MCCONE AS DCI - & [NOV 1961-APRL 1965] RABORN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-01773R000300040005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: MISC

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nuclear t 6pi robeL(iFttl
Senate For Rel Comm; the Jt Comm on Atomic E; and the
Preparedness Investigating Subcomm. all have resps
regarding the neclear test ban treaty.
W/in the Preparedness Investigating Subcomm, a Special
Subcomm on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Safeguards has been
created to saaxtkat insure there are adqquate detections
systems to detect Sov explosions. Sen. Henry Jackson
chairs this subcomm, as well as the Subcomm onMMME
Military Applications of the Jt Comm on Atomic E.
Jackson very active in considration of the issues
involved in test ban treaty and relies heavily on CIA
for info.
"An all-source briefing" of these 2 subcomms given
Aug 1965
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"Consistent w/ past practice, the Agency will continue to
meet periodically w/ the four CIA Subcomms, on a weekly
basis if possible."
From bery beginning of his tenure as DCI, Raborn announced
his intention to maintain close contact w/ the 4 subcomms.,
promising to do so at his. confirmation hearings. At these
hearings he said "I believe that the interests of this
country are served by a continuing program of the Central
Intell. A. keeping the members informed, not only of intell.
information but also as to the activities, programs and
organization of the CIA itself."
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the chairman of the 4 parent comms are also the chairmen
of the 4 CIA subcomms.
membership on the subcomms generally determined on basis
of seniority on the full comms.
until his recent retirement, Harry Byrd served on Sen ArmSer
Subcomm--Stuart Symington took his place and has BEHB$HB
"already demonstrated that he will be an active and enthu-
siastic member."
Saltonstall has announced his retirement at end of 1966
and his places on both Sen. subcomms. will need to be
filled.
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 P.L. 884Rrjved For Release 2006/08/21 : CIA-RD901-01773R000300040005-3 I 25x1
provided for CIA Retirement and Disability System
the result of enactment of H.R. 8427, 88th Cong.
text of act appears at 78 Statutes-at-Large 1043 et seq.
p. 175
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and Walter Pforzheimer
Interview / Lawrence Houston, Nov. 17, 1982, no transcript
both Houston and Pforzheimer are very skeptical re Hank Plas-
ter's theseis that McCone was unpopular on the Hill.
"Absolutely untrue," Pforz. Kid said.
instead, McCone was canned becuz he was a member of the JFK
circle and therefore made LBJ uncomfotable.
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 advocacy of ppr,qXedcj~griRseIease 2006/08/21: CIA-RDPO1-01773R000300040005-3
Interview w/ Lawrence Houston, Nov. 17, 1982, no transcript
McCone "would comment on policy when asked."
When he say on Excomm during Cuban missile crisis, he felt
free to comment on policy, becuz he was there not as DCI but
as a member of Excomm.
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Houston, Nov. 17, 1982, no
transcript.
the Q of wheterh the Senate would approve the nuclear tes
ban treaty very much up in the air.
McCone and Houston went before the Senate Preparedness Comm
(Subcomm?) for the DCI to testify.
Houston believes that McCone's testimony was so effective
that the DCI can be rightly credited w/ ultimately swaying
the Senate to approve the treaty
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the story was C, nn the hack naapq of
arrIed
NYT and caused
little stir and subsequent
,
14
ys
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some evidence of cong. unrest surfaced during confirmation
proceedings for McCone.
Eugene McCarthy unpahhy w/ answers McCone had given the Senate
Armed Serv Comm, esp. McCone's apparent disinclination to alter
the existing cong. oversight process.
p. 173
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SNIE 85-3-62, on Cuba. "The Military Buildup in Cuba"
judged on balance that Rus not deploying offensive missiles
in Cuba.
estimate approved by USIB on Sept 19. Subsequent study
determined that the 1st shipment of missiles has arrived on
Sept 8 and that a 2nd shipment reached Cuba on the 15th.
McCone, on his honeymoon, cabled on the 20th that the SNIE
should be recalled and rewritten becuz BNE had not considerex
the increased Sov bargaining power deployment of IRBMs
would give the Soviets.
p. 137
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Cone ma:3 a study of the intell ramifications of the crisis,
and showed an active interest in the episode during hearings
of the fiscal 1964 mil. budget.
the Gong. inquiry focused on whether a "photography gap"
had contributed to the crisis, struck by the fact that
the San Cristobal area had not been covered from Aug. 29
until Oct. 14.
the main charges vs. intell. lodged by the Preparedness
Investigating Subcomm of the Senate ArvSer Comm. Their
report conceded that US intell. had done "a reasonably
competent job" in acquiring intell info but condemned
the analysts who, in their opinion, had permitted the
intuition that Sov policy would not introduce stragetic
weapons into Cuba to warp their judgment and shape their
assessments.
****see US Cong (88/1), Senate Armed Serv, Interim REport:
The Cuban Military Buildup, 1963.
p. 146-147
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Nov 10, 198?
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McCone by end of his term as DCI had alienated many on
Capitol Hill because of his refusal to change CIA extimates
re the level of the Sov. threat. Hardliners on the Hill
wanted him to be more alarmist, but McCone refused to
alter the intelligence given him by his analysts.
Raborn was chosen as DCI solely becuz he had a good repu-
tation on the Hill. Raborn had been head of the Polaris
program (though his staff had done all the work--Raborn
had not been resp. for its success), and it was thought
he would get along w/ Cong. well.
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