NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 35; INDIA; COUNTRY PROFILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110058-0
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 58
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 r"A N Y Q rya_ r z C+'\:- h Y l:. 9�., YwluTf.: i' LT, R' F^'? TSCi ^.'::.T'^twy_;.'s"+�1'.... :-^..tx:f -vxt:� week{ n+. irmrrf an: n- aTx.. urt' a�. s.: 1mz. Y. r. wrcSK' rMi[+ mr1n' ff. Tl.^ C9: _^!rJ�'Y,n4.�.MR.'n1.21J'",T uTHF:^.T':w,.1CtlIYCi1N.:`i S IN 1 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attributicn is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret IN APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 7 4 1 ;:i e APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 Lnd of U[gne Comoedly Undrirunwo or NaUo" Ctran -let R[Xlorla!!sm gad PgMIAIlan 611W ECOWUL13 of SurvivsJ o PWIlla and Demorsocy, I ian $t* Whllbrr, Mc4hrrIrAaF Cb"Wiv is Am IN.., 17 Sriffilhosry mw fi g" to M CawJry rmfdr nu pnyrtrd fa lie Nis bbl On CmIW !gym ApwW. X#wwA wo .rd~ Foo Ovnma Ugt4DN ,r Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 It t. t, 4 N X Land of Unique Complexity 'To rradltqtr poverty Nor more moAr d dent In the next tlsW or J peon at the wry I r+ rrrti Coo /at dw path t1 no :aria ctrw." ludim Candhl, 23 Mob IM, India Is Irto tWnp at onras. OW the Millutid It unique radttp has dovcloped w;rl+ tssa mrnplrathat India anon than most aowatia frustrates gcrerallrz- 62M It It the nohemadcbytecudnCmazes of peoplr, the iubUme sditude of a myrtle; tke stench and squalor of o Calcutta dam, and 1l c etrmal beauty of the U Ntahat It is a Wodtive vbMMn lrrmt* rith bow mW arrov. a sdentW At the Trumbey nu rleariti- stallalborr. a cmty system forever dooming mQUam to Intodrtsble pmray a :3 servitude, and for wwlu s largol dcsnoaacy, N to the I DA kgnt army on eadh, Ihr pacific Poetry of Robindmth Topm, the brat of Madill. the mountain storm Ia KM61dF p&srty brand a Westeml obserrrr'r imagimllon in :dmosi 900,000 Wlage% and opulrnl wralth in Iht Malabar 111tlts aba+h Bombay. It h It woman Prtme Mlalsler. and the torltksWvg influ and to erolvc a dsllir;tim chank- rt, and outlook [cured nawbew else In the v,=hL Pavnty appcots to go almost unnollced by Iodianx probably bemw it Is sa profound tbat it aIMNI 10111 IT rnvrlap, the country and betmuses Act lack 4 resources and a bm4 of other diffbc altin pmiude its earlyelimivaliom Indian kadets recognize whore their priorities should be when they point out that mote than ant of I odla j 570 Million peof4c live briar the pmnment s own oukm apt of a tnlnlmual standard of livinr irrid %bet !t the current We of pap ulatlon KroKlh it mi It take 30 la 50 )vacs to etrer- ca= tbh eonclitian even under optimum oondllk= This problem sad a marry olhm are so rrrantmoth M to appmr Lmmaajpeabk U no WAuble. Vebm t)w Un ed happenk a it don with Glthtening rrauludty, wrildntcationed Mort; in one area often negate well�iatentioncd rlfatts In olrr atc+1 Fa ti- ample. brcm,se the drought in L073 has resulted in a &reline In apicultural output and a waken depldion of foodgmin rmtvr% India hm lead to divot resources originally allocates for averoll ecorrarnk dr.clo 1, Into amjh programer to" RliiJ the room Immediate problem of freding the peopia t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 -nno mcrc. 4 India is rife with contradictions and maladies and is inhabited by a complex and diverse people who can appear to be philosophical, detached, and serene one moment, and contentious, narrow, parochial, in- different, or smug the next. Nevertheless, the country seems to possess a searching, compelling grace that at- tracts many foreigners and almost mystically creates an outlook that counteracts the revulsion they feel when first exposed to the harsh realities of Indian life. To many observers, life pulses and ti :robs in India more than in any other place in the world. Conquerors and foreigners have come and gone and kingdoms and dynasties have risen and fallen, but Indian society remains a constant, and somehow despite crises and disasters �the people continue to survive. Essentially united by the pervasive social aspects of Hinduism, people of different races, religions, and modes of living manage in some subtle way to remain part of and have intense loyalty to the whole, to preserve their traditions of beauty and order, and to present a distinctive character to the outside world. Undercurrents of National Character 2 Although no generalized description of India's national character can be wholly valid, history and Hinduism have exerted enough influence as to create a common denominator of Indian action and thought. Indeed, many individual characteristics have a signifi- cant bearing on national attitudes and actions. Although Western ideas and 20th century institutions ht,ve effected some changes in India's overwhelmingly rural populace, significant attitudinal changes cannot easily be induced in 450 million village minds. What counts in 1973 India, however, is what goes on in the minds of a tiny percentage of the population: the educated, largely English- speaking elite who run the government, bureaucracy, and business; the educated non elite, who are unemployed; the wealthy land- owners, who farm with relative efficiency and who are able to provide the money and support for the political parties; and the party leaders at the village and district level, who control grassroots support. In the final analysis, the differences in character and thought between them and other Indians are more in degree than in substance. Indian leaders who have a sincere desire to syn- thesize 20th century ideas and methods with the traditional Indian culture are frustrated when they are unable to overcome the counterforces. Land reform and a ceiling on urban property holdings, for example, have been recognized as imperatives to progress, but forceful action in these matters would alienate s APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 Hands are at chest level to greet equals i f i A I t have been more than the apparent inability of Indians either to appear for appointments on time or to under- take bureaucratic business with even the slightest sense of time. While Westerners believe that most problems are soluble, given enough resources, many Indians believe that certain problems are either insoluble or at best, soluble only over an incalculable period of time, or that solutions breed their own problems and con- tradictions. Indians have ability and ingenuity but not a sense of immediacy. Indians constantly seem to post- pone making decisions despite an obvious need, sometimes for no other reason than that the astrologers advise the moment is not auspicious. Accordingly, decisionn. aking often appears mystical rather that rational in the Western sense and seems to be based on feel rather than logic. Immediate confrontation seems to be avoided unless the problem is so pressing that urgent action must be taken. It is not that Indian leaders are unconcerned or unwilling to do the right thing, but their approach appears to be so relaxed that it often frustrates and even infuriates non Indians. However, it is not at all certain that a Western ap- proach would produce better results in an Indian un- accustomed and unreceptive to it. Every man is probably more of an island in India than anywhere else. It may seem strange that there is such insularity in a country where people are so crowd cd together and a lack of privacy characterizes virtual- ly all aspects of life. The Hindu religion and the caste system, while providing cultural continuity and solidarity, have reinforced societal atomization and in- trospection. The joint family ha3 provided a strong but strictly limited sense of social responsibility. Large numbers of people are required to live under the same roof, or even in the same room, and to get along with each other. They work, eat, sleep, and relieve themselves together. Even today, a man who comes from a rural village to the city for employment will often send most of his earnings back to his family in his village, return there for important ceremonial oc- casions�a custom that causes an unacceptably high rate of absenteeism in many fields of endeavor �and years later retire to his native village. People outside the family, however, are regarded as distant islands �mere shadows for whom someone else, or God, is responsible. More practical reasons also exist for this insularity and insensitivity of man to man, es- pecially in urban areas. There are so many people in the cities and such an acute housing shortage that even Indians whose in- come should enable them to live above the subsistence level nevertheless live in slums; 30% to 40% of the pop- M members of the small but powerful segment of the population who provide the essential political support of the regime. Political subjugation, begun under the Muslims and completed by the British, created a galling sense of national inferiority, which still exists. By looking to the British for guidance, the Indian elite implicitly acknowledged a superior inferior relationship. Indians are fiercely proud of their culture and cherish in- dependence, but at the same time they take pride in the British system of law, administration, and educa- tion, and in the English language, which remains the communications link in business and government. In order to offset the fear that they really may be inferior, however, Indians are often so defensive touchy and sensitive �that they appear to be offensive, that is assertive, vain, and arrogant. Many Indians also feel that their cou `ry is unjustly held in an inferior status and seem to have a need to try to show their superiority over foreigners. National achievements, especially the crushing victory over Pakistan in December 1971 and the apparent ability to create a nuclear weapon, have tended to buoy self confidence, but euphoria is tran- sient and the feelings of national inferiority are deeply imbedded. Indians very often appear to act irrationally or con- tradictorily by accepting things that Westerners regard as ;..congruous or irreconcilable. A brilliant Indian nuclear scientist, for example, may exhibit Western rationality in the laboratory, but at home he defers every major decision to his father and practices Hindu ritual with no visible trace of discomfort. It has been suggested that the atomistic, highly individualistic Hindu religion, reinforced as it is by the caste system, has tended to develop compartments in the Indian mind. Rather than generating internal consistency, compartmentalization has inhibited the logical flow of implications from one aspect of life to another. In part, this may explain the tremendous gap between ideals and performance in India and why, despite the heavy flow of speeches, programs and policies from New Delhi, many ideas are not translated into action. Indians seem to have little concern for time. life seems to glide on imperceptibly. defying measurement in minutes and seconds. The Western notion that time is measurable and irreplaceable is absent. India's history is marked by vagueness over the centuries �the Indus Valley civilization existed "as early as" 2500 B.C.; Indo Aryans arrived in India from Central Asia and introduced Hinduism "about" 1500 -1200 B.C. The reasons for this lack of temporal precision are obscure and open to conjecture, but the consequences N APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 c i is ulation of any of India's major cities live under such Hinduism is a way of life in India, where it is prac- conditions. The government has created complicated ticed by more than 80% of the population. Grand definitions by structural variation (tin, cardboard, and not so grand temples, countless statues, sacred wood) of what constitutes slums but, in short, it con- cows, venerated rocks and trees, yogis, and itinerant siders them to be primarily residential areas which are sadhus (holymen) provide daily visible evidence of the overcrowded with dwellings unfit for human occupa- religion and spirituality. Indeed, sadhus, having chosen tion. According to the government, however, unfitness is relative to the social and economic progress of a jcommunity at any given period, and so the standards world that Hindus believe true spirituality can be of tolerable living conditions vary accordingly. The achieved. Thus, a Hindu's ultimate goal is to put an slum inhabitants are fortunate, however, compared to ti the thousands of permanent pavement dwellers i� the taining perfection �unity of all things with Brahma lars;,; cities. With almost half of the Indian population (God) �but this is so difficult to achieve that Hindus barely subsisting and unemployment and un- usually seek only to Improve the conditions for their deremployment so widespread, most Indian's find it 4 virtually impossible to assume any sense of obligation vi to or involvement with their fellow man. The com- him in achieving a better station in his next incarna- paratively few wealthy Indians who could afford to be tion. His ultimate goals can be furthered best by per- concerned tend to take a ritualistic approach to chari- forming the functions of his caste and avoiding the ty, which to the Western mind does not attack the fun- functions of other castes, even if he might do them damental problems. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 Sodhus� Indian "m" Hinduism is a way of life in India, where it is prac- ticed by more than 80% of the population. Grand and not so grand temples, countless statues, sacred cows, venerated rocks and trees, yogis, and itinerant sadhus (holymen) provide daily visible evidence of the religion and spirituality. Indeed, sadhus, having chosen the ascetic life, are respected and fully accepted by the people. It is only by such abandonment of the physical world that Hindus believe true spirituality can be achieved. Thus, a Hindu's ultimate goal is to put an end to the endless cycle of his reincarnation by at- taining perfection �unity of all things with Brahma (God) �but this is so difficult to achieve that Hindus usually seek only to Improve the conditions for their next existence. Each man, accordingly, calls upon the Hindu deities to achieve worldly ends for him and aid him in achieving a better station in his next incarna- tion. His ultimate goals can be furthered best by per- forming the functions of his caste and avoiding the functions of other castes, even if he might do them better. Hinduism is an individual, personal and non institutionalized religion. Although orthodox Hin- duism provides all embracing rules for the conduct of life from birth to death, it has no single, clear -cut system of practices, beliefs, or dogma, and no revealed ""J authority. A variety of ancient books �the Vedas, the Mahabharata, and the Ramayana �are universally accepted in Hinduism, but they merely provide moral guides. Recognizing that all people cannot have the same goals or beliefs, or attain the same spiritual heights, the great Hindu umbrella accepts atheistic preachers, pantheism, polytheistic practiiioners of magic and witchcraft, sophisticated and not so sophisticated monotheists, and monists. Indeed, Hin- duism has absorbed and incorporated many extrinsic beliefs, ideas, deities, and cults. There can be and is no heresy in Hinduism. At the village level, anthropomorphism, superstition, and belief in both local and major gods are prevalent, although the more enlightened and educated tend to reject these beliefs in favor of prayer and meditation. Despite Hinduism's flexibility, tolerance, and creed of nonviolence (ahimsa), India is a violent land where religious discrimination and prejudice based on real or imagined racial differences are found both within and outside of Hinduism. Untouchables are regarded by caste Hindus, especially at the village level, as a source of ritual pollution. The Indian constitution has al- olished untouchability and the discrimination based on it, but this type of discrimination is still widespread. ,.t lh Discrimination against Muslims is rrot as pronounced, .;CF APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 Sodhus� Indian "m" r7 C- g: y. z i1 r j but it is practiced, notably in employment oppor- tunities. Bloody communal violence, especially between Hindus and Muslims, can easily erupt over minor incidents that arouse religious sensitivities. In such gases, violence may stem more from the need of two economically competitive groups to vent their frustrations over miserable conditions than from actual religious differences. When the conditions of life become more difficult, such as during times of famine or worsening unemployment, there is often an accom- panying increase in the frustration level and local ten- sions. India's secioeennornic balance is so delicate that even wholly unrelated problems can lead to violent outbursts against religious groups. Skin color often is identified as evidence of racial difference, but such prejudice rarely leads to violence without the presence of other factors such as caste. This color prejudice, however, is more subtle, widespread, and intense than religious discrimination. Except for tribals, who do not seem to care, Indians revere light skin and disdain dark. This feeling may be rooted in real, or mythical, ethnic and racial differences in the past, and may have been reinforced by the caste system. Rich and poor, learned and il- literate, dark and light skinned, Hindu, Muslim, and other religions all exhibit strong color feelings, which coexist with but overlie caste prejudices. Because of his higher caste status, a dark skinned Tamil Brahman may look down on a lighter skinned Rajasthani Kshatriya, but the latter's wife will pity the former's wife because of her dark children. Their apparently in- escapable preoccupation with color leads most Indians to assume that Westerners look down on and victimize Asians because of their swarthy color. Caste, the social structure of Hinduism, is still very important in India but not necessarily in the traditional sense. Historically, membership in one of the broad social groups (varna)� Brahman (priests, highest status), Kshatriya (warriors, rulers), Vaisya (cultivators, middle class), and Sudra (artisans, lower class) �or nonmembership therein (the untouchables) made identification of social status and occupation relatively easy. In the Brahmanical Hindu view, varna indicated the general class of castes to which a person belonged, and within each, a ranked series of positions further defined status. People of varna status per- formed all the social, economic, religious, and military tasks for society, while the untouchables did the dirty work. Although the varna system was probably never more than a Vedic ideal, the system and vagueness of position within it have survived, giving some groups grounds for loosely determining their position in society. The essential caste compartmentalization today in- volves more than 3,000 subcastes (fatis), which are ranked in the TBrahmanical system by status within the four stratified varnas. The subcastes generally follow rules which have evolved from antiquity. These rules pervade all aspects of z Hindie's life. They define per- sonal relationships and obligations, and are especially important in village India, where 80% of the popula- tion lives. Despite some uncertainty over their own position within any varna, all Hindus recognize that the lowest position on the ncial scale is occupied by those outside of the varna �the loosely defined "Backward Classes," including the "Scheduled Castes" (untouchables, or as Gandhi called them, harijans), the "Scheduled Tribes," and "Other Backward Classes." These groups, which account for about 30% of the population, are legally accorded special recognition and privileges, because "backwardness" in India is a status determined by birth and not the result of economic or educational deprivation. Thus, some harijans have become rich, well- educated men, while a poor Brahman may seek to pose as a harijan in rider to gain preferential con- sideration for appointment to a specially reserved government job or admission to a university. Caste also seems to pervade the social structure of all non -Hindu Indians, except the tribals, whose social structture also is stratified and strongly resembles that of the Hindus. Every Indian and every caste, no matter how low on the social scale, can usually identify another con- sidered lower. Modernization is making the extremely complex social system of caste even more complex. Twentieth century society, technology, industry, and ideas are causing very gradual changes in caste relationships, es- pecially in cities where the urban environment com- plicates the more simple structure found in the villages. Concepts of democracy, egalitarianism, social responsibility and welfare, pragmatism, the oppor- tunities for more self development, and the eradica- tion of poverty have complicated traditional thought patterns and have had an important impact on many Indians at all levels of society. Although social and oc- cupational distinctions have been blurred or relaxed somewhat, with a corresponding alteration of values and attitudes, caste nevertheless still deeply affects all Indians. The habit of caste is apparently so ingrained that it is inescapable, despite new groupings which are beginning to emerge apart from caste. These groups in- clude political parties, labor organizations, and eco- 5 S '3ii.'r,s.itStiw., w K '4:.. ...#.r.:ir.I.A,Ff3iC94`�.3 Vila APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 4 nomic alliances of both urbanites and villagers based on regional as well as on caste considerations. More often than not, these social groups, as well as the more ideologically oriented political parties, present a veil which, when pierced, reveals a particular caste or group of castes, or a tiered structure controlled by peo- ple from higher castes. Indians apparently need a pecking order. They must know where they stand in relation to the next person, whether Indian or foreigner. New occupations, for example, have sometimes created new "castes," es- pecially in the cities where social identity can be con- cealer' A new occupational grouping, or even an ex- isting caste, can over a period of time rise to a higher position in the social structure merely by adopting the ritual of a higher caste. No organized Hindu authority exists to dispute such action. It is the group, then, whirl: can raise an individual's standing; personal ac- complishment, while important, is not enough. Even in government both central and state where caste considei 1tions should be irrelevant, they often con- sciously ur unconsciously influence appointments, promotions, working relations, and friendships. Prime Minister Gandhi, for example, is a Kashmiri Brahman; everything else being equal, she has tended to sur- round herself with Kashmiri Brahmans because she feels more comfortable with them. She as well as other astute political leaders seem to have been unable to es- cape caste considerations; they have adapted to caste rather than attempting to override it. Regionalism and Population 6 Regionalism, based primarily on linguistic con- siderations, and a swelling population are crucial problems confronting Indian leaders. Since in- dependence, India has several times redrawn its state political boundaries along essentially ethnolinguistic lines in response to continuous pressures for such action. The results -21 states and 9 lesser administrative regions �have been a mixed blessing. While 14 regional languages are recognized as national languages, English� spoken by only 2% to 3% of the population� continues to be an official language and remains the language of administration. The average Indian, accordingly, is isolated either within the language of his state or by his local dialect. Although territorial reorganizations have improved India's administrative structure and reduced the regional pressures, Indian leaders are concerned over the dangers inherent in further subdivision and tend to react negatively to issues which reinforce regionalism. Accordingly, when even purely language issues arise �such as the resentment of Assamese Bengali speakers over attempts in 1972 to make Assamese the sole medium of instruction in schools and universities in Assam �New Delhi has been more concerned about the long -range effects of yielding to regional demands than about quelling the violence that almost always oc- curs. Dissatisfaction with local rules for employment in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh emerged in 1972 �and continues in 1973. The resulting agitation, for example, was sufficient grounds for New Delhi to intervene directly and attempt to settle the dispute. There is continuing concern in New Delhi that the central government must deal firmly with regional pressures lest dormant regional and separatist passions, particularly in southern India, be revived and spread throughout the country. One child is born almost every second in India. This raises the prospect of there being a billion Indians by the turn of the century. The dimensions of such a human avalanche are so enormous that they have frustrated traditional attempts to deal with the attend- ant social and economic problems. Despite one of the world's most intensive family planning programs, which includes monetary incentives, multicolored con- doms, rhythm method beads, a large promotional campaign to publicize birth control techniques, vasec- tomy camps, and legalizing abortion in 1972, it is not at all certain whether population growth can be re- duced to tolerable levels. Lack of strong backing from Prime Minister Gandhi, shortages of trained personnel, the reluctance of those who are trained to go to the i !a JD a S'Y.el1BLw.>.d .ct .....w o t -...5. .vea .t. -...2 f .e. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 r I, r a counu),Wr. -IMr nym pK"elt Il se, and. rstl "I"ot Imin umpor*wk, indiftrrencr. and f.ar. Mlx'Ciall) arming 1hr ollappm hoer UR'L sctlnua hAndleaps K'Itlr .urvlsal no Garr whs,teucr bring err" "Or lw goals I lwo rrunomir pr,p9eess� nurcrrr+ must lrr aElrM, trnvurki trslucing papulillnn JUm.lh Tha Mmrinlnem. thrrrlrtrr. hops thrt the loavl} pGinning p gram will (sad to the prrs rnl Non ni I S million 64% �ti ti I� 197A, au ntimjled 7 -1 million had h s lot- mented to j9 l S IJ& a Xuol mud ol,prar nwrini since Iherr or" nsaee I}san 7b mlllloo Indium ht Inld4grd3 lrverttielr.c. a IKII J1311PA haA b�n rye I'upulall.in ct t, perhajn the m,al Impouanl Irrnblrru tucing India. 6r lallmr to ermri.e 11 rr �rtl) Ieopardiie+ tall Mcpat lo rmprr��r 1hr 11A of thr pn,ple hill also theitairm In w s iur Ival a% o polilially stable nztlrm 7 G APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA� RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 t Tti Ecallvm of ;urvIvil 0106CI1 IIn I1u 1111 ta16+ J111wJI5 111 IN 111111 ��114' ,11 J1,M1111 A .A,4t6.11111 a'IIJ.n 11 hav Jr alrrlc rn1.11..1414 1.I111� I4.lt 41141 .'1107,161,11-4* ItkWIl1.J --pInUll�lh alw11 II� -91111 Iw11r1IFta1 I'llr 1114rI 1;1411111110 Lrrr%L l }I 7110- 111r 11111.1' 1 W J� Heir 11r1171a 4,1 hr II JIra,1IIN'1 011 .1I,'r1111 J 11 16r t�4ti4 1i4-% 4.11JI Inb IIINNntr Irnl1141 LOC 1141 p v.%flllrlll 111111.1 111r10Tl hll rr.9141 It JXI`l"J 11491141 4(,1nl III .till Irn..1tin .ubH I III I hr r1wh Jltll IaiN11 Ijkr Irwn"b4.rl runt. M 411- 4 Al-All "I 119. 4191 ht al nl larlll vrtrldl5 v1101rr 11rtrultulo Pon-L114 1.11191 1"t 11.�4 1 F 111 5111 0411 114- I rllr +41'41 In tier .w' 411 111r ate. 15 ,4 11 4 1.11 ItiAt 4 161 11 rll 1:1911 jItrltr JI I llr 111;101 14111� 5 .0 Cll ral 441 1� .,I h 11-1141 IIMYr.�.1" IIJ .'..N1lttlllr-1 tee t -91111 CJ11R a'41 1rllall art r11111i I.. -141461� Lull' "411 140LR0 t 111 lIYM.9.TJIW .17,gp. K,9[. L r1/1 lh 411 11.1!1.41,71 ,111\ 14 1 N.t 1.+111115 allr4-., +1 ed Ir.I/11�gllrma y'rl. .1141 ,1V, 11 loll 111,11 pr.Mi III 4 -9all> 6. 41rro911 N.1. r4 I1-- 11.1 T}74 -9� 0%a% 0 44!c- %plev4l 1p1111117�rll Il N_u 1L.11 \4 t .ttulhl 4 Iw.Ila- I li 1,n 113t.t.Irl nc 41lltxvlllwl .d IIM.P' 1f1ew1tta+ 11 arl14'l1 III '5'Mr.11t 113 tltr Kl.iltl'l 1 -9I rl11W41 III IMJN'k 11%11111^ 1-71 1. Ih1 111'1 111111'tII 11111 11.141 11.111 .11,11\ 1111 ruil JCI '4r44 Ilrl�I I 1 1111111 .11 is J1 1'11.11 -11119 111711-1 111 111/ 14" AKl41919 p -KY54t Ill,1l Illg14'.11111 ,14,1161 IN- Ili 1'14-111 1.. 1 �IlR 1t,1, 15411111111 rrllblUQ -9 1 II .xI 1111194.-15 414411nt !attar I9r.11%1% .11 1111n9C10 i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA� RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 Jf n -u0Te &5e I S 4 5 4 S I I t r r. t N 1 1i IV a E?. z: LN R J 9 There is a fundamental conflict between India's political and purely economic goals. This conflict is complicated by the obvious desire of Indian leaders to bypass several centuries of evolutionary economic development without permitting either the economic freedom of Western -style capitalism or adopting the repressive state controls of communism. The social problems stemming from poverty, overpopulation, un- employment, and underemployment are so complex, so deeply entrenched in the economy, and so fraught with inhibiting political and social overtones that they tend to overwhelm the efforts to achieve such economic goals as improved technology and rapid ex- pansion of industrial and agricultural production. Ad- ditionally, India lacks the financial and many of the natural resources for extensive development and growth. Its languid, tradition -bound agricultural economy thus far has been unable to solve the basic food problem or generate sufficient surplus capital to adequately promote industrial development and modernization. Moreover, because of an ideological antipathy toward big business harbored by the current leadership of the Congress Party, the government has enacted legislation which discourages private invest- ment either by Indian capitalists or foreign investors. Finally, New Delhi's policies have failed to inciease Indian exports sufficiently to pay for needed imports. Accordingly, pragmatic Indian leaders feel that India will probably have to continue relying on foreign aid, at least for the foreseeable future. In 1971 economic conditions apparently were such that Mrs. Gandhi's successful election pledge of garibi hatao (abolish poverty) appeared to Indian leaders to be a realizable if yet a remote goal. India was euphoric over its victory in the December 1971 war with Pakistan and was encouraged by record stocks of foodgrain reserves, which obviated the need for P.L. 480 food assistance� foodgrains from the United States. Mrs. Gandhi's government was then able to concentrate its attention on such problems as land reform, income inequities, and unemployment. The need for land reform had long been recognized, but ac- tion had been postponed because emphasis had to be placed on the allocation of resources to deal with the more basic problems of survival. Indian voters, ap- parently convinced that Mrs. Gandhi could and would finally begin to deal with pressing social and economic issues, gave her party sweeping victories in the 1972 state elections, thereby extending Mrs. Gandhi's direct influence and control beyond the central government to almost all of the state governments. Encouraged by the possibility that a truly national effort based on center -state cooperation could now be launched, In- dian economic planners were able to conceive of the country's Fifth Five Year Plan (1974 -79) as the one un- der which India might finally achieve self sufficiency and make some real progress in fulfilling urgent social and economic goals. The disappointing monsoon of 1972, however, had turned optimism to pessimism and brought i zny Indian leaders back to the harsh realities of aconomic life in India. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 Bathing calik in wafer also used for drinking VI 1 I Through March 1972, India had received almost $20 billion in foreign economic aid, of which about 50% was from the United States and about 10% from the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Soviet aid has been earmarked largely for heavy industrial projects. U.S. and other Western aid, on the other hand, has been almost entirely in the form of food and raw materials and equipment for industry and agriculture. This dependence on foreign aid has been anathema to Mrs Gandhi, who has often stated that eliminating the need for it is one of her primary goals. It is uncertain whether her views have been motivated by a nationalistic desire for self- sufficiency, a shrewd assess- ment that aid -weary bilateral donor nations seem to be favoring multilateral aid, or simply the realization that during her tenure of office India's vet foreign aid receipts have been declining because of sharply rising debt repayments and a decrease in gross aid receipts. Despite her desire to end foreign assistance, Mrs. Gandhi in 1973 appeared aware that it is still needed. Acceptance of this fact has been a bitter but not im- possible pill for her to swallow, especially since India in effect will continue to need U.S. aid, even if it is supplied through multilateral organizations. Indians appear to view aid through an organization such as the World Bank as more acceptable than direct U.S. assistance, even if the United States supplies most of the funds. In early 1973, agricultural shortfalls resulting from the 1972 drought were leading to a new threat of famine, and India faced serious economic difficulties. A record breaking 9 million tons of foodgrain reserves were almost exhausted and India needed to purchase 2 to 3 million tons of foodgrain abroad. To finance these imports without seeking new foreign aid, India has had to dip into its carefully hoarded but limited foreign exchange holdings. The Fifth Five Year Plan has been reoriented from its original social welfare goals to emphasize more rapid economic growth, greater self- reliance, and even tighter central control of the economy. The whole process, however, represents a shift of words and resources rather than a shift to dramatic iiew approaches. The resources, or lack thereof, remain the same as before, and so does the planning mechanism. After more than two decades of "socialism" and ex- panding, tightly controlled, and planned economic development, India essentially still relies on ad hoc economic decisions made by the Prime Minister's of- fice. Politics plays such a key role in the formulation of economic policy that Mrs. Gandhi's desire to make progress in the field of social welfare frequently con- flicts with the policies needed to achieve economic growth. Because flexibility in economic policy is limited by political constraints, Mrs. Gandhi's policies have appeared to be inconsistent, contradictory, and lacking in depth. A sharp increase in economic growth is a prerequisite for achieving social welfare reforms. Mrs. Gandhi, however, feels obliged by political necessities to commit the government to measures which she feels are popular, such as encouraging small -scale industry to create employment. But small -scale industry, however, is often economically inefficient and does not necessarily contribute to significant economic growth. Indeed, more often than not, her domestic actions have been no more than sym- bolic gestures for public consumption that seemingly signify real progress but which, in fact, are ineffective, not enforced, or are altered later. Mrs. Gandhi has sur- rounded herself with highly competent economic ad- visers, but her instincts. training, and temperament are political, not economic. Thus, there has been a gap between precept and practice on crucial issues such as land reform because Mrs. Gandhi is dependent on rich farmers and landlords for political support and, therefore, is disinclined to pursue economic policies that would alienate them. Mrs. Gandhi's political instincts have probably already warned her that her political future will ul- timately hinge on her government's ability to fulfill her social welfare promises while, concurrently, main- taining stable economic growth. Although vacillation and compromise have markA her policies in the past, Mrs. Gandhi and other Indian leaders presumably realize that the time is rapidly approaching for some hard economic decisions. National elections must be held no later than the spring of 1976. i i 1 10 .i7ai,7t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 Politics and Democracy, Indian Style Tllr IIILPta 1>41 alrue n IIJ,1ru% au 111tIIJe1 Ifale,lawtu -a Ilrlueh dr1m.1.etio jurhallerntufeaut 4111 iltlrrtl Ir(I4Y1 Mfa1anl Mlth a (rnrnllee 1lrllllle= e-f wmigw- uk4alt-1 r6imh A. tri Ihr b rat 44 tti ales uiller �I Illr -L%&rrlljMI llerateltir Itete fwerl Ind \rarrlhrlrae de,Ffltr IIt lnlldife:alklfia nl 51 l'alertt l etthtlillr+ 1 1 -1 ltt Ir,uttueK If-411 1 111,,, a Itt.l.bf% and err. dlffrrrnt It1A 4.rul1nl -tla alld nr1,64 11+llla4ta hJi r erinullkil Ir111JfkJ1 laltldul al,ll dtilwdwil u+ p1rwrJim Ihr '1rm11r. alt. 111"le 111 jx4111an' JIe1I 4e16halthNtl Ir n Yl llm 1luhel *&K lee d>Jn, +e Ill aa,rrl e.dh Qa -at 1111414 1101 leeliL- h the kh -Illel a 6' r.'f 411111 Itt -+-11 Ihr 12M tllJl aj -Ittl F1n ^4 In Indu dr Ihr rllrattlr ..l<1al rival Nlltl atNl FY111rICaI hrletelrrtR Ihr 4--witluu +ealf Jlll thr 1ri11PN ul 1161-i1 1peep d. lddrr drums fol L 11 JU% Irldlall a4+lrn arr Illtlrldtr 4 rlgllu, It-al rrl te141 1411 6J M141 ttdaratalWin Iln n.attrrnal 1au1n Iril oh m tjkv Ili IrerKhhr eltlilr errWUx the, 1+111 -41t 111 14irr flreetl �jim'm 5P. ul Ihrnr c11C111lr JY114.11[% ,r-tral in Liar tH.1 nattuhal rjrt tlLM ounFe.trr,1 11- alre111 M'. 1d IIK 1t?T'= l pirVelrttrlul r1n '1116N ,I l1rl J rr pmd Rrrtlt lirrll lea FlellItlrvtlte al lltr kRU1. inatr aeu! mire, W11OWMI I^ch T1u r a (x111 111K11 h4nmi -rr A 4"Ie4l -eFllerudt -a1+rllll unr tl -.1d to r,tr 4 11utia1 f1.1 IIl1' I.A -odl +ho -Inaerr lehuer 14 fLtltauNtl L41tfuK urrKuleultlr hUth +t lalltprring- wir tmolhC And 11111MlJLm u1h --dI -ti u tnZel 41111 Jlt ule_.int purl of liar INllllllw' li Wooer r -f implaw travtelunslle Ir7nl.alu- nt +arr;a .ua't11+ S1'. -t llrelXJl Ie1r tfi nlll. po Iu,�r,r, I lly rr -ilb ill I7JItlt'e.lalr1 n1th'41J1 111711`w4l in 11r a K[ryl N'Ldr>. 401 ruFlydJl arulI mrelt alud a nwel lrnllleq r,.,ueltlr Ill In411tIT7 IlrllM><'rllaz 471 lrllreh Tler pJlll.unralar llelervsa a -it titr l er ael ul Indian d rllbKYJh I'rtllJlllrm al Ihr tr. -nlcr and ur,rr411r.,,t Ibr .tstr l r rt l A ll' 4611V tltt IIN tg1 %IVtity I 7otllra 114tlW U41lld f1111w'.1n I'adtamrnt wi.cr- 41C41to01h 1 r11i 4jur,tl -y1 drli;atr milli upimn r tw Irlml tttn rm lurid atlt++te buir 41 Tw11i1nerlrtuNdlb 1111 ul Ihrtr e lent w Ihr I.A *trldla dpuaR d l] L lr dul Iliw ,i .dh }xettr at I I n 6 and d-' e ,i1111 of n4mi;. -hrr Vera Il41rl41e 1t1 KntlYnt- %ImA irn nn InFtu'al a OW% e11u1T1ph' ill lli law.' Patllr% eet ulrlmlur, Or rlfrrlt rrim Ind QL& ul lhr na Ix1ItHrJI a�trm slid acerrld J. crraw thr pllrntfal rfftdonvi rd }Ylt NrllJtetrlll jiid KPavilsi tr111 ,Itauld thr 4 :cm Wm-, I'nrlti tealljtV41aI Inx rntttlri t'akrn fllm pkl.' thr I ainglrati I'.vl> la,ttwnemr to 1litlllta alfaln Ihr APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 c ..vn-p-v ttlegov6l. central government reflects essentially a coalition system, which has given it stability when guided by strong and authoritative leadership. Indeed, the coali- tion nature of Indian politics is also illustrated by the wide range of political beliefs that exist under t1- Congress Party umbrella. In addition to several major parties, there are a great number of special interest and splinter parties as well as independents both at the center and in many states. Chronic fluidity characterizes party politics in many states because, as the political tides change, loyalties often wane and defections occur. This renders even the most stable state coalition governments fragile and susceptible to collapse at any time, encourages minority government, with all its difficulties, and is an invitation to irrespon- sible demagoguery. The nature of Indian parliamentary politics and politicians also mitigates against efficiency. Indian parliamentary politics is a rough tend tumble business that gives full vent to impassioned politicians of all ideological stripes. Many legislators deliver rambling and vagi3c speeches and are often interrupted by haranguing colleagues. Emotions flare regularly, sometimes even leading to fist fights when the issues are politically sensitive. The simultaneous translation from the regional language of the speaker of English adds further confusion. Indeed, talk fr:quently seems preferred to action. Many pariiamentarians practice the art of gamesmoaship� wheeling and dealing �with such ze i that v'mlitics appears to be their major nativnai sport. Cor- uption is a fact of I:fe both among politicians and public servants. Corrup- tion is so pervasive, however, that it seems to hive been almost accepted by the people as an inherent evil connected with political and governmental jobs. On the other hand, more politicians probal;iv A.:t diligent and honest than not, and few survive in office without being responsive to their electorate. Despite Its cumbersome nature and capacity for delay, the system works. It works because of the acknowledged deter- mination of most of the nation's leaders to snake it work in order, hopefulll, co achieve a better existence for the people through democratic means. Despite crushing problems which, in th^ shortrun, might be more efficiently handled by ,iuthoritarian means, the national leaders' deep seated commitment to the forms of democracy has allowed diverse and plural interests to find appropriate expression within the Indian union. In addition, the feleral character of the Indian Union has compartmentalized some of the conflicting national pressures by providing local out- lets for regional grievances. Despite the "high com- 12 mand" concept of central decisionmaking by New Delhi, Indian leaders, particularly Mrs. Ganhdi, have traditionally considered center -state relations very im- portant. Recognizing that individual treatment and attention is nece=ssary in dealing with different areas, they have encouraged diverse and sometimes sur- prising solutions to the many problems. New Delhi ap- proved greater regional autonomy for the tribal areas of northeast India, for example, even though it was contrary to the trend toward increasing central control. Indian federalism has worked well, in general, and although regional partisans have often disagreed with New Delhi over interpretation of how deeply the center should exercise its constitutional responsibility in state affairs, their discontent, with very few exceptions, has been expressed by demands for greater autonomy, not for secession. Similarly, although discontent and frustration over the mherable conditions in India are expressed daily, the thrust is generally for change, not destruction of the existing system. Since independence, national leaderss have used "President's Rule" �the constitutional authority enabling the central government to assume direct con- trol of a state �to dominate and orchestrate Indian af- fairs. One -party domination and the use of President's Rule have evolved as special Indian tools for bringing y and holding together a diverse nation and providing it with direction and vitality. Democracy in the Indian context occasionally has also resulted in near anarchy, e.g., West Bengal during 1969 -71. Such conditions have produced a wily style of governing that sometimes smacks of autocracy but one that has sought to provide a relatively stable framework within which India might make significant strides in trying to solve its staggering problems. Since independence, Congress Party -led gov- ernments have shouted, wheedled, and compro- mised their way through India's democratic par- liamentary system at the national and local level and, on balance, have probably made progress to the degree that the Indian milieu has permitted. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's keen understanding of her people and the Indian political process has been en- viable and possibly unparalleled, even by her famous father. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110058 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 K t FOR IND CON G R ESS IU r 1 Y Whither, Mot idia? F i r AYOTt foR BMRAT M ATA IN, r N w E-. rip till NIRII ttir netRlr� FLAM .YIIIIt..l 11117 1111INJI1 (;mrt ttMr111 11 H thr V3lr9lllllrrlt J6ll Ill Ir.tdn ubn m.lr Ill .Gstdlltn 6 I r.10 of Idb bill' Jill j'1n r1111lkrut %11%, (:idol!" 1 u llrwd allivi t +1111 lotrlc 1lflulklll 1t11u11k 111 IK1111k %I tllr Rntra llrr kundg inl turxlkllatr% �kt W thr (iingrtro I`JII4 ilrmilrolnl f.A tiuhhu umf %h1 vd"'h 61111 dW rallkk" u13d lktIK%11 rl tlllllhllYl %t Illy .tu1r Irsrt..hr rlrruwrnlll 6J+.ha ril ululn %101 nlull.lrr. and u1r1.t u! Iltr I'r1ltrra. I'.etlt 1 t1f Rd171TJIk1el;1! Irallrr� Illd�tti1 111(1r1Kl+.q Ihr 1.11r-t1nf1. 11f 111:1 '110 m i ll rlly'PI Iw IJ0111 %Llttt 911 tlliti No 14414-MIN'ry' t'trligril" 1J111+1 ll1 .1 llttl. Ira.rr How lathtfr u,1� !M1 %ff+ I.4,7111e r0h ll:Lll Irt Sri 11JIt>' AIrr1 .0411!1� I11 ttrt171'11.Y' 111 4 I b .ld IUn% .q .11.' loll) ill. Mn.ryl Ibr 1 a.11K1r--h PJ111. 111 .tl l+ti+' ..11li tt l'J. IIIb1' IktJln %1n (.a 111lhl 11,1+ 11R 144 10 Ilo IrI11l -timr 14- u111t4r 11141+lsimn It1 111lik0l 611% A45411 mg trnlllolLm Uttl �In11 ul nllrllla' hul.tuulknuJl u1lu. J1311 prm vn[Hrr. Iln thq lwNiulnl 111 knlllrW' Iir+Nlrtlt. MlLr p114 tu1,I1%-! tvinit+ lnrl 4 1tJlr it fhrll� ritmim -Ir vr� in Iuf 1.'l APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 i opinion, warranted central control. She has fostered constitutional amendments to broaden her government's power to initiate reforms. These amendments empower Parliament and, by extrapola- tion, Mrs. Gandhi to abridge those fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian constitution that conflict with certain formerly unenforceable socioeconomic policy guidelines called "directive principles of state policy." She has stated that the thrust of these amendments is to place national social iustice objec- tives ahead of fundamental individual rights, but she has also promised that none of these basic. rights, ex- cept the right to own property, will be affected. Although Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1973 wields unprecedented power and is the single most im- portant person in the country the future for her, her Congress Party, and India may be now. Since coming to power in 1966, but especially since the late 1960's, Mrs. Gandhi's actions have resembled those of a skir- misher clearing the ground for the big battle. She routed the old guard in a gladiatorial Congress Party struggle in 1969. Subsequently, she reoriented the party so as to make it a more left -of- center, youth oriented, and reform minded organization, and she has begun to fill key advisory, government, and parry positions largely with congenial supporters who lack political bases of their own. Mrs. Gandhi swept the political board first in the March 1971 national elections and then in the state elections in the spring of 1972. Pausing of necessity in 1971 :o deal with the East Pakistan crisis, she eventuo liy achieved a crushing vic- tory over Pakistan in the December war With opposi- tion at the national and local level decimated and postwar nationalistic euphoria at a height. Mrs. Gandhi finally appeared to have all the necessary power to overcome deepseated center -state differences and to begin a nationwide attack on poverty and other socioeconomic ills with a real chance of success. Until the poor monsoon of 1972, agricultural progress leading to record- breaking foodstock reserves as well as modest growth in other segments of the economy were additional grounds for guarded op- timism that an asault on social welfare problems could finally begin in earnest. Although the govern- ment maintained that it was forced by lo�dies vulnerability :,nd the fear of possible joint Sino- Pakistani mil �:aty action to maintain and equip the world's third largest army, for the first time since Independence Pakistan no longer posed a significant mil tary threat. Even China seemed increasingly an unlikely aggressor, and no other external power threatened India. Indeed, when the United States 14 suspended economic aid in late 1971, New Delhi felt confident enough to proclaim that India was on the threshold of attaining its long desired goal of economic self reliance. Although the drought in 1972 has precipitated something of an economic crisis, it may prove to con- tain some political blessings in disguise for Mrs. Gandhi. Rising expectations and self confidence had begun to wane in the wake of disillusionment over ris- ing prices, continued unemployment, and little, if any, improvement in standards of living. The recent aboli- tion of princely purses and privileges and the nationalization of banks and insurance companies were well publicized accomplishments for Mrs. Gandhi, but ones which increasingly appeared to be mere gestures. The political opposition, while still weak, has become more vocal and is focusing attention on India's unsolved socioeconomic problem, but as long as national attention remains diverted to solving the more immediate problems associated with the monsoon failure, the Prime Minister may continue to enjoy a respite from accounting for her poor per- formance in social welfare matters. Even though the common man is scarcely better off than lie was a few years ago, he has blamed the deficient "system" rather than the Prime Minister. Mrs. Gandhi is only expected to "do something," i.e., to provide leadership for change, not to accomplish miracles. Nevertheless, her transparently ad hoc solutions to problems and her uncertai or un- willingness to act probably because of he6 un- familiarity with the economic field and felt political restraints �are beginning to become evident to the people. indeed, critics have al.eady begun to excoriate her for failing to reveal an explicit blueprint for change. Political opponents ma! succeed ;n making mismanagement an issue, but they probably will have to proceed by focusing attention on specific short- comings, such as the lack of food, rather than by criticizing her basic approach. lndia's problems are so numerous and complex and the agricultural econoni is so deeply dependent on the vagaries of natur that Mrs. Gandhi may have chosen pur"ely to avoid precision in policymaking as the only prudent way an Indian leader can operate. She may not know precisely how to solve India's problems, but in India's case, precision may not be necessary. `Its. Gandhi is viewed by many in 1973 as the symbolic leader of India Bharat data (Mother India). If she continues to play the role of a symbolic leader who maintains domestic tranquillity and simultancously takes rational, albeit ad hoc, measures v y s i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 'r i t 0 that result in at least some progress, she may be proceeding along the best path possible for India. Mrs. Gandhi is an astute, shrewd, pragmatic politician who has shown skill for taking deft action at the proper time in order to retain and expand her power, Nonalignment is still the cornerstone of Indian foreign policy, but the concept has been subtly redefined to remove the notions of neutrality associated with it some 20 years ago and to accom- modate India's enunciated policy of bilateralism �an admittedly opportunistic principle for guiding its foreign political and commercial relations. Mrs. Gandhi and the other Indian leaders presumably realize that India did not achieve the significant balancing voice it had sought as self proclaimed "leader" of the nonaligned or third world, even during the "bipolar" years. Such a goal may be inappropriate or impossible to attain today in a changing world dominated politically not only by the United States and the Soviet Union but also, to a lesser degree, by China, Western Europe, and Japan. A strong emotional attachment to the Ad concept still lingers in New Delhi, however. Mrs. C:i and Indian leaders still regard India as the major spokesman for at least the developing nations and believe that, because of its size, location, and potential, India has a rightful role to play in both regional and world affairs. They are quite sensitive about gaining international acceptance of this position. They rationalize that as the paramount power on the subcontinent, India should at least be able to extend its influence in Asia. The remark- ably successful war agaimt Pakistan in 1971 altered the power balance in South Apia so dramatically that many of India's smaller neighbors now regard new Delhi with incrm%M suspicion and fear. Furthermorr, to its detriment on the international scene, India in the Postwar period finds itself sornewhat at the mercy of its client state Bangladesh� particularly in the matter of release of Pakistani prisoners of war. And finally, two giants economically powerful Japan and China with its 850 million people and nuclear weapons �will continue to vie with India should New Delhi press its desire for a greater role in Asian affairs. Even before the moves for rapprochement among the great powers in the early 1970's, Ii,dia had sought to maintain balanced relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, to establish more normal relations with China in order to strengthen India's security, and to enhance its international position generally. Despite treaty relations with the Soviet Union, continuing serious strains over fundamental Is-sues with the United States, and the apparent in- difference of China, Mrs. Gandhi evidently seeks to balance India's foreign policy and maintains a credi- ble commitment to nonalignment. Indira Gandhi probably will determine India's course for the indefinite future. She realizes that India eventually may have to go it alone in its struggle for development, and she is seeking to evolve realistic In- dian solutions to uniquely Indian problems. In foreign affairs, her apparent desire to continue her father's policy of extending India's influence abroad to achieve regional status, or even international, is given renewed life by India's practical need for access to foreign resources, e.g., Middle East oil, and by India's security requirements. The Indian Government will have to continue balancing the domestic demands on resources with the continuing requirements for foreign invest- ment in framing its foreign policy initiatives. Whether Mn. Gandhi can achieve an international role com- mensurate with Indian aspirations, begin to alleviate social ills, and, at the same tinie, maintain a growing, self reliant economy will determine her future and the future of India. IS APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 Jf. n� rim Nff` 3 r u...vlw�p+7*, .r:.n*:�- erne, y....� e..- r�-.-. ..,.r..._.,................. Fa i Chronology 1447 August On 15 August India becomes an independent dominion in the British Commonwealth with Jawaharlal Nehru as its first Prime Minister. October Hindu bfaharaja of Kashmir, faced with rebellion by his Muslim subjects, accedes to India and requests Indian troops to repel tribal invaders from Pakistan. Indo Pakistani war continues in Kashmir throughout 1948. 1948 January `fahatmi Gandhi is assassinated on 30 January. 1949 January United Nations rranges cease -fire in the disputed territory of Jammu and i.ashmir and calls for plebiscite to determine its future. 1950 January India becomes an independent republic on 26 January under a new national constitution. 1951 June First major U.S. assistance agreement with India is signed; prov:Jes for loan -gift of 2 million tons of wheat. October First general elections begin, lasting through March 1952. 1952 December First Five Year Plan (FY 1951 /52- .055156) is (c. mally pre- rnted to Parliament, somewhat behind schedule. 1954 April Sir.o- Indian treaty recognizes Chinese suzerainty in Tibet. 1955 February First major Soviet aid project, a steel mill, is 1 rovided to India. 1956 November State boundaries are reorganized along linguistic lines in response to regional pressures. 1937 Chinese build roan to [Aeakh district of Kashmir in first Chinese rizure of Indian territory. 1960 September Agreement on division and use of Indus River waters is signed with Pakistan. 1961 December Indian troops seize control of Portuguese India on 18 December. 1962 September Serious skirmishing with Chinese troops breaks out along the indo- Tibetan border, followed in October by large -scale Chinese attacks in f.adakh and the ii._n North East Frontier Agency of State. 1964 May Prime Minister Nehru dies on 24 May. June Lai Bahadur Shastri becomes Prime Minister on 2 June. 1965 August Armed Pakistanis infiltrating into Kashmir spark widespread fighting, which leads to full -scale war in the Punjab, 6-23 September. 1966 January Prime Ninimer Shsstri dies on 11 January ie Tashkent, U.S.S.R., only hours after signing an accord with Pakistani President Ayub aimed at restoring normalcy to indo- Pakistani relations. lno:ra Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, is named 'Prime Minister on 19 January. 1967 February Fourth general elections result in a substantial deel'ne in Congress Party legislative strength at both national and state levels. 1969 April Fourth Five Year Plan begins after delay of 3 years, since MS and 1966 droughts and deteriorating economic condi- tions :ad necessitated emergency planning. August Y. V. Girt, with Prime Minister Gandhi's back ng. defeats regular Congress Party candidate for Indian presidency. November Prime Minister Gandhi's Congress Party rivals form a separate organiution in Parliament. z 16 11 N APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 v d 0 1971 March Fifth general elections result in a smashing victary for both Prime Minister Gandhi and her ruling Congress Party and halt trend toward coalition government at the national level. Pakistan (1 )vernment "crackdown" to reestablish its author- ity in East Pakistan on 25 March begins flow of 10 million refugees tv India and precipitates the Indo- Pakistani crisis. August India and the Soviet Union sign the Treaty of Pence, F riend- ahi, and Cooperation on 9 August in New Delhi. December Following months of increasing border violations and Indlai, support of Bengali independence fighters, a full -scale war errupts, 7 -17 December; India defeats Pakistan. 1972 March State election victories restore Congress Party hegemony at the state level. July Prime Minister Indira Gandhi meets with Pakistan President Bhutto at Simla, India; progress on a number of bilateral problems results. Area Brief LAND: Size: 1,211,000 sq. mi. (includes Indian portion of Jammu and Kashmir; Sikkim, Gos, Daman, and Diu) 60% agricultural, 19% forested, 21% inland water, urban, waste, and other Land boundaries: 7,880 miles RATER: Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 17 n. mi. (fishing, 12 n. mi.; additional 100 mi. is fisheries conservation zone, December 1968) Coastline: 4,378 mi. (including offshore islands) PEOPLE: Population: 578,034,000 (1 July 1973; excludes Sikkim but includes Indian portion of disputed Jammu and Kashmir, and Gas, Daman, and Diu); average annual growth rate is 2.5-% (est.) Etbale divisions: 72�/. Indo Aryan, 2.5.% Dravidian, 3% Mongoloid and other Religion: 83.5% Ilindu, 10.7% Muslim, L Sikh, 2.6% Christian, .7 Buddhist, .7 other Language: 15 languages recognized by the constitution; addi- tional 35 languages spoken by more than 100,000 persons; numerous other languages and dialects that are for the most part mutually unintelligible; Ifindi is the national language and the primary tongue of 30L% of the people; English enjoys "imwiste" status but Is the most important language for national, political, and commercial communication; Ilindu- stani, a populs variety of Ifindi -Urdu, is spoken widely throughout northern India Literacy: Males 30 females 18- both sexes 29% (1971 census) Labor force: About 184 million; 70% agriculture, more than IG% unemployed and underemployed; shortage of skilled labor is significant and unemployment is rising Organized labor: About 2.&% of labor force GOVERNMENT: Legal name: Rerublic of India Type: Federal republic Capital: New Delhi Political subdivisions: 21 states, 9 union territories, 1 pro- tectorate (Sikkim) Legal system: Based on English common law; constitution adopted 1950; judicial review of legislative sets; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations Branches: Parliamentary government, national and state; independent judiciary Government leader: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi Suffrage: Vaiversal ove: age 21 Elections: National and state elections ordinarily held every 5 years; may be postponed in emergency and may be held more frequently if g overnment loses confidence vote; next general election to be held by March 1976; 16 states and two union territories held state elections in March 1972; remaining rtates to be polled over next several years Political parties and lesderm: Indian National Congress split into two factions in 1969, largest faction (the Ruling Con- gress) loyal to Prime Minister Gandhi led by S.D. Sharma, and smaller faction (the Organization Congress) led by Sadiq Ali; Communist Party of India (CPI), S.A. Dange, chairman; Communist Party of India /Marxist (CPI /AI), P. Sundarayya, general secretary; Communist Party of India /Marxist- Lenin- ist (CMI \I1.), chairman unknown; Swatantra, P. Mody, chairman; Bharafiya Jana Sangh, L.K. Advani, president; Tb^ Socialist Party, Kappori Thakur, chairman; Drarida Munnetra Ka:hopam (DMK), N. Karunanidhi, president Voting strengib (1971 election): '13.7% Ruling Congress, 10.5% Organization Congress, 7.4% Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 3.1% Swatantra, 4.8% CPI, 5.2% CPI /M, 3.5% Socialist Parties, 3.7% DMK, 18.1% other Communists: 80,000 to 100,000 members of CPI (eat.); 80,000 100,000 members of CPI /M (eat.); Communist sympathiz- ers, 13 million 17 T'aK'fi a ti 3+.YYz a t A 4' ryry .+2 xAz APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 i N Other polilicel or pressure groups: Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam ADMK), M.G. Ramachandran, president, op- posing DMK in Tamil Nadu; splintered Akali Dal represent- ing Sikh religious community in the Punjab; various separat- ist groups seeking reorganization of states, particularly in Andhra Pradesh; numerous "senas" or militant chauvinistic organizations, including Shiv Sena In Bombay ECONOMY: GNP: 350 billion (est.) for FY1972/73, less than $100 per capita; real growth (FY1972/73) 3% est. Agriculture: Main crops �rice, other cereals, pulses, oilseeds, cotton, jute, sugarcane, tobacco, ten, and coffee; must import foodgrains; caloric intake is low, and diet is deficient in protein Fishing catch: 1.9 million tons (FY1971/72); exports $55 million (FY1971/72), imports 3100,009 Major industries: Textiles, food processing Steel: 6.4 million metric tons of ingot steel and 4.8 million metric tons of finished steel (FY1071/72) Electric power: 17.8 million kw. capacity (1972); 66 billion kw.-hr. produced x (1972), 120 kw.-hr. per capita Exports: 32.4 billion (f.o.b., FY1972/73); tea, jute manufac- tures, iron ore, cotton textiles, leather and leather products, iron and steel Imports: $2.8 billion (e.i.f., FY1072/73); machinery and tra....,:ort equipment, petroleum, iron and steel, grains and flour Major trade partners: U. U.K., U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, Japan Economic aid: U.S. (FY46 -71) $9.3 billion; U.S.S.R. and stern European countries (1054 -March 1973) 32 billion Monetary conversion rate: 7.5 rupees US31 Fiscal year: I April -31 March COMMUNICATIONS: Rai .'roads: 37,281 miles: 18,299 miles 5'6" gage; Id,072 miles 3 meter) gage; and 2,781 miles 2 and 2 gage, government owned; 129 miles 2 and 2 gage privately owned; 6,933 miles (6,645 miles 5 gage and 288 miles 3'3 1 1 11 double or multiple tracked and 2,303 miles eicctrified Hil,hways: 643,028 miles. 106,854 miles concrete and bitumi- nous surfaced (mostly bituminous surface treated); 95,054 miles gravel, crushed stone, or laterite surfaced; 184,631 miles improved earth; 356,489 ur'mproved earth Inland waterways: About 8,750 miles with seasonal depths of 3 ft. or n.ore Ports: 7 major (Bombay, Calcutta, Cochin, Kandla, Madra, Marmagao, Vishakhapatnam), 75 minor Merchant marine: 257 ships 1,000 g,r.t, and over, totaling 2,718,000 g.r.t. or 2,176,200 d.w.t. (197:3) Civil air: About 116 major transport aircraft; 2 major airlines Airfields: 619 total, 359 usable; 187 have permanent- surface runways; 2 have runways over 12,000 ft., 19 have runways 8,000 11,999 ft., 130 have runways 4,000 7,901) ft.; 4 sea- plane stations Telecommunications: Adequate international service; fair do- mestic telephone service in and between major cities; many small towns and villages without telephone service; telephone distribution is about 0.25 per 100 population; telegraph facil- ities widespread; AM radiobroadcast adequate; TV limited to Delhi -New Delhi and Bombay areas; 1,350,000 telephones (late 1972); 13 million licensed radio and about 40,000 TV sets (bite 1972); about 270 AM broadcast stations in about 75 locations; 3 TV stations; 1 earth satellite station; sub- marine cables extend to Malyasia, Sri Lanka, and Aden DEFENSE FORCES: Military manpower (1 July 1973); males 15 -49, 138,212,000; about 57% physically fit for military service 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 Places and Features referred to in this General Survey COORDINATES COORDINATES o IN 0 1 E. 0 IN. tE. Agra 27 11 78 Of Haryana (state) 20 00 76 00 Nicobar Islands (isls) Agra disc 27 05 77 58 Himachal Pradesh (union territory). 31 00 78 00 Orissa (stale) AhmadiLbfid 23 02 72 37 Hi ma l ayas 28 00 84 00 Ootacamund Ahmednagar 19 05 74 44 Hindan siren 28 27 77 28 Pachmarhi Aijal 23 44 92 43 Hindu Rush (mls) 35 00 71 00 Pandu Ajanta 20 32 75 43 Hooghly River (,qirm) 21 55 88 05 Parddip Ajmer 26 27� 74 38 Hyderiibiid 17 23 78 28 Parfidip Garh (port) Aksai Chin (region) 35 05 79 30 Hyderltbiid (state) 18 00 78 00 Pathftnkot Allbag 18 39 72 54 ImphiiI 24 49 93 57 Patna Aligarh 27 53 78 05 Indo-Gangetic Plain (plain) 27 00 80-00 Patna Allfilifibfid 25 27 81 51 Indraprast 28 29 77 18 Pechi Ambilla 30 21 76 50 Indus River (sirm) 24 20 67 4 Perambur (rr sla) Amindivi Islands (isls) 11 23 72 23 Indus Valley (valley) 29 00 71 00 Pondicherry (union territory) Amritsar 31 35 74 53 Isl&mAbAd, Pakistan 33 42 '73 10 Port Blair Andaman Islands (ills) 12 30 92 45 Izatnagar 28 23 79 25 Powrti Andhra Pradesh (state) 16 00 79 00 Jabalpur 23 10 1- 57 Punfikha, Bhutan Ankleshwar 21 36 73 00 J'aduguda (ore mill) 22 39 85 20 Pune (Poona) Arunachal Pradesh (union territory) 28 00 94 30 Jaipur 26 55 75 49 Punjab (stale) Arvi 18 22 73 49 Jaisalmer 26 55 70 54 Puri Asansol 23 41 86 59 Rilahalli 13 02 77 33 Quilon Assam (state) 26 00 93 00 Jamd1pur 25 18 86 30 Riijastbhn (state) Avadi 13 07 80 07 Jammu 32 44 74 52 Rfijkot Badagara 11 36 75 35 Jammu and Kashmir (state) 33 00 77 00 Riijmahiil Hills (hills) Biighdogra 26 42 88 19 JAmnagar 22 28 70 04 Rana Pratap Sagar Dam (dam). BERM (rr sla) 22 56 88 22 Jamshedpur 22 48 86 11 Rana PrAap Sagar (powerplant) Bangalore 12 59 77 35 Jessore, Bangladesh 23 10 89 13 Rfinebi Bavadahar 23 32 81 15 1 Jodhpur 26 17 73 02 Rangiipuram Barauni 25 41 78 23 JogiFhopa 26 14 90 35 Riinippettai Bareilly 28 2 1 79 25 Jorhdt 26 45 94 13 Rann of Kutch (marsh). Boxhl 24 18 85 25 Jullundur 31 19 75 34 Raurkela 130runi 25 29 85 59 Kiibul, Afghanistan 34 31 69 12 Riwalpindi, Pakistan Ba� ala 31 48 75 12 KAkin Ada 16 56 82 13 Rihand (,qtrm) Bay of Bengal (bay) 15 00 90 00 Kalol 23 15 72 29 Roorkee Begampet sla) 17 28 78 28 Kfilpdkkarn 12 34 30 10 Sabarigiri (hydro pwr site). Benares; 25 20 83 00 Kandl a 23 02 70 13 Sfibarmat! (rr sla) BhiLgirathi River (sirm) 23 25 88 23 Kandla Creek (strm) 22 58 70 15 Sfigar Bh&kra Dam (hydro pwr site) 31 25 76 28 Kanpur 20 25 85 10 SAha Bharat 24 20 72 14 Kanpur 26 28 80 21 Sdmbre Bhilai 21 13 81 26 Kardchi, Pakistan 24 52 67 03 Siinchi, Bhutan Bhopfil 23.16 77 24 Mraikkudi 10 04 78 47 Sankosh (strm) Bhubaneswar 20 14 85 50 Karakoram Range (mis) 34 00 78 00 Secunderabad Bhusival 21 03 75 46 MrikAl 10 55 79 50 Sharavati (strm) Bidar 17 54 77 33 Karnataka (region) 16 00 75 00 Shillong Bihfir 25 11 85 31 Kasauli 30 55 76 57 Shipki La (pass) Bihir (state) 25 00 86 00 Katarbaga 21 38 84 07 Shir&la Bhusival 21 03 75 46 HAthidwdr (peninsula) 21 58 70 30 Sholapur Bhutan, Kingdom of 27 30 90 30 Kathmandu, Nepal 27 43 85 19 Shwebo, Burma Bokiiro Coalfield (coalfield) 23 49 86 00 Keralr. (state) 10 00 76 15 Sikkim (protectorate) Bokfiro Nadi (sirm) 23 46 85 55 Khadki 18 34 73 52 Silchar Bc inbay 18 58 72 50 KhambhAt (Cambay) I 22 IS 72 37 Siliguri Brahmaputra (strm) 24 02 90 59 Kharagpur 22 20 87 20 Simla Buckingham Canal 15 39 80 13 Kharakvasla 18 26 73 46 Sindi Budge Budge 22 27 88 10 Khiisi Hills (mis) 25 35 91 38 Singarsi Peak (peak) CAchfir (dist) 25 05 92 55 Khulna, Bangladesh 22 48 89 33 Sriharikota Island (isl) Calcutta 22 32 88 22 Kirkee (see Khadki) 18 34 73 52 Srinagar Cape Comorin (cape) 8 04 77 34 KodaikAnal 10 14 77 29 Sylhet, Bangladesh Car'Nicobar (ist) 9 10 92 47 Kohima 25 40 94 07 Tiilcher Chibua (rr sta) 27 29 95 11 Koraput 18 49 82 43 Tam baram Cha-hsi-kang, China 32 32 79 41 Korba 22 21 82 41 Tamil Nfidu (state) (formerly ?V Chdlna, Bangladesh 22 36 89 31 Kota 25 11 75 50 Tdrdpur Chandausi 28 27 78 46 Hottagftdem 18 04 80 28 Tawang Chandiarh rr sta, 30 44 76 55 Kottayam 9 35 76 31 Telengana (area) g 22 22 73 07 Thar Desert, Pakistan (desert) Chandigarh (union territory) 30 45 76 48 Koyali launching statio Chandrapura (rr sta) 23 46 86 07 Royna (sirm) 17 18 74 10 Thumba (rocket Cherrapunji 25 18 91 42 Kozhikode (Calicut) 11 15 75 76 Tinsukia 15 57 80 59 Tripura (state) Chhinga Manga, Pakistan 31 05 73 58 Krishna (strm) 11 00 72 00 Trivandrum. Chittagong, Bangladesh 22 20 91 50 Laccadive Islands (ists) 34 20 77 25 Trombay Chittaranjan 23 52 86 52 Ladakh (dist) 31 35 74 18 Tuticorin Ch'u-mu-pi Shan-ku, China (valley) 27 39 87 03 Lahore, Pakistan 34 10 77 35 Le h....................... Udhampur Chushul 33 36 78 39 29 39 91 06 United Khasi-Jaintia Hills (dis. Cbutupilu 23 34 85 32 Lhasa, China 18 45 73 25 Utrdn (rr stn) Cochin 9 58 76 14 LonAvale 28 38 93 33 Uttar Pradesh (state) Co chin (former native state) 10 25 76 30 Longju 26 51 80 55 Vadodara (Baroda) �c. t --n 17a MQ Taieknow _r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110058-0 Is General Survey COORDINATES COORDINATES I COORDINATES o IN. o IE. o IN, o IE o I N. o I E. 27 11 78 OI Haryana (stale) 29 00 76 00 Nicobar Islands (isls) 8 00 93 30 27 05 77 58 Himachal Pradesh (union territory) 31 00 78 00 Orissa slate 21 00 84 00 F 23 02 72 37 Himalayas m(s) I 28 00 84 00 Ootnct mood 11 24 76 42 19 05 74 44 Hindan strm 28 27 77 28 Pachmarhi 22 28 78 26 23 44 92 43 Hindu Kush (mts) 35 00 71 00 Pandu.. 26 10 91 40 20 32 75 43 Hooghly River(slrm) 21 55 88 05 Paridip. 20 17 86 42 26 27� 74 38 Hyderfibiid 17 23 78 28 Parfidip Garb (port) 20 19 86 37 35 05 79 30 Hyderibfid (state) 18 00 78 00 Pathiinkot 32 17 75 39 18 39 72 54 Imphfil 24 49 93 57 Patna... 21 38 85 53 27 53 78 05 Indo- Gangetic Plain (plain) 27 00 80.00 Patna... 25 37 85,09 i.. 25 27 81 51 Indraprast 28 29 77 18 Pechi... 24 08 77 00 30 21 76 50 Indus River (sirm) 24 20 67 i'7 Perambur (rr sta)........................ 13 06 80 14 11 23 72 23 Indus Valley (valley) 29 00 71 00 Pondicherry (union territory) 11 56 79 4 31 35 74 53 Islfimibfid, Pakistan 33 42 '73 10 Port Blair 11 40 i 45 12 30 92 45 Izatnagar 28 23 79 25 Powfii... 27 21 95 39 16 00 79 00 Jabalpur 23 10 19 57 Puniikha, Bhutan....................... 27 37 89 52 21 36 73 00 Jaduguda (ore mill) 22 39 85 20 Pune Poona 18 32 73 52 28 00 94 30 Jaipur 26 55 75 49 Punjab state 31 00 76 00 18 22 73 49 Jaisnlmer 26 55 70 54 Puri 18 40 73 55 23 41 86 59 Jilahalli 13 02 77 33 Quilon.......................,. 8 53 76 36 26 00 93 00 Jamiilpur 25 18 86 30 Rajasthlin (slate)........................ 26 00 74 00 13 07 80 07 Jammu 32 44 74 52 R ijkot.......... 22 18 70 47 11 36 75 35 Jammu and Kashmir (stale) 33 00 77 00 Rijmahil Hills (hills) 24 40 87 25 26 42 88 19 Jim nagar 22 28 70 04 Rana Pratap Sagar Dam (dam) 24 56 75 38 22 56 88 22 Jamshedpur 22 48 86 11 Rana PrAap Sagar (powerplant) 24 57 75 38 12 59 77 35 Jessore, Bangladesh 23 10 89 13 Rfinchi... 23 21 85 20 23 32 81 15 Jodhpur 26 17 73 02 Rangdpuram 15 25 78 06 25 41 78 23 Jogighopa 26 14 00 35 Rinippettai 12 56 79 20 28 21 79 25 Jorhfit 26 45 94 13 Rann of Kutch (marsh) 24 05 70 10 24 18 85 25 Jullundur 31 19 75 34 Raurkela 22 12 84 53 25 29 85 59 Kfibul, ighanistan 34 31 69 12 Rdwalpindi, Pakistan.................... 33 36 73 04 31 48 75 12 Kikinfida 16 56 82 13 Rilland sirm 24 33 82 59 15 00 90 00 Kalol 23 15 72 29 Roorkee. 29 52 77 53 17 28 78 28 Kinl pfikkam 12 34 80 10 Sabarigiri (hydro pwr site) 9 21 77 08 25 20 83 00 Kandl a 23 02 70 13 Sfibarmati (rr sta) 23 05 72 40 23 25 88 23 Kandla Creek (strm) 22 58 70 15 Sagar.................................. 23 50 78 43 31 25 76 28 K inpur 20 25 85 10 Shha.... 30 19 76 59 24 20 72 14 Kinpur 26 28 80 21 Simbre. 15 52 74 37 21 13 81 26 Karichi, Pakistan 24 52 67 03 Sfinchi, Bhutan.,....................... 27 18 90 37 23,16 77 24 Kfiraikkudi 10 04 78 47 Sankosh slrm).......................... 26 23 89 48 20 14 85 50 Karakoram Range (mis) 34 00 78 00 Seeunderibid 17 27 78 30 21 03 75 46 Karikil 10 55 79 50 Sharavati (strm)......................... 14 16 74 25 17 54 77 33 Karnataka (region) 16 00 75 00 Shillong. 25.34 91 53 25 11 85 31 Kasauli 30 55 76 57 Shipki La (pass) 31 49 78 45 25 00 86 00 Katarbaga 21 38 84 07 Shirdla.. 16 59 74 08 21 03 75 46 Kfithifiwir (peninsula) 21 58 70 30 Sholapur 17 41 75 55 27 30 90 30 Kathmandu, Nepal 27 43 85 19 Qhwebo, Burma......................... 22 34 95 42 23 49 86 00 Kerala (slate) 10 00 76 15 Sikkim (protectorate) 27 45 88 30 23 46 85 55 Khadki 18 34 73 52 Silchar.. 24 49 92 48 i 18 58 72 50 Khambhiit( Cam (Cambay) 18 72 37- Siliguri 26 42... 88 26_. t... 24 02 90 59 Kharagpur 22 20 87 20 Simla.. 31 06 77 10 15 39 80 13 Kharakvasla 18 26 73 46 Sindi.... 20 48 78 52 22 27 88 10 Khisi Hills (mis) 25 35 91 38 Singarsi Peak (peak) 24 38 87 28 25 05 92 55 Khulna, Bangladesh 22 48 89 33 Sriharikota Island (isl)................... 13 45 80 10 22 32 f;8 22 Kirkee (see Khadki) 18 34 73 52 Srinagar, 34 05 74 49 8 04 77 34 Kodaikfinal 10 14 77 29 Sylhet, Bangladesh..................... 24 54 91 52 9 10 92 47 Kohima 25 40 94 07 Tilcher. 20 57 85 13 27 29 95 11 Koraput 18 49 82 43 Tam baram 12 55 80 07 32 32 79 41 Korba 22 21 82 41 Tamil Nfidu (state) (formerly Madras)..... 11 00 78 00 25 11 75 50 Tiripur. 19 51 72 42 18 04 80 28 Tawang 22 36 89 31 Kota 27 35 91 52 28 27 78 46 Kottayam Telen ana area 18 00 79 30 22 22 73 07 Thar Desert Pakistan (desert) 27 00 71 00 30 44 76 55 Kottayam 9 35 76 31 g 30 45 76 48 Koyali 23 46 86 07 Koyna sirm 17 18 74 10 Thumba (rocket launching station)......... 8 32 76 51 25 18 91 42 Kozhikode (Calicut) 11 15 75 76 Tinsukia 27 30 95 22 31 05 73 58 Krishna (strm) 15 57 80 59 Tripura state 24 00 92 00 22 20 91 50 Laccadive Islands (isls) 11 00 72 00 Trivandrum 8 29 76 55 23 52 86 52 Ladakh (dirt) 34 20 77 25 Trombay 19 02 72 56 27 39 87 03 Lahore, Pakistan 31 35 74 18 Tuticorin 8 47 78 O8 32 56 75 08 34 10 77 35 Udhampur 33 36 78:39 Leh......�.......... 25 30 92 00 r 23 34 85 32 Lhasa, Chlna 29 39 91 06 United Khasl Jamtia Hills (disc) 21 15 ?2 52 a.:76.14,, Lonayale 18 45 73 25 Utrin (rr sta) -9A nn ..An nn APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110058 -0 "w1w Rags Seewndrrib d (tltolr 1ltw rI.- 40 11 zs 4a 17 1t'0 7a 4e Karakoram K&rt>tld. 14 34 19 40 gAararatl Iwrrl- 111ar......... 11 bl 7T 33 )(wrak% frryu�}... li 00 7s 40 1lil3r 23 1111, 44 71 Kaadl 3o as 7e 57 ALIpl l a Ipew_ Plk ;r lxate)- 23 Do 1[6 00 KikWhimp_.. 71 SAS Ili ULrJtral....... 21 D7 73 li K4WAoir I?"ieI1 21 w n u TO 36 0 11 P>,�4apr.......... lik 'Mrkr. byre.... Y !lAfala ljlardr al, 9: 30 W oo KarbOardd, Kroi to to 7. 1a i Ila lioi+o CaaUUkid [t�ai+Hl 23 41 r14 00 Kml (w+M� li 74 7a 33 Ogkat iadl latr*U 21 46 23 a3 krdll....�.�...�.�� r+Tlrrw,..� tY I o 17 01 F&WHI. Krflsn $r Y 1'1r b A ti 1[1.eMar S lftf 0&" (--)L !i (a 10 a1 Kbkpm gr... p Kh�r..1. 29 d Ili a21. 1[titrlatbam Cuwt7.... tb St 10 Is klLi !Jk (wu} 23 23 N 3p tunwro tor t>r�SI Tt 7: 11 10 u 1Kh> tlanLlr T2 4S !b 37 Arlbanl�u lelad ..d] C"Ir Weel KlAto (w a{ied 11 1R 34 T2 SI 77 29 Pe1..pr d?1kL 1lusUd" Cap. Coaa1 {.rrl K 0i n it KotWSS1.- to It zS tl 07 r. Car 7lkomrfid). 9 10 14 47 K�htsr K orpr l, 4 0 IAA fi VAN% Yalllt+4fem CpLta {rr w- 71 77 is 11 22 71 a] 41 lam VLd l"rr (lafoee[y ala, (�%&4d(�lbrr. ema.......... ]Z a'! .0 4) KOO*... X&IA.......... 2S 11 7T SO r CSC 1�., s: 30 P9 31 T(�tud4dr.... 1>t 44 4w xt f. -a fa-%- .l.. T6 r. 7K 4 t u 76 3 T 4 _0 411111 aro+1. Cu h{.rr.},.... 70 ii :6 bb KK"a t. Ke3xly.. 23 t, o` Tj r IN.M N11-me lArm"I Ckand!*" IafN Lnrt7rtR 30 is 79 u IR KOJOa 420wl- 17 IY .4 l0 Tlatrba [r�rlel inumMf airlieI Ctdtapr {nelr 22 4i n Is 66 t l 42 )1 >'4 43 1644 K O }H 22 7i OT is is fe aT Kays+ 1rr.S.1.. IT le 71 to MIA bl 12 1(041nlottll'�`tutl Il 13 73 fi it of 73 it Nrlbaa (rsv3. Lt r3 w I ,.t*.dl.� ir>APd.1rul, s+l bs Is,tlai (ludi).......... If 23 ji 34 is Sr >Q tT 03 l.ba+ I'allklar.. fl 4 T7 M 21 LI+aSa, 4 1,7.a. :1 iT y: 1A 6 stl rri it Is 11 T :s oo :e m 21 31 a4 s! It di 72 6 3 A s e sA 7P Ai Laniki........... 72 as 13 11 27 'AI iR ?2 a4 Prcda>ti (Ir} 13 00 ty CG 71 :tl M 31 1daArat 12 f1 to IT 79 tS Se }I.dw.l...._...._ 914 71l oT ib tl Ts a 31abA.G cr+) _.:0 1e (oaf k3 ?>t Ii 10 U M iLbaw (r.w), 1} >m Ta W 1r ?i 3t II Il li f,... 30 19 To Q: 3J51.46 p6l4as Iplw I 21 w ISO 36 IT 1s sJ..j;., r.Llrtau- is or :a al fl ealpw (awl) 00 114 00 27 :d ;s It lrarp+�. rb Si 7>< 4R 2T i7 tl SI 11.1An.. ?7 30 TT 4l Z? ri wit JJr0.1y+ {I.nl 21 2f }I r: 01 0 l bi Maw etl4tltiant( (tifr.r.r .dl1 1% 41 71 i 2011 ;0 SS Maw 22 u :i ii a000 :7 Ill )4k4k aed tixth ['irkir 11I1L. 1114" U46 f 22 JA of wa :i >A al OG 2339 sT IN Stlllr J1441 fii1G1.. =a S0 ai aD 1{ 00 !i :+0 >JferoT "ad a 17 Tb I! r;. la iT 02 of ldlta lllll1Jilir). b la It so ZI If 67 >