBI did not
publicize the fact" of Lori Paton's investigation, al-
though they had interviewed her school principal and
the local police chief.
Assume, however, that Miss Paton had correctly
written to the SWP, as many people undoubtedly
have. That fact alone would apparently have been
grounds for an anticipatory investigation, even though
it is hard to imagine what crimes could be anticipated
by writing a letter. In addition, the chilling effect such
investigations have on First Amendment rights, includ-
ing freedom of association, is painfully clear.534
For those who do join SWP, the chill is likely to
spread to employers. The Committee heard from one
witness who termed FBI's inquiries about his employ-
ee, Bruce Bloy, who was an SWP member, as "pre-
sumptive, mysterious, and . . . aggressive."
Trash covers are another odious form of anticipa-
tory investigations. The IPS trash cover has already
been discussed, save for a comment on command and
control. When FBI personnel were originally asked
about trash covers by Committee staff, they stated:
"we have not engaged in [trash covers] since July
1966 . . . We had no trash covers on the IPS." Two
weeks later, at a Committee hearing, they corrected
themselves. They stated that, while there was an FBI
policy of not conducting trash covers, that policy was
not always followed.
Two memoranda show that the Bureau knew of the
trash covers and recognized the risks in such a meth-
od. The concerns? The "potential harm to the FBI
and the Federal Government, per se, far outweigh the
potential information that could be expected."539 It
was not risks to an individual's right of privacy that
concerned the FBI.
?
?
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b. Law Enforcement Turned Law-Breaking
The use of informants, albeit an effective law en-
forcement tool, is a method of investigation which is
particularly subject to abuses of Constitutional rights
and rights of privacy.
The Committee heard testimony from a former FBI
informant named 'Robert Hardy. Mr. Hardy chroni-
cled for the Committee his role in a 1971 Camden
Draft Board break-in. Pursuant to FBI instructions,
he infiltrated a peaceful anti-war group in Camden,
New Jersey.540 He instigated the burglary and sup-
plied the would-be burglars with tools, money, tech-
nical assistance and encouragement.54I
In sum, Mr. Hardy acted as an "agent-provoca-
teur." At one point, he attempted to halt the actual
burglary, because a conspiracy had been established.
His FBI handling-agents insisted that the burglary be
committed.542
The disturbing lesson is that in the FBI system there
is virtually no mechanism to- control agents in charge
of informants. The FBI Manual of Instructions on In-
formants sets forth specific guidelines for the handling
of informants, yet the uniqueness and secrecy sur-
rounding each informant's relationship with the han-
dling-agent impairs the effectiveness of those in-
structions.
In the Hardy case, the informant-agent relationship
was further complicated by political considerations.
The defendants in a celebrated case in nearby Harris-
burg, Pennsylvania, had recently been acquitted of all
conspiracy counts. The FBI apparently felt that an
overt act such as an actual break-in would be required
to insure a conviction, even though the alleged crime
of conspiracy, which was the basis of later prosecu-
tion, appears to have been completed far in advance
of the actual break-in.
It should be noted that Department of Justice attor-
neys were advised of this situation long before the
break-in and did nothing to avert the course of events.
The Commitee investigated another example of lack
of control over informants. The FBI used Robert
Merritt as an informant on New Left activities during
the early 1970's. His dulies included reporting on ac-
tivities at the Institute of Policy Studies? Merritt told
the Committee that his FBI handling-agents instructed
him to conduct break-ins, deliver unopened mail ac-
quired illegally, and solicit and provide information
to the FBI regarding homosexual proclivities of politi-
cally prominent people and individuals of the New
Left. ?
The FBI agents who handled Merritt denied these
allegations under oath.. They stated that Merritt acted
on his own.
The handling-agents stated that they terminated Mer-
ritt because they ascertained that he had provided
false information on one occasion and had reason
to believe he provided false information at other
times in the past. If this was true, it does not fit with
other facts. During the seven months that Merritt was
an FBI informant, he provided over 100 reports on
at least 25 people. He had, in fact, been categorized
as "reliable" in FBI records.
No effort was ever made to "correct" the Merritt
reports, by indicating that the information contained
therein might be unreliable. No prosecutive actions
were ever recommended as a result of Merritt's al-
legedly wrong actions. His efforts apparently fit well
with intelligence operations.
Furthermore. Merritt told staff that he had commit-
ted numerous illegal acts at the direction of District
of Columbus Metropolitan Police.
His FBI .handling-agents stated that although they
acquired Merritt from the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment, they never inquired as to the nature of his prior
activities as a police informant. This attitude of "see
no evil, hear no evil" appears to violate the seemingly
rigid regulations of the FBI Manual, designed to effect
the recruitment of responsible and reliable informants.
Conflicting testimony in the Merritt matter reveals
the problem itself. Since FBI agents' instructions to
their informants are, by necessity, given orally
and without witnesses, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to accurately fix responsibility for an informant's
actions.
If the FBI agent is at fault, the problem becomes
one of administrative command and control. If, how-
ever, the informant has gone bad, the problem is more
difficult. For example, if an informant successfully
instigates others to commit a crime, as in the Hardy
matter, his FBI contact agent may overlook the in-
formant's improper actions, because the informant is
important to a case for which the FBI agent is likely
to receive credit.
The risk that informants may use illegal methods is
heightened when one considers the kind of person
needed to infiltrate suspected criminal elements. Un-
derstating the problem, James Adams, Assistant to
the Director of FBI, testified before the Committee on
November 18, 1975: " [T]he informants you develop
are not recruited from Sunday Schools." The dubious
character of most informants is compounded by the
fact that informants are paid cash, and their payment
is commensurate with the information they furnish.
The more incriminating the information, the more
'lucrative the reward.
Electronic Surveillance?The Kissinger Wiretaps
In the last half-century, electronic technology has
revolutionized the science of investigations. These
developments also mean that "Big Brother" may be
watching.
Improper application of electronic surveillance
poses obvious risks because of its enormous potential
for invading privacy and the difficulty of detecting
intrusion.
Some examples follow.
In the spring of 1969, the Nixon White House was
disturbed that extremely sensitive information regard-
ing diplomatic relations and national security was-
leaking to the press on a fairly regular basis.
On May 9, 1969, William Beecher of the New York
Times wrote an article on Cambodia which triggered
a strong reaction from the White House. That day, a
series of telephone calls to ascertain the source of the
leaks took place. The calls were between Dr. Kissin-
ger and J. Edgar Hoover, and between Colonel Alex-
ander Haig and FBI personnel.
The apparent result of these consultations was the
installation of a wiretap on the residence of a Nation-
al Security Council staff on May 9, 1969. Significantly,
approval for this "national security" wiretap was not
requested- until May 10, 1969. The wiretap was re-
quested by Col. Haig "on the highest authority," and
was not approved by Attorney General John ,Mitchell
until May 12, 1969.
Seventeen persons were eventually wiretapped pur-
suant to this program.
Although the FBI never overheard information in-
dicating any breach of national security, the taps con-
tinued for lengthy periods of time.
No approval was ever sought for extensions of the
wiretaps as they continued unabated and unsuper-
vised. In addition, the FBI continued to report in-
formation which can only be characterized as political
or personal.
William C. Sullivan, former Chief of Intelligence
for the FBI, told staff that FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover did not regard these taps as FBI operations,
but as executive requests. According to Mr. Sullivan,
Hoover insisted on sending copies of the transcripts
directly to the White House, so the President would
be apprised of the "service" FBI was providing.
Several risks were inherent in the FBI's national
security wiretaps installed for Dr. Kissinger.
The first involved wiretapping United States citi-
zens without prior judicial approval. These dangers
were recognized by the Supreme Court in 1972. The
Court held that electronic surveillance of domestic
organizations or citizens was forbidden unless prior
judicial approval was obtained.
Secondly, wiretapping State Department officials
and members of the press, tends to stifle voices of
criticism and dissenting views, and infringes upon
freedom of the press.
Finally, the Kissinger wiretaps posed a risk that
the FBI could become the tool by which an Admin-
istration in power obtains political information.
The Houston Episode
On October 9, 1975, Anthony Zavala, a former
narcotics officer with the Houston Police Department
who had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment
on wiretap convictions, told the Committee of wide-
spread illegal police wiretapping in Houston, Texas,
from 1969 through 1972.
Mr. Zavala recounted that wiretapping had become
"second nature to us all," and "that it was all dis-
cussed freely, and that everyone knew what was going
on."
In 1973, Anthony I. P. Farris, United States At-
torney for the Southern District of Texas, learned of
allegations of wiretapping. He brought this informa-
tion to the attention of the FBI in the fall of 1973,
and requested that the Bureau investigate.
They did not. His requests continued. Finally, in
April 1974, the FBI assigned one special agent to
investigate the case. He filed reports, which according
to Farris were ". . . notable only in their lack of
substance, consisting largely of Xeroxed newspaper
articles."572
Footnotes:
525The primary programs were the Communist
Party, U.S.A. program (commenced in 1956) , the
Socialist Workers Party program (commenced in
1961), the White Extremist program (commenced in
1964) , the Black Extremist program (commenced in
1967) , and the New Left Domestic program (com-
menced in 1968). Lesser programs were the Puerto
Rican Bomber program (1966) , Operation Hoodwink
(1966) (a program pitting the Mafia against the
Communist Party), Operation Border Coverage (1961),
the Cuban program (1961) and the Yugoslav pro-
gram (1969) . All COINTELPRO programs termi-
nated after their existence was discovered following
the burglary of the FBI office in Media, Pa. on April
27, 1971. Staff COINTELPRO briefing between W.
Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director of the FBI in
charge of the Intelligence Division and J.B.F. Oli-
phant and R. Vermeire, at FBI headquarters, Aug.
22, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm. on Intell.
526The following are but a few examples of spe-
cific COINTELPRO programs, of which there were
a total of 3,247 proposed and 2,370 carried out:
In 1969, the FBI authorized an agent to send anony-
mous letters to the superior of Father Augustus Tay-
lor, Jr., a Catholic priest, complaining of Father Tay-
lor's speaking out on his television show against the
war in Vietnam and of his public support of certain
black organizations. Father Taylor's television show
was subsequently cancelled and he was transferred.
FBI COINTELPRO memoranda. . . .
In 1968, the FBI authorized interfering with a Mel-
lon Foundation's decision of whether to give Unity
Corporation, a black organization in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, a $150,000 grant. The FBI contacted a
confidential source within the Mellon Foundation, the
grant was denied, and the Unity Corporation sub-
sequently went bankrupt. FBI COINTELPRO Memo-
randa. . . .
In 1969, the FBI approved furnishing information
to a responsible Harvard University official that a
student who was employed by the University was
involved in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
activities. Shortly thereafter, the student lost his
job. FBI COINTELPRO Memoranda. . . .
More seriously, one program was carried out
wherein an anonymous letter was set to the Black
Panther Party accusing one of their members of being
a police informant. FBI COINTELPRO Memoranda
100-448006-2308. Another program authorized send-
ing a threatening letter to Huey Newton purporting
to be from a follower of Eldridge Cleaver. FBI COIN-
TELPRO Memoranda. . . .
527"MR. VERMEIRE. Why was there such a sig-
nificant break in investigative techniques in 1973?
"MR. WANNALL. Principally because an analysis
was made by a predecessor and a determination, I
think, that we should be aware, I think as we always
have been, of the climate of the times and restructure
on a strict statutory basis.
"I think the history of the Bureau, and I would not
bore you with details, has been one of responsiveness,
an awareness of the climate of the times, and re-
structuring." Staff Interview with W. Raymond
Wannall, FBI Assistant Director in charge of Intelli-
gence Division; Robert L. Shackelford, Section Chief,
FBI Intelligence Division, and David Ryan, Super-
visor, FBI Intelligence Division, by J.B.F. Oliphant,
R. Vermeire, J. Atkisson and E. Miller, Nov. 5, 1975,
copy on file with Sel. Comm. on Intell.
527aA case in point was the FBI's alleged targeting
of Congressman Andrew Young, of Georgia, wherein
the FBI 'requested Arthur Murtagh, a Special Agent,
to surreptitiously obtain Congressman Young's per-
sonal stationery and handwriting sample. At the time,
Congressman Young was a candidate for Congress.
Comm. Hearings, testimony of Arthur Murtagh, Nov.
18, 1975.
The FBI denies the aforementioned allegation.
Furthermore, Black agents presently comprise ap-
proximately 1.2 percent of FBI agent personnel.
Comm. Hearings, testimony of W. Raymond Wan-
nall, Nov. 18, 1975.
529The Committee staff attempted to find out what
triggered domestic intelligence investigations. The best
answer appeared to be:
"MR. VERMEIRE. Investigation with respect to a
particular crime?
"MR. SHACKELFORD. Potential crime.
"MR. VERMEIRE. Potential; is there probable
cause?
"MR. SHACKELFORD. Of course not."
Probable cause, of course, has been the traditional
test for arrest. . . .
52A mail cover is observing only what appears on
the outside of an envelope or parcel, a practice which
is carried out, of course, with the cooperation of
postal authorities. The technique is perfectly legal.
534The risk may even be intended. As Dean Louis
Pollak put it: "When the official investigation long
outlives its initially professed justification?that is to
say, reasoned suspicion or criminal activity imminent
or actually carried out?at that point it is inescapable
. . . that an important consequence, if not necessarily
a purpose, of the continuing investigation will be the
imposition of an official stigma on the political or
research activity being carried out by the 'subject.'"
539"[The Washington Field Office] feels it would
be most unwise at this point in time to seriously con-
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sider instituting a similar operation as encompassed
by the utilization of this source [the trash cover].
Potential harm to the FBI and the Federal Govern-
ment, per se, far outweigh the potential information
that could be expected from such a reinstated opera-
tion." FBI Washington Field Office Memorandum to
Headquarters, August 4, 1973.
540None of the group's members was known by the
FBI to be violence-prone.
541Al1 of which were paid for with FBI funds.
5421he FBI's denial of this allegation appears in
their Memorandum of Nov. 28, 1975. . . .
572The complete ineptitude of the FBI investigation
of the Houston matter was brought out by Congress-
man Johnson's questioning of Mr. Farris:
"MR. JOHNSON. Can you tell me why in this
case, when you requested Information with respect
to investigation of other law enforcement agencies?
in this case the Houston Police Department?you
didn't get any response from anybody who was of
real significance?
"MR. FARRIS. . . . In all other cases they always
responded; they always performed admirably; but
in this case?the investigation of the allegations of
illegal electronic surveillance by the police depart-
ment in Houston?there was not only reluctance but
obvious foot dragging.
"MR. JOHNSON. . . . What was the result of your
contacts with Saxbe and Kelley and the others?
"MR. FARRIS. To quote myself in other hearings,
zip; nothing. Saxbe didn't answer; the Deputy At-
torney General of the United States didn't answer;
the Assistant Attorney General Crime Section didn't
answer. No one answered. I don't think they were
listening.
"MR. JOHNSON. But you can characterize co-
operation they received prior to that time as "zip."
"MR. FARRIS. It is not worthy of the name in-
vestigation; yes, sir.
"MR. JOHNSON. Once again, this is inconsistent
with their response to other requests that you might
make for other investigations?
"MR. FARRIS. That is correct."
4. SALT Political
Control of Intelligence
Nowhere is the risk of corrupting intelligence
greater than in recent efforts to restrict and shape
important data on Soviet compliance with strategic
arms agreements.
Staff investigation and examination of key docu-
ments reveal that these SALT treaties, which are of
grave strategic significance, were consummated with-
out full intelligence input, that the prime U.S. official
who sponsored the accords also effectively controls
the verification of their feasibility, and that day-to-day
intelligence analysis of compliance is hindered by
arbitrary and inconsistent attempts to prevent leaks
of SALT data.
The prime factor in this situation is Dr. Kissinger,
with his passion for secrecy and his efforts to concen-
trate power and to consolidate ultimate control of
important intelligence functions, through his various
bureaucratic roles.
It is clear that, in the final stages of the SALT
talks, U.S. negotiators did not fully consult or inform
intelligence experts, who had been key figures in
previous treaty sessions. Only Russian technical ex-
perts were on hand. Dr. Kissinger's private talks
with Soviet leaders in this period were not dissemi-
nated. Some officials assert that "ambiguities" which
plague the accords may have been the result of U.S.
policy-makers' self-imposed intelligence blackout at
the critical moment.575
The record indicates that Dr. Kissinger, U.S. archi-
tect of the accords, has attempted to control the
dissemination and analysis of data on apparent Soviet
violations of the SALT pact.
Although CIA, as the government's principal ana-
lytical arm, has both general and specific responsi-
bility for the monitoring of SALT compliance, the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
has advised the Agency to avoid any written judg-
ments that the Soviets are in violation of SALT agree-
ments. Such findings were to be privately communi-
cated to the National Security Council, which, coinci-
dentally, was headed by Dr. Kissinger.
When sensitive intelligence reports on Soviet com-
pliance began to turn up with regularity, the National
Security Council initiated the procedure of severely
restricting dissemination of the information, by caus-
ing it to be placed in a "hold" status. Typically, the
CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence would, in con-
sultation with NSC staff, place an item on "hold"
until Dr. Kissinger or his representative agreed to
release it.
r ?
Two principal reasons have been given for access
restrictions: fear of leaks by officials seeking to in-
fluence U.S. SALT policy;578 and the need for ade-
quate time to determine a report's real significance,
thus avoiding rash judgments on complicated techni-
cal issues.
This unusual procedure, invoked previously in such
momentous situations as the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis, has been strangely implemented this time. At
times, the Secretary of State, the Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and key
U.S. officials in SALT compliance meetings with the
Soviets have not been aware of the existence of sensi-
tive data suggesting Soviet cheating. Dissemination
within several intelligence components has been hap-
hazard and uncontrolled.589
Two other problems with the "hold" process de-
tract from the integrity of the intelligence product.
NSC staff, for example, has influenced the timing and
content of intelligence community publications.590
Worse, both high officials and working level analysts
have been cut off from information for periods of
time ranging from days to six months.591
Dr. Kissinger's comments on this situation are at
variance with the facts.592
The spectre of important information, suggesting
Soviet violation of strategic arms limitations, pur-
posefully withheld for extended periods of time from
analysts, decision-makers and Members of Congress,
has caused great controversy within the Intelligence
Community.593 In addition, it has raised questions
as to the President's own knowledge of, and concur-
rence with, the "hold" procedure.594
The problem continues, as official fears of leaks
and policymakers' penchant for a unified view on
SALT goes on. Former State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research Director Ray S. Cline, in
testimony before the Committee, framed the issue:
"I do think the Congress should be sure that the
procedures for handling of strategic intelligence . . .
should have certain checks and balances in them so
that there is no possibility of suppression of informa-
tion that is unattractive to policy makers." Cline con-
cluded, "As I was leaving government, I found these
procedures breaking down, and that is why I feel
that the problem does deserve attention from the
Congress."
Footnotes:
575Interview with U.S. intelligence officials, J. Boos,
Dec. 4, 1975, copy on file with Se!. Comm. on Intell.
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt agreed in testimony to the
Committee. . . .
578Testimony by William Hyland, Dec. 17, 1975: "I
think the whole SALT process has been plagued by
leaks. Not only have negotating positions and fall-
back positions appeared in the press before they could
ever be put to the Russians, but the whole issue of
compliance has been Clouded by a considerable amount
of misinformation which has appeared in journals -
such as Aviation Week and the newspapers on what
the Soviets have or have not done."
589The Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence
told staff they had not received SALT hold items.
Interview by E. Sheketoff with Director of Naval
Intelligence, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for In-
telligence of the Air Force, Dec. 15 & 16, 1975. On
the other hand, one "hold" item was given to at
least 75 people in CIA alone. Testimony by William
Hyland and Edward Proctor, Dec. 17, 1975. DIA
informed the Committee that it kept no records on
"hold" dissemination and, consequently could not
determine just who was authorized to see these sensi-
tive items. Letter to the Committee, Dec. 16, 1975,
from office of Thomas Latimer, Department of De-
fense; testimony by Edward Proctor, Dec. 17, 1975.
Key U.S. officials, like Sidney Graybeal and U.
Alexis Johnson of the SALT compliance team, were
kept away from some data. Deputy CIA Director
Proctor noted: "After talking with General Walters
around noon yesterday I called Ray Cline to tell him
about the status outlined above. Cline was of course
disappointed. He said that he had talked to Rush
about the situation. Although Rush recalled being
briefed by Duckett on [deleted] shortly after they
were discovered, his recollection was very vague.
Rush had not realized that Secretary Rogers had not
been briefed. Ray reported that Rush was very con-
cerned that Alex Johnson and Sid Graybeal had not
been told. Rush is to talk to Rogers and urge that
Rogers talk to Kissinger to get permission to tell
Johnson and Graybeal." Edward Proctor, Note for
the Record, July 13, 1973.
599. .. Col. Merritt of the NSC staff told the CIA of-
ficial that "Dr. Kissinger wanted to avoid any written
judgments to the effect that the Soviets have violated
any of the SALT agreements. If the Director believes
the Soviets may be in violation, this should be the
subject of a memorandum from him to Dr. Kissinger.
The ju'ditnerii 'tfi;tv; cvliOlViOn 'is 'Considered i6
occurred is one that will be made at the NSC level."
. In one case, the head of the U.S. SALT team
in Geneva, U. Alexis Johnston, was not told of a secret
understanding made a year earlier on an agreed in-
terpretation of the treaty. Johnson first learned of
this from his Soviet counterparts. His cable to Wash-
ington is as follows:
"To: The White House for General Scowcroft Only
"From: U. Alexis Johnson SALT Geneva
"I. You will note that statement by Ustinov at yester-
day's SCC meeting contained reftel [sic?editor's
note] refers- to 'the agreed interpretive statements of
May 26 and July 29, 1972, . . .' We have no record
here, and no one in the delegation has any recollection
of latter statement. Presume it was a result of Henry's
exchanges with Dobrynin following Moscow summit.
Would appreciate text or summary of contents, so that
we will be in position to handle when Soviets again
raise matter in present negotiations on destruction,
dismantling and replacement procedures. Presumably
Phil Odeen or Bill Hyland are familiar with subject.
Warm regards, Johnson." June 7, 1973.
Admiral Zumwalt testified to the same effect.
Comm. Hearings . . . Dec. 2, 1975.
592Dr. Kissinger: "Whatever compliance issues ex-
isted at the time were brought to the attention of the
Verification Panel." Kissinger press conference, Wash.,
D.C., Dec. 9, 1975.
From documentary evidence: The Verification Pan-
el consists of the Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs, Deputy Secretary of State,
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of ACDA,
and the Director of Central Intelligence. Intelligence
on SALT compliance with is put on hold routinely
goes to only the Secretary of Defense, Director of
DIA, and Kissinger.
Dr. Kissinger: "All the decisions of the Verification
Panel with respect to compliance have been unani-
mous."
From documentary evidence: One member wrote
a memo on Jan. 14, 1975: "Upon further considera-
tion following the recent Verification Panel meeting
on SALT which addressed compliance issues, I am
concerned about the decision not to raise the issue of
Air Defense Testing . . . This testing could have ma-
jor strategic implications and its impact, in my opin-
ion, was not sufficiently assessed at this recent session
of the Verification Panel."
The Panel also does not vote or make formal de-
cisions.
Dr. Kissinger: "There is nobody who has claimed
that the issue of compliance was not being adequately
pursued. There is nobody who has objected to the
handling of the information."
Documentary evidence: Proctor memo of 13 July,
1973 . . . Colby letter to Richard Kennedy, Nov. 14,
1974 . .
Dr. Kissinger: "All intelligence concerning alleged
noncompliance was immediately distributed to all
the members of the Verification Panel . . ."
* * *
Dr. Kissinger: "The longest time an item was on
'hold' was two months."
From documentary evidence: Some items were on
"hold": 19 June 1973-8 Aug. 1973; 28 June 1974-17
Dec. 1974; 26 July 1974-17 Dec. 1974; 11 Sept. 1974-
17 Dec. 1974; 23 Sept. 1974-17 Dec. 1974.
Dr. Kissinger: "No Soviet interference actions have
interfered with our national means of detection."
From documentary evidence: Some important con-
cealment activities, as well as Soviets interfering with
national means of verification.
5930n January 13, 1973 Dr. Edward Proctor, Dep-
uty Director of the CIA for Intelligence and a member
of the SALT Steering Group, informed Acting Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence Walters that VII is now 24
days since we reported to Dr. Kissinger on the detec-
tion of several" alleged Soviet SALT violations. Proc-
tor noted that the "hold" items had been restricted
for so long as to raise suspicions "that important in-
formation is being withheld" from the many people
in the intelligence community who had related respon-
sibilities. Proctor advised that "there is little likeli-
hood that it [the hold item] will be lifted soon," and
that Mr. Odeen of Dr. Kissinger's staff "would like to
see a draft of the Monitoring Report with the item
in it to recommend to Kissinger whether the Report
should be published and whether it should have the
item in it." Note for the Record, July 13, 1973, Edward
W. Proctor.
594Proctor wrote on July 13 that "Earlier this morn-
ing, I had discussed with General Walters and Mr.
Colby the DCI's obligation?a la Watergate?to make
sure that the President knew of the withholding of
intelligence, was aware of the consequences of pro-
longed delay in informing others in the Executive and
Legislative Branches, and nonetheless had approved
the continuation of the restrictions." Ibid. The Presi-
dent was never personally approached.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420001-1