INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP02T06251R000900270001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 22, 1946
• Content Type: MEMO

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Walter Pforzheimer
Herewith, the paper I sent to
DCI in August 1946 on the intelligence
aspects of the Joint Congressional
Committee Report on Pearl Harbor.
Forty five years later, it still seems
to stand up. I have always considered
this Cong. Report one of their better
ones. I think this is the first docu-
ment we could find that I signed in my
legislative capacity. I wonder whether
it might be of any interest to Studies
in Intelligence, given the fact that
we are in the 50th anniversary of that
event. By the way, future DCI R. H.
Hillenkoetter was the Exec of the West
Virginia at PH, and, I think, was the
ranking wounded surviving officer of
that battleship on that date.
.~~ e'~.r X.R. G.~s-rZ
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~~ ~wj/
~~ i
22 Attgttst 19~
Bab~eoit Iat~13,iQaero-a at Pearl Harbaar
1. Pronraaant ~ 9easts Caeswrseat B~eielntioa ~. 27, Se~r+rn'~oia~:
Congress, (Septaaiet =9b5a, a Joint Congresaional Coa~ittM aae fie IavestiBar
t3on of the Pearl Hader Atta~clr was established to inaati~ita tbs attaotc~
and events and ciramaata~cea relati~ag thereto.
2. In Ju1J 19~b. the Coawiittea Report Brae pt:bliaihed, together
with the additional vsana~ of one t~resawan and the liiuosit~ impart of twa
~eriatora.
3. A a~ of the Cc~ittee Report has been lade by the nr~der-
aignsd Eton the Yiaapoint of ascertaining the role, achie~weats, and a~rt-
oaain~s of intall.ia~raoe is camectiaa with the attack cn Pearl Ftarbor. ThL
intelligw~e ?ta~ le attached here~rith. Ifo attewpt has bey a-ade to amine
the Cowaittee lwpoz't !!~ a adlitas~- or diploaatic afaaxlpoint. Rath~rra
thL pa~paar is raatslvt~d aole],tr to the prob],eas of iatakt.li.~Oe.
~., Ted esavralee~ee, this atae~jr of the Oo~aittee has beam
divided i.tito tbar tabs ar lblloars:
TA8 t - Cellection
1~ H -- itesearch cad Bvalnatien
TAB C - Dissesiaation
?AB D -- Deticienciea, Conclusions and Seooa~+sndat~iona of
the Coatnittee
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rj. Tt~s following aa~ aagng the a-sor oonaluaians and reoo>NaendaV-
bans reached by the C~oaaittee s
a. Intelligam~e:e work regairss csntralisation of authority
acid aLar-~sut allocation of ~spat-dbilities.
b. The arwed ser~iaes ationld:
(1) SeLot ottieers for intelligence work w'ho poaaees
the baal~d and aaOaait~ for sash wgrk;
(Z) Main these otliaers on intelligen?e ditty fer an
c.
ezteaded period at fiat;
(3) Snsnra that officers with au aptitude for intslli-
gaaice receive such aaaiHnaents and d+o ~t have their
progress impeded or their proaotions affected.
The restriction of highly classified inforecation to a
sinieowa member of officials, while ottect neaesaarrs slir-uld net be carried to
the point of pre~udi.cing the work of an organisation.
d. There a3tonld be ooa~lete intsgntion of !-ra~r and Hammy
intellige:tce ageascies.
e. Congress should o~nsid+er legislation ttill~r PrQteattog the
aeauri.t~jr of clarsitied Batter and amsndiag the ~oaamaicatioas fat of lg3h
insofar v it hawdiaaps oor intelligeaQS agaaairts with regard to wine tag~iag.
6. Nothing in the a~dditionsi aiams et Oong~esa~aan Esete or tky
itinerrit,~r Report of Senators Brearster and lergttson Materially chaonges the
Ya~erity Report insofsr a~s intollig~ae is ooncereald. 111 dates, unless other-
wise indicated, are in the year 19h1.
TiLTER L. P1r0RZHSZMSS
Chiefs Legislative Liaison Braaah
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~US.Li:CTt?~T
1 conaiderrble asount of inf?rmation regarding Japanese pl.aus~
intstntio~ss, and eaapabilitias wrs aollsated by tha ailitary and naval in-
telliganoe services, both in ~'ashingta~n arxi in the field, prior to Pearl
Harbor.
~s gi~eatsst: soes~co of iatelligea~cs inf'oraatda-a c J~_
sae pla~ese interca~pts era ~ b~
the Dods vans Y, Via, and were p~'ovided by a Point opsrat3ou of the i~pr
and ltavy. This operation was oharacteri$ed b? tMe C+ongr~sasisnat Coa^aittos
as "aeerting the highest oass~andation" becanss of the "eacercies of the
greatest i~ngsnuity and utnoat reaonrcefulneaa* by the aerric+es.
1b protect the ssovrit~r of c, it xas necessary is poste a
poligr of sztreaely liaited distribution of the arterial. Ttins it was
possible to avoid alerting the Japanese to the tact that tlirrir diplaaatiE
codes had bran broken. Had the Japanese been aware of thin tact, the
~auld hsvi ~nged thair modes, resu3tSag obviously in ate leas of
lia. c matu tb! ne. cods: oooLa b. b~akn.
Zho grsatsst volts.e o1' ~f c traftia, was of priarry iatsrsst tv
tbo 3tsts Dapa~taoat, bring diP3+onatic in nature, although Nrtsin els^snta
of t~ intoraataoa were of interest to the Armed Services. ~T st the
asssa?ss ooncernad the espiansgf activities at Japanese oor~aatlar atattls,
particul.ar~j- i''o6~8 th. looatioa sad sovsmenta of ~ae~rioan ships and the
status of a'331tary installatiass.
Detailed analysis of the intelligence secured through ~
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not rdquired by this ps~r. Sowe~rsx', it is intertating to teote that the
interesdptions included such assaagss {now arch publi.aised) as the
"erinds? Dods, the "berthing" plan of Pearl )!arbor, the "hidden wt~rd" Dods,
the "deadline" sessages, and the 1lNpart sessagro of 6-7 ~'. In
addition, as pointed out is the section of this pq~er on R1M.ssesSaatian"?
aessa~s ware interospted which showed the elestraat3.on ty tiss Japs~ese of
t)siir secret codes and ?ontidential papers,
Vital Snibruation was obtained bP the t'los~andsa' of the Pacific
Tleet troy the dai],y svaaries pr~yasrd tp- the Radio IntelligRnoe wit at
Hosl.i !which, through traffic analyses, identified, locat+ed~ and ds'tsr~ined
the aovsaents of JapsnNe warships b! their call signals wd by radio
dis~e?tion-finding techniques. A d~r1].ar unit wss inclv~d~ed within the tiara!
Coaasnd in the Philippines. the reports of the latter unit were eoaaaidered
the sore reliable, ind sll Pacific raebo in-talligeaa' reports were sub-
aittad to the Philippine~~IIait for e*a3~nation. Cflpies of these eralnations
wraps available to lCi~oel, as were fortalght3,T intelligsnaa bulletins treys
thNe sout~ea bty GI~I.
C1Aae liaison was aaintained in Haal.i bstwsea the se:~vicas and
the FBI. 1'hs latter proiri.ded exynaidss~ble inforaatioa of sigt~#.t~,sa~te:s,
iaaleding (on Dsorober b) the so-wtllsd 'Mori Call", wteiati was a ta-snscript
o! an interosptsd radio taleiphone ?vnrersati,on bbtwae~- a asabsr of the l~iea'i
tasdlf is Honolulu sad an indi~rS.dual in Japan. '>hs traiua~ri@t indiQat~ed
that the letter wu interested in such ailitary inforaat~ as daily
flights o!' aeroplanes, searchlights, end ship locations in Peeaarl Harbor.
Irs addition to the seuresss of collection listed abome, there was
the intoraation to be obtained from the aircraft warning radar, whi.d~
detected incomi.ag Japanaee planes on Deceanber 7~ while thrg* were still
130 wiles troy Oahu. { ~e failure to talcs advantage eyf this is now history. )
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Sn addit3Aa, Tashis;ton r+eaoame~ed ~~ and photographic
reconnaisaanns of tAe Jap~neao aandated islands, including ts+oop ooaaoatra-
tions in the Catolipes sad YarakaalL. This recoasws~datioa for collection
w,u not a~loited.
'~ Co~saittea a'Uo ata~disd Jaffe oolleati~ou of intelligsna~s,
baaiag its reaultSng aonalnsions largslT on Postr-~VJ Dqf r~~ of fatsrro-
gatLena of ktto~il.adgs~ J ~e ti~llaiiag sw,y bs ls.atsd o ss+~
the ssd~ aov~ers of JapanMe iatelligsn?e=
(l~ 3
(2) Ceosnla:' atatfi-j toa
(3) lfa~al. attaa~s of the Japanese P.~baaaT ~ ~ f
(~, hers in the United states=
(~ ~aetiaan public radio ba~adeastaf
(6 ~ s~ passendera oa ships which derc~OSd- in gassaf.i;
(Z asyeral i~maationj
(8 aoret.gn ddplre~atl.a ~tablishwenta;
(9 ~ Coaer~rS,al rimes;
(l0y signal. iatelligenae3
(u) Subaarine reoonnaiaaanae in Aawaiian wages.
ssr1T s+eQarts, by aeen~.tteem and boards isevestigating Pearl Sarbor
prior to the C.ang~assional ~ittee, had supported the belief that one of
the de'ta~ining ta~atars in the Japanese attack on Pearl Sarbor was that the
Japanese had the be~tit of unusually s~zperior inEe13.1g~-e=e? ~l1 ear7J-'
re;wrta ineiioated the pr?bahi11t~7 of eztecuivs J~aseaa ~na8s a~ivit7'
in Haaati. 'au Oaaaal Cosgsittee, honrs~s maalnd~d be7ond a
rsasoaabl~e cio~abt that supeeriaa' Japanese intitlli~OS "had nerth'Lag whata'~e
~ do" with the a on to attacl~c Pearl ~iartwr, and t~`t~+d'is'i"r
Jam a 3a Han~aii nas not rtotabl3r etteaiirs to ia~g flea
infoe'satiron ~ ~ sappo~rt the attack plans. Uh~.33s intsart+i:6atioau
in Japan indieat-e that one of the factors in the daoiaidoa to attack Pearl
f3arbor over the week-end was tlaae kno~d.edge that the Flreet os~dinas~Y case
into the harbor oa Pri,day sad remained over the w~eek~nd, further
3-
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iatsrrogat3oas cad investigatioas iat Jspaa rerraal that, eamept tar the
oansul in H~olulu and his sta!'ts ~P~~$e ~~ P~~ no for role is
the plans tc~r attack. It area therefore Salt by the Coami.ttee that the rr-le
of espiona-g~ is oonneation witb the Pearl Harbor attack has bean magnified
out o: pa+opo:~koa to its si~c-itioauieae.
,s aooted prsvieras2,~, m~ o! fie Js~ose traffic iatesoepted by
is ns dipl.o~cat3:a 3n :;+-tu~, but aa~ of the interoept~ed astaagos
ooae~r-ed eapioaa?e aertiait.i.ea by Japsaeq aaeuular staffs, particnlar7,T as
to the location cad aowmeat of Amotiaaa ships cad the natmre of azilitary
cad detenaive inatallati,aas. Ho~ceveri Japanese interrogated since FJ-3~r
have placed little iagwrtaAOe oa intelligenc:e obtained from the consulates.
For exawple, the Japanese did not ir~alnde the so-called *bertbing plan" of
Pearl Harbor (sea "Sesearch and rlraluation" seatioa of this report) i.n
listing infoneati,on used bF the sttsckiAg torte at Pearl Harbor. This
plea had bean supplied by the oonnil.ate at Ho~wlulu.
Fram aescapapers and saSa3inea publiahsd is the united states, the
dspanese compiled material reptrdiag ~erica's xar preparation, progress
cad espass3An of military insta11at1rons, locations and caQabdlitiea of
al.ror+att snd naava-1 waits, militarl ?ts~sa at Hawaii, Panama, fibs
Pl~ilipQinea, cad el s~swt+er+e.
Ia orataceot3Aa adth items of Qeiceral information, lttiiira? 1[ilkinson,
former Chief of OgZ, testified that "the Japaeceana for many years had the
rspatat3oa of being aetiowloas see~crra far swry~ scup at infor~aation...."
In Chia a~ar~ectl.a~ the ldmi.ral pointed out that the Japanese awre also
making iaveatigationa of naval iaatallatieona at Seattle, c3remertoa, Lc-izg
Bsaoh, San Diego, Paaaaa, cad Yauila, as well. as evincing an unusual
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istsrest in ttie prewenae of our Pacific Fleet and its detailed location scith-
i.n Pearl Aa~rbor.
general. infora-ation, in addition, inclndsd detailed bits et
intelligaoae regarding the habits, strength, aced see:urit~ of the Float is
Baran, s~i,ah the Iatelli~ee dec'tion of the Japa:are lfa~ral Q~en~-ra1 Staff
had bwsa assesing lb~r mow.
Ot great interest iw t2~e tact that t13s dapaos~s placed little
credanes m raQerts l~noe oc>cseraial ris~ss is toss a+o~mtrsea. etas
Japanese rsgasded thews sports as not isq~ortant eaou~ tuba the atardpoiat
of iatelligen?s to bay a "spa aial wrS.te-up, and snare ooaaidered as their
enm serifs."
Ths 3apsiess ~~d signal intelligsnee t4 deduce (tram signals
try Nserioau ship) the avmber of whips and sraa7.l craft of the Paciric
Fleet a~arsd in Pearl harbor or ont on training. The fleet training areas
were a-lao determined par~tialll- in thin aa~-n~-r.
Carosader Ono, staff ooaessnieatioas ott'S.oer of the Japanese
striking force, kept close watch on Aaafisa broadcasts as the task force
sppre~hed Pearl B~bor. It was felt that it could bs d~etermiaed from these
b shether tb. forces on Oahu bad asT inklir+g of the isperidiag attack.
3ina~ stat3aas Bi~1T wad ]i?lB were broadcasting nossrallya ~drdral lKagv^p felt
tLat Pisan loso~as s~se~e still oblirl~ons of destilapwsats. !br adv+ea~a3.
da~rs pries' t+a the attack, the dap force had beta intattosQfiing ass~ga~t troa
a~tr patrol pls-es. Zbey had rat bm k~ the oodey bat by wsssdt o; radio
direction tiader~t their had beean able- Lo plot is the plans psaitioas, knew
the msiber o! pattnl plao~es in the air at all tries ani that patrols wwre en-
tirelF in the aonths~estern sector oft 0 shu.
l!'t~er witting the infozatation availahl. on dapaAese collection of
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intelligence aaterial prier ~ Pearl harbor, the Coaasd.ttee aonQlnded that
there wes~++e certain w ~ dapaneae intelligencte. This atate~t
is aupported by the fact that the Japa~se eatiaatea as to onr air atrength
in H~ax+aii, atrde late in the call or 191-1, xsre thorn erroneous and
the wargit~ of error wan such M to mice it iagosaible to m~edtt that is3.th
superior i.gtelligeau:e. ?be ~ttre also felt tbat the dapaneas did not
bare aerate iatelligeaoe ~ to omr real naval ~aknses ixi tbs Paaf.t'im,
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RS"BBA$C1H ~ S1i1-LUA43AN
~s Gbngressianal Coaeaittes inr+sstiaatl.ng t2~s Pearl ~bor attack
reaolleed the "indisputable" am s~olusi~oa that "tbie at ta-o1c on Purl Harbor
sasparised !~ deteoding ?sti0- sad ~T establisbiesnta."
t~osorsl Marahasl taistitied that the tall~sat p~rot~?e:tioa for the
lssstia Fleet was the aa~or ~sideraticn of ti$a l~nq-. The sea~andaa7
doasids~raLicn was the protee'fiea~ of !bs Hassiian Zslanis. the ~estion
thin arises as to whether Lateilissaae p~r`to=sue! its soL in this uiuion.
ate ~a~ittse felt tbat tta adlitar~ amd aaia]. aaausbs in Hauii
w~ers "pa~o-per],t- ohsgss~ale with possessing high]~r sigaeitiaant intoraation
sad intslli~ in the dprs betor+e Pearl Harbor..." It also felt that
thts wis tree in Aashingtoc~, w3~ere arch intoraation, partianlarly~ lea,
was a~+d3,able to the heads of the intslligaaoe seatians of both of the
se~ioss, as wbll ss to the State D~art>tent. lhsra also appeared to be
the closest oooparatioa at t~ 9earetarlal l.earel bstewa 9ieEtretaries Hull,
S'lta~, and gnoac.
IL is the purpose of this ssati~on of this report to cote brietlF
tip aayor itabes of intoraration aTailab~e tr intelli$seree ostl.oigra of the
~taq and lfa~ !br rwMareh cad e~tlaal.Loa prior to Pearl Barber, aeed the
e-sttaat~as rwsulting tbsiats~aa.
l lstt~er tk+oa tdairal iCisal to the Crbiet of ia~al f)perations,
dated l8 l~ab~rusc~r 19111, stated t
"I feel that a surprise attack ~snbwarine, air, or
ooabined) on Fesrl Harbor is a possibilita-, sad we are taking
iswediate paractiaal steps to ~daiad,se the dssa~pe int].icted
sad to enevre that the attsa~cing force will papr."
In Yarah 1941, Qenearal Martin, wsesanding the Saaraiian Air Force,
and ldadtal Hel,linger, examaad3,ng the lfaval Baas Dster~ae tf.r poroe, pre-
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pared a point estimate forbsseing gmssible snddan hostile action in the
Haaaiisn araa. 1~is estiute included as possibilities,, as air attack ~
the fleet, the arrival of Japanese snt~sarinas or a fast raiding force, ul.th
mi prior xarning to tt~e dete~sders lYrow Aaerican 3sstelligence serria~es. ~~s
it is evidss~t that a psadble eutpriae air attack on Pearl Ssrbaut' nss is
the winds of its d~steddrrs at en eerlf date.
Tbss+e ass, et coarse, available for researeh wad eva~u+a a
sass of sstterial ebteiaed ~ ~3a. Aa set forth in the aeatioa at this pspar
oa Ditse^dnation, the 'Itar ~pa~-t~nt did not d3sseiainate aaterial is
its ooh in gaaRii. The A,t~q did not teal its osdes to be sattieSentl,T
aeQa~e for this pro~rpeae, though certain elesseits of intbraation were et each
a nature as to be of value to the bald cosssnders, and though troy tune to
ties the jtavY did tos~rard this saterial to the Pacific sleet i~- the tdx~a of
eatisates or paraphrases. 11hile the Gamnittee talc that the de+si.sion wet to
~'p~ tieLd car.ar~ders with all of the ~ was a reesoaabl.e Duds,, the feel-
ing ias also ~~ that th3.s aaterial, insofar L it wse prrfineat,
should ha~re reea~had the field acwsa~3ers is the tbra of ?peratS~onsl eatinates.
Tl~e tinwatttee felt tint the Japanese asssage of govdss>t-et 35
ttranalated Deeeie~r 3}, retr~'ing to aritioal rel:tirsmr beta the Qsdted
States wad Japasy asd re~ssting that the "ahipe Sn h~bor^ b~rrth3mi rrpaart
Le made ir~lsrlT, but at least twice a week, and direetSag that soctana
Qare be ta- ssdatafn its eearecy, should hale ratssd tAe gasstion es to
tether er sot this was hi~],T Sag~ortant iatelligeaee tO the Ps~Ma ~'~
iblle the CansRittee dse~s that the so-c~clled "berthing plan" :t Pearl Harbor
and related dispatches could not be concluded to be a bosh plot, it felt that mace
a part3.cul.ar interest in the Pacific Fleet base naa indicated, this intelli-
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gsnQe atwuld hate bes:z appreciated and diss~iaated to the cc~amaaeditag
ottioerrs is l~araii t~gsther tdtb other atoailab3.e iatelli~ce to assist
rhea in asking ~ estSaate of ttie sitautioa. It is i,atereating to siote that
no high ranlciag otPS.aa~rs is taerliingt~ea atts+ched the ei.psit3.aaace to this
iaiol,li~ao trhiah hitilsighs nary sakes apparrat that it arist h4'Ye posassssct.
Oae of the eaforiunate +QiraasstaesoM is ezooneati~a-a with ~,ia ~
the teat that setneera~l sigiiitiaaat .esha~es ?~. not traasiat,d pater to tLs
attack. orie~~ot these aoatainod tae tbs first tsars sa iagair~- tra '~
r.gardiag aertiaia detserees of the 1-xe~et iii Pearl Farber. ~e 13sdtations of
p~oi7nel. sad tacilits.ss both in lt~rhiaatoa and the fisld~ iaQltading the
probleei of taansaissi,oa to lfashiagtea, waus noted in the c~airse of the
test~i,aony.
7~e GoaQittss held that -
Rfh~e olticera is the iatslli~taoe dirisiaaa of ttie War
aFnd Aavy Depa~rtaoeats had ap~tiaal`st~ responsibility with
respect to the ~~jgia iate73igtia~e.....It tree the duty of
these ?tticers evaluate acrd dissaaiaate the i ~1a in the
tare of estiaatea...~is respc~asibilitay tl,eey taVQ eC~to dia-
char?o Leith t3iat high degree et shill aasd isagiaation t~iirrh
this iatell~.geaae trarraeited.
l~rs t~estsaogT et Secretary stsa.oa bafr+e eat this v3.Mr.
3~nforantsoa teas atrailable tbsv-tig~i ~ s~egarding Japraase instaeaa#~-
SYans to its oonsalatas to destroy codes, eiphaars,~ sad asat'ideatia-1 cbcaaeutr.
(Soo seatiosi of this rrport en Diiseariaatsai.) The oarer~elaing t~etgbt e#
tLs testiaoeiy }~- ~ttq sad ltat-~r experts is ta- flee eftiat that the flestauet~iss
a! ooclss sad oont`idential docsvssats nta'l~rar the airaaestaacwe p retai.liag is
Dsaeabat l9lil avant tar. Zhe Coesittee tack the position that ~aah3ngtaa
adsgnately discharged its resp~sibilil~r is traaaaitting this inforaatioa to
Hawaii. lt+e Coaaittee poiat-s out that
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"wit,~s the failure, h~arreY+sr, of 1,dvis'al Eiarwel t4 read
into this intelligence whet it is agreed sh~-uld have bees
ae7.!-eyidarit tc- hia~ it is believed that is tip lhtnra tl~
it~tslligaoas as well as the dspartarntal aa~raiaal_aad ~;,,~~:~~-~~.~.
estimate thereof ahonld be anpp ti oo~nenders."
Oa 6 Dseerb~a', the 1rBI delirsred to ls~q and Havy intelligeaEe
otlYoers at Hassii a ta~ssoript of an intercepted radio telephone wav+rrss-
tioa be'6wee~- a par'soei naasd ]Lanni in tioesolnln ar~d as itxxdividnal. in Jspen.
~s tcansaript indicated that the latter was interasted is daily tli~ts o!
~~ s Pa~~~T ~'t~ Ply tro? Haaolulu~ ~ei+s the lieas~h3.ig~tls
wens being used, and the nmaber of snips present at Pearl Harbor. ReteTenoe
was made in the vQnveraatian to ins tlasnsrs, which was presumed to be a
code. The llavir deterained that this intonation ahonld be atmdied t"artbar
bp- dapeusese linEtiists. viral 1Ci~s-el was nat intos~esd and did not see the
tsansaript affil ai"tsr the attack. The evening at 6 Dreaaibsr it was brought
to the atteac+t3oa of Qreaeral Short sad his tL-~2 ~tl- azs assistactt d-~, tim
irsdicsted that a special agent of the 1~HZ was alarsed ~ what he oonsider+ed
the ailitarlr inplicatioas of tha canversati?a in respect to Pearl Harbor,
Hath t3eneral Short aryl his 4-2 indicated that the assistant was perhaps
"too intelligeat:s oansaions* and that the sesaags was asthis~ about which
to become s~caited. ibis Coanittse felt flat the Bari aall pointed dlt~se'tlyr
at Hsenai.i.
3hs i+orteii.ght~ intelligbaae aea~natyr dated 1'fee~bsr 1, 191x1,
rso~eitnad bin Eiaarsl fram OwI, stated that it belie+~ed the ~' Jap~ss
capital ship strss;th was in bash waters, together with the g~reates! pa-rtLoa
of the .Tapagsss earrieare. Oa Decpber is Kisaial+s dsi]lr san~ary i~l3.e~ated
that the Jspaaeae serrice radio call signs had changed at wi.daight, ass
month alter the previous c3saage, whereas the former Japanese practice had
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beemn to change their call sins scary siz aa+nths. On 2 Dsceaber, a asias-
ra~ troa the Flset Iatsllig+anes Cittieer oa the disposition of the Japanese,
natal taros, together with a aontst'satsos~ bstw~ssa Kiw~ssl end this Ofiicsr,
stressed the paint that tLsra tray iw reliable into~naatian an Japanese esa:rlsr
divisions 1 and 2, aonadst3ug o! tour oarrirrs. lio iAtarwatlon on aarryers
tags atatiilabls ca h Dea~bss'. ldid.ral iiaaal rsearftec# this iatslligetyaea bat
aeeepted tt~e Mti~aate that the~- wore probsbl,T is boa-e tate~rs. the t7o^edtZM
tbtiad that,
"rscognisiag all of the tsgaria? of radio i~atellige~oe
analJsis, haeatar, ft wv still not is kespiag with his
rssaoasibiliq- as Oaas;Adsr in Chief at the Fleet t?r
A+dudral. 1Ciamel to 1gi~ers the sinister iaplicatioas of the
infaatation sapglisd through t2se Radio Iate2ligence Duit
after he had bean warned of tar. In asngr respects t3se
piatrsra Presented by radio intel.ligs4os tras aaeutg the asset
significant inforiaation rsLt3ng to when and, tc~ a degree,
rd~e~re the Japanese tpuld possibly at ack."
in adciitSon to this araterial, operational intelligence was atail-
able on the ~* of the attack itsast. This iacluded the reports of sigtrting
cad subsequent attack on a Japanese subrurine in aloa~e proacisitT to Pearl
Harbor, sad radar deteat~ion of the Japmsse rs3ding tv~rce Direr 130 a31ss
l~roat Oahe on the assntag st Deoeabeor 7th.
?Dsspits !~ lbre~-inei the sst3aats was lade and
persisted is that Heawil ways sate trat an a-fr attack, al
tboag~ the ray ass?pti~ons a~ada by tbt Lra~r aid fla~ry
OoaaNandsrs are iapliait adth th+e aoate~lati~ of as attack
tree witbant. Geosral Hlaert assuadd tbs Havy was caodaatimg
distant recamaisasnas. ~d~ral tiwas~l assmrsd, on the
. other hand, that tbs driq wnnld alert its sireraft wsraiaa
service, antiair~ar+att was, cad fightea~ pl.saes."
F"roa< the aban-s, it is apQsrsat that there was at least aoa~e
aogmisanoe in lfashiaagton and ~iaaraii of the possibility of a ra9~d on Pearl
Harbor. lfuch of the aaterial available pointed to hostile action on the
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gart of the dapsiaeaei but ita the mass of iaformatioa syai3.sbl~e, ~' of fibs
witaes~ses ooeiteradsd, a very ssal.l gerae~tage pointed to 'earl Harbor as the
point of attack. Orantad that this point was so, azd that thew its~os of
Sntes~aattan ahicD ~-t hays parot~aaed an estiaate of attack oat Fearl Har2ear
Loon anah lavr~ar bT hindsight t~hsn t1~ did at ttt? Haar, tfrn Caawittae felt
that a8rdral ti~eael and Qeneral Shoort nets sapplied a ist3Mrisatiooe to
aa1o~ a correct estiaats o! the sitaai~aea. mat tbp tai]:ad is dt-. Zlaat
there aay bsme bsea othar inioz~eation wrhiah peald hsq l~eee- sn~rplied these,
tail~sd to aodityr ttre Coaaittee's conaltaaion in this rsspeat.
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DZS~S~Q1fA?I0~
the p~,od preeedind Pearl Harbor, there appears to hs~re
been a failure of proper diasMdnation o! intelli~snae. ?his failure is
disaeaainat3on lq not sill bets the ~ashingtron headquarters of the .-s~y
sad ~~ and their field ooans~nds, bat also bed the services thsnel~nrt
in Hawaii.
id~dral Yi~ael's c~aoern in connection with internal Yaral dLstsi-
buti,on of secret asterial was set forth in a letter to Aural Stax'ks ~t
of liavsl Operations, 3n Febr~- 14111, in rich he etateds
*I do not know that we have mi.ased ~ but it
there 3.s an7 d~rubt as to whose responaibi]~ianFt~ L"'s betae~aen
OlQ and ra , it ia- to keep the Cos~der in Quiet
~~r int~~ pertinent reports on subjects that atwuld
be of interest to the Fleel, will ~rou kindljr tiz that
responsibility so that there will ba ~ s~lauDdsratan~BYa
In response, 1f~s3.ra1 Stark advised that OHI was Cully aaa~re et its
responsibilities to keep the Cosra~der in Chief of the Pac~fia Fleet adec;uate-
ly infora-ed cu sorters coaaernind tnreign nations and their activities.
In addition, is Aparil 19111, fnrtarvutio~ts were ~i.ven varioas naval oDsaslres's
~ is;alude the ~der~ta- t~iet of the Pacific 1rleet as as intoaat3aa ad-
dresses for all pertinent dispat~s, and to tarnish one Dopy of all
intelligence reports directs tie hi~a.
1l~e ?rny did not for~wrd the sabsta~nce of aa4 intereaepted dapanss~a
dispatahea to field ooms~des's because of its tealing that the Aangr cedes ware
geaierallT ~t as secure as those of the Savy. As evidessce of ti4is, Qsneral
3ti.les, ttar Departsant 13-2 at the t3a~r et Pearl Harbor, teatitied that he
was under the fapresaion that the Have would prosPtl,7 dissestinate such
intelligence to General 9hcrt~a headquarters.
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1 notable tailors existed in the dissaoeinativa of intelligenea
'bstwen the Ar~gr and Davy caeownds in Hs~ti. For exaa~al.e, the ArgT radar'
unit, ^tLioh first picked oP the ineneaiag Japanese places, plotted then back
out to the nortt- tollowing the attack. Zet this iataarstation, which aauld
barns arcls an ettsativ+s search tar the task force par~tibie, was awt ewplo~red
b7 ~itbsr asrvice. 4dsiral ~fssal stand b~ did art seaei~e fine intossation
for t~ iiRya-.
1 ~'t showing the positi~t of the dapataess t:arrierrs wan taJaeai
t~r+aa a dags~ess p3.ane by the A~qr ca ? Dsea~ber. It was mt abown to the
ltavy until the afternoon.
Ad~d.ral Ks~el stated that he did not supply aen~aral Short with
intatwatl.on he had received hoe t~ashington oancs~i~tg Japanese orders to
dostrvy codes, ciphers and confidential docents, adding thaty "I did hart
consider tt~t of any ri.tal fa~ortanae when I rettsived it...." General
Short, on this other haasd, ooag~la~.ning that he was na t provided with this
intalliaenoe ~ the Henry, indicated that it arcs the one thing t3iat mould
hater afteot~ed ste acre tt~ any other mattear.... *, and that it axe of these
diap+stahws otrncerning the destrn~Ss~a of th? osdts bad brae tarnished bin
by the liavt, be wmold bare gone 3nt~o a ears retinue alert. Zbe opinion of
rirt~oa27ar all witnesses holds that tbs oo~l~s busalna iat+e3.ligsncs w as t~brs
snot si~aii~.aaat inib~stion receivrd bs~en ~ bwesber arxi 6 Dsoewber
ra~ard3M the ire of wsr.
~s evidence belbre the Casaittee at~o~rs that alttaaugh lCiiel
reasived significant infosnatlan an four different ?cs~ssioaa between ~ end
6 Deceaber canaerning the destruction of codes sad coatidentiai dgcumenta
in da~panest diplcyaatic establishraats, and that although h? Imew that the
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llalry 13e~paarbaent had also order+r~. the destruction of its sodas is oar outlying
possessions, ha tailed to can~0- this intvrs~ati.~an tq t3aneral Wit. It is
the Casaitt~+e' a corialusion that lCiwmel' a tailure to supply Short with this
intelligenee was ~ines~sable."
Despite ]Ci>,ael's personal taileire (to 3sitstsE Short), Lba ta~etisosq'
reveals that oa shoat 3 Deoewbe~r (~eperal Short's assistaat F~ leased
troy laq saaraes that Japar-ese dipl+cwatia re~rgeata~~s iA ~a~,
In~oa, 6s ~g~ros ~: sad wlaeiwheee, were elesttwying tbetl.r
codes sad papers. Farther testisQay shows that the a~ssistaat G-g reeeiwed
siatl.ar intorsalie~m regarding Honolulu tray the 1p8I. Zlrere is alse eil.denoe
that this was ooaaaaicated to (1sn~.x'a7. Shwrt, alth?ugx- the YinoritT ~'t
Qonalders it an open qu~atisn and the e'ridenae rrot decisive.
In seking the finding set tcrth above, the Cosaittee points out
that the i~ataraat3.on ?n code destrnatiaa which Shen reaei~ed Ras not
supplied his d3.r~ectlr by the gar Department.
Stith lCiweel snd Shari have testifYed that tbq were wrangteil.],lr
deprived of iatellig+snce aYailable to ingtau through jiagia, wh3.ch would
bane coaQlete]y altered their estisate at ttie situation and wstsld bower
resulted Sn a proper alert and appsopriate di~osltltsc-s had thapr reeelTe~d it.
In parttenlat, tlMrre weans toar sessagea, ar grcx~is of sefsages, reedwd
thioug~ Yagia which sight hate been parti.e~7.arly sign3tieaaL io Bssgtii. The
ttioseittse is of the apission that this intslliganoe sheald haryi been saq~plied
tiaael acrd Smrt (together with ether ava3lahle i,af+orsat3.eet sat! isteSligesree)
to assist theca in sddag their estisate of the sitnatiaa.
8oweesr, the Cosd.ttes ltirtlwr finds that, bettr~estt thee, both
Ooa^raaders had considerable vital intelligesnoe indicat3.Ag a possible attack
on Hawaii. '~y- hsd, inter a1ia:
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1. Correspaade~aoa with Washingtsn and p].an$ revea7.3.ng the
possible dangers of air attack;
2. The vrarniag dispatches troa ~IashiagLonj
3. The Dade destruction intelligeaeaej
~. Radio intelligenwe ooiag the "],oat" daparwae carriers;
5, T}~ "fiwri" call. (See "BNea~+ sad g,Yaluation" section) j
6. The report of aightting and auDsegaas-t attack on a dapataase
,awe in close pro~cid~ to Pearl Harbor (aar3.r en
7 Decasbrr)3
7. Radar detection of the dapaaese Planes over 130 aiil.es f~
Oahe on the nwrning of Z Dece~ber.
Noting the errbneons assva~tSoass wbiab aasteac'a1 Short and ~ai:'al
Eisel lade regarding each other' a act3.vities is Hawaii, sad the eatiaatss
and actions v~ich they took based oa the i>~telligrsnce avzilable to them there,
the Coswittee belie vea it problesatical as to what steps gimmel and Short
untold have taken had thc~ received all of the intelligence ehich theyy contend
wss vrithheld troy thy. ~s a result of this, the Coaaaittee finds that
"the ultisate and dirr!at responsibility' for failure to engage the dapansae
oa the ~wraing of 7 Deeeabe~' with the vreaposs at their disposal rests
esisntisllf arnd P~PeriY ~~ the ~t~yr aoad Yav~ Ooaaasads Sn Sa~ntii...?
Hov~ev+sr, it is tbs Goa~tittee's additional conclusion t8at the
ottisees is the Iate3.lig~.oe and Rat Plans D3.vis~s et the star and sa-~
ti "had a pa-rtiaul,aa' rsapensibilit~ with respect to ttae pia
iatelllgaaee;" that it eras their dut~r t4 enlnate and disseminate ,~ in
the loans of estiaateao. This respoasibdllt~Ia the Coaatittse feels, these
ott'icers *tailed to discharge with that high degree of skill and ima8iaation
which this intellig~ce xarranted." The ~tt~ 1~arther stated:
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what the wsplete3y iasrfeative liaiavn betw~sen the
1st and tie Many in tiaanai.i at a tine ~e~u the t~lleat eac-
c~han~e et iatelligance ~raa absalataly' isperative, diatatei
that ailitary and naval intalli~aces particvlarly~ a~-st be
aoc~olidatsd."
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Iti ita final deatioai the Ca+aaittae d*votoa Sts attent,3.cin to
gsory~ Adainiatratir-s~ and f~~isatlanal D~efioia~iea is ottr ii111r
tart' aaod liarral Bstahliats ~realed ty- '!'ha Pearl ~atbar Ym-etrtigati4~.'"
In this ~St~ oe;~ the garst3Aa is peeMds "~-'f with coots of the ti:w'i
intslligsnos avaiLble in cM' hiatcry, tirith th~r aLoost etertaeia
that trir tiraue at ~ arith p2aes that a~at~aapLted tbs pereiM t,Tpa at ?t.
taoic that xas aeosogtsd by Za~an on the aaraing of DeoMher ? - 1R~j- eras it
joa~iblA ~'or a Pawl Aartiar to oooar4? She raaattons of the Coeaaitteeae 1.0
Chia latter c~ueatiaaz era of sstfiaiant inter+st to ararraat their bsin~
quoted berMth rrarbatia insofar as they rater to intellig+r~:
?~.. atioaatl awd Znt+a arork s asntx~lis>M-
tiara of a ~er-au oesat oa o
the o ar
the i)ireatvr of llaral Intelli~saoe#, the eanaluaiaae is iMSOrap-
able that the groper deatst~oati?~ of r+eaponsibilit~ bet~M~
ttaara taro diviaiaas arf the Barry DagartaEer-t did cot exieft.. Xar
Plana appears to h:~ee inaiated that ainoe it head the duty of
issniag oprratiosul ordrt !t swat asragats tht ptreragati~rs of
+nral~ta-ting iat~lli~eaas~ l[aral Ir~t"lligeaoo! a~n thee other haRai:
aMd+es Lo harm re eard~d the aattar of etaluatioa: as prarper3,r iRa
tlmr~atioa. It is clear that this inttradiepsrtareatal hia~ed~rl~Rad-
~t aa~;< agar oomfliaet ?aqr Mt reselwd lratore r ~ atoll ~-
7'~ 4~+tion it ~~ndiosd tbs ittsu~tirsagr aef ltaval Zntillt*r
~+~In 8aaaaiie tbeara sue amah a aarfcad failar+ is al3uo~or-trr rN-
spaosib3lit~ itd the Beaus of tbee Fe+rs#~ee~ 1a~s1 MsteieE t~t'4
t4^ciral El+NSh tea#.itiud bs did cat kMr ~eae; tM ooiaad~a~' io
absel+d lea]+d ruspomesiblt is t!N ?rrsaet a~f al~eetooaria~s std
rgpeet !o the a~tdditiaa cad readiarss of alabaraift. 2f:# poa~e-
tiaa- at ~ira1 D~ellinpr was a ~ho~l3y aeaa. 1!e ap-
pears to haw bMn rsspooa3.Dlde t@ a call to na oM. !~
pFratidis~g of ~erstraeetnrss eaf organis~-tioa aeewot bee oon~rr-
et11ti too elYiai~ acre! ?aQandreru the rras~r ll~teotSaa of our sili-
tart ar~d tilr-eel. arervioas.? (p. 2~1,t)
"2. rriao otticiaU aanaot cafe take toot
tell is e o
".....l~avp at fai have a3~ut~naa~adawtis]y f
tsatified that inatr uettiems to bare aoeisa Maw rrar is car uar a
laaguaaptt cad that in st~pl~ing Admiral ~CiaMl thiffi inforenatioA
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t :sy ~rere antitia~d to b~alisv~e tie would attach the pra;:~sr aig-
nificat~e to Lhia intelli~'anae. yet the coasaandsr in chief of
thu Pacific Asst Lfsstii'iesd ttidt hej did rwt interpret t}tgse
dispatahss to raa-,~n that Japan aoritsaplaLsd 3s~~ediatre sear on
the united ~tates.....The ample fact is that the dispatches
era not properly int~srprat~i. I3ad than Davy Llepartsssnt not
tabsn for granted that Kia~l wtntld be al?rtsd by t-h~ but in-
atead have ~ivssn hi~a the benefit of its ir~t$rprstationr there
Gould na~- ba no argnwesnt as tc~ arhat the state of alarLnaes
should i~ava been based on suah dispatches. i~ith Pearl tiarbar
as a aad expsrisnca~ crucial intalligenoe should in ti~a future
by ~plisd aaoaaanders aeac~,paniad 'ay the best ssti~tate of its
siaaificance." 4p. 2~1~-2~Sj
?3. stn drrabt as to vxheta~er out eta ~,ould bs van in-
for~aation should ~ s '~ resolved in soot o s the
inf oration.
~r:~I Mark h~esitat~ad about aoendit~; the ~ or~o o~ clocks
intolliE;enca to the Pacific outposts for t{~ rsasorY ~~iat iio
ra~;rsrdsd theta as adequately slsrtsd anti hs did not watat to
confuse thss~. As has been seen! he eras f ro}~rly sntltlad to
beiisw that navg3. sstablishm~ants ~rsra~ adequets7,y alerts but
the feat is that one - i;arraii -eras not in a 3tatfl of r~ a~acii-
Hess. This one excsptian is proof of te7a principle that aqy
question as to er~tct`:t:r i.nor~~Lion should bs supplf~sd tr'ts
.field should xiK~s lrs rsaolv~ad in favor of transaDi.tting it."
tP? z5:)
"~. The aoordin::tion and r r evaluation of intalli-
rorwoe in t mos 7 stress muart ~+ o
~ aentrali.zation o re i n a to
o ai
"'~$n ~o~tcasicsu w? tnassas have ?cho~c! tine aentinsnt that
the Pearl Harbor d~e-baale eras a~sds poasiblea not by the egra-
giaus errors or poor ~ud~nt of +~ individual or individugls
but rather by reason of the inpsrtecttion and dstialenaiss of
the eyataat eehereby hrsay and ~?avy intelli~e'ioe was coor:iinatad
and 'vaa~n~a-'fed. Onlg partial aredonaat howev+tr~ Gan be extend-
ed this oonclusian inaaasuah as to amount of aoordir~tian and
no aoystaa- could ba eyfsated to ca:apansats tar leak of alert~-
ness and iata~ina:ion. t3av~erthalsssa there is subutantial
basses fraw a reviser of the z'esrl lirbur investigation in its
entirety, to conclude that the system of handling intelLi~ercA
was seriously at feint Gnu that the security of the ti~tion can
bo inaeu~sd only ttzr~au~,h continuity of service anti aetttraliaar
Lion of responsibility in those ahar~ed with handlin` i~t~lli-
asncs. and the sees nt of an otfieer Navin- sn a titude
fret t~uah stork over an extend rind o. tisp sho not ia~-
ps s orUVreas nor eat hie praoiotians.
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"1'h~e prc;fasssi oral c'raracter of in'.~lli~-snce work does not ap-
pear to have be?n prot~erly apgrsci ated in Qith =r the :gar or Navy
departments. It seams to havo `,:x=an r2;ardeed a$ dust another tour
of duty as retlectead by liiaitatfons i~iposed on the pEariod of as-
signa~nt to such xork~ amont, ot:Yer things. The committee has r?-
aeiv~d the diatinat ispression t'~at ti~are xaD a tendency whether
realised or note to rel?gata intslli~enae to a role of secondary
importaace.
"As an integrated piaturej the pcr:xl harbor irvoati~;ations
graphiaally portray the izsperative neos8sityy in the Liar and Navy
Dapartm~nta~ (1) 'or aelaatian of n :'or int=lligence xork xho
possess the background! capacity, sand penchant for such 'pork;
(2) for :~.aintainiz~ them in tabs xor-c ovor su eatendsd ;.~ariod of
tir~,e in order that ttsey m~l- baaome steeped in the rauxi.i'ications
and refinements of t~eis field a:xi alloy this resasrvoir of loaarrl-
sdge in avalnating data receivadj and (3) for tine centralisation
of responsibility for handling intal:ligenCe to avoid a21 oS the
pitfalls of divided rssponsibility which expc~rienae ;gas made eo
abundantly apparent." (p. 25?--25~)
"10. 7~_?e is no substit~rte f~~r i.ma~nation and resovrceful-
riess on tha art oi' su erviso at~ci intslli-=enoe of Piaiala.
"As r$ eats '~~~ an ax.~n nation of tho situation n ;i:~ai.i~
there ass a failure to am,loy the necessary iaaar,i~*iu.~tion Frith
respaot to the in'.~lli~enca which sae at hand.
"~aahir~~ton~ like Aaxaii, passc~ssed unusurslly significant and
vital intelligence. ua,d greater imaEinat,ion and a keener axars-
naes of the significance Jf inLlii~encs exfsted~ ooncentrating
and applying; it to particular aitti~ttions~ it is propcar to suggest
that so~aone s:~ould hav$ con~.ly