THE C.I.A.: QUALITIES OF DIRECTOR VIEWED AS CHIEF REIN ON AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-01773R000100130065-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: April 29, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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verse Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/22 : CIA-RDPO1-01773R000100130065-9 f? In
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power and that, rmen said that two Americatt!3"t l" Ration today Will the fare and the Labor Departrnent. Bends. The specific legislations iwhile In May of that
)louse' itself j.1; ex, 'i'he lar J'st sin
t had diimrted servicemen fired 14 rounds al, IJ'r'li'il to p_ g single addition was they 4.uul,ht wit..' as (IrlnlYlpaid 5.5 per cent.
he (;real Society 1a crowd of approximately 1501ptvice it prickl $232.8-million for schools in lodged in committee as ever, un-
Normally there Is
"gent-rated theldemonstrators after three shots) Genalor Jahn Stennis, UCmo_ areas with Federal installations.llikely to move this year or ink
. five bidding between
a war fever in were fired at an Inter-American,crat Of Mississippi, announced The'President had sought toy the near future. dicates-One headed
to American peo- Peace Force observation post on before the vote that the Senate trim these "impacted area" These. bills would ailthorize CJhase Manhattan .Bank
Preparedness Subcommittee, funds to $183.4-million. The the use of Federal funds to meet other b the First
leaders." the roof of a low-lying building. Y
-thirds of the
itt
i
i
lf to tw
t d
th
f
ll f
h
ns
s
o
ee
e
u
rom a
a
in
which he heads, would study comm
City Bank---for maklnl
asumptlon' The major incident, in which the global commitments of the authorized sumo' $4 6-million. operating, deficits of transit fa-
six Dominicans were wounded,) The commute ]so added cilitles in cities all over thelto the city.
iewspaper execu- United States in view of recent Yesterday, bbecause
same ballroom took place early this evening atlstatements by Secretary of $155.8-million to he $34.1-mil- country. The aid would be le- size of the 1opped
sident $1umphrey Villa Duarte across the Ozama State Dean Rusk. lion the Presiders had sought signed to help, the lines return a borrowing of ;253,2%
rd hind-' speech River from the main part of the Mr. Rusk has testified that for direet Fed al Io ins to ol- to a sett-sustahiling basis. January, only a single
legs students. The bills di) Jlot have the sup-
splay of national capital. the United Stites hie: formal slipped into the metal
saying the coun- Hospital officials said a sev- agreements with 40 Countries This would br g e loan port of the Joh son Administra-I
I __ ^ Controller Mario A.
both guns and l enth wounded Dominican was involving American military as- Continued on Page 2 , olumn S Continued on )Etage >tO, Column 8 clno had placed atop i
with somber elo-
ttor P'ulbright
olish the "facile
hat thb country
billions "" of' dol-
~~_
It.,
tfes es and blic
eliminate air and
on while also
of billions on an
was not immediately known
whether he had been hit in the
Villa Duarte shooting.
The pollee said three of the
wounded were under 15 years
of age, the youngest being a
6-year-old boy.
Before the shooting started
the demonstrators threw rocks
at the troops and burned an
American flag.
munist aggression. w ' Controller J9lreeb'FJ
Senator Stennis noted that The C.I.A.: Qualities of Director outwardly that fact
Vietnam was a "relativRly small appear to bother Mr.
had and underdeveloped" fled down a substantial nationthat l Viewed as Chief Rein or A gency cino who booted Into
yesterday mo fog wit)
United States commitrrient. He `- j terlstlc exube}ange. 0
said that Congress should real- Following is the last of five articles on the Central the bankers, tall solemn
Istically appraise what might Intelligence Agency. The articles are b a team o New dark
happen if "two, three or four by of gray su ts, he sa
more contingencies or outbreaks York Times correspondents consisting of Toa'Wicker, John here are ou? friend
should occur at once." W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and others. morning, friends."
Later, United States iofficials special to The New York Times At 11 A.74.. the a
, Mr. Pl
said they would welcotne such WASHINGTON, April 28 -(Russians had Implanted often- hhoouurr an a aide lee pf (Mr. ti
an inquiry and would cpoperate As Copious evidence of a Soviet, sive missiles
fd?' Cuba did come
TI
b
nd
e ft
y being demon- The crowd milled around the
age Et; Column 4 Continued on Page 13, Column 1
Tying to Limit Arms Race
,n Indians and Pakistanis
By JOHN W. FINNEY
apedil to The Now Tort Timm
DN, April 28-
J.tas is seeking a
future military
die and Pakistan
for resumption
'conomic aid to
lea, officials said
nd Pakistan are
have responded
to move It" be-
the most con-
v in the discus-
s future level of
a the two noun-
ca, both the In-
of Planning,
cud the Pakistani
ter, Mohammed
roes 'here during
to discuss With
ai Bank for Re-
nd Development
officials how
aid they can ex-
I
argued for quick, decisive air
action before Ole missiles could
become operat e. But when the
President decid on his block-
ade-and-tilt) policy, Mr.
McCone loyally supported it and
helped carry It t.'
In 1963, Mr. cCone was per-
sonally in favo of the proposed
limited nuclear tesQban treaty.
He had backed su6h prbpossls
since his years as chairman of
the Atomic Am rgy Commission
In the. Eisenhower ~dministra-
tlon. I
Nevertheless) because of his
desire that the facts should be
known as'fuhy as possible, he
furnished a C.I.A. staff expert
In January, I when th?
terest rate t by th
was 4.1815 pe oerit, bet
the 4.2447 pe cost bit
day, Mr. Pr aceino
cepted the bi only ail
minute eonfe ce *ltl
sistants. La r he
would have I ked to
jested the bi , but c,
"because our batiks
pent from the aid-India and
aid-Pakistan consartlums.
Their discussions are a pre-
liminary to at least tentative
decisions expeoted to be reached
in the next few weeks by the
World Bank and the Johnson
,Administration.
Mr. Mebta said at a news
conference at the Induan Em-
bassy today that , India
wanted $1.6-billion in economic
aid in the coming year from
the 10-nation aid-India con-
sortium. About $700-million df
this total would come from the
United States.
The request represents about
a 70 per cent Increase over the
pout level of consortium aid.
Mr. Mehta said the increase
was essential to help India
through a "critical" stags at
her economic development pre,
gram, now at a midpoint In a
Coaslnoed on Pate 7, Column 1
against the i
Yesterday t
action was d
ference with
short and
emerged frorr
He said that
a]0
ie dontrc
ferent '
his !sdvii
Mr., Pl
it With
a his OR
to wlst Sena Jeln Stennis, -
Democrat of , chair- NE IND11~
man of an Armild Services sub.
committee aid an opponent of &w a ...44 OMtw-ks
the treaty. This angered the inept seat lit
White Horse and the State De- agllsJet; - , N, S~ak1wp;n
partm t but it was osrutatatt ana l.elKr
with Mr. Medooa's view of the ?Alrrial. ..... span .
C.I-A,'s role In informing the Ewnb Tddar., .... ttgfur
(stmt ....... Tauter;
Government as fully as poi. Ikpncigl sM Tr M F.
sible. Ins .. ,.. ... U. 5. Pr
It is in this kind of Intel- late In tk1 NwsA, Pi
M"
0411111" ealap IS, ~iaUsr^ 1 Nam atfeli entry bdsI
THI: NEW 1't)RK~lJ~1l ', 1 Kii)A'l , APRIL 29, 1966.
VAll1 GOG VHLLGll LiI I1E1l U U 11 W V1 I i VU A'IL
WARY ON VIETNAM By THOMAR J HAMILTON cedes, however, that n
-
ox a
op
.
fully with it. military build-up in Cuba, in- In, Mr. McCone was among
bid was remo ed.
did
t
ll
tio .rant+_ ei,
_, ?'__ i
a
h
ns
a
pso antibaliistics missilq system McCone, had a strong hunch
bill for Nike X directly over-l aircraft missiles, poured Into
rode the known oppo$ltfon of Washington in the summer of
the Defense Secretary. Mr. Mc- 1962, the director of the Central
Namara has testified outer that Intelligence Agency, John A.
can be wholly effective Itnd that about its meaning.
a powerful offensive deterrent He believed such an arsenal
is a better safeguard 1 than a half-way around the world from
questionable defense that might Moscow had to be designed
cost $32-bilpon it fully ultimately to protect even more
extended. Important Installations - long-
Coat Held 'Not chocking' range offensive missiles and
Nonetheless the Senate, with-nuclear weapons yet to be pro-
out opposition, approved the
purchase of hardware ever and
above the $416-million previous-
ly budgeted by Mr. McNamara
for "research and devel4pQtent."
The Senate was mote aced re-
portedly by concern o*r Com-
mmrtat Chisa's rapid nuclear de-
velopment and by repcilirts that
the Soviet Vales had ed
deployment of an satibailistles
system of its own,
Senator Richard B. Rusks,
Demonist of Georgia who is
ahatrman of the Armed Servlcm
Mr. MoCone told President
Kennedy about his-lunch but
specified that it was a personal
guess entirely lacking in oat-
crete supporting evidence, He
scrupulously refused to impose
his bunch on the contradictory
documentary and photoanalys s
evidence being provided by the
intelligence ccepdtunity over
which he presided He contin-
ued to pass to the President
and his advisers reports and
estimates-based on all avail-
able *"den e?-that the Soviet
Union was not likely to do
A. fig Latxau gt 6= lid-A49L When the evidence that the
r.,.,u.nea Unnr .,rand . to,. n?ter. rte- - '
New Ynra N Y . and at additional mailing official.
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 SIAI
?d L h+ q ~t1 4 611 l THE NEW YORK TIMES, PRIDAY, APRIL 29,
C.I.A. Operations: Man at Helm, Not the System, Viev
CHIEFS HAVE NOD
VARIED UALI IES
Dulles Was a Gambling
MoCohe an Incisive 01
Raborn Shuns Policy I
Continued From Page 1,
officials and experts
spread charges that It
Its polltlcal masters.
most charming and I
?,A Gat'tbling Man
of sucless was more
tint.
with les pf extraor
snnopin on such rule
As Ion as his brother,
fact
sus-
efer-
and
that
has
ac-
vide-
not
as guerrillas, by 90 miles of
swamp.
Above all, lacking his old
rapport with President Eisen-
hower and his brother, lacking
a coldly objective approach to
his plan, Mr. Dulles- never
realized that President Kennedy
suffered from more that
tactical reservations.
These misgivings in reality
it reluctance to approve the in-
vasion - -- forced the frequent
changes in plans, each weaken-
Ing the whole, until whatever
chance of success there might
have been was gone.
placed Allen Dulles at the
C.I.A.'s most critical hour.
After the Bay of Pigs fiasco,
It had barely escaped dismem-
berment, or at least the divorce
of its Intelligence and Opera-
n ot;also new cries for greater con-
been!trol, and the men around Presi-
or, it not hostile to, the agency.
Like Mr. Dulles Mr. McCune
Ing the senior members of the
Armed Services and Appropria-
tions Committees on Capitol
Hill and to converting the
members of It resuscitated
slut those who observed him area in the process of govern-'!well-known fountain of morel the intelligence ettorr rnose
wvnrk believe he also brought, ment men are more imDortantl leaks than any other body in who favor the present ei'mined
Cone to a tough-minded adminlstea-l of the widespread opinion rations of and pressures on d '--?-_, that --_._
. - - -_ of - . _.- an Mellon officers must be
trot of the agency. This belief mlttee would have to be bi-
is reinforced by the fact that partisan. This would give
the Congressional control that minority party members - as
now exists Is ill-lnftsrmed, in weft as dissidents In the ma-
the hands of a chosen few,I jority-- unparalleled opportu-
subject to what the agency nitles to learn the secrets of
wishes to tell even these few, the executive branch and of
o[Its 1 po-tivel ap, al of mi eo or
the The Intellectual - level of i.mlttees of the Senate aged House , controversial policies. Repub-
ling, agencies Improved greatly un- director reports. Investigation could have dis-
Guar lenge and defend their own often President and the National Sc-
He example himself of puttingi There are conflicting open-formed- in advance of C.I.A.
l C.LA: a analysts-incredible as
subject the C.I.A: s own action
Lao. programs to vigorous review
thu- Incisive Questions I There are four subcom-
Aregatd Prw
CHIEFS OF THE (-i.A.: Allen W. Dulles, left, was replaced by John A. McCollte, enter,
In 1961. Present diesetor, Adm. William F. Reborn, right, has held the post for npeu.
among present and. former of- members make them eager to close though to advise one .an-
ficlals that the problem of con- appear in print; they do notlother---avith analysts checking
trolling the C.I.A. most begin have the executive responslbll-l operators, but also profiting
with men inside the agency It- ity weighing on them, and many from a operators' experiences
self. C.I.A. operations could provide j in the field.
Moreover, they point out that
so-called pa,lamilitary op'ta-
tions ire more easily trans-
ferred on paper than in fact
to the Defdnse Depolrtnlsnt.
They dote that the department,
for instance, can by law ship
arms bnly to recognised gov
ernmehte that undertake cer-
tain obligations in return, and
cannot legally firm or assist,
say , rebel groups or mercen-
sties, leven for laudable pur-
crises.
As ~vidence of that; there 1s
the c
Ica) a d military organization
of hit tribesmen in Vietnam
carried
,yearsl~gorat . When the Army won
contro the operation in a
bureaucratic In-fight, the good
heginifing wilF lost in a classic
hit ur,t llllary mismanagement,
over'covert operations,
ponenl5 ask, how could
Foster Dulles, was Sec taryllevel. This exposed them to,the number of employes and the kind critics desire. At hest,'evitable exposure of some bit of
of State, Allen Dulles -hart nolpolicy considerations as never that the dlredtor reveals only for instance, it could probably political skylduggery In some
need to chafe etteder polltlrallbefore, and put policy-makers as much as he wants to. do little more than Invest.igateIottier tuunlry, when It is sup-
"controh" The Secretary. haul more closely In touch with the These conflicting views prom-, some questionable operations p,,,;,.,1 in be t e Simon-pure ves-
ably reflect the composition and,in secrecy and after they had yel of the Uq ted sates' propel
Interests of the subcommittees. taken place, and then report,dtplordahc r lesions?.
devious, back-Wiley adventilre Inlwere acting. l
i;a rln yl States Intellieene. Board -- x ga1,4 to he "Iaekadaigiral" and p,inht ohr nest .,,, A Lean Drastic Plan
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 ?~I
l: w,sevdit in 'arousing IrkrffanI exnert_s Into conferences and de-Itions" and Is "brutAlly frank." gControl. If a carefully and the tribal nrolect collapsed.
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r.. - a ,r,rr
his throne. I I Often he took such men with sul+oommittees get na precise,dangers, it could probably ex-,the n txments ask- how could
policy considerations a-s never that the director reveals Only for instance, it could probably ' political sku duggery fn some.
before, and put pocky-makers as much as he wants, to.. do litUe more than Investigate I other bountr?yr when It is sup-'
more closely in touch with the These conflicting vfeWs prob- some questionable operations posed to bete simon-pure ves-
experts on whose "facts" they ably reflect the composition . and' in secrecy and after they had set of the Urdled States' proper
As chairman or the United
States Intelligence Board - a
group that brings together rep-
Ad long as his brother.
Foster Dulles, was See]
of State, Allan Dulles ?hd no
,need to chafe tinder political
"control," The Secretary had
an almost equal faacinati for
devious, back-Icily advents re in
what he saw as a worldwide
crusade.
Personal Judgments
nesslike administration.
placed fuprerpe confiden
their personal 'Judgments.
Colleagues recall man
of state with the remark:
I know him personally
thing." I
Allen fDulles was also
the ?besl of relations wit
late CI rence Cannon .of
House 4pproprlations Corhmit-
tee wasithe key figure f pro-
viding C}I.A. funds.
Mr. Dulles kept persona con-
trol of the selection of Cher
members of Congress wi re-
sponsiblility for overseein the
C.I.A., v~ith the result t he
invariably had ft his side pose
members of the Congres4lonal
at the TC.LAof ., there w s a
peculiar set cireums as.
An ad v nturous directs in-
dined rely on his own often
extremes good and inf med
intuition widely traveled, read
and e; erienced, with rest
prestige! and the best c ec-
tions in ngress, whose oth-
er held the se;ond-higheit of-
fice in tie Administration, and
whose President comp tely
trusted and relied upon both,
was abl to'Itct almost a will
and wale shielded from an un-
pleasant consequences.
Kea y Kept Him In Of as
Wheal he Eisenhower A min-
istr?atlua amk to an end In 951,
Allen tulles'eappoin ent
was one f Pr eldent Ken dy's
first . Alt. Dulles, it a J,
Edgar oovea, who was ap-
pointbd head of the r era I
Bureau of Investigation the
and walr~thought t0 lend
lontt-
nulty a stability to the) new
In fact, Mr. Dulles's co linu-
Ance in! office set the tage
for the Bay of Pigs an the
great crisis of the C.I.A.
In that Incredible der a of'seem a little red-faced about
1961, it was Mr. Dulles's eak- Ithis compliance, and the intima-
tion Is that the C.I.A. may have
gone overboard in trying not
to undermine but to substanti-
ate a political policy decision.
Within the-,Bounds of Policy
his strengths-that came the
fore. He was committed the
Cuba invasion plan, at all oats,
against whatever objec ions.
The ad*ocate overcame the
planner.
As President Kennedy and
others interposed reservations
And qu$ilications, Mr. Dulles
and his chief lieutenant,
Richard M. Bissell, made what-
ever charges were required In
order to keep the plan alive.
landing site from the Trinidad
area to the Bay of Pigs, to
achieve more secrecy, thereby
accepting an interior beachhead
site and ,separating the refugee
force of invaders from the
Escaosbetiy Mountains. where
to
STAT
"apathetic," with sonee Sen- gldeology. Congress Is full A hr tesaI drastic but per
ators not wanting to know too of "professional anti-Commu-'baps more fteasible approach
much. The House subcommit-mists" and has not a few "pro- would be to,add knowledgeable
Department's intelligence unitltees are said to be "alert , In. fessional liberals." In its1Congresslonay experts in foreign
and others-Mr. McCone wonlterested and efficient," withlworldwide activities, the C.I.A.affairtl to he military and
a reputation for objectivity by members insisting on 'answers regularly taken covert actions anpro riatlo subcommittees
frequent,y overmling the pro-Ito questions. that would profoundly offend, that ow check on the C.I.A.
Representative George H.,elther or both--for Instance, Along this) line is the idea
Mahon, Democrat of Texas, supporting some non-Commu-, hacked by Senator McCarthy
chairman of the House Ap-lnist Iefti*t against a military that a subcoj -mittee of the Sen-
proprlaUons Committ warned the Adminlst 4.71t
must itself police th C.I.A.
budget more stringently than
that of any other agency be-
cause he and other ngress-Inew set of domestic polltica'man of the Spnate Foreign Re-
men, believe they shout protect pressures on the agency. lat!one Cemigtttee, Mike Mans-
the sensitive C.LA. bud t, as itt 9Policy. Knowledgeable men field t Moglana, the senate
obtain Information about trllt-!~reselonat economy b oc anal Joint Committee on Atomic uemocrn o .t ter, and Reorge
D. Aiken of ermont, a b-
clear programs in India, Isrtellthe a ens s more de~rmined Ener as a deslra_ble model
and other notion. 6 +_~ gY lican Inca of 'the f~
po
t
Mr. McCone also tried, but -Asa result of this?ahd otherl~point out out that the AtomlcEn- Kelatlona routes, or mlget
tailed, to end interagency rival- Congressional representations orgy Committee has developedlbring great balance and sen-
,rlee. He spent much time in the C.I.A. "slush fund" for its own staff of experts in its' sftlvity to th present group of
bitter dispute with Secretary of emergencies has been 1 reduced field, in some cases abler men watchdog subcommittees.
Defense Robert S. McNamara Mod of ose interviewed in
bee =100-mflllon. A cis than those in the Atomic Lnergy
to Mr
about divisions of labor sad ? McConds soul canoe- Commission, and these Con- the Nbw Yle l bl for
that
soeieved costs in technological prograflsl president Johnson's y grwional experts now have s these e kr krA. a Id also b have no in-
and about chain s of commabd drives resulted in an infs. vested Interest in their own the Gr.I.A
in Vietnam. He 1s reported 'to, tration reduction in the enoy'a Ideas of atomic policy and pros- fluenck an th selection tMA1-
tohave feared the growth of the enenl budget. !! I ectn bens the beorni giving
Defense Intelligence Agency Three chings, howare I Whit the,excuse for for giving
an Invasion of the a)tene voice is to make
C.I.A. terrlto clear about thle Congr essional An L re Foreseen
? .
With the State Department.Ioversight. This, these sources fear,'sun that" Iy "secure" and
Coo, rivalry continued- and All,
would be the outcome of a "respohalble" members of Con-
does..Much of this can be r1t-I Nei new Contro Joint committee on Intelligencelgress Are chgeen, the net effect
eat tributed, on the diplorttats' $t , One is s t fast the sli tnitteel-a new Intelligence empire on
to the C.I.A.'s readier access members exercise no *&I con Capitol Hill that could in time
to the upper levels of govern- trol because they are) not In. exert a direct policy influence
ment and to Its financial ability formed of all covert o atlons,l on the C.I.A., separate from
to underwrite the kind of re- either before or after they take and challenging the President's
search and field operations that place. 1policy decisions. This would dif-
State would like to do for Itself. The second point regarding fuse rather than focus power
On the agency's side, there is
undoubtedly some resentment
at the State Department's iir~ee
cently increased political con-
trol of C.I.A. operations. For
instance, until April 28, 1055,
the day President Johnson
ordered the Marines into Santo
Domingo, the C.I.A. had re-
ported the possibility of a re
bellion and it knew of three
Communist-controlled groups
functioning In the Dominican
Republic, ut but agency had
not suggested an imminent
threat of a Communist takes
over.
When the President and his
adyisers became persuaded that
there was such a threat, -
ever, C.I.A. agents supple
e
confirming Intelligence -- sol
of It open to challenge by n
lert, reader. C.I.A. officials
a
poasls of psis own agency, the
C.I.A.
Some Criticism, Too
His regime was not without
its critics. Many officials be-
lieve he fad ed the C.I.A.'s
Image of lot ts, which s
ac-aswide Its the'llorizons tine r
ugh- I the imaginlttlve Allen Dulls.
Ined For instance they I>sy he wls
,., the I slow to mobilize the C.I.A.to
MIs-
the
Mr. McCone's pride and the
fierce loyalty to the agency that
he developed made him resent-
ful of Congressional and public
criticism, not always to his
own advantage. Nevertheless,
as a result of his single-minded
efforts to control himself and
his agency, other former mem-
bers of the Kennedy Adminls-
tration-many of whom opposed
his appointment-now find It
hard to recall any time when
Mr. McCone or the C.I.A. $
his time overstepped the bounds
of policy deliberately.
Thus. they are lndkned to
cite him as proof of the theory
reghhtt or , vice versa. To re- ate Foreign
rather than clarify the problem
of control.
C.I.A.'s intelligence and analy-
sis function from the opera-
tions or "dirty tricks" function.
A Pountafn of 14eake
But the overwhelming con-
sensus of those most 'knowl-
edgeable about the C.I.A, now
and in the past, does not, sup-
port the idea that Con us
should "control" the (1LA. A
Qum r of re4sons are adduced: I vorce might Well lower the total
gSocurity. Congress Is the overt and covert efficiency of
cnnunauons and ray a wnareiDemocrat off Arkansas, chair
Is that the agency usually man-
ages tb hay itself checked by
its best frgiends in Congress
and by those who can but
shield it frpm more crOIeal
ato ses%~iaaiiild
a handful Of men like Mr. Can-
non and enator Russell, with
their grea prestige, dO not so' Other recommendations for
much co trol the CII.A. as a. Congressional intervention
shield it from Its oritics. t have been advanced. The most
Finally,~even these ebtablfsh-, drastic-and in some ways the
ment watlhdogs can be told' most Interesting-would be to
Just as much as the C.I.A.
director thinks they ! should
know. In fact, one or! two of
the subcommittee members are
known to shy away om too President Kennedy, after the
much secret information, on Bay of Pigs, rejected a proposal
the ground that they do not, to create a new and autonomous
want either to knout about lintelligence and analysis agen-
"black" operations or flake the cy. This plan would have covert
chance of unwittingly ,disclos-political operations under a
fog them. small and largely anonymous
For all these reasons,, therelsectlon of the State Depart-
monitoring of intelligence ac-I If accepted, this plan wouldactlvltiesof
The critics Insist that Con in terms of control, of divorcing
and nologlcal xe
__,.__I "black" operators their,
to investigate the activities of formation on which the decl-I arbitrarily reduced by half.
A number others suggested
once the C.I.A. arms; and to check other
check on intent- the sfon o act must be made. Thus, 9
gence covert operators would have that it was ssible for a great
executive relations with other many of the C.I.A.'s informs-
' study no more Information than any.
departments, - atherln functioos and
its budget and exercise greater one else in government, no liong
and more lntellfgest oversight Powu to shape, color withholds Y prof to be handled
than the present diffused sub- or manufacture ifrformatfon, openly by a State Depart.
comn:!ttees, which operate with- and could, in effect, do only meet, If one Congress would
_._.. -- .?.... or -, what they were told to de by aPPrOprlate a money for it
rcprc3CnL&UUU from v.n ~--- traditional) ta['ved for fitnde
most concerned with foreign reign at. I It would also reduce the sheer Y
fairs. (size and power of the C.I.A. by members of Congress whc
within the Government, much scoff' at the "oookle-pusher's'
bination of functions--provid- The same m misers are otter
In g proposing ac- quite willing appropriate bli
lion and having the ability to sums, almost blindly, for th
carry it out. secret, "tough)' and occadonall~
Rf fly' m;
eider at 11
for some selec
comrnl tee 11 of IndepenQent-
mfnd members of'Congrra to
make thorough, responsible
study f the whole IntsWgenne
community. Such a group
might bet outt ter determine how
much f thi community's sc-
tlvity actu sly needed or use-
tul, a d how touch of the whotie
apparatus might be reduced in
size and expenseand thus lire
the klhd of visibility that brings
the C.I.A. 1 disrepute over-
seas Ind at home.
+'eDaM
ny o oon-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/22 : CIA-RDP01-01773R000100130065-9
C.I.A.
example of wha
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/22 : CIA-RDP01-01773R000100130065-9
STAT
HE 'NEW 1'ORk TIMES, I'I2IDAY. APRIL 29, 1966.
Not the System, Viewed as Key to Control of Ag( ncy
Asedstad Pow
t W. Dulles, left, was replaced by John A. MoCone, center,
I. William F. Reborn, right, has held the post for auear.
a specially organiyei, reapon- drawing together and str - aspirations In the world, or is
alibis CongresMonal investiga- lining of capabilities the ag y It merely convenient, expedient
tlan might discover, some Of- already had, but It is rated and possible without regard to
ficfals expressed their doubts its wider impilcati ns or to the
a positive advance In C.I{A. real necessity f it?
about the Nationtl Security efficiency. In sum, is the government of
Agency. This Defense Depart-I The other Raborn innovat a proud arid honorable people
ment arm specializes in mak- Is a Navy-like system of 101g. relying too much on "black"
Ing and breaking codes, spends range management piannl t;, operations, "dirty ricks," harsh 47
about 1111-billion a year-twiceiHe has assigned a group of f- and illicit acts in he "back a1, xa
as mucif as the C.I.A,-and, in! let's" of the wo d . Is there
the opinion of many who know tirtals to "look ahead" for e? some point at w ch meeting
its work, hardly earns Its keep. cades at the shape of the wo Id fire with fire, for with force, -~g
But to most of those inter- to come. subversion with subversion,
viewed, the question of oontroll Out of this continuing stir y, crime with crime becomes so
.eta
ultimately came down to the the admiral hopes to be a^ to prevalent and accepted that,
caliber and attitude of the mend make more precise plans for he there no longer remains any
who run the C.I.A., and par- agency's needs in manpd r, distinction of honor and pride ,yd,
titularly Its director. money, equipment and orgy I- between grim a implacable i3S
The present director, Admiral zation in, say, 1975, so that It adversaries? P ?m
Raborn, is a than who earned can be planned for right now. These questions are a prgper -.m
a high reputation as the de- There persists among m yland necessary co tern for the r
veloper of the Navy's Polaris Interested in the C.I.A., X -!people of the Ll ited States. .ry7
missile but who had no PreviM I ever, a reluctance to accept he l They area proper nd necessary i' ,,
ous experience in intelligence idea that the agency should be, concern for Congo sal. But in the bi.l, .
work. Nor is he particularly headed by anyone other than an nature of the c , neither the' :;.,,A
close to President Johnson or' experienced, strong executive ' people nor Con can easily
to other high Administrationwith a wide grasp of inter a- learn the answers, much less in- ,al
officials. tional affairs and intellige celsure, that the an ers are al ?t
Inauspicious Start work, strong ties to the Adm n- ways the right o s, lrif ?
istration and the knowledg? ndl The Presides 'W Task AT
The admiral took office on determination to keep the ag n-! That can only done wyithin
.1j
a bad day-the one on which l cy's work within the limits Of, the executive b nth, b
e = :113
lit and ro riet
Mr. Marines to Johnson : Santo dispatched Domingo the last' This concern has been het t- hI he
i st authoritie of the Gov- ;la
April ened by the d' g ernment. Controll g the C.I.A. :,sf
Admiral Reborn and his prod- parture fr m
is White House of McGeo ge the a job that rests g upon 10
ecessor, Mr. McCone, lunched the
now president of he the President o the the United -
States, the directt of the ages
together In downtown Washing- Ford Foundation As M
J
r
o n-
.. ten that afternoon, unaware of cy and the fffo is appointed-
son's representative on the $4 12 DD
veil-known fountain of more the lrifelllgence efforts Those, Imminent intervention. As; group, he was probably sec nd,by the PresFldent to check its =?A~
aid
l R
f
k
A
iI
th
t
rt
d
Ad
i
b
m
ra
orn o
.
e mep are
o
,
e
nd
S
e
-,only to tike director of the 9,1 A,jwor
'aka than any y other body they pa
other
who favor the present c1mbined,fered Mr. McCone a ride to the In maintaining "control" ndlinsist that they control the tlq
in in
mlvii
ha
~
s
The e
V tnon. pressures al on agency insist that IntelilgencelLangley, Vat, headquarters Of:took arr9jntense interest In is !agency, then the are the. ones 3J.
ashit
ations of
who must be bla ed it control 0e
and $Etlon officers must be the C.LA But Mr. Mccone said duty
.
a -
ambers make them eager to
ppear in print; they do ntolclose !hough to advise one an-the was going home to pack, Thus, If the White House e- fails. 'tn9
other--.with analysts checking his clothes. placements, Bill D. Moyers ndI 'Those. who ev
that the executive responslbll- Lk that the
operat
om rs, but also profiting Those who know of this ex-,Walt W. Rostow, prove sit eriUnited .States ernment on
ty weighing on them, and manylfr
from the operators' experiences, change have it hunch that if loss Interested or less forcefu in occasion resorts force when 'vii
LA operations could provide!
In the field Bill 1
,. 'sse ,o
~ramatie passages in campaign Inv Mcr^,orte had accepted the representing the White Ho se,it shouldn Ri and
peches. Mohover, ty pent out that Invitation and. returned to the Interest in C.I.A. operations, nd the C.LAPs fo deputy di- Pia
pePollties. Any standing com- so-called paramilitary Opp's- turmoil that quickly developed if Admiral Raborn's ells ed rector, once said, shaa,dte !n all ,do
to M bi- tions hire more easily tons- in his old office, the history lack of experience In int li- fairness and justih difect their eat
ltlee wand hav
n
e
artisan. This would give tarred on paper than In fact of the intervention might have genre and foreign affairs ha dl- views to the quest n of national 'oJ
ninority party members - as to thk Def se Department. been different. many n are In- to s him, effective control of i_ri poli.,_.cy and not h behind the ow
,he'd to ,M-, the de
art ant ,__,
____ - .- - __1
t he
,,.4
the P
p
the
tha
rey-
as
people there 1s'an .9
dries to learn the secrets of arms Only to recognised gov-Imishmash of hasty evidence I official processes of control. enlignten
he executive branch and of ernmehts that undertake exr- the C.I.A. contrived to Justify[ evil and l1-conti !led agency
4
oreign policy, and to make,taln obligations In return, and the State Department's claim Promotion Debate which imp rte thi sinister ale- Ehf
ro8ticel capital of mistakes or'cannot legally arm or Assist,that 'there was a threat of a Some people concluded even ment." ?
Communist uprising. before the end of the admiral's The New Yor Tirntes? ctt!'~ ? io
ontroversial policies. Repub- say, rebel groups or mercen-i
armed with ar es, even for laudable pur-i One reason the admiral was first year that the difficulties of the C.I.A. sag sts that it is ua
(cans, for instance
,
11 the facts and testimony that poses. chosen, after President Johnson of finding a succession of it- not an invisible g ernment but 34
nvestigation could have dial- Nor Could the Defense Delia - had searched for six mopths able C.I.A. directors made it d- the real Bove ant P,! h losed, might well have ment aslly acquire the s 1,' for a successot to Mr, McCone,lvlsable to promote impres.'ve'United States u which the
,reeked the Kennedy Admin- the chnvenient "covers," the war that as head of the Polaris I professionals from within helresponsibility mu t lie whenever
atratlon after the $ay of Pigs. polltfr. I talent 'and bureaux at?! project he had shown t agency. the a enc may b found "out
t ..... D 1 great - 8 Y
Lets at the direction of the improvised action in time bf lify Inquisitive Congressmen. these ys the deputy director, eibility is accepteO. there can
'resident and the National tic- crisis, Another was that his mill- Richard Helms?who was sal to be no invisible go rnment.
e
- Co
- ''?--._--.. A- ~"iden
f that N.e
e r.l._ b--?-`
ve bee
d
h
u_ McCon_'
_
"m
uncil If
c
r
o
n
lint
ou
an
a
made
clonal committee had to be In? the c of the successful pout- I rrnl)kelyy target for charges of to succeed him. RADIATION CAPES
ormed ? in advance of C.I.A. ical a
d military organization heing too "soft" or too liberal Others argue, however, t at
f
activities, covert and overt, of hit tribesmen in Vietnam for his post. The same con- Intelligence is too dangerou IN NEVAD A-TEST
here might well be a direct icarrl . , out by the C.I.A. some.lsideratlon Influenced President thing to be left to professi al
tltutlonal freedom of the exer?-l control of the operation in alsc.r?vtttlve Republican John Mc-l of the President's with the o- FRENCHMAN T, Nev.,
dive branch and of the f'resi-Ihureadrratir In-tif?ht, the goodiCone, and it Is notable thatlhlical qualifications for a en- April 28 (AP) An under-
lent's right to conduct forr?Ign beginning wets lost in a classic, no leading figure of the J1emo-!ior Cabinet position should old ground nuclear explosion last
,nlicy. bit of ItI111 it ? rni:rmanagement,ierat.lr party. inurh less one (if' the post. Mondayi~accidentally leaked ra-
gControi. If a carefully , and a trlba project collapsed. its liberals, has ever been the' Whatever his identity, h w- dioactivity that ,plead over five
hoses cnmmilte,? cone Ion- I A. nr the lair. INr artment's ever, the prime conclusion of
P' agency's director. states, and as a result radio-'
lousty tried to avoid all theseltakin over covert operations.' $ecause of his lack of ex-!The New York Times surve of activity in the thyroid glands
!angers. It could probably ex-,the o pones s ask, htn' could villages has
nrr?Ienre to Intelligence and in-lino, Central Intelligence Age cyof residents in two
rrclse little real "control" of the departm nt survive the In. increased, the At mic Enerby
lernatinnal affairs, it is wldelyi is that Its director is or sh old
he kind critics desire. At best,evitab`e exposure of some bit of believed mm~ng present andlhe the central figure in es all. Commission said oday.
or Instance, It could probably political skylduggery in' some former officials that Admiral limiting and maintaining the ac- A Government spokesman
In little more than investigate lother hnuntr', when It Is sup- Reborn was r}hosen primarllyltual substance of control, w at- said the radioactivity escaped
vome questionable operations posed to he t e ?Imtm-purrs vet-I as it "front man.", Ironically, ever its forms may take. or when a "low-yield" nuclear
n secrecy and after they had set of the notices States' nrnner ..._ c,..,.,.es
ck- h,. was lit the director insists and he.rs weapon explosion pushed mat-
s
-nigh Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/22 : CIA-RDPO1-01773R000100130065-9
 g' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/22: CIA-RDPO1-01773R000100130065-9 .~
ehor
tiously tried to avoid all thexeltakin over covert operations.( Because of his lack of ex- The New York Times serve of
dangers, It could probably ex-,the opponents ask. how could,nerience In Intelligence and in- the Central Intelligence Ag cy
erclse littIh real control" of,lhe department survive the In- ternatinnal affairs, it is widelytis that its director is or sh uld
the kind critics desire. At best,'evitabte exposure of some bit of believed among present and be the central figure In es tab-
for instance, it could probably political skullduggery to some former officials that Admiral1Lshing and maintaining the ac-
do llVJe more than Investigate I other t:ountry, when it is sup- Raborn was chosen primarily tual substance of control, w at-
some questionable operations posed to bete simon-pure vex- as a "front flan." Ironically, ever its forms may take, or
In secrecy and aftew they had set of the U fed States' proper the Congress that .he was sup- If the director insists, and be ids
taken place, and then reportldiploniatic r lations? (posed to impress is actually all his efforts to make sure, at
privatelyortomigh tght not President respond.,
might A Lea Drastic Plan concerned--interviews disclosed the agency serve the polit cal
.,
qldeology. Congress is full A for lest; drastie but per
of "professional anti -Comm u-'haps more leasible approach
nists" and has not a few "pro-would be to,add knowledgeable
fessional liberals." In its Congrlxslonal experts in foreign
worldwide activities, the C.I.A.!affalrfM to he military and
regularly takes covert actions, appropriatioliIN subcommittees
that would profoundly offend that Clow check on the C.I.A.
either or both-for Instance,) Alofg thief line is the idea
supporting some non-Commu-harked by S ator McCarthy-
nist leftist against a militarythat a subco mittee of the Sen-
reghtie or vice versa. To re- ate Fbrelgn lations Commit-
port tftis kind of activity to, tee should b added to the ex-
Oongress would be certain to fisting watch cgs.
set off public debate and re-i such men J. W. Fulbright,
criminatlona and lay a wholeiDemoerat ofd Arkansas, chair-
new set of domestic political man If the Senate Foreign Re-
pressures on the agency. lat'onN Cemrgittee, Mike Manx-
gPelicy Knowledgeable men field hf Moq na, the Senate
in Washington do not accept' the Demohratic ader, and George
Joint Committee on Atomic D. Aiken of 5ermont, a Repub-
Energy as a desirable model lican tnem of the Foreign
for oversight of the C.I.A. They Relatlhnx mittee, might
point out that the Atomic En- bring great balance and seen-
ergy Committee has developed
its own staff of experts in its'sitivfty to th present group of
t
field, in some cases abler men wao of t os Intervst ome Inte subcommittees. in
than those in the Atomic Energy N o
Commission, and these Con- the e NOW Yor Times y for
gressfonal experts now have a these krtic also believed that
uld
lhave no la-
vested Interest in their own the S.I.A. o e
Ideae of atomic policy and prof- ftuena!on selection of mem-
ecG~ berg cif the bcommitteax.
An Empire Foreseen W e the ,excuse for giving
P the a cy voice I. to make
This, these sources fear.'sura t ly "secure" and
would be the outcome of a "rem ble" members of Con-
joint committee on intelligence! gress Are chgeen, the net effect
-a new intelligence empire on is the the agency usually man-
Capitol Hill that could In timelages tb havq itself checked by
exert a direct policy influence, its beat friends in Congress
and by those who can best
shield it frpm more critical
members like Senator oCarthy
and BPnator Man sfie
and challenging the President's
policy decisions. This would dif-
fuse rather than focus power
over the agency and confuse
rather than clarify the problem
of, control.
Other recommendations for
a . Congressional Intervention
have been advanced. The most
drastic-and in some ways the
Id be
FJ ly, m
alder at I
for sods s1
committee
lIa~sh Proposed
pry observed con-
i might be useful
act, nonpermanent
of independent-
moat interesting-would tolmake thorough, responsible
legislate the separation of the study of the whole intelligence
C,I.A.'s intelligence and analy- oomm hity. Such a group
six function from the opera-
tions or "dirty tricks" function.
President Kennedy, after the
Day of Plgs, rejected a proposal
to create a new and autonomous
Intelligence and analysis agen-
cy. This plan would have covert
political operations under a
small and largely anonymous
section of the State Depart-
much 1of th cbmmunity's aa-
tivity )II acts lly needed or use-
ful. add how much of the whole
apparatus ml ht be reduced in
size Ad expense--and thus In
the klhd of v sibility that brings
the C.I.A. bits disrepute over-
seas Itnd at home.
- Efficiency Drop Feared I how much
If accepted, this plan would lose 10 vital
have had the great advantage,' actlvl jes of
in terms of control, of dlvorcing~from hose
"black" operators and their nological
schemes from the source of In-land the like-r had their budgets
formation on Which the decl-)arbitrarily reduced by half.
the covert operators would have
no more Information than any-
one else in government, no
power to shape, color withhold
or manufacture inlotmation,
and could, in effect, do only
what they were told to do by
political authorities.
it would also reduce the sheer
size and power of the C.I.A.
within the Government, much
of which is based on Its com-
bination of functlons--provld-
ing information, proposing ac-
tion and having the ability to
carry it out.
On the other hand, as Mr.
Kennedy concluded, such a di-
vorce might Well Jower the total
?STAT1 covert efficiency of
scoff- at the' "cookie-pushers"
and the "strlpped-pants boys."
The same m begs cr. often
quite willing appropriate big
mums, almost bligdly, for the
secret, "toug1l~' and occasionally
glamorous 4etlvltles of the
spies, wrs and tbystMous
experts ?L C.I.A.
As anothe example of what
functions and
to be handled
State Depart-
Knowledgeable sources say
the C.IA. itself, In its day-to-
day business, Is a bureaucracy
like any other, functioning rou-
tinely whatever the quality of
Its leadership.! These sources
argue that the experience and
pl ofessfonahsm of Its staff are
so great that ny lack of these
quaijjefln Admiral Raborn IN
scarcely felt.
But they dd not agree that
"Red" Raborn is just a front
man. He is different-as would
be expected-drom Any direc-
tor who preceded him. but there
Is evidence available to suggest
that he may not be such an un-
fortunate chore as has been
suggested in a! number of crit-
ical articles in the press.
The admiral is Raid to have
President Johnlon's confidence,
although in a, different way
from.' the confidence President
Kennedy placed in Mr. McCone.
The latter was a valued mem-
ber of the group that argued
out high policy and Influenced
the President'sl decisions, not
with facts but also with opin-
ions and -recommendations.
Admiral Raborn is said to
make little fort to exert
such an Influence on policy.
Partly, this is bicause Mr. John-
son appar ntlyl does not want
the C.I.A. director in such a role
--and among those interviewed
by The New York Times there
was . a belief that one reason
John McCone loft the post was
that he could opt play as infii-
entlal a role a~ he had in the
miral's a
his Navy
Of a ser"1G
than a poll
He believes a Is his duty toe
lay the best av*llable facts be-
fore the President and those
other high officials who make
or Influence policy, so that their
judgments may be as informed
as possible. To enter Into policy
discussions as an advocate, in
his view, would Inevitably com-
promise his roe as an impartial
and objective lource of infor-
motion.
Among knowledgeable offici-l
als, moreover, dmiral Raborn
is credited whet at least two
administrative developments
within the ag cy-both stem-
g
g in,eom his Navy
Lsag-*e$s Planning
He has instkiled an opera-
tions ouster, not unlike a mili-
tary command Post or a Navy
ship's "combat nformation cen-
ter." In It, round-the-clock duty
officers eonuitantly monitor
communlcatioeonnnial of every sort.
They can Instantly communicate
with the Whlfe House, State
Department, Pentagon and
agents M the field, by means
of the agency'$ wizardry with
machines and electronics.
This represents primarily a
activity in the tyroid glands
of residents in two villages has
increased, the At mic Enerby
Commission said today.
A Government spokesman
said the radioactivity escaped
when a "low-yield" nuclear
weapon explosion pushed mat-
ter through' a ground fissure
to-have the sure grasp of the,) mend, only blind chance or in ,radioactivity r d northeast
agency's needs and activitieseptitude in the field is Ii ely'over Nevada, U h, Colorado,
Nebraska and Ka as.
that would melt Inspire confi- to take the C.I.A. out of lit- .The radioactl y remained
dence in it. Kcal control. well below dang levels, the
Raborn:Defended Conclusions of Study (spokesman said, nd could be
measured in the it only with
very sensitive inst ments.
The agency said the residents
of Hiko and Alamo, Nev.,
about 70 miles away, were
tested yesterday with a Public
Health Service thyroid scanning
device. The spokesman said
radioactive iodine as detected
in 11 children an two adults.
He said doses w re estimated
between 50 anti 2 mlllfroent-
gene.
The spokesman
was only, a frac
caused In thyroid
dinary dental X-r
A number of other co lu-
slons also emerge from he
study:
gwhatever may have b -en
the situation in the past, and
whatever misgivings are alt
about Admiral Raborn, then is
now little concern in the Join-
son Administration or am ng
former high officials, and t re
is even less evidence, that he
C.I.A. is making or sabotag ng
foreign policy or otherwise act-
ing on its own.
eWhen C.I.A. operations c-'i
quire a life of their own nd
outrun approved policy, t ey
often follow a pattern ell
known also in less secret s
of government. Diplomats
quently say more than they re
told to say to other gove
meats or otherwise exceed ir
Instructions. Foreign aid red
propaganda operations, the gh
"public," can commit the Uni Rd
States to practices and men in
ways not envisioned by Wa h-
ington. Military operations an
escalate by their own logic, and
when things go wrong the P n-
tagon has at times been m re
reluctant than the C.I.A. in
producing the facts.
CNonethcless, While A*
C.I.A. acts as the Governor is
fountain of information as ell
as its "black" operating
while It U the C.I.A. that th
proposes operations and P_
Plies the facts to justify th
the danger of Its getting out of
control of the Adminlstra on
exists and ought to be to en
seriously within and with ut
the Government. The Bay of
Pigs stands as enduring te. tt-
mony. to that fact,
The task of coping with Is
San Is essentially that of he
PreWidde J_ his highest offic Is
and the'lirector of the C.I A.
It can only be met periphen ly
by Congressional oversight, nd
then with increased danger of
security leaks and domestic -
litical pressures on the age. y.
gThe charges against he
C.I.A. at home and abroad re
no widespread and in m ny
ways so exaggerated that e
effectiveness and morale of e
agency may be seriously -
paired. In particular, th re
could ultimately be a probl m
in recruiting and keeping e
high caliber of personnel ulion
whom the agency must rely
both for doing useful work and
for keeping that work wi n
proper bounds,
Crucial Questions
Thus, there must be in t1his
and in any Administratio"I tight, relentle* searching
Ire-
view and analyiis of the C.I.A.
and iti activities, m el squarely and answering hon at.
ly at least these questions:
Is any proposed operation or
activity likely, on balance, to
make a genuine and necess ry
contribution, in the long ew
as well as the short, to le ti-
PESTER
(April 29,
THE PRES
Announced his
Wheeler as chai
Joint Chiefs of
with civil tights
sage to Con flew to
Houston for the ' President's
. TI
Confined
at wward deplo.
an ballistic miss
adJ ad at 4:51
oral Government
ignored or negleo
Lion's ' bus
systbtns.
THE HOtl1SE 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/22 : CIA-RDP01-01773R000100130065-9
AT
988)
DENT ?
Intention to'
Earle C.
an of.the
Passed by 352
to curb unlawfu
noon onday.
ApprMopriations Committee
added nearly a half-billion
dollars to the President's
'health and. educe on budglat.
DEPARTMENTS AdENCIES
State, Depantm mit. t spokes-
nun said Red ChMs. was pre
Paring, to expl its third
nuclear device.
Def lnsB end spokes-
man said the U fed State
had no evidence Cownu-,
mist Chin gqeeee airs t or pllpta =
were in the war over North
Vietnam
SCHEDULED R TODAY --
(April 1*i If88) _ 1.
President Johnson. has no i
scheduled appointments.
Senate and use not In ?-