NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 50E; GUINEA; COUNTRY PROFILE

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110061-6
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SECRET
SOf i OS /CP
Guinea
May 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
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(J"N'h:R-1L SL'RVEll' CIIA19 :Rti
CO'�\TR) PROFILE Integr.trd perspective of
the subject country Chronology Area Brief
Summary -tap
Tilt�: SOCII I'1 Social stmeture Population
Labor Living conditions and social problems
Health Religion Education Artistic expres-
sion Public information
CM I:RNMI:'s f M) POLITICS Political evo-
lution of the state: Governmental strength and sta-
bilih Structure and function Political dynamics
National policies Threats to stahility The
police Intelligence and security Countersub-
versive measures and capabilities
THE VCONOMY Appraka11 of the economy is
Its structnre� agriculture. forestry, fisheries, feels
and power, metals and minerals, manufactnring and
construction l3omestie trade Economic policy
and development Manpower International (-co-
nomic relation,
�1 \Sl)(M ATlO\ .V \1) TFILFCO`. M \CA-
TIONS Appraisal of systems Strategic mobility
Railroads Highways Inlilll(I waterways Ports
Merchant marine Civil air Airfields 'Tele-
communications
Mli -HART (:1:U(:Lt:11'lll Topography and cli-
mate Military geographic regions Strategic areas
Internal routes Approaches: land, sea, air
UNIJ F(MCES The d4ense establishment
joint activities Ground forces Naval Forces
Airforces Paramilitary
This General Survey supersedes the one tinted Jule
1969, copies of chicle should he destroyed.
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Guinea
The Decline of a Revolution 1
Promises, Problems, and Farancia The
Guineims and 'their Cotintr% Unique
Leader, Uni(pie System No alignment
14'ith a List to Port The Years Alwad
Chronologyy li
Area Brief li
Summary Map ......................follotes 1 7
This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substan-
tiall y completed by .1larch 197:3.
S t:ct r
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The Decline of a Revolution
The ReprlMic of (mincer. forinerh French Cuinea.
celebrated the 14111 annhi-min of it% indel(�ndenc��--
441KI of the veiollolitic:d "molutiolt" initiated b% it.
darablc� ruler. Pr�sid.ot :\hied Srkot 'four� �on 2
0d4slc�r If) 2. Of the 2S) Flack African st.il.s that h :tie
made the transition Will c�ilom 141 indelt�ndenl %tote
in the Ilostaar era. onlc ClIal:t acltit.%ed fill
%overrignh earlier and fm% hatie attracted %c mueh
att.�ritiot at the time of d" r birth. Ind:�t�d. Cuin.a's
enterl(ence on the inernatiop:d wene marked
mimething of a turning Itoint in hi %ton.
It' OU
Tar v%enh set the %lag. for Guinea'� Imild break
with France in the fall of 1955. First. Paris passed it
lac in 1979; granting its mer%t�a% lerritorim in \frica�
%till volonim in all lim name �a c�rmsid.rable degree of
autonon) tithin the frann�aork of the 10 scar old
French l'Ilion. (:nin.a's first g.n.ral election mach.
Ittrssible h the provision%
(If this l:aa. '444'1)1 S.koct
Tour�*% radical nationalist I).nuc�ritic� Part% of
(:nine: c PIX: t into li.c.r in March 195 The PI)(:"%
rneM nc�1ming margin of %icton -56 c.til of howat %;n
the Territorial ;%%w�mhl%� enabled Toure to effect it
nun licr of administrative .hang., that undercut the
:odliorit% of French officiate and tightviied Iris part%
control otter Guinea*% domestic affairs. The sc�c�cmd
critical development aas General de Gaulle s
acres %inn to Immer in arid 1955. Sc�milke to dw
gnMinq tidy of nationalism in Africa Imt final% bent
on prem-minx France'% traditional splten� cif ipfln.nce
on that nmtinent. de Cuplle decided to replace the
French Union a ith it new and soinunhat looser form
of as%odation lietneen hi% comitn and its mer%ea%
ltr..sc�ssiom: the French Contnumily This challge aas
inarlrrIed into the draft comtilution of tit. Fifth
Republic. a11ic�h axis submitted to rcferendimi in
metr liolitan Frame and .dl mer%. :ts compon��W of
dw French ('pion oti ?S September 1955. Fr.anc�e%
Mricun %tibject% aerc� true to reject the prctpowd
wmstittitian and then�b% acclaim inunediatc aial
compl.l. imlel(�t:dumv. lint de Gaulle trade it clear
during a lour of French Mrica prior to the referendcun
that it "im" wtc� could also result in annplea%ant
.�..potpie cvmseclu.nce%. l Ol'
De G aulle% threats did not scca% 'I'mire. From the
out-1, the Guinean leader had indic�atcd that his
supporl for the French Comimmit% project rested on
the condition that the ne" i)manization Ie it free
awiciation of eclpal partners that %%mild not
%ulcrdinate Mric�an interest% to thou� of Paris. When
de :utille :)alked at this demand. 'I'oure three the full
reuurc�c% of the PI)G into organi. a "no" %ote in
Ih. constitutional referendittit. Ili% ca tit paikn.
org:uni /eel miden the slogan of" e prefer to be boor n
freedonn than rich in 1a%er\." '.Meted dramatic
re %tilt%. In it masske and urderl\ turnout. Guinean
%otter% rejected de Gaulle. draft constitution and ehose
the ri%k\ alternative of innnuc(liate in(lepenclenc�e b\ a
20 to -i majority. (V M*I
Guinea stood alone ammitz France's \frica n
dependcnc�ie% in making this choice. Overnielnt. it
became it beacmi for African nationalists ever\ s\ here
and it testing ground for the viabilit\ of a uniclucl)
.%fricap path to %oc�i ;d and ec�ononnic� de\ eloptnent. \t
the same time. Tome's socialist pliloscpla\ and
e\ pressed millingn.%s to establish cordial political and
.economic relalicns \%ith the Soyic�t HOC. c�ouplcd \\ill
Frances sadden pullont, opened the way for the
.oc�n%ion of Cold War competition into sub Saharan
lifric�a. In short. Guinea abrctptl\ .assumed a political
importaitm on the world stage far out of proportion to
its size. muwrc�es. or geographic location. J' M'
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society grounded on the more progressive aspects of
African c�ullure and tradition struck a responsive ch,cl
among the Guinean people� parlic�ularly anong those
groups which had been most disadvantaged b%
preindependence� tribal cuslorrts and colonial
practices. I lopes for the future were further bnoved by
knowledge that Guinea possessed considerable mineral
wealth and by timely offers of ec�onowic assistance
from the Soviet bloc..
Toure's hold rhetoric was matehed by equally hold
action. His highly organized PD(: was able to
capitalize oin popular enthusiasm and nationalistic�
fervor to launch it program of radical political and
economic change in remarkably short order.
Justification for potentially controversial moves was
readily found in the broadly accepted imperative of
national unity. All opposition political parties were
either disbanded or absorbed into the PD(:. For its
part, the PDG moved to insure its continued
supremacy by tightening its control o% er all aspects of
political and social life. The process of staffing
responsible positions at all levels of the governmental
bureaucracy with party militants was pushed to
completion. Lt order to weaken old tribal and regional
allegi:.tnces and to develop a pervading sense of
national identity and pride, thi� PDGs leaders
pressured virtually everyone �young and old, literate
and illiterate. Europeanized urbanities and back
country peasants �to assume an active role in the
affairs of the country. Nationwide youth and women's
organizations were established to complement the
work of the party. The PDC's own grassroots structure
was greatly expanded, and no town or village was
neglected by its organizers. Within.2 years, some 5.000
party cells were in operation, and by 1964 Toure could
boast that one out of every I I pe rsons in Guinea held a
government or party post of some kind.
The emphasis oil popular involvement spilled over
into the economic field. where the regime was seeking
ways in .which to resolve the basic contradiction
between its commitment to revolutionary principles.
including rapid "decolonization." and its continued
need for financial and technical assistance from the
West. Both to compensate for the country's shortage of
investment funds and to impress foreign observers. the-
PDG organized an cxtensiv,� program of vol
labor �the so- called ill ceslissem enI luumain. "Their
standard of living still largely unaffected by their
country's break %with France and generally persuaded
that preservation of their revolution merited almost
any sacrifice, the Guineans flocked to contribute their
time and energy to a number of ambitious public
works projects. The program's initial results were
encomagiug, and lilt- gmernnu�nt prernplI% accorded
ill rr.Nli. M-111t-,I Inuni a major role in its first
development plan. Fnll 20', of lilt- lolal 6udgt-1
allocation for the 191111 -lira planning period a:r staled
to be contributed b% yolunlary labor.
Revolutions. however, have it %%a% of running out of
steam. and tilt- Guinean revolution soon pnyed to be
no exception. Toure simply could not fulfill tilt-
promise he had made. For erne thing. Gninva's n(.%%
one -party system did not live up to advance nolice
I opular enthusiasm gr dnal1% gave %ca% to apathy as
more and more Guineans concluded thal rather than
providing them with i t means for effec�tke
participation in the nrana,rwinent of national affair,.
Toure's political reforms had saddled thorn with a %asp
and expensive ne%% bureaucracy. Monmer. this
bureaucracy not only was totally snhst-rvient to tilt-
Toure regime but was beset by inertia. incompetence.
and petty graft.
The regime's ivabilih to deal with Guinea's
economic problems was �and still is� another major
factor contributing to popular disillusionnienl. By
arid 1960, Torrre's tendency to subordin;,te tilt-
ec�ouontic implications of his policy\ choices h
generalized political goals was beginning to have an
adverse effect on living standards and efficienc�v. His
haste in extending the public sector had outrun his
abilih to find or train competent Cuiuean re-
placements for departing European niauai;vri.d and
technical personnel. Moreover, fear that their firers
might be national I zed �o r, al the� ven least. be
subjected to ever more burdensome ne\% governmental
control prompte pram foreign businessmen to
close their doors. thereby aggravating an already
serious urban unemployment problem. Tourc's action
in withdrawing Guinea front the F renc�It franc zone �a
step be deemed necessary to both the appearroic�e
Mid exerc�isv of full national soycreignh had an
exert more disruptive inpact. IIItroductiOII of an
inconvertible Guinean franc discouraged new and
ouch- needed Western investment, induced it shift in
Guinea's pattern of trade toward barter deals s\ith the
Soviet bloc. and placed tile ambitious goal of
C n Ary's 1960 63 development phut hope lessl
6 and reach. Smuggling became it major problen.
affecting both internal and foreign trade. Domestic
shortages of foodstuffs and consumer commodities.
compounded by misnt:lnagenu�nt in the state
operated distribution systvnt. bred inflation and black
ntarketevring.
Tonre's response to these problems and to the
malaise which was spreading over the c�oontrx was to
tighten party discipline, impose further curbs on civil
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Iils�rli4.�. and aplmal fist gmatrr 4.fforl filed vigil:uas-
:rtluin,l "c III III4.rn�r.olnti oil r% rlt-ne�lth. A, ll,r
(,g111tn (�trge4)lnic ,ilualiute ctrnliltee�41 to (1rtrrioratl-.
1'1X: rhatllr, of "c,ueelt�rh�ltIletitte" It(�caent- 11141"�
fn�4lurnt. (:uitl4.a", f:eilnn�. at-"� 41IM11u1t-41 to the'
11e:1c11iRation, elf Fracli4)llar% n(�tlt.doniali aced
itlllt(�riali,l 4.114.Miv al 11411114. :still ahhtad. 1'rercluitning
a %irhtal %title of �rigs-. t11s- g( �rr1111e�nt u14)t-tl,tradih
toward a har,114'r and men� autheritariatt ,1% 1( of rah�.
and Olitit-ati, as- otllcd to inforal tilt stilt- anstt11s-r.
I..,cal trildef :ltd Rivals- hn,ht4..,n14.0 Itt-c:rne(� ties-
e11jt-ct of par; il-olar ahu�t- and di,crimiti:etion. Plirur,
and political trial, 11111it- .won�d 1114. halanl elf 4.%4.11
11111d oplttnitie11 to '1'4111n��, 114licit�,.
From lilt- vatpilal in (:otiakr% caent- .till Item�
(Is-clarttion, elf dl-tt-rnti seat iolt Ile cmal4� .1 %4wialht .toil
4.g:11itarian mwit�h. Fist mien) :oils hos"v%
'fours-' n�volulion had long ,int t.11-t -411u� a Matlt-r of
,lord, rath4.r than %oOntaotr. Ittut-.ti.. he## will
dcgcncrats-d into a pn/gratn elf fol;�(�(1 610I alid ;114.11
graclualh fadveil into ol�curil,. Diwiiii111�d Giint-ao
IN-gall to fl alnad 4)11 it ,a:th� c�4lmpa fill III to flit
wt-,twanl ciitfelu, elf M'a,t (:crman, 1ls-fon� tilt 1�n�(�lion
of the Bt-rlin Wall. h% 197 at Irael 1i1111.1NN1 01- -a
figure. 4�4111al to 4)114.-fifth elf (:ui11t-a' Imlilliall�d belief
Inytrtlati4)ti at im14.1ts-nds-ti(�4. 13 %vilr, l-arlit-r -had
cmigratt�11 h% 1Mal or ill4.gal 1114�.164..% Ice( 1114)11,:.1141
t-vilt-, wiltun�d a, far a, Nigrria aped 4�wil Imes-. bell
m.,t ,(�1tlt-(I th,t-r 14) h.me� -in S(�rn�gal. the 1,4)"
o tiot. Lile�ria. Sierra I.l-11114'. ,aid 1 (:oi11ca.
'fhs-ir pr4)%intih n�ie fnn�1�d 'fours-' gresuing 4)1r4'�io11
with flit- threat of (1ulttt-rn�.nlnti4)oan 4rnrpireit..
'fill- r%jxo%iiry (luring till- 16Kid% 4)f wwral anlinvinel-
con,piraHv-� :J14-godI% illwh ileg I'wrigtt Iacking 4)f
(lone,tic 4.114-11eit- alld 1140,till- Goint-at, v%il4.
t4mintr(1 T(Illn� that hi g111�rllltll�Ill N:1, 1114. 4)hi4.4.;
4)f a "It�rinwivia impt- rialkI plod."
I'11l- attack on :4makr% taunt hr(I in \o,( tnlwr 1970
11.
it ,stall P4)rbug114. militar% ftrt-v augne�1114(1 In
C11int-a11 4.04., ,l-cne�d to h4.ar out hi� et4)M
.u%-pi(-ion,.' 'I'l 4.ff4.ct of ;hi, VI+41(14' 4)11 01i114.:1'
forvigni and donel-,ti4. p4licil-, %t :t, drantalic. 111 1114
inlrnialiowil livid it m,nitl-d in vwii c14rwr tit- %i;h
It'urwital. anotf-wd h% lourr..nplmlrt elf in.nrtl�nt% lighliut to
Pl /rtlltt4ll 011rlra. Nllll 411 �ith�111 Claim .816 111
llrtaniiintt .mall IfIll -limp 111.411 wala /rim� atlark her the- 11111l"P/� /.l
frl.�inu Porttltnl� 1111.4111 "..trikint at the� itwirltl�nl.' hradlluartrr.
in Clnakn, ant, hopl�Inll%. topl4int Toner l'hr fort tall
obj(.0%4�4- Li.lmen priman goal. ltrn� �Nifllti a t �nnl,li�I64 d
'rim PIIrtltgnrM� 1�Ir1111�nt of the raiding f+IrtY� Nid"114�0 III %%aitl tg
shiln wit71 Ihr lila�rartl pn Nilhill 21 lalur% of 11164� illilm
Lording. Tier :liar 411 di,.idrnt.. 114"A "4.r, "it"l a for a
Im+p filar opri.itlt Ilhirh nr.rr nmirrialin�II It i, Urh th.It all tlrrr
r.rntualk rithrr killyd or ralltllrrd.
fill- (:olntnuni,l ,tilt�,. im�luding thr ,latimlilig of a
st all prott-l-livt- Nn irl 4)a%al ftr4r j11,1 tc�r flit-
h4)ritoo fnlm Comility .%I hortlt� it II�tl Ito a rvigii of
It-rnr ultich ;,mph I4 (I 1114. I4. :unfornuttiolt 4)f 011111-all
.4a�iah,nt front it ,iogh� -part% 1141puli.t affair into
han14-114�41 It-ftt%ing tlit�laltr,hip.
Tessier 11lane�(1 Ili. ,t-coril) ftrt�c,' iltabilil% to (14�:11
Midis tilt- imadvr uitIt grt-a,4.r di.-patch 4111 till
vo4tt-rttr of a fifth (�tIst11m c.tnepri-wd 4)f ,11nviviiig
b4mrgt-tli, do-ne�M,. ,%vvoI n liIIgI%. 114� launcht-d a
.Mt-s�pinu putgt- elf part% and g4owrltnit-ltt official,.
111:11% of 0141111 appa"�1111% %%vry guilt% 4)l little- oe4)ry
than LWIfiesg Mort- n1tdt-ral4. 11tlitival and vviiiwrtlic
lt4Itl-il-. 'I'hi %%a, Follinwil I% tna� arr4.,t fonr(1
ctaeft �ilea Iriah. fuel ,cattrwd rf cuidi4)n,.
c(,nling do Ili� 4) 1 11 �tatt�mt-ut,. 'I'oorc inepri,oncd I
4)f 21 cahirn�t ne�nelt-r 641"1 4)f Ihl- wtii4)r oftic�4�r, in
tilt- arnu�(I font, and ,4.nil-t-, dewhiding tilt-
c.nnm:uelt-r� 4)f flit- priti0pal neilitar% garri,on,, and
I 1 of N pml+ncial go,t�ruo Ilv al jailed two
forl11t-r aluba�atl.r 14) fit. :rhittgluti. flit- dtict 4)f hi,
m(lt Imt4hguanl. thr Misstate Catholic .%rdhhkhop 4)f
:on:tkn still �con� r civil .4.r%an doctt ir,.
t-11gin4�41%. and other t-(l11cat4�t1 1>t�4lylt
Tilt- iuepact 4)f Toom', Frowird lton,cclvai ing
can11>aigti a:1, 1a4)f4)ld. Olt ern� haled it ,trolgth4vicd
lei, grip lilt the It-tl-r, of allot cillicr cowl-d or
dl-anleot all %i,ihl4. p4h�otial ri%al ()it thr 4)tli4.r
h..nd. it n�,o114�41 in till- 4.lintinalion 4)t it v4.ry I argl-
lerti4)n elf Ih4. 11110. of 11411iticall%. adini11j
31141 it. hnicall% 4.1t4�ril-nct�tl (aein4.:ut, uhich had Ie�ctt
t14.v4.1olt4�(1 at gn�al tvl.l jilt.,. I'1.iti. '1'hi, I4)... togl-tltl-r
%tith till- paral"i gcnl-rltcd 11, aii atino,phcrc 4)f fear
and dcnunci oil. Nmtl Ivd to ill-%% difficltllic�-
particolarh in th4. l-c4)tiomic fit Id
But (:ui114.a lids t00%%; :ill 1t.,lidical dictalor :u,d
I�c4uomic ,lagnation 41141111d not �1.cttrc .4)n14. of
1'onrl-'. uccc� a. 4)r hi c.nntr%' 1a�ic pilvi tia! for
iahll- -if 114)4 pn�l1e roe �tuh�h4mld Feet othl-r
%frican It-advr, Low dent� NI �l-ll in ovt�rconling
divi,ivl- tribal altd rcgitnal It% :tltil-, or in milling
di,ciplin4�d and trsth oati4)11al lullitival in,titotion,. \4:
othl-r radical rl-gitnc in blit. Mrica ha, provt�d .o
dural,lc. %till. dl-,pill- Ilk p.,tl-ntially i11ltihiIing
c4t11ntitm4.ttt t4) al-i:lli,nl :still cclatoneic irnllgtl till
4.rIl-1�. 'I'o11rc La, mtoight and wvurl-d ;h4. a..i�tanl-c 4)1
prival4. Wo. :crii l-apital in flit- dcvclnplue�nt elf
t :uinl-a'. neincral ur alth. Nv aua elf 11111, IwU lau,i!l-
alining proit�4�t (:/nakr% can :11 Ita,t It4k fonvard to
.1 11t-lpfal rims- in 4�vlt.trt rt�el-niw%. no ntattl-r ho4v great
Iht- :I�I,rttnt-ot rf tilt- etht-r pr4)hlt-nt. it nt71.t face in
till- war% alwad.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6

The Guinea n.10 4 ).nd t .t- Como o y i ci
1,wiv rr�aIn rt/Grpr
I�;\('I'It left Il11�Ir Itr�fj111h lM INII Ilt'I Itrlili(',1l .11141
I�(-Ilnr oil j(. .\�14.111. lht'rt� rI�.111\ j% ratlll�r litth� I It, a
ch�tlns;ni�ht.
flit- ;r1i11t�,ur� �or Ilivir ,'on11tr\ �Ir-Ili
Illrlr IIIImi diatu tivi 11l4)rh fell fill' .ntllll\\t�.lt�r11 I III
III 911�.It (Illt;t� of \.4.1 11ri(�.- (alirn�.t �i/4� it I%
�lighll\ .mallur Ih.ul (:r,�Lt111 told Il11Io1.11ion .41041,11 1
millrotl .In� I'lo.t�1\ (�o1rlll,lr.lhh� h) Ilww 111 so
.11141 (\or\ I :o.1�t '111Ilhn11t:11 It j. Ialrli.11 lit-it Ili flit
.t of m- -I 11ri('.1 t�nllirt�. %%birli orvicht�(I from the.
%thilli(� (u,1�t to file- 1 %1101:111 IN Iht� 111111 .11141 15111
(v�nt11rir., tilt� c�otmlr% 11.1� too cli.ti l if, I� unikilli;
!Ii�1oril',1) tr,Illition� it. 0\\ Inllrt�(l..1� in 1114� of
1111411\ ollivr mri(�.ul �L11t�. ho.0� �iii� .11111 �h %%vrc�
(h�It�rnn114�(I I:\ flit- ri\.Ilr\ 411 I�:Ilroln�:1n I40\\t r. clurin>;
flit' colonial 4�r,1. 0hoe �,1 Ironli, r. \\(�n� (Ir.1\\n "Ai
�0,4114 ri for n:ltIIr,ll Iowa in If�.IIIIn�� or flit-
he nlo>;t�nt -it (1i tiif- I40;)Iil.iIion littrrlt�n�(I on flit- north
11\ hirtilt;ll,'.t� ;11i111 .111cl t 11,,;.41 .u1,I on flit- c.I %I 11\
\I.11i mid 1\on Cii. t. it It- rriton cur\c� jnl:ln(I ill :I
II,I('k .Irl' %%I I I( I I �Ilrr Itllll�II ,)I Sit'rr,i I .Pail(� 1)4'11
rI�achini; Il� �I I IIIIIIt� ;dmiiz III 111)r(l,'r 111
I.IId�ri.l. II i� ,111 ,1\\ k\\:Ir(I ('I )it IiuiIr,Ilil,n ati(I o11,� Ili(�II
11,1� (�1111trilmII�ll to 'I'mirI' I,1 r.r..lI,I1 \ith Hit- IIIrvat ill
It)n�icn intl'r\I�lit it n
;nj Ili '.I'. lit r\aIiIit! tr( l)i( -aI l�limatl� ,ind il
a.unl\ IIt (�q :i int� h :I\ I I(�11(Ic(I to (li�cOi11.1,,
\\I,IIItI lit� (vllltni /I�r.. iII I�.I(Pr.. :In(1 II,IIri�t aIikl�. bill
If ill' Iliv l'I fill Itr\ II itidc�t �1 /I'. It I� kind ,)I
(�omilh'r.tlill- 41 \t�r.iI :IimI n.ltnr,ll \\(�:11th. I-'( ur iii i I)r
I of )4)t;r.II)IIil�.,I ,Intl ('IiIII.Iti(' n�i_ (%i it I)I� (li� ii-
Lui�llt�(I. thrl�I� ,I \\Ilil�h (�oi11(�i(II \\itIi .I r( i in \\Ili( i
1,11(� trtl)r 1� I) to It III111aI1I I \I'r:I IIII.I I)I Ir..('r I),'I
B.I %m- ;IIiIII�I�. ,Iki) r,�I, rrl (I t4 ;1. \I:Irittnu ('I) 1i t:11.
or I.ImI�r ;nin,vI. ('r of ;1 :ilt- to (ill mill� \\i(h�
co 1.1�t:11 I)1:1i11 \\i111 .111 .1\1.1 t� 4'II'\ation of II�.. t11 .111
)f NO 14 .11)o\t�.I�.( II-\1.1 Bi�I�('tt�(I I,\ nl, Incl(�rinu ri\I'r.
It
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6

which empt% into broad estuaries a d tidal creeks
bordered b% maiigroyr swamps all(] marshes, the
region %vas dubbed lex Ricicres du Sud b% early French
explorers �a name it retained until the late 10th
century. Although it is characterized by extreme
humidity, Heavy rainfall (well over 1511 u., %4,
atnuaIIV), oppressive temperature and dense
broadleaf evergreen forests. it is one of Guinea's more
thickly populated areas. Pockets of rich alluvial soil
permit the cultivation of it wide variety of tropical
crops, and the movement of produce tp ports and
urban markets along the coast is relatively cast'.
Villagers grow rice, millet, c�om, kola Writ trues, and oil
palms on thousands of small plots carved out of the
t -rusts and swamps. Large -scale ,,gric�ulture, however.
is limited to a fv w pineapple and banana plantations
founded by Etiropeiws in the preindependenc�e period.
And despite the fat�: that few places in Guinea. are
oetter suited for ,risirtg food crops than the coastal
plain prospects for markedly increasing production
there either by increasing the acreage under
cultivation or by achieving higher yields per acre
through the introduction of more advanced farming
methods �arc far from bright. At he.it it scums likely to
be it gong time before Conakry has the financial and
human resources needed to dual effectively with the
problems created by the area's heavy rainfall:
excessive ground moisture. flc:,,.tng. reaching. and the
formation of alkalitie pans.
!doyenne Crtinee (vliddle Guinea, rses abri., tly
from the coastal plain i i a curies of steep .�scents which
cnlntinate in the massif of Fouta Djallon. It extends to
the eastward reaches of that massif �a fact which has
given rise to the widespread practice of using
Moyenne- Gcince and Fouta Djallou as it.tcrchange-
able regional desi, .ations �and embraces about one
third of Guineas total land area. Although the terrait
is relative rugged �much of it consists of scmb-
covered hills and plateaus ranging from 1,300 to over
5.000 feet in altitn le� living conditions arc much
more pleasant than along the coast. Rainfall is not so
heavy, and there are wider daily and seasonal
variations in temperature. Because of this, and
because the region is geoerally well suited to both
agricultural a pastoral pursuits, pohnlation densities
^nd to be high. The areas economic significance,
however. is not limited to the livestock, citrus fruits,
coffee, bananas, wheat, maize, and rice which are
raised there. Some of west Arica's liirgest rivers
including the Cambia and Senegal �rise in the Fouta
Djallon and provide Guinea �.yith considerable
k-droelec�tric� potential as they phinge downward in
picturesque rapid, and falls toward more gentle
6
sloping tablelands. More important, the county. "s
largest known deposits of bauxite �those at Kindia,
Fria, and Bake �lie in the hilly terrain where
Movenne- Guinee meets the coastal plain. Other
promising d(�pos;t, naw been found at To(tgue and
Dahola on.the Fotta Djallou massif itself, but these
have vet to he fill! evaluated.
haute- Guinee (Upper Guinea) lies to the east and
south of the Fouta Diallon. It is Cuinea's largest �and
least fa\ ored� geographic region. Consisting primarily
of gently, rolling savanna plains wlu'Ah average about
10A) feet in altitude and whic�li are almost devoid of
mineral resources, Ilaut. -Cuinec is it sparsel\ settled
and relatively arid area. 'The southwesterly nunscons
..weeping in from the coast have lost much of their
moisture h the time they reac�lt the suyanna. 'There
are occas ..aad heap y rainstorms in the summer, but
from November through \-larch dry. dusty winds blow
across the area from the Sahara. creating it hot,
withered desert environment. The sun is obscured
throughout much of the year �in the wet season by
clouds and in the dry scatun by dust and smoke from
brush fires. Daily variations in temperature and
humidity rut be extreme. The area's inhabitants tend
to cluster along the forest lined banks (if the Niger and
its tributaries, eking out an existence by raising cattle,
hunting. and. during the wet seas -ii. growing
cassava �the tropics' thick- rooted counterpart of the
Idaho potato millet, peanuts. tobacco. sweet
potatoes. and it little rice.
Guinee Forestiere (Forest Region). which oc�cupivs
the southermnost corner of the c�ouutry, is Guineas
most primitive area. Fur from Conakry and served
only by it sparse network of unpaved roads. it is
cLaracterized by mountainous terrain. it hot and
humid climate. and lush vegetation. The rounded hills
acrd scattered peaks of the Guinea Ilighlands traverse
the region from northwest to southeast. Most of the
area is 1.300 feet or t.:ore above sea level. and on the
Liberian frontier Mont Nimba �Gui :ea's highest
nouutain �rises to over 6.000 feet. Except for it few of
the higher hills and ridges, the land is covered with a
dense rain forest which extends across Guinea's borders
into the neighboring states of Sierra Leonc. Liberia,
and Ivory Coast. Gantt and wild fruit abound, and
crops are easily grown on cleared land. 1- lence. while
portions of the rain forest are virtually uninhabited,
Guinee Forestiere as it whole is rather densely
populated. Most of the inhabitants earn their
livelihood by collecting kola nuts, palm (oil kernels,
and quinine bark in the forests and by raising rice.
corn and cassava in the river valleys. But despite the
general backwardness of the area. it is of considerable
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6

lxtential importance to the Guinean ecornonny. Its
timber resources �as yet untapped �are vast.
Extensive iron ore deposits have been found in the
Souloumandou (Simandoti) mountain area and on the
northern slopes of Mont Nimba. With additional
investment and tighter controls on smuggling, the
regions coffee plantations and diamond fields could
yield substantial export revenues.
Guinea's population is as diverse as the terrain it
inhabits. There are at least IS distinct tribes, moony of
which spill over onto the territory of one or more
neighboring states. More than two dozen related �but
generally not mutually intelligible languages or
dialects are spoken. Some three of the people
are Muslims, but animism flourishes in parts of Basse-
Guinee and Guinee Forestiere, and nearly 40,0(X)
Guinekuns roust of whom live in or near Conakry
arc Christians.
The country's three largest trn ��s, the Fulani,
Malinke, and Sustn, together ioc�Iud,, nore than 70`,'i
of Guinea population and continue to enjoy it
corresponding preponderance of social and political
power. The predominantly Muslim Fulani, some 1.6
million strong, hold sssav in iv1oyenne- Cuilive.
Primarily it pastoral people and relatively recent
arrivals in the area (the Fulani did not enter the Fouta
Djallon in force until the 18th century), they are
Guineas largest tribe, even though they constitute
only one- fourth the total number of their kinsmen
scattered elsewhere throughout west Africa. The
Fulani gained their dominant position in Moye�nne-
Gi inee through it series of holy wars waged against
nonbelievers. By the early 19th century, most of the
area's original inhabitants had been killed, converted,
or expelled, and it Fulani elite was firmly established
kit the helm of it feudal kind tight)% organized Islannic�
domain. While the influence the Fulani subseyuentl%
came to wield throcughotut much of what is now
Guinea was curtailed �and the socipolitical system
thee had established in the Fouta Djallon area
disrupted th-� advent of French colonial rule, they
remained the country's most po%verful and privileged
tribe until the eve of independence. And although
they r,ow enjoy it much less exalted status, neither the
preindependence changes in the traditional political
order nor Toure�s postindependence egalitarianism
have completely erased the Fulani's elitist outlook. In
fact, T oure has never really trusted the Fulani, and
Fulani officials have generally been among the first to
feel the imp- of Guinea's rec purge and
internal crises.
llaknte- Guince is dominated by the Malinke tribe�
half of whose members reside in Mali and Capper
Volta. The Malinke are Guinea's s:�zond largest tribal
group, accounting for approxin lately 19 of the
country's total population. Like the Fulani, they are
Muslilw �in fact they were among the first Negroid
peoples ilk west Africa to come in contact with Arab
civilization and culture. But unlike the Fulani, the
Malinke adhere to it highly localized version of Islam,
and their traditional society was characterized by
autonomous village units rather than by centralized
political control. Proud descendants of the founders of
the vast Mali empire which reached its zenith in the
14th century, the Malinke eventually fell under
I� ulani domination. Although the\ proved to be
remarkably adaptable to modern influences during
the colonial era�developing a reputation as a hard-
working people willing to my their hand at anything
from agriculture to retail trading and soldiering �the
\1alinke were unable to compete with the Fulani for
power and prestige before Toure came to power. Nosy,
however. the two groups' relative positions have been
r-versed. Toure is part Malinke, and his tribesmen
have rcceiye