NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 50E; GUINEA; ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110060-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 60
• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
50E GS/ f4f
Guinea
May 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN L.. 3SEM
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%%*ANA M.
This dotwnenf conroins inlernfOSian oNec'ng the marionol defensr of rM Unir�d Sates. wi'Min rM
-meaning of title 1A. sections M and 794 of Me US tode as amended. Os hens:++ -ss-cn or re�elotio.
of its conrenrs co or roc@ -t+s by on unwtOw.red oorsem is prohibited eh low.
CtASSIFIEO AV 011611. ExEMt FROM GENERAL DECLASSIF1
CA110t4 S(:NEDULE Op E. G 11652 E1; militia personnel in command positions has
gn oats aggr%ated this %ituulion.
Strength trends (S)
Since in(lepeml4.nce. the strength of (:uineu armed
forces has grachtall% incn�ased to the preseW total of
:4roIt 3,50) ncn. Dv%pity the n ceipt of Sovicl and
(:zvch(rdovak ground e(Inipnn id. arms %trengtb bad
bet�11 n I ;rtiv(I% constant beh%een 19111 and 1970. hul
after 111w attack on Conakry. t11c 1'resident stated that
the arms %%ould be eyanded I4.) 30.000 tncu. While
1114. regolarartnv 11as probablt inereawd by only about
I.IX11) Ilwn since then. there has been it significant
increase in the nrtrnber of parctnililar% -h pt units
ttndrr arnn control. The arm\ -supcn sed (:ivic
Senice 1'roduc�tion Battalion totaling about 13.000
tnen, are miller the control of arnn head(luarlers.
Some personnel are armed ;caul have mc(ivcd limited
militar% training and are n�ferwd to a% civic s4.nice
tac�tical group% Also, several companies of lh(-
g4.ntlarnu�rie report to annv Conunamivrs. and militia
personnel are often called np to assist in army
operation s. The situation r(flects the gov4.rnnu�ut's
policy of attempting to maintain constant state of
militar% readines%. it police %%hick has been in force
since IS)illand is expcctc(I tocoutinnc us long ,%'Tonne
I4.liev4.s there is a 1(ssible threat to his r(�gime.
The taavv and air force strengths remained relatively
static for man% %cars prior l0 19,0. w1wo their
respective complements wery 1:50 and 160. The
inc�rea%e to a :3110-man nay\ and it 200 -man air force
n�sulted from efforts following t11C 1970 raid, to
rehabilitate the capabilities of the armed forces. 'I'hcse
personnel figures (�an be cxpec�ted to rise marginally
over the next :3 %ears as trainers return from courses
overseas.
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TOTAL
MAXIMUM
NtTMBER
N(TMIIER FIT FOR
AGE
OF MALES
MILITARY SERVICE
15 -19
201,000
110,000
20 -24
175,000
90,000
25 -29
153,000
75,000
30 -34
135,000
65,000
35 -39
115,000
50,000
4044
98,000
40,000
4549.
82,000
30,000
Total, 15 -49
959,000
460,000
The average number of males rvac�hing militar% a4e
(I Vii) iannnally during 197:1-7 ill total about 11.00.
A Conscription Lt%% %%a% pa %sell in October 1959
%%Mich provides that all abh bodied male Citizen"
betweetl IS mid -19 %Cars of age are liable for nlilitary
service. 'I'll(- ht" has ha(I littl(� application. Since
mzmpo%cer requirements generall% have been nlet b%
volunteer%. Ilowever. it modified version of the lase
may have I4.eII enforc4.O after tIt(- iova%ion of
Conakry, Who'll AIi expansion of the arm
amtcntnCold and ex- militant' personnel and paramili-
tary forces were mobilized. Most recruits ate io(luc�ted
into the militia will receive basic militar% training.
Subsequently. some are assign-(I to the army. while
others remain available for litter transfer or temporary
(lute with the army. 'I'll( militia. which totah about
8,IN)O, serves as it manpower pool for filling both
enlisted and officer billets in the army, mid it also
provides it really reserve force in an vinergem-%.
The a%ailablc militar% tnimdo%%er luck, dw gviwral
c(luc;tliort :cull Skills rvydred fur Mary mahilenancc and
operaliun of modem %%eapom and c(luipment.
Members of dw armed services arc grnerall% respected
I% the public. and matviiall% Ali-% are n lutivcly bett(
off than the average Gi iovau.
'I'll(* rise in 1114. slats of the militia has been
uviwrall% dcuoraliz ;ng to members (,I t1w armed
forces. who led t14. militia bas no experi4.race awl
AisIIffici4.nt training to earn out its Unties. F urlher. a
purge of the big114.st ranking officers in tla� s;�r%ice%
bet%%4.cfa 19119 amt 1972 has disc�ourimed an) political
;unbitiotts among mililar\ personnel and also ha�.
ttpsct 111w conventional command stntc�htrc. The
officer corps has expressed its disc�outew over the
selection ,%%lent for promoliun and the practice of
pluCiu>; militia personnel in command positions has
gn oats aggr%ated this %ituulion.
Strength trends (S)
Since in(lepeml4.nce. the strength of (:uineu armed
forces has grachtall% incn�ased to the preseW total of
:4roIt 3,50) ncn. Dv%pity the n ceipt of Sovicl and
(:zvch(rdovak ground e(Inipnn id. arms %trengtb bad
bet�11 n I ;rtiv(I% constant beh%een 19111 and 1970. hul
after 111w attack on Conakry. t11c 1'resident stated that
the arms %%ould be eyanded I4.) 30.000 tncu. While
1114. regolarartnv 11as probablt inereawd by only about
I.IX11) Ilwn since then. there has been it significant
increase in the nrtrnber of parctnililar% -h pt units
ttndrr arnn control. The arm\ -supcn sed (:ivic
Senice 1'roduc�tion Battalion totaling about 13.000
tnen, are miller the control of arnn head(luarlers.
Some personnel are armed ;caul have mc(ivcd limited
militar% training and are n�ferwd to a% civic s4.nice
tac�tical group% Also, several companies of lh(-
g4.ntlarnu�rie report to annv Conunamivrs. and militia
personnel are often called np to assist in army
operation s. The situation r(flects the gov4.rnnu�ut's
policy of attempting to maintain constant state of
militar% readines%. it police %%hick has been in force
since IS)illand is expcctc(I tocoutinnc us long ,%'Tonne
I4.liev4.s there is a 1(ssible threat to his r(�gime.
The taavv and air force strengths remained relatively
static for man% %cars prior l0 19,0. w1wo their
respective complements wery 1:50 and 160. The
inc�rea%e to a :3110-man nay\ and it 200 -man air force
n�sulted from efforts following t11C 1970 raid, to
rehabilitate the capabilities of the armed forces. 'I'hcse
personnel figures (�an be cxpec�ted to rise marginally
over the next :3 %ears as trainers return from courses
overseas.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110060 -7

a. Training (C)
Prior to indepcudemv. all :uineaul officer. ;lull
clolisted nu�rr h;:d been trained nr Freuch militar%
schools and Fri'nell colonial +alit� Since 195S. arot%
personnel hays heclo trained ill Guim.a. in
Czechoslovakia, the Soyiel I'nion, 0111a. ,Ind.
beginning in 1972. flit i',�ople 1(epublic (if Chinas.
Military engineers mid parttr()pers have meched
training in West (:canal%. Na o,al and air force
personnel are tralincd al Conakr% by loyicl lecliIiical
assistanee te;urls and b% Coim�aln ere"s trained in the
I'.S.S.B.: \ftcr gra dilation from the Conakr% \lililaln
\cadvm\. officer% receive im%al or pilot training in the
C.S.S.H. \bunt IM Soviet ad%i are pr�senl in the
army. oily%, and air force Cobalt military ad%kcr�.
munberiog about 2(1(1, %%ork primarily "ilh Coiloea*s
militia :Ind the 1':11C:(:. In 1972, 'loon� reeine. led
Cithan sceurih giiiads "ho noa prm ide protection for
the President amt also train Gtiincatrr� in sccurih
procedures. (:hina "a. to .end it mililar\ uli to
(:uineae in early 19;3 to train ;tail% and nay%
personnel. The arrival cf the mission "a. delatycd
"hilt financial arrattgerm�uls "ere hoeing r+'negotialed
and is c\pccicd (e he rescheduled for later ill the year.
d. Military budget (C)
Budget r�einest. for each of the .mall mili tit n
service- arc prepared Io% the r�specli%v service chid.
Mica are snbrnitted to the Minister of Ihr People'�
Arm% for r�yie" and coordination. The e\ecntiye
hnds;ct office thentmorloralcs the defense budget
iIt() the total national I;odget. "Rich is reyie"ed by
the leaders of the I'I)( \fter part% coofirmalion. the
budget is ratified b% the National .1��e mthly in clowd
session. Final budget approval is by the 1'r�sident, alit,
e\ereisc�s strung control over defense appropriations;
the National lsscnthly functions merely as it
ri ibber mp for e\ceutiyc polio% a od inyariaeb1%
(111domes the hudget as submitted.
Because of the goyernm�nt st- imtiyil% c�onccroing
dw release of economic data, uo militar budgetan
information bas hero available since IS)ill. \t that
time the countr military bnclget "as I'S$6.I
million. about ti of the total national budget. 'this
"as do" n sit
nilicantly from previous \sirs. reflecting
Cuinca fitimicia) problems. For the IW3 -6S period.
'dense budget. averaged 18.6 of the total national
Iu(Iget. it relatively high perec�ntage fur a asst \friea o
country. The military budget has probable risen since
1970 as it r�.ull of the c�oyotry's preoccupation "ith
security follo"irlg the Noycmber 10411 ItI kck.
5. Logislies (S)
Glineat*s underl(�\clope(I econoin\ has yer\ little�
ca lmbilih to mploorl its aermcd forces. Inelfcc�In�
ec�oloontic policies aced the lack of iuycstnn�nl capital
and .killed per.onne�I haye inllibited IIte dv\elopnivI;t
,cud c\ploilalio o of the vmmlry's remmi cvs and
Iru.tra tee its economic deyelopnee�rtt. Mantilac�turing
is ore a .stall scale and is dmo vd lrimarii\ to Ilse
processing ef it limited range of consumer goucls. \le.t
(of the "orking force is rugaeged in subsislclocc
:Igriculturv.
:ui lit -it relic, on foreign sourcrs for it iIi tit r
cei Ili ImiciII c\cept for .irnlIf� (It lit rlcrtnarsler items.
Since indepe�ndeocc in 1955. the country bars recci%cd
ruililart rnalericl from (:omoomisl :Intl non
(:ontnlooki conntrics \alucd at about $2 million.
The I.S.S. B., the principal supplier. hao, pro\idccl
aeboetl $15 million "orlh of arms aloof e(luipinent.
including �nt,ell :erns. field and aotliaircrah artillcre.
Iransport and armored \chie�le�s, naval patrol boats,
.,nd fighter. trainer. and transport aircraft. Olhcr
suppliers of mililar\ c(luipment include the I'eoplc's
11epublic of China. "hick ha� proyidcd tanks. Intck..
medium "capons. .shell arms. and atiommitiou;
:uba. light lank.. aim. and atnntuniti(n; Wc.t
Germ,m\. truck. and Icleconunnuicalions ecluipun lot;
and czechosimakia. small arm.. artillcn. and
Irito%Isort aircraft. Shipment� of .rtndl arrm "rn� also
received from Eg\Iit. Nigeria..1lgeria. Moot Ira( 1.
InlorrnaIiert is not ;mailable on %%I it or not the
\rpm lictrcao of Logistic. and 'Transport still retains
r�spunsibiIiI\ Inr the cnlire armed forces logistical
system. "hick has been a major deliciviw\ eof the
armed forces. Mainh�nancc is beln" statrtdard. and
spun� parts. "hic�h are gencrall\ in short most
be obtained from abroad.
There is uo kno"n administrative setup for medical
care in the armed forces. rnililar hospital at Hoke.
staffed I\ (:oban pb%%iciauts. is used Is) support the
rebels from Portuguese :uinea. Medical e�arc� is
provided b\ civilian facilities. Im ,i\ small military
dispen�arics. and b% .ono� pond\ trained medics
atlMehed It, tactical units.: \ssignnu lot of ntedicsal the
tactical level is dictated b\ .i /c and location of Imit
rather than fy any preconceived plan to provide
widespread medical support. There are no known
storage facilities for military medical sopplics other
Iha o at the dispcnsar\ lv%cl.
Vow diacritics im tlacr mmics sec tl(c list +d n:nncs �n lit( apnnt
of the tiuuunen Map in 'Ill. 'mmtr I'ndilc chapter acid the tamp
itscll
5
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C. t nn
Tlly political conditions and economic siagn;u c in
Guinea li.ive prevented the arin\ from nmking ntuc�h
progress in the developnunt of its c. I iIilivs.
Niorcover, following the arnny coups in Ghana 196W
and \-tali 1968), 'Poore, %%Iio has ab%u\ been ir% of
the coup potential of the arnty, look addition:.:! steps
to subject tit- artily to part\ disc�iplinc and' to ,c�k�ic�
action projects. After an a lleged tuilitar plot ill 19.). 9
and the arrest of high ranking officers� the ano 's role
was reduced almost exciusivel to one of civic� action
(Figure 3). By the tithe of the 19 11 inV;tsiort, lhc;trnt\
was a debilitated force, its negle�c�t c iclent in the
deteriorated state of equipuu�nt, limited training, and
poor inoralc. Its inability to tract quickly and
effectively during that attack prompted further
reorganizin), this tint- designed to improve Guinea's
defc nsiVV c;tpabilitics Withuul creating it potential
threat to the reginu�. Mtic�h of the obsolete equipment
has been replaced, small arms have been receivrd in
large cptantity. and training, both domestic and
foreign. has Lech intensified. r \t the same tithe.
however, a political purge has taken place which has
severcl\ deplet the officer corps. M my hive been
replaced by inilitia officers \cho arc not adcquatcl\
trained or vxpericnc -d. Tllc absence of qualified
leaders has offset soniewhat the progress ntacle in
trtiniug and reequipping tic fi,rce. 0vvra11, t11
army s cap;ibilitics have been upgraded, but its
effectiveness will continue to be hanipc� red be
,tibstandard inahitenancc and deficiencies in
organization, particidarl\ in logistics. (C)
6
L
I. Organization (S!
Information oil lh- latest artu\ reorg;otizatic:n.
begun in 1970. is not available. The forecast nuule
then that the arnn would be increased to 30,000 ineu
through the integration of paraniilitan forces and
civic service personnel and tie recall of ex ntiiitur\
personnel probably will ii(we. be attained because of
C:uillea's faltering ec�onc,nt\. Sonte (4-finite steps have�
been Cu p a to broaden the $,ase of the irni\ \cith
available resoitrc�es. but not of the tn;cguitud-
indicated bs tle: ;uuic,urtced expansion. Tllu 30,000-
inan arnn is c. ly c�oncekable if' inchided in this figure
are the 15,000 nuut :iv Service Production
;atkilions, the militia. and the g-nda;uterie. 'I'll(-
regular arms and these groups are often referred to
colleetivel\ its "militants ill arnis, or the "Peopli�
Ar:ns. Phis aggregation 'of forces must be
(listinanished from the regular arms. although the
arnn does exercise onitnand over vlenients of th e��-
other organizations ill certain c�irc�unislances. The
Civic Service Production Battalions, cs h;c�h have b--n
associated with the army sh acquired an
economic de vc1oputent role. are ci`So refert 1 tc as
"tactical groups." ,runt personnel ad these groups
and ;tpparentl\ keep them prepare for c�allup during
emergencies. The militia is it x 1mrate .sere ice, but
some of its personnel� both officers and enlisted na�n.
have beers integrated into the ariny. Its duties in some
cases are the one as the aria 's no\c that the\ share
ecliml status in the� defe,ae organization. Gendarnr�ri-
outposls in lhc� area bordering Portuguese (:rtinea are
tinder the olvmtional control of ;i rn iy regional
headquarters. so th:;t this c�oinponent, loo. is
c�onsidewd ;lit element of the P-opl-'s Arin\. The
Cabinet toendwr Mho ultiniatel\ exer cises ;tuthorit\
over all these svi-vices is koo\cn as tit- Minister of th-
People's Anne. whidi ni ;t\ indicate that it is not the
arnt\ that has been expanded so ntuc�h as the c�olicept
of the ii n
The regular arms is organized along convention it
lines under the Ariny Chief of Staff. wIiose
headquarters is at Conakry. 'There are four niililar\
zones in Guinea \c hic�h correspond to the c�ountrc
four geographical regions, each ontaining th-
headquarters of one of the anny's four infanta
battalions. Conakry is an independent militan zone�.
Thc� spc�ci!tl battalion is stationed there to defend the
capital� and the engineer battalion� the armored
battalion, and the recently fornied paracoinmando
battalion are also headquartered there.:\If battalions
are mider the conunand of the Arm of Staff.
except possible the irinored battalion. which in the
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FIGURE 3. Army personnel engaged in civic action
project (U/OU)

s`
j
J
past canoe under the direct control of the I'residOit.
Detachments of the armored battalion are assigned to
each military Zone, where they operate in conjunction
with the infantry battalions. The artillery.batteries are
not independent units hilt are organic to the regional
battalions. The battalion headquarters control the
ci:-ic service "tactical groups" its well as certain t
"endarnierie outposts.
me army has an industrial conplex in Conakr
which manufactures clothes and shoes for nililary and
civilian consumers. The factories, which are manned
I ,y army personnel, probable come under the control
of army headctnitrters.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition (S)
The estimated strength of Guinea's regular anny is
5,000, consisting of 150 officers, 500 NCO's, and 4.350
enlisted nen. If elements of the militia, the
gendarnerie and the civic service "tactical groups"
who operate with the arny are included, the actual
army strength could be increased by about 1.000. The
principal tactical units of the army are four infantry
battalions, a special battalion. an arnwred battalion. it
puraconunuudo battalion, and an engineer battalion.
There are also several transport and service supl,ort
runts and ni ntcrotis artillery detacbments.
The four infantry battalions, which serve as nililaa
Zone contrnands, arc headquartered its follows: Ist
Infantry Battalion, Kankan (.Military Zone IIII: d
Infantry Battalion. Kindia (.Military Zone I); id
Infantry Battalion. Labe (,Military Lone II): -Ith
Infantry Battalion, NZer,kore. (Xlililar Zone 1
Three infanta companies are standard for each
battalion, but there is only orc infante company in
the lth Battalion, and there are four in tit( id. Each
battalion has several artillery cletachnients which are
deployed throughout the Zones. The Ist and 2d Zones.
NvIlich border on Portuguese Guinea, contain the
heaviest concentration of artillery. It is also in these
two zones that gcndarnxrie outposts, strung .rlong the
Portuguese Guinea border, operate wider army
command. Detachments of tie armored battalion are
deployed to all fotir military Zones: it paraconi mmido
compare is probably at Labe, and another is either A
Boke in the Ist Zone in Conakry.
Tile military zone of Conakry is the defense
responsibility of the special battalion, which consists
of infantry, transport, armored, security, and artillery
elements and, possibly, it paratroop company. One of
the battalion's artillery detachments, at He "Tamara
just off the ccwske k f: t� ri.rkn has been equipped with
Soviet -made radar controlled guns since 1971.
FIGURE 4. Soviet -built BTR -152 armored personnel
carrier (C)
The nginver battalion al Conakr concerns itself
primarily with road building.unl cotslructimi work of
it civic nature. 'I'll( three construction companies of
the battalion are assigned lcrritorhdI\ according to the
pro;ccts they are involved ill. and detachnnvnts are
frecluently widely dispersed.
Arms and l-quipnicnt are largcl\ World War I I types
front Cominimist countries. primarily the Soviet
Union. Major items of equipment include 'I' I :uud
P'1' -76 tanks, unidentificd Chinese tanks. BTIi -IS2
armored personnel carricn c Figure -1). B'I'B� -10
armored personnel carriers. BBD\I arwt)red rccvtrnrti
sancc cars, self- prop(lled antitank suns. antiaircraft
artiller O7 85 and 100 nn). and field artillery
(16 55 and 105 -nun) (Fignrc 5). \lany of Ife
\wapons. w, well as armore and transport yeh;cles
FIGURE S. Soviet -built 85 -mm field guns (C)
N
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f
R
FIGURE 4. Soviet -built BTR -152 armored personnel
carrier (C)
The nginver battalion al Conakr concerns itself
primarily with road building.unl cotslructimi work of
it civic nature. 'I'll( three construction companies of
the battalion are assigned lcrritorhdI\ according to the
pro;ccts they are involved ill. and detachnnvnts are
frecluently widely dispersed.
Arms and l-quipnicnt are largcl\ World War I I types
front Cominimist countries. primarily the Soviet
Union. Major items of equipment include 'I' I :uud
P'1' -76 tanks, unidentificd Chinese tanks. BTIi -IS2
armored personnel carricn c Figure -1). B'I'B� -10
armored personnel carriers. BBD\I arwt)red rccvtrnrti
sancc cars, self- prop(lled antitank suns. antiaircraft
artiller O7 85 and 100 nn). and field artillery
(16 55 and 105 -nun) (Fignrc 5). \lany of Ife
\wapons. w, well as armore and transport yeh;cles
FIGURE S. Soviet -built 85 -mm field guns (C)
N
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j3
n
delivered prior to IS) 0. arc� probabl% is it poor still(- of
repair or compIvIvI% ino1wrable. Materiel c f later
delivvries, Miielt include scant '_t) I'- :31'%. hco I'T ,6's.
IU (:hincse light tanks fit, 13'1'11 Ill's, lour 13131)\I's.
23 arlillcr% pieces, and enortgh small arras for csrt
'30,000 nt(�n, are belivved to bt, in good condition, a ith
tL exception (If lilt, uscd arms prodded b Nigeria
;tad Algeria. \tan% of the small arms host been issued
to the militia and the gendarnu�rie. 'I'ftesv vIvmvnts.
plus those civic ser%iee "tactical groups" "hick lame
receivcd small arms training, repreu�nl it substantial
reser%t force. The militia and gendarmerie, hick
together total 9,OO(1 teen, could be e tleclie1% turd
ssith the arts% in it combat role. Illim-%vr. the 15.(I0(1
nn�u of the "tactical roups." oho hat, n ecied only
mi Ili Ina I training, could stake onlc it slight
contrilution to the national dcfcnsc, except for those
who have liven involved in arr\ operations.
3. Training (C)
Basic recruit training is carried out in the units b\
Guinean officers and noncommissium-d officers
trained in (:zec�hosImakia and the V.S.S.H. (Fignrc(it.
Officer candidates attend it 9 -month coarse at the
Guincan \lilitarc \cadent\ at (:amt) :\Ipha la\a.
near (:onakrc. :\mission through comprliti(e
examinations is opert to all gnalified noocontmis-
sioned officers. Suc�cessfnl applicants arc gi%en the
grade of aspirant officer. The initial class graduated :32
officers in 1962 and the s(�c�on(1 class. 1; in 19(3: no
later information is available.
A -month advanced staff trainint, course. an M X
school, and specialist t:nining also are co- t(lucted A
the military acmIvm\. !i,miet personnel are there :t%
FIGURE 6. Guinean soldiers training with Czechoslovak
7.62 -mm light machinegun (U/OU)
8
instmclors mid inlerprelers. ;md :tl Iltt� arm\ camp
near h;:nkau other Sos iels Iviic h familiarization
courses in the list au(t tnaintc nonce of Soy ic�t- supplied
cclnipuu�nt.
Guinean soldiers Im%4 attended mililar\ schools in
lilt Sc%iel 1'11ion. China. atoll (archoslos;tkia. SIml�
officers and enlisted Wren rt�eei\ed trcining in I`ppt in
1962. (her :11 arms personrtcl have been trained in
Wt ,I (arIII;III\ in milit;trs ettgincehim, and West
Genn;ut \rm\ engineer leant� have inslrueted ill
(:trnt,a. In t, ;crl\ 1969. it 30-aunt West Gctnt;tn
mission conducted on- the -iob training in romilmildim4
in Guinea. From 19(iS l0 19(i it 1'.S. militar\ te:tot
assisted ;t Guinean engineer company in it
roadbuilding proiect
The pn�ponderance of Smiet snppliccl egnipntc�nt
has tied Guinea to the 1'.S.S.Ii. for In.ining assistance
as (cell. In recent %ears. Guinea has made atterttpls to
broaden its sources (if training. both to re(luce its
dependence on the Soviet 1'nion and In enable more
personnel to be trained in :t shorter period of time. In
IS), I. :n n instructors began training a tit t\ wcurtt
personnel Ili, it to rt ponsiblr fur the IIresi(lent's
fete. Cubans presinnsis had prt%1ded trainingonl\
to lilt- militia. \mother n cent source of training
nsislance is the i'eople's liepublic of (:Itina. sc hich has
offered mur IO(1 militar% scholarships to the Guiticim
\rn\ mid has promised to send it training mission
dttrint; 197:3.
4. Logistics (S)
The (1044 of lilt- Logistics and Transport liurt,an
(G- I of the \rtn. Staff is responsible for the sttppl\
Mid logistics organization as \cell it for transport.
\laintenance of and equipmew is carried out
at the unit It� \el b\ tedmic�ian \cho an� fea in ntnnber
Mid poorl\ trained. This. Al I'll as deficiencies in
organi /ational capabilities. \could pret,lnde the arm\
Irons t,ngaging in sttslaitit -d actions.
D. Navv
The missions �f the :3O01 -nuut Guinean \;t\% are
coastal patrol. transport service. ;slid protrv, lion of
fisheries. It has it minor coastal patrol capabilit% but is
ineffective as it combat force. Ships and associated
equipment are of foreign ori0n. and the mac c is totallc
dependent on foreioi assistance for (It,celopment and
training. Ilead(piarters and the operating bane ;tn� at
(:onakr\. and small detachments arr belicced to be
stationed at Kamsar and Benti. \lane na\\ pt,nonnel
have been trained in the V.S.S.Ii.. and ill accordance
ccith mac\ e\pansion plans. tot, go\cnnnettt
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i
ammouucc�d in April 1972 that 150 nom� wcrc
scheduled for courses there ranging from 6 months to 2
years. lu the same year, personnel began training ill
the Peoples Hcpuhlic c,f Churl' in preparation for the
delivery of smeral Chimes(- patrol Imats. A Chinese
training mission will acc�omrpamy the bouts to Guinea.
Specialized training is given at Conakry by it Soviet
technical tell[ and by Guinean crews irainecl ill the
U.S.S.13. (S)
Ship inventory consists of fou� patrol boats (I'B),
two motor torpedo boats (N "I'), one motor gunboat
(I GNI and two motorboat submurrine chasers (PTC)
of Soviet origin, and one ex-U.S. rmecF,unized I.,nding
craft (LCNI). The I B's are Poluchul -1 class units
arnie d with two twin 12.7 -min n,ac�hineguns. The w
to
P -6 class 11`s were delivered in August 1972 and are
eyuilTe d with two torpedo tubes and two twin 25 -nun
AA gums. 'I'lle PG \I is also it 1) -6 class, but the torpedo
tubes bare been removed. The I)TC*s are \10 -VI class
brats, each with a (I isp',acemx"nt of about 66 tons,
armed with two twin 25 -nun AA guns and fitted with
two side throwing mortars and depth charge racks for
antisubmarine warfare. (S)
Inadc�(luate murintenamcc� of the naval craft
contributed to the sinking of two ships since 1967. The
rapid deterioration of the others was stemume(I by late
1971, when the remutining patrol craft were
overhauled in Conakry with the aid of Soviet
technicians. All ships are believed to ()per Jonal
but they seldom leave the harbor. Af least two new
patrol boats are scheduled to arrive in Guinea in late
1973. (S)
Guinea has no capability to constnrc�t naval ships.
small commercial shipyard. however, in lire Dort of
Conakry is capable of making minor repairs to naval
vessels. Virtually all engines, spare parts, and other
Ail) components must be imported. (C)
E. Air force (S)
The mission of the 200 -n,an air forte is to defend
Guinean air space and to support the armed forces by
providing close air support, light bombing.
mconnaissanc�e. border patrol. and general transport
and utility services.
The inventory of 36 aircraft includes 17 jet fighters
(10 NIC -15 FAGOTS and seven IMiG -17 Frr -ticos) and
one jet trainer (U- NIC -15 \lrn;:::r) which provide
significant strength and potential when compared to
other west African air forces. In addition, there are 16
Piston engine aircraft �nine transports (two 1\11-12
Cuits, four An -14 (alone, and three An -2 Cor.rs) and
seven trainers (Yak -18 kkx) �as well as two light
transport helicopters \1i -.1 Ilocxos). Siucc 1970 the
air fora� Iran added siX S(Wict MiGS l'ud tWo CUBS, and
ill's signed it contract for 12 M I -5 helimplers, which
are to be delivered in mid-197-3. There lilts been
speculation that Guiuca will rec�cive \1i(;-21's in 197.1,
but nu iufor,ualiorr is available to cmd"rru this.
I)cspite the pre of Vli( ;s now i the inventory,
life air fore(- has 1 :ttic conrbl't c�apabilil\.. as pilots (lo
not fly often enough to maintain proficiency. In if
national emergeney, the air force could be augnueuted
by Air Guiuev. which is ecic,ipped with IL-18's and
A\' -24 (Corr aircraft.
Air forcv heaeleluartcrs, airbasc. and training
facilities are all located at Gmakry airfield. Sill(-(-
November 1972. Cuban engineers awl constnrc�tion
crews have been vrec�ting new buil(lings and
improving military air facilities at :ouakry, pmbal�Iy
ill anticipation of further aircraft cdeliyerics. \\'ork is
also being clone our scvcral airfieMs in the interior.
including Farauah and Kankan, where ;s haw(-
been known to operate. \Pith they con,plctiou c,f
construction it can be esp(-ct(-(1 that the air force will
dcllim' some of its aircraft to the interior for greater
e�ountrywider coverage.
Reliable� information our the number of pil,,ts and
technicians in the air forte is not available. Since 1961
at least 50 Guineans have attended flight sc�hc,ols in
the U.S.S.R.. and lhse, and others. also have received
additional training in Conakry by Soviet advisers. lu
1972 about SO air force personnel were sent to the
Soviet Union for it variety of' specialty courses. Thirty
five c,f these were pilot trainees scheduled to attend 'a
2- to 3-year course after completi,rg
it \tar of Ilussian-
language studies. The percewage of Guinvams who arc
Irnable to suc�cessfc,lly complete such courses is
believed to be high b(-c�ausc of the low cduc�ational
Ic y(-I and rninin,al technical background of the
trainccs. TIIc actual IcyeI of skiIIc(I manpower
awuilabl(- has bean further reduced by oc:�asional
political purges. In December 1972. 1�! %ii(; pilots
were reported to have been removed I'min flight status
or from they service for suspected coup plotting. 'I'hcse
would represent nearly all qualified Guineas \liG
pilots, and if they are not reinstated the air force will
be forced to rely on newly graduated pilots and Soviet
advisers to keep its flying.
M-pi-n(Ienc�e on the Soviet Union to sustain and
improve the Guincarr Air Force can be expected to
ime with the arrival of new helicopters and
possible more MiC aircraft. In an effort to diversify its
sources of assistance Guinea has made appeals to
I?gypt ..all Algeria. Ilowc�ver, the aid these countries
IE
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s t� :ctc t�: r
could offer, primarily in the area of training. would
not substantially reduce Guinea's reliance on the
U.S.S.R.
F. Paramilitary forces
Guinean's two paramilitary forces. the militia and
the gendarmerie, enjoy equal status with the regular
arued forces under the central jurisdiction of the
Chief of Staff of tlu� Conbi.ied Forces. The chiefs of
staff of the militia and gendarmerie, as numbers of the
Combined Staff. coordinate the activities of their
services with those of the armed forces. especially the
army, to which certain mifiia and gcndarnu roe
elements are assigned. During I he reorganization ill
early 1971, .hc missions of boat these organizations
were c panded to include dcfcns(� responsibilities. The
army also has some responsibilities for border control,
particularly along the border with I'orlugucseGtinca.
'I'll( nurse to centralize control of Guinca's secetrity
forces was intended to increase the c�omarv's militan
preparedness by using available resources and to
prevent the formation of a power base within the
urine. (C)
'1 militia, traditionally an arm of the PDG. has
important police functions although it is nil ,a regular
police force. :Wministrative control of' the militia rests
with the Minister of the I'coplc's Arny. Personnel are
drawn from the youth affiliate of the I'D(:, which is
nade up of highl\ spirited, loyal revolutionaries.
During the 1970 invasion. these young cadres
performed enthcsiastically, if rather incffec�tually. and
Lyon high Commendation from the I're�sideut. Since
then, it pronounced effort has been made to upgrade
the militia's military ca pabilities and enable it to
assume tasks normally assigned to the array. Largely
because of his distrust of thy� army. 'Tours has ini-
tiated L police whereby militia jYficers are appointed
to key command posts in the �,.:ny, and important
army functions, such as the defense of the capital,
are shared by militia and anny units. (S)
There are at least 5,000 Guincans in the militia. hilt
many more aw probable in inactive status. The
organization of the militia still coiuc�ides with the
I'DG's regional hierarchy of political committees so
that militia units ,ur in all localities. Personnel are
trained by Cuban advisers in Guinea, and many also
are soul to tuba for 12 to 15 munrt')s of training. In
mid -1972, Cuba built it militia training camp outside
Conakr where Cuban instructors provide militar
training as well as couurses in agriculture and
mechanics. lu December 1972 tbc� school. mauled after
K%%ame Nkrunah, graduated its first class, c�ot0prked
cif 200 Guineans and 60 students from ueiglik,
Sierra I.eoiv. The trained militiamen serve as it
manpower resu�ne for tit( aruy. mud hoary it re
integrated into the army or assigned to mails fear short
toturs of duty. 'Those who coustilute the regular militia
than roadblocks, serve as security gti ards. and secure
strategic points in response to Guineas frequent alerts.
The militia is especially import:ut to the regime as an
instrument for reporting on the ntcryen+�rtt and
activities of the population. (S)
The gendarmerie's ascendamy ill the wake of the
1970 invasion has not been as dramatic as the
utilitia's: bo\%mer, it is treated by Toure as it separate.
select group among the branches of the armed forces.
The I'msident's favoritism toward the gendarmerie
wits indicated in Febman 1970. when control of
Guineas special- purpose communications network.
which sencs the arny, police. gcucfarmcrie. and
regional goyerun eit officials. was transferred from
army to gendarmerie contro The gendarmeries
mission of maintaining order in rural areas and
patroling the c�ountn *s borders has acquired added
signific�anc�e since the 1970 attack. Ill additiotj to
utanuing customs stations along the borders. the
geudarnerie seeks out autigove subversives and
assists the army ill countering penetration fr:'n
Portuguese� Guinea. The geudarneric is headed by a
chief of staff \%ho ciordinates its activities with other
senic�es in the Con billed Staff. Coordination with the
goyernorcrf the region in which units are located is also
required. The gendarmerie outposts along the
Portuguese Guinea border report directly to arm\
headquarters in their respective regions. (S)
The hcadaluarters of the 1.000 -man gemlarnwr.e is
in Couakn. here its special squadron is stationed.
Detachments c:f this squadron are located at airports.
harbor facilities, and sites of foreign aid projects.
'There are four additional scittich with hcacicluarlers
at Kiudia (1 st Squadron I: 1,abe (2d tiquadrin 1;
Kankan (id Sol midroul; and \zerekore -1tIt
Squadron). 'These units are in turn organized into city
brigades, border brigades. or no1) iIv platoons
c omprised of five to 15 men each whose areas of
jurisdiction c�oinc�ide y-ith the 29 regions in Guinea. (S)
Because tla� gendarmerie is lightly armed, has
limited transportation equipment and is widely
dispersed throughout the country, coordinated action
would be very difficult. It has, however. a professional
bearing, is moderately well trained, and is capable of
performing its mission during normal lines. (C)
NO FOREIGN OI SSE:1/
S teen t;�r
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