EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-01773R000100110001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
(HISTORICAL SERIES)
VOLUME XIV
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
1962
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-6SR O WASHINGTON :1986
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U.S. SENATE,
J FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
session at 10:45 a.m., in
Senators Sparkman, Hum-
ken, and Williams. Senator
~ of the bill (S. 2768) to pro-
States by authorizing the
official transcript.
n.J
REPORT ON THE U-2 INCIDENT
[Editor's Note.--0n May 5, 1960, the Soviet Union announced that it had shot
down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over its territory. American officials
at first described it as a weather research plane and denied that it had been in-
volved in espionage. Two days later, however, Soviet Premier Khrushchev revealed
that the pilot was still alive and would stand trial for spying. That same day, the
State Department admitted that the U-2 had been "endeavoring to obtain informa-
tion now concealed behind the Iron Curtain." Khrushchev's demand that President
Eisenhower apologize for the U-2 flights, and Eisenhower's refusal, led to the col-
lapse of the 4-Power Summit Conference scheduled for later that month in Paris.
The American pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was tried before a Soviet military tri-
bunal and sentenced to 10 years in prison. However, on February 10, 1962, Powers
was released in exchange for convicted Soviet spy Rudolph Abel powers returned to
the United States, where he was interrogated by a special board of inquiry which
the CIA had formed to investigate his capture.
On February 12, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee formally requested that
it receive a full report of Powers' interrogation. At a news conference, the following
day, President Kennedy said that Powers was "cooperating voluntarily" with the in-
terrogation, and that the results yvould be made available to Congress.
On March 6, Powers testified before a public hearing of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee. Chairman Richard Russell opened the hearing by reading astate-
ment from the CIA board of inquiry that Powers had "lived up to the .terms of his
employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in connection with
his mission as an American under the circumstances in which he found himself."j
TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1962
` U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
.. ..ir..a a>.aaaaua, ilGlutri~llC,
Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams. ,
committee) presiding.. e
p
U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of th
The committee met, pursuant to notice at 4
m in r Fv53
- _..._....... .l.aa.oa,a.,aao 11 Ally
of the committee wishes to ask questions.
rea Ing It
since everybody has read it. We will proceed. if v~u wnnirl l;ho +,.
-~-- p..~ ao sacs c.
The CIIAIRMAN. I have read it. There is no need of d'
as c;a. a~va Vl 411C
Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. McCone. You have issued a state-
ment concerning Powers? Does everybody have a copy?
c..__~__ n___ __ - - _ , . - _ _
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
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STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McCONE, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON,
GENERAL COUNSEL, JOHN S. WARNER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
AND MORSE ALLEN, CIA; MAJOR HARRY CORDES, U.S. AIR
FORCE, AND ROBERT GOODNOW, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULT-
ANT
Mr. McCoNE. Mr. Chairman, there are a few notes I have. I see
no reason to read the memorandum.
The CHAIRMAN. YOU may proceed.
Mr. McCoNE. First, I have been asked many questions as to the
purpose in securing Powers' release. The purpose was twofold; first,
an understandable human desire to secure the release of a young
man captured and imprisoned, and when acting under our direc-
tion. This has been and will continue to be our policy in other in-
stances if they should occur.
Second, and perhaps of greater importance to the national inter-
est, was to determine beyond a reasonable doubt if the U-2 plane
was actually brought down by ground-to-air fire or otherwise from
a very high altitude. If this fact was established, then the U-2 has
obviously been compromised and cannot be safely used where such
defensive installations exist. If, on the other hand, the investiga-
tion we conducted would prove that the U-2 descended from its al-
titude because of engine failure and, hence, finally came down
within reach.of Soviet fighter planes and was shot down, then the
U-2 might make further very important contributions to our na-
tional security.
It is, therefore, in our national interest to know all ascertainable
facts concerning this incident. For that reason the Powers-Abel ex-
change, in my opinion, has served the interests of the United
States.
Turning to the interrogation of Powers: Powers, on his return,
was first carefully examined by doctors who reported that he was
in good physical condition, normal mental condition, and showed
no signs whatsoever of abnormalities as a result of his imprison-
ment or any treatment he might have been subjected to during the
period of his imprisonment. This examination, which continued
throughout the period of his interrogation, was made by competent
physicians, by psychiatrists and psychologists who were chosen be-
cause of their knowledge of brainwashing, truth serums, and other
techniques which might have been applied.
One of these specialists is present now.
On the basis of these reports, the Board of Inquiry and the CIA
have concluded that Powers' physical and mental condition and
treatment during imprisonment would not distort his story regard-
less of what it was.
In connection with this interrogation, we selected a team of the
most competent interrogators available to us, who questioned
Powers intermittently over a period of 5 days concerning the inci-
dent and all related matters. These interrogators were chosen on
the basis of their experience and, most particularly, because of
their objectivity. We wanted men who, to our knowledge, were not
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RECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLI-
~Y LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON,
TER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
HARRY CORDES, U.S. AIR
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULT-
~ed many questions as to the
he purpose was twofold; first,
ecure the release of a young
Then acting under our direc-
to beour policy in other in-
~rtance to the national inter-
cable doubt if the U-2 plane
?to-air fire or otherwise from
stablished, then the U-2 has
of be safely used where such
e other hand, the investiga-
~e U-2 descended from its al-
hence, finally came down
irld was shot down, then the
ant contributions to our na-
est to know all ascertainable
t reason the Powers-Abel ex-
the interests of the United
versa Powers, on his return,
's who reported that he was
ental condition, and showed
ea a result of his imprison-
been subjected to during the
ilnination, which continued
.ion, was made by competent
~logists who were chosen be-
ing, truth serums, and other
(ied.
~v.
yard of Inquiry and the CIA
and mental condition and
not distort his story regard-
s, we selected .a team of the
ale to us, who questioned
S days concerning the inci-
~terrogators were chosen on
Est particularly, because of
to our knowledge, were not
prejudiced in the case, and also men skilled in interrogation
techniques. In this respect I think the executives of CIA were
successful.
One of these interrogators is here to answer your questions.
All conversations were recorded and transcribed and were care-
fully studied by the Board of Inquiry, which I will refer to later,
and by a technical evaluation group established by the U.S. Air
Force, at my request, to render a judgment as to whether a plane
damaged as Powers said his plane was damaged, could behave as
he claimed it did behave, with the effects of the pilot which he
claims he experienced.
As the paper before you indicates, the interrogators were satis-
fied that Powers' story was correct, that it was supported by collat-
eral intelligence unknown to him, and that there were no contra-
dictions which raised questions in their minds.
CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE
They therefore have reported that the Powers U-2 plane was
damaged while flying at 68,000 feet. Actually it was above 68,000
feet, but this information remains classified.
While the exact nature of the cause of the damage cannot be es-
tablished, circumstances lead to the conclusion that the damage
was caused by the explosion of a ground-to-air non-nuclear missile.
The explosion occurred some distance behind the plane, but close
enough to so impair the stabilizer as to render the plane uncontrol-
lable.
The plane acted as reported in the paper before you, and Powers
was exposed to forces of gravity, which explains his difficulty
throughout his descent. These have been carefully examined by
experts.
The loss of control, the nosing over of the plane, the tearing off
of the wings, the inverted spin assumed by the fuselage and the re-
maining parts of the plane, and the gravity forces on the pilot have
all been studied by competent serodynamicists and aeronautical
engineers, who report that all these events would all occur in the
manner described by Mr. Powers. In other words, there was no in-
consistency between what Mr. Powers said happened and what sci-
entists feel would happen under such circumstances.
A further point that has been examined is the extent of the
damage of the remnants of the plane. Some have stated that a
plane falling from such height would suffer far greater damage
than was evidenced by pictures of the remnants of the
Powers' U-2.
Aeronautical engineers who examined photographs of the rem-
nants of four other U-2's which failed at 68,000 feet or above, find
no appreciable difference between the condition of the remnants in
each of these planes and the pictures of the Powers' U-2. This
point was therefore dismissed by the experts.
SPECULATION THAT THE PLANE HAD DESCENDED
Conflicting intelligence which led to the speculation that Powers'
plane descended gradually to an altitude of 35,000 to 40,000 feet,
has also been examined.
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As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, there was considerable specu-
lation in the press that Powers was not shot down at 68,000 feet,
but that his engine flamed out and he descended gradually, and fi-
nally was shot down when he came within range of Soviet intercep-
tors. [Deleted.]
This information has been examined and reexamined by the
Board of Inquiry. This [deleted] caused the Board to question the
dependability and reliability of this particular information. More-
over, the fact that the information itself is in certain important de-
tails contradictory, contributed to the conclusion that such infor-
mation cannot be accepted as dependable intelligence upon which
Mr. Powers' story could be refuted.
[Deleted.]
POWERS' POLYGRAPH TEST
When Mr. Powers was confronted with the conflicting informa-
tion, he requested, as the paper before you states, a polygraph test.
He was under the polygraph for 5 hours, an inordinately long time
for a polygraph test. The test was conducted by the most expert
polygraph tester in the agency.
The results were positive. There were no reactions which, in the
opinion of the experts, could be interpreted as indicating that Mr.
Powers was deviating from the truth with respect to any essential
aspects of the inquiry, including, of course, his story of the event
which damaged his plane and the subsequent events during his de-
scent.
His insistence on subjecting himself to a polygraph and the re-
sults of the tests have an important bearing on the conclusions of
the Board and the agency.
[Deleted.]
THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
As has been reported, I appointed a Board of Inquiry to examine
into this matter carefully and to report the findings to me. The
Board was composed of three distinguished and knowledgeable citi-
zens: retired Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, who was former Chief
Justice of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia;
General Harold R. Bull, a man of great experience in both military
and intelligence matters; and John Bross, a very senior CIA staff
officer of long experience, of legal background and no previous
direct connection with the U-2 project. This Board spent 10 days
studying all available facts and interrogating a great number of
witnesses and specialists, including Mr. Powers himself.
They rendered a report to me, and then I met for several hours
with the Board to personally review the reasons for their conclu-
sions, and more particularly to examine the conflicts to which I re-
ferred earlier. The Board reached the conclusions stated in the
final paragraph of the paper before you.
After a long and intense discussion with the Board and the con-
sideration of all other information available to me at this time, I
concur with the findings and concur in the findings of the Board.
Those findings are to the effect, and I will quote:
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~e was considerable specu-
shot down at 68,000 feet,
~cended gradually, and fi-
n range of Soviet intercep-
Iand reexamined by the
the Board to question the
ticular information. More-
is in certain important de-
onclusion that such infor-
le intelligence upon which
:h the conflicting informa-
~u states, a polygraph test.
an inordinately long time
iucted by the most expert
no reactions which, in the
;ted as indicating that Mr.
th respect to any essential
rse, his story of the event
luent events during his de-
;o apolygraph and the re-
iring on the conclusions of
UIRY
oard of Inquiry to examine
~ the findings to me. The
led and knowledgeable citi-
an, who was former Chief
r the District of Columbia;
experience in both military
ss, a very senior CIA staff
~kground and no previous
This Board spent 10 days
gating a great number of
Powers himself.
ien I met for several hours
.e reasons for their conclu-
the conflicts to which I re-
conclusions stated in the
zth the Board and the con-
ilable to me at this time, I
the findings of the Board.
ill quote:
"On all the information available, therefore, it is the conclusion
of the Board of Inquiry which reviewed Mr. Powers' case," and my
conclusion as well, after carefully studying the Board report and
discussing it with them, "that Mr. Powers lived up to the terms of
his employment and instructions in connection with his mission
and in his obligations as an American under the circumstances in
which he found himself. Accordingly, the amount due Mr. Powers
under the terms of this contract will be paid to him."
That concludes my notes extending the statement that was made
public.
SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRI30NERs
The CHAIRMAN. Why d0 you think, Mr. McCone, the Russians did
not resort to greater pressure, if not torture on Mr. Powers? How
do you account for their apparently rather lenient treatment?
Mr. McCoNE. It seems to be rather characteristic of their teat??
ment of men who are imprisoned in this way. It was exactly the
way they treated the two fliers on the RB-47 that was shot down a
year or two ago, or were released about a year ago, you will recall.
This man was not part of any espionage system. He was a flier
and employed to pilot a .plane and to operate a mechanism in the
plane which he didn't know too much about, although he kneed the
purpose of the--
The CItwIRMAN. It is much more clearly espionage than the RB-
47 flyers, though, wasn't it? They were off the coast.
Mr. McCoNE. I do not think it more clearly espionage. It was
over the country rather than offshore. But the purposes of that
flight were very clearly known, which was to establish certain facts
with reference to the Soviet defense mechanism.
The CHAIRMAN. The conclusion is that the Russians developed a
more powerful vehicle, rocket, than we had thought they had, I
guess?
Mr. McCoNE. This is the conclusion that I draw from all of the
testimony, although Mr. Powers does not know and cannot say for
sure what brought him down. No one saw aground-to-air missile.
But when you take his story and you take all collateral intelligence
and examine the results of previous flights, you can only come to
the conclusion that it must have been aground-to-air missile, plus
the fact that we knew from other intelligence that he was flying
over Soviet air defense sites.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?
Senator SPARKMAN. Did I understand you to say that the plane
was flying in excess of 60,OJ0 feet at the time?
Mr. McCoNE. It was flying at 70,000 feet, Senator Sparkman.
Senator SPARKMAN. 70,000 feet?
Mr. McCoNE. Yes. The Soviets said that it was 68,000 feet, and
Powers admitted 68,000 feet, although that was below his actual al-
titude and several feet below the capability of the plane, so we just
let it go at that. That was consistent with his instructions, inciden-
tally.
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Senator SPARKMAN. We do not have any ground-to-air rocket in
that range, do we?
Mr. McCoNE. I do not know-on the effective range of the Nike
and the Nike Hercules-but I would think that it would be up in
that altitude, yes. Colonel, could you answer that question?
Senator SPARKMAN. The Nike Zeus.
Major CoRDES. To the best of my knowledge the Nike Ajax and
the Nike Hercules could reach to this altitude.
Senator SYMINGTON. I think you are wrong, but I will check it.
Major CoRDES. The Nike Hercules; and the Ajax is open to ques-
tion, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. I notice the gentleman sitting by you is hold-
ing some kind of an instrument. What is that?
Mr. HOUSTON. There was a lot of talk about whether it was just
the activating of a fuse which could have destroyed the plane. This
is not just a button you push. You have to go through four actions.
There are covers here which are wired down. )first you have to
break the cover up like that, then set that switch, and then break
that cover and set that switch, and then he has 70 seconds in
which to get out. So it is not just as easy as pushing a button.
Senator SPARKMwN. That is what I mean. I believe, according to
the statement, he said that there was no way of-first, he could not
get to it, and second, when he thought he might maneuver his way
to it, he felt he could not get out within the 70 seconds, is that
right?
Mr. McCoxE. That is correct.
Mr. HOUSTON. At that time he could get to it. It was within
reach, easy reach at that time. But he did not know yet whether he
could go out because he could not get into his ejection mechanism,
so he thought he would wait until he got clear. When he got clear
he was halfway out of the plane and he could not get in, owing to
the G forces, and reach it.
MODEL OF THE PLANE
Mr. McCoNE. I think if Major Cordes could get this plane, he
could describe Mr. Powers' story of what happened to him. Quite
by coincidence, a U-2 plane came down in Louisiana on the 2nd of
January, and the pilot of the plane describes the performance of
the plane, and it was just identical with that of Mr. Powers--con-
formed practically identically with what Mr. Powers had to say.
Major CoRDES. My apologies to you, sir. You have it already, Sen-
ator.
Senator $YMINGTON. You do it so well, I would like to hear it
three or four times more.
Major Cox.nES. This is a model of the U-2 of the type that Mr.
Powers was flying.
These are auxiliary fuel tanks. The engine is located in the fuse-
lage, in the area indicated thusly.
These are the air scoops. This is the cockpit. The equipment bay
where the camera is located is just behind the pilot in this area.
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my ground-to-air rocket in
effective range of the Nike
nk that it would be up in
wer that question?
wledge the Nike Ajax and
itude.
wrong, but I will check it.
t the t~jax ie open to ques-
THE PLANE
nan sitting by you is hold-
that?
about whether it was just
destroyed the plane. This
o go through four actions.
down. First you have to
~t switch, and then break
'n he has 70 seconds in
~s pushing a button.
in. I believe, according to
vay of-first, he could not
might maneuver his way
i the 70 seconds, is that
get to it. It was within
not know yet whether he
~ his ejection mechanism,
clear. When he got clear
ould not get in, owing to
could get this plane, he
happened to him. Quite
Louisiana on the 2nd of
~ibes the performance of
hat of Mr. Powers-con-
r. Powers had to say.
you have it already, Sen-
I would like to hear it
-2 of the type that Mr.
Ie is located in the fuse-
:pit. The equipment bay
~ the pilot in this area.
The analysis of the pictures of the wreckage reveals that a fail-
ure of some type occurred in the tail area. It was most likely a fail-
ure to one or both of the horizontal stabilizers. That is these eleva-
tors, horizontal stabilizers, in this area.
Mr. Powers stated that his right wing dropped thusly. He cor-
rected this. The ailerons responded. He corrected with the controls,
responded, at which time the nose started dropping, and at this
time he pulled back on the control column. The controls were inef-
fective.
At this time he described a series of events that, in reconstruct-
ing it, is most likely that at some time during this nose-over ma-
neuver, the tail perhaps came completely.clear of the aircraft.
Also at some time in his nose-over maneuver, the structural
limits of the wings were exceeded. The wings could have failed
either upward or downward. The direction is not critical, but the
fact that they did fail is clearly shown in the wreckage. They could
have failed upward from excessive speeds and loads or downward
from the effects of the winds.
PLANE WENT INTO A BPIN
This then is the portion of the airplane which is the range it
went over into an inverted position and started into this inverted
spin, as Mr. Power described it.
From my experience with a spinning aircraft, a spin is a very un-
comfortable maneuver. I would imagine with only this much of an
aircraft remaining, inverted spin of this type is quite uncomfort-
able.
He stated that the nose was up and he could see the sky up in
the front of the aircraft. This would indicate that possibly the
engine was still remaining with the fuselage at that time, provid-
ing this weight back in this area.
He stated that he attempted to get back in his ejection seat. He
had difficulty assuming the ejection seat.
It is interesting to note that on the 2nd of January this year, a
U-2 accident occurred in which the pilot landed in, I believe it was,
Alabama or Mississippi. He spent the night in a tree.
This gentleman, in reconstructing the series of events preceding
his accident-the events are quite similar to those described by Mr.
Powers. The sensations that he experienced during this inverted
spin are quite similar to those experienced by Mr. Powers.
AN AUTOPILOT MALFUNCTION
Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask, what was the cause of his in-
cident or accident?
Major CoxnES. The cause of his incident, sir, the most probable
cause, and these are the words of the accident report, was an auto-
pilot malfunction that caused the aircraft to exceed the structural
limitation and failure occurred in one or more control surfaces.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. When you use those interesting words
that you just used, what do you mean, the engine quit working or
what?
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Major CoRDES. No. The automatic pilot is a device designed to fly
the aircraft, allowing the pilot to devote more attention to naviga-
tion, fixing his position, recording information.
Senator HICKENIAOPER. I See.
Major CORDES. The automatic pilot senses changes 1n direction. It
is gyroscopically stabilized and applies corrections to the control
surfaces:
In this instance, the most probable cause of the accident was con-
sidered to be an autopilot malfunction that caused a pitching of the
aircraft that caused failure of the structures.
Senator LwvscxE. That is in the Louisiana fall?
Major CORDES. yes, sir:
PILOT JETTISONED MANUALLY
In ~ the case of Mr. Powers, Mr. Powers stated in his testimony
.that he was flying the aircraft manually, that the autopilot was
not employed. The similarity between the two accidents is in the
manner in which the wings failed, the inverted position, the sensa-
tions experienced by the pilots, sir.
In this spinning configuration, Mr. Powers stated that fmally he
was able to manually jettison mechanically. This is done by re-
leasing two handles, one on each side of the 'cockpit. The canopy
separated.
He states that he then released his safety belt, which allowed
him to fly out over the -forward portion of the aircraft. However, he
was momentarily connected by his oxygen equipment:
This subsequently broke loose. He does not know whether it
came loose at the ordinary disconnect position or if it were a break
in a different position.
He was thrown free of 'the aircraft. At this time his parachute
opened, he stated, almost immediately, and from this it was de-
duced that his altitude at that time was perhaps 15,000 feet or
below, because the parachute is set to open automatically at 15,000
feet or below. He then floated down to Earth.
At the time the pictures were taken in Gorki Park, the engine
was shown separate from the fuselage. There are indications that
at some time during the descent of this portion of the aircraft, the
engine may have been thrown free and landed separate from this
other part.
Senator SPARKMAN. The wings and all the parts that show there,
were they included in the pictures?
Major CORDES. The wing
Senator -SPAR.KMAN. The tail assembly.
Major CoRDES. No, sir; not in this fine a condition, but damaged.
Senator SPARKMAN. And the wings?
Major CORDES. I believe that there is no positive indication that
the left horizontal stabilizer was shown in any picture.
As I recall the picture of this other tail, it was up against the
exhibits so that it could not be determined whether .this was actu-
ally there or not. As I recall, this is more of the configuration that
the tail was in, with damage to each of these parts.
Senator SPARKMAN. Well, thank you.
kne
1V
S
slat
age ~
C
it w
T
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M
Sve:
was
ed, ;
seal
W
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up i
that
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that
that
wor,
of tl
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of is a device designed to fly
:e more attention to naviga-
mation.
Haas changes in direction. It
a corrections to the control
ruse of the accident was con-
;hat caused a pitching of the
Lures.
liana fall?
1NUALLY
ers stated ~in his testimony
illy, that the autopilot was
the two accidents is in the
inverted position, the sensa-
owers stated that finally he
iically. This is done by re-
of the ' cockpit.' The canopy
safety belt, :which allowed
of the aircraft. However; he
en equipment:"
does not know whether it
osition or if~it were a break
~, .
At this time his parachute
and from this it was de-
~vas perhaps 15,000 feet or
pen automatically at 15,000
;arth. ~ ;
in Gorki Park, the engine
There ere indications that
portion of the aircraft, the
l landed separate from this
l the parts that show there,
a condition, but damaged.
no positive indication that
in any picture.
tail, it was up against the
ned whether .this .was actu-
re of .the configuration that
,here parts. ,
Mr. McCone, you said that four U-2 flights had fallen at 68,000
feet or above. Did this include the two that he described a minute
ago?
Mr. McCoNE. There were four besides the Powers flight.
Senator SPwxxrrlnN. Well, the Louisiana or Alabama
Mr. McCoNE. And elsewhere.
Senator SPARKMAN. Didn't you have one in California just the
day before yesterday?
Mr. McCoNE. Yes. That was at about 30,D00 feet, I would say.
Senator SPAxxIVtAN. Do you know yet the trouble with it?
Mr. McCoNE. I have not had a report. The initial report was that
counterturbulence at the time of refueling occurred. Perhaps you
have a report on .that?
Major CoRDES. No, sir. I have nothing official yet.
Mr. McCoNE. That is the unofficial report I have. We lost the
pilot.
Senator SPwxxMwN. Yes, I noticed that.
MI33ION OF THE FLIGHT
When we held our hearings back in the summer of 1960-you
knew we held hearings on this?
Mr. McCoNE. Yes, I did.
Senator SPwxxMwN. I thought we had the hearings here, and we
also issued a report. It stated this in one of the paragraphs:
There remains the question of the wisdom of eendingthe flight at all.
The committee was told that the flight was after information of well above aver-
age importance, but it was not told what this information was.
Can you tell us now what the information was?
Mr. McCoNE. Yes.. Have we got a map here? I can tell you what
it was.
The pilot of this flight was to take off from here.
Senator SPARHMAN. Was that in Turkey?
Mr. McCoNE. In Pakistan.
It was to fly over- the Tyura Tam missile range, and then up to
Sverdlovsk-and here is where the accident occurred-and then it
was to go over here, which is a big base in which we were interest-
ed, and them up north.
Moscow is here; Leningrad is over here. It was to go up north in
search of missile bases and other installations up north.
We had never had any flights up in that area, although we had a
great many penetrations in the Soviet Union. We had never been
up in the north or if we had, they had not been satisfactory. For
that reason this was considered an unusually important mission.
THE TIMING OF THE FLIGHT
Senator SPwxtcM.~,N. If you remember, there was one question
that was in the minds of a great many people at that time, and
that was the timeliness of this flight. I do not know whether it is
worth going into now, but this was, you remember, just on the eve
of the opening of that conference.
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Mr. McCoNE. Indeed I do, Senator. I was over there in Paris at
the time, so I remember it very well.
Senator SPARKMAN. I guess you know something. It must have
caused quite a stir there.
Mr. McCoNE. Indeed it did.
I was not part of the decisionmaking process on flights at that
time. As Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, I was a
member of the National Security Council, [deleted].
I am told that there were a great many considerations, not the
least of which was the weather; that many of these flights aborted
because of bad weather, and there seemed to be a brief period
where there was particularly good weather, and therefore there
was a desire to take advantage of those conditions particularly up
into the north. Another consideration-we saw the rising defense
effort of the Soviets and wanted to get as much done as we could
before some incident might occur.
In retrospect, it might have been unfortunately timed with refer-
ence to the summit meeting. But we had to carry this effort on be-
cause this is the most solid intelligence, the hardest intelligence,
that we have ever obtained. A great deal that we know of the
Soviet military posture and atomic energy developments and all
the rest come from this U-2 photography. Hence, had this occurred
May 20 rather than May 1, I think it would have caused the same
kind of an uproar.
Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have used my share of the
time.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.
TWO ABORTED FLIGHTS
Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is my recollection that, at the hearings
at that time, it was made quite clear that the days of the year
when they had the greatest reasonable visibility over the entire
proposed course were very few, and are very few in that area. This
happened to be one of those days which had not occurred for a long
time before, and might not occur for a long time afterwards, and
they sent the flight when the conditions came as nearly being ideal
as they usually are in that area. At least, to my recollection that
was the presentation.
Mr. McCoNE. Yes, I think that is right. As I recall, and I am
speaking from memory now, there were-they aborted two flights,
and this was a third one.
NOT CHARACTERISTIC OF A FLAME OUT
Senator HICKENLOOPEA. Yes. If they had not settled on this day,
there was no telling how many weeks or months might go by
before they could get weather conditions which would answer as
many of the problems as they wanted to find out about.
Now, this hollow~ounding explosion, or whatever it was, that
Powers mentioned, and the subsequent or coincidental orange col-
ored flash, was that accompanied by a physical shock, did he say?
Mr. MCCoNE. It was described as a feeling of forward accelera-
tion. He got a push from the stern.
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is over there in Paris at
something. It must have
~rocesa on flights at that
Commission, I was a
~eleted].
y considderations, not the
y of these flights aborted
:led to be a brief period
her, and therefore there
:onditions particularly up
~e saw the rising defense
s much done as we could
;unately timed with refer-
to carry this effort on be-
the hardest intelligence,
;al that we know of the
?gy developments and all
Hence, had this occurred
uld have caused the same
ave used my share of the
ction that, at the hearings
.hat the days of the year
visibility over the entire
~e few in that area. This
iad not occurred for a long
long time afterwards, and
game as nearly being ideal
st, to my recollection that
;ht. As I recall, and I am
-they aborted two flights,
FLAME OUT
ad not settled on this day,
~ or months might go by
is which would answer as
find out about.
or whatever it was, that
or coincidental orange col-
~hyaical shock, did ~ fie say?
eeling of forward accelera-
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. That would not be characteristic of a
flameout, would it?
Mr. McCoNE. I would think not, no. It would be just the opposite,
would it not, Major?
Major CoRDSS? No, sir. That would ; not be characteristic of a
flameout, sir.
Senator HICKENI.OOPER. Would you think it was characteristic of
an air pressure or being struck by a solid object?
Mr. MCC.ONE. I would think it would be characteristic of an air
pressure. I would think if he was struck by a solid object there
would be much more of a violent reaction than he described.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. Yes.
What happens when they have a flameout at that height?
That is at a substantial height, is it not, accompanied by.an ex-
plosion or something of that kind, or by-well, an exploslon de-
scribes it-what happens?
Mr. McCoIVE. Major?
Senator HICKENI.oOPER. Does it just stop and there 18 no more?
CABIN PRffiSURE
Major CORDffi. Sir, I have experienced flameouts at that height,
too, to be exact, and the sensation is, it gets quite violent in the
airplane. The best way I could describe it is a chug in the engine,
not an explosion, not a push, but a chug in the engine, followed by
the next thing one would notice, his revolution per. minute indica-
tor going down rapidly. The next sensation, sir, would be the pres-
sure suit automatically inflating because the cabin Pressure would
tend to adjust itself to that of the outside air, the cabin being nor-
mally pressurized.
Senator IIICHENI.oOPER. Normally pressurized as the result of the
engine operation?
Major CoRDffi. Yes, sir. A compressor on the engine compresses
the alr, which pressurizes the cabin in the neighborhood of 29,000
feet at 68,000 to 70,000 feet.
Senator IIICHENLOOPER. Did he notice ariy immediate increase of
that expansion of his pressure suit?
Major CORDffi. Sir, he stated that he recalled at some time
during this series of maneuvers he experienced that -his suit did in-
flate.
" Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I See.
Is a flameout accompanied by a flash of light that could normally
be seen by the pilot?
Major CoRDffi. No, sir; it is not.
POWERS' COURTROOM DECLARATIONS
Senator IIICRENLOOPER. I take it, Mr. MCCone, that you are satis-
fied with Powers' courtroom declarations.
As I understand the reports, toheW~ h taae t~ ~~e reports
was asked him: Was he spying PY?
said that he said he was spying. Then there were some reports that
he seemed to agree with thelr condemnation of American policy
and expressed regret, or something of that kind, that this had hap-
pened.
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Those are apparently newspaper reports of one kind or another.
What was the circumstance there?
Mr. MCCoNE. I think they are right. I think it has been verified.
I think that he did that under the advice of the counsel that was
provided for him, who emphasized that the seriousness of his situa-
tion was great, and advised him to admit the purposes of his mis-
sion and express repentance because he was in danger of drawing a
death sentence. His action in this regard did not materially conflict
with the instructions that he was given as to the course of action
he should follow if captured.
NO EVIDENCE OF BRAINWASHING
Senator HICKENLOOPER. You discovered no evidence that any
means such as drug injections or anything of that kind or protract-
ed brainwashing techniques had been used on him?
Mr. MCCONE. I would like Dr. Goodnow to answer that question.
Mr. Goonxow. We made a pretty careful analysis of his testimo-
ny, his behavior when he came back and was debriefed and inter-
viewed by us, and through other collateral sources, the source of
procedures that the Soviets have used or could use under the cir-
cumstances, and there is no evidence of any kind that--
Senator HIriKENLOOPER. What does he Say Hbout lt?
Mr. GooDNOW. He says no.
Senator HIC.RENLOOPER. That 1S, they used no drugs?
Mr. GooDNOw. No drugs, no hypnoses, no truth serum, no special
procedures, no conditioning procedures.
Senator -SYMINGTON. They did give him an injection.
Mr. Goonxow. He did get an injection the first night in prison,
probably believed to be a general immunization injection.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean against disease of one kind or
another?
Mr. Goonxow. )`airly standard procedure in Russian prisons is to
give a new prisoner Immunization, because they are concerned
with the general physical health of the prisoners.
Senator HICiKENLOOPER. I See.
Was he questioned immediately after that?
Mr. Goonxow. No, he was not. This was on the first night in the
prison. He was not questioned during the next morning, but was
questioned sometime after that.
Mr. HOUSTON. Excuse me, Doctor, he was questioned some that
next morning.
Mr. Goonxow. In the morning?
Mr. HousTON. In the morning.
SeriatOT HICKENLOOPER. That 1S all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator LausChe.
COLLATERAL INTELLIGENCE
Senator LAUSCHE. What was this collateral intelligence that you
applied in reaching your judgment, that was unknown to him as
you interrogated him?
Mr. McCoNE. Well, at the point of his descent, he describes in
considerable detail the geography that he observed during his para-
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[ think it has been verified.
ice of the counsel that was
the seriousness of his situa-
nit the purposes of his mis-
was in danger of drawing a
~ did not materially conflict
i as to the course of action
gyred no evidence that any
'~ng of that kind or protract-
ed on him?
~w to answer that question.
eful analysis of his teatimo-
nd was debriefed and inter-
teral sources, the source of
or could use under the cir-
any kind that--
say about it?
used no drugs?
no truth serum, no special
n an injection.
~n the first night in prison,
nization injection.
ainst disease of one kind or
lure in Russian prisons is to
ecause they are concerned
prisoners.
that?
vas on the first night in the
the next morning, but was
was questioned some that
ateral intelligence that you
at was unknown to him as
his descent, he describes in
le observed during his para-
chute descent, and in this way identified the locality, the communi-
ty adjacent to the point of his landing.
Now, we determined that individuals who came to him immedi-
ately after his landing and testified at his trial, actually lived in
this particular community. This was determined and our knowl-
edge of that was not known to him.
Senator LnuscxE. How were those facts pertinent in concluding
that this happened the way it was described by him?
Mr. MCCoNE. I do not think that it was finally conclusive. I
think it was contributory to the whole picture, though.
Senator LnvscxE. Were any of these other experiences which you
described known to him in the giving of this testlmony? Was that
collateral intelligence which you applied to determine whether he
was telling the truth?
Major CORDES. Sir, the experiences that he described in going
through this descent in the aircraft were compared with experi-
ences described by other pilots who had experienced a similar type
of break-up of the aircraft. There were no inconsistencies noted be-
tween what Mr. Powers testified and the testimony of other pilots
who had experiended this same type of incident.
Senator LwuscxE. Had Powers ever gone through an experience
of this type before?
Major CORDES. He had not undergone this previously himself, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. SO the intelligence which you acquired
through other experiences was used in determining whether he
was telling the truth, and you found that his description compared
with your other intelligence?
Major CORDES. Sir, in our evaluation we were attempting to es-
tablish that the experiences that he described were completely con-
sistent with what would happen in this type of incident.
Senator LnuscxE. All right.
TIME OF DESCENT
Now, then, he was at 70,000 feet and his last observation of alti-
tude showed him to be, I think he testified, at 34,000 feet.
Did you try to calculate what length of time it would have taken
him to drop from the 70,000 feet down to the 34,000 feet?
Major CORDES. Yes, sir. We have had some estimates of this kind.
Senator LwuscxE. What is the estimate of the time, based upon
his description of what occurred?
Major CoxDES. Sir, the estimate went below 34,000, down to
15,000. There is evidence in his testimony that his parachute
opened. This would be the altitude at which he left the aircraft, so
our investigation concerned itself from the time of 70,000 feet down
to 15,000 feet.
The time estimates, sir, varied from a minimum of approximate-
ly 1 minute and 50 seconds up to several minutes. There could be
quite a significant variation, sir, dependent upon how much wing
surface remained with the fuselage, whether or not the engine was
thrown clear, and at what time it was thrown clear.
I am sorry, sir, that I cannot give you a more definite answer
than that at this time.
Senator LauscxE. I understand that.
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When you say several minutes,- what do you mean by several
minutes?
Major CoRDES. I mean, air, it could have been in excess of 5 min-
utes.
Senator LAUSCHE. 70 seconds to 5 minutes?
Major CoRDES. Yes.
WHY PILOT DID NOT DESTROY THE PLANE
Senator LAUSCxE. There has been no description given in your
demonstration of how this plane tumbled and revolved about the
time when he tried to reach this lever or mechanism that would
destroy the .ship. When did he try to reach it and why couldn't he
reach it?
Mr. McCoNE. Have you got your photographs of that?
Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't the issue why he did not destroy this
ship? That is the principal issue.
Mr. McCoNE. Yes, I think, yes. This has always been a question,
and there is an explanation for it that seemed plausible.
However, I would like to explain to the committee, if I might,
Mr. Chairman, that the charge that was placed in the ship was a
2'/2-pound charge for the purpose of destroying the .camera as an
operational camera. It was not a large enough charge to destroy
the camera or the film, to say nothing of the ship.
However, it was in a place where it was ,quite dangerous to the
pilot because it was immediately under him.
Major CORDES. Yes, sir.
Sir, this is a picture of the cockpit. This is the control wheel. The
pilot would be sitting facing the control wheel. The position of the
destruct is on his right, indicated thusly by my finger.
Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.
Major CoRDES. In the configuration that he described during his
descent from this aircraft or what remained of this aircraft, this
remaining portion of the aircraft was going through some wild gy-
rations, if I may use that expression. He was, by his description,
thrown out against his safety belt, and his arms were thrown
upward in this direction, sir.
He released himself by managing somehow to get his arms down
and releasing his safety belt. By his statement, he was thrown out
over the front of the aircraft-this would be out over in this direc-
tion; that is, upside down, spinning this way. Centrifugal force
threw him out this way.
FOUR SEPARATE OPERATIONS
At this time he stated that he could not reach back inside and
reach the switches. The switches, sir, if I may have that-this is
not a mere one single operation. There are four separate operations
involved to assure that this mechnism will destruct.
There is an arm switch in any such destruct mechanism, and one
must build certain safety features into it. The arm switch guard
must be raised; the arm switch must be activated thusly.
Next the destruct switch cover must be raised and the destruct
switch activated thusly.
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at do you mean by several
ave been in excess of 5 min-
iutes?
io description given in your
pled and revolved about the
r or mechanism that would
each it and why couldn't he
;ographs of, that?
by he did not destroy this
has always been a question,
seemed plausible.
the committee, if I might,
as placed in the ship was a
estroying the camera as an
e enough charge to destroy
>f the ship.
was quite dangerous to the
him.
~Iis is the control wheel. The
1 wheel. The position of the
by my finger.
hat he described during his
pained of this aircraft, this
;oing through some wild gy-
He was, by his description,
nd his arms were thrown
iehow to get his arms down
itement, he was thrown out
ld be out over in this direc-
;his way. Centrifugal force
not reach back inside and
if I may have that-this is
ire four separate operations
zll destruct.
~struct mechanism, and one
it. The arm switch guard
activated thusly.
be raised and the destruct
This is aspring-loaded switch; a momentary switch to the de-
struct position is all that is necessary.
On activating this destruct switch, the pilot has 70 seconds re-
maining to get clear of the aircraft.
From his description of the manipulations that this aircraft was
going through and the difficulty that he was having in attempting
to get at his seat and get his safety belt unfastened, in my estima-
tion, sir, it would have been difficult to actuate the switches.
Does that answer your question?
Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, it does.
That is, you really have to use this 70~econd period in determin-
ing whether under the circumstances he was able to liberate him-
self and also set into motion this explosive device.
Major CORDES. He must arm the device, then actuate the switch.
From the time he actuates this switch he then has 70 seconds to
get clear of the aircraft.
Senator LAUSCHE. What prevented him from getting clear of the
aircraft?
Major CoRnES. At this particular time, sir, at the time he unfas-
tened his seat belt stating he was thrown out forward and hanging
over the front of the cockpit, windshield, he stated that his oxygen
equipment, that equipment which connects the pressure suit to the
aircraft oxygen supply, was tangled up and it finally broke loose,
again his expression.
Senator LAUSCHE. Could he have reached this thing while he was
outside the plane?
Major CoRDES. It would have been extremely difficult, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask Mr. MCCone a question?
OTHER FLIGHTS IN THAT AREA
Generally how many flights were made in that area with
the U-2?
Mr. McCoNE. I do not have the exact number, Senator. If you
would take that down, there [deleted].
[Deleted.]
Mr. McCoNE. Not from the standpoint of interception or of
engine failure.
Senator LAUSCHE. Right.
The only difficulty that we had was on this flight of May 1?
Mr. McCoNE. That is the only difficulty we had over the Soviet
Union.
Senator LAUSCHE. Over the Soviet Union.
Mr. McCoNE. Yes. We had difficulty elsewhere with U-2's.
Senator LAUSCHE. [Deleted.]
Mr. McCoNE. Complaint?
Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, by the public or anybody else.
Mr. McCoNE. None whatsoever.
Senator LAUSCHE. The only complaint 13 that this flight should
not have been made.
Mr. McCoNE. That is correct.
Senator LAUSCHE. What if this one had proved successful?
Mr. MCCANE. If this one had proved successful?
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Senator LAVSCHE. Yes. There would have been no complaint I
suppose?
Mr. McCoNE. Eventually you were going to have trouble with
one of these flights, either mechanical failure and the plane would
come down or it would get shot down. But you are gaining the most
useful, solid intelligence that we have had on the Soviet Union.
Senator LAVSCHE. That is, you find no fault with the decision
that was made on that day of May 1, to make this flight?
Mr. McCoNE. No, I do not.
Senator LAVSCHE. All right. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.
POWERS' SALARY
Senator AIKEN. Mr. McCone, it is probably unfortunate that Mr.
Powers returned to a somewhat skeptical nation, and evidently
that skepticism was not all being allayed by recent developments.
We folks get questions that we cannot answer. Some of them we
probably should not answer even if we knew the answers.
As I understand it, Mr. Powers received his $2,600 a month pay
as a test pilot rather than an espionage agent.
Mr. McCoNE. That is correct.
Senator AIKEN. IS that the usual pay for a test pilot?
Mr. McCoNE. It is the pay, standard of pay, that we pay for the
pilots of the U-2 planes on these dangerous missions.
Senator AIKEN. Now, the question we are asked 1S how does the
pay for Mr. Powers compare with the pay which the seven astro-
nauts received, and was his job more hazardous than theirs?
Mr. McCoNE. I have not heard there were any special allowances
made to the astronauts. I am not familiar with that.
Senator AIKEN. That is a question that we are asked. Why should
he be paid so much more than they are?
Mr. McCoNE. I might say, however, that on the question of pay,
it pays less than an American Airlines pilot.
Senator AIKEN. Yes. He doesn't have a union. [Laughter.]
Mr. McCoNE. No, tl-.ere is no U-2 union.
Senator AIKEN. Which might account for it.
PROVIDING PILOT WITH DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES
Also you say that under general instructions that pilots-"If eva-
sion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should
surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude
toward their captors."
If that is so, why would they be furnished with a needle and any
other destructive devices?
Mr. MCCoNE. Of course, this does not assure that their captors
are going to have a cooperative attitude toward. them.
The taking of the needle was a voluntary act and on his own ini-
tiative. It was not mandatory that he take it. It is a fact that this is
the only flight of the 20-odd missions that he flew, it is the only
flight that he did take the needle.
Senator LAVSCHE. How many flights did he make?
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,ave been no complaint I
ing to have trouble with
ilure and the plane would
:you are gaining the most
I on the Soviet Union.
o fault with the decision
ake this flight?
tbly unfortilnate that Mr.
:al nation, and evidently
l by recent' developments.
snswer. Some of them we
ew the answers.
d his $2,600,a month pay
;ent.
r a test pilot?
' pay, that we pay. for the
Is missions.
ire asked is how does the
iy which the seven astro-
rdoue than .theirs?
xe any special allowances
with that.
we are asked. Why should
~t on the question of pay,
ot.
anion. [Laughter.]
r it.
tions that pilots-"If eva-
imminent, pilots should
t a .cooperative attitude
ed with a needle and any
assure that .their captors
.ward. them.
y act and on his own ini-
it. It is a fact that this is
at he flew, it is the only
Mr. McCoNE. He made 118 total U-2 flights of which, I
think, 2? were missions over either the Soviet Union or other
denied territories.
Senator LAUSCHE. Pardon me, George.
SITUATION OF DOWNEY AND FECrEAU
Senator AIKEN. Now, we hear comparisons drawn between Mr.
Powers and Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau who apparently were tor-
tured severely and are still in prison and refuse to talk. Did they
have a different type of training?
Mr. McCoNE. I am not familiar with the instructions that Mr.
Downey and Mr. Fecteau had. They are in the hands of the Chi-
nese Communists. I am quite positive that the Chinese Communists
did not adhere to the same- standards as the Soviets in these
matters. ,
Are you familiar with their instructions at all?
Mr., HOUSroN. They were given different instructions and they
were .engaged in very different operations. The operation was clas-
sified and a much more effective cover story existed to conceal the
operation which was given them than was given to the public; so
that there was more expectation that they would try to conceal the
exact nature of their, operation, whereas In the U-2 operation the
very presence of the plane in itself revealed the operation.
Senator AIKEN. Do you know of any recent efforts which have
been made to effect their release?
Mr. McCoNE. Yes, I do. There was a meeting in Warsaw last
week at which this matter was again discussed, inconclusively and
disappointingly from our standpoint.
There is another meeting scheduled on the 5th of April.
I had a long talk with Mrs. Downey on Saturday morning. It is a
very sad case.
SeriatOr AIREN. Yes.
Mr. McCoNE. And we intend to use every effort that we can, di-
rectly or with friendly nations, to try to persuade the Chinese Com-
munists that, on the basis of this very Power-Abel exchange, many
of their arguments against exchanges or consideration of the
Downey case can logically be dismissed.
Now, whether we are going to get very far with that or not, I do
not know. I am going to keep working at It.
Senator AIREN. We would be warranted, perhaps, 'in going to
rather unusual extremes to do something in order to get the re-
lease of Downey and Fecteau? '
Mr. McCoNE. I believe so.
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE PLANE
Senator AIKEPL; You say, "In the fifth place, a study of the photo-
graph of the debris of the plane and other informatlo~I co~pcerning
the plane revealed, in the opinion of experts making -#:he study, no
condition which suggested an inconsistency with Powers' account of
what had transpired."
Is that a photograph which was furnished you by the Russians or
ones you were able to get?
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Mr: MCCoxE. They were photographs from two sources. They
were photographs that were released by the Russians and also pho-
tographs, I believe, that we took, did we not?
Mr. HousTOx. Life Magazine.
Mr. MCCoxE. Of the exhibit, and also Life Magazine.
Senator AixEx. We took the one afterwards?
Mr. MCCoxE. Afterwards.
Senator AtxEx. Was it similar enough to the one used by the
Russians so that it appeared to be the same?
Mr. MCCoxE. Yes.
Mr. HousTOx. Except for those very first photographs which
were their own plane.
Senator AixEx. Yes.
POWERS' CAPTURE
One other question: Mr. Powers, in describing his accident and
his fall and his final parachuting to Earth, has he said anything,
did he observe whether he was being pursued on the way down-
ward or whether he was shot at or how was he captured?
Mr. MCCoxE. He was captured-he landed in a field, and there
were people there who observed him coming down, and were there
even in time to help spill the air out of his parachute and help him
get out of his rig. So they were there almost coincidentally with his
hitting the ground.
Senator AixEx. Of course, they did not know he was American?
Mr. MCCoxE. They did not know he was American. They, by fin-
gers, seemed to be questioning him whether there were one or two
people in the plane, and he signaled one, and then they pointed up,
and he says he observed what appears to be another parachute
coming down.
Now, this is unexplained. We have a certain conjecture and an
opinion that they actually shot down one of their own planes in the
excitement. But that is just a conjecture. We have no solid informa-
tion on it.
Senator AixEx. How long after he was captured did the Russian
military or police appear?
Mr. MCCoxE. Mr. Allen, I think you might answer that.
Mr. Aii.Ex. Relatively few minutes, at least as far as he could
tell.
Senator AixEx. Relatively few minutes?
Mr. A~.EN. Yes, sir.
Mr. HOUSTON. He does say in answer to that question today that
no one was in uniform until he got to the second village where he
was taken very quickly, and then apparently there was someone in
police uniform. The people who met him were not in uniform.
Senator AixEx. And he went willingly with the local people to
the village?
Mr. HOUSTON. That is right.
Senator AixEx. But he has no recollection of being pursued on
the way down?
Mr. HOUSTON. No, sir.
Senator AixEx. Or being shot at on the way down?
Mr. HOUSTON. No, sir.
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iphs from two sources. They
by the Russians and also pho-
ve not?
so Life Magazine.
erwards?
Hugh to the one used by the
same?
ery first photographs which
I describing his accident and
Earth, has he said anything,
~ pursued on the way down-
v was he captured? :-
landed in a field, and there
~oming down, and were there
.f his parachute and help him
almost coincidentally with his
not know he was American?
was American. They, by fm-
hether there were one or two
ne, and then they pointed up,
ars to be another parachute
a certain conjecture and an
one of their own planes in the
re. We have no solid informa-
vas captured did the Russian
might answer that.
at least as far as he could
r to that question today that
the second village where he
irently there was someone in
m were not in uniform.
gly with the local people to
llection of being pursued on
he way down?
Senator AlxErr. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.
POWERS' OTHER MI$SIONS
Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. McCone, how many of those missions
were flown by Powers?
Mr. McCoxE. I cannot tell you exactly, Senator. He flew several,
but of the 27 missions I cannot tell you how many of them were
penetrating Soviet territory. '
Do you know?
Mr. HOUSTON. [Deleted.]
Senator WILI,IAMS. As a result of your examination of Mr.
Powers, do you feel that he did everything that would be required
of a man in his position?
Mr. McCoxE. Yes, I do, and therefore I agree with the findings of
the Board and with the findings of our interrogators.
LEP'f WITH A CLOUD OVER HIM
Senator WILLIAMS. With that feeling, don't you think he is being
left with just a little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did ev-
erything he is supposed to do, why leave it hanging?
Mr. McCoxE. I do not think, Senator, we did. We tried to be ob-
jective, and the report which was released today explained, to the
extent we could explain it publicly, the .process we went through in
verifying his story and came to the conclusion that his story was
correct, and reached the conclusion -that he had conducted himself
in accordance with the contract and instructions, and comported
himself as an American should, and for that reason we were
paying him the money that he would be entitled to by law under
that finding.
Senator WILLIAMS. I read your findings there, and .they seem to
give him a clean bill of health. But the earlier press reports were
that, first, he had been subjected to intensive questioning, and later
there was a lie detector test. Those things indicate a doubt in the
man in the minds of somebody, and I do not think we can quite get
away from that. If a man is responsible for negligence, it should be
so stated; but if he did not act negligently, I am wondering if you
have not pretty much left him hanging.
Mr. McCoxE. Senator, the facts are that the doubt was there.
The doubt was there from the very day that he came down; there
was doubt in a great many of us. I thought .the way to dispel that
doubt was to go into the whole situation with sufficient thorough-
ness so that when we did report on it, it would be a considered
judgment resulting from a careful investigation, and the facts then
stood up, the man would be cleared.
It is true that during the period of the last 3 weeks, while this
interrogation has been going on and this high level Board has been
giving consideration to the whole matter and interrogating Powers
himself, there probably has been some doubt. But I would hope
that the very thoroughness that was exercised here would clarify
the matter, whereas I think if we just gave it a very light treat-
ment, the doubt might have continued.
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NO INCIDENTS OF SELF-DESTRUCTION
Senator AIKEN. Is it true, Mr. MCCone, that one or two other
pilots have destroyed themselves, their planes? We hear reports
that two have destroyed themselves when there appeared to be
danger of getting caught.
Mr. MCCoNE. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. AIKEN. Do you know about this?
Mr. HOUSTON. No, sir.
Mr. MCCONE. Not to my knowledge.
The fact is that this is the only incident where a U-2 pilot has
been downed on denied territory.
Senator AIKEN. But is this one the other day-you said you lost
five.
Mr. McCoNE. Yes, but they had not been on denied territory.
Senator AIxEN. This has been accidental reasons.
Mr. McCoNE. It has been accidental and been over either friend-
ly territory
Senator AIKEN. There was no reason for self-destruction.
Mr. McCoNE. Yes.
[Deleted.]
Senator WILLIAMS. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MCCone, I would like to return to Mr. Spark-
man's first questions.
THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FLIGHT
I did not quite get the significance of the answer with regard to
this question that was raised on the report before, as Senator
Sparkman read from one point on page 22.
There is another place, on page 7 of that report, which says as
follows:
In any event it appears that there was something very special about the May let
flight, although the committee has been unable to determine exactly what.
This is not the weather. We discussed the weather at length.
There was the feeling that there was some special event that justi-
fied going on this day. Can you throw any light on that?
Mr. McCoNE. No, I cannot. I do not know what is referred to
there, Mr. Chairman. The special importance of the flight was re-
connaissance in the north which would provide information that
we needed.
The CHAIRMAN. That would be true for any flight.
Mr. MCCoNE. But I do not know of any--
The CHAIRMAN. Your predecessor at least left the impression,
and that is reflected in these two statements, that there was some
event that made some very special reason why it should take place
at this time, other than the weather. We know about the weather
being always a consideration I thought maybe it might clarify that.
Mr. MCCoNE. It has never been disclosed to me.
Let me ask Mr. Houston, our general counsel. Do you know?
Mr. HOUSTON. No sir; I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. What we suspected, and it was purely a guess,
was that there was some event which you anticipated or you
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r-DESTRUCTION
~~
/Cone, that one or two other
Ieir planes? We hear reports
when there appeared to be
.. ~?f
~_,
cident where a U-2 pilot hag
other day-you said you lost
been on denied territory.
~ntal reasons.
l and been over either friend=
i for Self~estruction.
3 like to return to Mr. Spark-
' OF THE FLIGHT
~f the answer with regard to
e report before, as Senator
22.
?f that report, which says as
ping very special about the May lat
q determine exactly what.
ased the weather at length.
ome Special event that justi-
~ny light on that?
~t know what is referred to
~rtance of the flight was re-
ld provide information that
~r any flight.
~y
t least left the impression,
menu, that there was some
ion why it should take place
'Ve know about the weather
maybe it might clarify that.
sed to me.
counsel. Do you know?
and it was purely a guess,
;h you anticipated or you
thought there was reason that might be taking place that you
wanted to be sure of.
Mr. HOUSTON. I know of none, sir. I only know of the importance
put on the area to be covered.
COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE CIA
The CHAIRMAN. I wonder, Mr. McCone, if we could ask a few
other questions that are not directly related to this, although this
particular incident brought out an aspect of this operation which
has concerned a number of people.
Senator [Mike] Mansfield Some years ago,? and more recently Sen-
ator [Eugene] McCarthy, have introduced a resolution regarding a
joint committee for the overseeing, I suppose you would say, the
CIA.
You had long experience or considerable experience with the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Do you think that committee
functions properly and effectively?
Mr. MCCoNE. I had very Satisfactorily experience with the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, as you know.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you See any reason why a similar committee
for supervision of CIA Should not be set up?
Mr. MCCoNE. I do not see the necessity for it in view of the
manner in which the subcommittee of the Armed Services Commit-
tee and the subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee
function.
The CHAIRMAN. Are those committees given this function by law
or i5 that an informal arrangement? What is the basis for the su-
pervision of the subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees?
Mr. MCCoNE. Well I do not know, Mr. Chairman, what the back-
ground is. I do know that, and I have been told that, the legislation
which established the Central Intelligence ency, which was the
National Defense Act of 1947, was pr through the Armed
Services Committee. I imaglne that was the beginning of their ju-
risdiction over the Central Intelll'gence Agency.
The ,CHAIRMAN. Does that legislation give them jurisdiction over
the Central Intelligence Agency?
Mr. MCCoNE. I would be very much surprised if it did.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Houston?
Mr. HOUSTON. No. sir. The legislation does not mention it.
The CHAIRMAN. Does any legislation give any jurisdiction?
Mr. HOUSTON. Over in the House.
Mr. WARNER. Not legislation.
Mr. HOUSTON. In the constitution of the subcommittee.
Mr. WARNER. Not legislation.
. Mr. HOUSTON. Not legl' lation, but official action of the House.
Mr. 'WARNER. The House Parliamentarian has ruled that the
House Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction, but there is no
legislation that confers jurisdiction that I know of.
[Deleted.]
CIA BUDGET
The CHAIRMAN. What is the size of the budget of the CIA?
Mr. MCCoNE. I would like this off the record.
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[Discussion off the record.)
Mr. McCoNE. This figure is always kept very confidential.
The CHAIRMAN. The regular budget of the State Department is
about $260 million.
Mr. MCCoNE. I have not seen it for some years, but I remember
it is in that order.
[Deleted.)
[Deleted.) Although this is a question on which I can see there
are arguments on both sides of it, at the moment the Armed Serv-
ices Committee considers themselves as the parent committee of
CIA, and always has. _ Whether that is logical or not I think is a
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am trying to do, to develop a little
information with regard to this question. We have before us a reso-
lution now, S.J. Res. 77, introduced by Senator McCarthy for him-
self and a number of others, there must be 15 or 20 Senators-on
this question of creating a joint committee modeled after the
As I recall it, the first resolution of a similar nature was intro-
duced by the present majority leader, although he was not majority
leader at the time. We have had on various occasions-I am just
informed that the resolution introduced by Senator Mansfield as
long ago as 1956 was sponsored by 35 Senators, which raises this
question of whether there is a conflict.
ARMED SERVICES' INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
Let me go back a little with regard to the Armed Services. Each
of the Armed Services has its own intelligence; it has its own G-2,
does it not? Don't they all, the Air Force, the Army?
Mr. MCCoNE. Yes, each one has its own intelligence organization.
The CHAIRMAN. OrganlZatlOn.
Mr. MCCoNE. There is the G-2 and the A-2 and the ONI.
The CHAIRMAN. They are all quite substantial organizations?
Mr. MCCoNE. They are very substantial.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you, for the record, indicate if you know
how large they are?
Mr. MCCoNE. I do not know, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. But they are very substantial?
Mr. MCCoNE. They are very substantial.
The CHAIRMAN. Employing several thousand people?
Mr. MCCoNE. And they are parts of the budgets of the respective
services?
The CHAIRMAN. Yours then, the CIA, is not exclusively a mili-
tary operation, is it?
Mr. MCCoNE. No, it is not exclusively a military operation. In
fact, its basic purpose as established by law is to serve as a central
facility for collecting, assembling intelligence for all agencies, cor-
relating it and evaluating it, and then disseminating it.
The CHAIRMAN. Not only from all agencies, but you do it directly
on your own, too, don't you?
Mr. McCoNE. Yes, we do a great deal of that on our own. Then
there are certain areas of activity which are assigned to us by the
National Security Council.
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~t very confidential.
~f the State Department is
Mme years, but I remember
~ on which I can see there
e moment the Armed Sere
s the parent committee of
logical or not I think is a
an for determination by us,
ing to do, to develop a little
. We have before us a reso-
Senator McCarthy for him-
t be 15 or 20 Senators-on
imittee modeled after the
y, this is not new.
~ similar nature was intro-
though he was not majority
~rious occasions-I am just
d by Senator Mansfield as
Senators, which raises this
E ORGANIZATIONS
~ the Armed Services. Each
ligence; it has its own G-2,
:, the Army?
n intelligence organization.
A-2 and the ONI.
atantial organizations?
Il.
'cord, indicate if you know
stantial?
Il.
~usand people?
Ie budgets of the respective
is not exclusively a wili-
ly amilitary operation. In
law is to serve as a central
.genre for all agencies, cor-
isseminating it.
nciea, but you do it directly
l of that on our own. Then
h are assigned to ua by the
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIA AND STATE DEPARTMENT
The CHAIRMAN. We have had from time to time in the commit-
tee, reports of differences of views between the CIA and the repre-
sentatives of the State Department in such countries, as an exam-
ple, as Laos. Are you familiar with that?
Mr. McCoxE. Yes. ou were in
The CHAIRMAN. All of this is, of course, before y
charge, but you have heard of that?
Mr. McCoNE. Yes; indeed I have. I have heardno~tuiet efNation
that have existed. I heard them debated many
al Security Council when I was there sitting there as Chairman of
the Atomic Energy Commission.
The CHAIRMAN. Whether or not this is justified, it has vbe ie~n? 8
impression that in 'many cases the views of the CIA p
that not so? It did in Laos, didn't it?
Mr. McCoNE. No, I do not think that it did. I think the view of
the State Department prev;_iled in Laos; at least it prevails today.
gITUATION IN LAOS
The CxwlRirlAN. To be specific about it, go back, I think it was 2
or 3 years ago, to the time of the ouster of Souvanna Phouma and
the bringing In of Phoumi and Boun Oum. There is certainly infor-
mation in the hearings here that there was a difference of opinion
as to the wisdom of that move, and that the military arm and the
lace, whereas the representa-
CIA were in favor of what did take p
tive of the State Department was not in favor of it. Is that correct?
Have you ever heard of such position? times, Mr.
Mr. M({'.ONE. Yes, I have heard that debated many
Chairman, in the cloistered halls of the National Security Council.
The ,('HAIRMAN. It has been debated in this cloistered hall.
Mr. McCoNE. I heard the spokesman for the military take a very
strong position in favor of Phoumi, and spokesmen for the State
Department strongly support Souvanna, and I left with enc I eared
sion that the spokesman for the Central Intelligence Ag Y
strongly toward the military position.
The CHAIRMAN? Which prevailed in that case.
Mr. McCoNE. I was not so close to the situation that I knew that
any action was resulting from that difference.
The CHAIRMAN. The fact was that they did succeed in ousting
SouvannalP~h~ h Boun Oum, was he n Phnom Penh, and Phoumi
was instal
Mr. McCoNE. Yes, he was.
The CHl,IRMwN. I only use this as an illustration and, of course,
as I say, you were in no way responsible.
TWO STATE DEPARTMENTS
I am trying to resolve in my own mind just what we do their
here, whether we have two State Departments each going
own way. I realize that the traditional response to this is that the
CIA is not apolicy-making agency but, as a matter of fact, I am
quite unable to see the distinction when in a case like this the
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views of the CIA prevail over that of the State Department which
does make policy.
Mr. McCoNE. I think in the discussions I heard of this situation
it seemed to me it was the view of the Defense Department that
prevailed, because in the discussions I heard they took a very
strong position, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs took a very
strong position, and was supported by the Secretary of Defense.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree that the military and the CIA both took
that position. That is what our information was, but it was not
nearly authentic as yours in the NSC, because I was not in the
NSC. This came out in discussions here with representatives of the
Department of State.
I think this presents a very difficult position, at least for this
committee and for what we say is our Department of State, in the
formulation of policy. Do you have any suggestions to make about
this?
This is one of the reasons why, I think, there is a feeling, rightly
or wrongly, that some committee such as a joint committee sug-
gested, should have supervision over the activity, perhaps coordina-
tion, if you like. If we do not, then the military not only are run-
ning our military establishment but also are making our political
policy.
MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY JURISDICTION
Mr. MCCONE. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we are discuss-
ing two different things here. One is the logic of the jurisdiction of
the CIA resting with the Armed Services Committee as contrasted
with the Foreign Relations Committee. That is one problem.
The CHAIRMAN. That is one problem.
Mr. McCoNE. The other is the establishment of a joint committee
which would remove the jurisdiction of the CIA from either Armed
Services or Foreign Relations and place it under the cognizance of
a third committee.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Mr. McCoNE. Then it seems to me you would have this situation
where since CIA has its influence on both military matters and for-
eign policy, and, granted, whether it makes policy or not, there is
no dispute over the fact that it influences policy-you would have
three committees involved, so it would be further complicated, I
would think.
The CHAIRMAN. It would be presumed, I would think, that if a
joint committee were set up similar to the one on Atomic Energy,
it would have rather exclusive jurisdiction. I think this commit-
tee-at least, I want to speak only for myself and not the whole
committee although, as I say, a number of the members who spon-
sored or co-sponsored the resolution were on this committee-
would feel that the normal supervision of the representatives in
the Congress would be respected, that this would not be essentially
a military operation.
It leaves me with the feeling, the way it is now set up, that the
military not only directs the defense of the country but also are be-
coming the dominant influence in the political policy of the Gov-
ernment. Maybe it is a good thing, I do not know. I do not think it
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he State Department which
ins I heard of this situation+`
e Defense Department that.
I heard they took a very
Joint Chiefs took a very
he Secretary of Defense.
nary and the CIA both took
nation was, but it was pot .
;, because I was not in the.
with representatives of the
It position, at least for this
Department of State, in the
~ suggestions to make about
Ik, there is a feeling, rightly
h as a joint committee sug-
,e activity, perhaps coordina-
e military not only are run-
lso are making our political
[CY JURISDICTION
airman, that we are. discuss-
ze logic of the jurisdiction of
ces Committee as contrasted
That is one problem.
ishment of a joint committee
F the CIA from either Armed
;e it under the cognizance of
ou would have this situation
oth military matters and for-
nakea policy or not, there is
nces policy-you would have
ld be further complicated, I
-ed, I would think, that if a
~ the one on Atomic Energy,
fiction. I think this commit-
-r myself and not the whole
ar of the members who apon-
were on this committee-
on of the representatives in
this would not be essentially
~ay it is now set up, that the
f the country but also are be-
political policy of the Gov-
o not know. I do not think it
is quite traditional, nor do I think the American people quite un-
derstand that this is so.
You remember the famous statement, I think it was that of
Churchill, that war is much too important to be left to the gener-
als, or something to that effect.
Mr. McCoNE. Yea, I remember it very well.
The CHAIRMAN. I would not want to be held to the exact quota-
tion.
Mr. McCoNE. I can see the problem from the standpoint of this
committee. I do think that the problem would be compounded by
the establishment of.a.joint committee. I say this with some reluc-
tance because I had a very satisfactory experience with the Joint
Committee, but I would like to point out that the Joint Committee
is established and operates under very special legislation with
which you are thoroughly familiar.
It has been my observation that both their authority and their
success stem from the legislation that is basic to the committee.
This situation would not prevail in the case of a Joint Committee
on Central Intelligence.
The CHAIRMAN. Why not? This is where I get lost. I do not see
why it could not.
Mr. McCoNE. You might better accomplish what you are talking
about by arranging between the Armed Services Committee and
this committee, some joint subcommittee that could meet regularly
and discuss Agency matters. Then you would not be injecting a
third dimension into this problem, because I can just envisage a
joint committee sitting off some place with maybe no membership
from this committee or maybe one.
The CHAIRMAN. It would be logical that you would have some.
On Atomic Energy we have two of your very important members,
at least two, maybe more, important members on the Atomic
Energy Committee on this committee.
Mr. McCoNE. Well, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And they serve a great purpose.
Mr. McCoNE. But, as you know so well, Senator, these committee
assignments go by seniority, and so on and so forth, and chairman-
ship becomes of special consideration. Just picture-this concerns
me very much because I can see your dilemma, but I think it
would be compounded if the Joint Committee were sitting concern-
ing itself with an agency that you feel is affecting both defense
matters and, more particularly in your interest, in your special in-
terest, foreign affairs.
The CHAIRMAN. That 1s exactly what, it is the latter part of that,
concerns me. I mentioned only Laos. I could also mention, at least
rumors, with regard to Algeria. Guatemala, I think, is beyond a
rumor.
Mr. McCoNE. What is that?
The CHAIRMAN. Guatemala was beyond a rumor. I do not think
anyone would deny it.
Mr. McCoNE. Yes, we can go through a great many of them.
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The CHAIRMAN. There are a great many of them, and they essen-
tially involve very important policy matters.
Mr. MCCoNE. There is no question about that, and I think this is
absolutely true. For that reason there is probably a great deal of
logic that there should be a more intimate relationshlp between
this committee, or a subcommittee of your committee, and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
A VERY SPECIAL ACTIVITY
But I cannot see how you answer your problem, which I recog-
nize as a problem, by the creating of a joint committee unless that
joint committee is, by agreement, made up of a group from the
Armed Services Committee and a group from this committee. If
that is what you are talking about, then it is--
The CHAIRMAN. The bill simply leaves it to the leadership to ap-
point it. I do not believe in the appointment to the Joint Atomic
Energy Committee that they followed the usual rules in the ap-
pointment, if I am not mistaken about that, John. You probably re-
member this. This is what you would call a very speclal activity.
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I d0 not think it followed the same traditions
that we have followed in the other committees, and I think one of
the reasons why this procedure has appealed to them is simply be-
cause of the success of the Joint Atomlc Energy Committee.
Mr. MCCoNE. Yes; but I want to point out to you that my obser-
vation from working with the joint committee is that their success
is due to, in the first place, a very special area of their responsibil-
ity and the fact that it is controlled by special legislation; that it
gives them great authority in this particular area.
Now, I think that the very things that concern you here that you
have been talking about, and the fact that the Central Intelligence
Agency apparently in their activity materially affects matters of
your concern, of this committee's concern, is a reason why the joint
committee is not the answer that you want, unless the point com-
mittee is very carefully designed as really a subordinate element
on both this committee and the Armed Services Committee.
Senator SPARKMAN. If the Chairman will permit?
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.
COMPARISON TO JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
Senator .SPARKMAN. I d0 not quite follow you, because I see no
reason why there could not be the same kind of legislation setting
up this joint committee and giving them the same type of ju-
risdiction that was done in the case of the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee.
Now, in the case of the Joint Energy Committee you have a joint
committee but, at the same time, that part of the joint committee
which is in the Senate becomes a Senate legislative committee on
atomic ener legislation, and the same thing is true in the House.
Why couldn~the same thing be done with your Agency?
I was here when the Joint Atomic Energy Act was passed. I re-
member it quite clearly. In fact, it was handled by a committee of
which I was a member in the House at the time, on the House side.
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many of them, and they
natters.
about that, and I think this is'
re is probably a great deal':
intimate relationship between
' your committee, and the Cen
L~
~;
your problem, which I
Wade up of a group from ?th
;coup from this committee: ?~1Cf
ien it is-- a~
Ives it to the leadership to' a~;.
ed the usual rules in the ap=
it that, John. You probably?re-
ld call a very special activityx
followed the same traditions
ommittees, and I think one of
Ippealed to them is simply be-
~int out to you that my obser-
ommittee is that their succ~'s
~ecial area of their responsibil-
by special legislation; that it
rticular area.
hat concern you here that you
t that the Central Intelligence
materially affects matters of
cern, is a reason why the join
~u want, unless the joint com-
really asubordinate element
~d Services Committee.
n will permit?
follow you, because I see no
une kind of legislation setting
them the same type of ju-
of the Joint Atomic Energy
ry Committee you have a joint
It part of the joint committee
nate legislative committee on
ne thing is true in the House.
with your Agency?
Energy Act was passed. I re-
al handled by a committee of
it the time, on the House side.
I remember. the very hard fight and difficult time we had handling
it and, by the way, it was not a case of filling it up with senior
members. For instance, Senator [Clinton] Anderson and Senator
Gore both became members almost immediately upon coming to
the Senate, or within a year or so.
The CxwIRMAN. They were junior Members of the Senate.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator [John] Pastore, a brand new Senator
at the time, was put on it, and it has followed that course through-
out the years. So I do not see why it could not be done here.
You are apparently thinking of just a watchdog committee. I see
no reason why it could not be branched out and made the same
type of committee operation with the same type of jurisdiction that
prevails in the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.
OTHER MEMBERS LEFT IN IGNORANCE
Senator I.AUSCHE. May I ask you, if such a committee is created
would I, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, if I were
not put on the joint committee, find myself in the same ignorance
about what is going on in the Atomic Energy Commission, find
myself in the. same ignorance on what is going on in a matter of
business that I have a right to know? I know nothing of what is
going on.
Senator SPARKMAN. You probably would, but you would probably
have the satisfaction of knowing that there. was a committee with
full jurisdiction over that to know what was going on.
Senator I.AUSCxE. Frankly, I am barred from learning anything
about the Atomic Energy Commission. I went over to a hearing one
day and I entered that room in the House as if I were a person
from-well, without an authority at all.
Senator SPARKMAN. You have not been in their new office yet.
You ought to visit it.
Senator LAUSCxE. I do think if you create that committee in
matters that I ought to know about as a member of the For-
eign Relations Committee, I will be in the identical position
that I am now in trying to learn what is going on in the
Atomic Energy Commission.
TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES
Senator SPARKMAN. I will tell you, if you will yield further, a
thing that rather disturbs me about this whole thing. I just have
been sitting here looking at that map.
We are nominally at peace with Russia. I do not see that that
had anything to do with our defense; I mean the normal function-
ing of our defenses. It had a lot to do with bur relations with that
country.
The Chairman mentioned Guatemala. It seems to me the same
thing is true down there. I am referring 'to the Cuban situation.
The CxwIRMAN. Or Cuba, either one.
Senator SPARKMAN. The training m Guatemala and the prepara-
tion that was carried on by the CIA and our military was not a
part of it, not a part of the Invasion. It was something that vitally
affects the foreign affairs of this country. That is the thing that dis-
turbs me about this.
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Mr. McCoxE. There is no question about that, Senator S
man. Foreign affairs are of concern to the committee.
How do you answer that problem by creating another co
tee? Don't you create exactly the same situation? Aren't you'
danger of creating the same kind of a situation that Sena
Lausche just was concerned with? ~ s
Senator SpnRtcMnx. My answer to that would be that I gave'tp
him: at least he would have the satisfaction of knowing that the~ea
was a committee set up that did have jurisdiction over that. ~ 'It j
might be that they would be taking away the powers of this CO~i
mittee when you did set up a new committee. It does take away
powers from another committee when you do that.
Mr. McCoxE. My very sincere advice would be for you as mem-
bens of this committee to find a different solution than the creation
of an independent committee, because I think that if you do so you;
will fmd that you have a situation developing in this area that ag
exactly the circumstance that Senator Lausche criticizes in conneC.
tion with Atomic Energy.
Please understand me, I am not resisting the concept of commit
tee jurisdiction, because I worked closely with committees and
without difficulty. That does not worry me m the slightest.
But the very matter you discussed, your concern about this
flight-without debating the point, because I think I have a little
difference of opinion in what you said in that regard-but I could
see a Joint Committee on Intelligence which, because of their mis-
sion to gather intelligence, would be running these flights all over.
You would not know anything about it, and it would be seriously
affecting the mission of this committee. But you would not be privy
to it, any more than being privy to what the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy does for the reasons that Senator Lausche states.
Senator LnuscxE. I was trying to find a word here before. I
would say that I was accepted over there as a pariah. [Laughter.]
Go ahead; pardon me.
The Cxnixi-sax. That is a good word anyway.
You have to admit-I am just groping here for some answer-
this is the only executive function I can think of in which it is not
subject to some kind of legal supervision by a regular standing
committee. I agree that the covert operations are rather distinct.
This sort of thing which Senator Sparkman used in this example
is not really what is bothering me so much. It is what I believe to
be interference in political decisions.
I think the Cuban example is a much better one than this, be-
cause here a project was developed by the CIA, so far as I can un-
derstand, almost exclusively. If the military had an~hing to do
with it, at least the military tried to disassociate itse f very much
in the end. Whether or not that was sound-I remember when they
came before this committee, they professed a very remote interest
in that affair. That may have been hindsight, but we were given to
understand this was a CIA operation.
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ion about that, Senator S
to the committee.
n by creating another comin~'
d of a situation that Senator
A that would be that I gave:
have jurisdiction over that.
3 away the powers of this cow
committee. It does take awa*
lvice would be for you as mem?
Brent solution than the creatiod
ise I think that if you do so ygdq
;or Lausche criticizes in connei~;
resisting the concept of commi
closely with committees
rry me in the slightest.
seed, your concern about thi$
because I think I have a little
aid in that regard-but I could
ice which, because of their mis;
rt it, and it would be seriously
tee. But you would not be privy
what the Joint Committee on
s that Senator Lausche states.
to find a word here before. I
there as a pariah. [Laughter.
rd anyway.
?oping here for some answer-
can think of in which it is not
~rvision by a regular standing
operations are rather distinct.
Sparkman used in this example
w much. It is what I believe to
Huth better one than this, be-
by the CIA, so far as I can un-
military had anything to do
o disassociate itself very much
sound-I remember when they
-ofessed a very remote interest
Iindsight, but we were given to
Mr. McCoNE. If I might say And with very grave political impli-
The CHAIRMAN [continuing].
cations.
Mr. McCoNE. If I might in in after thehfactethese w,~renough
viewing that matter coming
blame for everybody in that fa}lure. a the merits of any of
The CHAIRMAN. I do not wish now to argu
these things, even of Laos, the demerits, but I was really trying ou
n to blame you particularly, because Y
get at-and I am not tryi g . ou had no responsibility
were not even in the organlzation and y
whatever for it-but there i ti ~ nature thatchavestaken place e n
I think, of essentially a Po ?
any number of countrles. We have mentioned only some of them.
REAL POLICY DETERMINED BY CIA
The activities in the Middle East, in Iran, Iraq, and so on-at the
occurred, we Were very greatly interested in them. We
time they receding and during the Suez
were in those activitia ~~~atio~ in the politlcal field, and yet
crisis, which had gre
this committee had no 1 mere underwayWe did not even have an
opportunity to know they was a story
Really, the first notice I ever had of the ~bawholhad wandered
that came fromdao~ there?TWe had no hing other than just pure
into that camp eat litical implications. It makes
but the real
rumor, and these were very gr Po
me feel as if this committee g he ClAugh the motlons,
policy is being determined by laces they were the domi-
I am convinced that in some of these P ned now
nant influence. [Deleted.]
But these are just incidental things that have happe
over the course of a number of years. [Deleted.]
If this is the way it is going to be run, I do not know really what
this committee has to do. We are just going through some motions
here, and we are pretending we are dlrecting or influencing our
foreign policy, while we are not.
A QUESTION OF SUPERVISION
You would not, of course, deny it, and I do not wish to try to
deny it. it in the least.
Mr. McCoNE? I would not denThat you do not have this influence.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing].
I believe you do. It is a question of how we coordinate it ane hoalw
is supervisedNE. I do not think the CIA is quite as influ
Mr. McCo
Andrew Tully said in his book, "I~i~t ~all'that he says? that they
The CHAIRMAN. You d0 notB I am not here to deny
Mr. McCONE Lcontinuing].
are pretty active. [Deleted.] our problem very clearly, but I do not
Now, I dust do not-I see y
agree, I do not think I agree, that the solution is a joint committee.
I think the solution-- ou think the solution is?
The CHAIRMAN. What d0 y
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Mr. McCoNE. I would like to think about it, but if I have to say
now, I think you and the Armed Forces Committee should set up a
subordinate subcommittee with representation from both of you,
and that committee should meet as frequently as necessary and on
a basis on which you would be fully informed on our affairs. That
is what I think.
Senator SPARKMAN. A consultative committee.
Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, are you intending to pursue
g~? this line of inquiry? I had not finished my questions on the subject
that was on the agenda for today's meeting on Powers, and I would
like to ask about two questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly; I thought you had finished.
Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to go.
The CHAIRMAN. I did not cut you off. I thought you had all the
_ opportunity.
COVER-STORY REVEALED
Senator LAUSCHE. I only want to ask if Powers was questioned as
to whether or not the Soviet interrogators told him that back home
in Washington it was disclosed that he was not accidentally
over the Russian ground but was there on an information-seeking
mission?
Mr. McCoNE. Mr. Allen, will you answer that?
Mr. ALLEN. He was told that by the Soviet interrogators.
Senator LAUSCHE. That is, they said, "Back home they admitted
you were here seeking information?"
Mr. ALLEN. After it came out, yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. Was he asked whether that influenced him at
all in his revelations to the interrogators?
Mr. ALLEN. I do not think they put it that way, sir, no.
Senator LAUSCHE. But the moment it came out that he was there
on an information-seeking mission, they told him that?
Mr. ALLEN. They told him that.
Senator LAUSCHE. That would have just rendered him defenseless
in trying to conceal what he was there on.
Mr. ALLEN. Actually, sir, he did very well in his defenses, we
think.
Senator LAUSCHE. To me it would seem that he became helpless
when they said, "Well, they have said in Washington that you are
here on an information-seeking mission."
Mr. ALLEN. On the overall, yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. I think that covers it.
The CHAIRMAN. IS that all?
Senator LAUSCHE. I am going to leave, I do not
The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you to leave. You go right
ahead.
COMMITTEE APPROVAL
Senator LAUSCHE. I want to to leave this thought with the Chair-
man: I am inclined to the belief that this committee ought to do
more than merely listen to this report. If Powers did act as an
American should have acted in this flight, we ought to give some
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but if I have to say
bout it
k
,
a
thin
Committee should set up a
i Forces
tation from both oa
d
represen
ii
n
t as frequently as necessary
i
'~'~?~'
ff
rs.
a
fully informed on our a
_N.,o'rnmmittee.
-
-
?man, ui~ ,.,.. ---,--
:inished my questions on the aubj
~
d I
w
~y's meeting on Powers, an
ou had finished. _,~,
ht y
h
oug
:
irman, I am going to have to go.
d all
h
a
it you off. I thought you
rORY REVEALED
k 'f Powers was questi~
i
nt to as
n~i.I.ogators told him that back
cidP
losed that he was not ac
tion
was there on an informa
ll you answer that? ' ~~,
ators
o
t
,
g
err
~t by the Soviet in
_ .~r. _7_ L..~..e +}fOVr'1
'i1
cation?" ?^
asked whether that influence
zterrogators? _-- -._~~f
they Yu~ +? .,..__ -- -
moment it came,out tha'he
-
.~yiv.,, .,...,~ ---
that. - ~` ~~
d -
rald have just rendere
wan ,,,.~+v ~--- well in his
he did very
ld seem that he
it wou
~ have said in W~~,
:ing mission. Y
.1, yes, sir.
that covers it.
1?
to leave, I do not
i
ng
p
cot asking you to lease
. rzt
L~rPTEE APPROVAL ~ ! i
this though
e
l
eav
t to to
;belief that this co
P
oW
to this report. ff
"
ted in this flight, -we;~
thought of the entire committee saying that we approve of what
has been done, and I am going to raise that question.
Senator SPARKMAN. Let me say that I agree with you.
The CHAIRMAN. I would want to think about it. I do not interpret
the report or the hearings we had as ever raising much question
about Powers. It was an entirely different question. It was the
timeliness of it. It had nothing whatever to do with Powers as a
man and as a citizen and so on.
However, I do not object to what you are saying. But I did not
want to leave this with the impression that I am going to approve
of everything that was done, including the decision to make the
flight at that time under the circumstances then prevailing.
Senator SPARKMAN. He does not mean that.
Senator LAUSCHE. I do not mean that.
The CxAIRMAN. You mean 83 an individual?
Senator I.AUSCHE. You see, when the hearings were concluded in
1960, was it?
Senator SPARKMAN. 1960.
Senator LAUSCxE [continuing]. We were left with this informa-
tion that Powers was completely investigated. He was trusted.
There was not a scintilla of proof to show that he was unworthy of
trust, that he was guarded against contact by possible infiltrators,
and that there was no proof of any character whatsoever that he
had defected.
You men conclude that he acted as an American should. He had
been condemned by some, and I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to
talk it out, as to whether or not this committee ought not to ap-
prove what has been done by the Chief of the Central Intelligence
Agency and by that Board.
The CxAIRMAN. We will think about it.
I do not want to prolong this too long. I think you get the point
that several times in the course of our hearings in the past, Imen-
tioned particularly Laos because we had Ambassador [Winthrop]
Brown here, and he most reluctantly, Ithink-my interpretation of
bis testimony was that there was a great difference of opinion
there, and that, in effect, he was overridden. He would not put it
plte as bluntly as I say it, but I cannot read anything else
wlt of his answers.
Just one example: the Cuban thing, I do not mean to imply that
his committee has all the wisdom, but I do think the responsibility
fat the committee has is such that it ought to be at least advised
;,~ advance as to such undertakings as the Cuban thing, for exam-
because that is not strictly a military matter.
e are not expected to infringe upon the strategy in case of war,
. in those matters which may lead to war and which affect it, it
to me this committee, if it is to have any function at all,
to be advised. In the activities of your people in many of the
spots-and they always are in critical spots, that is part of
business to be there-I do not see why this committee should
b/ informed and play a part.
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We would welcome a suggestion from you as the new head,
we hope in the new era here, to see if we cannot get a more sa
factory relationship. ~:^`?
'
I am not the only one, as I say. There are a great many. Tli@
were 35 sponsors to Senator Mansfield's resolution. I do not thin
there are quite that many to the McCarthy resolution, but it wo
appear to be in the neighborhood of 15 or 20. With this big an op
ation, you can see that it is going to continue to be troublesome
think. ' -~'N
x
~~
Mr. McCorrE. I would like to think this thing over. I think t
has been a very useful discussion, and I welcome an opportunity.
talk it over further with you. ._
I feel that the concept of the joint committee, for reasons I have`
expressed, would compound rather than tend to straighten out they
problem. _ '~;,#?~
Mr. McCortE. On the other hand, I do not think it beyond th
realm of possibility to develop an arrangement which would m
your problem, which I can see is a real one, and one that cannot
left unnoticed.
The CxnixM.ax. It seems to me that the-go ahead. s~-:
Mr. McCoxE. So far as I am concerned as Director of Central I~-(
telligence, which has to do with the entire intelligence communitq~
and giving it guidance as well as the direction of the Agency itself?
I have a great responsibility to this committee. I think. , F
The Cxnixrtnx. It has not been easy for this committee to get, . ~^' s
would say, any regular relationship with the CIA. Your predecessor `
took the view that he had no responsibility to this committee, and ~?
it is my understanding he never would appear without clearance of ;
the Subcommittee of Armed Services, which, under the law, has no
particular jurisdiction.
As I understand it, under the law you report only to NSC. You
are a creature of the NSC under the law, are you not?
Mr. McCoNE. That is right.
The CxaIRMAN. This other business is purely informal, casual, if
you like, as far as speaking legally, is that not correct?
Mr. WnxxEx. That is right, Mr. Chairman.
The CxaixMAN. If things go wrong we have the responsibility in
the eyes of the public, whether we have anything to do with it or
not, as we have very recently experienced in that connection.
The kind of information which you are equipped to develop, of
course, is extremely important to any judgment of any of these
policies that we have, the kind of judgment which is presently
under consideration in Southeast Asia, which is very important.
They are going to ask us to pass upon authorizations, and so on,
and we can do it only byy doing it completely in the dark or very
much in the dark, if we do not have any--
Mr. McCoxE. I think information in the Agency, both from our
own sources and then from the responsibility of gathering together
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uggestion from you as the new head, and
sere, to see if we cannot get a more satin
as I say. There are a great many. There'
.tor Mansfield's resolution. I do not think!
~ to the McCarthy resolution, but it wo
borhood of 15 or 20. With this big an o
_
is going to continue to be troublesom
.eke to think this thing over. I think
scansion, and I welcome an opportune
you.
of the joint committee, for reasons I
nd rather than tend to straighten out
be.
ether hand, I do not think it beyo
velop an arrangement which would
i see is a real one, and one that
s to me that the-go ahead.
o with the entire intelligence co
well as the direction of the Agee
ty to this committee. I think. ?
lationship with the CIA. Your pre
ed Services, which, under the law,
ler the law you report only to
;ht. t +?x
her business is purely informal,`s
;ht,1Vlr. Chairman. ...%s:
;s go wrong we have the respo;
nether we have anything to dA
a which you are equipped ,~,
~rtant to any judgment of;
~e kind of judgment which
~utheast Asia, which is verg
doing it completely in..thq
not have any
formation in the Agencq',
n the responsibility of ga
and evaluating intelligence from the entire community, and finally
in the preparation of estimates is done by the Board of National
Estimates, and that is all very vital to your committee.
The CHAIRMAN, The Board of National Estimates, that is made
up of what?
Mr. McCoNE. That is made up of 12 very senior people.
The CHAIRMAN. But that 1S your Shop?
Mr. McCoNE. That is part of the Central Intelligence
is really a facility of mine as Director of Central Intellige~ency. It
The CHAIRMAN. DceS the State Department's Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research have independent existence now under the
planning functions or is it part of your shop?
Mr. McCoNE. No, it is independent, as it always has been
The CHAIRMAN. Does It amount to much?
Mr. McCoNE. yes, it does. It has a very capable fellow running
it, Roger Hillsman, a very able fellow.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not know him.
Mr. McCoNE. He sits on the U.S. Intelligence Board.
ceive and evaluate intelligence that comes through their sou ces,
through their embassy sources and so forth, and feed their evalua-
tions into our Office of Current Intelligence and our Board of Na-
tional Estimates.
PARTICIPATION BY THE CIVILIAN ARM
The CHAIRMAN. It Seeing to me only common sense that if only
the military committees-and all committees, I suppose, human
nature being what it is-become oriented to their
ePonsibilities, what you really have is primarily a militalcular re-
making agency here, which ought not to be. It ought to be atpolelast
partially participated in by, we will call it, the civilian arm of the
Government.
Mr. MCCONE. I cannot disagree with that at all. I can readily see
the problem. But the very thing you said, the committees get ori-
ented to their particular mission, Is the reason why I think a joint
committee oriented to the intelligence function would make your
life more complicated than it is now, in my opinion.
The CHAIRMAN, I surely do not want to get it any more compli-
cated than it is now.
Mr. McCoNE. I think there is a better solution.
The CHAIRMAN, I think then what we ought to do is you pray
over it and see it you can come up with a good solution.
Mr. McCoNE. Fine.
PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW BOARD
The CHAIRMAN. Did this new Board that was set up to review the
by the President-under General _
~Ything to say about this? I havemneverTs enraIropoirt on
~' They were set up last ear weren't they?
~nator SPARKMnN r .,~~ c ? '
- "nA,RMAN. Last fall, and they were su
ale operation and make a report to the Pres dent. tO review the
MANE. The
r
ll
~
y
ea
lOh.
y devoted themselves more to the Cuban
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The CHAIRMAN. They did not consider this sort of problem:8~
Mr. McCoNE. No; they had some recommendations of co '
that should be made within the Agency, which I have take
consideration, but they did not deal with this problem.
The CHAIRMAN. I hope you will give it some thought and;`
y7our colleagues and the others, I would like to pursue it at a'~
(lAtP. Af+Pr Vnn dove 1....] ,. ,.L ____ ~_ .i _
p
r
a Ion. : n
Mr. McCoNE. That Board was made up of Maxwell T~
Robert Kennedy, Admiral Burke and Allen Dulles. They ren
a report that I have seen.
The CHAIRMAN. Just t0 the CUbari O
e
t~ ~
1
g my reso utlon4?
never have had any, but maybe with some solution better
that wh' h 1
I
d be
The CHAIRMAN. Every now and then Senator McCarthy,,
"when are you are going to have hearin s on
MCCARTHY'8 RESOLUTION
i~ir. tvic~;oNE. 1 would like to very much. ~ i:~s,
[Whereupon, at 6a0~p.m., the committee adjourned, subjegt'~
call of the (!},fl;,- ~
the State Department? --_ ___.,r_. ,...u? y~~ w~uiu oe suo~eci r~
~ ne VHAIRMAN. well, you could be right. I do not know whetlt~
that is the answer or not. It certainly does affect this committee.'
*n oa .. : ~.. ....7 .._ .
o
your committee and of the Armed ServiOe~
Committee, and therefore I question whether you are answerr~'
the problem that you propound by contemplating the creation'oP~
t}11 T/~ nnmtMi~4....
appear before the
Services Committee. But here in the Agency it is quite difl'erenb9~
affects the affairs
f
c
o
All the time that I was the Chairman of the Commission, I ~~
aPP~'ed before this committee nor did I
w
e
Y or out. Nothing;;
they do, or nothing that the Commission does, affects what yob
or what the Armed Servi
C
ary t 1
con ro the mlhtarf,
plications, and it is all pretty clearl
k
d
c cou
found, we might have. It seems, I confess,
your own Joint Atomic Energy Committee was the reason,
of its success, why I thought that was the proper way. If there:
better way, as I say, I do not want to complicate my life any
than it is, if you think that it would-- ~;~
Mr. McCoNE. I think you have to examine whether the
tions are exactly parallel, because the Atomic Energy Co
in its activities in its own field has little to do with any other.
and by the wording of the law the milit
~ N'
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08 :CIA-RDP01-017738000100110001-1