WEST BERLIN: LINCHPIN OF THE ALLIANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP02-06156R000100070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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West Berlin: Linchpin of the Alliance
The nature of the Berlin problem has not changed in the past
decade. Berlin was initially -- and remains potentially -- the
most important point of East-West confrontation.
Miniconfrontations still occur in the city, although they rarely
attract public notice, and the United States is still the only
Western power hat can cope effectively with Soviet political
The Quadripartite Agreement (QA) in force for a decade,
has resulted in a lower level of confrontation over
Berlin. Accomplishments resting on the QA are welcomed
by the Berliners, who remain skeptical about Soviet and
The Soviet challenge to the Berlin order has focused
mainly on West Berlin's links to West Germany. The
city's ties to the West were expanded despite strong
Soviet representation after 1971, but Bonn, reacting to
the Soviet complaints, backed away from further
challenges to the Soviets after 1978. East-West
relations in Berlin have been relatively calm in recent
years.
Branch. Questions and comments may be directed to F 25X1
European Analysis, Western Europe Division, erman-Nordic
25X1
25X1
This memorandum was prepared by Office of 25X1
Chief, Western Europe Division, 25X1
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The Soviets are reluctant to alter their current policy
of avoiding frictions with the West in Berlin. Growing
political instability in Eastern Europe, however, could
cause Moscow to revert to a militant, anti-Western policy
that would include pressures on West Berlin. Even so,
the Soviets would still probably refrain from challenging
the US presence in Berlin directly.
By defending German national interests in Berlin, the
Western Allies continue to demonstrate to Bonn and the
German public the merit of the alliance. This preserves
the community of interest which underlies West Germany's
participation in the defense of Western Europe. West
Berlin thus is a linchpin of the alliance.
The other powers engaged in Berlin have not significantly
altered their approach to the problem during the first
decade of the QA. The United Kingdom and France remain
satisfied to be involved with the. superpowers on equal
terms and appreciate the influence their Berlin roles
give them in Bonn. East Germany is the state least
sympathetic to the era of lessened confrontation.
High-level US visits to West Berlin highlight our
essential contribution to protection of the city and show
that the United States has not forgotten its
responsibility for Germany as a whole. Because the
Soviets understand this, they cooperate officially with
such public events so not to dramatize the need for US
protection.
The Social Democrats, who had long dominated West Berlin
politics, were ousted last year by the Christian
Democrats under Richard von Weizsaecker. His Christian
Democrats' government has performed effectively. It
promises to revitalize the city and make an SPD return to
power difficult. Von Weizsaecker will be able to
cooperate easily with the United States and with the
Ostpolitik of the Schmidt government.
-- Social problems have replaced East-West confrontations as
the main challenge facing West Berliners. West Berlin
seems to be accommodating the counterculture of its many
young radicals, but is is only beginning to grope with
the problem of a large and growing foreign population at
a time when the native population is aging and
diminishing.
-- Negative economic trends, especially loss of population
and industrial jobs, continue to plague West Berlin.
Although federal subsidies enabled the city in recent
years practically to match West Germany in economic
growth, the outlook for 1982 is poor.
-2 25X1
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Origins of US Role Confrontation between the United States
and the USSR after World War II soon focused on Berlin. Disputes
among the victor powers over policy toward defeated Germany led
in 1948 to a Soviet attempt to blockade the city, which was
countered by the US-led airlift to Berlin. Of the Western
nations engaged there, only the United States had the power to
offset and thus to resist effectively Soviet pressures on the
city; this is still the case.
Despite differences among the Western Allies and fears in
Western Europe that the United States might refuse involvement in
the European power game, Soviet pressure and US initiatives in
the early postwar years gradually led the Western powers to close
ranks behind US leadership in defense of what developed into the
Western -- including German -- position in Berlin. This
coalescence gave an imant impulse to the formation in 1949 of
The US commitment to defend Berlin shared by France and the
United Kingdom, and an emerging unity of purpose in the early
1950s between the infant West German state and NATO contributed
significantly to Bonn's decision in 1955 to accept a military
role in the defense of western Europe. NATO in return associated
itself with the Three Power determination to maintain the
security and welfare of Berlin.
The power balance around Berlin was again tested during the
Soviet challenge of 1958 that led to the Berlin Wall (1911) and
ended, in effect, with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Once
more Berlin was the focal point of world interest and the
essential role of the United States as protector and alliance
leader was spotlighted.
After the Cuban crisis came a period of rapprochment between
the United States and the Soviet Union. While the focus of US
interest shifted to Southeast Asia, Soviet policy continued to
seek full separation of West Berlin from West Germany. This
caused recurring tensions in Berlin until March 1969, when the
East Germans strongly urged Moscow to prevent a meeting in West
Berlin of an assembly to elect Bonn's federal president. The
Soviets resisted this pressure, and the crisis was defused when
1 The "Khrushchev ultimatum" of November 1958 informed the
Western Allies that the USSR intended to transfer all its
functions and responsibilities connected with Berlin to the
government of East Germany. This set off years of military bluff
and political struggle over Berlin. While the West concentrated
on protecting its position, the East Germans with Soviet backing
built the Berlin Wall and thus staunched the flow of refugees to
the West that had threatened the viability of the East German
state.
-3- 25X1
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Moscow, on the day before the presidential vote, announced that
bloody encounters with Chinese troops had occurred along the
Ussuri River. Former Chinese Vice-Premier Chou En Lai later
asserted that Moscow had provoked ssuri clashes in order to
cover its backdown in Berlin. 25X1
Berlin and Ostpolitik. In October 1969, the newly installed
Bonn government of former Governing Mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt
declared its readiness to recognize East Germany as a separate
state, thus initiating the accelerated Ostpolitik so widely
identified with detente. By recognizing East Germany and
guaranteeing not to contest its eastern border (the Oder-Neisse
line) in an eventual German peace settlement, West Germany
accepted the Soviet position on the boundaries of postwar
Europe. In return, Moscow arranged for East Germany to relax
some of the travel and communication restrictions that it had
imposed during 20 years of struggle to stablilize the East German
state. Without this improved access to their fellow Germans, the
West German electorate would not have accepted the Brandt
Ostpolitik.
The West Berliners, who had been exposed more frequently to
East German harassment because they are the main users of the
transit lines to West Germany and who had been excluded from East
Berlin and East Germany after the Wall was built in 1961, became
main beneficiaries of the relaxation of restrictions on travel
and communications. The East German government again admitted
West Berliners to its territory and contracted to facilitate the
transit traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. The
contracts struck were German, but they were concluded under the
aegis of the Quadripartite Agreement (QA) in which the victor
powers (France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and the United
States) reaffirmed their positions on Four-Power control of
Berlin. The QA took effect in 1972. F 25X1
Impact of the QA. The QA did not dispel the threat to West
Berlin. It did perform the feat of combining the conflicting
views of East and West in a document acceptable to both. As a
result, clashes over uncodified issues became a contest of QA
interpretations, and this has helped to reduce disputes to a
lower level of confrontation. The media lost interest in Berlin
as confrontations betw7 " were replaced by tedious 25X1
arguments among lawyers.
Although West Berliners welcomed the increased opportunity
to visit and telephone relatives and friends in East Germany as
well as the improvements in transit traffic to and from West
Berlin, on the whole Berlin opinion -- as revealed in polls and
editorial comments -- remains skeptical about the ultimate
achievements of the Ostpolitik. The still aggressive and
insecure character of the East German regime is a more immediate
problem when viewed from West Berlin rather than from further
away. Revocations by that regime of the "humanitarian
alleviations" -- for example, East Berlin's imposition in 1980 of
25X1
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a steeply increased currency exchange requirement for visitors --
are a much greater burden and the Eastern disposition to contest
West Berlin's ties to West Germany are a continuing threat. 0 25X1
Continuing Soviet Pressures. Soviet defense of East German
actions against Allied military patrols since the QA have made
clear that Moscow still rejects the Western Allied claim, as
occupiers of Berlin, to unimpeded access to East Berlin. Serious
harassment of US, UK and French patrols in the eastern part of
the city occurred in 1977. A firm and unified Western response
moved the Soviets to abandon this pressure and, instead, to
increase the frequency of their military patrols in West
Berlin. With Soviet approval, acknowledged to US officals, East
Germany controllers at Checkpoint Charlie are currently harassing
selected US diplomatic passport holders -- delaying their passage
sometimes for more than an hour -- when they seek to cross into
West Berlin at the international crossing point. 25X1
In September 1981, the Soviets attempted to use helicopters
to block ,the landing paths to airports in West Berlin for a
hijacked Polish airliner. This unprecedented breach of Berlin
flight rules brought strong Western Allied protests. Although
the Soviets still insist that such landings, if not opposed,
encourage international terrorism, they did not repeat the
blocking operation when other Polish aircraft were diverted to
West Berlin last February and April. 25X1
Pressures have been exerted also on the access routes to
West Berlin. The Soviets at times allowed the East Germans to
tighten transit procedures on grounds that West Germans were
misusing the transit routes for political purposes -- for
example, by sending busloads of youths to West Berlin to join
demonstrations against the Wall. In such incidents, each side
alleged the other had violated the transit agreement concluded
under the QA. F- 25X1
The main focus of Soviet pressure, however, has been West
Berlin's ties to West Germany which, according to the QA passage
favored by the West, are to be "maintained and-developed." Bonn
initially set out to develop those ties, misjudging the depth of
Moscow's objection to any expansion of the official West German
presence in West Berlin or to any new European Community links
with the city. Citing their version of another QA clause -- that
West Berlin is not a part of West Germany and is not governed by
it -- the Soviets used threats, protests and propaganda to resist
West German efforts to enhance ties to West Berlin.* The
*In their protests, the Soviets distort QA meaning on Bonn-
West Berlin ties, interpreting what the Western Allies regard as
a statement of continuing exclusion from full integration with
the West German government to a prohibition of any ties
whatsoever.
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sojourns in West Berlin of political representatives from Bonn
and of foreign leaders on official visits to West Germany
continue to draw Soviet protests. 25X1
Despite Soviet objections, some new links between. West
Berlin and the West have been established. West Berlin's
inclusion in the first elected European Parliament drew the
loudest Soviet protests and threats, but Western Allied backing
for this action was firm and the Soviets quieted down after the
election. A branch of the EC patent office was opened in West
Berlin and a new office of the West German Interior Ministry the
Environmental Protection Office (EPO), was established there in
the mid-1970s, but only after serious international friction.
The dispute over the EPO arose because Bonn, perhaps testing
(we speculate) the extent to which the QA authorized expansion of
its links to West Berlin, announced -- without coordinating with
the Western Allies or previously informing the Soviets -- that
the office would be located there. The Soviets bitterly
resisted, but the EPO was nevertheless opened when the Western
Allies, after settling their quarrel with Bonn over failure to
consult, affirmed that their interpretation of the QA supported
the West German action. Moscow has continued to object whenever
an environmentalist from thp t Berlin office shows up at an
international conference.
The struggle over the EPO influenced modifications in policy
toward Berlin that became apparent during the late 1970s. The
Bonn government, once it became aware of Soviet determination to
contest its links with West Berlin and thus of its need for
Western Allied support, expanded its consultation with the Allies
on Berlin and all-German matters. Bonn backed away gradually
from marked increases in its official presence in West Berlin
and, except for the unavoidable dispute over West-Berlin's role
in the European Parliament, there have been no serious
confro of this type since the Brezhnev visit to Bonn in
1978.
How Other Engaged Powers See Berlin
Aside from the US, there are five powers engaged in the
Berlin problem: the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, and West
and East Germany. The record of their actions, private
consultations and public statements since the QA went into force
has made clear that their attitudes on Berlin have not changed
significantly during this period.
West Germany - Bonn recognizes that the QA has not resolved
basic political differences, but it emphasizes the practical
improvements the QA has permitted, including expansion of West
Berlin's ties to West Germany.
Chancellor Schmidt's inner-German experts still assume the
Soviets and East Germans want to sever West Berlin's ties to the
West and make the city dependent on the East. To minimize
25X1
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pressure, the Bonn government now avoids expansion of its offices
in West Berlin because such expansion was the focus of the most
determined Soviet protests. In order to contend more effectively
with Soviet pressures, West Germany has since the EPO dispute
expanded its co eration with the Western Allies on Berlin
policy. 25X1
United Kingdom Berlin continues to offer the United
Kingdom a "place at the high table" of world affairs and a lever
to influence Bonn's policy in all areas. British governments
have long displayed anxiety, however, over the risks of the power
confrontation in Berlin; London thus speaks warmly of the QA's
accomplishments. Quick to suspect Bonn of provocative actions in
Berlin, Britain remains the ally in Berlin consultations most
anxious to avoid difficulties with the Soviets over the city, but
it is nevertheless sensitive to West Germany's political equity
there. 25X1
France - French officials attach special importance to
France's share of supreme authority in Berlin. Paris' role there
affords it a unique opportunity to deal with the United States
and the USSR on equal footing, maintaining the distinction
between wartime victor and loser, and enables France to influence
West Germany more than its power might otherwise permit. France
stands ready to take a hard line with the Soviets, especially
where Allied rights and responsibilities on such issues as
transit are concerned, and does not shrink from lecturing Bonn on
its limits in Berlin. Q 25X1
Soviet Union - The Soviets appear to prefer the mini-
confrontations of the QA era to the grander Berlin crises of
yesteryear, but they still must cope with East Germany's
persistent demands for greter sovereignty and its opposition to
any increase of Bonn's role in West Berlin. East Berlin objected
to West Germany's expansion of ties to West Berlin during the
1970s, and the sharp Soviet protests make clear that Moscow felt
the heat. There were hints that Soviet 25X1
Ambassador Yefremov, who was transferred to Vienna in 1975, had
to leave East Berlin because he was perceived to be a poor
enforcer of Eastern QA interpretations. He was replaced by his
predecessor in East Berlin, Pyotr Abrasimov, a negotiator of the
QA, whose thunder and expertise failed to keep West Berlin out of
the European Parliament. We believe the Soviets have concluded
that the vehemence of their complaints in this period did,
however, induce Bonn to forego additional West German offices in
West Berlin. They seem to calculate that the ensuing absence of
dispute over Berlin assists Soviet efforts to argue for detente
and to distract Bonn from its alliance engagements. At resent,
therefore, Moscow almost certainly wants calm in Berlin. L _] 25X1
East Germany - West Berlin remains a bone in the throat of
East Germany, the power most dissatisfied with the QA. The time
of political freebootng before the QA offered the East Berlin
regime more advantages than the QA regimen, with its flood of
West German visitors and communications, its denial of the powers
25X1
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of sovereignty (such as the ability to harass transit traffic to
West Berlin) and its ban on longstanding East German political
claims (for example, that West Berlin is East German
territory). From the East German perspective, it must often
appear that detente is a game the Soviets play with West Germany
at East Germany's expense.
Beginning in 1979, with public Soviet approval, actions by
East Germany started to reverse the liberalization introduced
during the detente era. The large increase in the currency
exchange levy on visitors to East Germany imposed in October 1980
sharply reduced the flow of West German visitors. This trend
away from the cordial relations that are supposed to characterize
detente, it is generally believed, reflects the regime's
insecurity about its internal problems rather than Soviet
inspiration, and it probably would have advanced further without
the need still to accommodate to overall Soviet policy.
Social Problems - In the 1960s West Berlin became a center
of youthful German radicalism and. anti-establishment activity.
The city attracts West Germans who seek to avoid conscription and
these young men provide material for street demonstrations and
radical movements at West Berlin universities. Problems of
public order resulting from this anti-establishment ferment
received attention throughout West Germany, in part because West
Berlin was at that time the scene of early terrorist actions.
During the 1970s, the radicals became tamer and the terrorists
chose West Germany instead of West Berlin as their main
battleground. Radicalism at the West Berlin universities
receded. But the activists army never fully demobilized. It
provided, in the 1980-81 disorders, recruits for the squatters
movement. Many young dropouts joined cooperatives that
encourated "alternative" lifestyles stressing crafts and
environmentalism. In the election of May 1981 an Alternative
List of young "reformers" gained 7.2 percent of the vote and 9
city assembly seats.
The toughest social and political challenge facing West
Berlin in the 1980s is the surge of foreign residents. In 1970,
unskilled foreign workers and their families, who had immigrated
to West Berlin in the 1950s and 1960s, totalled about 100
thousand, less than 5 percent of the city's population. Although
recruitment of foreign workers stopped in 1973 and resumed only
briefly thereafter, their number has grown to 230,000, 12 percent
of West Berlin's population today. Of these, 140,000 are Turks,
considering the "guest workers" least able to assimilate the
German culture. The increase comprises mainly relatives of
established "guest workers" and persons taking advantage of West
Germany's liberal asylum law.
Unemployment and the increase of foreigners in a population
that is aging and declining as a whole have stimulated anti-
foreign feelings. Governing Mayor von Weizsaecker announced that
he favors inducements for foreigners to return home and believes
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that those who remain should become German citizens, but US
officials familiar with the problem believe few "guest workers"
would opt for either course. The problem is more intractable
because the Germans resist the notion of their society becoming a
"melting pot."
West Berlin, a city famous for experiments will produce
further sensations and occasional disorders, although it has by
and large managed to incorporate the young radicals and
reformers. Their counterculture is tolerated, even represented
in the city assembly. Their potential for popular support is
limited, however, because Berlin's citizens are hard-nosed,
skeptical of utopians or pacifists, and profoundly prq The
media in West Berlin are predominantly conservative.
But the city is only beginning to grapple with the problem
of a sizeable foreign population, and this issue will be the main
test of the von Weizsaecker administration. The von Weizsaecker
government's attempt in 1981 to restrain immigration of relatives
of West .Berlin residents, although probably approved by the
native Berliners, caused much uncertainty among the foreign
community, especially the Turks.
West Berlin Economy Loss of population, loss of industrial
jobs and lack of investment have long restricted growth of the
West Berlin economy. The city's postwar isolation and loss of
importance to the German community make it difficult for business
and industry to recruit and hold top executive leadership.
Careers in the isolated city are less challenging now than when
embattled Berlin was a center of world interest.
Economic decline of West Berlin is resisted through a
variety of programs, such as intense promotion of tourism,
federal subsidies and special tax breaks designed to stimulte
business and industry. Despite improvements in access to the
city since the signing of the QA, the negative political factors
-- continued East German and Soviet challenge to West Berlin's
link to the West and dwindling emphasis of the city's role as
future capital of Germany -- helped to assure that the adverse
long-range trends continued during the past decade.
But these trends were not sharp and are partly attributable
to the recessions of the 1970s in West Germany, which takes 70
percent of West Berlin's industrial production. Aided by gradual
expansion of the federal subsidy, per capita output in West
Berlin grew at a 3.3 percent annual rate during 1970 - 1981, only
marginallly less than the rate in West Germany.
With West Germany experiencing a prolonged slump, West
Berlin's economy stagnated in 1981. Seasonally adjusted
unemployment rose to the highest level since the early 1950s.
With continuing high interest rates, reduced government spending
and weak domestic demand, the prospects for West Berlin in 1982
are not bright and a further rise in unemployment seems
25X1
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Berlin SPD Decline At the point when the Berlin of detente
ceased to attract world interest, the city had already entered a
decline of political leadership. Coincidentally, the new focus
on West Berlin's youthful demonstrators, on the large foreign
community, and on what seemed to many Berliners as revealed by
both their private and public comments as creeping provincialism
tended to offset for many residents the improvements in travel
and communication gained through the QA. j 25X1
By the end of the decade, the squatters movement protesting
Germany's urban housing shortage was firmly established in
downtown West Berlin. Its activists resisted eviction, clashed
with police, and vandalized commercial establishments when the
police tried to control them. In early 1981 the issue of public
order combined with a corruption scandal to topple the West
Berlin government, a coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Free
Democrats (FDP) modelled on the Schmidt government in Bonn. 0 25X1
Efforts were made to resuscitate the West Berlin
social/liberal coalition. One of Schmidt's most talented cabinet
members, Hans-Jochen Vogel, was brought from Bonn to provide new
leadership. But time had run out on the SPD in Berlin, for
generations a stronghold of the German left. Since the
distinguished mayoralty of Ernst Reuter, West Berlin's leader
during the blockade, the SPD had gradually fallen into the hands
of mediocre leaders. The decline had already been signalled
during the 1970s when the SPD, like other West Berlin parties,
started to import political leaders from West Germany, thereby
acknowled in the absence of homegrown successors to Reuter and
Brandt. h g 25X1
The 1981 election returned a strong plurality for the
Christian Democrats and ushered in the government of Richard von
Weizsaecker, who had come from Bonn two years earlier to lead the
West Berlin CDU. 25X1
Rise of the CDU. Until von Weizaecker's arrival, like the
SPD the West Berlin CDU had seemed neither intellectually nor
organizationally prepared to govern the city. Its local leaders,
conservatives nostalgic for the Adenauer era and profoundly
skeptical of all Ostpolitik seemed at most to aspire to enter the
Bundestag in Bonn. They did not win control of West Berlin so
much as inherit it because of SPD disarray. 25X1
The CDU is nevertheless in charge, its plurality in the city
assembly buttressed by the votes of enough Free Democrats to win
key votes. In its first year the von Weizsaecker administration
has given indications that it can revitalize West Berlin. It
restored a measure of public confidence in law and order while
showing n ility to make practical compromises on economic 25X1
issues.
Meanwhile the SPD, still the party of West Berlin's
bureaucracy, continues to register poorly in opinion polls.
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Vogel, who turned down a recent offer to rejoin the Schmidt
cabinet, seeks to rally the SPD mainly by playing to the
disaffected left, a tactic which seems likely to help von
Weizsaecker and the CDU consolidate their power. Unless the SPD
is unexpectedly rejuvinated. West Berlin will be governed for
some time by the CDU.
The Governing Mayor. Von Weizsaecker is known for his
intelligence and moderation; he is more liberal than the CDU
hierarchy in West Berlin. Widely respected in all West German
parties, he was once a candidate for the federal presidency and
therefore was a natural choice when the West Berlin CDU needed a
leader of national reputation. To complete his cabinet (Senat),
von Weizsaecker imported other West German politicians with
energy but little proven administrative ability. So far he has
controlled the Senat tightly, and it has performed effectively.
Von Weizsaecker's talent as a political executive had not
been tested before he became Governing Mayor. He is not a
partisan scrapper nor a soruce of ideological inspiration to his
party. But he is widely respected, knows what he wants, and has
already demonstrated that he can run city hall. There is already
speculation among West German political leaders that the CDU may
The conservatives in the West Berlin CDU are pleased to have
von Weizsaecker at the helm, although he does not share their
hard line views on Ostpolitik. On the contrary, he is inclined
to cooperate with the Schmidt government on relations with East
Germany.* Foreign policy remains von ' rest
and he sees
himself as a man, like Brandt before him, with a future beyond
Berlin. A longtime friend of the US, von Weizsaecker is an
articulate defender of the Atlantic alliance who has argued
publicly that the US can be relied onto defend Europe "if we do
not give them the impression that we are leaving the risks in the
world's trouble spots entirely to them."
Outlook
The Governing Mayor's views assure that US interests in West
Berlin will be respected by his government. Von Weizsaecker has
made a point of showing appreciation for US forces in the city.
His appraoch to Ostpolitik, generally positive but skeptical,
worked behind the scenes against partisans in their ranks who
wanted to oppose establishment of the von Weizsaecker government
because it lacks a majority. This demonstrates the leaders view
of the need to keep West Berlin governable.
Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher
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will elicit understanding from the Berliners and should
facilitate cooperation with the Schmidt government. To the
extent that West Berlin can influence events, this will minimize
disputes over issues such as the West German official presence in
US interests are still served by public events, including
Presidential visits, that reaffirm and highlight the essential US
contribution to maintaining the existence of a free West
Berlin. They are useful reminders that the power balance in
Europe remains unaltered by detente and that the United States
has not forgotten its responsibility for Germany as a whole or
for the Central European stability so desired by the European
nations. The impact of ceremonial displays of US power in West
Berlin is understood by the Soviets, whose immediate concern will
be to avoid the sort of East-West frictions that dramatize the
During almost four decades, the US presence in Berlin has
become a.'symbol of American determination to maintain a strong
position in Europe in order to guard the balance that emerged on
the continent following World War II. The Soviets have not
seriously challenged that position in a decade. They continue to
avoid unnecessary friction in Berlin with the West and especially
the West Germans. Moscow will be reluctant to depart from this
policy, especially while the political decision on NATO's INF
modernization program appears to hang in the balance.
Further disorder in Poland, however, could lead to political
instability in other aeas, including East Germany, and such
unrest would probably cause the Soviets to turn to a militant
anti-Western policy as one means of justifying the imposition of
harsher controls to restore order. Even if the Soviets should
revert to a more aggressive, anti-Western line which includes
pressure on West Berlin, we believe they are unlikely to mount
the sort of fundamental challenge to the US presence in Berlin
that they did in the depths of the Cold War.
If Berlin should again become a pressure point for the
Soviets, such a shift would renew popular and official
appreciation for the United States as the only ally powerful
enough to cope with such Soviet tactics and Western unity would
benefit. The United States and other Western Allies, by
representing all-German interests in Berlin, continue to
demonstrate to Bonn and the German public the merit of the
alliance, thereby preserving the community of interest that
engages West Germany in defense of Western Europe. Berlin is
thus a linchpin of the Western Alliance. Western protection of
the former German capital not only reinforces West Germany's
relationship to NATO but also nurtures political understanding
with the Berliners, who rely on the United States more than other
Europeans and who judge Bonn's efforts to improve ties to Moscow
with skepticism as well as sympathy.
-12- 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP02-06156R000100070001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP02-06156R000100070001-5
2 - DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - John McMahon, Executive Director
1 - NIO
1 - OD/EURA
2 - EURA Production Staff
4 - OCO/IDCD/CB
1 - CD/WE
1 - Division File
1- Branch File
1 - Author
DDI/EURA/WE/GN 4June1982
Distribution:
1 - Dennis Blair - NSC
1 - James Rentschler - NSC
1 - Prof. William Stearmann - NSC
1 - Walter Stoessel - Deputy Secretary of State
1 - Lawrence Eagleburger - UnderSecretary of State
3 - Thomas Niles - State
1f)- John Kornblum - State
1 - Richard Hoover - State
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP02-06156R000100070001-5